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| Publications of Owen Flanagan :chronological alphabetical combined listing:%% Journal Articles @article{fds287515, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the Mozi 1}, Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy}, Volume = {35}, Number = {3}, Pages = {473-491}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03503008}, Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03503008}, Key = {fds287515} } @article{fds355606, Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J}, Title = {Han fei zi’s philosophical psychology: Human nature, scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian consensus}, Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy}, Volume = {38}, Number = {2}, Pages = {293-316}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03802010}, Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03802010}, Key = {fds355606} } @article{fds357871, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The disunity of addictive cravings}, Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology}, Volume = {27}, Number = {3}, Pages = {243-246}, Year = {2020}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0030}, Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2020.0030}, Key = {fds357871} } @article{fds366398, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Cross-cultural philosophy and well-being}, Pages = {227-247}, Booktitle = {Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy: Owen Flanagan and Beyond}, Year = {2019}, Month = {October}, ISBN = {9780367350246}, Key = {fds366398} } @article{fds346700, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Is Oneness an Over-belief?}, Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, Volume = {99}, Number = {2}, Pages = {508-513}, Year = {2019}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12631}, Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12631}, Key = {fds346700} } @article{fds363772, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Identity and addiction}, Pages = {77-89}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction}, Year = {2018}, Month = {May}, ISBN = {9781138909281}, Key = {fds363772} } @article{fds335564, Author = {Flanagan, O and Zhao, W}, Title = {The self and its good vary cross-culturally: A dozen self-variations and Chinese familial selves}, Pages = {287-301}, Booktitle = {Self, Culture and Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Convergences on Knowing and Being}, Publisher = {Springer Singapore}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9789811057762}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17}, Doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17}, Key = {fds335564} } @article{fds335565, Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, G}, Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Third-wave existentialism}, Pages = {1-22}, Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190460723}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001}, Abstract = {Neuroexistentialism is a recent expression of existential anxiety over the nature of persons. Unlike previous existentialisms, neuroexistentialism is not caused by a problem with ecclesiastical authority, as was the existentialism represented by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, nor by the shock of coming face to face with the moral horror of nation state actors and their citizens, as in the mid-century existentialism of Sartre and Camus. Rather, neuroexistentialism is caused by the rise of the scientific authority of the human sciences and a resultant clash between the scientific and the humanistic image of persons. Flanagan and Caruso explain what neuroexistentialism is and how it is related to two earlier existentialisms and they spell out how neuroexistentialism makes particularly vivid the clash between the humanistic and the scientific image of persons. They conclude by providing a brief summary of the chapters to follow.}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001}, Key = {fds335565} } @article{fds339638, Author = {Tononi, G and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness}, Journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China}, Volume = {13}, Number = {3}, Pages = {332-348}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1}, Abstract = {This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.}, Doi = {10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1}, Key = {fds339638} } @article{fds366917, Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, GD}, Title = {Neuroexistentialism}, Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine}, Number = {83}, Pages = {68-72}, Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, Year = {2018}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm201883105}, Doi = {10.5840/tpm201883105}, Key = {fds366917} } @article{fds366918, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Philosophy of Multicultures}, Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine}, Number = {82}, Pages = {99-104}, Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, Year = {2018}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188283}, Doi = {10.5840/tpm20188283}, Key = {fds366918} } @article{fds329381, Author = {Gyal, P and Flanagan, O}, Title = {The role of pain in buddhism: The conquest of suffering}, Pages = {288-296}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9781138823181}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315742205}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315742205}, Key = {fds329381} } @article{fds327006, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Addiction Doesn’t Exist, But it is Bad for You}, Journal = {Neuroethics}, Volume = {10}, Number = {1}, Pages = {91-98}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2017}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z}, Abstract = {There is a debate about the nature of addiction, whether it is a result of brain damage, brain dysfunction, or normal brain changes that result from habit acquisition, and about whether it is a disease. I argue that the debate about whether addiction is a disease is much ado about nothing, since all parties agree it is “unquestionably destructive.” Furthermore, the term ‘addiction’ has disappeared from recent DSM’s in favor of a spectrum of ‘abuse’ disorders. This may be a good thing indicating more nuance in typing the heterogeneous phenomena we used to call ‘addiction’.}, Doi = {10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z}, Key = {fds327006} } @article{fds352990, Author = {Tekin, Ş and Flanagan, O and Graham, G}, Title = {Against the Drug Cure Model: Addiction, Identity, and Pharmaceuticals}, Volume = {122}, Pages = {221-236}, Booktitle = {Philosophy and Medicine}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13}, Abstract = {Recent advances in brain imaging methods as well as increased sophistication in neuroscientific modeling of the brain’s reward systems have facilitated the study of neural mechanisms associated with addiction such as processes associated with motivation, decision-making, pleasure seeking, and inhibitory control. These scientific activities have increased optimism that the neurological underpinnings of addiction will be delineated, and that pharmaceuticals that target and change these mechanisms will by themselves facilitate early intervention and even full recovery. In this paper, we argue that it is misguided to construe addiction as just or primarily a brain chemistry problem, which can be adequately treated by pharmaceutical interventions alone.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13}, Key = {fds352990} } @article{fds366919, Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H}, Title = {The Character of Consciousness}, Pages = {17-30}, Booktitle = {UNDERSTANDING JAMES, UNDERSTANDING MODERNISM}, Year = {2017}, ISBN = {978-1-5013-0274-9}, Key = {fds366919} } @article{fds366920, Author = {Flanagan, O and Graham, G}, Title = {Truth and Sanity: Positive Illusions, Spiritual Delusions, and Metaphysical Hallucinations}, Pages = {293-313}, Booktitle = {EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY: RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH}, Year = {2017}, Key = {fds366920} } @article{fds328339, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Negative dialectics in comparative philosophy: The case of Buddhist free will quietism}, Pages = {59-71}, Booktitle = {Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, ISBN = {9781138950344}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315668765}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315668765}, Key = {fds328339} } @article{fds318361, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Does yoga induce metaphysical hallucinations? Interdisciplinarity at the edge: Comments on Evan Thompson's waking, dreaming, being}, Journal = {Philosophy East and West}, Volume = {66}, Number = {3}, Pages = {952-958}, Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0074}, Doi = {10.1353/pew.2016.0074}, Key = {fds318361} } @article{fds318360, Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D}, Title = {Naturalizing Ethics}, Pages = {16-33}, Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism}, Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC}, Year = {2016}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9781118657607}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch2}, Abstract = {In this chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke naturalism.}, Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch2}, Key = {fds318360} } @article{fds327181, Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H}, Title = {William James and the problem of consciousness}, Pages = {152-161}, Booktitle = {Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What would they have said about our Mind-Body Problem?}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781138934412}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315678023}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315678023}, Key = {fds327181} } @article{fds361192, Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K}, Title = {Justice, care, and gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan debate revisited}, Pages = {69-84}, Booktitle = {An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781134712465}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203760192-13}, Abstract = {In 1958, G. E. M. Anscombe wrote, “It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking” (186). Anscombe hinted (and she and many others pursued the hint) that the Aristotelian tradition was the best place to look for a richer and less shadowy conception of moral agency than either utilitarianism or Kantianism had provided.}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203760192-13}, Key = {fds361192} } @article{fds366137, Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S}, Title = {Confucian Moral Sources}, Journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA}, Pages = {205-227}, Year = {2015}, Key = {fds366137} } @article{fds318363, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Buddhism and the scientific image: Reply to critics}, Journal = {Zygon(R)}, Volume = {49}, Number = {1}, Pages = {242-258}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12080}, Abstract = {I provide a précis of The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, and then respond to three critics, Christian Coseru, Charles Goodman, and Bronwyn Finnigan. © 2014 by the Joint Publication Board of Zygon.}, Doi = {10.1111/zygo.12080}, Key = {fds318363} } @article{fds287492, Author = {Crome, I and Wu, L-T and Rao, RT and Crome, P}, Title = {Introduction}, Pages = {xxiv-xxv}, Booktitle = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan}, Year = {2014}, Key = {fds287492} } @article{fds287493, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {*It Takes a Metaphysics, Raising Virtuous Buddhists*}, Booktitle = {*Cultivating Virtue*}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Snow, N}, Year = {2014}, Abstract = {Abstract: Buddhism is an extremely demanding ethic, possibly as demanding as act-utilitarianism. It endorses virtuous dispositions, compassion and loving-kindness, to alleviate the suffering of all sentient beings and to bring well-being in its stead. How does Buddhism inculcate these virtues, if it does? Besides the usual direct instruction, cajoling, carrots and sticks familiar across ethical traditions, Buddhists work to inculcate these virtues by teaching children a metaphysic that involves recognition of one’s ephemerality and one’s dependency on and interconnectedness with all other beings.}, Key = {fds287493} } @article{fds287495, Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J}, Title = {Han Fei Zi’s Philosophical Psychology: Human Nature, Scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian Consensus}, Booktitle = {The State of Nature in Comparative Political Thought: Western and Non-Western Perspectives}, Publisher = {Lexington Books}, Editor = {Carlson, JD and Fox, RA}, Year = {2014}, Key = {fds287495} } @article{fds287496, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Phenomenal Authority: The Epistemic Authority of Alcoholics Anonymous}, Booktitle = {The Nature of Addiction}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Levy, N}, Year = {2014}, Abstract = {To understand a complicated psycho-bio-social phenomenon(a) such as addiction to alcohol one wants ideally a phenomenology, a behavioral and cognitive psychology, a physiology, and a neurobiology – all embedded in a sociology. One wants to know what it is like to be alcoholic – if, that is, there is any commonality to the experiences of alcoholics (Flanagan 2011). One wants to know about such things as whether and if so what kind of loss of control alcoholics experience in relation to alcohol (as well as, any and all affective and cognitive deficits). One wants to know what the brain is doing and how it contributes to the production of the characteristic phenomenology(ies) and control (and other cognitive and affective) problems. One wants to know what effect heavy drinking has on vulnerable organ systems, e.g., the brain, the heart, and the liver. And, of course, all along the way, one should want to know how the sociomoral-cultural-political ecology normalizes, romanticizes, pathologizes, etc. alcoholism and its relations, heavy drinking, recklessness-under-the-influence, etc. Some scientists and philosophers worry that the program of A.A. biases our understanding of the phenomenology, psychology, physiology, and neurobiology of addiction and prevents a unified, or at least a consilient, account of the nature, causes, and treatment of alcoholism from emerging. I have experience in the rooms of A.A., as well as in seminar and conference rooms with experts on addiction. From this perspective, I assess this claim that A.A. is part of the problem, not of the solution, and suggest some ways to increase mutual understanding between the various modes of understanding alcoholism, which if abided would yield sensitive and sensible interaction among the practical program of A.A. and the sciences of addiction. One consequence is that A.A. would need to acknowledge that as a therapeutic social institution it is a repository of some practical knowledge about what works to help some people recovery and stay abstinent, but has no expertise on alcoholism or even on “how it works” if, that is, it does work.}, Key = {fds287496} } @article{fds287527, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {PERFORMING ONESELF}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Creativity}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Samuels, E and Kaufmann, SB}, Year = {2014}, Key = {fds287527} } @article{fds287540, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The shame of addiction.}, Journal = {Frontiers in Psychiatry}, Volume = {4}, Pages = {120}, Year = {2013}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {8 OCTOBER 2013}, url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24115936}, Abstract = {Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin normative failures. A failure of normal rational effective agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and shame at both this failure, and the failure to live up to the standards for a good life that the addict himself acknowledges and aspires to. Feeling shame for addiction is not a mistake. It is part of the shape of addiction, part of the normal phenomenology of addiction, and often a source of motivation for the addict to heal. Like other recent attempts in the addiction literature to return normative concepts such as "choice" and "responsibility" to their rightful place in understanding and treating addiction, the twin normative failure model is fully compatible with investigation of genetic and neuroscientific causes of addiction. Furthermore, the model does not re-moralize addiction. There can be shame without blame.}, Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00120}, Key = {fds287540} } @article{fds287488, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The View From the East Pole: Buddhist and Confucian Tolerance}, Booktitle = {Religion and Tolerance}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Clarke, S and Powell, R}, Year = {2013}, Abstract = {In this chapter I ask the question: Why are Buddhists and Confucians more tolerant, less conflict prone, less war-like, etc. than Abrahamic peoples IF THEY ARE?1 A proper analysis that positioned us to adequately answer this question would require defining the different concepts—“tolerance,” “conflict-prone,” “war-like”—producing evidence that it is true that there exist significant differences between adherents of these different traditions, and then using something like Mill’s methods to rule out political, economic, or material culture explanations of the differences, thereby making the reli- gious differences the most plausible candidate for the difference-maker.2 Here I do something less than what is needed. I operate on the assump- tion that it is true that Buddhists and Confucians are more tolerant, less conflict-prone, etc. than Abrahamic people, all else equal.3 Then I formulate a hypothesis for why the difference-maker may have to do with God, or better, with beliefs about God’s nature and modus operandi. I say “may” because I am not convinced that my hypothesis is true. The hypothesis is not that Buddhism and Confucianism are more rational, less superstitious than the Abrahamic religions. It is that Buddhism and Confucianism have theologies that differ from the Abrahamic ones in ways that make a difference. The core idea is that the belief in the Abrahamic God (Yahweh, God, Allah) engenders or supports attitudes and actions that demand epistemic and normative conformity across peoples with different customs, habits, and beliefs. Buddhist and Confucian theologies differ from each other in important ways, but share the following two features (Flanagan 2008; Flanagan 2011):}, Key = {fds287488} } @article{fds287489, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Social Epistemological Normalization of Contestable Narratives:* Stories of Just Deserts}, Pages = {358-375}, Booktitle = {What Happened In and To Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century}, Publisher = {notre dame university press}, Editor = {Rourke, FO}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds287489} } @article{fds287490, Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S}, Title = {Confucian Moral Sources}, Booktitle = {The Philosophical Challenge from China}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Burya, B}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds287490} } @article{fds287491, Author = {Flanagan, O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen, G}, Title = {Empiricism and Normative Ethics What do the biology and the psychology of morality have to do with ethics?}, Booktitle = {Evolved Morality: The Biology & Philosophy of Human Conscience}, Publisher = {Brill}, Editor = {Waal, FD and al, PSCE}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds287491} } @article{fds287520, Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Lane, T}, Title = {Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive Illusions}, Journal = {SYNTHESE Philosophy Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {SPRINGER}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds287520} } @article{fds287526, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Buddhism and The Scientific Image}, Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds287526} } @article{fds318364, Author = {Flanagan, B and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Anguished Art: Coming Through the Dark to the Light the Hard Way}, Pages = {75-83}, Booktitle = {Blues-Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling Low}, Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL}, Year = {2012}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9780470656808}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118153284.ch7}, Doi = {10.1002/9781118153284.ch7}, Key = {fds318364} } @article{fds318365, Author = {Einstein, G and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Sexual Identities and Narratives of Self}, Pages = {209-231}, Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, ISBN = {9780195140057}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011}, Abstract = {Certain philosophical ideas about identity, what makes one human, and other such dimensions may be associated with conceptions that concern how scientific knowledge about sense of self may be reinforced by processes that occur within the body and the brain. John Locke's cognitivist view asserts that among all other organisms, and although these organisms may possess organic integrity and biological continuity, only human beings are bestowed with a semantic and autobiographical memory. While Locke's view concentrates on how personal identity should entail cognitive memory, this chapter looks into alternative views wherein the self also involves certain conative factors. This chapter looks into the notion of sexual self and how the body and brain may also determine the self.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011}, Key = {fds318365} } @article{fds287539, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Phenomenal and historical selves}, Journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien}, Volume = {84}, Pages = {217-240}, Editor = {Katja Crone and Kristina Musholt and Anna Strasser}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0165-9227}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789401207904_011}, Abstract = {There are two ways a person can experience or, what is dif erent, can think about herself: f rst, as a subject of experience who feels a certain characteristic way, the-way-it-feels-to-be-oneself; and, second, as the person who is the subject of a particular autobiography, as the actor who is the protagonist in the history of this organism. The f rst is the phenomenal self; the second is the historical self. Marking the distinction has implications for philosophical psychology, for views about what a self is, how many selves a person has, the varieties of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and for normative views about how a self is supposed to relate to its own past and future.}, Doi = {10.1163/9789401207904_011}, Key = {fds287539} } @article{fds318367, Author = {Fairweather, A}, Title = {Introduction: Naturalized virtue epistemology}, Pages = {1-14}, Booktitle = {Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781107028579}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001}, Abstract = {This volume aims to launch a powerful and largely unexplored position in epistemology: naturalized virtue epistemology. Most debates in virtue epistemology have been decidedly axiological and aim to clarify the goals, values, and ends constitutive of epistemic evaluation. Value-driven inquiry has now become quite complex in the large literature on the value problem (and the related Meno problem), which examines whether the value of knowledge can be reduced to the value of any proper subset of its parts (Zagzebski 1996; Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2007). Normative epistemic inquiry has also been useful in meeting more traditional problems in epistemology, such as Gettier problems (Turri 2011) and problems of epistemic luck more generally, as well as the structure of knowledge (as etiological rather than foundational or coherentist), and Chisholm’s “problem of the criterion” (Riggs 2007). Virtue epistemology has opened many new areas of inquiry in contemporary epistemology including: epistemic agency (Greco 1999; Zagzebski 2001; Sosa 2007), the role of motivations and emotions in epistemology (Fairweather 2001; Hookway 2003), the nature of abilities (Millar 2008; Greco 2010; Pritchard 2012), skills (Greco 1993; Bloomfield 2000), and competences (Sosa 2007), the value of understanding (Kvanvig 2003; Grimm 2006; Riggs 2009), wisdom (Ryan 1999; Zagzebski 2013), curiosity (Whitcomb 2010; Inan 2012) and even education policy and practice (Baehr 2011). The virtue turn in epistemology that started with the early work of Sosa (1991) and Zagzebski (1996) has now produced a large and mature literature in normative epistemology. While the growth and impact of virtue epistemology has been impressive and important, it has come with insufficient attention to the empirical grounding of these normative theories, and thus runs the risk of endorsing free-floating epistemic norms cut loose from the real-world phenomenon they must evaluate. To this end, virtue epistemologists should heed the exhortation given by Anscombe in “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) to constrain normative theorizing in ethics with an empirically adequate moral psychology, and might even do so optimistically since Anscombe (and Foot, later Geach, and still later MacIntyre) was led to endorse virtue theory precisely because it appeared more psychologically plausible than deontology or consequentialism. The same cautionary (and perhaps optimistic) point holds for epistemic psychology and normative epistemology.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001}, Key = {fds318367} } @article{fds212082, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr. and Stephen Martin}, Title = {Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology}, Journal = {Human.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 21}, Year = {2012}, Abstract = {In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963) Wilfrid Sellars raises a problem for the very possibility of normative epistemology. How can the scientific image, which celebrates the causal relation among often imperceptible physical states, make room for justificatory relations among introspectible propositional attitudes? We sketch a naturalistic model of reason and of epistemic decisions that parallels a compatibilist solution to the problem of freedom of action. Not only doesn’t science lead to rejection of our account of normative reasoning, science depends on, sophisticates, and explains how normative reasoning is possible.}, Key = {fds212082} } @article{fds287519, Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen, G}, Title = {What do the Psychology and Biology of Morality have to do with Ethics?: Ethics as Human Ecology}, Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds287519} } @article{fds318370, Author = {Paulson, S and Flanagan, O and Bloom, P and Baumeister, R}, Title = {Quid pro quo: the ecology of the self.}, Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, Volume = {1234}, Pages = {29-43}, Year = {2011}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x}, Abstract = {Moderated by Steve Paulson, producer and interviewer for public radio's To the Best of Our Knowledge, philosopher and neurobiologist Owen Flanagan (Duke University), and psychologists Paul Bloom (Yale University) and Roy Baumeister (Florida State University) examine current biological, psychological, and anthropological research on the complex interaction between the self and others, and consider the roots of empathy and morality. The following is an edited transcript of the discussion that occurred February 23, 2011, 7:00-8:15 PM, at the New York Academy of Sciences in New York City.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x}, Key = {fds318370} } @article{fds287541, Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J}, Title = {HAN FEI ZI'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN NATURE, SCARCITY, AND THE NEO-DARWINIAN CONSENSUS}, Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy}, Volume = {38}, Number = {2}, Pages = {293-316}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2011}, Month = {June}, ISSN = {0301-8121}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x}, Key = {fds287541} } @article{fds287453, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Wittgenstein's Ethical Nonnaturalism: An Interpretation of Tractatus 6.41-47 and the 'Lecture on Ethics'}, Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, Volume = {48}, Number = {2}, Pages = {185-198}, Publisher = {University of Illinois Press}, Year = {2011}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0003-0481}, Key = {fds287453} } @article{fds318369, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Neuroscience: Knowing and feeling}, Journal = {Nature}, Volume = {469}, Number = {7329}, Pages = {160-161}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/469160a}, Doi = {10.1038/469160a}, Key = {fds318369} } @article{fds287485, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Performing Oneself}, Booktitle = {Philosophy and Creativity}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Paul, E and Kaufmann, SB}, Year = {2011}, Abstract = {Abstract: I explore the ancient idea that life is some kind of dramatic or artistic performance. How seriously and literally ought we to take this idea that life is like a dramatic performance, even that it is one? There are metaphysical and logical questions about whether and how self-creation and self-constitution are possible; and there are normative questions about which norms sensibly govern self-constituting performances. Here I discuss the normative questions associated with the ideas that life is a performance and that the self is something that both emerges in and is constituted by the performance. Three contemporary psychopoetic conceptions of persons – “day-by-day persons,” “ironic persons,” and “strong poetic persons” are examined in order to discuss whether there are legitimate normative constraints on “performing oneself,” and, if so, what these might be.}, Key = {fds287485} } @article{fds287486, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {My Non-Narrative, Non-Forensic Dasein: The First and Second Self}, Pages = {214-240}, Booktitle = {Self and Consciousness}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Liu, JL and Perry, J}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds287486} } @article{fds287546, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {I, hypocrite}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Volume = {208}, Number = {2791}, Pages = {44-44}, Year = {2010}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {0262-4079}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=000287908900039&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(10)63116-8}, Key = {fds287546} } @article{fds287518, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Neuroexistentialism, with David Barack}, Journal = {EURAMERICA}, Volume = {40}, Number = {3}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {EURAMERICA vol. 40, no. 3}, Key = {fds287518} } @article{fds167619, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {1. “What does the Modularity of Ethics have to do with Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few” with Robert A. Williams, TopiCS (Topics in Cognitive Science).}, Year = {2010}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds167619} } @article{fds287549, Author = {Flanagan, O and Williams, RA}, Title = {What does the modularity of morals have to do with ethics? Four moral sprouts plus or minus a few.}, Journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, Volume = {2}, Number = {3}, Pages = {430-453}, Year = {2010}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {1756-8757}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000283869500012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, "Mencian Moral Modularity," which claims four innate modules, and "Social Intuitionist Modularity," which claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of the "is-ought" problem. We explain in a new way what this problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not involve the logic of "ought," but rather the plasticity of human nature and the realistic options to "grow" and "do" human nature in multifarious legitimate ways.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01076.x}, Key = {fds287549} } @article{fds287484, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {What is it Like to be an Addict?}, Booktitle = {Addiction and Responsibility}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Graham, G and Poland, G}, Year = {2010}, Key = {fds287484} } @article{fds287544, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Can do attitudes: Some positive illusions are not misbeliefs}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {32}, Number = {6}, Pages = {519-520}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2009}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {0140-525X}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000274676100012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily selected for misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that some of its members are best understood as positive attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at all. © 2010 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09991439}, Key = {fds287544} } @article{fds287522, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Literate Ape}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Year = {2009}, Month = {November}, url = {http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php}, Key = {fds287522} } @article{fds287524, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Ego Tunnel}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html}, Key = {fds287524} } @article{fds287542, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {One Enchanted Being: Neuroexistentialism & Meaning}, Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science}, Volume = {44}, Number = {1}, Pages = {41-49}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {1467-9744}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x}, Key = {fds287542} } @article{fds287523, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Your mind is more than your brain}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Volume = {201}, Number = {2691}, Pages = {42-43}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.800-review-where-in-the-world-is-the-mind.html}, Abstract = {Two new books argue that the mind extends beyond the brain into the world around us. © 2009 Reed Business Information Ltd, England.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(09)60167-6}, Key = {fds287523} } @article{fds318371, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and smile}, Pages = {413-434}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780521884754}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018}, Abstract = {A major task for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts between our ordinary way of understanding persons and the world - what Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' - and scientific accounts of persons and the world - the 'scientific image'. Sometimes, of course, it is possible to blend the two images so as to produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic picture. But this is not always possible. In the case of Darwin's theory of natural selection, we seem to have a scientific theory that cannot be comfortably assimilated into the extant manifest image by adding, in Sellars' phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to that image. As traditionally understood, we humans are made in God's image and sit beneath God and the angels and above the animals on the 'Great Chain of Being'. There is a tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm and the material realm (us). We humans know the material realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial realm - theological and moral truths in particular - through illumination, grace or other non-empirical and nonrational or arational means. God sets out the moral law, and if we obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we will gain eternal salvation.}, Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018}, Key = {fds318371} } @article{fds287479, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These Years}, Pages = {52-78}, Booktitle = {Moral Personality, Identity and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Narvaez, D and Lapsley, DK}, Year = {2009}, url = {http://www.duke.edu/}, Key = {fds287479} } @article{fds287480, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {“Buddhist Persons & Eudaimonia Buddha”}, Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Philosophical Psychology}, Editor = {Symons, J}, Year = {2009}, url = {http://www.duke.edu/}, Key = {fds287480} } @article{fds287481, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Five Questions}, Booktitle = {Mind & Consciousness}, Publisher = {VIP Press}, Editor = {Grim, P}, Year = {2009}, Key = {fds287481} } @article{fds287483, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Neuro-Eudaimonics, or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the Seat of Happiness}, Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Philosophy and Neuroscience}, Editor = {Bickle, J}, Year = {2009}, url = {http://www.duke.edu/}, Key = {fds287483} } @article{fds287517, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Structures of Meaningful Life Stories}, Journal = {Argentinian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology}, Year = {2009}, Key = {fds287517} } @article{fds318372, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the Mozi}, Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy}, Volume = {35}, Number = {3}, Pages = {473-491}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2008}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x}, Key = {fds318372} } @article{fds287516, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Neural Pathway to the White House}, Journal = {The New Scientist}, Year = {2008}, Month = {July}, url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19826586.300-review-ithe-political-mindi-by-george-lakoff.html?full=true}, Key = {fds287516} } @article{fds322469, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Review: The Political Mind by George Lakoff}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Volume = {198}, Number = {2658}, Pages = {48-49}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8}, Abstract = {If winning elections is a matter of manipulating brains, that must make George Bush and his team experts in neuroscience - but Owen Flanagan isn't convinced. © 2008 Reed Business Information Ltd, England.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8}, Key = {fds322469} } @article{fds318377, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Consciousness}, Pages = {176-185}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch9}, Abstract = {What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of cognition? Can consciousness be studied empirically? These are the questions. Here are the answers}, Doi = {10.1002/9781405164535.ch9}, Key = {fds318377} } @article{fds287452, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Where is the Happiness}, Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Philosophy and Neuroscience}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2008}, Key = {fds287452} } @article{fds287477, Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D}, Title = {"What is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer, Railton, and Ruse"}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {45-52}, Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Year = {2007}, Key = {fds287477} } @article{fds287478, Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D}, Title = {Naturalizing Ethics}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {1-26}, Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Year = {2007}, Key = {fds287478} } @article{fds45628, Author = {O. Flanagan}, Title = {“The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness” in}, Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age: Routledge: Cruzon, London, In Press: Editors, D. K. Nauriyal, Michael Drummond, Y. B. Lal: Forward: His Holiness, XIV Dalai Lama}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Winter}, Key = {fds45628} } @article{fds287475, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Varieties of Naturalism}, Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Religion and Science}, Publisher = {OUP}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Winter}, Key = {fds287475} } @article{fds287476, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness}, Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Editor = {Nauriyal, DK and Drummond, YB}, Year = {2006}, Key = {fds287476} } @article{fds287514, Author = {Greene, M and Schill, K and Takahashi, S and Bateman-House, A and Beauchamp, T and Bok, H and Cheney, D and Coyle, J and Deacon, T and Dennett, D and Donovan, P and Flanagan, O and Goldman, S and Greely, H and Martin, L and Miller, E and Mueller, D and Siegel, A and Solter, D and Gearhart, J and McKhann, G and Faden, R}, Title = {Ethics: Moral issues of human-non-human primate neural grafting.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {309}, Number = {5733}, Pages = {385-386}, Year = {2005}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1112207}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1112207}, Key = {fds287514} } @article{fds318373, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The colour of happiness}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Volume = {178}, Number = {2396}, Pages = {44}, Year = {2003}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds318373} } @article{fds318374, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and smile}, Pages = {377-398}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {0521771978}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017}, Abstract = {Darwinism And The Manifest Image Of Humankind: A major task for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts between our ordinary way of understanding persons and the world - what Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' - and scientific accounts of persons and the world - the 'scientific image'. Sometimes, of course, it is possible to blend the two images so as to produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic picture. But this is not always possible. In the case of Darwin's theory of natural selection, we seem to have a scientific theory that cannot be comfortably assimilated into the extant manifest image by adding, in Sellars' phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to that image. As traditionally understood, we humans are made in God’s image and sit beneath God and the angels and above the animals on the ‘Great Chain of Being’. There is a tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm and the material realm (us). We humans know the material realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial realm – theological and moral truths in particular – through illumination, grace or other non-empirical and nonrational or arational means. God sets out the moral law, and if we obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we will gain eternal salvation. Nothing in this metaphysics, epistemology and ethics seems to square with the theory of natural selection. On this theory, no divine, intelligent designer is needed to explain the existence of humans or any other type of organic life. Moreover, as animals, descended from other animals, we humans possess no mysterious epistemic powers to detect what is true or what is good. The idea that morality has a divine origin and justification loses its force. The prospects for personal immortality seem nil. The manifest image of humankind thus takes a major hit at the hands of Darwin2019s theory, and it is not clear how to maintain sensibly the central components of that image.}, Doi = {10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017}, Key = {fds318374} } @article{fds287473, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Emotional Expressions: Why Moralists Scowl, Frown, and Smile}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Radick, G and Hodges, J}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds287473} } @article{fds287474, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Neurobiology of Sexual Self-Consciousness: Mind and the Interplay of Brain and Body}, Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain.}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Fireman, G and McVay, T and Flanagan, O}, Year = {2003}, Month = {Spring}, Abstract = {Chapter on Narrative Self-Construction by individuals w/non-standard sexual identities.}, Key = {fds287474} } @article{fds287513, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Emotional Expressions}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Radick, and Hodge}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds287513} } @article{fds318375, Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O}, Title = {A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and consciousness and experience}, Journal = {Minds and Machines}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1}, Pages = {113-126}, Year = {2001}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011276727406}, Abstract = {The books 'consciouness' and 'consciouness and experience,' written by Lycan, were reviewed. According to the reviwers, the author has given some powerful ideas about how functionalism would work, and a whole armory of useful tools. These two books are an indispensable part of any study of consciousness. They are ideal for graduate seminars, and accessible to interested readers who may already have waded through any of various recent philosophical works about consciousness.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1011276727406}, Key = {fds318375} } @article{fds287472, Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Natural Questions to Natural Answers}, Volume = {5}, Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections, Conjectures}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {2001}, Key = {fds287472} } @article{fds303570, Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Is Consciousness an Adaptation?}, Booktitle = {Evolving Consciousness}, Publisher = {Johns Benjamin, Amsterdam}, Editor = {Mulhauser, G}, Year = {2001}, Key = {fds303570} } @article{fds318376, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Dreaming is not an adaptation}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {23}, Number = {6}, Pages = {936-939}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2000}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00404024}, Abstract = {The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being different. To establish that some trait of character is an adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story about the fitness enhancing function it served when it evolved and possibly a story of how the maintenance of this function is fitness enhancing now. My aim is to evaluate the proposals put forward in these papers. My conclusion is that although sleep is almost certainly an adaptation, dreaming is not.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00404024}, Key = {fds318376} } @article{fds287547, Author = {Hardcastle, VG and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders}, Journal = {The Monist}, Volume = {82}, Number = {4}, Pages = {645-657}, Year = {1999}, ISSN = {0026-9662}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084733100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.2307/27903660}, Key = {fds287547} } @article{fds318362, Author = {Patton, LL and Griffiths, PJ}, Title = {Foreward}, Pages = {ix-xi}, Booktitle = {David Peter Lawrence - Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument: A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri Éaiva Philosophy}, Publisher = {Albany: State University of New York Press}, Year = {1999}, ISBN = {9781138888272}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315713571}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315713571}, Key = {fds318362} } @article{fds287467, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral Confidence: Three Cheers for Naturalistic Ethics}, Booktitle = {In The Face of Facts: Moral Inquiry in American Scholarship}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Westbrook, and Bethe-Elstain, and Fox}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds287467} } @article{fds287468, Author = {Flanagan, O and Guzeldere, G}, Title = {Consciousness: A Philosophical Tour}, Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Rolls, E}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds287468} } @article{fds287469, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {How to Study Consciousness Empirically: The Case of Dreams}, Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Rolls, E}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds287469} } @article{fds287470, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Consciousness as a Pragmatist Views It}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to William James}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Putnam, RA}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds287470} } @article{fds287471, Author = {Flanagan, O and Dryden, D}, Title = {Consciousness and the Mind}, Booktitle = {Invitation to Cognitive Science}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Sternberg, S}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds287471} } @article{fds287464, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Ethics Naturalized: Ethics and Human Ecology}, Booktitle = {Mind and Morals}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {May, and Clark, and Friedman}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds287464} } @article{fds287465, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral Network}, Booktitle = {The Churchlands and Their Critics}, Publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, Editor = {McCauley, R}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds287465} } @article{fds287509, Author = {Flanagan, O and Polger, T}, Title = {Zombies and the Function of Consciousness}, Journal = {The Journal of Consciousness Studies}, Volume = {2}, Number = {4}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds287509} } @article{fds303569, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Prospects For A Unified Theory of Consciousness or, What Dreams are Made Of}, Booktitle = {Scientific Approaches to the Question of Consciousness: 25th Carnegie Symposium on Cognition}, Publisher = {Erlbaum}, Editor = {Cohen, J and Schooler, J}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds303569} } @article{fds287552, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Consciousness and the natural method.}, Journal = {Neuropsychologia}, Volume = {33}, Number = {9}, Pages = {1103-1115}, Year = {1995}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0028-3932}, url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7501132}, Abstract = {'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous array of mental state types. The types share the property of 'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being something that it is like for the subject to be in one of these states.' I propose that we can only build a theory of consciousness by deploying 'the natural method' of coordinating all relevant informational resources at once, especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the natural method in action in mental domains where an adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i) visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever interest the particular cases have, the examination will show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary history of different domains and competences.}, Doi = {10.1016/0028-3932(95)00051-4}, Key = {fds287552} } @article{fds156818, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {"Consciousness"}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Ted Honderich}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds156818} } @article{fds287458, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and Self-Reclamation}, Pages = {135-162}, Booktitle = {Philosophical Psychopathology}, Publisher = {MIT}, Editor = {Graham, G and Stephens, L}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287458} } @article{fds287459, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Behaviorism}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287459} } @article{fds287460, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {D. C. Dennett}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287460} } @article{fds287461, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Stream of Consciousness}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287461} } @article{fds287462, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {History of the Philosophy of Mind}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287462} } @article{fds287463, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Consciousness}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287463} } @article{fds287508, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Moment of Truth on the Dublin Bridge}, Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly}, Volume = {94}, Number = {2}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds287508} } @article{fds287543, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {92}, Number = {1}, Pages = {5-27}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Hameroff, SR and Kaszniak, AW and Scott, AC}, Year = {1995}, ISBN = {0-262-08249-7}, ISSN = {0022-362X}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995PY90800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.2307/2940806}, Key = {fds287543} } @article{fds318379, Author = {FLANAGAN, O}, Title = {THE MOMENT OF TRUTH ON DUBLIN BRIDGE, A RESPONSE TO PICKERING,ANDREW}, Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly}, Volume = {94}, Number = {2}, Pages = {467-474}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds318379} } @article{fds318378, Author = {Jr, OF}, Title = {"Stream of Consciousness"}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Honderich, T}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds318378} } @article{fds318381, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Malaise of Modernity.Charles Taylor}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {104}, Number = {1}, Pages = {192-194}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1993}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293596}, Doi = {10.1086/293596}, Key = {fds318381} } @article{fds287457, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Situations and Dispositions}, Pages = {681-695}, Booktitle = {Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science}, Publisher = {Cambridge: MIT Press}, Editor = {Goldman, AI}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds287457} } @article{fds318380, Author = {FLANAGAN, O}, Title = {VALIDATION IN THE CLINICAL THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - GRUNBAUM,A}, Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement}, Number = {4726}, Pages = {3-4}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds318380} } @article{fds287456, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Other Minds, Obligation, and Honesty}, Booktitle = {Social and Cognitive Factors in Preschoolers’ Deception}, Publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum}, Editor = {Ceci, S and DeSimone, M and Putnick, ME}, Year = {1992}, Key = {fds287456} } @article{fds287507, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Identity, Gender, and Strong Evaluation}, Journal = {Nous}, Volume = {25}, Number = {2}, Pages = {198-198}, Publisher = {JSTOR}, Year = {1991}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0029-4624}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215579}, Doi = {10.2307/2215579}, Key = {fds287507} } @article{fds318382, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The modularity of consciousness}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {14}, Number = {3}, Pages = {446-447}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {1991}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00070692}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00070692}, Key = {fds318382} } @article{fds287506, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Virtue and Ignorance}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {87}, Number = {8}, Pages = {420-420}, Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, Year = {1990}, Month = {August}, ISSN = {0022-362X}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026736}, Doi = {10.2307/2026736}, Key = {fds287506} } @article{fds303568, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation}, Pages = {37-65}, Booktitle = {Identity, Character, and Morality}, Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds303568} } @article{fds287504, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Pragmatism, Ethics, and Correspondence Truth: Response to Gibson and Quine}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {98}, Number = {3}, Pages = {541-549}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1988}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0014-1704}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380967}, Doi = {10.1086/292971}, Key = {fds287504} } @article{fds287548, Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K}, Title = {Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {97}, Number = {3}, Pages = {622-637}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1987}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0014-1704}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292870}, Doi = {10.1086/292870}, Key = {fds287548} } @article{fds318383, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Materialism and immaterialism: A reply to Robinson}, Journal = {Contemporary Psychology: a Journal of Reviews}, Volume = {31}, Number = {9}, Pages = {722-722}, Publisher = {Portico}, Year = {1986}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/025101}, Doi = {10.1037/025101}, Key = {fds318383} } @article{fds318384, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Psychoanalysis as a social activity}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {9}, Number = {2}, Pages = {238-239}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {1986}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00022391}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00022391}, Key = {fds318384} } @article{fds287503, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Psychoanalysis and Social Practice: A Comment on Grünbaum}, Journal = {The Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Number = {Fall}, Year = {1986}, Month = {Fall}, Key = {fds287503} } @article{fds287550, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {83}, Number = {1}, Pages = {41-60}, Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, Year = {1986}, ISSN = {0022-362X}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026466}, Doi = {10.2307/2026466}, Key = {fds287550} } @article{fds318385, Author = {FLANAGAN, O}, Title = {CONSCIOUSNESS, NATURALISM, AND NAGEL}, Journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, Volume = {6}, Number = {3}, Pages = {373-390}, Publisher = {INST MIND BEHAVIOR INC}, Year = {1985}, Month = {June}, Key = {fds318385} } @article{fds287502, Author = {Flanagan, O and Adler, J}, Title = {Impartiality and Particularity}, Journal = {Social Research}, Volume = {50}, Number = {3}, Pages = {576-596}, Year = {1983}, ISSN = {0037-783X}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970910}, Doi = {10.2307/40970910}, Key = {fds287502} } @article{fds287501, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Quinean Ethics}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {93}, Number = {1}, Pages = {56-74}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1982}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0014-1704}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380762}, Doi = {10.1086/292405}, Key = {fds287501} } @article{fds287498, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {92}, Number = {3}, Pages = {499-512}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1982}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0014-1704}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380735}, Doi = {10.1086/292358}, Key = {fds287498} } @article{fds287499, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg}, Journal = {Ethics}, Volume = {92}, Number = {3}, Pages = {529-532}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1982}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0014-1704}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380737}, Doi = {10.1086/292360}, Key = {fds287499} } @article{fds287500, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Moral Structures?}, Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, Volume = {12}, Number = {3}, Pages = {255-270}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications}, Year = {1982}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200302}, Doi = {10.1177/004839318201200302}, Key = {fds287500} } @article{fds318386, Author = {Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Psychology, progress and the problem of reflexivity: a study in the epistemological foundations of psychology.}, Journal = {Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences}, Volume = {17}, Pages = {375-386}, Year = {1981}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co}, Doi = {10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co}, Key = {fds318386} } @article{fds287454, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Skinnerian Metaphysics and the Problem of Operationism}, Journal = {Behaviorism}, Volume = {8}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-13}, Year = {1980}, ISSN = {0090-4155}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758948}, Doi = {10.2307/27758948}, Key = {fds287454} } @article{fds318387, Author = {Flanagan, OJ and McCreadie-Albright, T}, Title = {Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism}, Journal = {Philosophical Studies}, Volume = {26}, Number = {5-6}, Pages = {425-430}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1974}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00368508}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00368508}, Key = {fds318387} } %% Books @book{fds335566, Author = {Caruso, G and Flanagan, O}, Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age of neuroscience}, Pages = {1-374}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190460723}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001}, Abstract = {Existentialism is a concern about the foundation of meaning, morals, and purpose. Existentialisms arise when some foundation for these elements of being is under assault. In the past, first-wave existentialism concerned the increasingly apparent inability of religion and religious tradition to provide such a foundation, as typified in the writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Second-wave existentialism, personified philosophically by Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, developed in response to the inability of an overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of reason and the common good to provide such a foundation. There is a third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism, developing in response to advances in the neurosciences that threaten the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self. With the increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and some responses to it. It brings together some of the world℉s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001}, Key = {fds335566} } @book{fds341012, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Foreword: Cross-cultural philosophy and the moral project}, Pages = {xi-xvii}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190499778}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001}, Key = {fds341012} } @book{fds222040, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {MORAL SPROUTS AND NATURAL TELEOLOGIES 21st CENTURY MORAL PSYCHOLOGY MEETS CLASSICAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY}, Publisher = {Marquette University Press}, Year = {2014}, Key = {fds222040} } @book{fds287538, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleology: 21st century Moral Psychology Meets Classical Chinese Philosophy}, Publisher = {Marquette University Press}, Year = {2014}, Abstract = {The 78th Aquinas Lecture}, Key = {fds287538} } @book{fds306209, Title = {Virtue Epistemology Naturalized}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Fairweather, A and Flanagan, O}, Year = {2014}, Key = {fds306209} } @book{fds222041, Author = {Abrol Fairweather and O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Fairweather and Flanagan}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds222041} } @book{fds306210, Author = {Fireman, GD and McVay, TE and Flanagan, OJ}, Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain}, Pages = {1-264}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, ISBN = {9780195140057}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001}, Abstract = {The evocation of narrative as a way to understand the content of consciousness, including memory, autobiography, self, and imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary work among psychologists, philosophers, and literary critics. Even neuroscientists have taken an interest in the stories people create to understand themselves, their past, and the world around them. The research presented in this volume should appeal to researchers enmeshed in these problems, as well as the general reader with an interest in the philosophical problem of what consciousness is and how it functions in the everyday world.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001}, Key = {fds306210} } @book{fds318366, Author = {Fairweather, A}, Title = {Naturalizing epistemic virtue}, Pages = {1-272}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781107028579}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348}, Abstract = {An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical definition meaning 'methodologically continuous with science'. The essays examine the empirical research in psychology on cognitive abilities and personal dispositions, meta-epistemic semantic accounts of virtue theoretic norms, the role of emotion in knowledge, 'ought-implies can' constraints, empirically and metaphysically grounded accounts of 'proper functioning', and even applied virtue epistemology in relation to education. Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue addresses many core issues in contemporary epistemology, presents new opportunities for work on epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive character, and will be of great interest to those studying virtue ethics and epistemology.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348}, Key = {fds318366} } @book{fds183894, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (paper 2013)}, Publisher = {MIT PRESS}, Year = {2011}, Month = {October}, Key = {fds183894} } @book{fds287537, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {2011}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds287537} } @book{fds141485, Author = {O. Flanagan}, Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {2007}, Month = {Fall}, Key = {fds141485} } @book{fds287536, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {2007}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds287536} } @book{fds18414, Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain. Eds. Gary Fireman, Ted McVay, and Owen Flanagan}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Gary Fireman and Ted McVay and Owen Flanagan}, Year = {2003}, Abstract = {Interdisciplinary book (edited collection) on role/construction of self-narratives in cog. sci, neuroscience, psychology and literature. A contribution to topic of personal identity and role of narrative in self-construction.}, Key = {fds18414} } @book{fds287533, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them}, Publisher = {Basic Books}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds287533} } @book{fds287535, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Almas Que Suenan}, Publisher = {Oceano}, Year = {2003}, Month = {Fall}, Abstract = {Spanish translation of DREAMING SOULS.}, Key = {fds287535} } @book{fds287532, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Dreaming Souls}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1999}, Month = {Fall}, Key = {fds287532} } @book{fds306211, Title = {The Nature of Consciousness}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Block, N and Guzeldere, G and Flanagan, O}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds306211} } @book{fds287531, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Self Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of Life}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds287531} } @book{fds287530, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Consciousness Reconsidered}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {1992}, Key = {fds287530} } @book{fds287529, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds287529} } @book{fds306212, Title = {Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds306212} } @book{fds287528, Author = {Flanagan, O}, Title = {The Science of the Mind}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {1984}, Key = {fds287528} } %% Book Reviews @article{fds212062, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {Kristján Kristjánsson The Self and Its Emotions Kristján Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 288pp., ISBN 9780521114783.}, Journal = {NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS}, Year = {2012}, url = {http://http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35356-the-self-and-its-emotions/}, Key = {fds212062} } @article{fds201209, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {SISSELA BOK Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain Science}, Journal = {Notre Dame Review of Books}, Year = {2011}, Month = {April}, Key = {fds201209} } @article{fds167613, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {The Ego Tunnel http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html}, Journal = {New Scientist}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, Key = {fds167613} } @article{fds167618, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {“The Literate Ape,” New Scientist November 23, 2009 http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php}, Year = {2009}, Key = {fds167618} } @article{fds167617, Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.}, Title = {“The Left Brain Conspiracy,” New Scientist, December 9, 2009 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20427381.600}, Year = {2009}, Key = {fds167617} } | |
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