Psychology and Neuroscience Faculty Database
Psychology and Neuroscience
Arts & Sciences
Duke University

 HOME > Arts & Sciences > pn > Faculty    Search Help Login pdf version printable version 

Publications of Michael Tomasello    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds332984,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
   Title = {Thirty years of great ape gestures.},
   Journal = {Animal Cognition},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {461-469},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1},
   Abstract = {We and our colleagues have been doing studies of great ape
             gestural communication for more than 30 years. Here we
             attempt to spell out what we have learned. Some aspects of
             the process have been reliably established by multiple
             researchers, for example, its intentional structure and its
             sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient. Other
             aspects are more controversial. We argue here that it is a
             mistake to assimilate great ape gestures to the
             species-typical displays of other mammals by claiming that
             they are fixed action patterns, as there are many
             differences, including the use of attention-getters. It is
             also a mistake, we argue, to assimilate great ape gestures
             to human gestures by claiming that they are used
             referentially and declaratively in a human-like manner, as
             apes' "pointing" gesture has many limitations and they do
             not gesture iconically. Great ape gestures constitute a
             unique form of primate communication with their own unique
             qualities.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1},
   Key = {fds332984}
}

@article{fds329385,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Müller, K and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {The relation between young children's physiological arousal
             and their motivation to help others.},
   Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
   Volume = {126},
   Pages = {113-119},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010},
   Abstract = {Children are motivated to help others from an early age.
             However, little is known about the internal biological
             mechanisms underlying their motivation to help. Here, we
             compiled data from five separate studies in which children,
             ranging in age from 18 months to 5.5 years, witnessed an
             adult needing help. In all studies, we assessed both (1)
             children's internal physiological arousal via changes in
             their pupil dilation, and (2) the latency and likelihood of
             them providing help. The results showed that the greater the
             baseline-corrected change in children's internal arousal in
             response to witnessing the need situation, the faster and
             more likely children were to help the adult. This was not
             the case for the baseline measure of children's tonic
             arousal state. Together, these results suggest that
             children's propensity to help is systematically related to
             their physiological arousal after they witness others
             needing help. This sheds new light on the biological
             mechanisms underlying not only young children's social
             perception but also their prosocial motivation more
             generally.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010},
   Key = {fds329385}
}

@article{fds326700,
   Author = {Kachel, U and Svetlova, M and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Three-Year-Olds' Reactions to a Partner's Failure to Perform
             Her Role in a Joint Commitment.},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {89},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1691-1703},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12816},
   Abstract = {When children make a joint commitment to collaborate,
             obligations are created. Pairs of 3-year-old children
             (N = 144) made a joint commitment to play a game. In three
             different conditions the game was interrupted in the middle
             either because: (a) the partner child intentionally
             defected, (b) the partner child was ignorant about how to
             play, or (c) the apparatus broke. The subject child reacted
             differently in the three cases, protesting normatively
             against defection (with emotional arousal and later
             tattling), teaching when the partner seemed to be ignorant,
             or simply blaming the apparatus when it broke. These results
             suggest that 3-year-old children are competent in making
             appropriate normative evaluations of intentions and
             obligations of collaborative partners.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12816},
   Key = {fds326700}
}

@article{fds333648,
   Author = {Kachel, G and Moore, R and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Two-year-olds use adults' but not peers'
             points.},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {e12660},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12660},
   Abstract = {In the current study, 24- to 27-month-old children (N = 37)
             used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task
             with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the
             location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally
             accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for
             adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding
             places, children used adults' pointing to find a hidden toy
             significantly more often than they used peers'. In
             interaction with peers, children's choice behavior was at
             chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe
             informative value to adults' but not peers' pointing
             gestures, and highlight the role of children's social
             expectations in their communicative development.},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.12660},
   Key = {fds333648}
}

@article{fds332985,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Great Apes and Human Development: A Personal
             History},
   Journal = {Child Development Perspectives},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {189-193},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12281},
   Abstract = {© 2018 The Author. Child Development Perspectives © 2018
             The Society for Research in Child Development In this
             article, I recount my history of research with great apes.
             From the beginning, the idea was to compare apes to human
             children, with an eye to discovering facts relevant to
             describing and explaining processes of human development.
             The research went through three more or less distinct
             stages, focusing on communication and social learning,
             social cognition and theory of mind, and cooperation and
             shared intentionality. I conclude by identifying problems
             and prospects for comparative research in developmental
             psychology.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdep.12281},
   Key = {fds332985}
}

@article{fds337395,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared
             intentionality account.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {115},
   Number = {34},
   Pages = {8491-8498},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804761115},
   Abstract = {To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must
             understand that their actions are determined not by reality
             but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children
             come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at
             about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different
             response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have
             some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not
             possible with current theories based on individual
             cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing
             that the key processes in constructing an understanding of
             belief are social and mental coordination with other persons
             and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in
             such social and mental coordination involves species-unique
             skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially
             as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic
             communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive
             function to coordinate the different perspectives involved.
             This shared intentionality account accords well with
             documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great
             apes and human children, and it explains why infants and
             apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only
             older children pass others.},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1804761115},
   Key = {fds337395}
}

@article{fds335757,
   Author = {Bohn, M and Zimmermann, L and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {The social-cognitive basis of infants' reference to absent
             entities.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {177},
   Pages = {41-48},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024},
   Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that infants as young as 12 month
             of age use pointing to communicate about absent entities.
             The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that
             infants do so based on tracking what their interlocutor
             experienced in a previous shared interaction. The present
             study addresses this assumption empirically. In three
             experiments, 12-month-old infants could request additional
             desired objects by pointing to the location in which these
             objects were previously located. We systematically varied
             whether the adult from whom infants were requesting had
             previously experienced the former content of the location
             with the infant. Infants systematically adjusted their
             pointing to the now empty location to what they experienced
             with the adult previously. These results suggest that
             infants' ability to communicate about absent referents is
             based on an incipient form of common ground.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024},
   Key = {fds335757}
}

@article{fds333647,
   Author = {House, BR and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Modeling social norms increasingly influences costly sharing
             in middle childhood.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {171},
   Pages = {84-98},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014},
   Abstract = {Prosocial and normative behavior emerges in early childhood,
             but substantial changes in prosocial behavior in middle
             childhood may be due to it becoming integrated with
             children's understanding of what is normative. Here we show
             that information about what is normative begins influencing
             children's costly sharing in middle childhood in a sample of
             6- to 11-year-old German children. Information about what is
             normative was most influential when indicating what was
             "right" (i.e., "The right thing is to choose this"). It was
             less influential when indicating what was prescribed by a
             rule (i.e., "There is a rule that says to choose this") or
             when it indicated what the majority of people do (i.e.,
             "Most people choose this"). These findings support the idea
             that middle childhood is when social norms begin to shape
             children's costly sharing and provide insight into the
             psychological foundations of the relationship between norms
             and prosocial behavior.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014},
   Key = {fds333647}
}

@article{fds329386,
   Author = {Domberg, A and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and
             competitive contexts.},
   Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {36},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {64-77},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12213},
   Abstract = {We report two studies that demonstrate how five- and
             seven-year-olds adapt their production of arguments to
             either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games
             elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on
             either of two halves of a playing field owned by either
             child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these
             decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged
             placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments
             showed a bias that was the result of withholding known
             arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not
             only more arguments, but also more 'two-sided' arguments.
             Also, seven-year-olds demonstrated a more frequent and
             strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted
             decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest
             that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context
             for children to produce arguments. Statement of contribution
             What is already known on this subject? Reasoning is a social
             skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
             Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer
             conversations. By adolescence, children use sophisticated
             arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals). What the
             present study adds? Cooperation offers a more motivating
             context for children's argument production. Seven-year-olds
             are more strategic than five-year-olds in their reasoning
             with peers. Children's reasoning with others becomes more
             sophisticated after preschool years.},
   Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12213},
   Key = {fds329386}
}

@article{fds331567,
   Author = {Vaish, A and Hepach, R and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The specificity of reciprocity: Young children reciprocate
             more generously to those who intentionally benefit
             them.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {167},
   Pages = {336-353},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005},
   Abstract = {Young children engage in direct reciprocity, but the
             mechanisms underlying such reciprocity remain unclear. In
             particular, prior work leaves unclear whether children's
             reciprocity is simply a response to receiving benefits
             (regardless of whether the benefits were intended) or driven
             by a mechanism of rewarding or preferring all benefactors
             (regardless of whom they benefited). Alternatively, perhaps
             children engage in genuine reciprocity such that they are
             particularly prosocial toward benefactors who intentionally
             provided them with benefits. Our findings support this
             third, richer possibility; the 3-year-olds who received
             benefits through the good intentions of a benefactor were
             subsequently more generous toward the benefactor than
             children who either (a) received the same benefits from the
             benefactor unintentionally or (b) observed the benefactor
             bestow the same benefits on another individual. Thus, young
             children are especially motivated to benefit those who have
             demonstrated goodwill toward them, suggesting, as one
             possible mechanism, an early sense of gratitude.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005},
   Key = {fds331567}
}

@article{fds330413,
   Author = {Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making
             with peers.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {166},
   Pages = {549-566},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018},
   Abstract = {In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the
             evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality
             of their respective proposals with their partners. In the
             main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were
             presented with a novel animal. In the key condition,
             children in a dyad individually received conflicting
             information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs.
             sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with
             first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups
             were able to reliably settle on the option with the best
             supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision,
             children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds
             of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a
             modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and
             5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried
             to convince children to change their minds by producing
             meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk,
             5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change
             their minds if their information was unreliable. These
             results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in
             collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to
             reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine
             the evidence emerges only during the early school
             years.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018},
   Key = {fds330413}
}

@article{fds330414,
   Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Concern for Group Reputation Increases Prosociality in Young
             Children.},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {181-190},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617733830},
   Abstract = {The motivation to build and maintain a positive personal
             reputation promotes prosocial behavior. But individuals also
             identify with their groups, and so it is possible that the
             desire to maintain or enhance group reputation may have
             similar effects. Here, we show that 5-year-old children
             actively invest in the reputation of their group by acting
             more generously when their group's reputation is at stake.
             Children shared significantly more resources with fictitious
             other children not only when their individual donations were
             public rather than private but also when their group's
             donations (effacing individual donations) were public rather
             than private. These results provide the first experimental
             evidence that concern for group reputation can lead to
             higher levels of prosociality.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797617733830},
   Key = {fds330414}
}

@article{fds332050,
   Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The reasons young children give to peers when explaining
             their judgments of moral and conventional
             rules.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {254-262},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000424},
   Abstract = {Moral justifications work, when they do, by invoking values
             that are shared in the common ground of the interlocutors.
             We asked 3- and 5-year-old peer dyads (N = 144) to identify
             and punish norm transgressors. In the moral condition, the
             transgressor violated a moral norm (e.g., by stealing); in
             the social rules condition, she/he violated a
             context-specific rule (e.g., by placing a yellow toy in a
             green box, instead of a yellow box). Children in both age
             groups justified their punishment in the social rules
             condition mostly by referring to the rule (e.g., "He must
             put yellow toys in the yellow box"). In contrast, in the
             moral condition they mostly justified their punishment by
             simply referring to the observed fact (e.g., "He stole"),
             seeing no need to state the norm involved (e.g., "He must
             not steal"), presumably because they assumed this as part of
             their moral common ground with their partner. These results
             suggest that preschoolers assume certain common ground moral
             values with their peers and use these in formulating
             explicit moral judgments and justifications. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/dev0000424},
   Key = {fds332050}
}

@article{fds329017,
   Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Young children are more willing to accept group decisions in
             which they have had a voice.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {166},
   Pages = {67-78},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003},
   Abstract = {People accept an unequal distribution of resources if they
             judge that the decision-making process was fair. In this
             study, 3- and 5-year-old children played an allocation game
             with two puppets. The puppets decided against a fair
             distribution in all conditions, but they allowed children to
             have various degrees of participation in the decision-making
             process. Children of both ages protested less when they were
             first asked to agree with the puppets' decision compared
             with when there was no agreement. When ignored, the younger
             children protested less than the older children-perhaps
             because they did not expect to have a say in the
             process-whereas they protested more when they were given an
             opportunity to voice their opinion-perhaps because their
             stated opinion was ignored. These results suggest that
             during the preschool years, children begin to expect to be
             asked for their opinion in a decision, and they accept
             disadvantageous decisions if they feel that they have had a
             voice in the decision-making process.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003},
   Key = {fds329017}
}

@article{fds335758,
   Author = {Halina, M and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The goal of ape pointing.},
   Journal = {Plos One},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e0195182},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195182},
   Abstract = {Captive great apes regularly use pointing gestures in their
             interactions with humans. However, the precise function of
             this gesture is unknown. One possibility is that apes use
             pointing primarily to direct attention (as in "please look
             at that"); another is that they point mainly as an action
             request (such as "can you give that to me?"). We
             investigated these two possibilities here by examining how
             the looking behavior of recipients affects pointing in
             chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus).
             Upon pointing to food, subjects were faced with a recipient
             who either looked at the indicated object (successful-look)
             or failed to look at the indicated object (failed-look). We
             predicted that, if apes point primarily to direct attention,
             subjects would spend more time pointing in the failed-look
             condition because the goal of their gesture had not been
             met. Alternatively, we expected that, if apes point
             primarily to request an object, subjects would not differ in
             their pointing behavior between the successful-look and
             failed-look conditions because these conditions differed
             only in the looking behavior of the recipient. We found that
             subjects did differ in their pointing behavior across the
             successful-look and failed-look conditions, but contrary to
             our prediction subjects spent more time pointing in the
             successful-look condition. These results suggest that apes
             are sensitive to the attentional states of gestural
             recipients, but their adjustments are aimed at multiple
             goals. We also found a greater number of individuals with a
             strong right-hand than left-hand preference for
             pointing.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0195182},
   Key = {fds335758}
}

@article{fds328848,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Children's developing metaethical judgments.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {164},
   Pages = {163-177},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008},
   Abstract = {Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may
             approach things more relativistically if different cultures
             are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children
             (N=136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral
             matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong
             to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it
             is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical
             judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party
             (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right.
             We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were
             more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a
             normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative
             extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and
             background) than when the antinormative judge was another
             ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a
             comparison case where parties disagreed about the
             possibility of different physical laws. These findings
             suggest that although young children often exhibit moral
             objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their
             objectivism with culturally relative metaethical
             judgments.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008},
   Key = {fds328848}
}

@article{fds326493,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I},
   Title = {The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of Human
             Cooperation.},
   Journal = {Human Nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {274-288},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1},
   Abstract = {To explain the evolutionary emergence of uniquely human
             skills and motivations for cooperation, Tomasello et al.
             (2012, in Current Anthropology 53(6):673-92) proposed the
             interdependence hypothesis. The key adaptive context in this
             account was the obligate collaborative foraging of early
             human adults. Hawkes (2014, in Human Nature 25(1):28-48),
             following Hrdy (Mothers and Others, Harvard University
             Press, 2009), provided an alternative account for the
             emergence of uniquely human cooperative skills in which the
             key was early human infants' attempts to solicit care and
             attention from adults in a cooperative breeding context.
             Here we attempt to reconcile these two accounts. Our
             composite account accepts Hrdy's and Hawkes's contention
             that the extremely early emergence of human infants'
             cooperative skills suggests an important role for
             cooperative breeding as adaptive context, perhaps in early
             Homo. But our account also insists that human cooperation
             goes well beyond these nascent skills to include such things
             as the communicative and cultural conventions, norms, and
             institutions created by later Homo and early modern humans
             to deal with adult problems of social coordination. As part
             of this account we hypothesize how each of the main stages
             of human ontogeny (infancy, childhood, adolescence) was
             transformed during evolution both by infants' cooperative
             skills "migrating up" in age and by adults' cooperative
             skills "migrating down" in age.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1},
   Key = {fds326493}
}

@article{fds320781,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Kante, N and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Toddlers Help a Peer.},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {88},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1642-1652},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12686},
   Abstract = {Toddlers are remarkably prosocial toward adults, yet little
             is known about their helping behavior toward peers. In the
             present study with 18- and 30-month-old toddlers (n = 192,
             48 dyads per age group), one child needed help reaching an
             object to continue a task that was engaging for both
             children. The object was within reach of the second child
             who helped significantly more often compared to a no-need
             control condition. The helper also fulfilled the peer's need
             when the task was engaging only for the child needing help.
             These findings suggest that toddlers' skills and motivations
             of helping do not depend on having a competent and helpful
             recipient, such as an adult, but rather they are much more
             flexible and general.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12686},
   Key = {fds320781}
}

@article{fds327646,
   Author = {Kano, F and Krupenye, C and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Submentalizing Cannot Explain Belief-Based Action
             Anticipation in Apes.},
   Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {633-634},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011},
   Key = {fds327646}
}

@article{fds328849,
   Author = {Grueneisen, S and Duguid, S and Saur, H and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Children, chimpanzees, and bonobos adjust the visibility of
             their actions for cooperators and competitors.},
   Journal = {Scientific Reports},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {8504},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7},
   Abstract = {Chimpanzees and bonobos are highly capable of tracking
             other's mental states. It has been proposed, however, that
             in contrast to humans, chimpanzees are only able to do this
             in competitive interactions but this has rarely been
             directly tested. Here, pairs of chimpanzees or bonobos
             (Study 1) and 4-year-old children (Study 2) were presented
             with two almost identical tasks differing only regarding the
             social context. In the cooperation condition, players'
             interests were matched: they had to make corresponding
             choices to be mutually rewarded. To facilitate coordination,
             subjects should thus make their actions visible to their
             partner whose view was partially occluded. In the
             competition condition, players' interests were directly
             opposed: the partner tried to match the subject's choice but
             subjects were only rewarded if they chose differently, so
             that they benefited from hiding their actions. The apes
             successfully adapted their decisions to the social context
             and their performance was markedly better in the cooperation
             condition. Children also distinguished between the two
             contexts, but somewhat surprisingly, performed better in the
             competitive condition. These findings demonstrate
             experimentally that chimpanzees and bonobos can take into
             account what others can see in cooperative interactions.
             Their social-cognitive skills are thus more flexible than
             previously assumed.},
   Doi = {10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7},
   Key = {fds328849}
}

@article{fds326494,
   Author = {Haux, L and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Do young children preferentially trust gossip or firsthand
             observation in choosing a collaborative partner?},
   Journal = {Social Development (Oxford, England)},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {466-474},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sode.12225},
   Doi = {10.1111/sode.12225},
   Key = {fds326494}
}

@article{fds328850,
   Author = {Engelmann, JM and Clift, JB and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Social disappointment explains chimpanzees' behaviour in the
             inequity aversion task.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
             Sciences},
   Volume = {284},
   Number = {1861},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1502},
   Abstract = {Chimpanzees' refusal of less-preferred food when an
             experimenter has previously provided preferred food to a
             conspecific has been taken as evidence for a sense of
             fairness. Here, we present a novel hypothesis-the social
             disappointment hypothesis-according to which food refusals
             express chimpanzees' disappointment in the human
             experimenter for not rewarding them as well as they could
             have. We tested this hypothesis using a two-by-two design in
             which food was either distributed by an experimenter or a
             machine and with a partner present or absent. We found that
             chimpanzees were more likely to reject food when it was
             distributed by an experimenter rather than by a machine and
             that they were not more likely to do so when a partner was
             present. These results suggest that chimpanzees' refusal of
             less-preferred food stems from social disappointment in the
             experimenter and not from a sense of fairness.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.1502},
   Key = {fds328850}
}

@article{fds320785,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children's Intrinsic Motivation to Provide Help Themselves
             After Accidentally Harming Others.},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {88},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1251-1264},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12646},
   Abstract = {Little is known about the flexibility of children's
             prosocial motivation. Here, 2- and 3-year-old children's
             (n = 128) internal arousal, as measured via changes in
             pupil dilation, was increased after they accidentally harmed
             a victim but were unable to repair the harm. If they were
             able to repair (or if they themselves did not cause the harm
             and the help was provided by someone else) their arousal
             subsided. This suggests that children are especially
             motivated to help those whom they have harmed, perhaps out
             of a sense of guilt and a desire to reconcile with them.
             Young children care not only about the well-being of others
             but also about the relationship they have with those who
             depend on their help.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12646},
   Key = {fds320785}
}

@article{fds325488,
   Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Young children mostly keep, and expect others to keep, their
             promises.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {159},
   Pages = {140-158},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004},
   Abstract = {Promises are speech acts that create an obligation to do the
             promised action. In three studies, we investigated whether
             3- and 5-year-olds (N=278) understand the normative
             implications of promising in prosocial interactions. In
             Study 1, children helped a partner who promised to share
             stickers. When the partner failed to uphold the promise, 3-
             and 5-year-olds protested and referred to promise norms. In
             Study 2, when children in this same age range were asked to
             promise to continue a cleaning task-and they agreed-they
             persisted longer on the task and mentioned their obligation
             more frequently than without such a promise. They also
             persisted longer after a promise than after a cleaning
             reminder (Study 3). In prosocial interactions, thus, young
             children feel a normative obligation to keep their promises
             and expect others to keep their promises as
             well.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004},
   Key = {fds325488}
}

@article{fds327020,
   Author = {Schmelz, M and Grueneisen, S and Kabalak, A and Jost, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees return favors at a personal cost.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {114},
   Number = {28},
   Pages = {7462-7467},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1700351114},
   Abstract = {Humans regularly provide others with resources at a personal
             cost to themselves. Chimpanzees engage in some cooperative
             behaviors in the wild as well, but their motivational
             underpinnings are unclear. In three experiments, chimpanzees
             (Pan troglodytes) always chose between an option delivering
             food both to themselves and a partner and one delivering
             food only to themselves. In one condition, a conspecific
             partner had just previously taken a personal risk to make
             this choice available. In another condition, no assistance
             from the partner preceded the subject's decision.
             Chimpanzees made significantly more prosocial choices after
             receiving their partner's assistance than when no assistance
             was given (experiment 1) and, crucially, this was the case
             even when choosing the prosocial option was materially
             costly for the subject (experiment 2). Moreover, subjects
             appeared sensitive to the risk of their partner's assistance
             and chose prosocially more often when their partner risked
             losing food by helping (experiment 3). These findings
             demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees are willing to
             incur a material cost to deliver rewards to a conspecific,
             but only if that conspecific previously assisted them, and
             particularly when this assistance was risky. Some key
             motivations involved in human cooperation thus may have
             deeper phylogenetic roots than previously
             suspected.},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1700351114},
   Key = {fds327020}
}

@article{fds326491,
   Author = {Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {From imitation to implementation: How two- and
             three-year-old children learn to enforce social
             norms},
   Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {237-248},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12159},
   Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12159},
   Key = {fds326491}
}

@article{fds326492,
   Author = {Rapp, DJ and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {The impact of choice on young children’s prosocial
             motivation},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {158},
   Pages = {112-121},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004},
   Key = {fds326492}
}

@article{fds326490,
   Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees, bonobos and children successfully coordinate in
             conflict situations.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
             Sciences},
   Volume = {284},
   Number = {1856},
   Publisher = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
             Sciences},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.0259},
   Abstract = {Social animals need to coordinate with others to reap the
             benefits of group-living even when individuals' interests
             are misaligned. We compare how chimpanzees, bonobos and
             children coordinate their actions with a conspecific in a
             Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how
             organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict. In
             study 1, we presented pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and
             children with an unequal reward distribution. In the
             critical condition, the preferred reward could only be
             obtained by waiting for the partner to act, with the risk
             that if no one acted, both would lose the rewards. Apes and
             children successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards.
             Children used a 'both-partner-pull' strategy and
             communicated during the task, while some apes relied on an
             'only-one-partner-pulls' strategy to solve the task,
             although there were also signs of strategic behaviour as
             they waited for their partner to pull when that strategy led
             to the preferred reward. In study 2, we presented pairs of
             chimpanzees and bonobos with the same set-up as in study 1
             with the addition of a non-social option that provided them
             with a secure reward. In this situation, apes had to
             actively decide between the unequal distribution and the
             alternative. In this set-up, apes maximized their rewards by
             taking their partners' potential actions into account. In
             conclusion, children and apes showed clear instances of
             strategic decision-making to maximize their own rewards
             while maintaining successful coordination.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.0259},
   Key = {fds326490}
}

@article{fds320783,
   Author = {Hardecker, S and Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children’s Developing Understanding of the Conventionality
             of Rules},
   Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {163-188},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624},
   Abstract = {© 2017 Taylor & Francis. Much research has investigated how
             children relate to norms taught to them by adult
             authorities. Very few studies have investigated norms that
             arise out of children’s own peer interactions. In two
             studies, we investigated how 5- and 7-year-old children
             teach, enforce, and understand rules that they either
             created themselves or were taught by an adult. Children
             (N = 240) were asked to either invent game rules on their
             own or were taught these exact same rules by an adult (yoked
             design). Children of both ages enforced and transmitted the
             rules in a normative way, regardless of whether they had
             invented them or were taught the rules by an adult,
             suggesting that they viewed even their own self-made rules
             as normatively binding. However, creating the rules led
             5-year-old children to understand them as much more
             changeable as compared with adult-taught rules.
             Seven-year-olds, in contrast, regarded both kinds of rules
             as equally changeable, indeed allowing fewer changes to
             their self-created rules than 5-year-olds. While the process
             of creating rules seemed to enlighten preschoolers’
             understanding of the conventionality of the rules,
             school-aged children regarded both self-created rules and
             adult-taught rules in a similar manner, suggesting a deeper
             understanding of rule normativity as arising from social
             agreement and commitment.},
   Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624},
   Key = {fds320783}
}

@article{fds320782,
   Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Young children, but not chimpanzees, are averse to
             disadvantageous and advantageous inequities.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {155},
   Pages = {48-66},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013},
   Abstract = {The age at which young children show an aversion to
             inequitable resource distributions, especially those
             favoring themselves, is unclear. It is also unclear whether
             great apes, as humans' nearest evolutionary relatives, have
             an aversion to inequitable resource distributions at all.
             Using a common methodology across species and child ages,
             the current two studies found that 3- and 4-year-old
             children (N=64) not only objected when they received less
             than a collaborative partner but also sacrificed to equalize
             when they received more. They did neither of these things in
             a nonsocial situation, demonstrating the fundamental role of
             social comparison. In contrast, chimpanzees (N=9) showed no
             aversion to inequitable distributions, only a concern for
             maximizing their own resources, with no differences between
             social and nonsocial conditions. These results underscore
             the unique importance for humans, even early in ontogeny,
             for treating others fairly, presumably as a way of becoming
             a cooperative member of one's cultural group.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013},
   Key = {fds320782}
}

@article{fds325489,
   Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by taking
             turns and along dominance asymmetries.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {53},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {265-273},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000236},
   Abstract = {Humans constantly have to coordinate their decisions with
             others even when their interests are conflicting (e.g., when
             2 drivers have to decide who yields at an intersection). So
             far, however, little is known about the development of these
             abilities. Here, we present dyads of 5-year-olds (N = 40)
             with a repeated chicken game using a novel methodology: Two
             children each steered an automated toy train carrying a
             reward. The trains simultaneously moved toward each other so
             that in order to avoid a crash-which left both children
             empty-handed-1 train had to swerve. By swerving, however,
             the trains lost a portion of the rewards so that it was in
             each child's interest to go straight. Children coordinated
             their decisions successfully over multiple rounds, and they
             mostly did so by taking turns at swerving. In dyads in which
             turn-taking was rare, dominant children obtained
             significantly higher payoffs than their partners. Moreover,
             the coordination process was more efficient in turn-taking
             dyads as indicated by a significant reduction in conflicts
             and verbal protest. These findings indicate that already by
             the late preschool years children can independently
             coordinate decisions with peers in recurrent conflicts of
             interest. (PsycINFO Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/dev0000236},
   Key = {fds325489}
}

@article{fds329018,
   Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance
             in a false belief task inanimate control.},
   Journal = {Communicative & Integrative Biology},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e1343771},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771},
   Abstract = {Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with
             humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as
             desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief
             task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a
             human actor would search for a goal object where he had last
             seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no
             longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking
             behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but
             rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use
             of inanimate controls to test this alternative
             submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we
             implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous
             false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but
             showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant
             tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no
             evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes'
             anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.},
   Doi = {10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771},
   Key = {fds329018}
}

@article{fds322245,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The fulfillment of others' needs elevates children's body
             posture.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {53},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {100-113},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000173},
   Abstract = {Much is known about young children's helping behavior, but
             little is known about the underlying motivations and
             emotions involved. In 2 studies we found that 2-year-old
             children showed positive emotions of similar magnitude-as
             measured by changes in their postural elevation using depth
             sensor imaging technology-after they achieved a goal for
             themselves and after they helped another person achieve her
             goal. Conversely, children's posture decreased in elevation
             when their actions did not result in a positive outcome.
             These results suggest that for young children, working for
             themselves and helping others are similarly rewarding.
             (PsycINFO Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/dev0000173},
   Key = {fds322245}
}

@article{fds326212,
   Author = {Buttelmann, D and Buttelmann, F and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an
             interactive helping task.},
   Journal = {Plos One},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e0173793},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173793},
   Abstract = {Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of
             circumstances requires an understanding of their
             psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the
             great apes, understand many psychological states of others,
             for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so
             far there is little evidence that they possess the key
             marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding
             of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal
             (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human
             1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including
             chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and
             orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and
             false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may
             possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's
             actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such
             understanding might not be the exclusive province of the
             human species.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0173793},
   Key = {fds326212}
}

@article{fds320786,
   Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The Early Emergence of Guilt-Motivated Prosocial
             Behavior.},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {87},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1772-1782},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12628},
   Abstract = {Guilt serves vital prosocial functions: It motivates
             transgressors to make amends, thus restoring damaged
             relationships. Previous developmental research on guilt has
             not clearly distinguished it from sympathy for a victim or a
             tendency to repair damage in general. The authors tested 2-
             and 3-year-old children (N = 62 and 64, respectively) in a
             2 × 2 design, varying whether or not a mishap caused harm
             to someone and whether children themselves caused that
             mishap. Three-year-olds showed greatest reparative behavior
             when they had caused the mishap and it caused harm, thus
             showing a specific effect of guilt. Two-year-olds repaired
             more whenever harm was caused, no matter by whom, thus
             showing only an effect of sympathy. Guilt as a distinct
             motivator of prosocial behavior thus emerges by at least
             3 years.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12628},
   Key = {fds320786}
}

@article{fds320787,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Grossmann, T and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Young Children Want to See Others Get the Help They
             Need.},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {87},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1703-1714},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12633},
   Abstract = {Children's instrumental helping has sometimes been
             interpreted as a desire to complete action sequences or to
             restore the physical order of things. Two-year-old children
             (n = 51) selectively retrieved for an adult the object he
             needed rather than one he did not (but which equally served
             to restore the previous order of things), and those with
             greater internal arousal (i.e., pupil dilation) were faster
             to help. In a second experiment (n = 64), children's
             arousal increased when they witnessed an adult respond
             inappropriately to another adult's need. This was not the
             case in a nonsocial control condition. These findings
             suggest that children's helping is not aimed at restoring
             the order of things but rather at seeing another person's
             need fulfilled.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12633},
   Key = {fds320787}
}

@article{fds320784,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {How chimpanzees cooperate: If dominance is artificially
             constrained.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {113},
   Number = {44},
   Pages = {E6728-E6729},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1614378113},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1614378113},
   Key = {fds320784}
}

@article{fds320788,
   Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act
             according to false beliefs.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {354},
   Number = {6308},
   Pages = {110-114},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf8110},
   Abstract = {Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are
             able to understand that others' actions are driven not by
             reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those
             beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans
             many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed
             experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We
             use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for
             human infants) to show that three species of great apes
             reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a
             location where he falsely believes an object to be, even
             though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer
             there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at
             least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false
             beliefs.},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.aaf8110},
   Key = {fds320788}
}

@article{fds320789,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {In Memoriam: Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915–2016]},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {155},
   Pages = {iii-iv},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013},
   Key = {fds320789}
}

@article{fds321683,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Butler, LP and Heinz, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social
             Norm},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {10},
   Pages = {1360-1370},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616661182},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797616661182},
   Key = {fds321683}
}

@article{fds320790,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915-2016].},
   Journal = {Journal of Child Language},
   Volume = {43},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {967-968},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000916000374},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0305000916000374},
   Key = {fds320790}
}

@article{fds323256,
   Author = {Vaish, A and Herrmann, E and Markmann, C and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {153},
   Pages = {43-51},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011},
   Key = {fds323256}
}

@article{fds340136,
   Author = {Melis, AP and Grocke, P and Kalbitz, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {One for You, One for Me},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {987-996},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616644070},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797616644070},
   Key = {fds340136}
}

@article{fds323257,
   Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Rapp, DJ and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Young children (sometimes) do the right thing even when
             their peers do not},
   Journal = {Cognitive Development},
   Volume = {39},
   Pages = {86-92},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004},
   Key = {fds323257}
}

@article{fds323843,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The ontogeny of cultural learning},
   Journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
   Volume = {8},
   Pages = {1-4},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008},
   Key = {fds323843}
}

@article{fds323258,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Preschoolers understand the normativity of cooperatively
             structured competition},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
   Volume = {143},
   Pages = {34-47},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014},
   Key = {fds323258}
}

@article{fds323259,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Mietzsch, T and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Young Children Understand the Role of Agreement in
             Establishing Arbitrary Norms-But Unanimity Is
             Key},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {87},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {612-626},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12510},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12510},
   Key = {fds323259}
}

@article{fds323260,
   Author = {Vogelsang, M and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Giving Is Nicer than Taking: Preschoolers Reciprocate Based
             on the Social Intentions of the Distributor},
   Journal = {Plos One},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {e0147539-e0147539},
   Publisher = {Public Library of Science (PLoS)},
   Editor = {di Pellegrino, G},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147539},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0147539},
   Key = {fds323260}
}

@article{fds322246,
   Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Svetlova, M and Johe, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Children's developing understanding of legitimate reasons
             for allocating resources unequally},
   Journal = {Cognitive Development},
   Volume = {37},
   Pages = {42-52},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001},
   Abstract = {© 2015 Elsevier Inc. Recent research on distributive
             justice suggests that young children prefer equal
             distributions. But sometimes unequal distributions are
             justified, such as when some individuals deserve more than
             others based on merit, need, or agreed-upon rules. When and
             how do children start incorporating such factors in their
             distributive decisions? Three-, 5-, and 8-year-old children
             (N= 72) had the opportunity to allocate several items to two
             individuals. One individual was neutral and the other
             provided a reason why she should be favored. Three of these
             reasons were legitimate (based on merit, need, or
             agreed-upon rules) whereas a fourth was idiosyncratic ("I
             just want more."). We found that with age, children's
             equality preference diminished and their acceptance of
             various reasons for privileged treatment increased. It was
             not until 8 years, however, that they differentiated between
             legitimate and idiosyncratic reasons for inequality. These
             findings suggest that children's sense of distributive
             justice develops from an early equality preference to a more
             flexible understanding of the basic normative reasons that
             inequality may, in some cases, be just.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001},
   Key = {fds322246}
}

@article{fds323261,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Misch, A and Hernandez-Lloreda, V and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Uniquely human self-control begins at school
             age},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {979-993},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12272},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.12272},
   Key = {fds323261}
}

@article{fds323262,
   Author = {Schäfer, M and Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Fair Is Not Fair Everywhere},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {8},
   Pages = {1252-1260},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615586188},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797615586188},
   Key = {fds323262}
}

@article{fds323263,
   Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience
             to infer what a competitor can see?},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {105},
   Pages = {211-221},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028},
   Key = {fds323263}
}

@article{fds323264,
   Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children use salience to solve coordination
             problems},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {495-501},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12224},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.12224},
   Key = {fds323264}
}

@article{fds323265,
   Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {“I Know You Don't Know I Know…” Children Use
             Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning for Peer
             Coordination},
   Journal = {Child Development},
   Volume = {86},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {287-293},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12264},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12264},
   Key = {fds323265}
}

@article{fds321684,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call,,
             J},
   Title = {Restorative justice in young children},
   Journal = {Current Biology},
   Volume = {25},
   Pages = {1-5},
   Year = {2015},
   Key = {fds321684}
}

@article{fds323266,
   Author = {Rossano, F and Fiedler, L and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Preschoolers’ understanding of the role of communication
             and cooperation in establishing property
             rights.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {51},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {176-184},
   Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
   Year = {2015},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038493},
   Doi = {10.1037/a0038493},
   Key = {fds323266}
}

@article{fds320792,
   Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Differences in the early cognitive development of children
             and great apes.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychobiology},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {547-573},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/dev.21125},
   Abstract = {There is very little research comparing great ape and human
             cognition developmentally. In the current studies we
             compared a cross-sectional sample of 2- to 4-year-old human
             children (n=48) with a large sample of chimpanzees and
             bonobos in the same age range (n=42, hereafter: apes) on a
             broad array of cognitive tasks. We then followed a group of
             juvenile apes (n=44) longitudinally over 3 years to track
             their cognitive development in greater detail. In skills of
             physical cognition (space, causality, quantities), children
             and apes performed comparably at 2 years of age, but by 4
             years of age children were more advanced (whereas apes
             stayed at their 2-year-old performance levels). In skills of
             social cognition (communication, social learning, theory of
             mind), children out-performed apes already at 2 years, and
             increased this difference even more by 4 years. Patterns of
             development differed more between children and apes in the
             social domain than the physical domain, with support for
             these patterns present in both the cross-sectional and
             longitudinal ape data sets. These results indicate key
             differences in the pattern and pace of cognitive development
             between humans and other apes, particularly in the early
             emergence of specific social cognitive capacities in
             humans.},
   Doi = {10.1002/dev.21125},
   Key = {fds320792}
}

@article{fds321685,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The ultra-social animal},
   Journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {187-194},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2015},
   Doi = {10.1002/ejsp.2015},
   Key = {fds321685}
}

@article{fds320793,
   Author = {Grosse, G and Scott-Phillips, TC and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Three-year-olds hide their communicative intentions in
             appropriate contexts.},
   Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
   Volume = {49},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {2095-2101},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032017},
   Abstract = {Human cooperative communication involves both an informative
             intention that the recipient understands the content of the
             signal and also a (Gricean) communicative intention that the
             recipient recognizes that the speaker has an informative
             intention. The degree to which children understand this
             2-layered nature of communication is the subject of some
             debate. One phenomenon that would seem to constitute clear
             evidence of such understanding is hidden authorship, in
             which informative acts are produced but with the
             communicative intent behind them intentionally hidden. In
             this study, 3- and 5-year-old children were told that an
             adult was seeking a toy but wanted to find it on her own.
             Children of both ages often did something to make the toy
             easier for the adult to see while at the same time
             concealing their actions in some way. This suggests that by
             the age of 3, children are able to separate the multiple
             layers of intentionality involved in human cooperative
             communication.},
   Doi = {10.1037/a0032017},
   Key = {fds320793}
}

@article{fds320794,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Keupp, S and Hare, B and Vaish, A and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Direct and indirect reputation formation in nonhuman great
             apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo
             pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens).},
   Journal = {Journal of Comparative Psychology},
   Volume = {127},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {63-75},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028929},
   Abstract = {Humans make decisions about when and with whom to cooperate
             based on their reputations. People either learn about others
             by direct interaction or by observing third-party
             interactions or gossip. An important question is whether
             other animal species, especially our closest living
             relatives, the nonhuman great apes, also form reputations of
             others. In Study 1, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and
             2.5-year-old human children experienced a nice experimenter
             who tried to give food/toys to the subject and a mean
             experimenter who interrupted the food/toy giving. In studies
             2 and 3, nonhuman great apes and human children could only
             passively observe a similar interaction, in which a nice
             experimenter and a mean experimenter interacted with a third
             party. Orangutans and 2.5-year-old human children preferred
             to approach the nice experimenter rather than the mean one
             after having directly experienced their respective
             behaviors. Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human
             children also took into account experimenter actions toward
             third parties in forming reputations. These studies show
             that the human ability to form direct and indirect
             reputation judgment is already present in young children and
             shared with at least some of the other great
             apes.},
   Doi = {10.1037/a0028929},
   Key = {fds320794}
}

@article{fds321687,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Vaish, A},
   Title = {Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Psychology},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {231-255},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812},
   Key = {fds321687}
}

@article{fds320795,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Cissewski, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {A comparison of temperament in nonhuman apes and human
             infants.},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1393-1405},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x},
   Abstract = {The adaptive behavior of primates, including humans, is
             often mediated by temperament. Human behavior likely differs
             from that of other primates in part due to temperament. In
             the current study we compared the reaction of bonobos,
             chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human infants to
             novel objects and people - as a measure of their
             shyness-boldness, a key temperamental trait. Human children
             at the age of 2.5 years avoided novelty of all kinds far
             more than the other ape species. This response was most
             similar to that seen in bonobos and least like that of
             chimpanzees and orangutans. This comparison represents a
             first step in characterizing the temperamental profiles of
             species in the hominoid clade, and these findings are
             consistent with the hypothesis that human temperament has
             evolved since our lineage diverged from the other apes in
             ways that likely have broad effects on behavior. These
             findings also provide new insights into how species
             differences in ecology may shape differences in
             temperament.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x},
   Key = {fds320795}
}

@article{fds320797,
   Author = {Hare, B and Rosati, A and Kaminski, J and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The domestication hypothesis for dogs' skills with human
             communication: a response to Udell et al. (2008) and Wynne
             et al. (2008)},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {79},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {e1-e6},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031},
   Key = {fds320797}
}

@article{fds320798,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Differences in the cognitive skills of bonobos and
             chimpanzees.},
   Journal = {Plos One},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {8},
   Pages = {e12438},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012438},
   Abstract = {While bonobos and chimpanzees are both genetically and
             behaviorally very similar, they also differ in significant
             ways. Bonobos are more cautious and socially tolerant while
             chimpanzees are more dependent on extractive foraging, which
             requires tools. The similarities suggest the two species
             should be cognitively similar while the behavioral
             differences predict where the two species should differ
             cognitively. We compared both species on a wide range of
             cognitive problems testing their understanding of the
             physical and social world. Bonobos were more skilled at
             solving tasks related to theory of mind or an understanding
             of social causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at
             tasks requiring the use of tools and an understanding of
             physical causality. These species differences support the
             role of ecological and socio-ecological pressures in shaping
             cognitive skills over relatively short periods of
             evolutionary time.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0012438},
   Key = {fds320798}
}

@article{fds320799,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Call, J and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {The structure of individual differences in the cognitive
             abilities of children and chimpanzees.},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {102-110},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797609356511},
   Abstract = {Most studies of animal cognition focus on group performance
             and neglect individual differences and the correlational
             structure of cognitive abilities. Moreover, no previous
             studies have compared the correlational structure of
             cognitive abilities in nonhuman animals and humans. We
             compared the structure of individual differences of 106
             chimpanzees and 105 two-year-old human children using 15
             cognitive tasks that posed problems about the physical or
             social world. We found a similar factor of spatial cognition
             for the two species. But whereas the chimpanzees had only a
             single factor in addition to spatial cognition, the children
             had two distinct additional factors: one for physical
             cognition and one for social cognition. These findings, in
             combination with previous research, support the proposal
             that humans share many cognitive skills with nonhuman apes,
             especially for dealing with the physical world, but in
             addition have evolved some specialized skills of social
             cognition.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797609356511},
   Key = {fds320799}
}

@article{fds320800,
   Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees coordinate in a negotiation game},
   Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {381-392},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003},
   Abstract = {A crucially important aspect of human cooperation is the
             ability to negotiate to cooperative outcomes when interests
             over resources conflict. Although chimpanzees and other
             social species may negotiate conflicting interests regarding
             travel direction or activity timing, very little is known
             about their ability to negotiate conflicting preferences
             over food. In the current study, we presented pairs of
             chimpanzees with a choice between two cooperative tasks-one
             with equal payoffs (e.g., 5-5) and one with unequal payoffs
             (higher and lower than in the equal option, e.g., 10-1).
             This created a conflict of interests between partners with
             failure to work together on the same cooperative task
             resulting in no payoff for either partner. The chimpanzee
             pairs cooperated successfully in as many as 78-94% of the
             trials across experiments. Even though dominant chimpanzees
             preferred the unequal option (as they would obtain the
             largest payoff), subordinate chimpanzees were able to get
             their way (the equal option) in 22-56% of trials across
             conditions. Various analyses showed that subjects were both
             strategic and also cognizant of the strategies used by their
             partners. These results demonstrate that one of our two
             closest primate relatives, the chimpanzee, can settle
             conflicts of interest over resources in mutually satisfying
             ways-even without the social norms of equity, planned
             strategies of reciprocity, and the complex communication
             characteristic of human negotiation. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.
             All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003},
   Key = {fds320800}
}

@article{fds320801,
   Author = {Wobber, V and Hare, B and Koler-Matznick, J and Wrangham, R and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Breed differences in domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris)
             comprehension of human communicative signals},
   Journal = {Interaction Studies},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {206-224},
   Publisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company},
   Editor = {Matsuzawa, T},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.10.2.06wob},
   Abstract = {Recent research suggests that some human-like social skills
             evolved in dogs (Canis familiaris) during domestication as
             an incidental by-product of selection for "tame" forms of
             behavior. It is still possible, however, that the social
             skills of certain dog breeds came under direct selection
             that led to further increases in social problem solving
             ability. To test this hypothesis, different breeds of
             domestic dogs were compared for their ability to use various
             human communicative behaviors to find hidden food. We found
             that even primitive breeds with little human contact were
             able to use communicative cues. Further, "working" dogs
             (shepherds and huskies: thought to be bred intentionally to
             respond to human cooperative communicative signals) were
             more skilled at using gestural cues than were non-working
             breeds (basenji and toy poodles: not thought to have been
             bred for their cooperative-communicative ability). This
             difference in performance existed regardless of whether the
             working breeds were more or less genetically wolf-like.
             These results suggest that subsequent to initial
             domesticating selection giving rise to cue-following skills,
             additional selection on communicative abilities in certain
             breeds has produced substantive differences in those breeds'
             abilities to follow cues. © John Benjamins Publishing
             Company.},
   Doi = {10.1075/is.10.2.06wob},
   Key = {fds320801}
}

@article{fds320803,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Response [3]},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {319},
   Number = {5863},
   Pages = {569},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds320803}
}

@article{fds320804,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernandez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Comparing social skills of children and apes -
             Response},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {319},
   Number = {5863},
   Pages = {570-570},
   Publisher = {AMER ASSOC ADVANCEMENT SCIENCE},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds320804}
}

@article{fds320802,
   Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Do chimpanzees reciprocate received favours?},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {951-962},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal interactions observed in animals may persist
             because individuals keep careful account of services
             exchanged with each group member. To test whether
             chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, possess the cognitive skills
             required for this type of contingency-based reciprocity, we
             gave chimpanzees the choice of cooperating with a
             conspecific who had helped them previously or one who had
             not helped them in two different experimental tasks. In the
             first experiment, one of the partners preferentially
             recruited the subjects to cooperate in a mutualistic task,
             while the other potential partner never chose to cooperate
             with the subject, but rather chose a different partner. In
             the second experiment, one of the partners altruistically
             helped the subjects to reach food, while the other partner
             never helped the subject, but rather took the food himself.
             In both experiments there was some evidence that the
             chimpanzees increased the amount they cooperated with or
             helped the partner who had been more helpful towards them
             compared to their baseline behaviour towards the same
             individual (or in a control condition). However, in both
             experiments this effect was relatively weak and subjects did
             not preferentially favour the individual who had favoured
             them over the one who had not in either experiment. Although
             taken together, these experiments provide some support for
             the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of contingent
             reciprocity, they also suggest that models of immediate
             reciprocation and detailed accounts of recent exchanges
             (e.g. Tit for Tat) may not play a large role in guiding the
             social decisions of chimpanzees. © 2008 The Association for
             the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014},
   Key = {fds320802}
}

@article{fds320805,
   Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernàndez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition:
             the cultural intelligence hypothesis.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {317},
   Number = {5843},
   Pages = {1360-1366},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1146282},
   Abstract = {Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their
             nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence
             hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a
             species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging
             early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging
             knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by
             giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large
             numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives,
             chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human
             children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the
             cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the
             hypothesis that humans simply have more "general
             intelligence," we found that the children and chimpanzees
             had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the
             physical world but that the children had more sophisticated
             cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing
             with the social world.},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.1146282},
   Key = {fds320805}
}

@article{fds325191,
   Author = {Warneken, F and Hare, B and Melis, AP and Hanus, D and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young
             children.},
   Journal = {Plos Biology},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {e184},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184},
   Abstract = {People often act on behalf of others. They do so without
             immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even
             toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed
             that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology
             not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives,
             such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few
             experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have
             produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report
             experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms
             of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and
             repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two
             comparative studies, semi-free ranging chimpanzees helped an
             unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants,
             irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the
             helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study,
             chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to
             food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a
             newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These
             results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of
             altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human
             altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence
             suggested.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184},
   Key = {fds325191}
}

@article{fds325192,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Lehmann, H and Call,
             J},
   Title = {Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great
             apes and human infants: the cooperative eye
             hypothesis.},
   Journal = {Journal of Human Evolution},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {314-320},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001},
   Abstract = {As compared with other primates, humans have especially
             visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that
             this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for
             conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in
             close-range joint attentional and communicative
             interactions, which would seem to imply especially
             cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current
             study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye
             hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great
             apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked"
             to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes
             closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed
             gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head
             direction (although eye direction played some role as well).
             In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye
             direction in these same situations. These results
             demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in
             gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes
             evolved a new social function in human evolution, most
             likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social
             interactions.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001},
   Key = {fds325192}
}

@article{fds325195,
   Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by
             hiding.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {101},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {495-514},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011},
   Abstract = {There is little experimental evidence that any non-human
             species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate
             the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g.,
             manipulating what another sees). We show here that
             chimpanzees, one of humans' two closest primate relatives,
             sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others.
             Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel
             tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to
             approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the
             human's view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so).
             These findings not only corroborate previous work showing
             that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but
             also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are
             skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether
             others can or cannot see them.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011},
   Key = {fds325195}
}

@article{fds325194,
   Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Engineering cooperation in chimpanzees: tolerance
             constraints on cooperation},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {275-286},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018},
   Abstract = {The cooperative abilities of captive chimpanzees, Pan
             troglodytes, in experiments do not match the sophistication
             that might be predicted based on their naturally occurring
             cooperative behaviours. This discrepancy might partly be
             because in previous experiments potential chimpanzee
             cooperators were partnered without regard to their social
             relationship. We investigated the ability of chimpanzee
             dyads to solve a physical task cooperatively in relation to
             their interindividual tolerance levels. Pairs that were most
             capable of sharing food outside the test were also able to
             cooperate spontaneously (by simultaneously pulling two
             ropes) to obtain food. In contrast, pairs that were less
             inclined to share food outside of the test were unlikely to
             cooperate. Furthermore, previously successful subjects
             stopped cooperating when paired with a less tolerant
             partner, even when the food rewards were presented in a
             dispersed and divisible form to reduce competition between
             subjects. These results show that although chimpanzees are
             capable of spontaneous cooperation in a novel instrumental
             task, tolerance acts as a constraint on their ability to
             solve such cooperative problems. This finding highlights the
             importance of controlling such social constraints in future
             experiments on chimpanzee cooperation, and suggests that the
             evolution of human-like cooperative skills might have been
             preceded by the evolution of a more egalitarian social
             system and a more human-like temperament. © 2006 The
             Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018},
   Key = {fds325194}
}

@article{fds325193,
   Author = {Jensen, K and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {What's in it for me? Self-regard precludes altruism and
             spite in chimpanzees.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
             Sciences},
   Volume = {273},
   Number = {1589},
   Pages = {1013-1021},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3417},
   Abstract = {Sensitivity to fairness may influence whether individuals
             choose to engage in acts that are mutually beneficial,
             selfish, altruistic, or spiteful. In a series of three
             experiments, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could pull a rope
             to access out-of-reach food while concomitantly pulling
             another piece of food further away. In the first study, they
             could make a choice that solely benefited themselves
             (selfishness), or both themselves and another chimpanzee
             (mutualism). In the next two experiments, they could choose
             between providing food solely for another chimpanzee
             (altruism), or for neither while preventing the other
             chimpanzee from receiving a benefit (spite). The main result
             across all studies was that chimpanzees made their choices
             based solely on personal gain, with no regard for the
             outcomes of a conspecific. These results raise questions
             about the origins of human cooperative behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2005.3417},
   Key = {fds325193}
}

@article{fds325196,
   Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {311},
   Number = {5765},
   Pages = {1297-1300},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1123007},
   Abstract = {Humans collaborate with non-kin in special ways, but the
             evolutionary foundations of these collaborative skills
             remain unclear. We presented chimpanzees with collaboration
             problems in which they had to decide when to recruit a
             partner and which potential partner to recruit. In an
             initial study, individuals recruited a collaborator only
             when solving the problem required collaboration. In a second
             study, individuals recruited the more effective of two
             partners on the basis of their experience with each of them
             on a previous day. Therefore, recognizing when collaboration
             is necessary and determining who is the best collaborative
             partner are skills shared by both chimpanzees and humans, so
             such skills may have been present in their common ancestor
             before humans evolved their own complex forms of
             collaboration.},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.1123007},
   Key = {fds325196}
}

@article{fds325197,
   Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Human-like social skills in dogs?},
   Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {439-444},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003},
   Abstract = {Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social
             and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest
             primate relatives. For example, they use human social and
             communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find
             hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see
             in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid
             species suggest that these unusual social skills have a
             heritable component and initially evolved during
             domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating
             fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in
             chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar
             process may have been an important catalyst leading to the
             evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The
             study of convergent evolution provides an exciting
             opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary
             processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and
             communication.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003},
   Key = {fds325197}
}

@article{fds325198,
   Author = {Call, J and Hare, B and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of
             human intentional action.},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {488-498},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x},
   Abstract = {Understanding the intentional actions of others is a
             fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An
             important question is therefore whether other animal
             species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees,
             also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we
             show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training)
             behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling
             or unable to give them food Chimpanzees produced more
             behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an
             unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter
             These data together with other recent studies on
             chimpanzees' knowledge about others' visual perception show
             that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and
             perceptions of others than previously demonstrated},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x},
   Key = {fds325198}
}

@article{fds325199,
   Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in
             cooperative cognitive tasks},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {68},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {571-581},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011},
   Abstract = {In a series of four experiments, chimpanzees, Pan
             troglodytes, were given two cognitive tasks, an object
             choice task and a discrimination task (based on location),
             each in the context of either cooperation or competition. In
             both tasks chimpanzees performed more skilfully when
             competing than when cooperating, with some evidence that
             competition with conspecifics was especially facilitatory in
             the discrimination location task. This is the first study to
             demonstrate a facilitative cognitive effect for competition
             in a single experimental paradigm. We suggest that
             chimpanzee cognitive evolution is best understood in its
             socioecological context. © 2004 The Association for the
             Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011},
   Key = {fds325199}
}

@article{fds326035,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
   Title = {Chimpanzees versus humans: It's not that
             simple},
   Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {239-240},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4},
   Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4},
   Key = {fds326035}
}

@article{fds325200,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
   Title = {Chimpanzees understand psychological states - The question
             is which ones and to what extent},
   Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {153-156},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4},
   Abstract = {New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are
             needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal
             species understand about the psychological states of others.
             Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things
             about what others do and do not see, or have and have not
             seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about
             others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in
             competitive situations. They clearly do not have a
             human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is
             to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are
             similar and different.},
   Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4},
   Key = {fds325200}
}

@article{fds326346,
   Author = {Hare, B and Addessi, E and Call, J and Tomasello, M and Visalberghi,
             E},
   Title = {Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do
             and do not see?},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {65},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {131-142},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2002.2017},
   Abstract = {Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which
             two individuals competed over food. When given a choice
             between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or
             hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to
             retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the
             hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the
             dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was
             monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the
             piece of food that it approached. To test between these
             alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head
             start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of
             food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant
             entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes,
             subordinates that were given a head start did not
             preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first.
             Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the
             hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what
             another individual does or does not see. We compare our
             results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same
             paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social
             cognition. © 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal
             Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2002.2017},
   Key = {fds326346}
}

@article{fds325201,
   Author = {Hare, B and Brown, M and Williamson, C and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {The domestication of social cognition in
             dogs.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {298},
   Number = {5598},
   Pages = {1634-1636},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1072702},
   Abstract = {Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks
             in which they must read human communicative signals
             indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we
             found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show
             these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few
             weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do
             show these skills. These findings suggest that during the
             process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set
             of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to
             communicate with humans in unique ways.},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.1072702},
   Key = {fds325201}
}

@article{fds325202,
   Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {61},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {139-151},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518},
   Abstract = {We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by
             chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a
             subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food,
             which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side
             of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not
             seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved
             elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control
             conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the
             same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting
             procedure and could monitor the visual access of their
             dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive
             to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they
             should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food
             that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what
             they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either
             uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In
             experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their
             behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who
             witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant
             individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating
             their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed
             what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose
             consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which
             dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen
             hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely
             to be due to the changed nature of the competition under
             these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive
             skills. These findings suggest that at least in some
             situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees
             know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not
             know), and that they use this information to devise
             effective social-cognitive strategies. © 2001 The
             Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1518},
   Key = {fds325202}
}

@article{fds325570,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Fogleman, T},
   Title = {The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, Pan
             troglodytes, and rhesus macaques, Macaca
             mulatta},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {61},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {335-343},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1598},
   Abstract = {Primates follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to
             outside objects. We followed the ontogeny of this
             social-cognitive skill for two species: rhesus macaques and
             chimpanzees, in the first two experiments, using both a
             cross-sectional and a longitudinal design, we exposed
             individuals of different ages to a human looking in a
             specified direction. Rhesus infants first began reliably to
             follow the direction of this gaze at the end of the early
             infancy period, at about 5.5 months of age. Chimpanzees did
             not reliably follow human gaze until 3-4 years; this
             corresponds to the latter part of the late infancy period
             for this species. In the third experiment we exposed
             individuals of the same two species to a human repeatedly
             looking to the same location (with no special object at that
             location) to see if subjects would learn to ignore the
             looks. Only adults of the two species diminished their
             gaze-following behaviour over trials. This suggests that in
             the period between infancy and adulthood individuals of both
             species come to integrate their gaze-following skills with
             their more general social-cognitive knowledge about other
             animate beings and their behaviour, and so become able to
             deploy their gaze-following skills in a more flexible
             manner. © 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal
             Behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1598},
   Key = {fds325570}
}

@article{fds325203,
   Author = {Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Cues to food location that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris)
             of different ages do and do not use},
   Journal = {Animal Cognition},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {107-112},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710000070},
   Abstract = {The results of three experiments are reported. In the main
             study, a human experimenter presented domestic dogs (Canis
             familiaris) with a variety of social cues intended to
             indicate the location of hidden food. The novel findings of
             this study were: (1) dogs were able to use successfully
             several totally novel cues in which they watched a human
             place a marker in front of the target location; (2) dogs
             were unable to use the marker by itself with no behavioral
             cues (suggesting that some form of human behavior directed
             to the target location was a necessary part of the cue); and
             (3) there were no significant developments in dogs' skills
             in these tasks across the age range 4 months to 4 years
             (arguing against the necessity of extensive learning
             experiences with humans). In a follow- up study, dogs did
             not follow human gaze into "empty space" outside of the
             simulated foraging context. Finally, in a small pilot study,
             two arctic wolves (Canis lupus) were unable to use human
             cues to locate hidden food. These results suggest the
             possibility that domestic dogs have evolved an adaptive
             specialization for using human-produced directional cues in
             a goal-directed (especially foraging) context. Exactly how
             they understand these cues is still an open question. ©
             Springer-Verlag 2000.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s100710000070},
   Key = {fds325203}
}

@article{fds325204,
   Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Agnetta, B and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not
             see},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {771-785},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377},
   Abstract = {We report a series of experiments on social problem solving
             in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a
             subordinate and a dominant individual were put into
             competition over two pieces of food. In all experiments
             dominants obtained virtually all of the foods to which they
             had good visual and physical access. However, subordinates
             were successful quite often in three situations in which
             they had better visual access to the food than the dominant,
             for example, when the food was positioned so that only the
             subordinate (and not the dominant) could see it. In some
             cases, the subordinate might have been monitoring the
             behaviour of the dominant directly and simply avoided the
             food that the dominant was moving towards (which just
             happened to be the one it could see). In other cases,
             however, we ruled out this possibility by giving
             subordinates a small headstart and forcing them to make
             their choice (to go to the food that both competitors could
             see, or the food that only they could see) before the
             dominant was released into the area. Together with other
             recent studies, the present investigation suggests that
             chimpanzees know what conspecifics can and cannot see, and,
             furthermore, that they use this knowledge to devise
             effective social-cognitive strategies in naturally occurring
             food competition situations. (C)2000 The Association for the
             Study of Animal Behaviour.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1377},
   Key = {fds325204}
}

@article{fds325571,
   Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use human and conspecific
             social cues to locate hidden food},
   Journal = {Journal of Comparative Psychology},
   Volume = {113},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {X173-X177},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {June},
   Abstract = {Ten domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different breeds and
             ages were exposed to 2 different social cues indicating the
             location of hidden food, each provided by both a human
             informant and a conspecific informant (for a total of 4
             different social cues). For the local enhancement cue the
             informant approached the location where food was hidden and
             then stayed beside it. For the gaze and point cue, the
             informant stood equidistant between 2 hiding locations and
             bodily oriented and gazed toward the 1 in which food was
             hidden (the human informant also pointed). Eight of the 10
             subjects, including the one 6-month-old juvenile, were above
             chance with 2 or more cues. Results are discussed in terms
             of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes by means of
             which dogs come to use social cues to locate
             food.},
   Key = {fds325571}
}

@article{fds325205,
   Author = {Itakura, S and Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Chimpanzee use of human and conspecific social cues to
             locate hidden food},
   Journal = {Developmental Science},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {448-456},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00089},
   Abstract = {Two studies are reported in which chimpanzees attempted to
             use social cues to locate hidden food in one of two possible
             hiding places. In the first study four chimpanzees were
             exposed to a local enhancement cue (the informant approached
             and looked to the location where food was hidden and then
             remained beside it) and a gaze/point cue (the informant
             gazed and manually pointed towards the location where the
             food was hidden). Each cue was given by both a human
             informant and a chimpanzee informant. In the second study 12
             chimpanzees were exposed to a gaze direction cue in
             combination with a vocal cue (the human informant gazed to
             the hiding location and produced one of two different
             vocalizations: a 'food-bark' or a human word-form). The
             results were: (i) all subjects were quite skillful with the
             local enhancement cue, no matter who produced it; (ii) few
             subjects were skillful with the gaze/point cue, no matter
             who produced it (most of these being individuals who had
             been raised in infancy by humans); and (iii) most subjects
             were skillful when the human gazed and vocalized at the
             hiding place, with little difference between the two types
             of vocal cue. Findings are discussed in terms of
             chimpanzees' apparent need for additional cues, over and
             above gaze direction cues, to indicate the presence of
             food.},
   Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00089},
   Key = {fds325205}
}

@article{fds326036,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Agnetta, B},
   Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, follow gaze direction
             geometrically},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {769-777},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1192},
   Abstract = {Two experiments on chimpanzee gaze following are reported.
             In the first, chimpanzee subjects watched as a human
             experimenter looked around various types of barriers. The
             subjects looked around each of the barriers more when the
             human had done so than in a control condition (in which the
             human looked-in another direction). In the second
             experiment, chimpanzees watched as a human looked towards
             the back of their cage. As they turned to follow the human's
             gaze a distractor-object was presented. The chimpanzees
             looked at the distractor while still following the human's
             gaze to the back of the cage. These two experiments
             effectively disconfirm the low-level model of chimpanzee
             gaze following in which it is claimed that upon seeing
             another animate being's gaze direction chimpanzees simply
             turn in that direction and look around for something
             interesting. Rather, they support the hypothesis that
             chimpanzees follow the gaze direction of other animate
             beings geometrically to specific locations, in much the same
             way as human infants. The degree to which chimpanzees have a
             mentalistic interpretation of the gaze and/or visual
             experience of others is still an open question.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1192},
   Key = {fds326036}
}

@article{fds325206,
   Author = {Byrne, RW and Russon, AE},
   Title = {Learning by imitation: a hierarchical approach.},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {667-684},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x98001745},
   Abstract = {To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively
             complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have
             been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive
             psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be
             subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input
             increases the activation of stored internal representations.
             Imitation itself has generally been seen as a "special
             faculty." This has diverted much research towards the
             all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with
             disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great apes,
             however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized
             hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at
             various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct
             ones: the "action level," a rather detailed and linear
             specification of sequential acts, and the "program level," a
             broader description of subroutine structure and the
             hierarchical layout of a behavioural "program." Program
             level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism,
             adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and
             thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test
             for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe
             the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas
             and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing
             "rehabilitation" to the wild. Representing and manipulating
             relations between objects seems to be one basic building
             block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that
             great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans
             in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some
             chimpanzee behaviour previously described as "emulation" and
             suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the
             program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in
             great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social
             role, even in humans.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x98001745},
   Key = {fds325206}
}

@article{fds326347,
   Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
   Title = {Five primate species follow the visual gaze of
             conspecifics},
   Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
   Volume = {55},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1063-1069},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1997.0636},
   Abstract = {Individuals from five primate species were tested
             experimentally for their ability to follow the visual gaze
             of conspecifics to an outside object. Subjects were from
             captive social groups of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, sooty
             mangabeys, Cercocebus atys torquatus, rhesus macaques,
             Macaca mulatta, stumptail macaques, M. arctoides, and
             pigtail macaques, M. nemestrina. Experimental trials
             consisted of an experimenter inducing one individual to look
             at food being displayed, and then observing the reaction of
             another individual (the subject) that was looking at that
             individual (not the food). Control trials consisted of an
             experimenter displaying the food in an identical manner when
             the subject was alone. Individuals from all species reliably
             followed the gaze of conspecifics, looking to the food about
             80% of the time in experimental trials, compared with about
             20% of the time in control trials. Results are discussed in
             terms of both the proximate mechanisms that might be
             involved and the adaptive functions that might be served by
             gaze-following.},
   Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1997.0636},
   Key = {fds326347}
}


%% Books   
@book{fds320791,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {A Natural History of Human Morality},
   Pages = {180 pages},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {0674088646},
   Abstract = {Michael Tomasello offers the most detailed account to date
             of the evolution of human moral psychology.},
   Key = {fds320791}
}

@book{fds321686,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {A Natural History of Human Thinking},
   Pages = {1-192},
   Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9780674724778},
   Abstract = {Tool-making or culture, language or religious belief: ever
             since Darwin, thinkers have struggled to identify what
             fundamentally differentiates human beings from other
             animals. In this much-anticipated book, Michael Tomasello
             weaves his twenty years of comparative studies of humans and
             great apes into a compelling argument that cooperative
             social interaction is the key to our cognitive uniqueness.
             Once our ancestors learned to put their heads together with
             others to pursue shared goals, humankind was on an
             evolutionary path all its own. Tomasello argues that our
             prehuman ancestors, like today’s great apes, were social
             beings who could solve problems by thinking. But they were
             almost entirely competitive, aiming only at their individual
             goals. As ecological changes forced them into more
             cooperative living arrangements, early humans had to
             coordinate their actions and communicate their thoughts with
             collaborative partners. Tomasello’s “shared
             intentionality hypothesis” captures how these more
             socially complex forms of life led to more conceptually
             complex forms of thinking. In order to survive, humans had
             to learn to see the world from multiple social perspectives,
             to draw socially recursive inferences, and to monitor their
             own thinking via the normative standards of the group. Even
             language and culture arose from the preexisting need to work
             together. What differentiates us most from other great apes,
             Tomasello proposes, are the new forms of thinking engendered
             by our new forms of collaborative and communicative
             interaction. A Natural History of Human Thinking is the most
             detailed scientific analysis to date of the connection
             between human sociality and cognition.},
   Key = {fds321686}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds330415,
   Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Great apes anticipate actions based on agents' (false)
             beliefs},
   Journal = {International Journal of Psychology : Journal International
             De Psychologie},
   Volume = {51},
   Pages = {255-255},
   Publisher = {ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds330415}
}

@misc{fds320796,
   Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Species differences in the rate of cognitive ontogeny among
             humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos},
   Journal = {American Journal of Physical Anthropology},
   Volume = {144},
   Pages = {313-314},
   Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds320796}
}


Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Faculty * Staff * Grad * Postdocs * Reload * Login