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| Publications of Michael Tomasello :recent first alphabetical combined listing:%% Journal Articles @article{fds352032, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint attention and lexical acquisition style}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {4}, Number = {12}, Pages = {197-211}, Year = {1983}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378300401202}, Abstract = {Recent research has documented systematic individual differences in early lexical development. The current study investigated the relation ship of these differences to differences in the way mothers and children regulate each other's attentional states. Mothers of 6 one-year-olds kept diary records and were videotaped with their children at monthly intervals as well. Language measures from the diary were related to measures of attention manipulation and maintenance derived from a coding of the videotaped interactions. Results showed that when mothers initiated interactions by directing their child's attention, rather than by following into it, their child learned fewer object labels and more personal-social words. Dyads who maintained sustained bouts of joint attentional focus had children with larger vocabularies overall. It was concluded that the way mothers and children regulate each other's attention is an important factor in children's early lexical development. © 1983, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/014272378300401202}, Key = {fds352032} } @article{fds352030, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's coordination of gestural and linguistic reference}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {5}, Number = {15}, Pages = {199-209}, Year = {1984}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378400501503}, Abstract = {The current study investigated the relationship between young children's linguistic and nonlinguistic communicative strategies. Twenty-three children, 20-44 months of age, served as subjects. In a naturalistic setting, an adult gave signs of noncomprehension (a contingent query) to each of the child's object references. The child's original linguistic reference and use of gestures were recorded and compared to his/her subsequent linguistic and gestural responses to the adult query. Results showed that the children used gestures more often with pronouns than with nouns: either to clarify a linguistic reference from the original utterance or to supplement a linguistic response to the adult query. This would imply that two- to three-year- old children are aware of the communicative principle that pronouns 'need' gestures more than nouns, and more generally, that they are capable of coordinating their linguistic and nonlinguistic communi cative strategies. © 1984, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/014272378400501503}, Key = {fds352030} } @article{fds352031, Author = {George, BL and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The effect of variation in sentence length on young children's attention and comprehension}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {5}, Number = {14}, Pages = {115-127}, Year = {1984}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378400501403}, Abstract = {The effect of sentence length on children's attention and com prehension was studied. Twenty-five two- to five-year-olds were placed into three groups, High, Middle, and Low, based on their mean length of utterance (MLU). Subsequently, each child watched three videotaped stories, each having the same number of words but a different MLU. The time the child spent gazing at the monitor was measured. Comprehension was measured by a picture choice task. Results indicated that the High group attended most to the Long Level, comprehended obvious content best at the Long Level, and comprehended subtle content best at the Medium Level; the Low group attended most to the Medium Level and comprehended little. It was concluded that both input level and child level differentially affect attention and comprehension. © 1984, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/014272378400501403}, Key = {fds352031} } @article{fds352029, Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ and Dines, J}, Title = {Children's speech revisions for a familiar and an unfamiliar adult.}, Journal = {Journal of speech and hearing research}, Volume = {27}, Number = {3}, Pages = {359-363}, Year = {1984}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jshr.2703.359}, Abstract = {Initial characterizations of the communicative abilities of preschoolers stressed their egocentric nature. Recently, however, even 2-year-olds have been observed to adjust their speech appropriately in situations in which the listener provides feedback by signaling noncomprehension. The current study had an adult signal noncomprehension to the requests of 2-year-old Stage I and Stage II children. Each child interacted with a familiar (mother) and an unfamiliar adult. The children repeated their requests about one third of the time and revised them about two thirds of the time. Stage I children elaborated their requests significantly more often than Stage II children. The familiarity of the adult listener had no effect on the way Stage II children revised their requests, but the Stage I children's revisions contained novel lexical items more often when they were interacting with the unfamiliar adult. Both of these findings may have resulted from the fact that the more conversationally skilled Stage II children relied on verbal-conversational cues, which were the same for both adult interactants in this situation. The Stage I children may have been less aware of these conversational cues, relying on general social cues such as familiarity of the interactant. The results are discussed in terms of the potential role of different types of adults in the language acquisition process.}, Doi = {10.1044/jshr.2703.359}, Key = {fds352029} } @article{fds352028, Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ}, Title = {Cognitive bases of lexical development: object permanence and relational words.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {11}, Number = {3}, Pages = {477-493}, Year = {1984}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900005900}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900005900}, Key = {fds352028} } @article{fds352027, Author = {Tomasello, M and George, BL and Kruger, AC and Jeffrey, M and Farrar, and Evans, A}, Title = {The development of gestural communication in young chimpanzees}, Journal = {Journal of Human Evolution}, Volume = {14}, Number = {2}, Pages = {175-186}, Year = {1985}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2484(85)80005-1}, Abstract = {Plooij (Action, Gesture and Symbol, Academic Press 1978; Before Speech, C.U.P. 1979) described some intentionally-produced communicatory gestures used by one-year-old chimpanzees on the Gombe Stream Reserve. The current study investigated the use of this type of gesture at later developmental periods. Subjects were five infant and juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) living in a semi-natural group at the Yerkes Regional Primate Center Field Station. On the basis of naturalistic observations, three stages in the development of communicatory gestures were determined: (1) One-year-old infants used some gestures, but only in an immature form and only with their mothers or with peers; (2) Two-year-olds produced more gestures which were clearly intentional and conventional (they waited for a response), and they directed them to all group members; (3) Three-year-olds used a wider variety of gestures, and they supplemented them with a "gaze-alternation" behavior which indicated even more clearly the goal of the communication. Many of the gestures used by infants and juveniles were not used by adults, thus indicating a significance confined to specific developmental periods. This contradicts the commonly-held assumption (e.g. Van Lawick-Goodall, 1967) that the developmental process is one in which young chimpanzees come gradually to learn a pre-existing set of adult communicatory gestures. From this and other evidence, it is argued that, while some of the gestures are learned observationally, many are learned through a process of "direct convention-alization" between animals, and others rely on both of these processes. © 1985 Academic Press Inc. (London) Limited.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0047-2484(85)80005-1}, Key = {fds352027} } @article{fds352026, Author = {Evans, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Evidence for social referencing in young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).}, Journal = {Folia primatologica; international journal of primatology}, Volume = {47}, Number = {1}, Pages = {49-54}, Year = {1986}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000156263}, Abstract = {A captive chimpanzee group was observed in order to determine the extent to which the social interactions of the infants and juveniles (18-50 months) were affected by their mothers' relationships with other adult group members. It was found that the young chimpanzees initiated more interactions with adults who interacted more with their mothers. A vast majority of those interactions occurred at significant distances from the mother. It is argued that these data imply a social-cognitive ability in young chimpanzees closely related to the human infant's ability to use its mother in 'social referencing'.}, Doi = {10.1159/000156263}, Key = {fds352026} } @article{fds352025, Author = {Anselmi, D and Tomasello, M and Acunzo, M}, Title = {Young children's responses to neutral and specific contingent queries.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {13}, Number = {1}, Pages = {135-144}, Year = {1986}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900000349}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900000349}, Key = {fds352025} } @article{fds352024, Author = {Tomasello, M and Mannle, S and Kruger, AC}, Title = {Linguistic Environment of 1- to 2-Year-Old Twins}, Journal = {Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {169-176}, Year = {1986}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.22.2.169}, Abstract = {The current study investigated differences in the language learning environments of singletons and twins, with special reference to pragmatic factors that might be expected to differ in dyadic and triadic interactive situations. Six twin pairs and 12 singleton children (all firstborn) were observed in natural interactions with their mothers, once at 15 months of age and again at 21 months of age. Twins were lower than singletons on all measures of language development. The language learning environments of the two groups differed as well. Although twin mothers spoke and interacted with their children as much as singleton mothers when twins were analyzed together, when analyzed from the point of view of the individual twin child, twin children received less speech directed specifically to them, participated in fewer and shorter episodes of joint attentional focus, and had fewer and shorter conversations with their mothers. In addition, twin mothers were more directive in their interactional styles. Correlational analyses indicated that variation of these language learning environment factors for the sample as a whole, as well as variation for some of these factors within the twin group itself, was related to early language growth. It is proposed that both the quantitative and qualitative differences observed in the language learning environments of singletons and twins derive from the nature of the triadic situation and that these differences have important effects on the child's early language development. © 1986 American Psychological Association.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.22.2.169}, Key = {fds352024} } @article{fds352023, Author = {Kruger, AC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Transactive Discussions With Peers and Adults}, Journal = {Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {22}, Number = {5}, Pages = {681-685}, Year = {1986}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.22.5.681}, Abstract = {Piaget hypothesized that peer and adult-child discussions of moral dilemmas are qualitatively different. He asserted that children are more likely to use reasoning when interacting with peers. To test this hypothesis, the present study compared the interactive styles of child-child and adult-child dyads engaged in discussions of moral dilemmas, focusing on the use of logical operations (transacts). Forty-eight female subjects, ages 7 and 11 years, were paired with either a female agemate or their mother. Children used transacts in a higher proportion of their conversational turns when interacting with peers than when interacting with mothers. Subjects produced proportionally more transactive responses when interacting with mothers because mothers produced proportionally more requests for idea clarification than did peer partners. Self-generated transacts, on the other hand, were produced proportionally more often with peers. Furthermore, when paired with peers, children produced transactive statements that operated on the partner's logic more often, rather than clarifying their own logic. These results support Piaget's contention that moral discussions with peers feature a more spontaneous use of reasoning than do discussions with adults. © 1986 American Psychological Association.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.22.5.681}, Key = {fds352023} } @article{fds352022, Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ}, Title = {Object permanence and relational words: a lexical training study.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {13}, Number = {3}, Pages = {495-505}, Year = {1986}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030500090000684x}, Doi = {10.1017/s030500090000684x}, Key = {fds352022} } @article{fds352021, Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ}, Title = {Joint attention and early language.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {57}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1454-1463}, Year = {1986}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1986.tb00470.x}, Abstract = {This paper reports 2 studies that explore the role of joint attentional processes in the child's acquisition of language. In the first study, 24 children were videotaped at 15 and 21 months of age in naturalistic interaction with their mothers. Episodes of joint attentional focus between mother and child--for example, joint play with an object--were identified. Inside, as opposed to outside, these episodes both mothers and children produced more utterances, mothers used shorter sentences and more comments, and dyads engaged in longer conversations. Inside joint episodes maternal references to objects that were already the child's focus of attention were positively correlated with the child's vocabulary at 21 months, while object references that attempted to redirect the child's attention were negatively correlated. No measures from outside these episodes related to child language. In an experimental study, an adult attempted to teach novel words to 10 17-month-old children. Words referring to objects on which the child's attention was already focused were learned better than words presented in an attempt to redirect the child's attentional focus.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1986.tb00470.x}, Key = {fds352021} } @article{fds352020, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Why the left hand?}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {10}, Number = {2}, Pages = {286-287}, Year = {1987}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00047919}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00047919}, Key = {fds352020} } @article{fds352507, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Learning to use prepositions: a case study.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {14}, Number = {1}, Pages = {79-98}, Year = {1987}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900012745}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900012745}, Key = {fds352507} } @article{fds352019, Author = {Tomasello, M and Davis-Dasilva, M and Camak, L and Bard, K}, Title = {Observational learning of tool-use by young chimpanzees}, Journal = {Human Evolution}, Volume = {2}, Number = {2}, Pages = {175-183}, Year = {1987}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02436405}, Abstract = {In the current study two groups of young chimpanzees (4-6 and 8-9 years old) were given a T-bar and a food item that could only be reached by using the T-bar. Experimental subjects were given the opportunity to observe an adult using the stick as a tool to obtain the food; control subjects were exposed to the adult but were given no demonstration. Subjects in the older group did not learn to use the tool. Subjects in the younger group who were exposed to the demonstrator learned to use the stick as a tool much more readily than those who were not. None of the subjects demonstrated an ability to imitatively copy the demonstrator's precise behavioral strategies. More than simple stimulus enhancement was involved, however, since both groups manipulated the T-bar, but only experimental subjects used it in its function as a tool. Our findings complement naturalistic observations in suggesting that chimpanzee tool-use is in some sense «culturally transmitted» - though perhaps not in the same sense as social-conventional behaviors for which precise copying of conspecifics is crucial. © 1987 Editrice II Sedicesimo.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF02436405}, Key = {fds352019} } @article{fds352016, Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C}, Title = {Down the Garden Path: Inducing and correcting overgeneralization errors in the foreign language classroom}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {9}, Number = {3}, Pages = {237-246}, Year = {1988}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716400007827}, Abstract = {In this study we compared two methods for teaching grammatical exceptions in the foreign language classroom. Thirty-nine students in two sections of an introductory college French course served as subjects. Eight target structures, exemplifying –exceptions to a rule,– were randomly assigned to one of two teaching conditions for a section taught in the spring; each structure was assigned to the opposite teaching condition for a section taught the following fall. In one condition we simply taught the students the exception as an exception. In the other – what we called the Garden Path condition – we presented canonical exemplars encouraging students to induce the rule; we then asked them to generate the form (which we knew to be an exception) and then corrected their resulting overgeneralization error. Analysis of subsequent formal testing showed that students learned the exception better in the Garden Path condition and that this advantage persisted throughout the semesterlong course. We hypothesized that this technique helped students to focus attention both on the rule and on the features of the particular structure that marked it as an exception. © 1988, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0142716400007827}, Key = {fds352016} } @article{fds352017, Author = {Tomasello, M and Snow, CE}, Title = {Well-fed organisms still need feedback}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {11}, Number = {3}, Pages = {475-476}, Year = {1988}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058568}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00058568}, Key = {fds352017} } @article{fds352018, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of joint attentional processes in early language development}, Journal = {Language Sciences}, Volume = {10}, Number = {1}, Pages = {69-88}, Year = {1988}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0388-0001(88)90006-X}, Abstract = {In this paper I examine the role of joint attentional processes in the child's early lexical acquisition and conversational interaction. In both cases I conclude that relatively extended periods of adult-child joint attentional focus on nonlinguistic entities, perhaps as manifest in routines, scaffold the child's early language development. On the other hand, adult directiveness - whether of child behavior/attention or of the dyad's conversational topic - has a negative effect on early language development. For both lexical acquisition and conversational interaction some findings from experimental studies are available to supplement conclusions based on correlational evidence. Based on these findings, I propose a developmental sequence of joint attentional processes in early language development and discuss the role of adults in the child's passage through this sequence. © 1988.}, Doi = {10.1016/0388-0001(88)90006-X}, Key = {fds352018} } @article{fds352015, Author = {Tomasello, M and Mannle, S and Werdenschlag, L}, Title = {The effect of previously learned words on the child's acquisition of words for similar referents.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {15}, Number = {3}, Pages = {505-515}, Year = {1988}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900012538}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900012538}, Key = {fds352015} } @article{fds352011, Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C}, Title = {Feedback for language transfer errors the garden path technique}, Journal = {Studies in Second Language Acquisition}, Volume = {11}, Number = {4}, Pages = {385-395}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0272263100008408}, Abstract = {In this study we compared two methods for correcting language transfer errors in the foreign language classroom. Thirty-two English-speaking college students enrolled in two sections of an introductory French course served as subjects. Eight commonly encountered English-to-French transfer errors were identified and randomly assigned to one of two teaching conditions for one class section; each error was assigned to the opposite condition for the other section. In both teaching conditions students began by translating English sentences into French. The sentences were such that an L1 (first language) transfer strategy produced correct translations (e.g., using savoir for some uses of “to know”). A sentence for which the transfer would not produce an adequate translation (e.g., a sentence requiring connaître) was then introduced in one of two ways. In one condition—what we have termed the Garden Path condition—students were given the new sentence and asked to translate as before. Their inevitable transfer error was then immediately corrected by the teacher. In the control condition students were simply given the correct French form and told that it differed from the English pattern (they were not given the opportunity to commit a transfer error). Student learning of the non-transferable form was assessed three times throughout the course of the semester, and at all time points performance was better in the Garden Path condition. We interpreted this finding as support for a cognitive comparison model of second language acquisition. © 1989, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0272263100008408}, Key = {fds352011} } @article{fds352012, Author = {Snow, CE and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Data on language input: Incomprehensible omission indeed!}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {357-358}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049104}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00049104}, Key = {fds352012} } @article{fds352013, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cognition as cause}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {12}, Number = {3}, Pages = {607-608}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00073738}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00073738}, Key = {fds352013} } @article{fds352014, Author = {Tomasello, M and Gust, D and Frost, GT}, Title = {A longitudinal investigation of gestural communication in young chimpanzees}, Journal = {Primates}, Volume = {30}, Number = {1}, Pages = {35-50}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02381209}, Abstract = {A longitudinal study of chimpanzee gestural communication is reported. Subjects were seven 5- to 8-year-old members of a semi-natural group at the Yerkes Field Station. These were the same individuals observed by Tomasello et al. (1985) four years previously. Nearly identical operational definitions and observational procedures were used in the two studies. Longitudinal comparisons between the two observation periods revealed that the development of chimpanzee gestural communication is best characterized as a series of ontogenetic adaptations: as particular social functions (e.g., nursing, playing, grooming, etc.) arise, decline, or change, gestural communication follows suit. Most gestures seem to be conventionalized by individuals in direct social interaction with conspecifics. Some gestures may be learned by "second-person imitation"-an individual copying a behavior directed to it by another individual. No evidence was found for "third-person imitation"-an individual copying a gesture used between two other individuals. Implications for the concept of chimpanzee "culture" are discussed. © 1989 Japan Monkey Centre.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF02381209}, Key = {fds352014} } @article{fds366605, Author = {Tomasello, M and Gust, DA and Evans, A}, Title = {Peer interaction in infant chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Folia primatologica; international journal of primatology}, Volume = {55}, Number = {1}, Pages = {33-40}, Year = {1990}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000156495}, Abstract = {The peer interactions of 6 infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) ranging in age from 18 to 50 months were observed in a seminatural context. The infants and their mothers lived as members of a captive social group at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center. An analysis of contact initiations between infants indicated that the most preferred peer interactant was the youngest and the least preferred was the oldest infant. Infants also initiated more interactions with the offspring of adults that had the closest relationships with both themselves and their mothers. These results indicate that a number of factors may influence the peer affiliations of infant chimpanzees, including the age of the infant and the mother's social relationships.}, Doi = {10.1159/000156495}, Key = {fds366605} } @article{fds352010, Author = {Tomasello, M and Conti-Ramsden, G and Ewert, B}, Title = {Young children's conversations with their mothers and fathers: differences in breakdown and repair.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {17}, Number = {1}, Pages = {115-130}, Year = {1990}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900013131}, Abstract = {In this study we compared the conversations of mothers and fathers with their children at 1; 3 and 1; 9, with special attention to breakdown-repair sequences. We found that, overall, children and secondary caregiver fathers experienced more communicative breakdowns than did children and primary caregiver mothers. More specifically, fathers requested clarification of their children more often than did mothers, and they most often used a non-specific query (e.g. What?). Mothers used more specific queries (e.g. Put it where?) and were involved in more 'looped' sequences involving multiple requests for clarification. Fathers also failed to acknowledge child utterances more often than did mothers. After a father non-acknowledgement, children tended not to persist and when they did they often received further non-acknowledgements; the dyad did not often return to the child's original topic. After a maternal non-acknowledgement, on the other hand, children persisted and the dyad more often returned to its previous topic. The results are interpreted as support for the Bridge Hypothesis which claims that fathers present children with communicative challenges that help prepare them for communication with less familiar adults.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900013131}, Key = {fds352010} } @article{fds352007, Author = {Barton, ME and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint Attention and Conversation in Mother‐Infant‐Sibling Triads}, Journal = {Child Development}, Volume = {62}, Number = {3}, Pages = {517-529}, Year = {1991}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01548.x}, Abstract = {The current study investigated the general nature of joint attentional and conversational interaction in mother‐infant‐sibling triads. 9 19‐month‐old infants and 9 24‐month‐old infants were videotaped during 20 min of free play with their mothers and preschool‐aged siblings around a common activity. Analyses revealed that even 19‐month‐old infants were capable of participating in triadic interactions and conversations, and that the proportional frequency of both these measures increased with age. Triadic conversations were nearly 3 times longer and elicited nearly twice as many infant turns per conversation as dyadic conversations. Infants were more likely to join into an ongoing conversational topic than to initiate one themselves, and they were more likely to take a turn in those conversations if they were in a joint attentional state with the speaker. Infants were just as likely to respond to a comment or request directed to another person as they were to one directed to themselves, indicating reliable comprehension of language not addressed to them. These results suggest that the mother‐infant‐sibling interactive context differs in important ways from the mother‐infant dyadic context and that it is a richer language learning environment than previously supposed. Copyright © 1991, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01548.x}, Key = {fds352007} } @article{fds352008, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Objects are analogous to words, not phonemes or grammatical categories}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {14}, Number = {4}, Pages = {575-576}, Year = {1991}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00071466}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00071466}, Key = {fds352008} } @article{fds352009, Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C}, Title = {A Reply to Beck and Eubank}, Journal = {Studies in Second Language Acquisition}, Volume = {13}, Number = {4}, Pages = {513-517}, Year = {1991}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0272263100010317}, Abstract = {Beck and Eubank (1991) criticize our recent SSLA article (Tomasello & Herron, 1989) on both theoretical and methodological grounds. While we appreciate their attempt to discuss and clarify important issues—and while they do make several sound and very interesting points—in a number of cases they seriously misrepresent our study. We will attempt to address the criticisms in roughly the order in which they were raised. © 1991, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0272263100010317}, Key = {fds352009} } @article{fds352002, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The social bases of language acquisition}, Journal = {Social Development}, Volume = {1}, Number = {1}, Pages = {67-87}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x}, Abstract = {A language is composed of conventional symbols shaped by their social‐communicative functions. Children acquire these symbols, both lexical and syntactic, in the context of culturally constituted event structures that make salient these functions. In the acquisition process children rely on cultural learning skills (i.e., imitative learning). These skills emanate from their ability to participate intersubjectively with adults in cultural activities (i.e., joint attention), which underlies their ability to understand the ways adults are using particular pieces of language. The development of communicative competence as a whole, including not only lexical and syntactic skills but also various pragmatic skills, depends largely on feedback about communicative efficacy that children receive from different interactants. This feedback is used by children to make further inferences about the conventional functional significance of particular linguistic expressions. This social‐pragmatic view of language acquisition obviates the need for a priori, specifically linguistic, format constraints on the language acquisition process. Copyright © 1992, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x}, Key = {fds352002} } @article{fds352003, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Author's response: On defining language: Replies to Shatz and Ninio}, Journal = {Social Development}, Volume = {1}, Number = {2}, Pages = {159-162}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00121.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00121.x}, Key = {fds352003} } @article{fds352004, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cognitive ethology comes of age}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {15}, Number = {1}, Pages = {168-169}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00068163}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00068163}, Key = {fds352004} } @article{fds352005, Author = {SECULES, T and HERRON, C and TOMASELLO, M}, Title = {The Effect of Video Context on Foreign Language Learning}, Journal = {The Modern Language Journal}, Volume = {76}, Number = {4}, Pages = {480-490}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4781.1992.tb05396.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-4781.1992.tb05396.x}, Key = {fds352005} } @article{fds352006, Author = {Mannle, S and Barton, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds' conversations with their mothers and preschool-aged siblings}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {12}, Number = {34}, Pages = {57-71}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272379201203404}, Abstract = {The pragmatics of sibling-infant and mother-infant conversations were compared. Sixteen children, 22 to 26 months of age, were videotaped for 15 minutes in dyadic interaction with their mothers and for 15 minutes in dyadic interaction with their preschool-aged siblings. Sibling-infant and mother-infant conversations were compared on three dimensions: quantitative characteristics, conversational style and conversational repair of potential breakdowns. Compared with mothers and infants, siblings and infants talked less and had shorter conversations. On an individual level, siblings asked fewer questions of the infants and issued more directives to them than did the mothers. Moreover, siblings failed to repair disruptions in conversations almost twice as often as mothers. The infants' conversational behaviours, however, did not differ when interacting with the siblings as opposed to the mothers. These results indicate that preschool-aged siblings are not yet adept at making the kinds of pragmatic adjustments in their speech that scaffold infants in their early conversational interactions. It is suggested that the experience later- born infants have with less responsive siblings may be valuable preparation for interacting with strangers, especially peers, who share many characteristics with siblings. © 1992, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/014272379201203404}, Key = {fds352006} } @article{fds352001, Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC}, Title = {Joint attention on actions: acquiring verbs in ostensive and non-ostensive contexts.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {19}, Number = {2}, Pages = {311-333}, Year = {1992}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900011430}, Abstract = {Two studies of verb learning are reported. The focus of both studies was on children in their second year of life learning verbs in various pragmatic contexts. Of particular interest was the comparison of ostensive contexts--in which word and referent were simultaneously present in the child's perceptual field--to non-ostensive contexts. In a naturalistic study of 24 children at 1;3 and 1;9, it was found that mothers modelled verbs for their children most often BEFORE the referent action actually occurred. Over 60% of maternal verbs were used to refer to actions that mothers wished children to perform or that they were anticipating their performing (IMPENDING actions). Some verbs were also used to refer to current actions (ONGOING actions) or actions that had just been completed (COMPLETED actions). Children responded with comprehension most often to impending models. Impending and completed models, but not ongoing models, were correlated with children's verb vocabularies at 1;9. The second study was a lexical training study of 48 two-year-olds. Children learned to produce a novel verb best when it was modelled in the impending condition. They learned to comprehend it equally well in the impending and completed conditions. Children showed no signs of superior learning in the ostensive (ongoing) learning context. Results of the two studies are discussed in terms of the different learning processes involved in acquiring nouns and verbs, and, more broadly, in terms of a social-pragmatic view of language acquisition in which the ostensive teaching paradigm is but one of many contexts in which children learn to establish a joint attentional focus with mature language users.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900011430}, Key = {fds352001} } @article{fds351997, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {It's imitation, not mimesis}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {16}, Number = {4}, Pages = {771-772}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032921}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00032921}, Key = {fds351997} } @article{fds351998, Author = {Tomasello, M and Olguin, R}, Title = {Twenty-three-month-old children have a grammatical category of noun}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {8}, Number = {4}, Pages = {451-464}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(05)80004-8}, Abstract = {This study investigated experimentally the nature and development of children's early productivity with nouns, both in verb-argument structure and with plural morphology. Eight 20- to 26-month-old boys and girls were, in the context of playing a game over a several week period, exposed to four novel nouns, modeled in experimentally controlled ways. The question was whether, when, and in what ways the children would become productive with these nouns in their spontaneous speech, going beyond the particular linguistic forms they had heard. In terms of verb-argument structure, 7 of the 8 children used their nouns in productive argument roles, that is, in semantic roles they had not heard them used in. Five of the 8 children used the plural morpheme productively with the novel nouns as well. Implications for theories of grammatical category formation are discussed. © 1993, Ablex Publishing Corporation, 355 Chestnut Street, Norwood, New Jersey 07648. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(05)80004-8}, Key = {fds351998} } @article{fds351999, Author = {Olguin, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Twenty-five-month-old children do not have a grammatical category of verb}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {8}, Number = {3}, Pages = {245-272}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(93)80001-A}, Abstract = {This study investigated experimentally the nature and development of children's early productivity with verb-argument structure and verb morphology. Twenty-two to 25-month-old boys and girls were, in the context of playing a game over a several week period, exposed to eight novel verbs modeled with experimentally controlled argument structures and verb inflections. The question was whether, when, and in what ways the children would become productive with these verbs in their spontaneous speech, going beyond the particular linguistic forms they had heard. In terms of verb-argument structure, the results showed that children most often followed the surface structure of the model, regardless of the argument they were trying to express. Thus, when children had heard an argument expressed for a verb, they almost always marked that argument correctly in their own utterances; when they had not heard an argument expressed for a particular verb, their correct marking dropped to chance levels. The children showed no signs of productive verb morphology, but they did use the newly learned verbs in some creative ways involving noun-like uses and the appending of locatives. Results are discussed in terms of Tomasello's (1992) Verb Island hypothesis. © 1993 Ablex Publishing Corporation.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(93)80001-A}, Key = {fds351999} } @article{fds352000, Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC and Ratner, HH}, Title = {Cultural learning}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {495-552}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0003123x}, Abstract = {This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning - in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x0003123x}, Key = {fds352000} } @article{fds351996, Author = {Nagell, K and Olguin, RS and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Processes of social learning in the tool use of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {107}, Number = {2}, Pages = {174-186}, Year = {1993}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.107.2.174}, Abstract = {Common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 2-year-old human children (Homo sapiens) were presented with a rakelike tool and a desirable but out-of-reach object. One group of subjects observed a human demonstrator use the tool in one way, and another group observed a demonstrator use the tool in another way. Children in both cases did what the model did. Chimpanzee subjects, however, behaved identically in the 2 model conditions. Both groups performed better than subjects who saw no demonstration. This pattern of results suggest that the chimpanzees were paying attention to the general functional relations in the task and to the results obtained by the demonstrator but not to the actual methods of tool use demonstrated. Human children were focused on the demonstrator's actual methods of tool use (her behavior). The different social learning processes used by the 2 species have implications for their different forms of social organization.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.107.2.174}, Key = {fds351996} } @article{fds351995, Author = {Tomasello, M and Savage-Rumbaugh, S and Kruger, AC}, Title = {Imitative learning of actions on objects by children, chimpanzees, and enculturated chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {64}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1688-1705}, Year = {1993}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb04207.x}, Abstract = {In this study we compared the abilities of chimpanzees and human children to imitatively learn novel actions on objects. Of particular interest were possible differences between chimpanzees raised mostly with conspecifics (mother-reared) and chimpanzees raised in a human-like cultural environment (enculturated). Subjects were thus 3 enculturated and 3 mother-reared chimpanzees, along with 8 18-month-old and 8 30-month-old human children. Each subject was tested over a 2-day period with 16 novel objects. The introduction of each object was preceded by a baseline period in which the subject's natural proclivities toward the object were determined. For 12 objects, a human experimenter demonstrated first a simple and then a complex novel action, instructing the subject in each case to "Do what I do" (chimpanzees were prepared for the task behaviorally as well). For the other 4 objects, demonstration of a single action took place on the first day and the subject's opportunity to imitate was delayed until the second day, 48 hours later. Actions that a subject produced in baseline were excluded from further analysis. For each analyzed action, the subject's behavior was scored as to whether it successfully reproduced (1) the end result of the demonstrated action, and (2) the behavioral means used by the demonstrator. Results showed that in immediate imitation the mother-reared chimpanzees were much poorer imitators than the enculturated chimpanzees and the human children, who did not differ from one another. Surprisingly, on the delay trials, the enculturated chimpanzees significantly outperformed the other 3 groups. We conclude from these results that a human-like sociocultural environment is an essential component in the development of human-like social-cognitive and imitative learning skills for chimpanzees, and perhaps for human beings as well.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb04207.x}, Key = {fds351995} } @article{fds351991, Author = {Tomasello, M and Mervis, CB}, Title = {THE INSTRUMENT IS GREAT, BUT MEASURING COMPREHENSION IS STILL A PROBLEM}, Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development}, Volume = {59}, Number = {5}, Pages = {174-179}, Year = {1994}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.1994.tb00186.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.1994.tb00186.x}, Key = {fds351991} } @article{fds351992, Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC and Ratner, HH}, Title = {The role of emotions in cultural learning}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {17}, Number = {4}, Pages = {782-784}, Year = {1994}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00037195}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00037195}, Key = {fds351992} } @article{fds351993, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Nagell, K and Olguin, R and Carpenter, M}, Title = {The learning and use of gestural signals by young chimpanzees: A trans-generational study}, Journal = {Primates}, Volume = {35}, Number = {2}, Pages = {137-154}, Year = {1994}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02382050}, Abstract = {Observations of chimpanzee gestural communication are reported. The observations represent the third longitudinal time point of an ongoing study of the Yerkes Primate Center Field Station chimpanzee group. In contrast to observations at the first two time points, the current observations are of a new generation of infants and juveniles. There were two questions. The first concerned how young chimpanzees used their gestures, with special focus on the flexibility or intentionality displayed. It was found that youngsters quite often used the same gesture in different contexts, and different gestures in the same context. In addition, they sometimes used gestures in combinations in a single social encounter, these combinations did not convey intentions that could not be conveyed by the component gestures, however. It was also found that individuals adjusted their choice of signals depending on the attentional state of the recipient. The second question was how chimpanzees acquired their gestural signals. In general, it was found that there was little consistency in the use of gestures among individuals, especially for non-play gestures, with much individual variability both within and across generations. There were also a number of idiosyncratic gestures used by single individuals at each time point. It was concluded from these results that youngsters were not imitatively learning their communicatory gestures from conspecifics, but rather that they were individually conventionalizing them with each other. Implications of these findings for the understanding of chimpanzee communication and social learning are discussed. © 1994 Japan Monkey Centre.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF02382050}, Key = {fds351993} } @article{fds351994, Author = {Tomasello, M and Barton, M}, Title = {Learning Words in Nonostensive Contexts}, Journal = {Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {30}, Number = {5}, Pages = {639-650}, Year = {1994}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.30.5.639}, Abstract = {Four word learning studies with 24-month-old children are reported. In Studies 1 and 2, an adult used a novel word to announce her intention to perform an action or to find an object. It was found that a knowledge of what action or object was impending-established through scripted events before the word's introduction-was not necessary for children to learn the words. Studies 3 and 4 focused on what word learning cues children might be using in these contexts. In Study 3, it was found that children learned a novel verb for an intentional and not an accidental action. In Study 4, it was found that children learned a novel noun for an object the adult was searching for, not ones she had rejected while searching. Because none of the best-known constraints on lexical acquisition could have helped them in these contexts, it was concluded that children were relying on social-pragmatic cues to learn the new words.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.30.5.639}, Key = {fds351994} } @article{fds366604, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Social cognition of monkeys and apes}, Journal = {American Journal of Physical Anthropology}, Volume = {37}, Number = {19 S}, Pages = {273-305}, Year = {1994}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.1330370610}, Abstract = {This paper reviews what is known about the social cognition of monkeys and great apes. The literature reviewed is divided into three main content areas: (1) social interaction, including knowledge of individuals, knowledge of social relationships, alliance formation, and cooperation; (2) communication, including alarm calls, calls for recruiting allies, gestures, and the “language” skills of human‐raised apes; and (3) social learning, including the “cultural transmission” of food‐preparation behaviors, the social learning of tool use, and the social learning of vocal and gestural communication. Contrary to the hypotheses of a number of recent investigators, we find no compelling differences in the social cognition of monkeys and great apes. It is possible that differences in the social behavior of these two classes of primate are due to processes of nonsocial cognition, and it is possible that the social behavior of apes is more strongly influenced by human interaction and training.© 1994 Wiley‐Liss, Inc. Copyright © 1994 Wiley‐Liss, Inc., A Wiley Company}, Doi = {10.1002/ajpa.1330370610}, Key = {fds366604} } @article{fds351990, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The social learning of tool use by orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)}, Journal = {Human Evolution}, Volume = {9}, Number = {4}, Pages = {297-313}, Year = {1994}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02435516}, Abstract = {Very little is known about the social learning of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), especially in the context of problem-solving situations such as tool use. Sixteen orangutans were presented with a rake-like tool and desirable but out-of-reach food. Eight subjects observed a human demonstrator use the tool in one way, while another eight observed the demonstrator use the tool in another way. Subjects behaved identically in the two experimental conditions, showing no effect of the type of demonstration observed. Analysis of individual learning curves suggested that a large component of individual trial-and-error learning was at work, even for two subjects who received additional trials with an orangutan demonstrator. This pattern of results suggests that subjects were paying attention to the general functional relations in the task and to the results obtained by the demonstrator, but not to the actual methods of tool use demonstrated. It is concluded that subjects in both conditions were employing emulation learning, not imitative learning. © 1994 International Institute for the Study of Man.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF02435516}, Key = {fds351990} } @article{fds351989, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Production and comprehension of referential pointing by orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {108}, Number = {4}, Pages = {307-317}, Year = {1994}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.108.4.307}, Abstract = {We report 3 studies of the referential pointing of 2 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Chantek was raised in an enculturated environment; Puti, raised in a nursery, had a more typical captive life. In Experiment 1, flexibility of pointing behavior was investigated by requiring subjects to point in novel circumstances (for an out-of-sight tool, not food). In Experiment 2, we investigated the orangutans' comprehension of the significance of a human point in helping them to locate food. In Experiment 3, we investigated whether these pointing subjects comprehended that a human recipient must be looking for the point to achieve its attention-directing goal. In all experiments the enculturated orangutan showed better understanding of pointing than the captive orangutan. This finding is consistent with recent studies that have found differences in the cognitive and social-cognitive abilities of apes that have had different types of experience with humans.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.108.4.307}, Key = {fds351989} } @article{fds351984, Author = {Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint Attention and Imitative Learning in Children, Chimpanzees, and Enculturated Chimpanzees}, Journal = {Social Development}, Volume = {4}, Number = {3}, Pages = {217-237}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1995.tb00063.x}, Abstract = {In this study we compared the nature of the joint attentional interactions that occurred as chimpanzees and human children engaged with a human experimenter (E). Subjects were three chimpanzees raised mostly with conspecifics (mother‐reared), three chimpanzees raised in a human‐like cultural environment (encultur‐ated), and six 18‐month‐old human children. Of particular interest were possible differences between the two groups of chimpanzees that might have resulted from their different ontogenetic histories. Observations were made as subjects participated in an imitative learning task involving a number of novel objects. Variables coded were such things as subjects' looks to the object, looks to E, the coordination of such looks in periods of joint engagement with E, and gestural attempts to direct E's attention or behavior (declaratives and imperatives). Results showed that encultur‐ated chimpanzees were most similar to human children in social interactions involv‐ing objects, for example, in their attention to the object in compliance with E's request, their joint attentional interactions during less structured periods, and their use of declarative gestures to direct E's attention to objects. They were not similar to children, but rather resembled their mother‐reared conspecifics, in the duration of their looks to E's face. A positive relation between subjects' joint attentional skills and their imitative learning skills was found for both chimpanzee and human sub‐jects. It is concluded that a human‐like sociocultural environment is an essential component in the development of human‐like social‐cognitive and joint attentional skills for chimpanzees, and perhaps for human beings as well Copyright © 1995, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1995.tb00063.x}, Key = {fds351984} } @article{fds351985, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Commentary}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {38}, Number = {1}, Pages = {46-52}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278298}, Doi = {10.1159/000278298}, Key = {fds351985} } @article{fds351986, Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N}, Title = {Two-year-olds use pragmatic cues to differentiate reference to objects and actions}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {10}, Number = {2}, Pages = {201-224}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0885-2014(95)90009-8}, Abstract = {Previous studies have found that children can use social-pragmatic cues to determine "which one" of several objects or "which one' of several actions an adult intends to indicate with a novel word. The current studies attempted to determine whether children can also use such cues to determine "what kind" of referent, object, or action, an adult intends to indicate. In the first study, 27-month-old children heard an adult use a nonce word in conjunction with a nameless object while it was engaged in a nameless action. The discourse situation leading into this naming event was manipulated so that in one condition the target action was the one new element in the discourse context at the time of the naming event, and in another condition the target object was the one new element. Results showed that children learned the new word for whichever element was new to the discourse context. The second study followed this same general method, but in this case children in one condition watched as an adult engaged in preparatory behaviors that indicated her desire that the child perform the action before she produced the novel word, whereas children in another condition saw no such preparation. Results showed that children who saw the action preparation learned the new word for the action, whereas children who saw no preparation learned the new word for the object. These two studies demonstrate the important role of social-pragmatic information in early word learning, and suggest that if there is a Whole Object assumption in early lexical acquisition, it is an assumption that may be very easily overridden. © 1995.}, Doi = {10.1016/0885-2014(95)90009-8}, Key = {fds351986} } @article{fds351987, Author = {Byrnl, RW and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do rats ape?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {50}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1417-1420}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0003-3472(95)80056-5}, Doi = {10.1016/0003-3472(95)80056-5}, Key = {fds351987} } @article{fds351983, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Use of social information in the problem solving of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {109}, Number = {3}, Pages = {308-320}, Year = {1995}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.109.3.308}, Abstract = {Fourteen juvenile and adult orangutans and 24 3- and 4-year-old children participated in 4 studies on imitative learning in a problem-solving situation. In all studies a simple to operate apparatus was used, but its internal mechanism was hidden from subjects to prevent individual learning. In the 1st study, orangutans observed a human demonstrator perform 1 of 4 actions on the apparatus and obtain a reward; they subsequently showed no signs of imitative learning. Similar results were obtained in a 2nd study in which orangutan demonstrators were used. Similar results were also obtained in a 3rd study in which a human encouraged imitation from an orangutan that had previously been taught to mimic arbitrary human actions. In a 4th study, human 3- and 4-year-old children learned the task by means of imitation.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.109.3.308}, Key = {fds351983} } @article{fds351979, Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds learn words for absent objects and actions}, Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {14}, Number = {1}, Pages = {79-93}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1996.tb00695.x}, Abstract = {Two studies of word learning in 24-month-old children are reported, one involving an object word (Study 1) and one involving an action word (Study 2). In both studies, non-verbal scripts of playing with novel objects/actions in particular ways were established before the child was exposed to any language models. Following this pre-training, children heard an experimenter announce her intention to either find an object or perform an action. In the referent condition, children then saw the intended referent (object or action) immediately after hearing the language model. Children in the absent referent condition experienced the same non-verbal scripts and language models, but never saw the referent object or action after hearing the language model: at the appropriate juncture in the script they were told that the toy barn in which the target object had been previously located was 'locked', or that the toy character who had previously performed the target action was missing. Comparisons with two control conditions indicated that children were able to learn words for a novel object and a novel action in both the referent and absent referent conditions and, moreover, that learning was equivalent in these two conditions. These results show quite clearly that early lexical acquisition does not depend on temporal contiguity between word and referent - or indeed any perceptual pairing between word and referent at all - but rather it relies on children's active understandings of a speaker's referential intentions in particular discourse contexts.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.1996.tb00695.x}, Key = {fds351979} } @article{fds351980, Author = {Akhtar, N and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Role of Discourse Novelty in Early Word Learning}, Journal = {Child Development}, Volume = {67}, Number = {2}, Pages = {635-645}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01756.x}, Abstract = {2 studies of word learning are reported. In Study 1, 24-month-old children and 2 adults played with 3 nameless objects. These objects were placed in a clear box along with a novel nameless object. The adults then displayed excitement about the contents of the box and modeled a new word. Comparison with a control condition indicated significant learning of the new word for the novel object. Study 2 followed the same procedure with one difference; the children played with the novel object while the adults were absent. Thus, at the time of the language model the target object was novel only to the adults, not to the children. Again subjects displayed significant learning of the new word. This last finding suggests that 24-month-old children understand that adults use language for things that are novel to the discourse context and that this novelty is determined from the speaker's point of view.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01756.x}, Key = {fds351980} } @article{fds351981, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The child's contribution to culture: A commentary on Toomela}, Journal = {Culture and Psychology}, Volume = {2}, Number = {3}, Pages = {307-318}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9600200306}, Abstract = {Toomela (1996) has emphasized the psychological dimensions of the process by which human children become participants in cultures. I support his arguments with observations of chimpanzees, which are similar to humans in some ways but still do not live culturally, and of human infants both before and after they have the capacity to participate fully in cultural activities. Toomela also proposes a new account of the process of internalization in which language plays the central role. I disagree somewhat with this account, arguing that whereas language is the most powerful human artifact potentiating internalization, other artifacts - both material and symbolic - may serve the same function if children are introduced to them in social interactions in which others have intentions toward their intentional states - and they know this. The central theoretical point of Toomela's paper is that a comprehensive account of the human species as a cultural species must focus not only on the cultural collective, but also on individuals and their psychological capacities.}, Doi = {10.1177/1354067X9600200306}, Key = {fds351981} } @article{fds351982, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Piagetian and Vygotskian Approaches to Language Acquisition}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {39}, Number = {5}, Pages = {269-276}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278478}, Abstract = {Both Piaget and Vygotsky were centrally concerned with the ontogenetic relationships between language, cognition, and social life. Recently, researchers have drawn on their observations and hypotheses to establish much closer links between these phenomena than either theorist ever imagined. In investigating the cognitive bases of early language, very close links have been established between specific cognitive achievements and the acquisition of certain types of early words, for example between object permanence development and the acquisition of words for disappearance and between means ends development and the acquisition of words for success/failure. In investigating the social bases of early language, close links have been established between the quantity and quality of joint attentional social interactions in which a child and an adult engage and the child’s early word learning skills. Despite their seminal contributions to the study of early language development along these two lines, neither Piaget nor Vygotsky fully appreciated the skills of social cognition that underlie the acqusition of language. © 1996 S. Karger AG, Basel.}, Doi = {10.1159/000278478}, Key = {fds351982} } @article{fds351978, Author = {Tomasello, M and Strosberg, R and Akhtar, N}, Title = {Eighteen-month-old children learn words in non-ostensive contexts.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {23}, Number = {1}, Pages = {157-176}, Year = {1996}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900010138}, Abstract = {Previous studies have demonstrated that children aged 2;0 can learn new words in a variety of non-ostensive contexts. The current two studies were aimed at seeing if this was also true of children just beginning to learn words at 1;6. In the first study an adult interacted with 48 children. She used a nonce word to announce her intention to find an object ('Let's find the gazzer'), picked up and rejected an object with obvious disappointment, and then gleefully found the target object (using no language). Children learned the new word as well in this condition as in a condition in which the adult found the object immediately. In the second study the adult first played several rounds of a finding game with each of 60 children, in which it was first established that one of several novel objects was always in a very distinctive hiding place (a toy barn). The adult then used a nonce word to announce her intention to find an object ('Let's find the toma') and then proceeded to the barn. In the key condition the barn was mysteriously 'locked'; the child thus never saw the target object after the nonce word was introduced. Children learned the new word as well in this condition as in a condition in which the adult found the object immediately. The results of these two studies suggest that from very early in language acquisition children learn words not through passive, associative processes, but rather through active attempts to understand adult behaviour in a variety of action and discourse contexts.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900010138}, Key = {fds351978} } @article{fds351977, Author = {Tomasello, M and Camaioni, L}, Title = {A comparison of the gestural communication of apes and human infants;}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {40}, Number = {1}, Pages = {7-24}, Year = {1997}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278540}, Abstract = {The naturally occurring gestures of chimpanzees and prelinguistic human infants are compared. Considered as special cases are apes raised by humans as they gesture to humans, and children with autism. Overall, the most important differences between the gestures of typically developing children and the gestures of individuals from the other three groups concern: (1) their predominant use of triadic, distal gestures; (2) their extensive use of declarative gestures, and (3) their use of imitative learning in acquiring some gestures (symbolic or referential), which implies that the gestures are understood as bi-directional communicative conventions. These differences all derive from the uniquely human form of social cognition (i.e., knowledge of other minds) that first emerges during the 2nd year of life and that enables human infants to understand other persons as intentional agents with whom they may share experience. Implications for the origins and evolution of human culture and language are discussed. © 1997 S. Karger AG, Basel.}, Doi = {10.1159/000278540}, Key = {fds351977} } @article{fds351976, Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N and Dodson, K and Rekau, L}, Title = {Differential productivity in young children's use of nouns and verbs.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {24}, Number = {2}, Pages = {373-387}, Year = {1997}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000997003085}, Abstract = {A fundamental question of child language acquisition is children's productivity with newly learned forms. The current study addressed this question experimentally with children just beginning to combine words. Ten children between 1;6 and 1;11 were taught four new words, two nouns and two verbs, over multiple sessions. All four words were modelled in minimal syntactic contexts. The experimenter gave children multiple opportunities to produce the words and made attempts to elicit morphological endings (plural for nouns, past tense for verbs). Overall, children combined the novel nouns productively with already known words much more often than they did the novel verbs-by many orders of magnitude. Several children also pluralized a newly learned noun, whereas none of them formed a past tense with a newly learned verb. A follow-up study using a slightly different methodology confirmed the finding of limited syntactic productivity with verbs. Hypotheses accounting for this asymmetry in the early use of nouns and verbs are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000997003085}, Key = {fds351976} } @article{fds351975, Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's productivity with word order and verb morphology.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {33}, Number = {6}, Pages = {952-965}, Year = {1997}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.33.6.952}, Abstract = {Four studies examined English-speaking children's productivity with word order and verb morphology. Two- and 3-year-olds were taught novel transitive verbs with experimentally controlled argument structures. The younger children neither used nor comprehended word order with these verbs; older children comprehended and used word order correctly to mark agents and patients of the novel verbs. Children as young as 2 years 1 month added -ing but not -ed to verb stems; older children were productive with both inflections. These studies demonstrate that the present progressive inflection is used productively before the regular past tense marker and suggest that productivity with word order may be independent of developments in verb morphology. The findings are discussed in terms of M. Tomasello's (1992a) Verb Island hypothesis and M. Rispoli's (1991) notion of the mosaic acquisition of grammatical relations.}, Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.33.6.952}, Key = {fds351975} } @article{fds351974, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Gluckman, A}, Title = {Comprehension of novel communicative signs by apes and human children.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {68}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1067-1080}, Year = {1997}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01985.x}, Abstract = {Forty-eight young children (2.5 and 3.0 years old) and 9 great apes (6 chimpanzees and 3 orangutans) participated in a hiding-finding game. An adult human experimenter (the Hider) hid a reward in 1 of 3 opaque containers aligned on a wooden plank. Another adult experimenter (the Communicator) attempted to help the subject find the reward by giving 1 of 3 types of communicative sign: (1) Pointing, for which she placed her hand directly above the correct container with index finger oriented down; (2) Marker, for which she placed a small wooden block on top of the correct container; and (3) Replica, for which she held up a perceptually identical duplicate of the correct container. At both ages, children were above chance in this finding game with all 3 types of communicative sign, with Pointing being easiest (because they knew it prior to the experiment), Marker being next easiest, and Replica being most difficult. In contrast, no ape was above chance for any of the communicative signs that it did not know before the experiment (some had been trained in the use of the marker previously, and one knew pointing), nor was group performance above chance for any of the signs, despite the fact that apes experienced three times as many trials as children on each sign. Our explanation of these results is that young children understand the communicative intentions of other persons--although they may have more difficulty comprehending the exact nature of those intentions in some cases--whereas apes treat the behavioral signs of others as predictive cues only (signals). This may be because apes do not perceive and understand the communicative intentions of others, at least not in a human-like way.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01985.x}, Key = {fds351974} } @article{fds326347, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B}, Title = {Five primate species follow the visual gaze of conspecifics}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {55}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1063-1069}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1997.0636}, Abstract = {Individuals from five primate species were tested experimentally for their ability to follow the visual gaze of conspecifics to an outside object. Subjects were from captive social groups of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys torquatus, rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, stumptail macaques, M. arctoides, and pigtail macaques, M. nemestrina. Experimental trials consisted of an experimenter inducing one individual to look at food being displayed, and then observing the reaction of another individual (the subject) that was looking at that individual (not the food). Control trials consisted of an experimenter displaying the food in an identical manner when the subject was alone. Individuals from all species reliably followed the gaze of conspecifics, looking to the food about 80% of the time in experimental trials, compared with about 20% of the time in control trials. Results are discussed in terms of both the proximate mechanisms that might be involved and the adaptive functions that might be served by gaze-following.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1997.0636}, Key = {fds326347} } @article{fds351967, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Reference: Intending that others jointly attend}, Journal = {Pragmatics and Cognition}, Volume = {6}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {229-243}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.6.1-2.12tom}, Abstract = {My approach to reference focuses on naturally occuring processes of communication, and in particular on children’s earliest referential activities. I begin by describing three different kinds of child gesture – ritualizations, deictics, and symbolic gestures – and then proceed to examine young children’s early word learning. The account focuses on the joint attentional situations in which young children learn their earliest gestures and linguistic symbols and on the social-cognitive and cultural learning processes involved in the different cases. © 1998 John Benjamins Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1075/pc.6.1-2.12tom}, Key = {fds351967} } @article{fds351968, Author = {Tomasello, M and Brooks, PJ}, Title = {Young Children'S earliest transitive and intransitive constructions}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {9}, Number = {4}, Pages = {379-396}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.1998.9.4.379}, Abstract = {Much of children's early syntactic development can be seen as the acquisition of sentence-level constructions that correspond to relatively complex events and states of affairs. The ctirrent study was an attempt to determine the relative concreteness (verb-specificity) or abstractness (verb-generality) of such constructions for children just beginning to produce large numbers of multi-word utterances. Sixteen children at 2.0 years of age and sixteen children at 2.5 years of age participated (all English speaking). Each child was taught two novel verbsfor a highly transitive action: one in a transitive construction (Ernie is tamming the car) and one in an intransitive construction (with patient as subject: The ball is meeking). They were then given o p rtunities to use their newly learned verbs, in many cases in discourse situations that encouraged use of the “opposite” construction (i.e., agentand patient-focused questions). Results showed that 2.0-year-old children almost never produced an utterance using a novel verb in anything other t an the construction in which it had been modeled. Children at 2.5 years of age were somewhat more productive, but still the large majority of these children avoided using the experimental verbs in nonmodeled constructions. These results suggest that when English-speaking children produce simple transitive and intransitive utterances in their spontaneous speech, they are doing so on a verb-specific basis (verb Island constructions), schematizing more abstract constructions only later as they discover patterns that apply across many such lexically specific constructions. © 1998, Walter de Gruyter. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1515/cogl.1998.9.4.379}, Key = {fds351968} } @article{fds351969, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response to commentators}, Journal = {Journal of Child Language}, Volume = {25}, Number = {2}, Pages = {485-491}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305000998003511}, Doi = {10.1017/S0305000998003511}, Key = {fds351969} } @article{fds351970, Author = {Ashley, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cooperative problem-solving and teaching in preschoolers}, Journal = {Social Development}, Volume = {7}, Number = {2}, Pages = {143-163}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00059}, Abstract = {The current study investigated the ontogenetic origins of children's skills of cooperative problem-solving in a task involving two complementary roles. Participants were peer dyads of 24, 30, 36, and 42 months of age. Primary dyads were initially presented with an instrumental problem whose solution required them to cooperate by coordinating two complementary actions. To further investigate their understanding of the task, these same dyads were then presented with the same problem but with roles reversed. Finally, after each of these primary participants had demonstrated proficiency in both roles, each was separately paired with a naive peer and given the opportunity to teach the naive partner the task. A clear ontogenetic trend emerged. Even with adult assistance, 24-month-old children never became independently proficient at the task. Thirty-and 36-month-old children became proficient mostly independently, but only relatively slowly and without demonstrating extensive amounts of behavioral coordination or the use of explicitly directive language to facilitate coordination. Although they did show evidence of recognizing when a peer was new to the task, children of this age engaged in little explicit teaching of naive peers. In contrast, 42-month-old children mastered the task much more quickly than the other children, responded much more quickly and accurately when their roles were reversed, coordinated both their actions and language in the task to a much greater extent, and engaged in more explicit teaching of naive peers. Results are discussed in terms of the developing social cognitive skills that enable children from 2 to 4 years of age to understand other persons as mental agents with whom they may share mental perspectives.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-9507.00059}, Key = {fds351970} } @article{fds351971, Author = {Carpenter, M and Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Fourteen- through 18-month-old infants differentially imitate intentional and accidental actions}, Journal = {Infant Behavior and Development}, Volume = {21}, Number = {2}, Pages = {315-330}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90009-1}, Abstract = {This study explored infants' ability to discriminate between, and their tendency to reproduce, the accidental and intentional actions of others. Twenty 14- through 18-month-olds watched an adult perform a series of two-step actions on objects that made interesting results occur. Some of the modeled actions were marked vocally as intentional ("There!"), some were marked vocally as accidental ("Woops!"). Following each demonstration, infants were given a chance to make the result occur themselves. Overall, infants imitated almost twice as many of the adult's intentional actions as her accidental ones. Infants before age 18 months thus may understand something about the intentions of other persons. This understanding represents infants' first step toward adult-like social cognition and underlies their acquisition of language and other cultural skills. © 1998 Ablex Publishing Corporation.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90009-1}, Key = {fds351971} } @article{fds351972, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Uniquely primate, uniquely human}, Journal = {Developmental Science}, Volume = {1}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-16}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00002}, Abstract = {Two hypotheses about primate cognition are proposed. First, it is proposed that primates, but not other mammals, understand categories of relations among external entities. In the physical domain primates have special skills in tasks such as oddity, transitivity, and relation matching that require facility with relational categories; in the social domain primates have special skills in understanding the third-party social relationships that hold among other individuals in their groups. Second, it is proposed that humans, but not other primates, understand the causal and intentional relations that hold among external entities. In the physical domain only humans understand causal forces as mediating the connection between sequentially ordered events; in the social domain only humans understand the behavior of others as intentionally directed and controlled by desired outcomes. Both these uniquely primate and these uniquely human cognitive skills are hypothesized to have their origins in adaptations for negotiating complex social interactions.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00002}, Key = {fds351972} } @article{fds351973, Author = {Carpenter, M and Nagell, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age.}, Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development}, Volume = {63}, Number = {4}, Pages = {i-143}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1166214}, Abstract = {At around 1 year of age, human infants display a number of new behaviors that seem to indicate a newly emerging understanding of other persons as intentional beings whose attention to outside objects may be shared, followed into, and directed in various ways. These behaviors have mostly been studied separately. In the current study, we investigated the most important of these behaviors together as they emerged in a single group of 24 infants between 9 and 15 months of age. At each of seven monthly visits, we measured joint attentional engagement, gaze and point following, imitation of two different kinds of actions on objects, imperative and declarative gestures, and comprehension and production of language. We also measured several nonsocial-cognitive skills as a point of comparison. We report two studies. The focus of the first study was the initial emergence of infants' social-cognitive skills and how these skills are related to one another developmentally. We found a reliable pattern of emergence: Infants progressed from sharing to following to directing others' attention and behavior. The nonsocial skills did not emerge predictably in this developmental sequence. Furthermore, correlational analyses showed that the ages of emergence of all pairs of the social-cognitive skills or their components were inter-related. The focus of the second study was the social interaction of infants and their mothers, especially with regard to their skills of joint attentional engagement (including mothers' use of language to follow into or direct infants' attention) and how these skills related to infants' early communicative competence. Our measures of communicative competence included not only language production, as in previous studies, but also language comprehension and gesture production. It was found that two measures--the amount of time infants spent in joint engagement with their mothers and the degree to which mothers used language that followed into their infant's focus of attention--predicted infants' earliest skills of gestural and linguistic communication. Results of the two studies are discussed in terms of their implications for theories of social-cognitive development, for theories of language development, and for theories of the process by means of which human children become fully participating members of the cultural activities and processes into which they are born.}, Doi = {10.2307/1166214}, Key = {fds351973} } @article{fds366603, Author = {Boesch, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzee and human cultures}, Journal = {Current Anthropology}, Volume = {39}, Number = {5}, Pages = {591-614}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/204785}, Abstract = {Culture has traditionally been attributed only to human beings. Despite growing evidence of behavioral diversity in wild chimpanzee populations, most anthropologists and psychologists still deny culture to this animal species. We argue here that culture is not monolithic but a set of processes. These processes show much diversity both in the social norms and models that determine which individuals will be exposed to particular cultural variants and what cultural variants will be present in the population and in the social learning mechanisms that determine the fidelity of transmission of the variants over time. Recognition of the diversity of these processes is important because it affects cultural dissemination, cultural evolution, and the complexity of cultural artifacts. A comparison of chimpanzee and human cultures shows many deep similarities, thus suggesting that they share evolutionary roots. Two possible differences between the two species are discussed. First, thanks to indirect means of transmission such as language, cultural dissemination is possible over greater stretches of time and space in humans than in chimpanzees. Second, human cultures rely more intensively than chimpanzee cultures on cumulative cultural evolution through the ratchet effect, which allows the accumulation of modifications over time and produces more elaborate cultural artifacts. © 1998 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1086/204785}, Key = {fds366603} } @article{fds351966, Author = {Visalberghi, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Primate causal understanding in the physical and psychological domains}, Journal = {Behavioural Processes}, Volume = {42}, Number = {2-3}, Pages = {189-203}, Year = {1998}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0376-6357(97)00076-4}, Abstract = {Evidence for primates' understanding of causality is presented and discussed. Understanding causality requires the organism to understand not just that two events are associated with one another in space and time, but also that there is some 'mediating force' that binds the two events to one another which may be used to predict or control those events (e.g. a physical force such as gravity or a psychological force such as an intention). In the physical domain, studies of tool use indicate that capuchin monkeys do not have a causal understanding of the functioning of tools in terms of the physical forces involved, but rather they learn to associate aspects of their own behavior with the results it produces. Apes show some possible signs of understanding the causal relations involved in tool use in the sense that they may employ various forms of foresight in approaching novel tasks, perhaps involving an understanding of physical forces-although not to the extent of human children. In the psychological domain, nonhuman primates understand conspecifics as animate beings that generate their own behavior and, thus, they appreciate that to manipulate conspecifics communicative signals, and not physical activities, are required. However, there is very little evidence that nonhuman primates of any species understand others as psychological beings with intentions and other psychological states that mediate their behavioral interactions with the world-as human children begin to do sometime during their second year of life. More research, using a wider range of problem-solving situations, is needed if we are to become more precise in our understanding of how primates understand the causal structure of the world around them.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0376-6357(97)00076-4}, Key = {fds351966} } @article{fds351965, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and human children (Homo sapiens).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {112}, Number = {2}, Pages = {192-206}, Year = {1998}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.112.2.192}, Abstract = {This study investigates the understanding of others' intentions in 2- and 3-year-old children, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). During training, subjects learned to use a discriminative cue to select a baited box. During testing, the experimenter placed a marker on top of the baited box to inform the subject of the reward's location. However, the experimenter also accidentally dropped the marker on top of an unbaited box, so that during any given trial the experimenter marked 2 boxes, 1 intentionally and 1 accidentally. All 3 species preferentially selected the box the experimenter had marked intentionally (especially during the initial trials), with 3-year-old children presenting the most robust results. These findings suggest that subjects understood something about the experimenter's intentions. The authors speculate that understanding of others' intentions may precede the understanding of others' beliefs both at the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.112.2.192}, Key = {fds351965} } @article{fds325206, Author = {Byrne, RW and Russon, AE}, Title = {Learning by imitation: a hierarchical approach.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {21}, Number = {5}, Pages = {667-684}, Year = {1998}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x98001745}, Abstract = {To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input increases the activation of stored internal representations. Imitation itself has generally been seen as a "special faculty." This has diverted much research towards the all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great apes, however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct ones: the "action level," a rather detailed and linear specification of sequential acts, and the "program level," a broader description of subroutine structure and the hierarchical layout of a behavioural "program." Program level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism, adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing "rehabilitation" to the wild. Representing and manipulating relations between objects seems to be one basic building block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some chimpanzee behaviour previously described as "emulation" and suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social role, even in humans.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x98001745}, Key = {fds325206} } @article{fds351964, Author = {Dodson, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Acquiring the transitive construction in English: the role of animacy and pronouns.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {25}, Number = {3}, Pages = {605-622}, Year = {1998}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000998003535}, Abstract = {Twenty-four children between 2;5 and 3;1 were taught two nonce verbs. Each verb was used multiple times by an adult experimenter to refer to a highly transitive action involving a mostly animate agent (including the child herself) and a patient of varying animacy. One of the verbs was modelled in the Two-Participants condition in which the experimenter said: 'Look. Big Bird is dopping the boat'. The other verb was modelled in the No-Participant condition in which the experimenter named the Two-Participants but did not use them as arguments of the novel verb: 'Look what Big Bird is doing to the boat. It's called keefing'. It was found that whereas many children produced transitive sentences with the Two-Participants verb, only children close to 3;0 produced transitive sentences with the No-Participant verb. This age is somewhat younger than previous studies in which young children were asked to produce transitive sentences with two lexical nouns for the two animate participants. Also, re-analyses of previously published studies in which children learned novel verbs in sentence frames without arguments found that the few transitive sentences produced by children under 2;6 involved either I or me as subject. One hypothesis is thus that as young children in the third year of life begin to construct a more abstract and verb-general transitive construction, this construction initially contains only certain types of participants expressed in only certain kinds of linguistic forms.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000998003535}, Key = {fds351964} } @article{fds351963, Author = {Tomasello, M and Brooks, PJ and Stern, E}, Title = {Learning to produce passive utterances through discourse}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {18}, Number = {53}, Pages = {223-237}, Year = {1998}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272379801805306}, Abstract = {Two studies of English-speaking children's acquisition of the passive construction are reported. In the first study children at 3.0 and 3.5 years of age were taught to produce full passive utterances with a nonce verb through rich discourse interaction. All the older children learned to produce a passive with the nonce verb, whereas only two-thirds of the younger children learned to do this - and they needed three times as many adult utterances to do so. In the second study, also using a nonce verb, some 3.0-year-old children were given rich discourse interactions containing truncated passives, passive questions, and by phrases - all of which added up to a full passive - but they never heard a full passive utterance as a whole. Other children were given only models of full passive utterances with no discourse scaffolding. Only children who heard full passive utterances produced them. The children who participated in rich discourse interactions produced truncated passives (as they had heard). These results demonstrate that children can learn to produce full passive sentences with a nonce verb at 3 years of age, but, in accordance with Tomasello's (1992) verb island hypothesis, they tend to do so only within the syntactic constructions in which they have heard adults using that verb. © Alpha Academic.}, Doi = {10.1177/014272379801805306}, Key = {fds351963} } @article{fds325205, Author = {Itakura, S and Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzee use of human and conspecific social cues to locate hidden food}, Journal = {Developmental Science}, Volume = {2}, Number = {4}, Pages = {448-456}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00089}, Abstract = {Two studies are reported in which chimpanzees attempted to use social cues to locate hidden food in one of two possible hiding places. In the first study four chimpanzees were exposed to a local enhancement cue (the informant approached and looked to the location where food was hidden and then remained beside it) and a gaze/point cue (the informant gazed and manually pointed towards the location where the food was hidden). Each cue was given by both a human informant and a chimpanzee informant. In the second study 12 chimpanzees were exposed to a gaze direction cue in combination with a vocal cue (the human informant gazed to the hiding location and produced one of two different vocalizations: a 'food-bark' or a human word-form). The results were: (i) all subjects were quite skillful with the local enhancement cue, no matter who produced it; (ii) few subjects were skillful with the gaze/point cue, no matter who produced it (most of these being individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans); and (iii) most subjects were skillful when the human gazed and vocalized at the hiding place, with little difference between the two types of vocal cue. Findings are discussed in terms of chimpanzees' apparent need for additional cues, over and above gaze direction cues, to indicate the presence of food.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00089}, Key = {fds325205} } @article{fds325571, Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use human and conspecific social cues to locate hidden food}, Journal = {Journal of Comparative Psychology}, Volume = {113}, Number = {2}, Pages = {X173-X177}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0735-7036.113.2.173}, Abstract = {Ten domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different breeds and ages were exposed to 2 different social cues indicating the location of hidden food, each provided by both a human informant and a conspecific informant (for a total of 4 different social cues). For the local enhancement cue the informant approached the location where food was hidden and then stayed beside it. For the gaze and point cue, the informant stood equidistant between 2 hiding locations and bodily oriented and gazed toward the 1 in which food was hidden (the human informant also pointed). Eight of the 10 subjects, including the one 6-month-old juvenile, were above chance with 2 or more cues. Results are discussed in terms of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes by means of which dogs come to use social cues to locate food.}, Doi = {10.1037//0735-7036.113.2.173}, Key = {fds325571} } @article{fds326036, Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Agnetta, B}, Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, follow gaze direction geometrically}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {58}, Number = {4}, Pages = {769-777}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1192}, Abstract = {Two experiments on chimpanzee gaze following are reported. In the first, chimpanzee subjects watched as a human experimenter looked around various types of barriers. The subjects looked around each of the barriers more when the human had done so than in a control condition (in which the human looked-in another direction). In the second experiment, chimpanzees watched as a human looked towards the back of their cage. As they turned to follow the human's gaze a distractor-object was presented. The chimpanzees looked at the distractor while still following the human's gaze to the back of the cage. These two experiments effectively disconfirm the low-level model of chimpanzee gaze following in which it is claimed that upon seeing another animate being's gaze direction chimpanzees simply turn in that direction and look around for something interesting. Rather, they support the hypothesis that chimpanzees follow the gaze direction of other animate beings geometrically to specific locations, in much the same way as human infants. The degree to which chimpanzees have a mentalistic interpretation of the gaze and/or visual experience of others is still an open question.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1192}, Key = {fds326036} } @article{fds351960, Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How children constrain their argument structure constructions}, Journal = {Language}, Volume = {75}, Number = {4}, Pages = {720-738}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/417731}, Abstract = {We tested two hypotheses about how English-speaking children learn to avoid making argument structure errors such as Don't giggle me. The first is that children base their usage of verbs on membership in narrow-range semantic classes (Pinker 1989). The second is that children make use of indirect negative evidence in the form of alternative expressions that preempt tendencies to overgeneralize. Ninety-six children (32 each at 2.5, 4.5, and 6/7 years of age) were introduced to two nonce verbs, one as a transitive verb and one as an intransitive verb. One verb was from a semantic class that can be used both transitively and intransitively while the other was from a fixed transitivity class. Half of the children were given preempting alternatives with both verbs; for example, they heard a verb in a simple transitive construction (as in Ernie's meeking the car) and then they also heard it in a passive construction - which enabled them to answer the question 'What's happening with the car?' with It's getting meeked (rather than generalizing to the intransitive construction with It's meeking). We found empirical support for the constraining role of verb classes and of preemption, but only for children 4.5 years of age and older. Results are discussed in terms of a model of syntactic development in which children begin with lexically specific linguistic constructions and only gradually learn to differentiate verbs as lexical items from argument structure constructions as abstract linguistic entities.}, Doi = {10.2307/417731}, Key = {fds351960} } @article{fds351961, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The human adaptation for culture}, Journal = {Annual Review of Anthropology}, Volume = {28}, Pages = {509-529}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509}, Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human ontogeny at approximately 1 year of age, as infants begin to engage with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and gestural communication. Young children's joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool-use practices, and other conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural learning allow human beings to, in effect, pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal kingdom.}, Doi = {10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509}, Key = {fds351961} } @article{fds351962, Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children learn to produce passives with nonce verbs.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {35}, Number = {1}, Pages = {29-44}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.35.1.29}, Abstract = {Younger and older children (mean ages = 2 years 11 months and 3 years 5 months) learned 2 nonce verbs in a full passive or active transitive construction. When asked patient-focused questions encouraging passive-voice replies (e.g., "What happened to the ball?") or agent-focused questions encouraging active-voice replies (e.g., "What did Elmo do?"), children used a variety of strategies to meet the demands of the questions, usually without changing the construction in which the verb occurred. In Study 2 in which passive and active constructions were primed, 40% of the almost 3-year-old children used an active-introduced verb in a passive construction and 35% used a passive-introduced verb in an active transitive construction when discourse demands encouraged them to do so. Thus, before their 3rd birthdays, some children have an understanding of the passive and active transitive constructions general enough to support productive usages with newly learned verbs.}, Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.35.1.29}, Key = {fds351962} } @article{fds351959, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A nonverbal false belief task: the performance of children and great apes.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {70}, Number = {2}, Pages = {381-395}, Year = {1999}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00028}, Abstract = {A nonverbal task of false belief understanding was given to 4- and 5-year-old children (N = 28) and to two species of great ape: chimpanzees and orangutans (N = 7). The task was embedded in a series of finding games in which an adult (the hider) hid a reward in one of two identical containers, and another adult (the communicator) observed the hiding process and attempted to help the participant by placing a marker on the container that she believed to hold the reward. An initial series of control trials ensured that participants were able to use the marker to locate the reward, follow the reward in both visible and invisible displacements, and ignore the marker when they knew it to be incorrect. In the crucial false belief trials, the communicator watched the hiding process and then left the area, at which time the hider switched the locations of the containers. When the communicator returned, she marked the container at the location where she had seen the reward hidden, which was incorrect. The hider then gave the subject the opportunity to find the sticker. Successful performance required participants to reason as follows: the communicator placed the marker where she saw the reward hidden; the container that was at that location is now at the other location; so the reward is at the other location. Children were also given a verbal false belief task in the context of this same hiding game. The two main results of the study were: (1) children's performance on the verbal and nonverbal false belief tasks were highly correlated (and both fit very closely with age norms from previous studies), and (2) no ape succeeded in the nonverbal false belief task even though they succeeded in all of the control trials indicating mastery of the general task demands.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00028}, Key = {fds351959} } @article{fds351958, Author = {Visalberghi, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Causal understanding in primates in physical and psychological domain}, Journal = {Sistemi Intelligenti}, Volume = {11}, Number = {2}, Pages = {307-331}, Year = {1999}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1422/3515}, Doi = {10.1422/3515}, Key = {fds351958} } @article{fds351956, Author = {Tomasello, M and Striano, T and Rochat, P}, Title = {Do young children use objects as symbols?}, Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {17}, Number = {4}, Pages = {563-584}, Year = {1999}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151099165483}, Abstract = {Much of young children's symbolic play is heavily scaffolded by adult symbolic action models, which children may imitate, and by adult verbal scripts. The current studies attempted to evaluate 18-35-month-old children's symbolic skills in the absence of such scaffolding. In a study of symbol comprehension, children were tested for their ability to comprehend an adult's use of either a replica object or an associated gesture to communicate which object in an array she wanted. In a study of symbol production, children were given some objects that afforded symbolic manipulations, but without adult symbolic action models or verbal scripts. The results of the two studies converged to suggest that children below 2 years of age have symbolic skills with gestures, but not with objects. It was also found that while children at 26 months were able to use an object as a symbol for another object, they had difficulties when the symbol had another conventional use (e.g. a drinking cup used as a hat). The findings are discussed in terms of DeLoache's dual representation model, and a modification of that model is proposed.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151099165483}, Key = {fds351956} } @article{fds351957, Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M and Dodson, K and Lewis, LB}, Title = {Young children's overgeneralizations with fixed transitivity verbs.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {70}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1325-1337}, Year = {1999}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00097}, Abstract = {The present study examined English-speaking children's tendency to make argument structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., I disappeared it). Children were exposed to several English verbs of fixed transitivity (exclusively intransitive or exclusively transitive) and then asked questions that encouraged them to overgeneralize usage of the verbs. Seventy-two children (24 in each of three age groups: 3, 4/5, and 8 years of age) experienced four actions performed by puppets. Each action had two verbs of similar meaning associated with it in the context of the experimental action: one more familiar to young children and one less familiar. Children at all ages were more likely to overgeneralize usage of verbs that were less familiar to them, supporting the hypothesis that children's usage of verbs in particular construction types becomes entrenched over time. As children solidly learn the transitivity status of particular verbs, they become more reluctant to use those verbs in other argument structure constructions.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00097}, Key = {fds351957} } @article{fds351954, Author = {Bellagamba, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Re-enacting intended acts: Comparing 12- and 18-month-olds}, Journal = {Infant Behavior and Development}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {277-282}, Year = {1999}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(99)00002-8}, Abstract = {The current study was a replication and extension of a study of infant imitative learning by Meltzoff (1995). Unlike the 18-month-old infants in that study (and other 18-month-olds in the current study), the 12-month-olds in this study did not frequently imitate unsuccessful goal-directed actions. Also, both 12- and 18-month-old infants reproduced actions more often when they observed the entire action and its result than when they observed the result only. © 1999 ABLEX Publishing Corporation.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0163-6383(99)00002-8}, Key = {fds351954} } @article{fds351955, Author = {Behrens, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {And what about the Chinese?}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {22}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1014}, Year = {1999}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X99222224}, Abstract = {We discuss other recent studies on the acquisition of the German plural that do not support the dual-mechanism model. The attested overgeneralizations are not by default only, nor completely random, but predictable from subregularities based on the grammatical gender and the phonology of the noun. In addition, the dual-mechanism model creates a number of problems for acquisition (theory) rather than solving existing ones.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X99222224}, Key = {fds351955} } @article{fds325204, Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Agnetta, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {59}, Number = {4}, Pages = {771-785}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377}, Abstract = {We report a series of experiments on social problem solving in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual were put into competition over two pieces of food. In all experiments dominants obtained virtually all of the foods to which they had good visual and physical access. However, subordinates were successful quite often in three situations in which they had better visual access to the food than the dominant, for example, when the food was positioned so that only the subordinate (and not the dominant) could see it. In some cases, the subordinate might have been monitoring the behaviour of the dominant directly and simply avoided the food that the dominant was moving towards (which just happened to be the one it could see). In other cases, however, we ruled out this possibility by giving subordinates a small headstart and forcing them to make their choice (to go to the food that both competitors could see, or the food that only they could see) before the dominant was released into the area. Together with other recent studies, the present investigation suggests that chimpanzees know what conspecifics can and cannot see, and, furthermore, that they use this knowledge to devise effective social-cognitive strategies in naturally occurring food competition situations. (C)2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1377}, Key = {fds325204} } @article{fds351952, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Culture and cognitive development}, Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science}, Volume = {9}, Number = {2}, Pages = {37-40}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00056}, Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not. The difference can be clearly seen when the social learning skills of humans and their nearest primate relatives are systematically compared. The human adaptation for culture begins to make itself manifest in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as human infants come to undestrand other persons as intentional agents like the self and so engage in joint attentional interactions with them. This understanding then enables young children (a) to employ some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning to acquire the accumulated wisdom of their cultures, especially as embodied in language, and also (b) to comprehend their worlds in some uniquely powerful ways involving perspectivally based symbolic representations.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8721.00056}, Key = {fds351952} } @article{fds351953, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Primate cognition: Introduction to the issue}, Journal = {Cognitive Science}, Volume = {24}, Number = {3}, Pages = {351-361}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2403_1}, Abstract = {I introduce the special issue by: (1) outlining something of the relationship between mainstream cognitive science and the study of nonhuman primate cognition; (2) providing a brief overview of the scientific study of primate cognition and how the papers of this special issue fit into that scientific paradigm; and (3) explicating my own views about the relationship between nonhuman primate cognition and human cognition. © 2000 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15516709cog2403_1}, Key = {fds351953} } @article{fds351951, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do young children have adult syntactic competence?}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {74}, Number = {3}, Pages = {209-253}, Year = {2000}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00069-4}, Abstract = {Many developmental psycholinguists assume that young children have adult syntactic competence, this assumption being operationalized in the use of adult-like grammars to describe young children's language. This "continuity assumption" has never had strong empirical support, but recently a number of new findings have emerged - both from systematic analyses of children's spontaneous speech and from controlled experiments - that contradict it directly. In general, the key finding is that most of children's early linguistic competence is item based, and therefore their language development proceeds in a piecemeal fashion with virtually no evidence of any system-wide syntactic categories, schemas, or parameters. For a variety of reasons, these findings are not easily explained in terms of the development of children's skills of linguistic performance, pragmatics, or other "external" factors. The framework of an alternative, usage-based theory of child language acquisition - relying explicitly on new models from Cognitive-Functional Linguistics - is presented.}, Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00069-4}, Key = {fds351951} } @article{fds351950, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The item-based nature of children's early syntactic development}, Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, Volume = {4}, Number = {4}, Pages = {156-163}, Year = {2000}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01462-5}, Abstract = {Recent research using both naturalistic and experimental methods has found that the vast majority of young children's early language is organized around concrete, item-based linguistic schemas. From this beginning, children then construct more abstract and adult-like linguistic constructions, but only gradually and in piecemeal fashion. These new data present significant problems for nativist accounts of children's language development that use adult-like linguistic categories, structures and formal grammars as analytical tools. Instead, the best account of these data is provided by a usage-based model in which children imitatively learn concrete linguistic expressions from the language they hear around them, and then - using their general cognitive and social-cognitive skills - categorize, schematize and creatively combine these individually learned expressions and structures. Copyright (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd.}, Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01462-5}, Key = {fds351950} } @article{fds351949, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Erratum: (Trends in Cognitive Sciences (April) 4:4 (156-163))}, Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, Volume = {4}, Number = {5}, Pages = {186}, Year = {2000}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01481-9}, Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01481-9}, Key = {fds351949} } @article{fds325203, Author = {Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cues to food location that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different ages do and do not use}, Journal = {Animal Cognition}, Volume = {3}, Number = {2}, Pages = {107-112}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2000}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710000070}, Abstract = {The results of three experiments are reported. In the main study, a human experimenter presented domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) with a variety of social cues intended to indicate the location of hidden food. The novel findings of this study were: (1) dogs were able to use successfully several totally novel cues in which they watched a human place a marker in front of the target location; (2) dogs were unable to use the marker by itself with no behavioral cues (suggesting that some form of human behavior directed to the target location was a necessary part of the cue); and (3) there were no significant developments in dogs' skills in these tasks across the age range 4 months to 4 years (arguing against the necessity of extensive learning experiences with humans). In a follow- up study, dogs did not follow human gaze into "empty space" outside of the simulated foraging context. Finally, in a small pilot study, two arctic wolves (Canis lupus) were unable to use human cues to locate hidden food. These results suggest the possibility that domestic dogs have evolved an adaptive specialization for using human-produced directional cues in a goal-directed (especially foraging) context. Exactly how they understand these cues is still an open question. © Springer-Verlag 2000.}, Doi = {10.1007/s100710000070}, Key = {fds325203} } @article{fds351947, Author = {Call, J and Agnetta, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cues that chimpanzees do and do not use to find hidden objects}, Journal = {Animal Cognition}, Volume = {3}, Number = {1}, Pages = {23-34}, Year = {2000}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710050047}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees follow conspecific and human gaze direction reliably in some situations, but very few chimpanzees reliably use gaze direction or other communicative signals to locate hidden food in the object-choice task. Three studies aimed at exploring factors that affect chimpanzee performance in this task are reported. In the first study, vocalizations and other noises facilitated the performance of some chimpanzees (only a minority). In the second study, various behavioral cues were given in which a human experimenter either touched, approached, or actually lifted and looked under the container where the food was hidden. Each of these cues led to enhanced performance for only a very few individuals. In the third study - a replication with some methodological improvements of a previous experiment - chimpanzees were confronted with two experimenters giving conflicting cues about the location of the hidden food, with one of them (the knower) having witnessed the hiding process and the other (the guesser) not. In the crucial test in which a third experimenter did the hiding, no chimpanzee found the food at above chance levels. Overall, in all three studies, by far the best performers were two individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans. It thus seems that while chimpanzees are very good at "behavior reading" of various sorts, including gaze following, they do not understand the communicative intentions (informative intentions) behind the looking and gesturing of others - with the possible exception of enculturated chimpanzees, who still do not understand the differential significance of looking and gesturing done by people who have different knowledge about states of affairs in the world. © Springer-Verlag 2000.}, Doi = {10.1007/s100710050047}, Key = {fds351947} } @article{fds351948, Author = {Campbell, AL and Brooks, P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Factors affecting young children's use of pronouns as referring expressions.}, Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research : JSLHR}, Volume = {43}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1337-1349}, Year = {2000}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jslhr.4306.1337}, Abstract = {Most studies of children's use of pronouns have focused either on the morphology of personal pronouns or on the anaphoric use of pronouns by older children. The current two studies investigated factors affecting children's choice of pronouns as referring expressions-in contrast with their use of full nouns and null references. In the first study it was found that 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children did not use pronouns differentially whether the adult (a) modeled a pronoun or a noun for the target object or (b) did or did not witness the target event (although there was evidence that they did notice and take account of the adult's witnessing in other ways). In the second study it was found that children of this same age (a) do not use pronouns to avoid unfamiliar or difficult nouns but (b) do use pronouns differently depending on the immediately preceding discourse of the experimenter (whether they were asked a specific question such as "What did X do?" or a general question such as "What happened?"). In the case of specific questions, children prefer to use a null reference but use some pronouns as well (almost never using full nouns); in the case of the generic questions, children use pronouns even more often (and use nouns more as well). This finding was corroborated by some new analyses of children's use of pronouns in specific discourse situations in previously published studies. These findings suggest that children's choice of pronouns as referring expressions in early language development is influenced more by the immediately preceding discourse than other kinds of factors.}, Doi = {10.1044/jslhr.4306.1337}, Key = {fds351948} } @article{fds325202, Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {61}, Number = {1}, Pages = {139-151}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518}, Abstract = {We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food, which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting procedure and could monitor the visual access of their dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely to be due to the changed nature of the competition under these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive skills. These findings suggest that at least in some situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not know), and that they use this information to devise effective social-cognitive strategies. © 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1518}, Key = {fds325202} } @article{fds325570, Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Fogleman, T}, Title = {The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {61}, Number = {2}, Pages = {335-343}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1598}, Abstract = {Primates follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to outside objects. We followed the ontogeny of this social-cognitive skill for two species: rhesus macaques and chimpanzees, in the first two experiments, using both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal design, we exposed individuals of different ages to a human looking in a specified direction. Rhesus infants first began reliably to follow the direction of this gaze at the end of the early infancy period, at about 5.5 months of age. Chimpanzees did not reliably follow human gaze until 3-4 years; this corresponds to the latter part of the late infancy period for this species. In the third experiment we exposed individuals of the same two species to a human repeatedly looking to the same location (with no special object at that location) to see if subjects would learn to ignore the looks. Only adults of the two species diminished their gaze-following behaviour over trials. This suggests that in the period between infancy and adulthood individuals of both species come to integrate their gaze-following skills with their more general social-cognitive knowledge about other animate beings and their behaviour, and so become able to deploy their gaze-following skills in a more flexible manner. © 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1598}, Key = {fds325570} } @article{fds351940, Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Development of Relative Clauses in Spontaneous Child Speech}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {131-151}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.2001.006}, Abstract = {This study examines the development of relative clauses in the speech of four English-speaking children between 1;9 and 5;2 years of age. It is shown that the earliest relative clauses occur in presentational constructions that express a single proposition in two finite clauses. Starting from such simple sentences, children gradually learn the use of more complex constructions in which the relative clause modifes the noun of a full-edged main clause. Five factors are considered that might contribute to the development of relative clauses in spontaneous child speech: (1) the ambient language, (2) the formulaic character of the main clause, (3) the information structure of the whole utterance, (4) the communicative function of presentational relatives, and (5) the limited processing capacity of young children. © 2001, 2000 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1515/cogl.2001.006}, Key = {fds351940} } @article{fds351941, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {First steps toward a usage-based theory of language acquisition}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {61-82}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.2001.012}, Abstract = {Usage-based models of language focus on the specific communicative events in which people learn and use language. In these models, the psycholinguistic units with which individuals operate are determined not by theoretical fiat but by observation of actual language use in actual communicative events. This data-based approach make these models especially congenial for the analysis of children's language, since children do not learn and use the same units as adults. In this paper I employ a usage-based model of language to argue for five fundamental facts about child language acquisition: (1) the primary psycholinguistic unit of child language acquisition is the utterance, which has as its foundation the expression and understanding of communicative intentions; (2) early in their language development children are attempting to reproduce not adult words but whole adult utterances; (3) children's earliest utterances are almost totally concrete in the sense that they are instantiations of item-based schemas or constructions; (4) abstractions result from children generalizing across the type variation they observe at particular “slots” in otherwise recurrent tokens of the same utterance; and (5) children create novel utterances for themselves via usage-based syntactic operations in which they begin with an utterance-level schema and then modify that schema for the exigencies of the particular communicative situation (usage event) at hand. © 2001, 2000 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1515/cogl.2001.012}, Key = {fds351941} } @article{fds351942, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cultural Transmission:A View from Chimpanzees and Human Infants}, Journal = {Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology}, Volume = {32}, Number = {2}, Pages = {135-146}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002002}, Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as infants begin to engage with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and gestural communication. Young children–s joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool use practices, and many other conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural learning allow human beings to pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal kingdom. © 2015, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/0022022101032002002}, Key = {fds351942} } @article{fds351943, Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The acquisition of finite complement clauses in English: A corpus-based analysis}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {97-142}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.12.2.97}, Abstract = {This article examines the development of finite complement clauses in the speech of seven English-speaking children aged 1;2 to 5;2.It shows that in most of children's complex utterances that seem to include a finite complement clause, the main clause does not express a full proposition; rather, it functions as an epistemic marker, attention getter, or marker of illocutionary force. The whole construction thus contains only a single proposition expressed by the apparent complement clause. As children grow older, some of the “main clauses” become more substantial and new complement-taking verbs emerge that occur with truly embedded complement clauses. However, since the use of these constructions is limited to only a few verbs, we argue that they are not yet licensed by a general schema or rule; rather, they are “constructional islands” organized around individual verbs. © 2001, Walter de Gruyter. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1515/cogl.12.2.97}, Key = {fds351943} } @article{fds351944, Author = {Pika, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {'Separating the wheat from the chaff': A novel food processing technique in captive Gorillas (Gorilla g. gorilla)}, Journal = {Primates}, Volume = {42}, Number = {2}, Pages = {167-170}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02558144}, Abstract = {Observation of a novel food processing technique is reported for captive zoo gorillas (Gorilla g. gorilla). It is similar in function to that of Japanese macaques' wheat placer mining behaviour and consists of puffing/blowing air with the mouth onto a mixture of oat grains and chaff in order to separate out the oat grains. Three females in two of four groups regularly use this behaviour. Other individuals in these groups or individuals of the two other groups in the same zoo do not use it. However, a very similar behaviour has been observed in three other individuals in a gorilla group of another zoo. The existence of this technique in spatially separated groups implies that multiple individuals have invented it for themselves. The possible role of social transmission is still to be investigated.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF02558144}, Key = {fds351944} } @article{fds351945, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Could we please lose the mapping metaphor, please?}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {24}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1119-1120}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01390131}, Abstract = {Although Bloom gives more credit to social cognition (mind reading) than do most other theorists of word learning, he does not go far enough. He still relies fundamentally on a learning process of association (or mapping), neglecting the joint attentional and cultural learning skills from which linguistic communication emerges at one year of age.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x01390131}, Key = {fds351945} } @article{fds351946, Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {What preschool children do and do not do with ungrammatical word orders}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {16}, Number = {2}, Pages = {679-692}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(01)00054-5}, Abstract = {Akhtar [J. Child Lang. 26 (1999) 339.] found that when 4-year-old English-speaking children hear novel verbs in transitive utterances with ungrammatical word orders (e.g., Elmo the tree meeked), they correct them to canonical SVO order almost all of the time. However, when 3-year-olds and older 2-year-olds hear these same utterances, they waver between correcting and using the ungrammatical ordering. In the current study, we adapted this task for children at 2;4, using an intransitive construction. The major finding was that children corrected the noncanonical word order less than half as often as Akhtar's 2-year-old subjects who were approximately 4 months older. At the same time, however, children showed in several ways that they had some implicit understanding of canonical SV order; for example, they used the novel verb which they heard used in grammatical word order more often than the novel verb which they heard in ungrammatical word order, and they consistently used pronouns and the progressive -s auxiliary in appropriate ways. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body of theory and research suggesting that the ontogenetic emergence of linguistic categories and schemas is a gradual process, as is the emergence of categories in other domains of cognitive development. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(01)00054-5}, Key = {fds351946} } @article{fds366602, Author = {Striano, T and Tomasello, M and Rochat, P}, Title = {Social and object support for early symbolic play}, Journal = {Developmental Science}, Volume = {4}, Number = {4}, Pages = {442-455}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00186}, Abstract = {In this study we sought to determine the degree to which 2-to 3-year-old children use objects symbolically in the relative absence of adult symbolic actions or linguistic descriptions, and how the nature of objects influences symbolic play. Results revealed a dramatic increase in children's creative symbolic productions between 2 and 3 years of age, with the tendency to produce symbolic actions influenced to an equal degree by adult symbolic action models and verbal directions. Children of all ages were heavily influenced by the nature of the object to be used as a symbol, with the youngest children using only replica objects as symbols. In a second study, we examined children's looks to an adult as they engaged in different kinds of activities with objects. The main finding was that children looked to the adult immediately after performing a symbolic action more often than if they performed an instrumental action. We argue for the essentially social nature of symbolic play, both in terms of how children learn to use objects as symbols and in terms of the reasons they do so.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00186}, Key = {fds366602} } @article{fds351939, Author = {Campbell, AL and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The acquisition of English dative constructions}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {253-267}, Year = {2001}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716401002065}, Abstract = {We analyzed the three main types of English dative constructions - the double-object dative, the to dative, and the for dative - in the spontaneous speech of seven children from the age of 1;6 to 5;0. The main findings were as follows. First, the double-object dative was acquired by most of the children before either of the prepositional datives; this was attributed to the greater frequency with which children heard this construction with individual verbs. Second, the verbs children used with these constructions were not only the adult prototypical ones, but also a number of the less prototypical ones; again, this was very likely due to their frequency and saliency in the language children heard. Third, no support was found for Ninio's (1999) analysis of the emergence of constructions in terms of a single "pathbreaking" verb; rather, children began using the double-object dative with many different verbs and did not follow the trajectory proposed by Ninio (i.e., a single verb is used for some months before an "explosion" of new verbs is introduced in the construction). Finally, most of the verbs initially used in the three dative constructions were first used in other constructions (e.g., a simple transitive); this was even true for some obligatory datives, such as give and show. The current results provide a starting point for determining the underlying representations for the different kinds of dative constructions and for explicating how children understand the interrelations among these and other constructions.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0142716401002065}, Key = {fds351939} } @article{fds351938, Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of pronouns in young children's acquisition of the English transitive construction.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {37}, Number = {6}, Pages = {739-748}, Year = {2001}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.37.6.739}, Abstract = {Two studies investigating the linguistic representations underlying English-speaking 2 1/2-year-olds' production of transitive utterances are reported. The first study was a training study in which half the children heard utterances with full nouns as agent and patient, and half the children heard utterances with both pronouns (i.e., He's [verb]-ing it) and also full nouns. In subsequent testing, only children who had been trained with pronouns and nouns were able to produce a transitive utterance creatively with a nonce verb. The second study reported an analogous set of findings, but in comprehension. Together, the results of these 2 studies suggest that English-speaking children build many of their early linguistic constructions around certain specific lexical or morphological items and patterns, perhaps especially around particular pronoun configurations.}, Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.37.6.739}, Key = {fds351938} } @article{fds351937, Author = {Tomasello, M and Abbot-Smith, K}, Title = {A tale of two theories: response to Fisher.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {83}, Number = {2}, Pages = {207-214}, Year = {2002}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00172-x}, Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00172-x}, Key = {fds351937} } @article{fds351936, Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German children's productivity with tense morphology: the Perfekt (present perfect).}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {29}, Number = {3}, Pages = {567-589}, Year = {2002}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000902005147}, Abstract = {Two nonce-word studies examined German-speaking children's productivity with the Perfekt (present perfect) from 2;6 to 3;6. The German Perfekt consists of the past participle of the main verb and an inflected form of an auxiliary (either haben 'have' or sein 'be'). In Study 1, nonce verbs were either introduced in the infinitival form, and children (seventy-two children, aged 2;6 to 3;6) were tested on their ability to produce the Perfekt, or introduced in the Perfekt, and children were tested on their ability to produce the infinitive. In Study 2 twenty-four children aged 3;6 were given the past participle form of nonce verbs to see if they could supply the appropriate auxiliary (based mainly on verb semantics). The results were that many children as young as 2;6 used past participles productively (more than used infinitival forms productively), but all children had much difficulty in supplying both auxiliaries appropriately. The current findings suggest that mastery of the Perfekt construction as a whole does not take place before the age of four and that frequency of exposure is an important factor in determining the age at which children acquire grammatical constructions.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000902005147}, Key = {fds351936} } @article{fds351934, Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A new false belief test for 36-month-olds}, Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {393-420}, Year = {2002}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151002320620316}, Abstract = {We report two studies that suggest that some 36-month-old (and younger) children understand others' false beliefs. In the false belief conditions, children and two adults (E1 and E2) watched as an object was put into a container. E1 left the room, and E2 switched that object with another. E1 returned, expressed her desire for the object, and struggled to open the container (without succeeding). She spied both objects across the room and said to the child. 'Oh, there it is. Can you get it for me?' In other conditions, the object was not switched or E1 witnessed the switch. Other variations included using a novel word for the object and removing the 'pull of the real'. Measures of children's latency and uncertainty were taken to determine whether those who were correct on the false belief tasks were guessing (luckily) or truly understanding. Results showed that between one-third and almost two-thirds of children took account of the adult's false belief when deciding which object the adult was requesting. We compare this task with other implicit and explicit tasks. We also conclude that certain task demands (e.g. the pull of the real) in traditional theory of mind assessments are unnecessary.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151002320620316}, Key = {fds351934} } @article{fds351935, Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Understanding "prior intentions" enables two-year-olds to imitatively learn a complex task.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {73}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1431-1441}, Year = {2002}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00481}, Abstract = {This study investigated children's understanding of others' intentions in a social learning context. Specifically, it investigated whether knowing an adult's prior intention before the adult gives a demonstration influences what children learn from the demonstration. In the five main experimental conditions, ninety-six 2-year-old children watched as an experimenter (E) pulled out a pin and opened the door of a box. Children in two No Prior Intention conditions saw this demonstration alone or paired with an irrelevant action. Children in three Prior Intention conditions knew what E was trying to do before the demonstration: they first saw E either attempt unsuccessfully to open the door, or visit and open several other containers, or they first saw that the door opened. Children opened the box themselves more often in each of these three conditions than in the two No Prior Intention conditions, even though children in all five conditions saw the exact same demonstration of how to open the box.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00481}, Key = {fds351935} } @article{fds325201, Author = {Hare, B and Brown, M and Williamson, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The domestication of social cognition in dogs.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {298}, Number = {5598}, Pages = {1634-1636}, Year = {2002}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1072702}, Abstract = {Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1072702}, Key = {fds325201} } @article{fds351933, Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds learn novel nouns, verbs, and conventional actions from massed or distributed exposures.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {38}, Number = {6}, Pages = {967-978}, Year = {2002}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.38.6.967}, Abstract = {Two-year-old children were taught either 6 novel nouns, 6 novel verbs, or 6 novel actions over 1 month. In each condition, children were exposed to some items in massed presentations (on a single day) and some in distributed presentations (over the 2 weeks). Children's comprehension and production was tested at 3 intervals after training. In comprehension, children learned all types of items in all training conditions at all retention intervals. For production, the main findings were that (a) production was better for nonverbal actions than for either word type, (b) children produced more new nouns than verbs, (c) production of words was better following distributed than massed exposure, and (d) time to testing (immediate, 1 day, 1 week) did not affect retention. A follow-up study showed that the most important timing variable was the number of different days of exposure, with more days facilitating production. Results are discussed in terms of 2 key issues: (a) the domain-generality versus domain-specificity of processes of word learning and (b) the relative ease with which children learn nouns versus verbs.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.38.6.967}, Key = {fds351933} } @article{fds351932, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Things are what they do: Katherine Nelson's functional approach to language and cognition}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {3}, Number = {1}, Pages = {5-19}, Year = {2002}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327647JCD0301_2}, Abstract = {This article attempts to summarize Katherine Nelson's theoretical and empirical contributions to the ontogenetic study of language and cognition. Nelson's approach has consistently emphasized the function of language and linguistic concepts in children's larger conceptual and social lives and, conversely, how children's emerging understanding of the function of linguistic symbols in larger conceptual and social structures makes language acquisition possible in the first place. This approach has led to an especially fruitful body of theoretical and empirical work. Copyright © 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/S15327647JCD0301_2}, Key = {fds351932} } @article{fds326346, Author = {Hare, B and Addessi, E and Call, J and Tomasello, M and Visalberghi, E}, Title = {Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do and do not see?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {65}, Number = {1}, Pages = {131-142}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2002.2017}, Abstract = {Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which two individuals competed over food. When given a choice between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the piece of food that it approached. To test between these alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, subordinates that were given a head start did not preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first. Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see. We compare our results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition. © 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2002.2017}, Key = {fds326346} } @article{fds351930, Author = {Tomasello, M and Rakoczy, H}, Title = {What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality}, Journal = {Mind and Language}, Volume = {18}, Number = {2}, Pages = {121-147}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00217}, Abstract = {It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social cognition of humans from that of other animals is the belief-desire psychology of four-year-old children and adults (so-called theory of mind). We argue here that this is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human social cognition. The first step is one year old children's understanding of persons as intentional agents, which enables skills of cultural learning and shared intentionality. This initial step is 'the real thing' in the sense that it enables young children to participate in cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with a conventional/normative/reflective dimension - for example, linguistic communication and pretend play - thus inaugurating children's understanding of things mental. Understanding beliefs and participating in collective intentionality at four years of age - enabling the comprehension of such things as money and marriage - results from several years of engagement with other persons in perspective-shifting and reflective discourse containing propositional attitude constructions.}, Doi = {10.1111/1468-0017.00217}, Key = {fds351930} } @article{fds351931, Author = {Cameron-Faulkner, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A construction based analysis of child directed speech}, Journal = {Cognitive Science}, Volume = {27}, Number = {6}, Pages = {843-873}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.06.001}, Abstract = {The child directed speech of twelve English-speaking mothers was analyzed in terms of utterance-level constructions. First, the mothers' utterances were categorized in terms of general constructional categories such as Wh-questions, copulas and transitives. Second, mothers' utterances within these categories were further specified in terms of the initial words that framed the utterance, item-based phrases such as Are you ..., I'll ..., It's ..., Let's ..., What did .... The findings were: (i) overall, only about 15% of all maternal utterances had SVO form (most were questions, imperatives, copulas, and fragments); (ii) 51% of all maternal utterances began with one of 52 item-based phrases, mostly consisting of two words or morphemes (45% began with one of just 17 words); and (iii) children used many of these same item-based phrases, in some cases at a rate that correlated highly with their own mother's frequency of use. We suggest that analyses of adult-child linguistic interaction should take into account not just general constructional categories, but also the item-based constructions that adults and children use and the frequency with which they use them. © 2003 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.06.001}, Key = {fds351931} } @article{fds366601, Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Language and social understanding: Commentary on Nelson et al.}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {46}, Number = {1}, Pages = {47-50}, Year = {2003}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000067778}, Doi = {10.1159/000067778}, Key = {fds366601} } @article{fds325200, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B}, Title = {Chimpanzees understand psychological states - The question is which ones and to what extent}, Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, Volume = {7}, Number = {4}, Pages = {153-156}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2003}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4}, Abstract = {New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal species understand about the psychological states of others. Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things about what others do and do not see, or have and have not seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in competitive situations. They clearly do not have a human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are similar and different.}, Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4}, Key = {fds325200} } @article{fds351929, Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children extend both words and non-verbal actions to novel exemplars}, Journal = {Developmental Science}, Volume = {6}, Number = {2}, Pages = {185-190}, Year = {2003}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00270}, Abstract = {Markson and Bloom (1997) found that some learning processes involved in children's acquisition of a new word are also involved in their acquisition of a new fact. They argued that these findings provided evidence against a domain-specific system for word learning. However, Waxman and Booth (2000) found that whereas children quite readily extend newly learned words to novel exemplars within a category, they do not do this with newly learned facts. They therefore argued that because children did not extend some facts in a principled way, word learning and fact learning may result from different domain-specific processes. In the current study, we argue that facts are a poor comparison in this argument since facts vary in whether they are tied to particular individuals. A more appropriate comparison is a conventional non-verbal action on an object - 'what we do with things like this' - since they are routinely generalized categorically to new objects. Our study shows that 2 1/2-year-old children extend novel non-verbal actions to new objects in the same way that they extend novel words to new objects. The findings provide support for the view that word learning represents a unique configuration of more general learning processes.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00270}, Key = {fds351929} } @article{fds351928, Author = {Lieven, E and Behrens, H and Speares, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Early syntactic creativity: a usage-based approach.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {30}, Number = {2}, Pages = {333-370}, Year = {2003}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000903005592}, Abstract = {The aim of the current study was to determine the degree to which a sample of one child's creative utterances related to utterances that the child previously produced. The utterances to be accounted for were all of the intelligible, multi-word utterances produced by the child in a single hour of interaction with her mother early in her third year of life (at age 2;1.11). We used a high-density database consisting of 5 hours of recordings per week together with a maternal diary for the previous 6 weeks. Of the 295 multi-word utterances on tape, 37% were 'novel' in the sense that they had not been said in their entirety before. Using a morpheme-matching method, we identified the way(s) in which each novel utterance differed from its closest match in the preceding corpus. In 74% of the cases we required only one operation to match the previous utterance and the great majority of these consisted of the substitution of a word (usually a noun) into a previous utterance or schema. Almost all the other single-operation utterances involved adding a word onto the beginning or end of a previous utterance. 26% of the novel, multi-word utterances required more than one operation to match the closest previous utterance, although many of these only involved a combination of the two operations seen for the single-operation utterances. Some others were, however, more complex to match. The results suggest that the relatively high degree of creativity in early English child language could be at least partially based upon entrenched schemas and a small number of simple operations to modify them. We discuss the implications of these results for the interplay in language production between strings registered in memory and categorial knowledge.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000903005592}, Key = {fds351928} } @article{fds326035, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B}, Title = {Chimpanzees versus humans: It's not that simple}, Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, Volume = {7}, Number = {6}, Pages = {239-240}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2003}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4}, Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4}, Key = {fds326035} } @article{fds351925, Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N}, Title = {What paradox? A response to Naigles (2002).}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {88}, Number = {3}, Pages = {317-323}, Year = {2003}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00048-9}, Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00048-9}, Key = {fds351925} } @article{fds351926, Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of language in the development of false belief understanding: a training study.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {74}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1130-1144}, Year = {2003}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00597}, Abstract = {The current study used a training methodology to determine whether different kinds of linguistic interaction play a causal role in children's development of false belief understanding. After 3 training sessions, 3-year-old children improved their false belief understanding both in a training condition involving perspective-shifting discourse about deceptive objects (without mental state terms) and in a condition in which sentential complement syntax was used (without deceptive objects). Children did not improve in a condition in which they were exposed to deceptive objects without accompanying language. Children showed most improvement in a condition using both perspective-shifting discourse and sentential complement syntax, suggesting that each of these types of linguistic experience plays an independent role in the ontogeny of false belief understanding.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00597}, Key = {fds351926} } @article{fds351927, Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Gestural communication in young gorillas (Gorilla gorilla): gestural repertoire, learning, and use.}, Journal = {American journal of primatology}, Volume = {60}, Number = {3}, Pages = {95-111}, Year = {2003}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.10097}, Abstract = {In the present study we investigated the gestural communication of gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). The subjects were 13 gorillas (1-6 years old) living in two different groups in captivity. Our goal was to compile the gestural repertoire of subadult gorillas, with a special focus on processes of social cognition, including attention to individual and developmental variability, group variability, and flexibility of use. Thirty-three different gestures (six auditory, 11 tactile, and 16 visual gestures) were recorded. We found idiosyncratic gestures, individual differences, and similar degrees of concordance between and within groups, as well as some group-specific gestures. These results provide evidence that ontogenetic ritualization is the main learning process involved, but some form of social learning may also be responsible for the acquisition of special gestures. The present study establishes that gorillas have a multifaceted gestural repertoire, characterized by a great deal of flexibility with accommodations to various communicative circumstances, including the attentional state of the recipient. The possibility of assigning Seyfarth and Cheney's [1997] model for nonhuman primate vocal development to the development of nonhuman primate gestural communication is discussed.}, Doi = {10.1002/ajp.10097}, Key = {fds351927} } @article{fds351924, Author = {Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of the input in the acquisition of third person singular verbs in English.}, Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research : JSLHR}, Volume = {46}, Number = {4}, Pages = {863-877}, Year = {2003}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2003/067)}, Abstract = {During the early stages of language acquisition, children pass through a stage of development when they produce both finite and nonfinite verb forms in finite contexts (e.g., "it go there," "it goes there"). Theorists who assume that children operate with an abstract understanding of tense and agreement marking from the beginnings of language use tend to explain this phenomenon in terms of either performance limitations in production (e.g., V. Valian, 1991) or the optional use of finite forms in finite contexts due to a lack of knowledge that tense and agreement marking is obligatory (the optional infinitive hypothesis; K. Wexler, 1994, 1996). An alternative explanation, however, is that children's use of nonfinite forms is based on the presence of questions in the input ("Where does it go?") where the grammatical subject is immediately followed by a nonfinite verb form. To compare these explanations, 2 groups of 24 children aged between 2 years 6 months and 3 years were exposed to 6 known and 3 novel verbs produced in either declaratives or questions or in both declaratives and questions. The children were then questioned to elicit use of the verbs in either finite or nonfinite contexts. The results show that for novel verbs, the children's patterns of verb use were closely related to the patterns of verb use modeled in the language to which they were exposed. For known verbs, there were no differences in the children's use of individual verbs, regardless of the specific patterns of verb use modeled in the language they heard. The implications of these findings for theories of early verb use are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2003/067)}, Key = {fds351924} } @article{fds351922, Author = {Tomasello, M and Haberl, K}, Title = {Understanding attention: 12- and 18-month-olds know what is new for other persons.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {39}, Number = {5}, Pages = {906-912}, Year = {2003}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.39.5.906}, Abstract = {Infants at 12 and 18 months of age played with 2 adults and 2 new toys. For a 3rd toy, however, 1 of the adults left the room while the child and the other adult played with it. This adult then returned, looked at all 3 toys aligned on a tray, showed great excitement ("Wow! Cool!"), and then asked, "Can you give it to me?' To retrieve the toy the adult wanted, infants had to (a) know that people attend to and get excited about new things and (b) identify what was new for the adult even though it was not new for them. Infants at both ages did this successfully, lending support to the hypothesis that 1-year-old infants possess a genuine understanding of other persons as intentional and attentional agents.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.39.5.906}, Key = {fds351922} } @article{fds351923, Author = {Call, J and Bräuer, J and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are sensitive to the attentional state of humans.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {117}, Number = {3}, Pages = {257-263}, Year = {2003}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.117.3.257}, Abstract = {Twelve domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were given a series of trials in which they were forbidden to take a piece of visible food. In some trials, the human continued to look at the dog throughout the trial (control condition), whereas in others, the human (a) left the room, (b) turned her back, (c) engaged in a distracting activity, or (d) closed her eyes. Dogs behaved in clearly different ways in most of the conditions in which the human did not watch them compared with the control condition, in which she did. In particular, when the human looked at them, dogs retrieved less food, approached it in a more indirect way, and sat (as opposed to laid down) more often than in the other conditions. Results are discussed in terms of domestic dogs' social-cognitive skills and their unique evolutionary and ontogenetic histories.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.117.3.257}, Key = {fds351923} } @article{fds351921, Author = {Savage, C and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Testing the abstractness of children's linguistic representations: Lexical and structural priming of syntactic constructions in young children}, Journal = {Developmental Science}, Volume = {6}, Number = {5}, Pages = {557-567}, Year = {2003}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00312}, Abstract = {The current studies used a priming methodology to assess the abstractness of children's early syntactic constructions. In the main study, 3-, 4- and 6-year-old children were asked to describe a prime picture by repeating either an active or a passive sentence, and then they were left to their own devices to describe a target picture. For half the children at each age, the prime sentences they repeated had high lexical overlap with the sentence they were likely to produce for the target, whereas for the other half there was very low lexical overlap between prime and target. The main result was that 6-year-old children showed both lexical and structural priming for both the active transitive and passive constructions, whereas 3- and 4-year-old children showed lexical priming only. This pattern of results would seem to indicate that 6-year-old children have relatively abstract representations of these constructions, whereas 3- and 4-year-old children have as an integral part of their representations certain specific lexical items, especially pronouns and some grammatical morphemes. In a second study it was found that children did not need to repeat the prime out loud in order to be primed - suggesting that the priming effect observed concerns not just peripheral production mechanisms but underlying linguistic representations common to comprehension and production. These results support the view that young children develop abstract linguistic representations gradually during the preschool years.}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00312}, Key = {fds351921} } @article{fds351917, Author = {Tomasello, M and Stahl, D}, Title = {Sampling children's spontaneous speech: How much is enough?}, Journal = {Journal of Child Language}, Volume = {31}, Number = {1}, Pages = {101-121}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305000903005944}, Abstract = {There has been relatively little discussion in the field of child language acquisition about how best to sample from children's spontaneous speech, particularly with regard to quantitative issues. Here we provide quantitative information designed to help researchers make decisions about how best to sample children's speech for particular research questions (and/or how confident to be in existing analyses). We report theoretical analyses in which the major parameters are: (1) the frequency with which a phenomenon occurs in the real world, and (2) the temporal density with which a researcher samples the child's speech. We look at the influence of these two parameters in using spontaneous speech samples to estimate such things as: (a) the percentage of the real phenomenon actually captured, (b) the probability of capturing at least one target in any given sample, (c) the confidence we can have in estimating the frequency of occurrence of a target from a given sample, and (d) the estimated age of emergence of a target structure. In addition, we also report two empirical analyses of relatively infrequent child language phenomena, in which we sample in different ways from a relatively dense corpus (two children aged 2;0 to 3;0) and compare the different results obtained. Implications of these results for various issues in the study of child language acquisition are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0305000903005944}, Key = {fds351917} } @article{fds351918, Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {To move or not to move: How apes adjust to the attentional state of others}, Journal = {Interaction Studies}, Volume = {5}, Number = {2}, Pages = {199-219}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.5.2.03lie}, Abstract = {A previous observational study suggested that when faced with a partner with its back turned, chimpanzees tend to move around to the front of a non-attending partner and then gesture-rather than gesturing once to attract attention and then again to convey a specific intent.We investigated this preference experimentally by presenting six orangutans, five gorillas, nine chimpanzees, and four bonobos with a food begging situation in which we varied the body orientation of an experimenter (E) with respect to the subject (front vs. back) and the location of the food (in front or behind E). These manipulations allowed us to measure whether subjects preferred to move around to face E or to use signals to attract her attention before they begged for food. Results showed that all species moved around to face E and then produced visual gestures, instead of using tactile/ auditory gestures behind E to call her attention. Species differences were apparent particularly when the food and E were in different locations. Unlike gorillas and orangutans, chimpanzees and bonobos (from genus Pan) produced their gestures in front of E in all conditions, including that in which subjects had to leave the food behind to communicate with her. Implications of these results are discussed in the context of the evolution of social cognition in great apes. © John Benjamins Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1075/is.5.2.03lie}, Key = {fds351918} } @article{fds351919, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Learning through others}, Journal = {Daedalus}, Volume = {133}, Number = {1}, Pages = {51-58}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/001152604772746693}, Doi = {10.1162/001152604772746693}, Key = {fds351919} } @article{fds351920, Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social communication in siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus): use of gestures and facial expressions.}, Journal = {Primates; journal of primatology}, Volume = {45}, Number = {1}, Pages = {41-57}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10329-003-0063-7}, Abstract = {The current study represents the first systematic investigation of the social communication of captive siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus). The focus was on intentional signals, including tactile and visual gestures, as well as facial expressions and actions. Fourteen individuals from different groups were observed and the signals used by individuals were recorded. Thirty-one different signals, consisting of 12 tactile gestures, 8 visual gestures, 7 actions, and 4 facial expressions, were observed, with tactile gestures and facial expressions appearing most frequently. The range of the signal repertoire increased steadily until the age of six, but declined afterwards in adults. The proportions of the different signal categories used within communicative interactions, in particular actions and facial expressions, also varied depending on age. Group differences could be traced back mainly to social factors or housing conditions. Differences in the repertoire of males and females were most obvious in the sexual context. Overall, most signals were used flexibly, with the majority performed in three or more social contexts and almost one-third of signals used in combination with other signals. Siamangs also adjusted their signals appropriately for the recipient, for example, using visual signals most often when the recipient was already attending (audience effects). These observations are discussed in the context of siamang ecology, social structure, and cognition.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10329-003-0063-7}, Key = {fds351920} } @article{fds351915, Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Training 2;6-year-olds to produce the transitive construction: the role of frequency, semantic similarity and shared syntactic distribution.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {7}, Number = {1}, Pages = {48-55}, Year = {2004}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00322.x}, Abstract = {Childers and Tomasello (2001) found that training 2 1/2-year-olds on the English transitive construction greatly improves their performance on a post-test in which they must use novel verbs in that construction. In the current study, we replicated Childers and Tomasello's finding, but using a much lower frequency of transitive verbs and models in training. We also used novel verbs that were of a different semantic class to our training verbs, demonstrating that semantic homogeneity is not crucial for generalization. We also replicated the finding that 4-year-olds are significantly more productive than 2 1/2-year-olds with the transitive construction, with the new finding that this is also true for verbs of emission. In addition, 'shared syntactic distribution' of novel verb and training verbs was found to have no observable effect on the number of 2 1/2-year-olds who were productive in the post-test.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00322.x}, Key = {fds351915} } @article{fds351916, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {12- and 18-month-old infants follow gaze to spaces behind barriers.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {7}, Number = {1}, Pages = {F1-F9}, Year = {2004}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00315.x}, Abstract = {Infants follow the gaze direction of others from the middle of the first year of life. In attempting to determine how infants understand the looking behavior of adults, a number of recent studies have blocked the adult's line of sight in some way (e.g. with a blindfold or with a barrier). In contrast, in the current studies an adult looked behind a barrier which blocked the child's line of sight. Using two different control conditions and several different barrier types, 12- and 18-month-old infants locomoted a short distance in order to gain the proper viewing angle to follow an experimenter's gaze to locations behind barriers. These results demonstrate that, contra Butterworth, even 12-month-old infants can follow gaze to locations outside of their current field of view. They also add to growing evidence that 12-month-olds have some understanding of the looking behaviors of others as an act of seeing.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00315.x}, Key = {fds351916} } @article{fds351914, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T}, Title = {Young children know that trying is not pretending: a test of the "behaving-as-if" construal of children's early concept of pretense.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {40}, Number = {3}, Pages = {388-399}, Year = {2004}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.3.388}, Abstract = {In 3 studies, young children were tested for their understanding of pretend actions. In Studies 1 and 2, pairs of superficially similar behaviors were presented to 26- and 36-month-old children in an imitation game. In one case the behavior was marked as trying (signs of effort), and in the other case as pretending (signs of playfulness). Three-year-olds, and to some degree 2-year-olds, performed the real action themselves (or tried to really perform it) after the trying model, whereas after the pretense model, they only pretended. Study 3 ruled out a simple mimicking explanation by showing that children not only imitated differentially but responded differentially with appropriate productive pretending to pretense models and with appropriate productive tool use to trying models. The findings of the 3 studies demonstrate that by 2 to 3 years of age, children have a concept of pretense as a specific type of intentional activity.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.40.3.388}, Key = {fds351914} } @article{fds351912, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The pragmatics of primate communication}, Journal = {Psychologie Francaise}, Volume = {49}, Number = {2}, Pages = {209-218}, Year = {2004}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2003.11.006}, Abstract = {Pragmatics is about how individuals use their inventory of semiotic devices, the strategic choices they make, in particular acts of communication. An interesting question is the degree to which other animal species, especially our nearest primate relatives, employ pragmatic strategies in their vocal and gestural communication. Based on a review of the evidence, it is concluded in this essay that primate communication displays almost none of the pragmatic dimensions that characterize human linguistic communication. The most fundamental reason is that nonhuman animal communication does not really take place on the mental or intersubjective plane at all. It is directed at the behavior and emotional states of others, not at their attentional or mental states. © 2004 Publié par Elsvier SAS pour Société française de psychologie.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.psfr.2003.11.006}, Key = {fds351912} } @article{fds351913, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Henning, A and Striano, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {7}, Number = {3}, Pages = {297-307}, Year = {2004}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x}, Abstract = {Infants point for various motives. Classically, one such motive is declarative, to share attention and interest with adults to events. Recently, some researchers have questioned whether infants have this motivation. In the current study, an adult reacted to 12-month-olds' pointing in different ways, and infants' responses were observed. Results showed that when the adult shared attention and interest (i.e alternated gaze and emoted), infants pointed more frequently across trials and tended to prolong each point--presumably to prolong the satisfying interaction. However, when the adult emoted to the infant alone or looked only to the event, infants pointed less across trials and repeated points more within trials--presumably in an attempt to establish joint attention. Results suggest that 12-month-olds point declaratively and understand that others have psychological states that can be directed and shared.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x}, Key = {fds351913} } @article{fds325198, Author = {Call, J and Hare, B and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of human intentional action.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {7}, Number = {4}, Pages = {488-498}, Year = {2004}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x}, Abstract = {Understanding the intentional actions of others is a fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An important question is therefore whether other animal species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees, also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training) behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling or unable to give them food Chimpanzees produced more behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter These data together with other recent studies on chimpanzees' knowledge about others' visual perception show that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and perceptions of others than previously demonstrated}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x}, Key = {fds325198} } @article{fds325199, Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in cooperative cognitive tasks}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {68}, Number = {3}, Pages = {571-581}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2004}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011}, Abstract = {In a series of four experiments, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, were given two cognitive tasks, an object choice task and a discrimination task (based on location), each in the context of either cooperation or competition. In both tasks chimpanzees performed more skilfully when competing than when cooperating, with some evidence that competition with conspecifics was especially facilitatory in the discrimination location task. This is the first study to demonstrate a facilitative cognitive effect for competition in a single experimental paradigm. We suggest that chimpanzee cognitive evolution is best understood in its socioecological context. © 2004 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011}, Key = {fds325199} } @article{fds351910, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Syntax or semantics? Response to Lidz et al.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {93}, Number = {2}, Pages = {139-140}, Year = {2004}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2003.09.015}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2003.09.015}, Key = {fds351910} } @article{fds351907, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Visual perspective taking in dogs (Canis familiaris) in the presence of barriers}, Journal = {Applied Animal Behaviour Science}, Volume = {88}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {299-317}, Year = {2004}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2004.03.004}, Abstract = {Previous studies have shown that dogs have developed a special sensitivity to the communicative signals and attentional states of humans. The aim of the current study was to further investigate what dogs know about the visual perception of humans and themselves. In the first two experiments we investigated whether dogs were sensitive to the properties of barriers as blocking the visual access of humans. We presented dogs with a situation in which a human forbade them to take a piece of food, but the type and orientation of the barrier allowed the dog to take the food undetected in some conditions. Dogs differentiated between effective and ineffective barriers, based on their orientation or the particular features of the barriers such as size or the presence of window. In the third study we investigated whether dogs know about what they themselves have seen. We presented subjects with two boxes and placed food in one of them. In the Seen condition the location of the food was shown to the dogs while in the Unseen condition dogs were prevented from seeing the destination of the food. Before selecting one of the boxes by pressing a lever, dogs had the opportunity to seek extra information regarding the contents of the boxes, which would be particularly useful in the condition in which they had not seen where the food was hidden. Dogs rarely used the opportunity to seek information about the contents of the box before making their choice in any condition. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting that dogs have access to what they themselves have seen, which contrasts with the positive evidence about visual perspective taking in others from the first two experiments and previous studies. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.applanim.2004.03.004}, Key = {fds351907} } @article{fds351908, Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {7}, Number = {4}, Pages = {216-223}, Year = {2004}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0214-2}, Abstract = {A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0214-2}, Key = {fds351908} } @article{fds351909, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {7}, Number = {4}, Pages = {213-215}, Year = {2004}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0227-x}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0227-x}, Key = {fds351909} } @article{fds351902, Author = {Namy, LL and Campbell, AL and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The changing role of iconicity in non-verbal symbol learning: A U-shaped trajectory in the acquisition of arbitrary gestures}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {5}, Number = {1}, Pages = {37-57}, Year = {2004}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0501_3}, Abstract = {This article reports 2 experiments examining the changing role of iconicity in symbol learning and its implications regarding the mechanisms supporting symbol-to-referent mapping. Experiment 1 compared 18- and 26-month-olds' mapping of iconic gestures (e.g., hopping gesture for a rabbit) vs. arbitrary gestures (e.g., dropping motion for a rabbit). Experiment 2 replicated this comparison with 4-year-olds. All ages successfully mapped iconic gestures. Eighteen-month-olds and 4-year-olds but not 26-month-olds mapped arbitrary gestures, revealing a U-shaped developmental function. These findings imply that (a) there is no advantage for iconicity in early symbol learning and (b) the range of symbols mapped becomes more restricted at 26 months, re-emerging more flexibly during the preschool years. We argue that the decline in arbitrary gesture learning is a function of developing appreciation of communicative conventions. We propose that the re-emergence of arbitrary gestures at 4 years is driven by a wider range of symbolic experiences, and enhanced sensitivity to others' communicative intent. Copyright © 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0501_3}, Key = {fds351902} } @article{fds351903, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two hypotheses about primate cognition}, Journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie}, Volume = {52}, Number = {4}, Pages = {585-601}, Year = {2004}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds351903} } @article{fds351904, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {What kind of evidence could refute the UG hypothesis?: Commentary on Wunderlich}, Journal = {Studies in Language}, Volume = {28}, Number = {3}, Pages = {642-645}, Year = {2004}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sl.28.3.13tom}, Doi = {10.1075/sl.28.3.13tom}, Key = {fds351904} } @article{fds351905, Author = {Liebal, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Use of gesture sequences in chimpanzees.}, Journal = {American journal of primatology}, Volume = {64}, Number = {4}, Pages = {377-396}, Year = {2004}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20087}, Abstract = {Gestural communication in a group of 19 captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was observed, with particular attention paid to gesture sequences (combinations). A complete inventory of gesture sequences is reported. The majority of these sequences were repetitions of the same gestures, which were often tactile gestures and often occurred in play contexts. Other sequences combined gestures within a modality (visual, auditory, or tactile) or across modalities. The emergence of gesture sequences was ascribed to a recipient's lack of responsiveness rather than a premeditated combination of gestures to increase the efficiency of particular gestures. In terms of audience effects, the chimpanzees were sensitive to the attentional state of the recipient, and therefore used visually-based gestures mostly when others were already attending, as opposed to tactile gestures, which were used regardless of whether the recipient was attending or not. However, the chimpanzees did not use gesture sequences in which the first gesture served to attract the recipient's visual attention before they produced a second gesture that was visually-based. Instead, they used other strategies, such as locomoting in front of the recipient, before they produced a visually-based gesture.}, Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20087}, Key = {fds351905} } @article{fds351906, Author = {Maslen, RJC and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A dense corpus study of past tense and plural overregularization in English.}, Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research : JSLHR}, Volume = {47}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1319-1333}, Year = {2004}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2004/099)}, Abstract = {In the "blocking-and-retrieval-failure" account of overregularization (OR; G. F. Marcus, 1995; G. F. Marcus et al., 1992), the claim that a symbolic rule generates regular inflection is founded on pervasively low past tense OR rates and the lack of a substantive difference between past tense and plural OR rates. Evidence of extended periods of OR in the face of substantial correct input (M. Maratsos, 2000) and of an initial period in which nouns are more likely to be overregularized than verbs (V. A. Marchman, K. Plunkett, & J. Goodman, 1997) casts doubt on the blocking account and suggests instead an interplay between type and token frequency effects that is more consistent with usage-based approaches (e.g., J. Bybee, 1995; K. Köpcke, 1998; K. Plunkett & V. Marchman, 1993). However, previous naturalistic studies have been limited by data that account for only 1-2% of child speech. The current study reports analyses of verb and noun ORs in a dense naturalistic corpus (1 child, 2;00.12-3;11.06 [years;months.days]) that captures 8-10% of child speech and input. The data show (a) a marked difference in verb and noun OR rates; (b) evidence of a relationship between relative regular/irregular type frequencies and the onset and rate of past tense and plural ORs; (c) substantial OR periods for some verbs and nouns despite hundreds of correct tokens in child speech and input; and (d) a strong negative correlation between input token frequencies and OR rates for verbs and nouns. The implications of these findings for blocking and other accounts of OR are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2004/099)}, Key = {fds351906} } @article{fds351894, Author = {Kaminski, J and Riedel, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic goats, Capra hircus, follow gaze direction and use social cues in an object choice task}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {69}, Number = {1}, Pages = {11-18}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.008}, Abstract = {Gaze following is a basic social cognitive skill with many potential benefits for animals that live in social groups. At least five primate species are known to follow the gaze of conspecifics, but there have been no studies on gaze following in other mammals. We investigated whether domestic goats can use the gaze direction of a conspecific as a cue to find food. They were able to do this, at a level comparable to that of primates. In a second experiment, we tested goats' ability to use gaze and other communicative cues given by a human in a so-called object choice situation. An experimenter hid food out of sight of the subject under one of two cups. After baiting the cup the experimenter indicated the location of the food to the subject by using different cues. The goats used communicative cues (touching and pointing) but not gaze by itself. Since domestic dogs are very skilled in this task, whereas wolves are not, one hypothesis is that the use of communicative cues in the object choice task is a side-effect of domestication. © 2004 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.008}, Key = {fds351894} } @article{fds351895, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of frequency in the acquisition of English word order}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {20}, Number = {1}, Pages = {121-136}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2004.08.001}, Abstract = {Akhtar [Akhtar, N. (1999). Acquiring basic word order: Evidence for data-driven learning of syntactic structure. Journal of Child Language, 26, 339-356] taught children novel verbs in ungrammatical word orders. Her results suggested that the acquisition of canonical word order is a gradual, data-driven process. The current study adapted this methodology, using English verbs of different frequencies, to test whether children's use of word order as a grammatical marker depends upon the frequency of the lexical items being ordered. Ninety-six children in two age groups (2;9 and 3;9) heard either high frequency, medium frequency or low frequency verbs that were modeled in SOV order. Children aged 2;9 who heard low frequency verbs were significantly more likely to adopt the weird word order than those who heard higher frequency verbs. Children aged 3;9 preferred to use SVO order regardless of verb frequency. Furthermore, the younger children reverted to English word order using more arguments as verb frequency increased and used more pronouns than their older counterparts. This suggests that the ability to use English word order develops from lexically specific schemas formed around frequent, distributionally regular items (e.g. verbs, pronouns) into more abstract, productive schemas as experience of the language is accrued. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2004.08.001}, Key = {fds351895} } @article{fds351896, Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The gestural communication of apes}, Journal = {Gesture}, Volume = {5}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {41-56}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/gest.5.1-2.05pik}, Abstract = {Gestural communication of nonhuman primates may allow insight into the evolutionary scenario of human communication given the flexible use and learning of gestures as opposed to vocalizations. This paper provides an overview of the work on the gestural communication of apes with the focus on their repertoire, learning mechanisms, and the flexibility of gesture use during interactions with conspecifics. Although there is a variation between the species in the types and numbers of gestures performed, the influence of ecology, social structure and cognitive skills on their gestural repertoires is relatively restricted. As opposed to humans, apes do not use their gestures referentially nor do their gestures show the symbolic or conventionalized features of human gestural communication. However, since the gestural repertoires of apes are characterized by a high degree of individual variability and flexibility of use as opposed to their vocalizations it seems plausible that the gestures were the modality within which symbolic communication first evolved.}, Doi = {10.1075/gest.5.1-2.05pik}, Key = {fds351896} } @article{fds351897, Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Particle placement in early child language: A multifactorial analysis}, Journal = {Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory}, Volume = {1}, Number = {1}, Pages = {89-112}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cllt.2005.1.1.89}, Abstract = {Recent studies of the English verb particle construction have shown that particle placement varies with a variety of linguistic features, which seem to influence the speaker's choice of a particular position. The current study investigates whether children's use of the particle varies with the same features as in adult language. Using corpus data from two English-speaking children, we conducted a multifactorial analysis of six linguistic variables that are correlated with particle placement in adult language. Our analysis reveals significant associations between the position of the particle and two of the six variables, the NP type of the direct object and the meaning of the particle, suggesting that children as young as two years of age process at least some of the features that motivate particle placement in adult speakers. © Walter de Gruyter.}, Doi = {10.1515/cllt.2005.1.1.89}, Key = {fds351897} } @article{fds351898, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M}, Title = {The emergence of social cognition in three young chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development}, Volume = {70}, Number = {1}, Pages = {vii-132}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00324.x}, Abstract = {We report a series of 10 studies on the social-cognitive abilities of three young chimpanzees. The studies were all ones previously conducted with human infants. The chimpanzees were 1-5 years of age, had been raised mostly by humans, and were tested mostly directly by a familiar human experimenter. First, in a longitudinal investigation with repeated measurements from a social-cognitive test battery, the three young chimpanzees were similar in many ways to human infants; the major difference was a total lack of attempts to share attention with others either in joint attentional interactions or through declarative gestures. Second, in imitation-based tests of the understanding of intentional action, the chimpanzees, like human infants, showed an understanding of failed attempts and accidents; but they did not pay attention to the behavioral style of the actor or the actor's reasons for choosing a particular behavioral means. Third, in tests of their understanding of visual perception, the chimpanzees followed the gaze direction of a human to an out-of-sight location behind a barrier and gestured more to a human who could see them than to one who could not; but they showed no understanding that perceivers can focus their attention on one thing, or one aspect of a thing, within their perceptual fields for a reason. Finally, in tests of joint intentions and joint attention, the chimpanzees showed no ability to either reverse roles with a partner in a collaborative interaction or to set up a joint attentional framework for understanding the communicative intentions behind a pointing gesture. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the early ontogeny of human social cognition comprises two distinct trajectories, each with its own evolutionary history: one for understanding the basics of goal-directed action and perception, common to all apes, and another for sharing psychological states with others in collaborative acts involving joint intentions and attention, unique to the human species.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00324.x}, Key = {fds351898} } @article{fds351899, Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy actions in terms of goals.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {8}, Number = {1}, Pages = {F13-F20}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00385.x}, Abstract = {In the context of an imitation game, 12- and 18-month-old infants saw an adult do such things as make a toy mouse hop across a mat (with sound effects). In one condition (House), the adult ended by placing the mouse in a toy house, whereas in another condition (No House) there was no house present at the final location. Infants at both ages usually simply put the mouse in the house (ignoring the hopping motion and sound effects) in the House condition, presumably because they interpreted the adult's action in terms of this final goal and so ignored the behavioral means. In contrast, infants copied the adult's action (both the hopping motion and the sound effects) when no house was present, presumably because here infants saw the action itself as the adult's only goal. From very early, infants' social learning is flexible: infants focus on and copy either the end or the means of an adult action as required by the context.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00385.x}, Key = {fds351899} } @article{fds351900, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T}, Title = {On tools and toys: how children learn to act on and pretend with 'virgin objects'.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {8}, Number = {1}, Pages = {57-73}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00393.x}, Abstract = {The focus of the present study was the role of cultural learning in infants' acquisition of pretense actions with objects. In three studies, 18- and 24-month-olds (n = 64) were presented with novel objects, and either pretense or instrumental actions were demonstrated with these. When children were then allowed to act upon the objects themselves, qualitatively similar patterns of cultural (imitative) learning both of pretend and of instrumental actions were observed, suggesting that both types of actions can be acquired in similar ways through processes of cultural learning involving one or another form of collective intentionality. However, both absolute imitation rates and creativity were lower in pretense compared to instrumental actions, suggesting that the collective intentionality that constitutes pretense is especially difficult for children to comprehend. An additional analysis of children's gazes to the experimenter during their actions revealed that 24-month-olds looked more often to the experimenter during pretense actions than during instrumental actions - suggesting that pretense is culturally learned in a similar fashion as practical actions, but that young children understand pretense as a more inherently social, intersubjective activity.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00393.x}, Key = {fds351900} } @article{fds351901, Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Gestural communication in subadult bonobos (Pan paniscus): repertoire and use.}, Journal = {American journal of primatology}, Volume = {65}, Number = {1}, Pages = {39-61}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20096}, Abstract = {This article aims to provide an inventory of the communicative gestures used by bonobos (Pan paniscus), based on observations of subadult bonobos and descriptions of gestural signals and similar behaviors in wild and captive bonobo groups. In addition, we focus on the underlying processes of social cognition, including learning mechanisms and flexibility of gesture use (such as adjustment to the attentional state of the recipient). The subjects were seven bonobos, aged 1-8 years, living in two different groups in captivity. Twenty distinct gestures (one auditory, eight tactile, and 11 visual) were recorded. We found individual differences and similar degrees of concordance of the gestural repertoires between and within groups, which provide evidence that ontogenetic ritualization is the main learning process involved. There is suggestive evidence, however, that some form of social learning may be responsible for the acquisition of special gestures. Overall, the present study establishes that the gestural repertoire of bonobos can be characterized as flexible and adapted to various communicative circumstances, including the attentional state of the recipient. Differences from and similarities to the other African ape species are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20096}, Key = {fds351901} } @article{fds351893, Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Unwilling versus unable: infants' understanding of intentional action.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {41}, Number = {2}, Pages = {328-337}, Year = {2005}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.41.2.328}, Abstract = {Infants experienced a female adult handling them toys. Sometimes, however, the transaction failed, either because the adult was in various ways unwilling to give the toy (e.g., she teased the child with it or played with it herself) or else because she was unable to give it (e.g., she accidentally dropped it). Infants at 9, 12, and 18 months of age reacted with more impatience (e.g., reaching, looking away) when the adult was unwilling to give them the toy than when she was simply unable to give it. Six-month-olds, in contrast, showed no evidence of this differentiation. Because infants' behavioral responses were appropriately adapted to different kinds of intentional actions, and because the adult's actions sometimes produced results that did not match her goal (when having accidents or failed attempts), these findings provide especially rich evidence that infants first begin to understand goal-directed action at around 9 months of age.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.41.2.328}, Key = {fds351893} } @article{fds351892, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {All great ape species follow gaze to distant locations and around barriers.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {119}, Number = {2}, Pages = {145-154}, Year = {2005}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.119.2.145}, Abstract = {Following the gaze direction of conspecifics is an adaptive skill that enables individuals to obtain useful information about the location of food, predators, and group mates. In the current study, the authors compared the gaze-following skills of all 4 great ape species. In the 1st experiment, a human either looked to the ceiling or looked straight ahead. Individuals from all species reliably followed the human's gaze direction and sometimes even checked back when they found no target. In a 2nd experiment, the human looked behind some kind of barrier. Results showed that individuals from all species reliably put themselves in places from which they could see what the experimenter was looking at behind the barrier. These results support the hypothesis that great apes do not just orient to a target that another is oriented to, but they actually attempt to take the visual perspective of the other.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.119.2.145}, Key = {fds351892} } @article{fds351891, Author = {Kemp, N and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's knowledge of the "determiner" and "adjective" categories.}, Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research : JSLHR}, Volume = {48}, Number = {3}, Pages = {592-609}, Year = {2005}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2005/041)}, Abstract = {Children's understanding of the grammatical categories of "determiner" and "adjective" was examined using 2 different methodologies. In Experiment 1, children heard novel nouns combined with either a or the. Few 2-year-olds, but nearly all 3- and 4-year-olds, subsequently produced the novel nouns with a different determiner from the modeled combination. Experiment 2 used a priming methodology. Children age 2, 3, 4, and 6 years repeated descriptions of pictures, before describing target pictures themselves. When the primes consisted of a varied determiner + noun, all age groups produced more determiner + noun descriptions. When the primes consisted of a determiner + adjective + noun, 2-year-olds showed no priming. Three- to 6-year-olds showed item-specific priming, but only 6-year-olds (and to a limited extent 4-year-olds) showed both item-specific and structural priming. These results suggest that children build an understanding of determiners and adjectives gradually, perhaps from individual lexical items, over a number of years, and that pragmatic correctness may be attained particularly late.}, Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2005/041)}, Key = {fds351891} } @article{fds351890, Author = {Call, J and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens).}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {8}, Number = {3}, Pages = {151-163}, Year = {2005}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0237-8}, Abstract = {There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0237-8}, Key = {fds351890} } @article{fds325197, Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Human-like social skills in dogs?}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {9}, Number = {9}, Pages = {439-444}, Year = {2005}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003}, Abstract = {Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003}, Key = {fds325197} } @article{fds351887, Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's sensitivity to listener knowledge and perceptual context in choosing referring expressions}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {26}, Number = {4}, Pages = {541-558}, Year = {2005}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716405050290}, Abstract = {Speakers use different types of referring expressions depending on what the listener knows or is attending to; for example, they use pronouns for objects that are already present in the immediate discourse or perceptual context. In a first study we found that 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children are strongly influenced by their interlocutor's knowledge of a referent as expressed in her immediately preceding utterance. Specifically, when they are asked a question about a target object ("Where is the broom?"), they tend to use null references or pronouns to refer to that object ("On the shelf" or "It's on the shelf"); in contrast, when they are asked more general questions ("What do we need?") or contrast questions ("Do we need a mop?") that reveal no knowledge of the target object they tend to use lexical nouns ("A broom" or "No, a broom"). In a second study we found that children at around their second birthday are not influenced by immediately preceding utterances in this same way. Finally, in a third study we found that 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children's choice of referring expressions is very little influenced by the physical arrangements of objects in the perceptual context, whether it is absent or needs to be distinguished from a close-by alternative, when they request a target object from a silent adult. These results are discussed in terms of children's emerging understanding of the knowledge and attentional states and other persons. © 2005 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0142716405050290}, Key = {fds351887} } @article{fds351888, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll, H}, Title = {In search of the uniquely human}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {28}, Number = {5}, Pages = {721-727}, Year = {2005}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05540123}, Abstract = {As Bruner so eloquently points out, and Gauvain echoes, human beings are unique in their "locality." Individual groups of humans develop their own unique ways of symbolizing and doing things - and these can be very different from the ways of other groups, even those living quite nearby. Our attempt in the target article was to propose a theory of the social-cognitive and social-motivational bases of humans' ability and propensity to live in this local, that is, this cultural, way - which no other species does - focusing on such things as the ability to collaborate and to create shared material and symbolic artifacts. © 2005 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X05540123}, Key = {fds351888} } @article{fds351889, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll, H}, Title = {Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {28}, Number = {5}, Pages = {675-691}, Year = {2005}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000129}, Abstract = {We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x05000129}, Key = {fds351889} } @article{fds351886, Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {One-year-olds comprehend the communicative intentions behind gestures in a hiding game.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {8}, Number = {6}, Pages = {492-499}, Year = {2005}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00440.x}, Abstract = {This study explored infants' ability to infer communicative intent as expressed in non-linguistic gestures. Sixty children aged 14, 18 and 24 months participated. In the context of a hiding game, an adult indicated for the child the location of a hidden toy by giving a communicative cue: either pointing or ostensive gazing toward the container containing the toy. To succeed in this task children had to do more than just follow the point or gaze to the target container. They also had to infer that the adult's behaviour was relevant to the situation at hand - she wanted to inform them that the toy was inside the container toward which she gestured. Children at all three ages successfully used both types of cues. We conclude that infants as young as 14 months of age can, in some situations, interpret an adult behaviour as a relevant communicative act done for them.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00440.x}, Key = {fds351886} } @article{fds351883, Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German-speaking children's productivity with syntactic constructions and case morphology: Local cues act locally}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {25}, Number = {1}, Pages = {103-125}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723705049120}, Abstract = {It has been proposed that children acquiring case-marking languages might be quicker to acquire certain constructions than children acquiring word order languages, because the cues involved in grammatical morphology are more 'local', whereas word order is an inherently distributed cue (Slobin, 1982). In the current studies using nonce nouns and verbs, we establish that German-speaking children are not productive with passive and active transitive sentence-level constructions at an earlier age than English-speaking children; the majority of children learning both languages are not productive until after their third birthdays. In contrast, in the second and third studies reported here, the majority of German-speaking children were productive with nominative and accusative case marking inside NPs before their third birthdays - and these are of course the very same case markers centrally involved in passive and active transitive constructions. We conclude from these results that, whereas for some functions mastering local cues is all that is required, and this is fairly simple, in other cases, such as the case marking involved in sentence-level syntactic constructions, the mastery of local cues is only one part of the process of forming complex analogical relationships among utterances. Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications.}, Doi = {10.1177/0142723705049120}, Key = {fds351883} } @article{fds351884, Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A new look at the acquisition of relative clauses}, Journal = {Language}, Volume = {81}, Number = {4}, Pages = {882-906}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2005.0169}, Abstract = {This study reconsiders the acquisition of relative clauses based on data from two sentence-repetition tasks. Using materials modeled on the relative constructions of spontaneous child speech, we asked four-year-old English- and German-speaking children to repeat six different types of relative clauses. Although English and German relative clauses are structurally very different, the results were similar across studies: intransitive subject relatives caused fewer errors than transitive subject relatives and direct object relatives, which in turn caused fewer errors than indirect object relatives and oblique relatives; finally, genitive relatives caused by far the most problems. Challenging previous analyses in which the acquisition of relative clauses has been explained by the varying distance between filler and gap, we propose a multifactorial analysis in which the acquisition process is determined primarily by the similarity between the various types of relative clauses and their relationship to simple sentences.}, Doi = {10.1353/lan.2005.0169}, Key = {fds351884} } @article{fds351885, Author = {Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M and Striano, T}, Title = {Role reversal imitation and language in typically developing infants and children with autism}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {8}, Number = {3}, Pages = {253-278}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327078in0803_4}, Abstract = {Three types of role reversal imitation were investigated in typically developing 12-and 18-month-old infants and in children with autism and other developmental delays. Many typically developing infants at both ages engaged in each of the 2 types of dyadic, body-oriented role reversal imitation: self-self reversals, in which the adult acted on herself and the child then acted on himself, and other-other reversals, in which the adult acted on the child and the child then acted back on the adult. However, 12-month-olds had more difficulty than 18-month-olds with triadic, object-mediated role reversals involving interactions around objects. There was little evidence of any type of role reversal imitation in children with autism. Positive relations were found between role reversal imitation and various measures of language development for 18-month-olds and children with autism. Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15327078in0803_4}, Key = {fds351885} } @article{fds352506, Author = {Riches, NG and Tomasello, M and Conti-Ramsden, G}, Title = {Verb learning in children with SLI: frequency and spacing effects.}, Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research : JSLHR}, Volume = {48}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1397-1411}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2005/097)}, Abstract = {<h4>Purpose</h4>This study explored the effect of frequency (number of presentations), and spacing (period between presentations) on verb learning in children with specific language impairment (SLI). Children learn words more efficiently when presentations are frequent and appropriately spaced, and this study investigated whether children with SLI likewise benefit. Given that these children demonstrate greater frequency dependence and rapid forgetting of recently acquired words, an investigation of frequency and spacing in this population is especially warranted.<h4>Method</h4>Twenty-four children with SLI (mean age 5;6 [years;months]) and 24 language-matched control children (mean age 3;4) were taught novel verbs during play sessions. In a repeated measures design, 4 experimental conditions combined frequency (12 or 18 presentations) and spacing (all presentations in 1 session, or spread over 4 days). Comprehension and production probes were administered after the final session and 1 week later.<h4>Results</h4>Although the children with SLI benefited significantly from frequent and widely spaced presentations, there were no significant effect in the control group. The language-impaired children showed rapid forgetting.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The frequency and spacing of presentations crucially affect the verb learning of children with SLI. A training regimen characterized by appropriately spaced intervals and moderate repetition will optimally benefit lexical learning.}, Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2005/097)}, Key = {fds352506} } @article{fds351882, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Beyond formalities: The case of language acquisition}, Journal = {Linguistic Review}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2-4}, Pages = {183-197}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.183}, Abstract = {Generative grammar retained from American structural linguistics the 'formal' approach, which basically effaces the semantic and pragmatic dimensions of grammar. This creates serious problems for an account of language acquisition, most especially the problem of how to link universal grammar to some particular language (the linking problem). Parameters do not help the situation, as they depend on a prior linking of the lexical and functional categories of a language to universal grammar. In contrast, usage-based accounts of language acquisition do not posit an innate universal grammar and so have no linking problem. And if children's cognitive and social skills are conceptualized in the right way, there is no poverty of the stimulus in this approach either. In general, the only fully adequate accounts of language acquisition are those that give a prominent role to children's comprehension of communicative function in everything from words to grammatical morphemes to complex syntactic constructions. © Walter de Gruyter.}, Doi = {10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.183}, Key = {fds351882} } @article{fds351872, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The effect of perceptual availability and prior discourse on young children's use of referring expressions}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {27}, Number = {3}, Pages = {403-422}, Year = {2006}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0142716406060334}, Abstract = {Choosing appropriate referring expressions requires assessing whether a referent is "available" to the addressee either perceptually or through discourse. In Study 1, we found that 3- and 4-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, chose different referring expressions (noun vs. pronoun) depending on whether their addressee could see the intended referent or not. In Study 2, in more neutral discourse contexts than previous studies, we found that 3- and 4-year-olds clearly differed in their use of referring expressions according to whether their addressee had already mentioned a referent. Moreover, 2-year-olds responded with more naming constructions when the referent had not been mentioned previously. This suggests that, despite early social-cognitive developments, (a) it takes time to master the given/new contrast linguistically, and (b) children understand the contrast earlier based on discourse, rather than perceptual context. © 2006 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0142716406060334}, Key = {fds351872} } @article{fds351880, Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Gestural communication of orangutans (pongo pygmaeus)}, Journal = {Gesture}, Volume = {6}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-38}, Year = {2006}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/gest.6.1.02lie}, Abstract = {This study represents a systematic investigation of the communicative repertoire of Sumatran orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii), with a focus on intentional signals in two groups of captive orangutans. The goal was to analyze the signal repertoire with respect to (1) the number and frequency of signals (gestures, facial expressions, and actions), (2) the variability of individual repertoires as a function of group, age class, and sex, and (3) the flexibility of use in terms of ‘means-end dissociation’ and ‘audience effects’ and to interpret the findings in terms of the ecology, social structure and socio-cognitive skills of orangutans. The results show that orangutans use a remarkable number of signals including tactile and visual gestures as well as several more complex actions, though few facial expressions and no auditory gestures were observed. One third of signals were used within a play context, followed by one fourth of interactions in the context of ingestion. Although the repertoire included several visual gestures, most of the signals produced were tactile gestures and they were used particularly in the contexts of affiliation and agonism, whereas visual gestures dominated in the context of grooming, ingestion and sexual behavior. Individual repertoires showed a remarkable degree of variability as a function of age and group affiliation. Orangutans used their signals flexibly in several functional contexts and adjusted the signal they used depending on the attentional state of the recipient, similar to findings of other great ape species and gibbons. Thus, the communicative behavior of orangutans is characterized by a variable and flexible use of signals possibly reflecting their highly variable social structure and their sophisticated socio-cognitive skills, with the dominance of tactile gestures corresponding to the arboreal nature of this species. © 2006 John Benjamins Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1075/gest.6.1.02lie}, Key = {fds351880} } @article{fds351881, Author = {Riedel, J and Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {27-35}, Year = {2006}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0256-0}, Abstract = {Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-005-0256-0}, Key = {fds351881} } @article{fds351879, Author = {Bräuer, J and Kaminski, J and Riedel, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {120}, Number = {1}, Pages = {38-47}, Year = {2006}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38}, Abstract = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38}, Key = {fds351879} } @article{fds325196, Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {311}, Number = {5765}, Pages = {1297-1300}, Year = {2006}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1123007}, Abstract = {Humans collaborate with non-kin in special ways, but the evolutionary foundations of these collaborative skills remain unclear. We presented chimpanzees with collaboration problems in which they had to decide when to recruit a partner and which potential partner to recruit. In an initial study, individuals recruited a collaborator only when solving the problem required collaboration. In a second study, individuals recruited the more effective of two partners on the basis of their experience with each of them on a previous day. Therefore, recognizing when collaboration is necessary and determining who is the best collaborative partner are skills shared by both chimpanzees and humans, so such skills may have been present in their common ancestor before humans evolved their own complex forms of collaboration.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1123007}, Key = {fds325196} } @article{fds351878, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {311}, Number = {5765}, Pages = {1301-1303}, Year = {2006}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1121448}, Abstract = {Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviors (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals in a variety of different situations. This requires both an understanding of others' goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills and motivations in three young chimpanzees.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1121448}, Key = {fds351878} } @article{fds325193, Author = {Jensen, K and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {What's in it for me? Self-regard precludes altruism and spite in chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {273}, Number = {1589}, Pages = {1013-1021}, Year = {2006}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3417}, Abstract = {Sensitivity to fairness may influence whether individuals choose to engage in acts that are mutually beneficial, selfish, altruistic, or spiteful. In a series of three experiments, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could pull a rope to access out-of-reach food while concomitantly pulling another piece of food further away. In the first study, they could make a choice that solely benefited themselves (selfishness), or both themselves and another chimpanzee (mutualism). In the next two experiments, they could choose between providing food solely for another chimpanzee (altruism), or for neither while preventing the other chimpanzee from receiving a benefit (spite). The main result across all studies was that chimpanzees made their choices based solely on personal gain, with no regard for the outcomes of a conspecific. These results raise questions about the origins of human cooperative behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2005.3417}, Key = {fds325193} } @article{fds351875, Author = {Ambridge, B and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The distributed learning effect for children's acquisition of an abstract syntactic construction}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {21}, Number = {2}, Pages = {174-193}, Year = {2006}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.09.003}, Abstract = {In many cognitive domains, learning is more effective when exemplars are distributed over a number of sessions than when they are all presented within one session. The present study investigated this distributed learning effect with respect to English-speaking children's acquisition of a complex grammatical construction. Forty-eight children aged 3;6-5;10 (Experiment 1) and 72 children aged 4;0-5;0 (Experiment 2) were given 10 exposures to the construction all in one session (massed), or on a schedule of two trials per day for 5 days (distributed-pairs), or one trial per day for 10 days (distributed). Children in both the distributed-pairs and distributed conditions learnt the construction better than children in the massed condition, as evidenced by productive use of this construction with a verb that had not been presented during training. Methodological and theoretical implications of this finding are discussed, with particular reference to single-process accounts of language acquisition. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.09.003}, Key = {fds351875} } @article{fds351876, Author = {Kidd, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Examining the role of lexical frequency in the acquisition and processing of sentential complements}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {21}, Number = {2}, Pages = {93-107}, Year = {2006}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.01.006}, Abstract = {We present empirical data showing that the relative frequency with which a verb normally appears in a syntactic construction predicts young children's ability to remember and repeat sentences instantiating that construction. Children aged 2;10-5;8 years were asked to repeat grammatical and ungrammatical sentential complement sentences (e.g., 'I think + S'). The sentences contained complement-taking verbs (CTVs) used with differing frequencies in children's natural speech. All children repeated sentences containing high frequency CTVs (e.g., think) more accurately than those containing low frequency CTVs (e.g., hear), and made more sophisticated corrections to ungrammatical sentences containing high frequency CTVs. The data suggest that, like adults, children are sensitive to lexico-constructional collocations. The implications for language acquisition are discussed. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.01.006}, Key = {fds351876} } @article{fds351877, Author = {Herrmann, E and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Apes' use of iconic cues in the object-choice task.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {9}, Number = {2}, Pages = {118-130}, Year = {2006}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0013-4}, Abstract = {In previous studies great apes have shown little ability to locate hidden food using a physical marker placed by a human directly on the target location. In this study, we hypothesized that the perceptual similarity between an iconic cue and the hidden reward (baited container) would help apes to infer the location of the food. In the first two experiments, we found that if an iconic cue is given in addition to a spatial/indexical cue - e.g., picture or replica of a banana placed on the target location - apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas) as a group performed above chance. However, we also found in two further experiments that when iconic cues were given on their own without spatial/indexical information (iconic cue held up by human with no diagnostic spatial/indexical information), the apes were back to chance performance. Our overall conclusion is that although iconic information helps apes in the process of searching hidden food, the poor performance found in the last two experiments is due to apes' lack of understanding of the informative (cooperative) communicative intention of the experimenter.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-005-0013-4}, Key = {fds351877} } @article{fds351873, Author = {Melis, AP and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory information from others.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {120}, Number = {2}, Pages = {154-162}, Year = {2006}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.120.2.154}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) competed with a human for food. The human sat inside a booth, with 1 piece of food to her left and 1 to her right, which she could retract from her chimpanzee competitor's reach as needed. In Experiment 1, chimpanzees could approach either side of the booth unseen but then had to reach through 1 of 2 tunnels (1 clear, 1 opaque) for the food. In Experiment 2, both tunnels were clear and the human was looking away, but 1 of the tunnels made a loud noise when it was opened. Chimpanzees preferentially reached through the opaque tunnel in the first study and the silent tunnel in the second, successfully concealing their taking of the food from the human competitor in both cases. These results suggest that chimpanzees can, in some circumstances, actively manipulate the visual and auditory perception of others by concealing information from them.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.120.2.154}, Key = {fds351873} } @article{fds351874, Author = {Warneken, F and Chen, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {77}, Number = {3}, Pages = {640-663}, Year = {2006}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00895.x}, Abstract = {Human children 18-24 months of age and 3 young chimpanzees interacted in 4 cooperative activities with a human adult partner. The human children successfully participated in cooperative problem-solving activities and social games, whereas the chimpanzees were uninterested in the social games. As an experimental manipulation, in each task the adult partner stopped participating at a specific point during the activity. All children produced at least one communicative attempt to reengage him, perhaps suggesting that they were trying to reinstate a shared goal. No chimpanzee ever made any communicative attempt to reengage the partner. These results are interpreted as evidence for a uniquely human form of cooperative activity involving shared intentionality that emerges in the second year of life.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00895.x}, Key = {fds351874} } @article{fds366600, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T}, Title = {The role of experience and discourse in children's developing understanding of pretend play actions}, Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {24}, Number = {2}, Pages = {305-335}, Year = {2006}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151005X36001}, Abstract = {The present work investigated the development of an explicit understanding of pretend play actions. Study I revealed a long décalage between earlier implicit understanding of pretence as an intentional activity and a later more explicit understanding. Study 2 was a training study. It tested for two factors - systematic pretence experience and explicit pretence discourse - that may be important in development from early implicit to later explicit pretence understanding. Two training groups of 3.5-year-old children received the same pretence experiences involving systematic contrasts between pretending, really performing and trying to perform actions. In the 'explicit' group, these experiences were talked about with explicit 'pretend to' and 'pretend that' language. In the 'implicit' group no such discourse was used, but only implicit discourse in talking about pretence versus real actions. The two training groups were compared with a control group that received functional play experience. After training, only the explicit group showed improvement in their explicit pretence understanding. In none of the groups was there any transfer to tasks tapping mental state understanding, false belief (FB) and appearance-reality, (A-R). The findings are discussed in the context of current theories about the developmental relations between pretence, discourse, and mental state understanding. © 2006 The British Psychological Society.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151005X36001}, Key = {fds366600} } @article{fds351871, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Striano, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {12- and 18-month-olds point to provide information for others}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {7}, Number = {2}, Pages = {173-187}, Year = {2006}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2}, Abstract = {Classically, infants are thought to point for 2 main reasons: (a) They point imperatively when they want an adult to do something for them (e.g., give them something; "Juice!"), and (b) they point declaratively when they want an adult to share attention with them to some interesting event or object ("Look!"). Here we demonstrate the existence of another motive for infants' early pointing gestures: to inform another person of the location of an object that person is searching for. This informative motive for pointing suggests that from very early in ontogeny humans conceive of others as intentional agents with informational states and they have the motivation to provide such information communicatively. Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2}, Key = {fds351871} } @article{fds325194, Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Engineering cooperation in chimpanzees: tolerance constraints on cooperation}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {72}, Number = {2}, Pages = {275-286}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2006}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018}, Abstract = {The cooperative abilities of captive chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, in experiments do not match the sophistication that might be predicted based on their naturally occurring cooperative behaviours. This discrepancy might partly be because in previous experiments potential chimpanzee cooperators were partnered without regard to their social relationship. We investigated the ability of chimpanzee dyads to solve a physical task cooperatively in relation to their interindividual tolerance levels. Pairs that were most capable of sharing food outside the test were also able to cooperate spontaneously (by simultaneously pulling two ropes) to obtain food. In contrast, pairs that were less inclined to share food outside of the test were unlikely to cooperate. Furthermore, previously successful subjects stopped cooperating when paired with a less tolerant partner, even when the food rewards were presented in a dispersed and divisible form to reduce competition between subjects. These results show that although chimpanzees are capable of spontaneous cooperation in a novel instrumental task, tolerance acts as a constraint on their ability to solve such cooperative problems. This finding highlights the importance of controlling such social constraints in future experiments on chimpanzee cooperation, and suggests that the evolution of human-like cooperative skills might have been preceded by the evolution of a more egalitarian social system and a more human-like temperament. © 2006 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018}, Key = {fds325194} } @article{fds351870, Author = {Ambridge, B and Rowland, CF and Theakston, AL and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Comparing different accounts of inversion errors in children's non-subject wh-questions: 'What experimental data can tell us?'.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {33}, Number = {3}, Pages = {519-557}, Year = {2006}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000906007513}, Abstract = {This study investigated different accounts of children's acquisition of non-subject wh-questions. Questions using each of 4 wh-words (what, who, how and why), and 3 auxiliaries (BE, DO and CAN) in 3sg and 3pl form were elicited from 28 children aged 3;6-4;6. Rates of noninversion error (Who she is hitting?) were found not to differ by wh-word, auxiliary or number alone, but by lexical auxiliary subtype and by wh-word+lexical auxiliary combination. This finding counts against simple rule-based accounts of question acquisition that include no role for the lexical subtype of the auxiliary, and suggests that children may initially acquire wh-word + lexical auxiliary combinations from the input. For DO questions, auxiliary-doubling errors (What does she does like?) were also observed, although previous research has found that such errors are virtually non-existent for positive questions. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000906007513}, Key = {fds351870} } @article{fds351869, Author = {Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Apes' and children's understanding of cooperative and competitive motives in a communicative situation.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {9}, Number = {5}, Pages = {518-529}, Year = {2006}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00519.x}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) (Study 1) and 18- and 24-month-old human children (Study 2) participated in a novel communicative task. A human experimenter (E) hid food or a toy in one of two opaque containers before gesturing towards the reward's location in one of two ways. In the Informing condition, she attempted to help the subject find the hidden object by simply pointing to the correct container. In the Prohibiting condition, E held out her arm toward the correct container (palm out) and told the subject firmly 'Don't take this one.' As in previous studies, the apes were at chance in the Informing condition. However, they were above chance in the new Prohibiting condition. Human 18-month-olds showed this same pattern of results, whereas 24-month-olds showed the opposite pattern: they were better in the Informing condition than in the Prohibiting condition. In our interpretation, success in the Prohibiting condition requires subjects to understand E's goal toward them and their behavior, and then to make an inference (she would only prohibit if there were something good in there). Success in the Informing condition requires subjects to understand a cooperative communicative motive - which apparently apes and young infants find difficult.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00519.x}, Key = {fds351869} } @article{fds351868, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Level I perspective-taking at 24 months of age}, Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {24}, Number = {3}, Pages = {603-613}, Year = {2006}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151005X55370}, Abstract = {The current study sought to determine the age at which children first engage in Level I visual perspective-taking, in which they understand that the content of what another person sees in a situation may sometimes differ from what they see. An adult entered the room searching for an object. One candidate object was out in the open, whereas another was visible for the child but behind an occluder from the adults perspective. When asked to help the adult find the sought-for object, 24-month-old children, but not 18-month-old children, handed him the occluded object (whereas in a control condition they showed no preference for the occluded toy). We argue that the performance of the 24-month-olds requires Level I visual perspective-taking skills and that this is the youngest age at which these skills have been demonstrated. © 2006 The British Psychological Society.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151005X55370}, Key = {fds351868} } @article{fds351867, Author = {Moll, H and Koring, C and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants determine others' focus of attention by pragmatics and exlusion}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {7}, Number = {3}, Pages = {411-430}, Year = {2006}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0703_9}, Abstract = {In the studies presented here, infants' understanding of others' attention was assessed when gaze direction cues were not diagnostic. Fourteen-, 18- and 24-month-olds witnessed an adult look to the side of an object and express excitement. In 1 experimental condition this object was new for the adult because she was not present while the child and someone else played with it earlier. Children responded to this as if they assumed that the adult was excited about this new object as a whole. In the other condition the object was one with which the infant and this adult had just previously played for a minute. In this case children appeared to assume that the adult could not be excited about this object in itself. They responded either by attending to a specific part of the object or, more frequently, by looking around the room for another object. These results suggest that 1-year-olds can determine what others are attending to based on a pragmatic assessment of what is new and what is old for them combined with a form of reasoning by exclusion. Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0703_9}, Key = {fds351867} } @article{fds325195, Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {101}, Number = {3}, Pages = {495-514}, Year = {2006}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011}, Abstract = {There is little experimental evidence that any non-human species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g., manipulating what another sees). We show here that chimpanzees, one of humans' two closest primate relatives, sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others. Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the human's view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so). These findings not only corroborate previous work showing that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether others can or cannot see them.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011}, Key = {fds325195} } @article{fds351866, Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Exemplar-learning and schematization in a usage-based account of syntactic acquisition}, Journal = {Linguistic Review}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Pages = {275-290}, Year = {2006}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/TLR.2006.011}, Abstract = {The early phases of syntactic acquisition are characterized by many input frequency and item effects, which argue against theories assuming innate access to classical syntactic categories. In formulating an alternative view, we consider both prototype and exemplar-learning models of categorization. We argue for a 'hybrid' usage-based view in which acquisition depends on exemplar learning and retention, out of which permanent abstract schemas gradually emerge and are immanent across the summed similarity of exemplar collections. These schemas are graded in strength depending on the number of exemplars and the degree to which semantic similarity is reinforced by phonological, lexical, and distributional similarity. © Walter de Gruyter 2006.}, Doi = {10.1515/TLR.2006.011}, Key = {fds351866} } @article{fds351864, Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Goats' behaviour in a competitive food paradigm: Evidence for perspective taking?}, Journal = {Behaviour}, Volume = {143}, Number = {11}, Pages = {1341-1356}, Year = {2006}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853906778987542}, Abstract = {Many mammalian species are highly social, creating intra-group competition for such things as food and mates. Recent research with nonhuman primates indicates that in competitive situations individuals know what other individuals can and cannot see, and they use this knowledge to their advantage in various ways. In the current study, we extended these findings to a non-primate species, the domestic goat, using the conspecific competition paradigm developed by Hare et al. (2000). Like chimpanzees and some other nonhuman primates, goats live in fission-fusion societies, form coalitions and alliances, and are known to reconcile after fights. In the current study, a dominant and a subordinate individual competed for food, but in some cases the subordinate could see things that the dominant could not. In the condition where dominants could only see one piece of food but subordinates could see both, subordinates' preferences depended on whether they received aggression from the dominant animal during the experiment. Subjects who received aggression preferred the hidden over the visible piece of food, whereas subjects who never received aggression significantly preferred the visible piece. By using this strategy, goats who had not received aggression got significantly more food than the other goats. Such complex social interactions may be supported by cognitive mechanisms similar to those of chimpanzees. We discuss these results in the context of current issues in mammalian cognition and socio-ecology. © Brill Academic Publishers 2006.}, Doi = {10.1163/156853906778987542}, Key = {fds351864} } @article{fds351865, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {9}, Number = {6}, Pages = {557-564}, Year = {2006}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00533.x}, Abstract = {Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00533.x}, Key = {fds351865} } @article{fds351862, Author = {Schwier, C and van Maanen, C and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Rational imitation in 12-month-old infants}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {10}, Number = {3}, Pages = {303-311}, Year = {2006}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327078in1003_6}, Abstract = {Gergely, Bekkering, and Király (2002) demonstrated that 14-month-old infants engage in "rational imitation." To investigate the development and flexibility of this skill, we tested 12-month-olds on a different but analogous task. Infants watched as an adult made a toy animal use a particular action to get to an endpoint. In 1 condition there was a barrier that prevented a more straightforward action and so gave the actor no choice but to use the demonstrated action. In the other condition there was no barrier, so the actor had a free choice to use the demonstrated action or not. Twelve-month-olds showed the same pattern of results as in Gergely and colleagues' study: They copied the particular action demonstrated more often when the adult freely chose to use the action than when she was forced to use it. Twelve-month-olds, too, thus show an understanding of others' intentions as rational choices and can use this understanding in cultural learning contexts. Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1207/s15327078in1003_6}, Key = {fds351862} } @article{fds351863, Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Push or pull: Imitation vs. emulation in great apes and human children}, Journal = {Ethology}, Volume = {112}, Number = {12}, Pages = {1159-1169}, Year = {2006}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.2006.01269.x}, Abstract = {All four species of great apes and young human children (12-24 mo of age) were administered an imitation task designed to distinguish between results learning (emulation) and action learning (imitation). Some subjects were exposed to a demonstrator either pushing or pulling a door to open a box, whereas others simply saw the door of the box opening itself in one of the two directions (the ghost control). Most of the apes successfully opened the box in both experimental conditions, as well as in a baseline condition, but without being influenced either by the demonstrator's actions or by the door's motions. In contrast, human children over 12 mo of age were influenced by the demonstration: the 18-mo-olds were influenced by the demonstrator's actions, and the 24-mo-olds were influenced both by the demonstrator's actions and by the door's motions in the ghost control. These results provide support for the hypothesis that human children have a greater propensity than great apes for focusing either on a demonstrator's action or on the result of their action, as needed, in social learning situations. © 2006 The Authors.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1439-0310.2006.01269.x}, Key = {fds351863} } @article{fds366599, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Are apes really inequity averse?}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {273}, Number = {1605}, Pages = {3123-3128}, Year = {2006}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3693}, Abstract = {Brosnan et al. (Brosnan, S. F. Schiff, H. C. & de Waal, F. B. M. 2005 Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proc. R. Soc. B272, 253-258) found that chimpanzees showed increased levels of rejection for less-preferred food when competitors received better food than themselves and postulated as an explanation inequity aversion. In the present study, we extended these findings by adding important control conditions, and we investigated whether inequity aversion could also be found in the other great ape species and whether it would be influenced by subjects' relationship with the competitor. In the present study, subjects showed a pattern of food rejection opposite to the subjects of the above study by Brosnan et al. (2005). Our apes ignored fewer food pieces and stayed longer in front of the experimenter when a conspecific received better food than themselves. Moreover, chimpanzees begged more vigorously when the conspecific got favoured food. The most plausible explanation for these results is the food expectation hypothesis - seeing another individual receive high-quality food creates the expectation of receiving the same food oneself - and not inequity aversion.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2006.3693}, Key = {fds366599} } @article{fds351859, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {"This way!", "No! That way!"-3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {22}, Number = {1}, Pages = {47-68}, Year = {2007}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.002}, Abstract = {In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds' understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.002}, Key = {fds351859} } @article{fds351860, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {11}, Number = {3}, Pages = {271-294}, Year = {2007}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2007.tb00227.x}, Abstract = {Two experiments investigated the proclivity of 14-month-old infants (a) to altruistically help others toward individual goals, and (b) to cooperate toward a shared goal. The infants helped another person by handing over objects the other person was unsuccessfully roaching for, but did not help reliably in situations involving more complex goals. When a programmed adult partner interrupted a joint cooperative activity at specific moments, infants sometimes tried to reengage the adult, perhaps indicating that they understood the interdependency of actions toward a shared goal. However, as compared to 18- and 24-month-olds, their skills in behaviorally coordinating their actions with a social partner remained rudimentary. Results are integrated into a model of cooperative activities as they develop over the 2nd year of life. Copyright © 2007, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2007.tb00227.x}, Key = {fds351860} } @article{fds351861, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M}, Title = {Shared intentionality.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {10}, Number = {1}, Pages = {121-125}, Year = {2007}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x}, Abstract = {We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social-cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of chimpanzees -- and then at a version based on shared intentionality -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of human 1- and 2-year-olds. We thus see the following transformations: gaze following into joint attention, social manipulation into cooperative communication, group activity into collaboration, and social learning into instructed learning. We conclude by highlighting the role that shared intentionality may play in integrating more biologically based and more culturally based theories of human development.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x}, Key = {fds351861} } @article{fds351858, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Reference and attitude in infant pointing.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {34}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-20}, Year = {2007}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000906007689}, Abstract = {We investigated two main components of infant declarative pointing, reference and attitude, in two experiments with a total of 106 preverbal infants at 1;0. When an experimenter (E) responded to the declarative pointing of these infants by attending to an incorrect referent (with positive attitude), infants repeated pointing within trials to redirect E's attention, showing an understanding of E's reference and active message repair. In contrast, when E identified infants' referent correctly but displayed a disinterested attitude, infants did not repeat pointing within trials and pointed overall in fewer trials, showing an understanding of E's unenthusiastic attitude about the referent. When E attended to infants' intended referent AND shared interest in it, infants were most satisfied, showing no message repair within trials and pointing overall in more trials. These results suggest that by twelve months of age infant declarative pointing is a full communicative act aimed at sharing with others both attention to a referent and a specific attitude about that referent.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000906007689}, Key = {fds351858} } @article{fds325192, Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Lehmann, H and Call, J}, Title = {Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great apes and human infants: the cooperative eye hypothesis.}, Journal = {Journal of human evolution}, Volume = {52}, Number = {3}, Pages = {314-320}, Year = {2007}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001}, Abstract = {As compared with other primates, humans have especially visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in close-range joint attentional and communicative interactions, which would seem to imply especially cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked" to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head direction (although eye direction played some role as well). In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye direction in these same situations. These results demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes evolved a new social function in human evolution, most likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social interactions.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001}, Key = {fds325192} } @article{fds351856, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {10}, Number = {2}, Pages = {F1-F7}, Year = {2007}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x}, Abstract = {There is currently controversy over the nature of 1-year-olds' social-cognitive understanding and motives. In this study we investigated whether 12-month-old infants point for others with an understanding of their knowledge states and with a prosocial motive for sharing experiences with them. Declarative pointing was elicited in four conditions created by crossing two factors: an adult partner (1) was already attending to the target event or not, and (2) emoted positively or neutrally. Pointing was also coded after the event had ceased. The findings suggest that 12-month-olds point to inform others of events they do not know about, that they point to share an attitude about mutually attended events others already know about, and that they can point (already prelinguistically) to absent referents. These findings provide strong support for a mentalistic and prosocial interpretation of infants' prelinguistic communication.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x}, Key = {fds351856} } @article{fds351857, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How 14- and 18-month-olds know what others have experienced.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {43}, Number = {2}, Pages = {309-317}, Year = {2007}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.2.309}, Abstract = {Fourteen- and 18-month-old infants observed an adult experiencing each of 2 objects (experienced objects) and then leaving the room; the infant then played with a 3rd object while the adult was gone (unexperienced object). The adult interacted with the 2 experienced objects in 1 of 3 ways: by (a) sharing them with the infant in an episode of joint engagement, (b) actively manipulating and inspecting them on his or her own as the infant watched (individual engagement), or (c) looking at them from a distance as the infant played with them (onlooking). As evidenced in a selection task, infants of both ages knew which objects had been experienced by the adult in the joint engagement condition, only the 18-month-olds knew this in the individual engagement condition, and infants at neither age knew this in the onlooking condition. These results suggest that infants are 1st able to determine what adults know (have experienced) on the basis of their direct, triadic engagements with them.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.43.2.309}, Key = {fds351857} } @article{fds366598, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll, H}, Title = {Understanding of intentions, shared intentions: The origins of cultural thinking}, Journal = {Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle}, Volume = {62}, Number = {1}, Pages = {61-105}, Year = {2007}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/MPSzle.62.2007.1.4}, Abstract = {We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: 1. the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and 2. a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.}, Doi = {10.1556/MPSzle.62.2007.1.4}, Key = {fds366598} } @article{fds351852, Author = {Okamoto-Barth, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes' understanding of other individuals' line of sight.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {18}, Number = {5}, Pages = {462-468}, Year = {2007}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01922.x}, Abstract = {Previous research has shown that many social animals follow the gaze of other individuals. However, knowledge about how this skill differs between species and whether it shows a relationship with genetic distance from humans is still fragmentary. In the present study of gaze following in great apes, we manipulated the nature of a visual obstruction and the presence/absence of a target. We found that bonobos, chimpanzees, and gorillas followed gaze significantly more often when the obstruction had a window than when it did not, just as human infants do. Additionally, bonobos and chimpanzees looked at the experimenter's side of a windowless obstruction more often than the other species. Moreover, bonobos produced more double looks when the barrier was opaque than when it had a window, indicating an understanding of what other individuals see. The most distant human relatives studied, orangutans, showed few signs of understanding what another individual saw. Instead, they were attracted to the target's location by the target's presence, but not by the experimenter's gaze. Great apes' perspective-taking skills seem to have increased in the evolutionary lineage leading to bonobos, chimpanzees, and humans.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01922.x}, Key = {fds351852} } @article{fds351853, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {French children's use and correction of weird word orders: a constructivist account.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {34}, Number = {2}, Pages = {381-409}, Year = {2007}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030500090600794x}, Abstract = {Using the weird word order methodology (Akhtar, 1999), we investigated children's understanding of SVO word order in French, a language with less consistent argument ordering patterns than English. One hundred and twelve French children (ages 2; 10 and 3; 9) heard either high or low frequency verbs modelled in either SOV or VSO order (both ungrammatical). Results showed that: (1) children were more likely to adopt a weird word order if they heard lower frequency verbs, suggesting gradual learning; (2) children in the high frequency conditions tended to correct the ungrammatical model they heard to the closest grammatical alternative, suggesting different models activated different grammatical schemas; and (3) children were less likely to express the object of a transitive verb than were English children in an equivalent study, suggesting object expression is more difficult to master in French, perhaps because of its inconsistency in the input. These findings are discussed in the context of a usage-based model of language acquisition.}, Doi = {10.1017/s030500090600794x}, Key = {fds351853} } @article{fds351854, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Liszkowski, U}, Title = {A new look at infant pointing.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {78}, Number = {3}, Pages = {705-722}, Year = {2007}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01025.x}, Abstract = {The current article proposes a new theory of infant pointing involving multiple layers of intentionality and shared intentionality. In the context of this theory, evidence is presented for a rich interpretation of prelinguistic communication, that is, one that posits that when 12-month-old infants point for an adult they are in some sense trying to influence her mental states. Moreover, evidence is also presented for a deeply social view in which infant pointing is best understood--on many levels and in many ways--as depending on uniquely human skills and motivations for cooperation and shared intentionality (e.g., joint intentions and attention with others). Children's early linguistic skills are built on this already existing platform of prelinguistic communication.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01025.x}, Key = {fds351854} } @article{fds325191, Author = {Warneken, F and Hare, B and Melis, AP and Hanus, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young children.}, Journal = {PLoS biology}, Volume = {5}, Number = {7}, Pages = {e184}, Year = {2007}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184}, Abstract = {People often act on behalf of others. They do so without immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives, such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two comparative studies, semi-free ranging chimpanzees helped an unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants, irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study, chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence suggested.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184}, Key = {fds325191} } @article{fds351851, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Enculturated chimpanzees imitate rationally.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {10}, Number = {4}, Pages = {F31-F38}, Year = {2007}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00630.x}, Abstract = {Human infants imitate others' actions 'rationally': they copy a demonstrator's action when that action is freely chosen, but less when it is forced by some constraint (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002). We investigated whether enculturated chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) also imitate rationally. Using Gergely and colleagues' (2002) basic procedure, a human demonstrator operated each of six apparatuses using an unusual body part (he pressed it with his forehead or foot, or sat on it). In the Hands Free condition he used this unusual means even though his hands were free, suggesting a free choice. In the Hands Occupied condition he used the unusual means only because his hands were occupied, suggesting a constrained or forced choice. Like human infants, chimpanzees imitated the modeled action more often in the Hands Free than in the Hands Occupied condition. Enculturated chimpanzees thus have some understanding of the rationality of others' intentional actions, and use this understanding when imitating others.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00630.x}, Key = {fds351851} } @article{fds351849, Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds use primary sentence accent to learn new words.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {34}, Number = {3}, Pages = {677-687}, Year = {2007}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000907008021}, Abstract = {German children aged 2;1 heard a sentence containing a nonce noun and a nonce verb (Der Feks miekt). Either the noun or the verb was prosodically highlighted by increased pitch, duration and loudness. Independently, either the object or the action in the ongoing referential scene was the new element in the situation. Children learned the nonce noun only when it was both highlighted prosodically and the object in the scene was referentially new. They did not learn the nonce verb in any condition. These results suggest that from early in linguistic development, young children understand that prosodic salience in a sentence indicates referential newness.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000907008021}, Key = {fds351849} } @article{fds351850, Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees are vengeful but not spiteful.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {104}, Number = {32}, Pages = {13046-13050}, Year = {2007}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0705555104}, Abstract = {People are willing to punish others at a personal cost, and this apparently antisocial tendency can stabilize cooperation. What motivates humans to punish noncooperators is likely a combination of aversion to both unfair outcomes and unfair intentions. Here we report a pair of studies in which captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) did not inflict costs on conspecifics by knocking food away if the outcome alone was personally disadvantageous but did retaliate against conspecifics who actually stole the food from them. Like humans, chimpanzees retaliate against personally harmful actions, but unlike humans, they are indifferent to simply personally disadvantageous outcomes and are therefore not spiteful.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0705555104}, Key = {fds351850} } @article{fds320805, Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernàndez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: the cultural intelligence hypothesis.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {317}, Number = {5843}, Pages = {1360-1366}, Year = {2007}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1146282}, Abstract = {Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more "general intelligence," we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1146282}, Key = {fds320805} } @article{fds351848, Author = {Kidd, E and Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Object relatives made easy: A cross-linguistic comparison of the constraints influencing young children's processing of relative clauses}, Journal = {Language and Cognitive Processes}, Volume = {22}, Number = {6}, Pages = {860-897}, Year = {2007}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01690960601155284}, Abstract = {We present the results from four studies, two corpora and two experimental, which suggest that English- and German-speaking children (3;1-4;9 years) use multiple constraints to process and produce object relative clauses. Our two corpora studies show that children produce object relatives that reflect the distributional and discourse regularities of the input. Specifically, the results show that when children produce object relatives they most often do so with (a) an inanimate head noun, and (b) a pronominal relative clause subject. Our experimental findings show that children use these constraints to process and produce this construction type. Moreover, when children were required to repeat the object relatives they most often use in naturalistic speech, the subject-object asymmetry in processing of relative clauses disappeared. We also report cross-linguistic differences in children's rate of acquisition which reflect properties of the input language. Overall, our results suggest that children are sensitive to the same constraints on relative clause processing as adults.}, Doi = {10.1080/01690960601155284}, Key = {fds351848} } @article{fds351847, Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees are rational maximizers in an ultimatum game.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {318}, Number = {5847}, Pages = {107-109}, Year = {2007}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1145850}, Abstract = {Traditional models of economic decision-making assume that people are self-interested rational maximizers. Empirical research has demonstrated, however, that people will take into account the interests of others and are sensitive to norms of cooperation and fairness. In one of the most robust tests of this finding, the ultimatum game, individuals will reject a proposed division of a monetary windfall, at a cost to themselves, if they perceive it as unfair. Here we show that in an ultimatum game, humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), are rational maximizers and are not sensitive to fairness. These results support the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences and aversion to inequitable outcomes, which play key roles in human social organization, distinguish us from our closest living relatives.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1145850}, Key = {fds351847} } @article{fds366597, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees really know what others can see in a competitive situation.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {10}, Number = {4}, Pages = {439-448}, Year = {2007}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0088-1}, Abstract = {Chimpanzee's perspective-taking abilities are currently disputed. Here we show that in some food competition contexts, subordinate chimpanzees do take the visual perspective of dominant individuals, preferentially targeting a hidden piece of the food that the dominant cannot see over a piece that is visible to both individuals. However, the space where the animals compete is critical in determining whether subjects demonstrate this skill. We suggest that competition intensity, as mediated by these spatial factors, may play an important role in determining the strategy chimpanzees utilize in competitive contexts. Since some strategies may not require visual perspective taking in order to be successful, chimpanzees may not always demonstrate this skill. Differences in spatial arrangement may therefore account for the conflicting results of past studies.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0088-1}, Key = {fds366597} } @article{fds351845, Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Fourteen-month-olds know what others experience only in joint engagement.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {10}, Number = {6}, Pages = {826-835}, Year = {2007}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00615.x}, Abstract = {We investigated how 14-month-old infants know what others know. In two studies, an infant played with each of two objects in turn while an experimenter was present. Then the experimenter left the room, and the infant played with a third object with an assistant. The experimenter returned, faced all three objects, and said excitedly 'Look! Can you give it to me?' In Study 1, the experimenter experienced each of the first two toys in episodes of joint visual engagement (without manipulation) with the infant. In response to her excited request infants gave the experimenter the object she did not know, thus demonstrating that they knew which ones she knew. In Study 2, infants witnessed the experimenter jointly engage around each of the experienced toys with the assistant, from a third-person perspective. In response to her request, infants did not give the experimenter the object she had not experienced. In combination with other studies, these results suggest that to know what others have experienced 14-month-old infants must do more than just perceive others perceiving something; they must engage with them actively in joint engagement.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00615.x}, Key = {fds351845} } @article{fds351846, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How toddlers and preschoolers learn to uniquely identify referents for others: a training study.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {78}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1744-1759}, Year = {2007}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01098.x}, Abstract = {This training study investigates how children learn to refer to things unambiguously. Two hundred twenty-four children aged 2.6, 3.6, and 4.6 years were pre- and posttested for their ability to request stickers from a dense array. Between test sessions, children were assigned to a training condition in which they (a) asked for stickers from an adult, (b) responded to an adult's requests for stickers, (c) observed 1 adult ask another for stickers, or (d) heard model descriptions of stickers. All conditions yielded improvements in referring strategies, with condition (a) being most effective. Four-year-olds additionally demonstrated learning effects in a transfer task. These results suggest that young children's communication skills develop best in response to feedback about their own attempts at reference.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01098.x}, Key = {fds351846} } @article{fds320802, Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do chimpanzees reciprocate received favours?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {76}, Number = {3}, Pages = {951-962}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014}, Abstract = {Reciprocal interactions observed in animals may persist because individuals keep careful account of services exchanged with each group member. To test whether chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, possess the cognitive skills required for this type of contingency-based reciprocity, we gave chimpanzees the choice of cooperating with a conspecific who had helped them previously or one who had not helped them in two different experimental tasks. In the first experiment, one of the partners preferentially recruited the subjects to cooperate in a mutualistic task, while the other potential partner never chose to cooperate with the subject, but rather chose a different partner. In the second experiment, one of the partners altruistically helped the subjects to reach food, while the other partner never helped the subject, but rather took the food himself. In both experiments there was some evidence that the chimpanzees increased the amount they cooperated with or helped the partner who had been more helpful towards them compared to their baseline behaviour towards the same individual (or in a control condition). However, in both experiments this effect was relatively weak and subjects did not preferentially favour the individual who had favoured them over the one who had not in either experiment. Although taken together, these experiments provide some support for the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of contingent reciprocity, they also suggest that models of immediate reciprocation and detailed accounts of recent exchanges (e.g. Tit for Tat) may not play a large role in guiding the social decisions of chimpanzees. © 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014}, Key = {fds320802} } @article{fds351838, Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Grammar}, Volume = {1-3}, Pages = {38-50}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development, Three-Volume Set}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780123704603}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6}, Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young children must master the grammatical constructions of their language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical issues in the field and trace the developmental path children follow from talking in single-unit 'holophrases' to using complex, abstract constructions. We describe the development of children's initial skills with word order, case marking, and morphology as abstract elements in early constructions, and we discuss the level of abstraction characteristic of young children's grammatical constructions at different stages of development and in some different languages of the world. Finally, we consider the learning processes that enable young children both to acquire and to abstract across grammatical constructions.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6}, Key = {fds351838} } @article{fds351840, Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Graded representations in the acquisition of English and German transitive constructions}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {23}, Number = {1}, Pages = {48-66}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.11.002}, Abstract = {English and German children aged 2 years 4 months and 4 years heard both novel and familiar verbs in sentences whose form was grammatical, but which mismatched the event they were watching (e.g., 'The frog is pushing the lion', when the lion was actually the 'agent' or 'doer' of the pushing). These verbs were then elicited in new sentences. All children mostly corrected the familiar verb (i.e., they used the agent as the grammatical subject), but there were cross-linguistic differences among the two-year-olds concerning the novel verb. When English 2-year-olds used the novel verb they mostly corrected. However, their most frequent response was to avoid using the novel verb altogether. German 2-year-olds corrected the novel verb significantly more often than their English counterparts, demonstrating more robust verb-general representations of agent- and patient-marking. These findings provide support for a 'graded representations' view of development, which proposes that grammatical representations may be simultaneously abstract but 'weak'. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.11.002}, Key = {fds351840} } @article{fds351841, Author = {Moll, H and Richter, N and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Fourteen-month-olds know what "we" have shared in a special way}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {13}, Number = {1}, Pages = {90-101}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15250000701779402}, Abstract = {People often express excitement to each other when encountering an object that they have shared together previously in some special way. This study investigated whether 14-month-old infants know precisely what they have and have not shared in a special way (and with whom). In the experimental condition an adult and infant shared an object (the target) excitedly because it unexpectedly reappeared in several places. They then shared 2 other objects (the distractors) in a more normal fashion. Later, the adult reacted excitedly to a tray containing all 3 objects and then made an ambiguous request for the infant to hand "it" to her. There were 2 control conditions. In 1 of them, a different adult, who knew none of the 3 objects, made the ambiguous request. In the other control condition, the adult who made the request had previously experienced the objects only alone, while the infant looked on unengaged. Infants in the experimental condition chose the target object more often than the distractors and more often than they chose it in either control condition. These results demonstrate that 14-month-old infants can identify which one of a set of objects "we" - and not just I or you alone - have had a special experience with in the past.}, Doi = {10.1080/15250000701779402}, Key = {fds351841} } @article{fds351842, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Behavioral cues that great apes use to forage for hidden food.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1}, Pages = {117-128}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0095-2}, Abstract = {We conducted three studies to examine whether the four great ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) are able to use behavioral experimenter-given cues in an object-choice task. In the subsequent experimental conditions subjects were presented with two eggs, one of which contained food and the other did not. In Study 1 the experimenter examined both eggs by smelling or shaking them, but only made a failed attempt to open (via biting) the egg containing food. In a control condition, the experimenter examined and attempted to open both eggs, but in reverse order to control for stimulus enhancement. The apes significantly preferred the egg that was first examined and then bitten, but had no preference in a baseline condition in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we investigated whether the apes could extend this ability to cues not observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull apart the egg), as well as whether they made this discrimination based on the function of the action the experimenter performed. Subjects significantly preferred eggs presented with this novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a novel but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes did not interpret human actions as cues to food-location when they already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus, great apes were able to use a variety of experimenter-given cues associated with foraging actions to locate hidden food and thereby were partially sensitive to the general purpose underlying these actions.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0095-2}, Key = {fds351842} } @article{fds351843, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1}, Pages = {175-178}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0097-0}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others? In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0097-0}, Key = {fds351843} } @article{fds351844, Author = {Tolar, TD and Lederberg, AR and Gokhale, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The development of the ability to recognize the meaning of iconic signs.}, Journal = {Journal of deaf studies and deaf education}, Volume = {13}, Number = {2}, Pages = {225-240}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/deafed/enm045}, Abstract = {Early developmental psychologists viewed iconic representation as cognitively less complex than other forms of symbolic thought. It is therefore surprising that iconic signs are not acquired more easily than arbitrary signs by young language learners. One explanation is that children younger than 3 years have difficulty interpreting iconicity. The current study assessed hearing children's ability to interpret the meaning of iconic signs. Sixty-six 2.5- to 5-year-olds who had no previous exposure to signs were required to match iconic signs to pictures of referents. Whereas few of the 2.5-year-olds recognized the meaning of the iconic signs consistently, more than half of the 3.0-year-olds and most of 3.5-year-olds performed above chance. Thus, the ability to recognize the meaning of iconic signs gradually develops during the preschool years. Implications of these findings for sign language development, receptive signed vocabulary tests, and the development of the ability to interpret iconic symbols are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1093/deafed/enm045}, Key = {fds351844} } @article{fds351837, Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response [6]}, Journal = {Science}, Volume = {319}, Number = {5861}, Pages = {284}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds351837} } @article{fds320803, Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response [3]}, Journal = {Science}, Volume = {319}, Number = {5863}, Pages = {569}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, Key = {fds320803} } @article{fds320804, Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernandez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Comparing social skills of children and apes - Response}, Journal = {SCIENCE}, Volume = {319}, Number = {5863}, Pages = {570-570}, Publisher = {AMER ASSOC ADVANCEMENT SCIENCE}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, Key = {fds320804} } @article{fds351836, Author = {Liebal, K and Colombi, C and Rogers, SJ and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Helping and cooperation in children with autism.}, Journal = {Journal of autism and developmental disorders}, Volume = {38}, Number = {2}, Pages = {224-238}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0381-5}, Abstract = {Helping and cooperation are central to human social life. Here, we report two studies investigating these social behaviors in children with autism and children with developmental delay. In the first study, both groups of children helped the experimenter attain her goals. In the second study, both groups of children cooperated with an adult, but fewer children with autism performed the tasks successfully. When the adult stopped interacting at a certain moment, children with autism produced fewer attempts to re-engage her, possibly indicating that they had not formed a shared goal/shared intentions with her. These results are discussed in terms of the prerequisite cognitive and motivational skills and propensities underlying social behavior.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10803-007-0381-5}, Key = {fds351836} } @article{fds351833, Author = {Riedel, J and Schumann, K and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The early ontogeny of human-dog communication}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {75}, Number = {3}, Pages = {1003-1014}, Year = {2008}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.08.010}, Abstract = {Although dogs, Canis familiaris, are skilful at responding to human social cues, the role of ontogeny in the development of these abilities has not been systematically examined. We studied the ability of very young dog puppies to follow human communicative cues and successfully find hidden food. In the first experiment we compared 6-, 8-, 16- and 24-week-old puppies in their ability to use pointing gestures or a marker as a cue. The results showed that puppies, independent of age, could use all human communicative cues provided; only their success at using the marker cue increased with age. In the second and third experiments we investigated the flexibility of the puppies' understanding by reducing the degree to which they could use local enhancement to solve these problems. Here, subjects could not simply approach the hand of the experimenter and follow its direction to the correct location because cups were placed next to the dog instead of next to the experimenter. Six-week-old puppies readily used all of the human communicative cues provided. These findings support the hypothesis that domestication played a critical role in shaping the ability of dogs to follow human-given cues. © 2007 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.08.010}, Key = {fds351833} } @article{fds351832, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Albrecht, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants' visual and auditory communication when a partner is or is not visually attending.}, Journal = {Infant behavior & development}, Volume = {31}, Number = {2}, Pages = {157-167}, Year = {2008}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2007.10.011}, Abstract = {In the current study we investigated infants' communication in the visual and auditory modalities as a function of the recipient's visual attention. We elicited pointing at interesting events from thirty-two 12-month olds and thirty-two 18-month olds in two conditions: when the recipient either was or was not visually attending to them before and during the point. The main result was that infants initiated more pointing when the recipient's visual attention was on them than when it was not. In addition, when the recipient did not respond by sharing interest in the designated event, infants initiated more repairs (repeated pointing) than when she did, again, especially when the recipient was visually attending to them. Interestingly, accompanying vocalizations were used intentionally and increased in both experimental conditions when the recipient did not share attention and interest. However, there was little evidence that infants used their vocalizations to direct attention to their gestures when the recipient was not attending to them.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.infbeh.2007.10.011}, Key = {fds351832} } @article{fds351828, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Rational tool use and tool choice in human infants and great apes.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {79}, Number = {3}, Pages = {609-626}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01146.x}, Abstract = {G. Gergely, H. Bekkering, and I. Király (2002) showed that 14-month-old infants imitate rationally, copying an adult's unusual action more often when it was freely chosen than when it was forced by some constraint. This suggests that infants understand others' intentions as rational choices of action plans. It is important to test whether apes also understand others' intentions in this way. In each of the current 3 studies, a comparison group of 14-month-olds used a tool more often when a demonstrator freely chose to use it than when she had to use it, but apes generally used the tool equally often in both conditions (orangutans were an exception). Only some apes thus show an understanding of others' intentions as rational choices of action plans.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01146.x}, Key = {fds351828} } @article{fds351829, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {12}, Number = {5}, Pages = {187-192}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010}, Abstract = {On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff's seminal paper asking whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, we review recent evidence that suggests in many respects they do, whereas in other respects they might not. Specifically, there is solid evidence from several different experimental paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others, as well as the perception and knowledge of others. Nevertheless, despite several seemingly valid attempts, there is currently no evidence that chimpanzees understand false beliefs. Our conclusion for the moment is, thus, that chimpanzees understand others in terms of a perception-goal psychology, as opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010}, Key = {fds351829} } @article{fds351830, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The sources of normativity: young children's awareness of the normative structure of games.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {44}, Number = {3}, Pages = {875-881}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.44.3.875}, Abstract = {In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old children's awareness of the normative structure of conventional games. In the target conditions, an experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule game. After the child and the experimenter had played for a while, a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd experimenter), asked to join in, and then performed an action that constituted a mistake in the game. In control conditions, the puppet performed the exact same action as in the experimental conditions, but the context was different such that this act did not constitute a mistake. Children's normative responses to the puppet's acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching) were scored. Both age groups performed more normative responses in the target than in the control conditions, but the 3-year-olds did so on a more explicit level. These studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even very young children have some grasp of the normative structure of conventional activities.}, Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.44.3.875}, Key = {fds351830} } @article{fds351831, Author = {Brandt, S and Diessel, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The acquisition of German relative clauses: a case study.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {35}, Number = {2}, Pages = {325-348}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000907008379}, Abstract = {This paper investigates the development of relative clauses in the speech of one German-speaking child aged 2 ; 0 to 5 ; 0. The earliest relative clauses we found in the data occur in topicalization constructions that are only a little different from simple sentences: they contain a single proposition, express the actor prior to other participants, assert new information and often occur with main-clause word order. In the course of the development, more complex relative constructions emerge, in which the relative clause is embedded in a fully-fledged main clause. We argue that German relative clauses develop in an incremental fashion from simple non-embedded sentences that gradually evolve into complex sentence constructions.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000907008379}, Key = {fds351831} } @article{fds351826, Author = {Chang, F and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Automatic evaluation of syntactic learners in typologically-different languages}, Journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, Volume = {9}, Number = {3}, Pages = {198-213}, Year = {2008}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.10.002}, Abstract = {Human syntax acquisition involves a system that can learn constraints on possible word sequences in typologically-different human languages. Evaluation of computational syntax acquisition systems typically involves theory-specific or language-specific assumptions that make it difficult to compare results in multiple languages. To address this problem, a bag-of-words incremental generation (BIG) task with an automatic sentence prediction accuracy (SPA) evaluation measure was developed. The BIG-SPA task was used to test several learners that incorporated n-gram statistics which are commonly found in statistical approaches to syntax acquisition. In addition, a novel Adjacency-Prominence learner, that was based on psycholinguistic work in sentence production and syntax acquisition, was also tested and it was found that this learner yielded the best results in this task on these languages. In general, the BIG-SPA task is argued to be a useful platform for comparing explicit theories of syntax acquisition in multiple languages. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.10.002}, Key = {fds351826} } @article{fds351827, Author = {Tennie, C and Hedwig, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {An experimental study of nettle feeding in captive gorillas.}, Journal = {American journal of primatology}, Volume = {70}, Number = {6}, Pages = {584-593}, Year = {2008}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20532}, Abstract = {Mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) in Karisoke, Rwanda, feed on the stinging nettle Laportea alatipes by means of elaborate processing skills. Byrne [e.g. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 358:529-536, 2003] has claimed that individuals acquire these skills by means of the so-called program-level imitation, in which the overall sequence of problem-solving steps (not the precise actions) is reproduced. In this study we present western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) with highly similar nettles. Twelve gorillas in three different groups (including also one nettle-naïve gorilla) used the same program-level technique as wild mountain gorillas (with differences mainly on the action level). Chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos did not show these program-level patterns, nor did the gorillas when presented with a plant similar in structural design but lacking stinging defenses. We conclude that although certain aspects (i.e. single actions) of this complex skill may be owing to social learning, at the program level gorilla nettle feeding derives mostly from genetic predispositions and individual learning of plant affordances.}, Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20532}, Key = {fds351827} } @article{fds351824, Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young German children's early syntactic competence: a preferential looking study.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {11}, Number = {4}, Pages = {575-582}, Year = {2008}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00703.x}, Abstract = {Using a preferential looking methodology with novel verbs, Gertner, Fisher and Eisengart (2006) found that 21-month-old English children seemed to understand the syntactic marking of transitive word order in an abstract, verb-general way. In the current study we tested whether young German children of this same age have this same understanding. Following Gertner et al. (2006), one group of German children was tested only after they had received a training/practice phase containing transitive sentences with familiar verbs and the exact same nouns as those used at test. A second group was tested after a training/practice phase consisting only of familiar verbs, without the nouns used at test. Only the group of children with the training on full transitive sentences was successful in the test. These findings suggest that for children this young to succeed in this test of syntactic understanding, they must first have some kind of relevant linguistic experience immediately prior to testing--which raises the question of the nature of children's linguistic representations at this early point in development.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00703.x}, Key = {fds351824} } @article{fds351825, Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German children's comprehension of word order and case marking in causative sentences.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {79}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1152-1167}, Year = {2008}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01181.x}, Abstract = {Two comprehension experiments were conducted to investigate whether German children are able to use the grammatical cues of word order and word endings (case markers) to identify agents and patients in a causative sentence and whether they weigh these two cues differently across development. Two-year-olds correctly understood only sentences with both cues supporting each other--the prototypical form. Five-year-olds were able to use word order by itself but not case markers. Only 7-year-olds behaved like adults by relying on case markers over word order when the two cues conflicted. These findings suggest that prototypical instances of linguistic constructions with redundant grammatical marking play a special role in early acquisition, and only later do children isolate and weigh individual grammatical cues appropriately.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01181.x}, Key = {fds351825} } @article{fds351822, Author = {Tomasello, M and Warneken, F}, Title = {Human behaviour: Share and share alike.}, Journal = {Nature}, Volume = {454}, Number = {7208}, Pages = {1057-1058}, Year = {2008}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/4541057a}, Doi = {10.1038/4541057a}, Key = {fds351822} } @article{fds351823, Author = {Dabrowska, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Rapid learning of an abstract language-specific category: Polish children's acquisition of the instrumental construction.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {35}, Number = {3}, Pages = {533-558}, Year = {2008}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000908008660}, Abstract = {Rapid acquisition of linguistic categories or constructions is sometimes regarded as evidence of innate knowledge. In this paper, we examine Polish children's early understanding of an idiosyncratic, language-specific construction involving the instrumental case - which could not be due to innate knowledge. Thirty Polish-speaking children aged 2 ; 6 and 3 ; 2 participated in a elicited production experiment with novel verbs that were demonstrated as taking nouns in the instrumental case as patients. Children heard the verbs in sentences with either masculine or feminine nouns (which take different endings in the instrumental case), and were tested with new nouns of the same and of the opposite gender. In both age groups, a substantial majority of children succeeded in generalizing from one gendered form of the instrumental case to the other (especially to the masculine), thus indicating that they have some kind of abstract understanding of the instrumental case in this construction. This relatively early abstract knowledge of an idiosyncratic construction casts doubt on the view that early acquisition requires innate linguistic knowledge.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000908008660}, Key = {fds351823} } @article{fds351820, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Twelve-month-olds communicate helpfully and appropriately for knowledgeable and ignorant partners.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {108}, Number = {3}, Pages = {732-739}, Year = {2008}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.013}, Abstract = {In the current study we investigated whether 12-month-old infants gesture appropriately for knowledgeable versus ignorant partners, in order to provide them with needed information. In two experiments we found that in response to a searching adult, 12-month-olds pointed more often to an object whose location the adult did not know and thus needed information to find (she had not seen it fall down just previously) than to an object whose location she knew and thus did not need information to find (she had watched it fall down just previously). These results demonstrate that, in contrast to classic views of infant communication, infants' early pointing at 12 months is already premised on an understanding of others' knowledge and ignorance, along with a prosocial motive to help others by providing needed information.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.013}, Key = {fds351820} } @article{fds351817, Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {109}, Number = {2}, Pages = {224-234}, Year = {2008}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010}, Abstract = {There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees' and human children's understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010}, Key = {fds351817} } @article{fds351818, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in 20-month-olds.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {44}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1785-1788}, Year = {2008}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013860}, Abstract = {The current study investigated the influence of rewards on very young children's helping behavior. After 20-month-old infants received a material reward during a treatment phase, they subsequently were less likely to engage in further helping during a test phase as compared with infants who had previously received social praise or no reward at all. This so-called overjustification effect suggests that even the earliest helping behaviors of young children are intrinsically motivated and that socialization practices involving extrinsic rewards can undermine this tendency.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0013860}, Key = {fds351818} } @article{fds351819, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Assessing the validity of ape-human comparisons: a reply to Boesch (2007).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {122}, Number = {4}, Pages = {449-452}, Year = {2008}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.122.4.449}, Abstract = {Boesch (2007) criticizes research comparing ape and human cognition on the basis of both internal and external validity. The authors show here that most of those criticisms are not valid because: (i) most threats to internal validity (e.g., conspecific experimenters for humans but not apes) are controlled for experimentally; (ii) externally, there is no empirical evidence that captive apes have fewer cognitive skills than wild apes and indeed some evidence (especially from human-raised apes) that they have more; and (iii) externally, there is no empirical evidence that Western middle-class children have different cognitive skills from other children at very early ages in basic cognitive domains. Although difficult, with appropriate methodological care, experimental cross-species comparisons may be validly made.}, Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.122.4.449}, Key = {fds351819} } @article{fds351816, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Collective intentionality and cultural development}, Journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie}, Volume = {56}, Number = {3}, Pages = {401-410}, Year = {2008}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2008.0031}, Doi = {10.1524/dzph.2008.0031}, Key = {fds351816} } @article{fds351812, Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {One-year-olds' understanding of nonverbal gestures directed to a third person}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {24}, Number = {1}, Pages = {23-33}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.10.001}, Abstract = {We investigated whether infants comprehend others' nonverbal communicative intentions directed to a third person, in an 'overhearing' context. An experimenter addressed an assistant and indicated a hidden toy's location by either gazing ostensively or pointing to the location for her. In a matched control condition, the experimenter performed similar behaviors (absent-minded gazing and extended index finger) but did not communicate ostensively with the assistant. Infants could then search for the toy. Eighteen-month-old infants were skillful in using both communicative cues to find the hidden object, whereas 14-month-olds performed above chance only with the pointing cue. Neither age group performed above chance in the control condition. This study thus shows that by 14-18 months of age, infants are beginning to monitor and comprehend some aspects of third party interactions. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.10.001}, Key = {fds351812} } @article{fds351813, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {24}, Number = {1}, Pages = {61-69}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.07.004}, Abstract = {We investigated preschoolers' selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts - novel games - from reliable actors. More important, - and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.07.004}, Key = {fds351813} } @article{fds351814, Author = {Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants appreciate the social intention behind a pointing gesture: Commentary on "Children's understanding of communicative intentions in the middle of the second year of life" by T. Aureli, P. Perucchini and M. Genco}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {24}, Number = {1}, Pages = {13-15}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.09.004}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.09.004}, Key = {fds351814} } @article{fds351815, Author = {Tomasello, M and Brandt, S}, Title = {Flexibility in the semantics and syntax of children's early verb use.}, Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development}, Volume = {74}, Number = {2}, Pages = {113-126}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2009.00523.x}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2009.00523.x}, Key = {fds351815} } @article{fds351810, Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Are apes inequity averse? New data on the token-exchange paradigm.}, Journal = {American journal of primatology}, Volume = {71}, Number = {2}, Pages = {175-181}, Year = {2009}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20639}, Abstract = {Recent studies have produced mixed evidence about inequity aversion in nonhuman primates. Brosnan et al. [Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] found inequity aversion in chimpanzees and argued that effort is crucial, if subjects are to evaluate how they are rewarded in comparison to a competitor for an identical performance. In this study we investigated inequity aversion with chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans, using the method of Brosnan et al. [Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] after introducing some methodological improvements. Subjects always received a less-preferred food in exchange for a token, whereas the competitor received either the same type of food for their token (equity) or a more favored food for it (inequity). Apes did not refuse more of the less-preferred food when a competitor had received the more favored food. Thus, with an improved methodology we failed to reproduce the findings of Brosnan et al. [Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] that apes show inequity aversion.}, Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20639}, Key = {fds351810} } @article{fds351806, Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Sympathy through affective perspective taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {45}, Number = {2}, Pages = {534-543}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014322}, Abstract = {In most research on the early ontogeny of sympathy, young children are presented with an overtly distressed person and their responses are observed. In the current study, the authors asked whether young children could also sympathize with a person to whom something negative had happened but who was expressing no emotion at all. They showed 18- and 25-month-olds an adult either harming another adult by destroying or taking away her possessions (harm condition) or else doing something similar that did not harm her (neutral condition). The "victim" expressed no emotions in either condition. Nevertheless, in the harm as compared with the neutral condition, children showed more concern and subsequent prosocial behavior toward the victim. Moreover, children's concerned looks during the harmful event were positively correlated with their subsequent prosocial behavior. Very young children can sympathize with a victim even in the absence of overt emotional signals, possibly by some form of affective perspective taking.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0014322}, Key = {fds351806} } @article{fds351807, Author = {Colombi, C and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M and Young, G and Warneken, F and Rogers, SJ}, Title = {Examining correlates of cooperation in autism: Imitation, joint attention, and understanding intentions.}, Journal = {Autism : the international journal of research and practice}, Volume = {13}, Number = {2}, Pages = {143-163}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1362361308098514}, Abstract = {The goal of the current study was to examine the contribution of three early social skills that may provide a foundation for cooperative performance in autism: (1) imitation, (2) joint attention, and (3) understanding of other people's intentions regarding actions on objects. Fourteen children with autistic disorder (AD) and 15 children with other developmental disabilities (DDs) matched on non-verbal developmental age (AD, mean 27.7, SD 9.8; DD, mean 33.4, SD 11.1) and verbal developmental age (AD, mean 21.5, SD 12.3; DD, mean 28.4, SD 11.0) participated in the study. Children with autism showed poorer performance on imitation and joint attention measures, but not on the intentionality task. Multiple regression analyses showed that imitation skills and joint attention contributed independently to cooperation, above and beyond the understanding of intentions of actions on objects.}, Doi = {10.1177/1362361308098514}, Key = {fds351807} } @article{fds351808, Author = {Liebal, K and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants use shared experience to interpret pointing gestures.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {264-271}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00758.x}, Abstract = {We investigated whether 1-year-old infants use their shared experience with an adult to determine the meaning of a pointing gesture. In the first study, after two adults had each shared a different activity with the infant, one of the adults pointed to a target object. Eighteen- but not 14-month-olds responded appropriately to the pointing gesture based on the particular activity they had previously shared with that particular adult. In the second study, 14-month-olds were successful in a simpler procedure in which the pointing adult either had or had not shared a relevant activity with the infant prior to the pointing. Infants just beginning to learn language thus already show a complex understanding of the pragmatics of cooperative communication in which shared experience with particular individuals plays a crucial role.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00758.x}, Key = {fds351808} } @article{fds351809, Author = {Kirschner, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint drumming: social context facilitates synchronization in preschool children.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {102}, Number = {3}, Pages = {299-314}, Year = {2009}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2008.07.005}, Abstract = {The human capacity to synchronize body movements to an external acoustic beat enables uniquely human behaviors such as music making and dancing. By hypothesis, these first evolved in human cultures as fundamentally social activities. We therefore hypothesized that children would spontaneously synchronize their body movements to an external beat at earlier ages and with higher accuracy if the stimulus was presented in a social context. A total of 36 children in three age groups (2.5, 3.5, and 4.5 years) were invited to drum along with either a human partner, a drumming machine, or a drum sound coming from a speaker. When drumming with a social partner, children as young as 2.5 years adjusted their drumming tempo to a beat outside the range of their spontaneous motor tempo. Moreover, children of all ages synchronized their drumming with higher accuracy in the social condition. We argue that drumming together with a social partner creates a shared representation of the joint action task and/or elicits a specific human motivation to synchronize movements during joint rhythmic activity.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2008.07.005}, Key = {fds351809} } @article{fds351805, Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Normativity and context in young children's pretend play}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {24}, Number = {2}, Pages = {146-155}, Year = {2009}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.01.003}, Abstract = {In two studies 3-year-olds' understanding of the context-specificity of normative rules was investigated through games of pretend play. In the first study, children protested against a character who joined a pretend game but treated the target object according to its real function. However, they did not protest when she performed the same action without having first joined the game. In the second study, children protested when the character mixed up an object's pretend identities between two different pretend games. However, they did not protest when she performed the same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the studies show that young children see the pretence-reality distinction, and the distinction between different pretence identities, as normative. More generally, the results of these studies demonstrate young children's ability to enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so context-specifically. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.01.003}, Key = {fds351805} } @article{fds351803, Author = {Chan, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's understanding of the agent-patient relations in the transitive construction: Cross-linguistic comparisons between Cantonese, German, and English}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {20}, Number = {2}, Pages = {267-300}, Year = {2009}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.015}, Abstract = {Cantonese-, German-, and English-speaking children aged 2;6, 3,6, and 4,6 acted out transitive sentences containing novel verbs in three conditions: (1) agent and patient were cued redundantly by both word order and animacy; (2) agent and patient were marked only with word order; and (3) agent and patient were cued in conflicting ways with word order and animacy. All three age groups in all three languages comprehended the redundantly cued sentences. When word order was the only cue, English children showed the earliest comprehension at 2;6, then German, and then Cantonese children at 3;6. When the cues conflicted, none of the 2;6 children in any language comprehended in adult-like ways, whereas all of the children at 3;6 and 4;6 preferred word order over animacy (but with some cross-linguistic differences in performance as well). When animacy contrast changed across sentence types, Cantonese children comprehended the sentences differently at all three age levels, German children did so at the two younger ages, and English children only at the youngest age. The findings correspond well with the informativeness of word order in the three languages, suggesting that children's learning of the syntactic marking of agent-patient relations is strongly influenced by nature of the language they hear around them. © 2009 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.015}, Key = {fds351803} } @article{fds351804, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Schäfer, M and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Prelinguistic infants, but not chimpanzees, communicate about absent entities.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {20}, Number = {5}, Pages = {654-660}, Year = {2009}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02346.x}, Abstract = {One of the defining features of human language is displacement, the ability to make reference to absent entities. Here we show that prelinguistic, 12-month-old infants already can use a nonverbal pointing gesture to make reference to absent entities. We also show that chimpanzees-who can point for things they want humans to give them-do not point to refer to absent entities in the same way. These results demonstrate that the ability to communicate about absent but mutually known entities depends not on language, but rather on deeper social-cognitive skills that make acts of linguistic reference possible in the first place. These nonlinguistic skills for displaced reference emerged apparently only after humans' divergence from great apes some 6 million years ago.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02346.x}, Key = {fds351804} } @article{fds351801, Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children understand multiple pretend identities in their object play.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {27}, Number = {Pt 2}, Pages = {385-404}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151008x322893}, Abstract = {This set of studies examined the ability of 3-year-olds to conceptualize multiple pretend identities with objects. Rather than relying on verbal response measures, as has been done in the past, children's creative and inferential pretend actions were used as indicators of their understanding. The common structure to all four studies was that children were confronted with one pretend scenario, moved to a second pretend scenario and then back again to the first. Children proficiently tailored their pretence to an object whose pretend identity changed between scenarios despite being less able to name each identity. Thus, using an inferential action methodology, these studies provide early and particularly convincing evidence that children can track the multiple pretend identities of objects.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151008x322893}, Key = {fds351801} } @article{fds351802, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Brosche, N and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of the context-relativity of normative rules in conventional games.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {27}, Number = {Pt 2}, Pages = {445-456}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151008x337752}, Abstract = {We investigated young children's awareness of the context-relative rule structure of simple games. Two contexts were established in the form of spatial locations. Familiar objects were used in their conventional way at location 1, but acquired specific functions in a rule game at location 2. A third party then performed the conventional act at either of the two locations, constituting a mistake at location 2 (experimental condition), but appropriate at location 1 (control condition). Three-year-olds (but not 2-year-olds) systematically distinguished the two conditions, spontaneously intervening with normative protest against the third party act in the experimental, but not in the control condition. Young children thus understand context-specific rules even when the context marking is non-linguistic. These results are discussed in the broader context of the development of social cognition and cultural learning.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151008x337752}, Key = {fds351802} } @article{fds351798, Author = {Kaminski, J and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs are sensitive to a human's perspective}, Journal = {Behaviour}, Volume = {146}, Number = {7}, Pages = {979-998}, Year = {2009}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853908X395530}, Abstract = {We investigated dogs' ability to take the visual perspective of humans. In the main study, each of two toys was placed on the dog's side of two small barriers (one opaque, one transparent). In experimental conditions, a human sat on the opposite side of the barriers, such that she could see only the toy behind the transparent barrier. The experimenter then told the dog to 'Bring it here!' (without designating either toy in any way). In the Back Turned control E also sat on the opposite side but with her back turned so that she could see neither toy, and in the Same Side control she sat on the same side as the dog such that she could see both toys. When toys were differentiable dogs approached the toy behind the transparent barrier in experimental as compared to back turned and same side condition. Dogs did not differentiate between the two control conditions. In a second study dogs were not sensitive to what a human had or had not seen in the immediate past. These results suggest that, even in the absence of overt behavioural cues, dogs are sensitive to others visual access, even if that differs from their own. © 2009 BRILL.}, Doi = {10.1163/156853908X395530}, Key = {fds351798} } @article{fds351799, Author = {Krachun, C and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and apes.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {521-535}, Year = {2009}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00793.x}, Abstract = {A nonverbal false belief task was administered to children (mean age 5 years) and two great ape species: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Because apes typically perform poorly in cooperative contexts, our task was competitive. Two versions were run: in both, a human competitor witnessed an experimenter hide a reward in one of two containers. When the competitor then left the room (version A) or turned around (version B), the experimenter switched the locations of the containers. The competitor returned and reached with effort, but unsuccessfully, towards the incorrect container. Children displayed an understanding of the competitor's false belief by correctly choosing the other container to find the reward. Apes did not. However, in version A (but not version B), apes looked more often at the unchosen container in false belief trials than in true belief control trials, possibly indicating some implicit or uncertain understanding that needs to be investigated further.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00793.x}, Key = {fds351799} } @article{fds351800, Author = {Matsui, T and Rakoczy, H and Miura, Y and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Understanding of speaker certainty and false-belief reasoning: a comparison of Japanese and German preschoolers.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {602-613}, Year = {2009}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00812.x}, Abstract = {It has been repeatedly shown that when asked to identify a protagonist's false belief on the basis of his false statement, English-speaking 3-year-olds dismiss the statement and fail to attribute to him a false belief. In the present studies, we tested 3-year-old Japanese children in a similar task, using false statements accompanied by grammaticalized particles of speaker (un)certainty, as in everyday Japanese utterances. The Japanese children were directly compared with same-aged German children, whose native language does not have grammaticalized epistemic concepts. Japanese children profited from the explicit statement of the protagonist's false belief when it was marked with the attitude of certainty in a way that German children did not - presumably because Japanese but not German children must process such marking routinely in their daily discourse. These results are discussed in the broader context of linguistic and theory of mind development.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00812.x}, Key = {fds351800} } @article{fds351791, Author = {Brandt, S and Kidd, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The discourse bases of relativization: An investigation of young German and English-speaking children's comprehension of relative clauses}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {539-570}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.024}, Abstract = {In numerous comprehension studies, across different languages, children have performed worse on object relatives (e.g., the dog that the cat chased) than on subject relatives (e.g., the dog that chased the cat). One possible reason for this is that the test sentences did not exactly match the kinds of object relatives that children typically experience. Adults and children usually hear and produce object relatives with inanimate heads and pronominal subjects (e.g., the car that we bought last year) (cf. Kidd et al., Language and Cognitive Processes 22: 860-897, 2007). We tested young 3-year old German- and English-speaking children with a referential selection task. Children from both language groups performed best in the condition where the experimenter described inanimate referents with object relatives that contained pronominal subjects (e.g., Can you give me the sweater that he bought?). Importantly, when the object relatives met the constraints identified in spoken discourse, children understood them as well as subject relatives, or even better. These results speak against a purely structural explanation for children's difficulty with object relatives as observed in previous studies, but rather support the usage-based account, according to which discourse function and experience with language shape the representation of linguistic structures. © 2009 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.024}, Key = {fds351791} } @article{fds351792, Author = {Kirjavainen, M and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {'I want hold Postman Pat': An investigation into the acquisition of infinitival marker 'to'}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {29}, Number = {3}, Pages = {313-339}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723709105312}, Abstract = {Infinitival-to omission errors (e.g., *I want hold Postman Pat) are produced by many English-speaking children early in development. This article aims to explain these omissions by investigating the emergence of infinitival-to, and its production/omission in obligatory contexts. A series of corpus analyses were conducted on the naturalistic data from one to 13 children between the ages of approximately 2;0 and 3;1 testing three hypotheses from two theoretical viewpoints. The data suggest that the errors are associated with different verb sequences (e.g., going-to and going-X) and their frequencies in the language to which children are exposed. The article concludes that these constructions compete for output when children are producing those verbs and that this supports the usage-based/constructivist account of the omission errors. Copyright © 2009 The Author(s).}, Doi = {10.1177/0142723709105312}, Key = {fds351792} } @article{fds351793, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Pronoun co-referencing errors: Challenges for generativist and usage-based accounts}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {599-626}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.026}, Abstract = {This study tests accounts of co-reference errors whereby children allow "Mama Bear" and "her" to co-refer in sentences like "Mama Bear is washing her" (Chien and Wexler, Language Acquisition 1: 225-295, 1990). 63 children aged 4;6, 5;6 and 6;6 participated in a truth-value judgment task augmented with a sentence production component. There were three major finding: 1) contrary to predictions of most generativist accounts, children accepted co-reference even in cases of bound anaphora e.g., "Every girl is washing her" 2) contrary to Thornton and Wexler (Principle B, VP Ellipsis and Interpretation in Child Grammar, The MIT Press, 1999), errors did not appear to occur because children understood referring expressions to be denoting the same person in different guises 3) contrary to usage-based accounts, errors were less likely in sentences that contained lower as opposed to higher frequency verbs. Error rates also differed significantly according to pronoun type ("him", "her", "them"). These challenging results are discussed in terms of possible processing explanations. © 2009 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.026}, Key = {fds351793} } @article{fds351794, Author = {Lieven, E and Salomo, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-old children's production of multiword utterances: A usage-based analysis}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {481-507}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.022}, Abstract = {Children generate novel utterances from the outset of multiword speech. In this study, we apply a usage-based method called 'traceback' to the multiword utterances of four two-year-olds to see how closely related these utterances are to their previous utterances. Data was collected from the age of 2;0 until 6 weeks later on a relatively dense sampling schedule. We attempted to match each novel multiword utterance in a two-hour corpus to lexical strings and schemas that the child had said before. Matches were found for between 78-92 percent of all multiword utterances. Between 62-91 percent of the slots in schemas created by these tracebacks were for referring expressions and were filled with nouns or noun phrases. For one child, recording continued throughout his third year and we compared his data at MLUs matched with the other three children to investigate developmental changes. We found that, with increasing MLU, and developmentally, children were less repetitive within sessions, the tracebacks required a wider range of semantic slots and the material placed in these slots increased in complexity. © 2009 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.022}, Key = {fds351794} } @article{fds351795, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The roots of human altruism.}, Journal = {British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953)}, Volume = {100}, Number = {Pt 3}, Pages = {455-471}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000712608x379061}, Abstract = {Human infants as young as 14 to 18 months of age help others attain their goals, for example, by helping them to fetch out-of-reach objects or opening cabinets for them. They do this irrespective of any reward from adults (indeed external rewards undermine the tendency), and very likely with no concern for such things as reciprocation and reputation, which serve to maintain altruism in older children and adults. Humans' nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees, also help others instrumentally without concrete rewards. These results suggest that human infants are naturally altruistic, and as ontogeny proceeds and they must deal more independently with a wider range of social contexts, socialization and feedback from social interactions with others become important mediators of these initial altruistic tendencies.}, Doi = {10.1348/000712608x379061}, Key = {fds351795} } @article{fds351796, Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of cumulative culture.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {364}, Number = {1528}, Pages = {2405-2415}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0052}, Abstract = {Some researchers have claimed that chimpanzee and human culture rest on homologous cognitive and learning mechanisms. While clearly there are some homologous mechanisms, we argue here that there are some different mechanisms at work as well. Chimpanzee cultural traditions represent behavioural biases of different populations, all within the species' existing cognitive repertoire (what we call the 'zone of latent solutions') that are generated by founder effects, individual learning and mostly product-oriented (rather than process-oriented) copying. Human culture, in contrast, has the distinctive characteristic that it accumulates modifications over time (what we call the 'ratchet effect'). This difference results from the facts that (i) human social learning is more oriented towards process than product and (ii) unique forms of human cooperation lead to active teaching, social motivations for conformity and normative sanctions against non-conformity. Together, these unique processes of social learning and cooperation lead to humans' unique form of cumulative cultural evolution.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2009.0052}, Key = {fds351796} } @article{fds351797, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {112}, Number = {2}, Pages = {337-342}, Year = {2009}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006}, Abstract = {Recently, several studies have claimed that soon after their first birthday infants understand others' false beliefs. However, some have questioned these findings based on criticisms of the looking-time paradigms used. Here we report a new paradigm to test false belief understanding in infants using a more active behavioral response: helping. Specifically, the task was for infants to help an adult achieve his goal - but to determine that goal infants had to take into account what the adult believed (i.e., whether or not he falsely believed there was a toy inside a box). Results showed that by 18 months of age infants successfully took into account the adult's belief in the process of attempting to determine his goal. Results for 16-month-olds were in the same direction but less clear. These results represent by far the youngest age of false belief understanding in a task with an active behavioral measure.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006}, Key = {fds351797} } @article{fds351785, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Varieties of altruism in children and chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {13}, Number = {9}, Pages = {397-402}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.008}, Abstract = {Recent empirical research has shed new light on the perennial question of human altruism. A number of recent studies suggest that from very early in ontogeny young children have a biological predisposition to help others achieve their goals, to share resources with others and to inform others of things helpfully. Humans' nearest primate relatives, such as chimpanzees, engage in some but not all of these behaviors: they help others instrumentally, but they are not so inclined to share resources altruistically and they do not inform others of things helpfully. The evolutionary roots of human altruism thus appear to be much more complex than previously supposed.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.008}, Key = {fds351785} } @article{fds351786, Author = {Grassmann, S and Stracke, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds exclude novel objects as potential referents of novel words based on pragmatics.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {112}, Number = {3}, Pages = {488-493}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.010}, Abstract = {Many studies have established that children tend to exclude objects for which they already have a name as potential referents of novel words. In the current study we asked whether this exclusion can be triggered by social-pragmatic context alone without pre-existing words as blockers. Two-year-old children watched an adult looking at a novel object while saying a novel word with excitement. In one condition the adult had not seen the object beforehand, and so the children interpreted the adult's utterance as referring to the gazed-at object. In another condition the adult and child had previously played jointly with the gazed-at object. In this case, children less often assumed that the adult was referring to the object but rather they searched for an alternative referent--presumably because they inferred that the gazed-at object was old news in their common ground with the adult and so not worthy of excited labeling. Since this inference based on exclusion is highly similar to that underlying the Principle of Contrast/Mutual Exclusivity, we propose that this principle is not purely lexical but rather is based on children's understanding of how and why people direct one another's attention to things either with or without language.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.010}, Key = {fds351786} } @article{fds351787, Author = {Krachun, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {112}, Number = {3}, Pages = {435-450}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.012}, Abstract = {A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees' responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.012}, Key = {fds351787} } @article{fds351788, Author = {Tomasello, M and Kaminski, J}, Title = {Behavior. Like infant, like dog.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {325}, Number = {5945}, Pages = {1213-1214}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1179670}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1179670}, Key = {fds351788} } @article{fds351789, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do great apes use emotional expressions to infer desires?}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {12}, Number = {5}, Pages = {688-698}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00802.x}, Abstract = {Although apes understand others' goals and perceptions, little is known about their understanding of others' emotional expressions. We conducted three studies following the general paradigm of Repacholi and colleagues (1997, 1998). In Study 1, a human reacted emotionally to the hidden contents of two boxes, after which the ape was allowed to choose one of the boxes. Apes distinguished between two of the expressed emotions (happiness and disgust) by choosing appropriately. In Studies 2 and 3, a human reacted either positively or negatively to the hidden contents of two containers; then the ape saw him eating something. When given a choice, apes correctly chose the container to which the human had reacted negatively, based on the inference that the human had just eaten the food to which he had reacted positively - and so the other container still had food left in it. These findings suggest that great apes understand both the directedness and the valence of some human emotional expressions, and can use this understanding to infer desires.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00802.x}, Key = {fds351789} } @article{fds351790, Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of joint commitments.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {45}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1430-1443}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016122}, Abstract = {When adults make a joint commitment to act together, they feel an obligation to their partner. In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether young children also understand joint commitments to act together. In the first study, when an adult orchestrated with the child a joint commitment to play a game together and then broke off from their joint activity, 3-year-olds (n = 24) reacted to the break significantly more often (e.g., by trying to re-engage her or waiting for her to restart playing) than when she simply joined the child's individual activity unbidden. Two-year-olds (n = 24) did not differentiate between these 2 situations. In the second study, 3- and 4-year-old children (n = 30 at each age) were enticed away from their activity with an adult. Children acknowledged their leaving (e.g., by looking to the adult or handing her the object they had been playing with) significantly more often when they had made a joint commitment to act together than when they had not. By 3 years of age, children thus recognize both when an adult is committed and when they themselves are committed to a joint activity.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0016122}, Key = {fds351790} } @article{fds351784, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Society need not be selfish}, Journal = {Nature}, Volume = {461}, Number = {7260}, Pages = {41}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/461041a}, Doi = {10.1038/461041a}, Key = {fds351784} } @article{fds320801, Author = {Wobber, V and Hare, B and Koler-Matznick, J and Wrangham, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Breed differences in domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) comprehension of human communicative signals}, Journal = {Interaction Studies}, Volume = {10}, Number = {2}, Pages = {206-224}, Publisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company}, Editor = {Matsuzawa, T}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.10.2.06wob}, Abstract = {Recent research suggests that some human-like social skills evolved in dogs (Canis familiaris) during domestication as an incidental by-product of selection for "tame" forms of behavior. It is still possible, however, that the social skills of certain dog breeds came under direct selection that led to further increases in social problem solving ability. To test this hypothesis, different breeds of domestic dogs were compared for their ability to use various human communicative behaviors to find hidden food. We found that even primitive breeds with little human contact were able to use communicative cues. Further, "working" dogs (shepherds and huskies: thought to be bred intentionally to respond to human cooperative communicative signals) were more skilled at using gestural cues than were non-working breeds (basenji and toy poodles: not thought to have been bred for their cooperative-communicative ability). This difference in performance existed regardless of whether the working breeds were more or less genetically wolf-like. These results suggest that subsequent to initial domesticating selection giving rise to cue-following skills, additional selection on communicative abilities in certain breeds has produced substantive differences in those breeds' abilities to follow cues. © John Benjamins Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1075/is.10.2.06wob}, Key = {fds320801} } @article{fds351782, Author = {Bannard, C and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Modeling children's early grammatical knowledge.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {106}, Number = {41}, Pages = {17284-17289}, Year = {2009}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0905638106}, Abstract = {Theories of grammatical development differ in how much abstract knowledge they attribute to young children. Here, we report a series of experiments using a computational model to evaluate the explanatory power of child grammars based not on abstract rules but on concrete words and phrases and some local abstractions associated with these words and phrases. We use a Bayesian procedure to extract such item-based grammars from transcriptions of 28+ h of each of two children's speech at 2 and 3 years of age. We then use these grammars to parse all of the unique multiword utterances from transcriptions of separate recordings of these same children at each of the two ages. We found that at 2 years of age such a model had good coverage and predictive fit, with the children showing radically limited productivity. Furthermore, adding expert-annotated parts of speech to the induction procedure had little effect on coverage, with the exception of the category of noun. At age 3, the children's productivity sharply increased and the addition of a verb and a noun category markedly improved the model's performance.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0905638106}, Key = {fds351782} } @article{fds351783, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Universal grammar is dead}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Volume = {32}, Number = {5}, Pages = {470-471}, Year = {2009}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990744}, Abstract = {The idea of a biologically evolved, universal grammar with linguistic content is a myth, perpetuated by three spurious explanatory strategies of generative linguists. To make progress in understanding human linguistic competence, cognitive scientists must abandon the idea of an innate universal grammar and instead try to build theories that explain both linguistic universals and diversity and how they emerge. © 2009 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09990744}, Key = {fds351783} } @article{fds320800, Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees coordinate in a negotiation game}, Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior}, Volume = {30}, Number = {6}, Pages = {381-392}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2009}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003}, Abstract = {A crucially important aspect of human cooperation is the ability to negotiate to cooperative outcomes when interests over resources conflict. Although chimpanzees and other social species may negotiate conflicting interests regarding travel direction or activity timing, very little is known about their ability to negotiate conflicting preferences over food. In the current study, we presented pairs of chimpanzees with a choice between two cooperative tasks-one with equal payoffs (e.g., 5-5) and one with unequal payoffs (higher and lower than in the equal option, e.g., 10-1). This created a conflict of interests between partners with failure to work together on the same cooperative task resulting in no payoff for either partner. The chimpanzee pairs cooperated successfully in as many as 78-94% of the trials across experiments. Even though dominant chimpanzees preferred the unequal option (as they would obtain the largest payoff), subordinate chimpanzees were able to get their way (the equal option) in 22-56% of trials across conditions. Various analyses showed that subjects were both strategic and also cognizant of the strategies used by their partners. These results demonstrate that one of our two closest primate relatives, the chimpanzee, can settle conflicts of interest over resources in mutually satisfying ways-even without the social norms of equity, planned strategies of reciprocity, and the complex communication characteristic of human negotiation. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003}, Key = {fds320800} } @article{fds351780, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the normative directions of fit of different speech acts.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {113}, Number = {2}, Pages = {205-212}, Year = {2009}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.013}, Abstract = {Young children use and comprehend different kinds of speech acts from the beginning of their communicative development. But it is not clear how they understand the conventional and normative structure of such speech acts. In particular, imperative speech acts have a world-to-word direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the world must change to fit the word. In contrast, assertive speech acts have a word-to-world direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the word must fit the world truly. In the current study, 3-year-olds understood this difference explicitly, as they directed their criticisms selectively to actors when they did not follow the imperatives of the speaker, but to speakers when they did not describe an actor's actions correctly. Two-year-olds criticized appropriately in the case of imperatives, but showed a more ambiguous pattern in the case of assertions. These findings identify another domain in which children's normative understanding of human activity emerges around the third year of life.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.013}, Key = {fds351780} } @article{fds351781, Author = {Kaminski, J and Tempelmann, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs comprehend human communication with iconic signs.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {12}, Number = {6}, Pages = {831-837}, Year = {2009}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00815.x}, Abstract = {A key skill in early human development is the ability to comprehend communicative intentions as expressed in both nonlinguistic gestures and language. In the current studies, we confronted domestic dogs (some of whom knew many human 'words') with a task in which they had to infer the intended referent of a human's communicative act via iconic signs--specifically, replicas and photographs. Both trained and untrained dogs successfully used iconic replicas to fetch the desired item, with many doing so from the first trial. Dogs' ability to use photographs in this same situation was less consistent. Because simple matching to sample in experimental contexts typically takes hundreds of trials (and because similarity between iconic sign and target item did not predict success), we propose that dogs' skillful performance in the current task reflects important aspects of the comprehension of human communicative intentions.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00815.x}, Key = {fds351781} } @article{fds320797, Author = {Hare, B and Rosati, AG and Kaminski, J and Braeuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The domestication hypothesis for dogs' skills with human communication: A response to Udell et al. (2008) and Wynne et al. (2008)}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {79}, Number = {2}, Pages = {e1-e6}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2010}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031}, Key = {fds320797} } @article{fds320799, Author = {Herrmann, E and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Call, J and Hare, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The structure of individual differences in the cognitive abilities of children and chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {21}, Number = {1}, Pages = {102-110}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797609356511}, Abstract = {Most studies of animal cognition focus on group performance and neglect individual differences and the correlational structure of cognitive abilities. Moreover, no previous studies have compared the correlational structure of cognitive abilities in nonhuman animals and humans. We compared the structure of individual differences of 106 chimpanzees and 105 two-year-old human children using 15 cognitive tasks that posed problems about the physical or social world. We found a similar factor of spatial cognition for the two species. But whereas the chimpanzees had only a single factor in addition to spatial cognition, the children had two distinct additional factors: one for physical cognition and one for social cognition. These findings, in combination with previous research, support the proposal that humans share many cognitive skills with nonhuman apes, especially for dealing with the physical world, but in addition have evolved some specialized skills of social cognition.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797609356511}, Key = {fds320799} } @article{fds351748, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of pronoun frames in early comprehension of transitive constructions in English}, Journal = {Language Learning and Development}, Volume = {7}, Number = {1}, Pages = {24-39}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441003732914}, Abstract = {Case marking in English in available only on some pronouns and only in some cases. It is unknown whether young children acquiring English nevertheless make use of this highly restricted marking as a cue to sentence interpretation. The current study therefore examined how 2- and 3-year-old English children use case-marked pronoun frames and constructional word order cues (actives versus passives) to understand agent-patient relations in transitive sentences containing novel verbs. In a pointing comprehension test, 2-year-olds used pronoun frames containing two case-marked pronouns to help them interpret grammatical sentences, both actives and passives, but they were unable to assign agent patient relationships in any consistent way with ungrammatical pronoun frames. Threeyear- olds also used pronoun frames to interpret grammatical active and passive sentences (with either one or two case-marked pronouns) but varied in their interpretation of ungrammatical sentences according to pronoun frame. These results suggest that the role of case-marked pronouns has been underestimated in English language acquisition, and that even very young English children use multiple cues to comprehend transitive sentences. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1080/15475441003732914}, Key = {fds351748} } @article{fds351775, Author = {Kidd, E and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Lexical frequency and exemplar-based learning effects in language acquisition: evidence from sentential complements}, Journal = {Language Sciences}, Volume = {32}, Number = {1}, Pages = {132-142}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2009.05.002}, Abstract = {Usage-based approaches to language acquisition argue that children acquire the grammar of their target language using general-cognitive learning principles. The current paper reports on an experiment that tested a central assumption of the usage-based approach: argument structure patterns are connected to high frequency verbs that facilitate acquisition. Sixty children (N = 60) aged 4- and 6-years participated in a sentence recall/lexical priming experiment that manipulated the frequency with which the target verbs occurred in the finite sentential complement construction in English. The results showed that the children performed better on sentences that contained high frequency verbs. Furthermore, the children's performance suggested that their knowledge of finite sentential complements relies most heavily on one particular verb - think, supporting arguments made by Goldberg [Goldberg, A.E., 2006. Constructions at Work: The Nature of Generalization in Language. Oxford University Press, Oxford], who argued that skewed input facilitates language learning. Crown Copyright © 2009.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.langsci.2009.05.002}, Key = {fds351775} } @article{fds351776, Author = {Salomo, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's sensitivity to new and given information when answering predicate-focus questions}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {31}, Number = {1}, Pages = {101-115}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S014271640999018X}, Abstract = {In two studies we investigated 2-year-old children's answers to predicate-focus questions depending on the preceding context. Children were presented with a successive series of short video clips showing transitive actions (e.g., frog washing duck) in which either the action (action-new) or the patient (patient-new) was the changing, and therefore new, element. During the last scene the experimenter asked the question (e.g., What's the frog doing now?). We found that children expressed the action and the patient in the patient-new condition but expressed only the action in the action-new condition. These results show that children are sensitive to both the predicate-focus question and newness in context. A further finding was that children expressed new patients in their answers more often when there was a verbal context prior to the questions than when there was not. © 2009 Cambridge University Press.}, Doi = {10.1017/S014271640999018X}, Key = {fds351776} } @article{fds351777, Author = {Chan, A and Meints, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's comprehension of English SVO word order revisited: Testing the same children in act-out and intermodal preferential looking tasks}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {25}, Number = {1}, Pages = {30-45}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.10.002}, Abstract = {Act-out and intermodal preferential looking (IPL) tasks were administered to 67 English children aged 2-0, 2-9 and 3-5 to assess their comprehension of canonical SVO transitive word order with both familiar and novel verbs. Children at 3-5 and at 2-9 showed evidence of comprehending word order in both verb conditions and both tasks, although children at 2-9 performed better with familiar than with novel verbs in the act-out task. Children at 2-0 showed no evidence of comprehending word order in either task with novel verbs; with familiar verbs they showed competence in the IPL task but not in the act-out task. The difference in performance for familiar and novel verbs from the same children at 2-0, on the IPL task, and at 2-9, on the act-out task, is consistent with the hypothesis that early linguistic/cognitive representations are graded in strength, with early representations still weak and very task dependent. However, these representations also become more abstract with development, as indicated by the familiarity effect even in the more sensitive IPL task. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.10.002}, Key = {fds351777} } @article{fds351778, Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children follow pointing over words in interpreting acts of reference.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {13}, Number = {1}, Pages = {252-263}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00871.x}, Abstract = {Adults refer young children's attention to things in two basic ways: through the use of pointing (and other deictic gestures) and words (and other linguistic conventions). In the current studies, we referred young children (2- and 4-year-olds) to things in conflicting ways, that is, by pointing to one object while indicating linguistically (in some way) a different object. In Study 1, a novel word was put into competition with a pointing gesture in a mutual exclusivity paradigm; that is, with a known and a novel object in front of the child, the adult pointed to the known object (e.g. a cup) while simultaneously requesting 'the modi'. In contrast to the findings of Jaswal and Hansen (2006), children followed almost exclusively the pointing gesture. In Study 2, when a known word was put into competition with a pointing gesture - the adult pointed to the novel object but requested 'the car'- children still followed the pointing gesture. In Study 3, the referent of the pointing gesture was doubly contradicted by the lexical information - the adult pointed to a known object (e.g. a cup) but requested 'the car'- in which case children considered pointing and lexical information equally strong. Together, these findings suggest that in disambiguating acts of reference, young children at both 2 and 4 years of age rely most heavily on pragmatic information (e.g. in a pointing gesture), and only secondarily on lexical conventions and principles.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00871.x}, Key = {fds351778} } @article{fds352505, Author = {Whiten, A and McGrew, WC and Aiello, LC and Boesch, C and Boyd, R and Byrne, RW and Dunbar, RIM and Matsuzawa, T and Silk, JB and Tomasello, M and van Schaik, CP and Wrangham, R}, Title = {Studying extant species to model our past.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {327}, Number = {5964}, Pages = {410}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.327.5964.410-a}, Doi = {10.1126/science.327.5964.410-a}, Key = {fds352505} } @article{fds351772, Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The influence of frequency and semantic similarity on how children learn grammar}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {30}, Number = {1}, Pages = {79-101}, Year = {2010}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723709350525}, Abstract = {Lexically based learning and semantic analogy may both play a role in the learning of grammar. To investigate this, 5-year-old German children were trained on a miniature language (nominally English) involving two grammatical constructions, each of which was associated with a different semantic verb class. Training was followed by elicited production and grammaticality judgement tests with trained verbs and a generalization test, involving untrained verbs. In the trained verbs judgement test the children were above chance at associating particular verbs with the constructions in which they had heard them. They did this significantly more often with verbs which they had heard especially frequently in particular constructions, indicating lexically based learning. There was also an interaction between frequency and semantic class (or the particular verbs). In the generalization judgement test the children were at chance overall. In the elicited production generalization test 75% of the children used the same construction for all items.}, Doi = {10.1177/0142723709350525}, Key = {fds351772} } @article{fds351768, Author = {Melis, AP and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {36-month-olds conceal visual and auditory information from others.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {13}, Number = {3}, Pages = {479-489}, Year = {2010}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00892.x}, Abstract = {By three years of age, children are skilled at assessing under which circumstances others can see things. However, nothing is known about whether they can use this knowledge to guide their own deceptive behaviour. Here we investigated 3-year-olds' ability to strategically inhibit or conceal forbidden actions that a nearby adult experimenter could see or hear. In the first experiment, children were more likely to disobey the adult when she did not have visual access to their activities than they were when she was looking at them. In the second experiment, in which the adult could never see the child, children refrained from making noise when engaging in a prohibited action that the adult might hear. These results suggest that by three years of age children use their knowledge of others' perceptual states to decide whether it is safe to commit a transgression and, moreover, actively conceal perceptual cues that could reveal to others their ongoing transgression.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00892.x}, Key = {fds351768} } @article{fds351779, Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Evidence for emulation in chimpanzees in social settings using the floating peanut task.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {5}, Number = {5}, Pages = {e10544}, Year = {2010}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010544}, Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>It is still unclear which observational learning mechanisms underlie the transmission of difficult problem-solving skills in chimpanzees. In particular, two different mechanisms have been proposed: imitation and emulation. Previous studies have largely failed to control for social factors when these mechanisms were targeted.<h4>Methods</h4>In an attempt to resolve the existing discrepancies, we adopted the 'floating peanut task', in which subjects need to spit water into a tube until it is sufficiently full for floating peanuts to be grasped. In a previous study only a few chimpanzees were able to invent the necessary solution (and they either did so in their first trials or never). Here we compared success levels in baseline tests with two experimental conditions that followed: 1) A full model condition to test whether social demonstrations would be effective, and 2) A social emulation control condition, in which a human experimenter poured water from a bottle into the tube, to test whether results information alone (present in both experimental conditions) would also induce successes. Crucially, we controlled for social factors in both experimental conditions. Both types of demonstrations significantly increased successful spitting, with no differences between demonstration types. We also found that younger subjects were more likely to succeed than older ones. Our analysis showed that mere order effects could not explain our results.<h4>Conclusion</h4>The full demonstration condition (which potentially offers additional information to observers, in the form of actions), induced no more successes than the emulation condition. Hence, emulation learning could explain the success in both conditions. This finding has broad implications for the interpretation of chimpanzee traditions, for which emulation learning may perhaps suffice.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0010544}, Key = {fds351779} } @article{fds351767, Author = {Tomasello, M and Herrmann, E}, Title = {Ape and human cognition: What's the difference?}, Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science}, Volume = {19}, Number = {1}, Pages = {3-8}, Year = {2010}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721409359300}, Abstract = {Humans share the vast majority of their cognitive skills with other great apes. In addition, however, humans have also evolved a unique suite of cognitive skills and motivations-collectively referred to as shared intentionality-for living collaboratively, learning socially, and exchanging information in cultural groups. © The Author(s) 2010.}, Doi = {10.1177/0963721409359300}, Key = {fds351767} } @article{fds351765, Author = {Seed, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Primate cognition.}, Journal = {Topics in cognitive science}, Volume = {2}, Number = {3}, Pages = {407-419}, Year = {2010}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01099.x}, Abstract = {As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed by other primates. There may be differences between humans and other primates, however, in more complex cognitive skills, such as reasoning about relations, causality, time, and other minds. Of special importance, the human primate seems to possess a species-unique set of adaptations for "cultural intelligence," which are broad reaching in their effects on human cognition.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01099.x}, Key = {fds351765} } @article{fds351766, Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {What's in a manner of speaking? Children's sensitivity to partner-specific referential precedents.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {46}, Number = {4}, Pages = {749-760}, Year = {2010}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019657}, Abstract = {Do young children form "referential pacts"? If a person has referred to an object with a certain term (e.g., the horse), will children expect this person to use this term in the future but allow others to use a different expression (e.g., the pony)? One hundred twenty-eight children between 3 and 5 years old co-operated with an experimenter (E1) to move toys to new locations on a shelf. E1 established referential terms for all toys in a warm-up game. Then, either the original partner, E1, or a new partner, E2, played a second game with the same toys. In this game, the experimenters referred to toys using either their original terms from the warm-up game or new terms. Children were slower to react to new terms than old, and this difference in reaction times was greater in the original partner condition (but only on the first trial). Children sometimes protested at the use of new terms, doing so regardless of their interlocutor's identity. We contrast these findings with those for adults and discuss their implications for the debate regarding the nature of referential pacts.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0019657}, Key = {fds351766} } @article{fds320798, Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in the cognitive skills of bonobos and chimpanzees.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {5}, Number = {8}, Pages = {e12438}, Year = {2010}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012438}, Abstract = {While bonobos and chimpanzees are both genetically and behaviorally very similar, they also differ in significant ways. Bonobos are more cautious and socially tolerant while chimpanzees are more dependent on extractive foraging, which requires tools. The similarities suggest the two species should be cognitively similar while the behavioral differences predict where the two species should differ cognitively. We compared both species on a wide range of cognitive problems testing their understanding of the physical and social world. Bonobos were more skilled at solving tasks related to theory of mind or an understanding of social causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at tasks requiring the use of tools and an understanding of physical causality. These species differences support the role of ecological and socio-ecological pressures in shaping cognitive skills over relatively short periods of evolutionary time.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0012438}, Key = {fds320798} } @article{fds351761, Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants' use of shared experience in declarative pointing}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {15}, Number = {5}, Pages = {545-556}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00028.x}, Abstract = {In this study, we asked whether 14- and 18-month-old infants use the experiences they have previously shared with others when deciding what to point to for them declaratively. After sharing a particular type of referent with an adult in an excited manner, 18-month-olds subsequently found a picture of that type of referent more worthy of declarative pointing than some other picture-but only for that adult, not for a different adult. Mixed results were found with 14-month-olds. We thus show that by 18 months, infants accurately track their shared experiences with specific individuals and use this to make communicative decisions. These results also demonstrate that infants sometimes use declarative pointing to indicate not totally "new" things, as in the classic formulation, but things which are "old" in the sense that "we" should recognize them as similar to something we have previously shared. © International Society on Infant Studies (ISIS).}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00028.x}, Key = {fds351761} } @article{fds351762, Author = {Kirschner Sebastian and S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint music making promotes prosocial behavior in 4-year-old children}, Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior}, Volume = {31}, Number = {5}, Pages = {354-364}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004}, Abstract = {Humansw are the only primates that make music. But the evolutionary origins and functions of music are unclear. Given that in traditional cultures music making and dancing are often integral parts of important group ceremonies such as initiation rites, weddings or preparations for battle, one hypothesis is that music evolved into a tool that fosters social bonding and group cohesion, ultimately increasing prosocial in-group behavior and cooperation. Here we provide support for this hypothesis by showing that joint music making among 4-year-old children increases subsequent spontaneous cooperative and helpful behavior, relative to a carefully matched control condition with the same level of social and linguistic interaction but no music. Among other functional mechanisms, we propose that music making, including joint singing and dancing, encourages the participants to keep a constant audiovisual representation of the collective intention and shared goal of vocalizing and moving together in time - thereby effectively satisfying the intrinsic human desire to share emotions, experiences and activities with others. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004}, Key = {fds351762} } @article{fds351763, Author = {Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Development ofword order in german complement-clause constructions: Effects of input frequencies, lexical items, and discourse function}, Journal = {Language}, Volume = {86}, Number = {3}, Pages = {583-610}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2010.0010}, Abstract = {We investigate the development of word order in German children's spontaneous production of complement clauses. From soon after their second birthday, young German children use both verb-final complements with complementizers and verb-second complements without complementizers. By their third birthday they use both kinds of complement clauses with a variety of complement-taking verbs. Early in development, however, verb-final complements and verbsecond complements are used with separate sets of complement-taking verbs, and they are used with separate sets of item-specific main-clause phrases. For example, initially phrases such as 'I want to see' were used exclusively with verb-final complements, whereas phrases such as 'do you see' and 'you have to say' were used exclusively with verb-second complements. Only later in development-when specific complement-taking verbs were used with both verb-second and verbfinal complements, with a greater variety of main-clause phrases, and when specific main-clause phrases were used with both verb-second and verb-final complements-was there evidence for structural links between these various, item-based, complement-clause constructions.}, Doi = {10.1353/lan.2010.0010}, Key = {fds351763} } @article{fds351759, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infant cognition}, Journal = {Current Biology}, Volume = {20}, Number = {20}, Year = {2010}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.001}, Abstract = {Until fairly recently, young infants were thought to be as cognitively incompetent as they were morally innocent. They were epistemological 'tabulae rasae', helpless 'bundles of reflexes' who spent all of their time sleeping, crying and sucking. In the famous words of William James, infants lived in "one great blooming, buzzing confusion". © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.001}, Key = {fds351759} } @article{fds351754, Author = {Greenberg, JR and Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzee helping in collaborative and noncollaborative contexts}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {80}, Number = {5}, Pages = {873-880}, Year = {2010}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.008}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, help others in a variety of contexts. Some researchers have claimed that this only occurs when food is not involved and the recipient actively solicits help. In the current study, however, we found that chimpanzees often helped conspecifics obtain food in a pulling task with no solicitation whatsoever, in a situation in which, based on past experience, the conspecific's desire for the food was apparent. We also assessed whether the collaborative context of the situation impacted helping rates. Specifically, we compared how often both partners obtained rewards when one partner needed the help of the other, who had already received a reward for free (helping without collaboration), and when one partner needed the other's help after they had already begun collaborating (helping during collaboration). Partners provided assistance significantly more often in both of these helping conditions than in a control condition in which partners could provide unneeded help. However, unlike human children who have been tested in a similar task, chimpanzees did not help their partner more during (than without) collaboration. These results suggest that chimpanzees' helping behaviour is more robust than previously believed, but at the same time may have different evolutionary roots from the helping behaviour of humans. © 2010 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.008}, Key = {fds351754} } @article{fds351755, Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Prosodic stress on a word directs 24-month-olds' attention to a contextually new referent}, Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics}, Volume = {42}, Number = {11}, Pages = {3098-3105}, Year = {2010}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.04.019}, Abstract = {From the very beginning of language acquisition, young children are sensitive to what is given versus what is new in their discourse with others. Here we ask whether 24-month-olds use this skill to interpret prosodic highlighting as an invitation to focus their attention on what is new in the situation. Using an eye-tracking methodology, we compared children's visual fixation of referents that were given versus those that were new in the situation when the prosodic highlighting of their corresponding word varied. Results showed that 24-month-old children looked longer to the referents of prosodically stressed words when those referents were new to the context. Neither stress of the word alone nor newness of the referent alone was sufficient to induce children to focus their attention on the target referent. These results suggest that from an early age children understand at least one important communicative function of prosodic stress. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2010.04.019}, Key = {fds351755} } @article{fds351756, Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children selectively avoid helping people with harmful intentions.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {81}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1661-1669}, Year = {2010}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01500.x}, Abstract = {Two studies investigated whether young children are selectively prosocial toward others, based on the others' moral behaviors. In Study 1 (N = 54), 3-year-olds watched 1 adult (the actor) harming or helping another adult. Children subsequently helped the harmful actor less often than a third (previously neutral) adult, but helped the helpful and neutral adults equally often. In Study 2 (N = 36), 3-year-olds helped an actor who intended but failed to harm another adult less often than a neutral adult, but helped an accidentally harmful and a neutral adult equally often. Children's prosocial behavior was thus mediated by the intentions behind the actor's moral behavior, irrespective of outcome. Children thus selectively avoid helping those who cause--or even intend to cause--others harm.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01500.x}, Key = {fds351756} } @article{fds351757, Author = {Grosse, G and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Infants communicate in order to be understood.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {46}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1710-1722}, Year = {2010}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020727}, Abstract = {Infants intentionally communicate with others from before their 1st birthday. But there is some question about how they understand the communicative process. Do they understand that for their request to work the recipient must both understand the request and be cooperatively disposed to fulfill it? On the basis of the study by Shwe and Markman (1997), we developed a new paradigm that tested whether and how 18-, 24-, and 30-month-old children repair a failed request. Children at all ages repaired their requests in the case of a misunderstanding even if they had obtained the requested object already. They also repaired differently depending on the precise reason for the communicative failure (e.g., misunderstanding the referent versus the communicative intent) and did not repair in the case of correct understanding, even if they did not get the requested object. Thus, from very early in their communicative careers, young children operate with a basic understanding of the mental and cooperative nature of human communication.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0020727}, Key = {fds351757} } @article{fds351758, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Bigger knows better: young children selectively learn rule games from adults rather than from peers.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {28}, Number = {Pt 4}, Pages = {785-798}, Year = {2010}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151009x479178}, Abstract = {Preschoolers' selective learning from adult versus peer models was investigated. Extending previous research, children from age 3 were shown to selectively learn simple rule games from adult rather than peer models. Furthermore, this selective learning was not confined to preferentially performing certain acts oneself, but more specifically had a normative dimension to it: children understood the way the adult demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate/correct one. This was indicated in their spontaneous normative interventions (protest, critique, etc.) in response to third party acts deviating from the one demonstrated by the adult model. Various interpretations of these findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151009x479178}, Key = {fds351758} } @article{fds351753, Author = {Grosse, G and Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {21-Month-olds understand the cooperative logic of requests}, Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics}, Volume = {42}, Number = {12}, Pages = {3377-3383}, Year = {2010}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.05.005}, Abstract = {Human communication rests on a basic assumption of partner cooperativeness, including even requesting. In the current study, an adult made an ambiguous request for an object to 21-month-old infants, with one potential referent being right in front of her and the other being across the room. In a normal situation (Hands-Free), infants interpreted the request as referring to the distant object-the one the adult needed help fetching. In contrast, in a situation in which the adult was constrained so that fetching either object herself would be difficult (Hands-Occupied), infants selected the far object much less often. These results suggest that infants just beginning to acquire language already understand something of the cooperative logic of requests. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2010.05.005}, Key = {fds351753} } @article{fds351745, Author = {Kaminski, J and Nitzschner, M and Wobber, V and Tennie, C and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do dogs distinguish rational from irrational acts?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {81}, Number = {1}, Pages = {195-203}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.10.001}, Abstract = {Range et al. (2007, Current Biology, 17, 868-872) found that dogs, Canis familiaris, copy others' means to achieve a goal more often when those means are the rational solution to a problem than when they are irrational. In our first experiment, we added a further control condition and failed to replicate this result, suggesting that dogs in the previous study may have been distracted in the irrational condition rather than selectively attending to the irrational nature of the action. In a second experiment, the demonstrator used an unusual means (an extended leg) to communicate the location of food, either rationally (her hands were occupied) or irrationally (she could have used her hand). Dogs succeeded in finding the food irrespective of whether the leg action was rational or irrational. Our results suggest that dogs do not distinguish rational from irrational acts, instead simply being proficient at monitoring human behavioural patterns. © 2010 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.10.001}, Key = {fds351745} } @article{fds351746, Author = {Melis, AP and Warneken, F and Jensen, K and Schneider, AC and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain food and non-food items}, Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, Volume = {278}, Number = {1710}, Pages = {1405-1413}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1735}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) sometimes help both humans and conspecifics in experimental situations in which immediate selfish benefits can be ruled out. However, in several experiments, chimpanzees have not provided food to a conspecific even when it would cost them nothing, leading to the hypothesis that prosociality in the food-provisioning context is a derived trait in humans. Here, we show that chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain both food and non-food items-given that the donor cannot get the food herself. Furthermore, we show that the key factor eliciting chimpanzees' targeted helping is the recipients' attempts to either get the food or get the attention of the potential donor. The current findings add to the accumulating body of evidence that humans and chimpanzees share the motivation and skills necessary to help others in situations in which they cannot selfishly benefit. Humans, however, show prosocial motives more readily and in a wider range of contexts. © 2010 The Royal Society.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2010.1735}, Key = {fds351746} } @article{fds351747, Author = {Liszkowski, U and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Individual differences in social, cognitive, and morphological aspects of infant pointing}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {16-29}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2010.10.001}, Abstract = {Little is known about the origins of the pointing gesture. We sought to gain insight into its emergence by investigating individual differences in the pointing of 12-month-old infants in two ways. First, we looked at differences in the communicative and interactional uses of pointing and asked how different hand shapes relate to point frequency, accompanying vocalizations, and mothers' pointing. Second, we looked at differences in social-cognitive skills of point comprehension and imitation and tested whether these were related to infants' own pointing. Infants' and mothers' spontaneous pointing correlated with one another, as did infants' point production and comprehension. In particular, infants' index-finger pointing had a profile different from simple whole-hand pointing. It was more frequent, it was more often accompanied by vocalizations, and it correlated more strongly with comprehension of pointing (especially to occluded referents). We conclude that whole-hand and index-finger pointing differ qualitatively and suggest that it is index-finger pointing that first embodies infants' understanding of communicative intentions. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2010.10.001}, Key = {fds351747} } @article{fds351749, Author = {Warneken, F and Lohse, K and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children share the spoils after collaboration}, Journal = {Psychological Science}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {267-273}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610395392}, Abstract = {Egalitarian behavior is considered to be a species-typical component of human cooperation. Human adults tend to share resources equally, even if they have the opportunity to keep a larger portion for themselves. Recent experiments have suggested that this tendency emerges fairly late in human ontogeny, not before 6 or 7 years of age. Here we show that 3-year-old children share mostly equally with a peer after they have worked together actively to obtain rewards in a collaboration task, even when those rewards could easily be monopolized. These findings contrast with previous findings from a similar experiment with chimpanzees, who tended to monopolize resources whenever they could. The potentially species-unique tendency of humans to share equally emerges early in ontogeny, perhaps originating in collaborative interactions among peers. © The Author(s) 2011.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797610395392}, Key = {fds351749} } @article{fds351750, Author = {Scheider, L and Grassmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs use contextual information and tone of voice when following a human pointing gesture.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {6}, Number = {7}, Pages = {e21676}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021676}, Abstract = {Domestic dogs are skillful at using the human pointing gesture. In this study we investigated whether dogs take contextual information into account when following pointing gestures, specifically, whether they follow human pointing gestures more readily in the context in which food has been found previously. Also varied was the human's tone of voice as either imperative or informative. Dogs were more sustained in their searching behavior in the 'context' condition as opposed to the 'no context' condition, suggesting that they do not simply follow a pointing gesture blindly but use previously acquired contextual information to inform their interpretation of that pointing gesture. Dogs also showed more sustained searching behavior when there was pointing than when there was not, suggesting that they expect to find a referent when they see a human point. Finally, dogs searched more in high-pitched informative trials as opposed to the low-pitched imperative trials, whereas in the latter dogs seemed more inclined to respond by sitting. These findings suggest that a dog's response to a pointing gesture is flexible and depends on the context as well as the human's tone of voice.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0021676}, Key = {fds351750} } @article{fds351751, Author = {Bullinger, AF and Zimmermann, F and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Different social motives in the gestural communication of chimpanzees and human children.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {14}, Number = {1}, Pages = {58-68}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00952.x}, Abstract = {Both chimpanzees and human infants use the pointing gesture with human adults, but it is not clear if they are doing so for the same social motives. In two studies, we presented chimpanzees and human 25-month-olds with the opportunity to point for a hidden tool (in the presence of a non-functional distractor). In one condition it was clear that the tool would be used to retrieve a reward for the pointing subject (so the pointing was selfish or 'for-me'), whereas in the other condition it was clear that the tool would be used to retrieve the reward for the experimenter (so the pointing was helpful or 'for-you'). The chimpanzees pointed reliably only when they themselves benefited, whereas the human children pointed reliably no matter who benefited. These results are interpreted as evidence for the especially cooperative nature of human communication.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00952.x}, Key = {fds351751} } @article{fds351744, Author = {Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees know that others make inferences.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {108}, Number = {7}, Pages = {3077-3079}, Year = {2011}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1000469108}, Abstract = {If chimpanzees are faced with two opaque boards on a table, in the context of searching for a single piece of food, they do not choose the board lying flat (because if food was under there it would not be lying flat) but, rather, they choose the slanted one- presumably inferring that some unperceived food underneath is causing the slant. Here we demonstrate that chimpanzees know that other chimpanzees in the same situation will make a similar inference. In a back-and-forth foraging game, when their competitor had chosen before them, chimpanzees tended to avoid the slanted board on the assumption that the competitor had already chosen it. Chimpanzees can determine the inferences that a conspecific is likely to make and then adjust their competitive strategies accordingly.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1000469108}, Key = {fds351744} } @article{fds351743, Author = {Vaish, A and Missana, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {29}, Number = {Pt 1}, Pages = {124-130}, Year = {2011}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151010x532888}, Abstract = {We investigated children's moral behaviour in situations in which a third party was harmed (the test case for possession of agent-neutral moral norms). A 3-year-old and two puppets each created a picture or clay sculpture, after which one puppet left the room. In the Harm condition, the remaining (actor) puppet then destroyed the absent (recipient) puppet's picture or sculpture. In a Control condition, the actor acted similarly but in a way that did not harm the recipient. Children protested during the actor's actions, and, upon the recipient's return, tattled on the actor and behaved prosocially towards the recipient more in the Harm than in the Control condition. This is the first study to show that children as young as 3 years of age actively intervene in third-party moral transgressions.}, Doi = {10.1348/026151010x532888}, Key = {fds351743} } @article{fds351742, Author = {Jorschick, L and Endesfelder Quick and A and Glässer, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German-English-speaking children's mixed NPs with 'correct' agreement}, Journal = {Bilingualism}, Volume = {14}, Number = {2}, Pages = {173-183}, Year = {2011}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1366728910000131}, Abstract = {Previous research has reported that bilingual children sometimes produce mixed noun phrases with 'correct' gender agreement- A s in der dog (der being a masculine determiner in German and the German word for dog, hund, being masculine as well). However, these could obviously be due to chance or to the indiscriminate use of a default determiner. In the current study, we established with high statistical reliability that each of three German-English bilingual children, of 2-4 years of age, produced such mixed NPs with 'correct' agreement at significantly greater than chance levels. Also noteworthy was the fact that all three children produced such NPs with German determiners and English nouns much more frequently than the reverse. These findings provide a solid statistical foundation for further studies into the phenomenon of mixed noun phrases with 'correct' gender agreement.}, Doi = {10.1017/S1366728910000131}, Key = {fds351742} } @article{fds351738, Author = {Krajewski, G and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How polish children switch from one case to another when using novel nouns: Challenges for models of inflectional morphology}, Journal = {Language and Cognitive Processes}, Volume = {26}, Number = {4-6}, Pages = {830-861}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01690965.2010.506062}, Abstract = {The two main models of children's acquisition of inflectional morphology-the Dual-Mechanism approach and the usage-based (schema-based) approach-have both been applied mainly to languages with fairly simple morphological systems. Here we report two studies of 2-3-year-old Polish children's ability to generalise across case-inflectional endings on nouns. In the first study, we found that the morphological form in which children first encounter a noun in Polish has a strong effect on their ability to produce other forms of that same noun. In the second study, we found that this effect is different depending on the target form to which children are switching. Similarity between inflectional endings played a crucial role in facilitating the task, whereas the simple frequency of either source or target forms was not a decisive factor in either study. These findings undermine Dual-Mechanism models that posit all-ornone acquisition of abstract morphological rules, and they also present serious challenges for usage-based models, in which frequency typically plays a key role. © 2010 Psychology Press.}, Doi = {10.1080/01690965.2010.506062}, Key = {fds351738} } @article{fds351739, Author = {Grünloh, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German children use prosody to identify participant roles in transitive sentences}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {393-419}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2011.015}, Abstract = {Most studies examining children's understanding of transitive sentences focus on the morphosyntactic properties of the construction and ignore prosody. But adults use prosody in many different ways to interpret ambiguous sentences. In two studies we investigated whether 5-year-old German children use prosody to determine participant roles in object-first (OVS) sentences with novel verbs (i.e., whether they use prosodic marking to overrule word order as a cue). Results showed that children identify participant roles better in this atypically ordered construction when sentences are realized with the marked, OVS-typical intonational pattern, especially in combination with case marking (Study 1). In a second study, we embedded these sentences into an appropriate discourse context. The results show that, even in the absence of any case marking, children understand participant roles when they are realized with the appropriate intonational pattern. These findings demonstrate that young children can use intonation to help identify participant roles in transitive sentences, at least in marked constructions such as the German object-first (OVS) construction. © 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New York.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2011.015}, Key = {fds351739} } @article{fds351740, Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social Engagement Leads 2-Year-Olds to Overestimate Others' Knowledge}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {248-265}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2010.00044.x}, Abstract = {Previous research has found that young children recognize an adult as being acquainted with an object most readily when the child and adult have previously engaged socially with that object together. In the current study, we tested the hypothesis that such social engagement is so powerful that it can sometimes lead children to overestimate what has been shared. After having shared two objects with an adult in turn, 2-year-old children played with a third object the adult could not see. In three out of four conditions, the adult remained co-present and/or communicated to the child while she played with the third object. Children falsely perceived the adult as being acquainted with the third object when she remained co-present (whether or not she also communicated) but not when she clearly terminated the interaction by disengaging and leaving. These results suggest that when young children are engaged with a co-present person they tend to overestimate the other's knowledge. © International Society on Infant Studies (ISIS).}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2010.00044.x}, Key = {fds351740} } @article{fds351741, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {14}, Number = {3}, Pages = {530-539}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.x}, Abstract = {Young children interpret some acts performed by adults as normatively governed, that is, as capable of being performed either rightly or wrongly. In previous experiments, children have made this interpretation when adults introduced them to novel acts with normative language (e.g. 'this is the way it goes'), along with pedagogical cues signaling culturally important information, and with social-pragmatic marking that this action is a token of a familiar type. In the current experiment, we exposed children to novel actions with no normative language, and we systematically varied pedagogical and social-pragmatic cues in an attempt to identify which of them, if either, would lead children to normative interpretations. We found that young 3-year-old children inferred normativity without any normative language and without any pedagogical cues. The only cue they used was adult social-pragmatic marking of the action as familiar, as if it were a token of a well-known type (as opposed to performing it, as if inventing it on the spot). These results suggest that - in the absence of explicit normative language - young children interpret adult actions as normatively governed based mainly on the intentionality (perhaps signaling conventionality) with which they are performed.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.x}, Key = {fds351741} } @article{fds366596, Author = {Brandt, S and Verhagen, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German children's productivity with simple transitive and complement-clause constructions: Testing the effects of frequency and variability}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {325-357}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2011.013}, Abstract = {The development of abstract schemas and productive rules in language is affected by both token and type frequencies. High token frequencies and surface similarities help to discover formal and functional commonalities between utterances and categorize them as instances of the same schema. High type frequencies and diversity help to develop slots in these schemas, which allow the production and comprehension of novel utterances. In the current study we looked at both token and type frequencies in two related constructions in German child-directed speech: simple transitive and complement-clause constructions. Both constructions contain high frequency verbs, which potentially support the development of verb-specific schemas. However, only the frequent verbs in the transitive constructions occur with a variety of subject types, which also supports the development of a slot in the subject position. We then used an elicited production task to compare 4- and 5-year-old German-speaking children's productivity with simple transitive constructions and complement-clause constructions. The children were prompted to change the subjects of high and low frequency simple transitive verbs, such as essen 'eat' and naschen 'nibble', mental-state complement-taking verbs, such as denken 'think' and vermuten 'presume', and communication complement-taking verbs, such as sagen 'say' and berichten 'report'. In accordance with earlier findings, children had less difficulty producing new utterances with high frequency transitive verbs than with low frequency transitive verbs. For the other verb classes, however, we found either reverse frequency effects or no frequency effects. For these verb classes, children's productivity can be determined by diversity rather than simple token frequency. We discuss how token frequency interacts with diversity, discourse function, semantic complexity, and syntactic complexity. © 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New York.}, Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2011.013}, Key = {fds366596} } @article{fds351736, Author = {Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Greenberg, JR and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Collaboration encourages equal sharing in children but not in chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Nature}, Volume = {476}, Number = {7360}, Pages = {328-331}, Year = {2011}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature10278}, Abstract = {Humans actively share resources with one another to a much greater degree than do other great apes, and much human sharing is governed by social norms of fairness and equity. When in receipt of a windfall of resources, human children begin showing tendencies towards equitable distribution with others at five to seven years of age. Arguably, however, the primordial situation for human sharing of resources is that which follows cooperative activities such as collaborative foraging, when several individuals must share the spoils of their joint efforts. Here we show that children of around three years of age share with others much more equitably in collaborative activities than they do in either windfall or parallel-work situations. By contrast, one of humans' two nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 'share' (make food available to another individual) just as often whether they have collaborated with them or not. This species difference raises the possibility that humans' tendency to distribute resources equitably may have its evolutionary roots in the sharing of spoils after collaborative efforts.}, Doi = {10.1038/nature10278}, Key = {fds351736} } @article{fds351734, Author = {Mersmann, D and Tomasello, M and Call, J and Kaminski, J and Taborsky, M}, Title = {Simple Mechanisms Can Explain Social Learning in Domestic Dogs (Canis familiaris)}, Journal = {Ethology}, Volume = {117}, Number = {8}, Pages = {675-690}, Year = {2011}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.2011.01919.x}, Abstract = {Recent studies have suggested that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) engage in highly complex forms of social learning. Here, we critically assess the potential mechanisms underlying social learning in dogs using two problem-solving tasks. In a classical detour task, the test dogs benefited from observing a demonstrator walking around a fence to obtain a reward. However, even inexperienced dogs did not show a preference for passing the fence at the same end as the demonstrator. Furthermore, dogs did not need to observe a complete demonstration by a human demonstrator to pass the task. Instead, they were just as successful in solving the problem after seeing a partial demonstration by an object passing by at the end of the fence. In contrast to earlier findings, our results suggest that stimulus enhancement (or affordance learning) might be a powerful social learning mechanism used by dogs to solve such detour problems. In the second task, we examined whether naïve dogs copy actions to solve an instrumental problem. After controlling for stimulus enhancement and other forms of social influence (e.g. social facilitation and observational conditioning), we found that dogs' problem solving was not influenced by witnessing a skilful demonstrator (either an unknown human, a conspecific or the dog's owner). Together, these results add to evidence suggesting that social learning may often be explained by relatively simple (but powerful) mechanisms. © 2011 Blackwell Verlag GmbH.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1439-0310.2011.01919.x}, Key = {fds351734} } @article{fds351735, Author = {Callaghan, T and Moll, H and Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Liszkowski, U and Behne, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Early social cognition in three cultural contexts.}, Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development}, Volume = {76}, Number = {2}, Pages = {vii-142}, Year = {2011}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00603.x}, Abstract = {The influence of culture on cognitive development is well established for school age and older children. But almost nothing is known about how different parenting and socialization practices in different cultures affect infants' and young children's earliest emerging cognitive and social-cognitive skills. In the current monograph, we report a series of eight studies in which we systematically assessed the social-cognitive skills of 1- to 3-year-old children in three diverse cultural settings. One group of children was from a Western, middle-class cultural setting in rural Canada and the other two groups were from traditional, small-scale cultural settings in rural Peru and India.In a first group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's most basic social-cognitive skills for understanding the intentions and attention of others: imitation, helping, gaze following, and communicative pointing.Children's performance in these tasks was mostly similar across cultural settings. In a second group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's skills in participating in interactive episodes of collaboration and joint attention.Again in these studies the general finding was one of cross-cultural similarity. In a final pair of studies, we assessed 2- to 3-year-old children's skills within two symbolic systems (pretense and pictorial). Here we found that the Canadian children who had much more experience with such symbols showed skills at an earlier age.Our overall conclusion is that young children in all cultural settings get sufficient amounts of the right kinds of social experience to develop their most basic social-cognitive skills for interacting with others and participating in culture at around the same age. In contrast, children's acquisition of more culturally specific skills for use in practices involving artifacts and symbols is more dependent on specific learning experiences.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00603.x}, Key = {fds351735} } @article{fds351737, Author = {Stumper, B and Bannard, C and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {"Frequent frames" in German child-directed speech: a limited cue to grammatical categories.}, Journal = {Cognitive science}, Volume = {35}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1190-1205}, Year = {2011}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01187.x}, Abstract = {Mintz (2003) found that in English child-directed speech, frequently occurring frames formed by linking the preceding (A) and succeeding (B) word (A_x_B) could accurately predict the syntactic category of the intervening word (x). This has been successfully extended to French (Chemla, Mintz, Bernal, & Christophe, 2009). In this paper, we show that, as for Dutch (Erkelens, 2009), frequent frames in German do not enable such accurate lexical categorization. This can be explained by the characteristics of German including a less restricted word order compared to English or French and the frequent use of some forms as both determiner and pronoun in colloquial German. Finally, we explore the relationship between the accuracy of frames and their potential utility and find that even some of those frames showing high token-based accuracy are of limited value because they are in fact set phrases with little or no variability in the slot position.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01187.x}, Key = {fds351737} } @article{fds351729, Author = {Pettersson, H and Kaminski, J and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Understanding of human communicative motives in domestic dogs}, Journal = {Applied Animal Behaviour Science}, Volume = {133}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {235-245}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2011.05.008}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees find it easier to locate food when a human prohibits them from going to a certain location than when she indicates that location helpfully. Human children, in contrast, use the cooperative gesture more readily. The question here was whether domestic dogs are more like chimpanzees, in this regard, or more like human children. In our first study we presented 40 dogs with two communicative contexts. In the cooperative context the experimenter informed the subject where food was hidden by pointing helpfully (with a cooperative tone of voice). In the competitive context the experimenter extended her arm towards the correct location in a prohibitive manner, palm of hand out (uttering a forbidding command in a prohibitive tone of voice). Dogs were successful in the cooperative condition (P=0.005) but chose randomly in the competitive condition (P=0.221). The second study independently varied the two characteristics of the communicative gesture (the gesture itself and the tone of voice). In addition to replicating dogs' better performance with the cooperative gestures, this study suggests that tone of voice and context had more effect than type of gesture. In the context of food acquisition, domestic dogs, like human children, seem more prepared to use human gestures when they are given cooperatively. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.applanim.2011.05.008}, Key = {fds351729} } @article{fds351730, Author = {Melis, AP and Schneider, AC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, share food in the same way after collaborative and individual food acquisition}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {82}, Number = {3}, Pages = {485-493}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.05.024}, Abstract = {We investigated the hypothesis that patterns of chimpanzee food sharing are influenced by whether individuals contributed to its acquisition collaboratively. In two experiments we exposed pairs of captive chimpanzees to food acquisition/sharing situations in which we manipulated (1) whether or not the two individuals had worked together collaboratively to retrieve the food and (2) the proximity of the individuals to the food at the moment of retrieval. The first experiment resembled a scramble competition scenario, with nonmonopolizable food. Proximity of individuals to the food when it arrived was the major variable affecting amount obtained by subordinates. Whether or not the food was obtained via collaboration had no effect. The second experiment resembled a contest competition scenario, as the food was a single large piece of fruit that could be more readily monopolized. In this scenario, dominants obtained more food than subordinates, the amount of food obtained by 'noncaptors' was affected by their proximity to the food when it arrived, and again previous collaboration had no effect. These results suggest that in many food acquisition situations first-arriver and first-possessor chimpanzees, as well as dominants in general, have a significant advantage in food acquisition, but being a collaborator brings no extra benefits. © 2011 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.05.024}, Key = {fds351730} } @article{fds351731, Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of markedness in non-verbal communication.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {38}, Number = {4}, Pages = {888-903}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000383}, Abstract = {Speakers often anticipate how recipients will interpret their utterances. If they wish some other, less obvious interpretation, they may 'mark' their utterance (e.g. with special intonations or facial expressions). We investigated whether two- and three-year-olds recognize when adults mark a non-verbal communicative act--in this case a pointing gesture--as special, and so search for a not-so-obvious referent. We set up the context of cleaning up and then pointed to an object. Three-year-olds inferred that the adult intended the pointing gesture to indicate that object, and so cleaned it up. However, when the adult marked her pointing gesture (with exaggerated facial expression) they took the object's hidden contents or a hidden aspect of it as the intended referent. Two-year-olds' appreciation of such marking was less clear-cut. These results demonstrate that markedness is not just a linguistic phenomenon, but rather something concerning the pragmatics of intentional communication more generally.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000383}, Key = {fds351731} } @article{fds351732, Author = {Salomo, D and Graf, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of perceptual availability and discourse context in young children's question answering.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {38}, Number = {4}, Pages = {918-931}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000395}, Abstract = {Three- and four-year-old children were asked predicate-focus questions ('What's X doing?') about a scene in which an agent performed an action on a patient. We varied: (i) whether (or not) the preceding discourse context, which established the patient as given information, was available for the questioner; and (ii) whether (or not) the patient was perceptually available to the questioner when she asked the question. The main finding in our study differs from those of previous studies since it suggests that children are sensitive to the perceptual context at an earlier age than they are to previous discourse context if they need to take the questioner's perspective into account. Our finding indicates that, while children are in principle sensitive to both factors, young children rely on perceptual availability when a conflict arises.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000395}, Key = {fds351732} } @article{fds351733, Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's responses to guilt displays.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {47}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1248-1262}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0024462}, Abstract = {Displaying guilt after a transgression serves to appease the victim and other group members, restore interpersonal relationships, and indicate the transgressors' awareness of and desire to conform to the group's norms. We investigated whether and when young children are sensitive to these functions of guilt displays. In Study 1, after 4- and 5-year-old children watched videos of transgressors either displaying guilt (without explicitly apologizing) or not displaying guilt, 5-year-olds appropriately inferred that the victim would be madder at the unremorseful transgressor and would prefer the remorseful transgressor. They also said that they would prefer to interact with the remorseful transgressor, judged the unremorseful transgressor to be meaner, and, in a distribution of resources task, gave more resources to the remorseful transgressor. The 4-year-olds did not draw any of these inferences and distributed the resources equally. However, Study 2 showed that 4-year-olds were able to draw appropriate inferences about transgressors who explicitly apologized versus those who did not apologize. Thus, 4-year-olds seem to know the appeasement functions that explicit apologies serve but only when children have reached the age of 5 years do they seem to grasp the emotions that apologies stand for, namely, guilt and remorse, and the appeasement functions that displaying these emotions serve.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0024462}, Key = {fds351733} } @article{fds351727, Author = {Rekers, Y and Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children, but not chimpanzees, prefer to collaborate.}, Journal = {Current biology : CB}, Volume = {21}, Number = {20}, Pages = {1756-1758}, Year = {2011}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.066}, Abstract = {Human societies are built on collaborative activities. Already from early childhood, human children are skillful and proficient collaborators. They recognize when they need help in solving a problem and actively recruit collaborators [1, 2]. The societies of other primates are also to some degree cooperative. Chimpanzees, for example, engage in a variety of cooperative activities such as border patrols, group hunting, and intra- and intergroup coalitionary behavior [3-5]. Recent studies have shown that chimpanzees possess many of the cognitive prerequisites necessary for human-like collaboration. Chimpanzees have been shown to recognize when they need help in solving a problem and to actively recruit good over bad collaborators [6, 7]. However, cognitive abilities might not be all that differs between chimpanzees and humans when it comes to cooperation. Another factor might be the motivation to engage in a cooperative activity. Here, we hypothesized that a key difference between human and chimpanzee collaboration-and so potentially a key mechanism in the evolution of human cooperation-is a simple preference for collaborating (versus acting alone) to obtain food. Our results supported this hypothesis, finding that whereas children strongly prefer to work together with another to obtain food, chimpanzees show no such preference.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.066}, Key = {fds351727} } @article{fds351728, Author = {Kaminski, J and Neumann, M and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Dogs, Canis familiaris, communicate with humans to request but not to inform}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {82}, Number = {4}, Pages = {651-658}, Year = {2011}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.06.015}, Abstract = {Dogs are especially skilful at comprehending human communicative signals. This raises the question of whether they are also able to produce such signals flexibly, specifically, whether they helpfully produce indicative ('showing') behaviours to inform an ignorant human. In experiment 1, dogs indicated the location of an object more frequently when it was something they wanted themselves than when it was something the human wanted. There was some suggestion that this might be different when the human was their owner. So in experiment 2 we investigated whether dogs could understand when the owner needed helpful information to find a particular object (out of two) that they needed. They did not. Our findings, therefore, do not support the hypothesis that dogs communicate with humans to inform them of things they do not know. © 2011 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.06.015}, Key = {fds351728} } @article{fds320795, Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Cissewski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A comparison of temperament in nonhuman apes and human infants.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {14}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1393-1405}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x}, Abstract = {The adaptive behavior of primates, including humans, is often mediated by temperament. Human behavior likely differs from that of other primates in part due to temperament. In the current study we compared the reaction of bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human infants to novel objects and people - as a measure of their shyness-boldness, a key temperamental trait. Human children at the age of 2.5 years avoided novelty of all kinds far more than the other ape species. This response was most similar to that seen in bonobos and least like that of chimpanzees and orangutans. This comparison represents a first step in characterizing the temperamental profiles of species in the hominoid clade, and these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that human temperament has evolved since our lineage diverged from the other apes in ways that likely have broad effects on behavior. These findings also provide new insights into how species differences in ecology may shape differences in temperament.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x}, Key = {fds320795} } @article{fds351723, Author = {Bullinger, AF and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, prefer individual over collaborative strategies towards goals}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {82}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1135-1141}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.08.008}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees engage in a number of group activities, but it is still unclear to what extent they prefer mutualistic collaborative strategies over individual strategies to achieve their goals. In one experiment, we gave chimpanzees the choice between pulling a platform to within reach either individually or collaboratively with a tolerant partner, both strategies having equivalent payoffs. Overall, chimpanzees preferred the individual option, and this preference was independent of the type of reward for which they were working (food or tool). In a second experiment, chimpanzees switched to the collaboration option as soon as the payoff was increased for this option. These results suggest that chimpanzees prefer to work alone in foraging-like situations and choose collaboration only if it maximizes their reward. These results thus make a strong case for the hypothesis that differences between humans' and chimpanzees' collaboration are to a great extent due to motivational differences. © 2011 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.08.008}, Key = {fds351723} } @article{fds351724, Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children aged 2 ; 1 use transitive syntax to make a semantic-role interpretation in a pointing task.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {38}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1109-1123}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000747}, Abstract = {The current study used a forced choice pointing paradigm to examine whether English children aged 2 ; 1 can use abstract knowledge of the relationship between word order position and semantic roles to make an active behavioural decision when interpreting active transitive sentences with novel verbs, when the actions are identical in the target and foil video clips. The children pointed significantly above chance with novel verbs but only if the final trial was excluded. With familiar verbs the children pointed consistently above chance. Children aged 2 ; 7 did not show these tiring effects and their performance in the familiar and novel verb conditions was always equivalent.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000747}, Key = {fds351724} } @article{fds351725, Author = {Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Conformity to peer pressure in preschool children.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {82}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1759-1767}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01666.x}, Abstract = {Both adults and adolescents often conform their behavior and opinions to peer groups, even when they themselves know better. The current study investigated this phenomenon in 24 groups of 4 children between 4;2 and 4;9 years of age. Children often made their judgments conform to those of 3 peers, who had made obviously erroneous but unanimous public judgments right before them. A follow-up study with 18 groups of 4 children between 4;0 and 4;6 years of age revealed that children did not change their "real" judgment of the situation, but only their public expression of it. Preschool children are subject to peer pressure, indicating sensitivity to peers as a primary social reference group already during the preschool years.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01666.x}, Key = {fds351725} } @article{fds351726, Author = {Rossano, F and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of violations of property rights.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {121}, Number = {2}, Pages = {219-227}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007}, Abstract = {The present work investigated young children's normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party's object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007}, Key = {fds351726} } @article{fds351722, Author = {Bullinger, AF and Wyman, E and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Coordination of Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a Stag Hunt Game}, Journal = {International Journal of Primatology}, Volume = {32}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1296-1310}, Year = {2011}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10764-011-9546-3}, Abstract = {Group-living animals frequently face situations in which they must coordinate individual and sometimes conflicting goals. We assessed chimpanzees' ability to coordinate in a Stag Hunt game. Dyads were confronted with a situation in which each individual was already foraging on a low-value food (hare) when a high-value food (stag) appeared that required collaboration for retrieval, with a solo attempt to get the stag resulting in a loss of both options. In one condition visibility between partners was open whereas in the other it was blocked by a barrier. Regardless of condition, dyads almost always (91%) coordinated to choose the higher valued collaborative option. Intentional communication or monitoring of the partner's behavior before decision making-characteristic of much human coordination-were limited. Instead, all dyads adopted a leader-follower strategy in which one partner took the risk of going first, presumably predicting that this would induce the other to join in (sometimes communicating if she was slow to do so). These results show that humans' closest primate relatives do not use complex communication to coordinate but most often use a less cognitively complex strategy that achieves the same end. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10764-011-9546-3}, Key = {fds351722} } @article{fds351721, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Methodological challenges in the study of primate cognition}, Journal = {Science}, Volume = {334}, Number = {6060}, Pages = {1227-1228}, Year = {2011}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1213443}, Abstract = {Laboratory studies of primate cognition face the problem that captive populations of a species are not always comparable, and generalizations to natural populations are never certain. Studies of primate cognition in the field face the problem that replications are expensive and difficult, and again different populations are not always comparable. To help remedy these problems, we recommend the creation of data banks where primary data and videotapes may be deposited (perhaps as a requirement of publication) to facilitate cross-examination, replication, and, eventually, the pooling of data across investigators.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.1213443}, Key = {fds351721} } @article{fds351711, Author = {Nitzschner, M and Melis, AP and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Dogs (Canis familiaris) evaluate humans on the basis of direct experiences only.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {7}, Number = {10}, Pages = {e46880}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0046880}, Abstract = {Reputation formation is a key component in the social interactions of many animal species. An evaluation of reputation is drawn from two principal sources: direct experience of an individual and indirect experience from observing that individual interacting with a third party. In the current study we investigated whether dogs use direct and/or indirect experience to choose between two human interactants. In the first experiment, subjects had direct interaction either with a "nice" human (who played with, talked to and stroked the dog) or with an "ignoring" experimenter who ignored the dog completely. Results showed that the dogs stayed longer close to the "nice" human. In a second experiment the dogs observed a "nice" or "ignoring" human interacting with another dog. This indirect experience, however, did not lead to a preference between the two humans. These results suggest that the dogs in our study evaluated humans solely on the basis of direct experience.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0046880}, Key = {fds351711} } @article{fds351712, Author = {Bannard, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Can we dissociate contingency learning from social learning in word acquisition by 24-month-olds?}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {7}, Number = {11}, Pages = {e49881}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049881}, Abstract = {We compared 24-month-old children's learning when their exposure to words came either in an interactive (coupled) context or in a nonsocial (decoupled) context. We measured the children's learning with two different methods: one in which they were asked to point to the referent for the experimenter, and the other a preferential looking task in which they were encouraged to look to the referent. In the pointing test, children chose the correct referents for words encountered in the coupled condition but not in the decoupled condition. In the looking time test, however, they looked to the targets regardless of condition. We explore the explanations for this and propose that the different response measures are reflecting two different kinds of learning.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0049881}, Key = {fds351712} } @article{fds351713, Author = {Rossano, F and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {One-year-old infants follow others' voice direction.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {23}, Number = {11}, Pages = {1298-1302}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612450032}, Abstract = {We investigated 1-year-old infants' ability to infer an adult's focus of attention solely on the basis of her voice direction. In Studies 1 and 2, 12- and 16-month-olds watched an adult go behind a barrier and then heard her verbally express excitement about a toy hidden in one of two boxes at either end of the barrier. Even though they could not see the adult, infants of both ages followed her voice direction to the box containing the toy. Study 2 showed that infants could do this even when the adult was positioned closer to the incorrect box while she vocalized toward the correct one (and thus ruled out the possibility that infants were merely approaching the source of the sound). In Study 3, using the same methods as in Study 2, we found that chimpanzees performed the task at chance level. Our results show that infants can determine the focus of another person's attention through auditory information alone-a useful skill for establishing joint attention.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797612450032}, Key = {fds351713} } @article{fds351714, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Five-year olds, but not chimpanzees, attempt to manage their reputations.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {7}, Number = {10}, Pages = {e48433}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048433}, Abstract = {Virtually all theories of the evolution of cooperation require that cooperators find ways to interact with one another selectively, to the exclusion of cheaters. This means that individuals must make reputational judgments about others as cooperators, based on either direct or indirect evidence. Humans, and possibly other species, add another component to the process: they know that they are being judged by others, and so they adjust their behavior in order to affect those judgments - so-called impression management. Here, we show for the first time that already preschool children engage in such behavior. In an experimental study, 5-year-old human children share more and steal less when they are being watched by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same whether they are being watched by a groupmate or not. This species difference suggests that humans' concern for their own self-reputation, and their tendency to manage the impression they are making on others, may be unique to humans among primates.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0048433}, Key = {fds351714} } @article{fds351715, Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Untrained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) fail to imitate novel actions.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {7}, Number = {8}, Pages = {e41548}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0041548}, Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>Social learning research in apes has focused on social learning in the technical (problem solving) domain - an approach that confounds action and physical information. Successful subjects in such studies may have been able to perform target actions not as a result of imitation learning but because they had learnt some technical aspect, for example, copying the movements of an apparatus (i.e., different forms of emulation learning).<h4>Methods</h4>Here we present data on action copying by non-enculturated and untrained chimpanzees when physical information is removed from demonstrations. To date, only one such study (on gesture copying in a begging context) has been conducted--with negative results. Here we have improved this methodology and have also added non-begging test situations (a possible confound of the earlier study). Both familiar and novel actions were used as targets. Prior to testing, a trained conspecific demonstrator was rewarded for performing target actions in view of observers. All but one of the tested chimpanzees already failed to copy familiar actions. When retested with a novel target action, also the previously successful subject failed to copy--and he did so across several contexts.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Chimpanzees do not seem to copy novel actions, and only some ever copy familiar ones. Due to our having tested only non-enculturated and untrained chimpanzees, the performance of our test subjects speak more than most other studies of the general (dis-)ability of chimpanzees to copy actions, and especially novel actions.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0041548}, Key = {fds351715} } @article{fds351716, Author = {Kirchhofer, KC and Zimmermann, F and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Dogs (Canis familiaris), but not chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), understand imperative pointing.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {7}, Number = {2}, Pages = {e30913}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030913}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees routinely follow the gaze of humans to outside targets. However, in most studies using object choice they fail to use communicative gestures (e.g. pointing) to find hidden food. Chimpanzees' failure to do this may be due to several difficulties with this paradigm. They may, for example, misinterpret the gesture as referring to the opaque cup instead of the hidden food. Or perhaps they do not understand informative communicative intentions. In contrast, dogs seem to be skilful in using human communicative cues in the context of finding food, but as of yet there is not much data showing whether they also use pointing in the context of finding non-food objects. Here we directly compare chimpanzees' (N = 20) and dogs' (N = 32) skills in using a communicative gesture directed at a visible object out of reach of the human but within reach of the subject. Pairs of objects were placed in view of and behind the subjects. The task was to retrieve the object the experimenter wanted. To indicate which one she desired, the experimenter pointed imperatively to it and directly rewarded the subject for handing over the correct one. While dogs performed well on this task, chimpanzees failed to identify the referent. Implications for great apes' and dogs' understanding of human communicative intentions are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0030913}, Key = {fds351716} } @article{fds351717, Author = {Tomasello, M and Hamann, K}, Title = {Collaboration in young children.}, Journal = {Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)}, Volume = {65}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-12}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2011.608853}, Abstract = {Humans accomplish much of what they do in collaboration with others. In ontogeny, children's earliest abilities to collaborate develop in two basic steps. First, 1- and 2-year-olds learn to form with others joint goals and joint attention--which include an understanding of the individual roles and perspectives involved. Second, as they approach their third birthdays, children's collaborative interactions with others take on a more normative dimension involving obligations to the partner. In addition, their cognitive abilities to conceptualize simultaneously both their own role and perspective along with those of the other develop considerably as well. This form of collaborative interaction is underlain by species-unique skills and motivations for shared intentionality that make possible, ultimately, such things as complex cultural institutions.}, Doi = {10.1080/17470218.2011.608853}, Key = {fds351717} } @article{fds351718, Author = {Warneken, F and Gräfenhain, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Collaborative partner or social tool? New evidence for young children's understanding of joint intentions in collaborative activities.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {15}, Number = {1}, Pages = {54-61}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01107.x}, Abstract = {Some children's social activities are structured by joint goals. In previous research, the criterion used to determine this was relatively weak: if the partner stopped interacting, did the child attempt to re-engage her? But re-engagement attempts could easily result from the child simply realizing that she needs the partner to reach her own goal in the activity (social tool explanation). In two experiments, 21- and 27-month-old children interacted with an adult in games in which they either did or did not physically need the partner to reach a concrete goal. Moreover, when the partner stopped interacting, she did so because she was either unwilling to continue (breaking off from the joint goal) or unable to continue (presumably still maintaining the joint goal). Children of both age groups encouraged the recalcitrant partner equally often whether she was or was not physically needed for goal attainment. In addition, they did so more often when the partner was unable to continue than when she was unwilling to continue. These findings suggest that young children do not just view their collaborative partners as mindless social tools, but rather as intentional, cooperative agents with whom they must coordinate intentional states.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01107.x}, Key = {fds351718} } @article{fds351719, Author = {Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's developing commitments to joint goals.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {83}, Number = {1}, Pages = {137-145}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01695.x}, Abstract = {This study investigated young children's commitment to a joint goal by assessing whether peers in collaborative activities continue to collaborate until all received their rewards. Forty-eight 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children worked on an apparatus dyadically. One child got access to her reward early. For the partner to benefit as well, this child had to continue to collaborate even though there was no further reward available to her. The study found that 3.5-year-olds, but not 2.5-year-olds, eagerly assisted their unlucky partner. They did this less readily in a noncollaborative control condition. A second study confirmed that 2.5-year-old children understood the task structure. These results suggest that children begin to appreciate the normative dimensions of collaborative activities during the 3rd year of life.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01695.x}, Key = {fds351719} } @article{fds351720, Author = {Grosse, G and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-old children differentiate test questions from genuine questions.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {39}, Number = {1}, Pages = {192-204}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000760}, Abstract = {Children are frequently confronted with so-called 'test questions'. While genuine questions are requests for missing information, test questions ask for information obviously already known to the questioner. In this study we explored whether two-year-old children respond differentially to one and the same question used as either a genuine question or as a test question based on the situation (playful game versus serious task) and attitude (playful ostensive cues versus not). Results indicated that children responded to questions differently on the basis of the situation but not the expressed attitude of the questioner. Two-year-old children thus understand something of the very special communicative intentions behind test questions.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000760}, Key = {fds351720} } @article{fds351709, Author = {Theakston, AL and Maslen, R and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The acquisition of the active transitive construction in English: A detailed case study}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {23}, Number = {1}, Pages = {91-128}, Year = {2012}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cog-2012-0004}, Abstract = {In this study, we test a number of predictions concerning children's knowledge of the transitive Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) construction between two and three years on one child (Thomas) for whom we have densely collected data. The data show that the earliest SVO utterances reflect earlier use of those same verbs, and that verbs acquired before 2;7 show an earlier move towards adultlike levels of use in the SVO construction and in object argument complexity than later acquired verbs. There is not a close relation with the input in the types of subject and object referents used, nor a close adherence to Preferred Argument Structure (PAS) before 2;7, but both early and late acquired verbs show a simultaneous move towards PAS patterns in selection of referent type at 2;9. The event semantics underpinning early transitive utterances do not straightforwardly fit prototype (high or inalienable) notions of transitivity, but rather may reflect sensitivity to animacy and intentionality in a way that mirrors the input. We conclude that children's knowledge of the transitive construction continues to undergo significant development between 2;0 and 3;0, reflecting the gradual abstraction and integration of the SVO and VO constructions, verb semantics, discourse pragmatics, and the interactions between these factors. These factors are considered in the context of a prototype for the transitive construction. © Walter de Gruyter.}, Doi = {10.1515/cog-2012-0004}, Key = {fds351709} } @article{fds351708, Author = {Kaminski, J and Schulz, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How dogs know when communication is intended for them.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {15}, Number = {2}, Pages = {222-232}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01120.x}, Abstract = {Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication in a way that other animal species do not. But little is known about the specific cues they use to determine when human communication is intended for them. In a series of four studies, we confronted both adult dogs and young dog puppies with object choice tasks in which a human indicated one of two opaque cups by either pointing to it or gazing at it. We varied whether the communicator made eye contact with the dog in association with the gesture (or whether her back was turned or her eyes were directed at another recipient) and whether the communicator called the dog's name (or the name of another recipient). Results demonstrated the importance of eye contact in human-dog communication, and, to a lesser extent, the calling of the dog's name--with no difference between adult dogs and young puppies--which are precisely the communicative cues used by human infants for identifying communicative intent. Unlike human children, however, dogs did not seem to comprehend the human's communicative gesture when it was directed to another human, perhaps because dogs view all human communicative acts as directives for the recipient.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01120.x}, Key = {fds351708} } @article{fds351703, Author = {Haun, DBM and Rekers, Y and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Majority-biased transmission in chimpanzees and human children, but not orangutans.}, Journal = {Current biology : CB}, Volume = {22}, Number = {8}, Pages = {727-731}, Year = {2012}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006}, Abstract = {Cultural transmission is a key component of human evolution. Two of humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, have also been argued to transmit behavioral traditions across generations culturally [1-3], but how much the process might resemble the human process is still in large part unknown. One key phenomenon of human cultural transmission is majority-biased transmission: the increased likelihood for learners to end up not with the most frequent behavior but rather with the behavior demonstrated by most individuals. Here we show that chimpanzees and human children as young as 2 years of age, but not orangutans, are more likely to copy an action performed by three individuals, once each, than an action performed by one individual three times. The tendency to acquire the behaviors of the majority has been posited as key to the transmission of relatively safe, reliable, and productive behavioral strategies [4-7] but has not previously been demonstrated in primates.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006}, Key = {fds351703} } @article{fds351704, Author = {Fletcher, GE and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in cognitive processes underlying the collaborative activities of children and chimpanzees}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {27}, Number = {2}, Pages = {136-153}, Year = {2012}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.02.003}, Abstract = {We compared the performance of 3- and 5-year-old children with that of chimpanzees in two tasks requiring collaboration via complementary roles. In both tasks, children and chimpanzees were able to coordinate two complementary roles with peers and solve the problem cooperatively. This is the first experimental demonstration of the coordination of complementary roles in chimpanzees. In the second task, neither species was skillful at waiting for a partner to be positioned appropriately before beginning (although children did hesitate significantly longer when the partner was absent). The main difference between species in both tasks was in children's, but not chimpanzees', ability to profit from experience as a collaborator in one role when later reversing roles. This difference suggests that as they participate in a collaboration, young children integrate both roles into a single " birds-eye-view" representational format in a way that chimpanzees do not. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.02.003}, Key = {fds351704} } @article{fds351705, Author = {Matthews, D and Butcher, J and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two- and four-year-olds learn to adapt referring expressions to context: effects of distracters and feedback on referential communication.}, Journal = {Topics in cognitive science}, Volume = {4}, Number = {2}, Pages = {184-210}, Year = {2012}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01181.x}, Abstract = {Children often refer to things ambiguously but learn not to from responding to clarification requests. We review and explore this learning process here. In Study 1, eighty-four 2- and 4-year-olds were tested for their ability to request stickers from either (a) a small array with one dissimilar distracter or (b) a large array containing similar distracters. When children made ambiguous requests, they received either general feedback or specific questions about which of two options they wanted. With training, children learned to produce more complex object descriptions and did so faster in the specific feedback condition. They also tended to provide more information when requesting stickers from large arrays. In Study 2, we varied only distracter similarity during training and then varied array size in a generalization test. Children found it harder to learn in this case. In the generalization test, 4-year-olds were more likely to provide information (a) when it was needed because distracters were similar to the target and (b) when the array size was greater (regardless of need for information). We discuss how clear cues to potential ambiguity are needed for children to learn to tailor their referring expression to context and how several cues of heuristic value (e.g., more distracters > say more) can promote the efficiency of communication while language is developing. Finally, we consider whether it would be worthwhile drawing on the human learning process when developing algorithms for the production of referring expressions.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01181.x}, Key = {fds351705} } @article{fds351701, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not about the same object at the same time.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {48}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1124-1132}, Year = {2012}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025915}, Abstract = {Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus "the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object (e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really was by selecting one of two items that represented this object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic theory of mind tasks.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0025915}, Key = {fds351701} } @article{fds351702, Author = {Grassmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How two word-trained dogs integrate pointing and naming.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {15}, Number = {4}, Pages = {657-665}, Year = {2012}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0494-x}, Abstract = {Two word-trained dogs were presented with acts of reference in which a human pointed, named objects, or simultaneously did both. The question was whether these dogs would assume co-reference of pointing and naming and thus pick the pointed-to object. Results show that the dogs did indeed assume co-reference of pointing and naming in order to determine the reference of a spoken word, but they did so only when pointing was not in conflict with their previous word knowledge. When pointing and a spoken word conflicted, the dogs preferentially fetched the object by name. This is not surprising since they are trained to fetch objects by name. However, interestingly, in these conflict conditions, the dogs fetched the named objects only after they had initially approached the pointed-to object. We suggest that this shows that the word-trained dogs interpret pointing as a spatial directive, which they integrate into the fetching game, presumably assuming that pointing is relevant to finding the requested object.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0494-x}, Key = {fds351702} } @article{fds351699, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children Enforce Social Norms}, Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science}, Volume = {21}, Number = {4}, Pages = {232-236}, Year = {2012}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721412448659}, Abstract = {Social norms have played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation, serving to stabilize prosocial and egalitarian behavior despite the self-serving motives of individuals. Young children's behavior mostly conforms to social norms, as they follow adult behavioral directives and instructions. But it turns out that even preschool children also actively enforce social norms on others, often using generic normative language to do so. This behavior is not easily explained by individualistic motives; it is more likely a result of children's growing identification with their cultural group, which leads to prosocial motives for preserving its ways of doing things. © The Author(s) 2012.}, Doi = {10.1177/0963721412448659}, Key = {fds351699} } @article{fds351700, Author = {Gampe, A and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Eighteen-month-olds learn novel words through overhearing}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {32}, Number = {3}, Pages = {385-397}, Year = {2012}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723711433584}, Abstract = {The prototypical word learning situation in western, middle-class cultures is dyadic: an adult addresses a child directly, ideally in a manner sensitive to their current focus of attention. But young children also seem to learn many of their words in polyadic situations through overhearing. Extending the previous work of Akhtar and colleagues, in the current two studies we gave 18-month-old infants opportunities to acquire novel words through overhearing in situations that were a bit more complex: they did not socially interact with the adult who used the new word before the word learning situation began, and the way the adult used the new word was less transparent in that it was neither a naming nor a directive speech act. In both studies, infants learned words equally well (and above chance) whether they were directly addressed or had to eavesdrop on two adults. Almost from the beginning, young children employ diverse learning strategies for acquiring new words. © 2011 The Author(s).}, Doi = {10.1177/0142723711433584}, Key = {fds351700} } @article{fds351694, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children are intrinsically motivated to see others helped.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {23}, Number = {9}, Pages = {967-972}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612440571}, Abstract = {Young children help other people, but it is not clear why. In the current study, we found that 2-year-old children's sympathetic arousal, as measured by relative changes in pupil dilation, is similar when they themselves help a person and when they see that person being helped by a third party (and sympathetic arousal in both cases is different from that when the person is not being helped at all). These results demonstrate that the intrinsic motivation for young children's helping behavior does not require that they perform the behavior themselves and thus "get credit" for it, but rather requires only that the other person be helped. Thus, from an early age, humans seem to have genuine concern for the welfare of others.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797612440571}, Key = {fds351694} } @article{fds351695, Author = {Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {No third-party punishment in chimpanzees.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {109}, Number = {37}, Pages = {14824-14829}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1203179109}, Abstract = {Punishment can help maintain cooperation by deterring free-riding and cheating. Of particular importance in large-scale human societies is third-party punishment in which individuals punish a transgressor or norm violator even when they themselves are not affected. Nonhuman primates and other animals aggress against conspecifics with some regularity, but it is unclear whether this is ever aimed at punishing others for noncooperation, and whether third-party punishment occurs at all. Here we report an experimental study in which one of humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), could punish an individual who stole food. Dominants retaliated when their own food was stolen, but they did not punish when the food of third-parties was stolen, even when the victim was related to them. Third-party punishment as a means of enforcing cooperation, as humans do, might therefore be a derived trait in the human lineage.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1203179109}, Key = {fds351695} } @article{fds351696, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator's group affiliation.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {124}, Number = {3}, Pages = {325-333}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.004}, Abstract = {To become cooperative members of their cultural groups, developing children must follow their group's social norms. But young children are not just blind norm followers, they are also active norm enforcers, for example, protesting and correcting when someone plays a conventional game the "wrong" way. In two studies, we asked whether young children enforce social norms on all people equally, or only on ingroup members who presumably know and respect the norm. We looked at both moral norms involving harm and conventional game norms involving rule violations. Three-year-old children actively protested violation of moral norms equally for ingroup and outgroup individuals, but they enforced conventional game norms for ingroup members only. Despite their ingroup favoritism, young children nevertheless hold ingroup members to standards whose violation they tolerate from outsiders.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.004}, Key = {fds351696} } @article{fds351697, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Semantics of the transitive construction: prototype effects and developmental comparisons.}, Journal = {Cognitive science}, Volume = {36}, Number = {7}, Pages = {1268-1288}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01249.x}, Abstract = {This paper investigates whether an abstract linguistic construction shows the kind of prototype effects characteristic of non-linguistic categories, in both adults and young children. Adapting the prototype-plus-distortion methodology of Franks and Bransford (1971), we found that whereas adults were lured toward false-positive recognition of sentences with prototypical transitive semantics, young children showed no such effect. We examined two main implications of the results. First, it adds a novel data point to a growing body of research in cognitive linguistics and construction grammar that shows abstract linguistic categories can behave in similar ways to non-linguistic categories, for example, by showing graded membership of a category. Thus, the findings lend psychological validity to the existing cross-linguistic evidence for prototypical transitive semantics. Second, we discuss a possible explanation for the fact that prototypical sentences were processed differently in adults and children, namely, that children's transitive semantic network is not as interconnected or cognitively coherent as adults'.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01249.x}, Key = {fds351697} } @article{fds351698, Author = {Behne, T and Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Twelve-month-olds' comprehension and production of pointing.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {30}, Number = {Pt 3}, Pages = {359-375}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02043.x}, Abstract = {This study explored whether infants aged 12 months already recognize the communicative function of pointing gestures. Infants participated in a task requiring them to comprehend an adult's informative pointing gesture to the location of a hidden toy. They mostly succeeded in this task, which required them to infer that the adult was attempting to direct their attention to a location for a reason - because she wanted them to know that a toy was hidden there. Many of the infants also reversed roles and produced appropriate pointing gestures for the adult in this same game, and indeed there was a correlation such that comprehenders were for the most part producers. These findings indicate that by 12 months of age infants are beginning to show a bidirectional understanding of communicative pointing.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02043.x}, Key = {fds351698} } @article{fds351690, Author = {Matthews, D and Behne, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Origins of the human pointing gesture: a training study.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {15}, Number = {6}, Pages = {817-829}, Year = {2012}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01181.x}, Abstract = {Despite its importance in the development of children's skills of social cognition and communication, very little is known about the ontogenetic origins of the pointing gesture. We report a training study in which mothers gave children one month of extra daily experience with pointing as compared with a control group who had extra experience with musical activities. One hundred and two infants of 9, 10, or 11 months of age were seen at the beginning, middle, and end of this one-month period and tested for declarative pointing and gaze following. Infants'ability to point with the index finger at the end of the study was not affected by the training but was instead predicted by infants' prior ability to follow the gaze direction of an adult. The frequency with which infants pointed indexically was also affected by infant gaze following ability and, in addition, by maternal pointing frequency in free play, but not by training. In contrast, infants' ability to monitor their partner's gaze when pointing, and the frequency with which they did so, was affected by both training and maternal pointing frequency in free play. These results suggest that prior social cognitive advances, rather than adult socialization of pointing per se, determine the developmental onset of indexical pointing, but socialization processes such as imitation and adult shaping subsequently affect both infants' ability to monitor their interlocutor's gaze while they point and how frequently infants choose to point.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01181.x}, Key = {fds351690} } @article{fds351691, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Schütte, S and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes infer others' goals based on context.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {15}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1037-1053}, Year = {2012}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0528-4}, Abstract = {In previous studies claiming to demonstrate that great apes understand the goals of others, the apes could potentially have been using subtle behavioral cues present during the test to succeed. In the current studies, we ruled out the use of such cues by making the behavior of the experimenter identical in the test phase of both the experimental and control conditions; the only difference was the preceding "context." In the first study, apes interpreted a human's ambiguous action as having the underlying goal of opening a box, or not, based on that human's previous actions with similar boxes. In the second study, chimpanzees learned that when a human stood up she was going to go get food for them, but when a novel, unexpected event happened, they changed their expectation-presumably based on their understanding that this new event led the human to change her goal. These studies suggest that great apes do not need concurrent behavioral cues to infer others' goals, but can do so from a variety of different types of cues-even cues displaced in time.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0528-4}, Key = {fds351691} } @article{fds351686, Author = {Tomasello, M and Melis, AP and Tennie, C and Wyman, E and Herrmann, E}, Title = {Two key steps in the evolution of human cooperation: The interdependence Hypothesis}, Journal = {Current Anthropology}, Volume = {53}, Number = {6}, Pages = {673-692}, Year = {2012}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/668207}, Abstract = {Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans' species-unique forms of cooperation-as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life-all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent. © 2012 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1086/668207}, Key = {fds351686} } @article{fds351687, Author = {Kaiser, I and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Theft in an ultimatum game: chimpanzees and bonobos are insensitive to unfairness.}, Journal = {Biology letters}, Volume = {8}, Number = {6}, Pages = {942-945}, Year = {2012}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2012.0519}, Abstract = {Humans, but not chimpanzees, punish unfair offers in ultimatum games, suggesting that fairness concerns evolved sometime after the split between the lineages that gave rise to Homo and Pan. However, nothing is known about fairness concerns in the other Pan species, bonobos. Furthermore, apes do not typically offer food to others, but they do react against theft. We presented a novel game, the ultimatum theft game, to both of our closest living relatives. Bonobos and chimpanzee 'proposers' consistently stole food from the responders' portions, but the responders did not reject any non-zero offer. These results support the interpretation that the human sense of fairness is a derived trait.}, Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2012.0519}, Key = {fds351687} } @article{fds351688, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Why be nice? Better not think about it.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {16}, Number = {12}, Pages = {580-581}, Year = {2012}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.006}, Abstract = {Are people more likely to be cooperative if they must act quickly or if they have more time to mull it over? The results of a recent series of studies suggest that peoples' initial impulse is to cooperate, but that with more time and reflection they become more selfish.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.006}, Key = {fds351688} } @article{fds351689, Author = {Schneider, A-C and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How chimpanzees solve collective action problems.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {279}, Number = {1749}, Pages = {4946-4954}, Year = {2012}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1948}, Abstract = {We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2012.1948}, Key = {fds351689} } @article{fds321687, Author = {Tomasello, M and Vaish, A}, Title = {Origins of human cooperation and morality}, Journal = {Annual Review of Psychology}, Volume = {64}, Number = {1}, Pages = {231-255}, Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812}, Abstract = {From an evolutionary perspective, morality is a form of cooperation. Cooperation requires individuals either to suppress their own self-interest or to equate it with that of others. We review recent research on the origins of human morality, both phylogenetic (research with apes) and ontogenetic (research with children). For both time frames we propose a two-step sequence: first a second-personal morality in which individuals are sympathetic or fair to particular others, and second an agent-neutral morality in which individuals follow and enforce group-wide social norms. Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating with others, and the ontogeny of these skills and motives unfolds in part naturally and in part as a result of sociocultural contexts and interactions. © 2013 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812}, Key = {fds321687} } @article{fds351682, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A New Look at Children's Prosocial Motivation}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {18}, Number = {1}, Pages = {67-90}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00130.x}, Abstract = {Young children routinely behave prosocially, but what is their motivation for doing so? Here, we review three studies which show that young children (1) are intrinsically motivated rather than motivated by extrinsic rewards; (2) are more inclined to help those for whom they feel sympathy; and (3) are not so much motivated to provide help themselves as to see the person helped (as can be seen in changes of their sympathetic arousal, as measured by pupil dilation, in different circumstances). Young children's prosocial behavior is thus intrinsically motivated by a concern for others' welfare, which has its evolutionary roots in a concern for the well-being of those with whom one is interdependent. © International Society on Infant Studies (ISIS).}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00130.x}, Key = {fds351682} } @article{fds351683, Author = {Bullinger, AF and Burkart, JM and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Bonobos, Pan paniscus, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, prefer to feed alone}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {85}, Number = {1}, Pages = {51-60}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.10.006}, Abstract = {Many primates share food, but the motives behind this food sharing are mostly not known. We investigated individuals' preference to feed either alone or together with a tolerant partner. Subjects (chimpanzees who are highly competitive around food, bonobos who are more tolerant around food and common marmosets who are cooperative breeders and share food actively with some partners) were tested with a door-opening paradigm. In a 2 × 2 design with the factors 'food' and 'partner', subjects had the opportunity to eat piles of sharable food, if present, and/or to open the door, thereby allowing the partner, if present, to join the subject. While food had a main effect on the subject's behaviour, the presence of the partner did not. Individuals of all species opened the door much more often if there was no food available. These results suggest that regardless of their differing social organizations, chimpanzees, bonobos and marmosets do not voluntarily co-feed, but do not mind having company if there is no food present. © 2012 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.10.006}, Key = {fds351683} } @article{fds351684, Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-year-olds' understanding of the consequences of joint commitments.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {8}, Number = {9}, Pages = {e73039}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0073039}, Abstract = {Here we investigate the extent of children's understanding of the joint commitments inherent in joint activities. Three-year-old children either made a joint commitment to assemble a puzzle with a puppet partner, or else the child and puppet each assembled their own puzzle. Afterwards, children who had made the joint commitment were more likely to stop and wait for their partner on their way to fetch something, more likely to spontaneously help their partner when needed, and more likely to take over their partner's role when necessary. There was no clear difference in children's tendency to tattle on their partner's cheating behavior or their tendency to distribute rewards equally at the end. It thus appears that by 3 years of age making a joint commitment to act together with others is beginning to engender in children a "we"-intentionality which holds across at least most of the process of the joint activity until the shared goal is achieved, and which withstands at least some of the perturbations to the joint activity children experience.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0073039}, Key = {fds351684} } @article{fds351685, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Can domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use referential emotional expressions to locate hidden food?}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {1}, Pages = {137-145}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0560-4}, Abstract = {Although many studies have investigated domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) use of human communicative cues, little is known about their use of humans' emotional expressions. We conducted a study following the general paradigm of Repacholi in Dev Psychol 34:1017-1025, (1998) and tested four breeds of dogs in the laboratory and another breed in the open air. In our study, a human reacted emotionally (happy, neutral or disgust) to the hidden contents of two boxes, after which the dog was then allowed to choose one of the boxes. Dogs tested in the laboratory distinguished between the most distinct of the expressed emotions (Happy-Disgust condition) by choosing appropriately, but performed at chance level when the two emotions were less distinct (Happy-Neutral condition). The breed tested in the open air passed both conditions, but this breed's differing testing setup might have been responsible for their success. Although without meaningful emotional expressions, when given a choice, these subjects chose randomly, their performance did not differ from that in the experimental conditions. Based on the findings revealed in the laboratory, we suggest that some domestic dogs recognize both the directedness and the valence of some human emotional expressions.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0560-4}, Key = {fds351685} } @article{fds320794, Author = {Herrmann, E and Keupp, S and Hare, B and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Direct and indirect reputation formation in nonhuman great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {127}, Number = {1}, Pages = {63-75}, Year = {2013}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028929}, Abstract = {Humans make decisions about when and with whom to cooperate based on their reputations. People either learn about others by direct interaction or by observing third-party interactions or gossip. An important question is whether other animal species, especially our closest living relatives, the nonhuman great apes, also form reputations of others. In Study 1, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human children experienced a nice experimenter who tried to give food/toys to the subject and a mean experimenter who interrupted the food/toy giving. In studies 2 and 3, nonhuman great apes and human children could only passively observe a similar interaction, in which a nice experimenter and a mean experimenter interacted with a third party. Orangutans and 2.5-year-old human children preferred to approach the nice experimenter rather than the mean one after having directly experienced their respective behaviors. Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human children also took into account experimenter actions toward third parties in forming reputations. These studies show that the human ability to form direct and indirect reputation judgment is already present in young children and shared with at least some of the other great apes.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0028929}, Key = {fds320794} } @article{fds351679, Author = {Melis, AP and Altrichter, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Allocation of resources to collaborators and free-riders in 3-year-olds.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {114}, Number = {2}, Pages = {364-370}, Year = {2013}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2012.08.006}, Abstract = {Recent studies have shown that in situations where resources have been acquired collaboratively, children at around 3 years of age share mostly equally. We investigated 3-year-olds' sharing behavior with a collaborating partner and a free-riding partner who explicitly expressed her preference not to collaborate. Children shared more equally with the collaborating partner than with the free rider. These results suggest that young children are sensitive to the contributions made by others to a collaborative effort (and possibly their reasons for not collaborating) and distribute resources accordingly.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2012.08.006}, Key = {fds351679} } @article{fds351680, Author = {Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees predict that a competitor's preference will match their own.}, Journal = {Biology letters}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {20120829}, Year = {2013}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2012.0829}, Abstract = {The ability to predict how another individual will behave is useful in social competition. Chimpanzees can predict the behaviour of another based on what they observe her to see, hear, know and infer. Here we show that chimpanzees act on the assumption that others have preferences that match their own. All subjects began with a preference for a box with a picture of food over one with a picture of nothing, even though the pictures had no causal relation to the contents. In a back-and-forth food competition, chimpanzees then avoided the box with the picture of food when their competitor had chosen one of the boxes before them-presumably on the assumption that the competitor shared their own preference for it and had already chosen it. Chimpanzees predicted that their competitor's preference would match their own and adjusted their behavioural strategies accordingly.}, Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2012.0829}, Key = {fds351680} } @article{fds351676, Author = {Bräuer, J and Bös, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) coordinate their actions in a problem-solving task.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {2}, Pages = {273-285}, Year = {2013}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0571-1}, Abstract = {Cooperative hunting is a cognitively challenging activity since individuals have to coordinate movements with a partner and at the same time react to the prey. Domestic dogs evolved from wolves, who engage in cooperative hunting regularly, but it is not clear whether dogs have kept their cooperative hunting skills. We presented pairs of dogs with a reward behind a fence with two openings in it. A sliding door operated by the experimenter could block one opening but not both simultaneously. The dogs needed to coordinate their actions, so that each was in front of a different opening, if one of them was to cross through and get food. All 24 dog pairs solved the problem. In study 1, we demonstrated that dogs understood how the apparatus worked. In study 2, we found that, although the performance of the pairs did not depend on the divisibility of the reward, pairs were quicker at coordinating their actions when both anticipated rewards. However, the dogs did not monitor one another, suggesting that their solutions were achieved by each individual attempting to maximize for itself.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0571-1}, Key = {fds351676} } @article{fds351677, Author = {Salomo, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's ability to answer different types of questions.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {40}, Number = {2}, Pages = {469-491}, Year = {2013}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000912000050}, Abstract = {Young children answer many questions every day. The extent to which they do this in an adult-like way - following Grice's Maxim of Quantity by providing the requested information, no more no less - has been studied very little. In an experiment, we found that two-, three- and four-year-old children are quite skilled at answering argument-focus questions and predicate-focus questions with intransitives in which their response requires only a single element. But predicate-focus questions for transitives - requiring both the predicate and the direct object - are difficult for children below four years of age. Even more difficult for children this young are sentence-focus questions such as "What's happening?", which give the child no anchor in given information around which to structure their answer. In addition, in a corpus study, we found that parents ask their children predicate-focus and sentence-focus questions very infrequently, thus giving children little experience with them.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000912000050}, Key = {fds351677} } @article{fds351678, Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of cultural common ground.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {31}, Number = {Pt 1}, Pages = {88-96}, Year = {2013}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.2012.02080.x}, Abstract = {Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3- and 5-year-old children to a culturally well-known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, 'What is that?', either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3- and 5-year-olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5-year-olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well-known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.2012.02080.x}, Key = {fds351678} } @article{fds351674, Author = {Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) strategic helping in a collaborative task.}, Journal = {Biology letters}, Volume = {9}, Number = {2}, Pages = {20130009}, Year = {2013}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2013.0009}, Abstract = {Many animal species cooperate, but the underlying proximate mechanisms are often unclear. We presented chimpanzees with a mutualistic collaborative food-retrieval task requiring complementary roles, and tested subjects' ability to help their partner perform her role. For each role, subjects required a different tool, and the tools were not interchangeable. We gave one individual in each dyad both tools, and measured subjects' willingness to transfer a tool to their partner as well as which tool (correct versus incorrect) they transferred. Most subjects helped their partner and transferred the tool the partner needed. Thus, chimpanzees not only coordinate different roles, but they also know which particular action the partner needs to perform. These results add to previous findings suggesting that many of chimpanzees' limitations in collaboration are, perhaps, more motivational than cognitive.}, Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2013.0009}, Key = {fds351674} } @article{fds351675, Author = {Moll, H and Meltzoff, AN and Merzsch, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Taking versus confronting visual perspectives in preschool children.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {49}, Number = {4}, Pages = {646-654}, Year = {2013}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028633}, Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that 3-year-olds can take other people's visual perspectives not only when they perceive different things (Level 1) but even when they see the same thing differently (Level 2). One hypothesis is that 3-year-olds are good perspective takers but cannot confront different perspectives on the same object (Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). In 2 studies using color filters, 3-year-olds were unable to judge in what color they and an adult saw the same picture. This was the case irrespective of whether children replied verbally (pilot study) or by pointing to color samples (main study). However, 3-year-olds readily took an adult's perspective by determining which of 2 objects an adult referred to as being a certain color, independently from how the children saw the objects (main study). Taken together, these results suggest that preschoolers' difficulty is not so much taking perspectives as it is directly confronting another's view with their own-an ability that seems to be acquired between 4 and 5 years of age.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0028633}, Key = {fds351675} } @article{fds351669, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Parental Presence and Encouragement Do Not Influence Helping in Young Children}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {18}, Number = {3}, Pages = {345-368}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00120.x}, Abstract = {Young children begin helping others with simple instrumental problems from soon after their first birthdays. In previous observations of this phenomenon, both naturalistic and experimental, children's parents were in the room and could potentially have influenced their behavior. In the two current studies, we gave 24-month-old children the opportunity to help an unfamiliar adult obtain an out-of-reach object when the parent (or a friendly female adult) (i) was present but passive, (ii) was present and highlighted the problem for the child, (iii) was present and actively encouraged the child to help, (iv) was present and ordered the child to help, or (v) was absent from the room. The children helped at relatively high levels and equally under all these treatment conditions. There was also no differential effect of treatment condition on children's helping in a subsequent test phase in which no parent was present, and children had to disengage from a fun activity to help. Young children's helping behavior is not potentiated or facilitated by parental behavior in the immediate situation, suggesting that it is spontaneous and intrinsically motivated. Copyright © International Society on Infant Studies (ISIS).}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00120.x}, Key = {fds351669} } @article{fds351670, Author = {Bräuer, J and Keckeisen, M and Pitsch, A and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Domestic dogs conceal auditory but not visual information from others.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {351-359}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0576-9}, Abstract = {A number of studies have shown that dogs are sensitive to a human's perspective, but it remains unclear whether they use an egocentric strategy to assess what humans perceive. We investigated whether dogs know what a human can see and hear, even when the dogs themselves are unable to see the human. Dogs faced a task in which forbidden food was placed in a tunnel that they could retrieve by using their paw. Whereas the dogs could not see the experimenter during their food retrieval attempts, the experimenter could potentially see the dog's paw. In the first experiment, dogs could choose between an opaque and a transparent side of the tunnel, and in the second experiment, they could choose between a silent and a noisy approach to the tunnel. The results showed that dogs preferred a silent approach to forbidden food but they did not hide their approach when they could not see a human present. We conclude that dogs probably rely on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what the human can see and hear.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0576-9}, Key = {fds351670} } @article{fds351671, Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzee responders still behave like rational maximizers.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {110}, Number = {20}, Pages = {E1837}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1303627110}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1303627110}, Key = {fds351671} } @article{fds351672, Author = {Kaminski, J and Pitsch, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Dogs steal in the dark.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {385-394}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0579-6}, Abstract = {All current evidence of visual perspective taking in dogs can possibly be explained by dogs reacting to certain stimuli rather than understanding what others see. In the current study, we set up a situation in which contextual information and social cues are in conflict. A human always forbade the dog from taking a piece of food. The part of the room being illuminated was then varied, for example, either the area where the human was seated or the area where the food was located was lit. Results show that dogs steal significantly more food when it is dark compared to when it is light. While stealing forbidden food the dog's behaviour also depends on the type of illumination in the room. Illumination around the food, but not the human, affected the dogs' behaviour. This indicates that dogs do not take the sight of the human as a signal to avoid the food. It also cannot be explained by a low-level associative rule of avoiding illuminated food which dogs actually approach faster when they are in private. The current finding therefore raises the possibility that dogs take into account the human's visual access to the food while making their decision to steal it.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0579-6}, Key = {fds351672} } @article{fds351673, Author = {Scheider, L and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do domestic dogs interpret pointing as a command?}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {361-372}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0577-8}, Abstract = {Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication flexibly, particularly the pointing gesture. Here, we examine whether dogs interpret pointing informatively, that is, as simply providing information, or rather as a command, for example, ordering them to move to a particular location. In the first study a human pointed toward an empty cup. In one manipulation, the dog either knew or did not know that the designated cup was empty (and that the other cup actually contained the food). In another manipulation, the human (as authority) either did or did not remain in the room after pointing. Dogs ignored the human's gesture if they had better information, irrespective of the authority's presence. In the second study, we varied the level of authority of the person pointing. Sometimes this person was an adult, and sometimes a young child. Dogs followed children's pointing just as frequently as they followed adults' pointing (and ignored the dishonest pointing of both), suggesting that the level of authority did not affect their behavior. Taken together these studies suggest that dogs do not see pointing as an imperative command ordering them to a particular location. It is still not totally clear, however, if they interpret it as informative or in some other way.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0577-8}, Key = {fds351673} } @article{fds351668, Author = {Moore, R and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-year-olds understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze}, Journal = {Interaction Studies}, Volume = {14}, Number = {1}, Pages = {62-80}, Year = {2013}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.14.1.05moo}, Abstract = {The communicative interactions of very young children almost always involve language (based on conventions), gesture (based on bodily deixis or iconicity) and directed gaze. In this study, ninety-six children (3;0 years) were asked to determine the location of a hidden toy by understanding a communicative act that contained none of these familiar means. A light-and-sound mechanism placed behind the hiding place and illuminated by a centrally placed switch was used to indicate the location of the toy. After a communicative training session, an experimenter pressed the switch either deliberately or accidentally, and with or without ostension (in the form of eye contact and child-directed speech). In no condition did she orient towards the hiding place. When the switch was pressed intentionally, children used the light-and-sound cue to find the toy - and tended to do so even in the absence of ostensive eye contact. When the experimenter pressed the switch accidentally, children searched randomly - demonstrating that they were tracking her communicative intent, and not merely choosing on the basis of salience. The absence of an effect of ostension contradicts research that ostension helps children to interpret the communicative intentions underlying unfamiliar signs. We explain this by concluding that while it may play a role in establishing a communicative interaction, it is not necessary for sustaining one; and that even with a highly novel communicative act - involving none of the means of communication on which children typically rely - three-year-olds can comprehend the communicative intentions behind an intentionally produced act. © John Benjamins Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1075/is.14.1.05moo}, Key = {fds351668} } @article{fds351666, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children sympathize less in response to unjustified emotional distress.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {49}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1132-1138}, Year = {2013}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029501}, Abstract = {Three-year-old children saw an adult displaying the exact same distress in 3 different conditions: (a) the adult's distress was appropriate to a genuine harm, (b) the adult's distress was an overreaction to a minor inconvenience, and (c) there was no apparent cause for the adult's distress. Children who witnessed the adult being appropriately upset showed concern for him, intervened on his behalf, and checked on him when he later expressed distress out of their view. Children who did not know the cause for the adult's distress responded similarly. In contrast, children who witnessed the adult overreacting to an inconvenience showed lower rates of intervening and checking. The degree of children's concern across conditions was correlated with the latency of their helping behavior toward the adult later. These results suggest that from an early age, young children's sympathy and prosocial behavior are not automatic responses to emotional displays but, rather, involve taking into account whether the displayed distress is justified.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0029501}, Key = {fds351666} } @article{fds351667, Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Error patterns in young German children's wh-questions.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {40}, Number = {3}, Pages = {656-671}, Year = {2013}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000912000104}, Abstract = {In this article we report two studies: a detailed longitudinal analysis of errors in wh-questions from six German-learning children (age 2 ; 0-3 ; 0) and an analysis of the prosodic characteristics of wh-questions in German child-directed speech. The results of the first study demonstrate that German-learning children frequently omit the initial wh-word. A lexical analysis of wh-less questions revealed that children are more likely to omit the wh-word was ('what') than other wh-words (e.g. wo 'where'). In the second study, we performed an acoustic analysis of sixty wh-questions that one mother produced during her child's third year of life. The results show that the wh-word was is much less likely to be accented than the wh-word wo, indicating a relationship between children's omission of wh-words and the stress patterns associated with wh-questions. The findings are discussed in the light of discourse-pragmatic and metrical accounts of omission errors.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000912000104}, Key = {fds351667} } @article{fds351664, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The attention-grammar interface: Eye-gaze cues structural choice in children and adults}, Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Volume = {24}, Number = {3}, Pages = {457-481}, Year = {2013}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cog-2013-0020}, Abstract = {We investigated whether children (3- and 4-year-olds) and adults can use the active passive alternation - essentially a choice of subject - in a way that is consistent with the eye-gaze of the speaker. Previous work suggests the function of the subject position can be grounded in attentional mechanisms (Tomlin 1995, 1997). Eye-gaze is one powerful source of directing attention that we know adults and young children are sensitive to; furthermore, we know adults are more likely to look at the subject of their sentence than any other character (Gleitman et al. 2007; Griffin and Bock 2000). We demonstrate that older children and adults are able to use speaker-gaze to choose a felicitous subject when describing a scene with both agent-focused and patient focused cues. Integrating attentional and grammatical information in this way allows children to limit the degrees of freedom on what the function of certain linguistic constructions might be.}, Doi = {10.1515/cog-2013-0020}, Key = {fds351664} } @article{fds351665, Author = {Halina, M and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The ontogenetic ritualization of bonobo gestures.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {16}, Number = {4}, Pages = {653-666}, Year = {2013}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-013-0601-7}, Abstract = {Great apes communicate with gestures in flexible ways. Based on several lines of evidence, Tomasello and colleagues have posited that many of these gestures are learned via ontogenetic ritualization-a process of mutual anticipation in which particular social behaviors come to function as intentional communicative signals. Recently, Byrne and colleagues have argued that all great ape gestures are basically innate. In the current study, for the first time, we attempted to observe the process of ontogenetic ritualization as it unfolds over time. We focused on one communicative function between bonobo mothers and infants: initiation of "carries" for joint travel. We observed 1,173 carries in ten mother-infant dyads. These were initiated by nine different gesture types, with mothers and infants using many different gestures in ways that reflected their different roles in the carry interaction. There was also a fair amount of variability among the different dyads, including one idiosyncratic gesture used by one infant. This gestural variation could not be attributed to sampling effects alone. These findings suggest that ontogenetic ritualization plays an important role in the origin of at least some great ape gestures.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-013-0601-7}, Key = {fds351665} } @article{fds351663, Author = {Graf, E and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Subject and object omission in children's early transitive constructions: A discourse-pragmatic approach}, Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics}, Volume = {36}, Number = {3}, Pages = {701-727}, Year = {2013}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716413000477}, Abstract = {This paper investigates discourse effects on the provision of both subjects and objects and investigates whether pragmatic discourse features govern the realization/omission of both constituents alike. In an elicitation study, we examined how the discourse-pragmatic feature contrast, as applied to the subject, verb, or object of a transitive utterance affected the provision of elements in the remainder of the sentence when all elements were previously introduced. The results showed that 3.5-year-old children were more likely to realize a contrasted argument with a lexical noun but more likely to omit the argument when it was not part of a contrast, regardless of its subject or object status. This suggests that contrast presents a unifying discourse feature for argument omission in language development.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0142716413000477}, Key = {fds351663} } @article{fds351661, Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Non-verbal communication enables children's coordination in a "Stag Hunt" game}, Journal = {European Journal of Developmental Psychology}, Volume = {10}, Number = {5}, Pages = {597-610}, Year = {2013}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2012.726469}, Abstract = {This study assessed the role of non-verbal communication in 4-year-old children's decisions to coordinate with others. During a "Stag Hunt" game, the child and an adult individually and continually collected low-value prizes (hares). Occasionally, an alternative option of collecting a high-value prize (stag) cooperatively with the adult arose, but entailed a risk: a lone attempt on this prize by either player would leave that player empty handed. Children coordinated with the adult to obtain the high-value prize more often when that adult made mutual eye contact and smiled at them than when she attended to the prizes only. This suggests that neither verbal nor gestural communication are necessary for coordination: Minimal, non-verbal communication enables children's coordination with others towards joint goals. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1080/17405629.2012.726469}, Key = {fds351661} } @article{fds351662, Author = {Carpenter, M and Uebel, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Being mimicked increases prosocial behavior in 18-month-old infants.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {84}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1511-1518}, Year = {2013}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12083}, Abstract = {Most previous research on imitation in infancy has focused on infants' learning of instrumental actions on objects. This study focused instead on the more social side of imitation, testing whether being mimicked increases prosocial behavior in infants, as it does in adults (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). Eighteen-month-old infants (N = 48) were either mimicked or not by an experimenter; then either that experimenter or a different adult needed help. Infants who had previously been mimicked were significantly more likely to help both adults than infants who had not been mimicked. Thus, even in infancy, mimicry has positive social consequences: It promotes a general prosocial orientation toward others.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12083}, Key = {fds351662} } @article{fds351658, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, recognize successful actions, but fail toimitate them}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {86}, Number = {4}, Pages = {755-761}, Year = {2013}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.07.015}, Abstract = {Cultural transmission, by definition, involves some form of social learning. Chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates clearly engage in some forms of social learning enabling some types of cultural transmission, but there is controversy about whether they copy the actual bodily actions of demonstrators. In this study chimpanzees recognized when a human actor was using particular bodily actions that had led to successful problem solving in the past. But then when it was their turn to solve the problem, they did not reproduce the human actor's bodily actions themselves, even though they were clearly capable of producing the movements. These results help us identify more precisely key reasons for the differences in the social learning and cultural transmission of humans and other primates. © 2013 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.07.015}, Key = {fds351658} } @article{fds351659, Author = {Wittig, M and Jensen, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Five-year-olds understand fair as equal in a mini-ultimatum game.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {116}, Number = {2}, Pages = {324-337}, Year = {2013}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.004}, Abstract = {In studies of children's resource distribution, it is almost always the case that "fair" means an equal amount for all. In the mini-ultimatum game, players are confronted with situations in which fair does not always mean equal, and so the recipient of an offer needs to take into account the alternatives the proposer had available to her or him. Because of its forced-choice design, the mini-ultimatum game measures sensitivity to unfair intentions in addition to unfair outcomes. In the current study, we gave a mini-ultimatum game to 5-year-old children, allowing us to determine the nature of fairness sensitivity at a period after false belief awareness is typically passed and before formal schooling begins. The only situation in which responders rejected offers was when the proposer could have made an equal offer. But unlike adults, they did not employ more sophisticated notions of fairness that take into account the choices facing the proposer. Proposers, in their turn, were also not adult-like in that they had a very poor understanding that responders would reject unequal offers when an equal one was available. Thus, preschool children seem to understand "fair=equal" in this task, but not much more, and they are not yet skillful at anticipating what others will find fair beyond 50/50 splits.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.004}, Key = {fds351659} } @article{fds351660, Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The emergence of contingent reciprocity in young children.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {116}, Number = {2}, Pages = {338-350}, Year = {2013}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.002}, Abstract = {Contingent reciprocity is important in theories of the evolution of human cooperation, but it has been very little studied in ontogeny. We gave 2- and 3-year-old children the opportunity to either help or share with a partner after that partner either had or had not previously helped or shared with the children. Previous helping did not influence children's helping. In contrast, previous sharing by the partner led to greater sharing in 3-year-olds but not in 2-year-olds. These results do not support theories claiming either that reciprocity is fundamental to the origins of children's prosocial behavior or that it is irrelevant. Instead, they support an account in which children's prosocial behavior emerges spontaneously but is later mediated by reciprocity.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.002}, Key = {fds351660} } @article{fds320793, Author = {Grosse, G and Scott-Phillips, TC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-year-olds hide their communicative intentions in appropriate contexts.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {49}, Number = {11}, Pages = {2095-2101}, Year = {2013}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032017}, Abstract = {Human cooperative communication involves both an informative intention that the recipient understands the content of the signal and also a (Gricean) communicative intention that the recipient recognizes that the speaker has an informative intention. The degree to which children understand this 2-layered nature of communication is the subject of some debate. One phenomenon that would seem to constitute clear evidence of such understanding is hidden authorship, in which informative acts are produced but with the communicative intent behind them intentionally hidden. In this study, 3- and 5-year-old children were told that an adult was seeking a toy but wanted to find it on her own. Children of both ages often did something to make the toy easier for the adult to see while at the same time concealing their actions in some way. This suggests that by the age of 3, children are able to separate the multiple layers of intentionality involved in human cooperative communication.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0032017}, Key = {fds320793} } @article{fds351656, Author = {Schulze, C and Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {3-year-old children make relevance inferences in indirect verbal communication.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {84}, Number = {6}, Pages = {2079-2093}, Year = {2013}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12093}, Abstract = {Three studies investigated 3-year-old children's ability to determine a speaker's communicative intent when the speaker's overt utterance related to that intent only indirectly. Studies 1 and 2 examined children's comprehension of indirectly stated requests (e.g., "I find Xs good" can imply, in context, a request for X; N = 32). Study 3 investigated 3- and 4-year-old children's and adults' (N = 52) comprehension of the implications of a speaker responding to an offer by mentioning an action's fulfilled or unfulfilled precondition (e.g., responding to an offer of cereal by stating that we have no milk implies rejection of the cereal). In all studies, 3-year-old children were able to make the relevance inference necessary to integrate utterances meaningfully into the ongoing context.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12093}, Key = {fds351656} } @article{fds351657, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Over, H and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children care more about their reputation with ingroup members and potential reciprocators.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {16}, Number = {6}, Pages = {952-958}, Year = {2013}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12086}, Abstract = {Human cooperation depends on individuals caring about their reputation, and so they sometimes attempt to manage them strategically. Here we show that even 5-year-old children strategically manage their reputation. In an experimental setting, children shared significantly more resources with an anonymous recipient when (1) the child watching them could reciprocate later, and (2) the child watching them was an ingroup rather than an outgroup member (as established by minimal group markers). This study is not only the first to show that young children selectively invest in their reputation with specific individuals, but also the first to show that we care more about our reputation with ingroup than with outgroup members.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12086}, Key = {fds351657} } @article{fds351654, Author = {Bannard, C and Klinger, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How selective are 3-year-olds in imitating novel linguistic material?}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {49}, Number = {12}, Pages = {2344-2356}, Year = {2013}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032062}, Abstract = {In 3 studies we explored when 3-year-olds would imitate novel words in utterances produced by adult speakers. Child and experimenter took turns in requesting objects from a game master. The experimenter always went first and always preceded the object's familiar name with a novel adjective (e.g., "the dilsige duck"). In the first 2 experiments, we found that children were more likely to reproduce the adjective when there were 2 different instances of the same object present in the situation than when there was only 1 or when there were 2 objects of different types present. Thus, children seemed to be sensitive to the descriptive and contrastive function of the adjectives in determining which parts of the utterances to reproduce. Nonetheless, replication of even redundant material was over 50%, suggesting a strategy of somewhat blind copying. In the 3rd experiment, we found that children were less likely to reproduce a redundant adjective when the speaker indicated gesturally that he did not intend to produce it than when he clearly produced it intentionally. We distinguish insightful imitation (the copying of a speaker's goal and means when motivated by insight into why those particular means were chosen) and blind imitation (the copying of a speaker's goal and means with no awareness of why those specific means were chosen) from mimicry. We explore the roles that these modes of imitation might play in language development.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0032062}, Key = {fds351654} } @article{fds351655, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children understand and defend the entitlements of others.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {116}, Number = {4}, Pages = {930-944}, Year = {2013}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.013}, Abstract = {Human social life is structured by social norms creating both obligations and entitlements. Recent research has found that young children enforce simple obligations against norm violators by protesting. It is not known, however, whether they understand entitlements in the sense that they will actively object to a second party attempting to interfere in something that a third party is entitled to do-what we call counter-protest. In two studies, we found that 3-year-old children understand when a person is entitled to do something, and so they actively defend this person's entitlement against unjustified interference from second parties. In some cases, they even enforce second-order entitlements, for example, in the case of ownership where an owner is entitled to entitle others to use the owner's property.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.013}, Key = {fds351655} } @article{fds321685, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The ultra-social animal}, Journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology}, Volume = {44}, Number = {3}, Pages = {187-194}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2015}, Abstract = {In evolutionary perspective, what is most remarkable about human sociality is its many and diverse forms of cooperation. Here, I provide an overview of some recent research, mostly from our laboratory, comparing human children with their nearest living relatives, the great apes, in various tests of collaboration, prosocial behavior, conformity, and group-mindedness (e.g., following and enforcing social norms). This is done in the context of a hypothetical evolutionary scenario comprising two ordered steps: a first step in which early humans began collaborating with others in unique ways in their everyday foraging and a second step in which modern humans began forming cultural groups. Humans' unique forms of sociality help to explain their unique forms of cognition and morality. © 2014.}, Doi = {10.1002/ejsp.2015}, Key = {fds321685} } @article{fds351637, Author = {Liebal, K and Vaish, A and Haun, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Does sympathy motivate prosocial behaviour in great apes?}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e84299}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0084299}, Abstract = {Prosocial behaviours such as helping, comforting, or sharing are central to human social life. Because they emerge early in ontogeny, it has been proposed that humans are prosocial by nature and that from early on empathy and sympathy motivate such behaviours. The emerging question is whether humans share these abilities to feel with and for someone with our closest relatives, the great apes. Although several studies demonstrated that great apes help others, little is known about their underlying motivations. This study addresses this issue and investigates whether four species of great apes (Pongo pygmaeus, Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus) help a conspecific more after observing the conspecific being harmed (a human experimenter steals the conspecific's food) compared to a condition where no harming occurred. Results showed that in regard to the occurrence of prosocial behaviours, only orangutans, but not the African great apes, help others when help is needed, contrasting prior findings on chimpanzees. However, with the exception of one population of orangutans that helped significantly more after a conspecific was harmed than when no harm occurred, prosocial behaviour in great apes was not motivated by concern for others.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0084299}, Key = {fds351637} } @article{fds351644, Author = {Nitzschner, M and Kaminski, J and Melis, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Side matters: Potential mechanisms underlying dogs' performance in a social eavesdropping paradigm}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {90}, Pages = {263-271}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.01.035}, Abstract = {Social eavesdropping is the gathering of information by observing interactions between other individuals. Previous studies have claimed that dogs, Canis familiaris, are able to use information obtained via social eavesdropping, that is, preferring a generous over a selfish human donor. However, in these studies the side was constant between the demonstrations and the dogs' choices, not controlling for potential location biases. In the crucial control condition of our experiments, the donors swapped places in half of the trials before the dogs chose. We found that first choice behaviour as well as the time dogs interacted with the generous donor were influenced by location (side). In a second experiment the subject's owner interacted with the two donors. Again, the result of the side control revealed that the critical factor was location (side) not person. The results of these experiments provide no evidence for social eavesdropping in dogs and show the importance of critical control conditions. © 2014 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.01.035}, Key = {fds351644} } @article{fds351645, Author = {Vogelsang, M and Jensen, K and Kirschner, S and Tennie, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game}, Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, Volume = {5}, Number = {JUL}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00729}, Abstract = {Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This "tragedy of the commons" has been demonstrated experimentally in adults with the public goods game. Contributions to a public good decline over time due to free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about how children behave when confronted with this social dilemma. Forty-eight preschoolers were tested using a novel non-verbal procedure and simplified choices more appropriate to their age than standard economic approaches. The rate of cooperation was initially very low and rose in the second round for the girls only. Children were affected by their previous outcome, as they free rode more after experiencing a lower outcome compared to the other group members. © 2014 Vogelsang, Jensen, Kirschner, Tennie and Tomasello.}, Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00729}, Key = {fds351645} } @article{fds351646, Author = {Warneken, F and Steinwender, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's planning in a collaborative problem-solving task}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {31}, Number = {1}, Pages = {48-58}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.003}, Abstract = {One important component of collaborative problem solving is the ability to plan one's own action in relation to that of a partner. We presented 3- and 5-year-old peer pairs with two different tool choice situations in which they had to choose complementary tools with which to subsequently work on a collaborative problem-solving apparatus. In the bidirectional condition, exemplars of the two necessary tools appeared in front of each child. In the unidirectional condition, one child had to choose between two different tools first, while the other child had only one tool available. Thus, both conditions required close attention to the actions of the partner, but the unidirectional condition additionally required the anticipation of the partner's constrained tool choice. Five-year-olds were proficient planners in both conditions, whereas 3-year-olds did not consistently make the correct choice. However, 3-year-olds who had first experienced the unidirectional condition chose the correct tool at an above-chance level. Moreover, communication during the tool choice led to greater success among 3-year-olds, but not among 5-year-olds. These results provide the first experimental evidence that between 3 and 5 years of age children develop the ability to plan the division of labor in a collaborative task. We discuss our findings regarding planning for a collaborative task in relation to prior research on planning abilities for individual problem-solving that appear to undergo developmental change between 3 and 5 years of age. © 2014 Elsevier Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.003}, Key = {fds351646} } @article{fds351647, Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M}, Title = {Dueling dualists : Commentary on carpendale, atwood, and kettner}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {56}, Number = {6}, Pages = {401-405}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000357237}, Doi = {10.1159/000357237}, Key = {fds351647} } @article{fds351648, Author = {Göckeritz, S and Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's creation and transmission of social norms}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {30}, Number = {1}, Pages = {81-95}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.01.003}, Abstract = {Children's lives are governed by social norms. Since Piaget, however, it has been assumed that they understand very little about how norms work. Recent studies in which children enforce social norms indicate a richer understanding, but children are still relating to pre-existing adult norms. In this study, triads of 5-year-olds worked on an instrumental task without adult guidance. Children spontaneously created social norms regarding how the game "should" be played. They transmitted these with special force (using more generic and objective language) to novices, suggesting that young children understand to some degree, the conventional nature and special force of social norms in binding all who would participate. © 2014 Elsevier Inc.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.01.003}, Key = {fds351648} } @article{fds351649, Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two- and 3-Year-Olds Know What Others Have and Have Not Heard}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {15}, Number = {1}, Pages = {12-21}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2012.710865}, Abstract = {Recent studies have established that even infants can determine what others know based on previous visual experience. In the current study, we investigated whether 2- and 3-year-olds know what others know based on previous auditory experience. A child and an adult heard the sound of one object together, but only the child heard the sound of another (target) object. When later the sounds of both objects were played simultaneously, the adult reacted with surprise and excitement ("Oh, listen, what is that?"). In response, both 24- and 36-month-olds directed the adult's attention to the target more often than chance and more often than in a control condition in which the adult had heard neither sound. These results indicate that by 24 months of age, children's understanding of others' knowledge and ignorance is not limited to the visual domain but extends across perceptual domains. © 2014 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2012.710865}, Key = {fds351649} } @article{fds351650, Author = {Hertel, A and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Generalize or personalize--do dogs transfer an acquired rule to novel situations and persons?}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {9}, Number = {7}, Pages = {e102666}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0102666}, Abstract = {Recent studies have raised the question of whether dogs, like human infants, comprehend an established rule as generalizable, normative knowledge or rather as episodic information, existing only in the immediate situation. In the current study we tested whether dogs disobeyed a prohibition to take a treat (i) in the presence of the communicator of the ban, (ii) after a temporary absence of the communicator, and (iii) in the presence of a novel person. Dogs disobeyed the rule significantly more often when the communicator left the room for a moment or when they were faced with a new person, than when she stayed present in the room. These results indicate that dogs "forget" a rule as soon as the immediate human context becomes disrupted.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0102666}, Key = {fds351650} } @article{fds351651, Author = {Tempelmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do domestic dogs learn words based on humans' referential behaviour?}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {9}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e91014}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0091014}, Abstract = {Some domestic dogs learn to comprehend human words, although the nature and basis of this learning is unknown. In the studies presented here we investigated whether dogs learn words through an understanding of referential actions by humans rather than simple association. In three studies, each modelled on a study conducted with human infants, we confronted four word-experienced dogs with situations involving no spatial-temporal contiguity between the word and the referent; the only available cues were referential actions displaced in time from exposure to their referents. We found that no dogs were able to reliably link an object with a label based on social-pragmatic cues alone in all the tests. However, one dog did show skills in some tests, possibly indicating an ability to learn based on social-pragmatic cues.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0091014}, Key = {fds351651} } @article{fds351652, Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Familiar verbs are not always easier than novel verbs: how German pre-school children comprehend active and passive sentences.}, Journal = {Cognitive science}, Volume = {38}, Number = {1}, Pages = {128-151}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12066}, Abstract = {Many studies show a developmental advantage for transitive sentences with familiar verbs over those with novel verbs. It might be that once familiar verbs become entrenched in particular constructions, they would be more difficult to understand (than would novel verbs) in non-prototypical constructions. We provide support for this hypothesis investigating German children using a forced-choice pointing paradigm with reversed agent-patient roles. We tested active transitive verbs in study 1. The 2-year olds were better with familiar than novel verbs, while the 2½-year olds pointed correctly for both. In study 2, we tested passives: 2½-year olds were significantly below chance for familiar verbs and at chance for novel verbs, supporting the hypothesis that the entrenchment of the familiar verbs in the active transitive voice was interfering with interpreting them in the passive voice construction. The 3½-year olds were also at chance for novel verbs but above chance with familiar verbs. We interpret this as reflecting a lessening of the verb-in-construction entrenchment as the child develops knowledge that particular verbs can occur in a range of constructions. The 4½-year olds were above chance for both familiar and novel verbs. We discuss our findings in terms of the relative entrenchment of lexical and syntactic information and to interference between them.}, Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12066}, Key = {fds351652} } @article{fds351653, Author = {Hamann, K and Bender, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Meritocratic sharing is based on collaboration in 3-year-olds.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {50}, Number = {1}, Pages = {121-128}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032965}, Abstract = {The present study investigated young preschoolers' proportional allocation of rewards in 2 different work contexts. We presented 32 pairs of 3.5-year-old peers with a collaborative task to obtain rewards by pulling ropes. In order to establish differences in work input, 1 child's rope was not immediately accessible but had to be retrieved from the apparatus by means of a specific tool, while the other child had no such additional work to do. The result of the game was that 1 individual received 1 toy and the other received 3 toys. In the Deserving condition, the working child received the 3 toys (thus work and reward matched), whereas in the Undeserving condition, the other child received the 3 toys (he or she was overpaid, and the working child was underpaid). Another 32 dyads participated in a noncollaborative, parallel work task, again in a Deserving condition and an Undeserving condition. On average, children with 3 toys shared with their partner more in the Undeserving condition than in the Deserving condition after collaboration but not in a parallel work setup. These results suggest that young children take merit into account in distributing resources at a much younger age than previously believed and that peer collaboration is an especially facilitative context for children's attention to norms of fairness.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0032965}, Key = {fds351653} } @article{fds351636, Author = {Liebal, K and Vaish, A and Haun, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Correction: Does sympathy motivate prosocial behaviour in great apes? (PLoS ONE)}, Journal = {PLoS ONE}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/annotation/1fe9c2b8-84dd-44c4-a4ba-b62e0460b513}, Doi = {10.1371/annotation/1fe9c2b8-84dd-44c4-a4ba-b62e0460b513}, Key = {fds351636} } @article{fds351635, Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Discourse particles and belief reasoning: The case of German doch}, Journal = {Journal of Semantics}, Volume = {31}, Number = {1}, Pages = {115-133}, Year = {2014}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/fft001}, Abstract = {Discourse particles typically express the attitudes of interlocutors with respect to the propositional content of an utterance - for example, marking whether or not a speaker believes the content of the proposition that she uttered. In German, the particle doch - which has no direct English translation - is commonly used to correct a belief that is thought to be common ground among those present. We asked whether German adults and 5-year-olds are able to infer that a speaker who utters doch intends to be understood in this way. Sixty-four children (4;9-5;3 years) and twenty-four adults participated in a comprehension task in which a speaker explicitly expressed either a positive belief or a negative belief. Subsequently, in both conditions, the speaker checked the truth of her previous belief and corrected her belief with doch. In both the group of adults and the group of children, polarity of the speaker's belief affected hearers' interpretations of the speaker's utterance. In a third condition we investigated whether participants could also perform the more difficult task of interpreting the speaker's utterance with doch while inferring the speaker's belief. Whereas adults showed a similar performance as in the explicit belief conditions, children showed limited abilities in keeping track of the speaker's belief. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1093/jos/fft001}, Key = {fds351635} } @article{fds351633, Author = {van der Goot, MH and Tomasello, M and Liszkowski, U}, Title = {Differences in the nonverbal requests of great apes and human infants.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {85}, Number = {2}, Pages = {444-455}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12141}, Abstract = {This study investigated how great apes and human infants use imperative pointing to request objects. In a series of three experiments (infants, N = 44; apes, N = 12), subjects were given the opportunity to either point to a desired object from a distance or else to approach closer and request it proximally. The apes always approached close to the object, signaling their request through instrumental actions. In contrast, the infants quite often stayed at a distance, directing the experimenters' attention to the desired object through index-finger pointing, even when the object was in the open and they could obtain it by themselves. Findings distinguish 12-month-olds' imperative pointing from ontogenetic and phylogenetic earlier forms of ritualized reaching.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12141}, Key = {fds351633} } @article{fds351634, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Eighteen-month-olds understand false beliefs in an unexpected-contents task.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {119}, Pages = {120-126}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.10.002}, Abstract = {Recent studies suggest that infants understand that others can have false beliefs. However, most of these studies have used looking time measures, and the few that have used behavioral measures are all based on the change-of-location paradigm, leading to claims that infants might use behavioral rules instead of mental state understanding to pass these tests. We investigated infants' false-belief reasoning using a different paradigm. In this unexpected-contents helping task, 18-month-olds were familiarized with boxes for blocks that contained blocks. When an experimenter subsequently reached for a box for blocks that now contained a spoon, infants based their choice of whether to give her a spoon or a block on her true or false belief about which object the block box contained. These results help to demonstrate the flexibility of infants' false-belief understanding.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.10.002}, Key = {fds351634} } @article{fds320792, Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in the early cognitive development of children and great apes.}, Journal = {Developmental psychobiology}, Volume = {56}, Number = {3}, Pages = {547-573}, Year = {2014}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/dev.21125}, Abstract = {There is very little research comparing great ape and human cognition developmentally. In the current studies we compared a cross-sectional sample of 2- to 4-year-old human children (n=48) with a large sample of chimpanzees and bonobos in the same age range (n=42, hereafter: apes) on a broad array of cognitive tasks. We then followed a group of juvenile apes (n=44) longitudinally over 3 years to track their cognitive development in greater detail. In skills of physical cognition (space, causality, quantities), children and apes performed comparably at 2 years of age, but by 4 years of age children were more advanced (whereas apes stayed at their 2-year-old performance levels). In skills of social cognition (communication, social learning, theory of mind), children out-performed apes already at 2 years, and increased this difference even more by 4 years. Patterns of development differed more between children and apes in the social domain than the physical domain, with support for these patterns present in both the cross-sectional and longitudinal ape data sets. These results indicate key differences in the pattern and pace of cognitive development between humans and other apes, particularly in the early emergence of specific social cognitive capacities in humans.}, Doi = {10.1002/dev.21125}, Key = {fds320792} } @article{fds351631, Author = {Köymen, B and Lieven, E and Engemann, DA and Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's norm enforcement in their interactions with peers.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {85}, Number = {3}, Pages = {1108-1122}, Year = {2014}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12178}, Abstract = {This study investigates how children negotiate social norms with peers. In Study 1, 48 pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 96) and in Study 2, 48 pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds (N = 96) were presented with sorting tasks with conflicting instructions (one child by color, the other by shape) or identical instructions. Three-year-olds differed from older children: They were less selective for the contexts in which they enforced norms, and they (as well as the older children to a lesser extent) used grammatical constructions objectifying the norms ("It works like this" rather than "You must do it like this"). These results suggested that children's understanding of social norms becomes more flexible during the preschool years.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12178}, Key = {fds351631} } @article{fds351632, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The communicative contexts of grammatical aspect use in English.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {41}, Number = {3}, Pages = {705-723}, Year = {2014}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000913000135}, Abstract = {In many of the world's languages grammatical aspect is used to indicate how events unfold over time. In English, activities that are ongoing can be distinguished from those that are completed using the morphological marker -ing. Using naturalistic observations of two children in their third year of life, we quantify the availability and reliability of the imperfective form in the communicative context of the child performing actions. On average, 30% of verbal descriptions refer to child actions that are grounded in the here-and-now. Of these utterances, there are two features of the communicative context that reliably map onto the functions of the imperfective, namely, that events are construed as ongoing and from within. The findings are discussed with reference to how the context in which a child hears aspectual language may limit the degrees of freedom on what these constructions mean.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000913000135}, Key = {fds351632} } @article{fds351630, Author = {Moné, Y and Monnin, D and Kremer, N}, Title = {The oxidative environment: a mediator of interspecies communication that drives symbiosis evolution.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {281}, Number = {1785}, Pages = {20133112}, Year = {2014}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.3112}, Abstract = {Symbiotic interactions are ubiquitous in nature and play a major role in driving the evolution of life. Interactions between partners are often mediated by shared signalling pathways, which strongly influence both partners' biology and the evolution of the association in various environments. As an example of 'common language', the regulation of the oxidative environment plays an important role in driving the evolution of symbiotic associations. Such processes have been occurring for billions of years, including the increase in Earth's atmospheric oxygen and the subsequent evolution of mitochondria. The effect of reactive oxygen species and reactive nitrogen species (RONS) has been characterized functionally, but the molecular dialogue between partners has not been integrated within a broader evolutionary context yet. Given the pleiotropic role of RONS in cell-cell communication, development and immunity, but also their associated physiological costs, we discuss here how their regulation can influence the establishment, the maintenance and the breakdown of various symbiotic associations. By synthesizing recent developments in redox biology, we aim to provide an interdisciplinary understanding of the influence of such mediators of interspecies communication on the evolution and stability of symbioses, which in turn can shape ecosystems and play a role in health and disease.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2013.3112}, Key = {fds351630} } @article{fds351627, Author = {Bullinger, AF and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) instrumentally help but do not communicate in a mutualistic cooperative task.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {128}, Number = {3}, Pages = {251-260}, Year = {2014}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035645}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees cooperate in a variety of contexts, but communicating to influence and regulate cooperative activities is rare. It is unclear whether this reflects chimpanzees' general inability or whether they have found other means to coordinate cooperative activities. In the present study chimpanzees could help a partner play her role in a mutually beneficial food-retrieval task either by transferring a needed tool (transfer condition) or by visually or acoustically communicating the hiding-location of the needed tool (communication condition). Overall, chimpanzees readily helped their partner by delivering the needed tool, but none of them communicated the hiding location of the tool to their partner reliably across trials. These results demonstrate that although chimpanzees can coordinate their cooperative activities by instrumentally helping their partner in her role, they do not readily use communication with their partner for this same end.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0035645}, Key = {fds351627} } @article{fds351628, Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children create iconic gestures to inform others.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {50}, Number = {8}, Pages = {2049-2060}, Year = {2014}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037224}, Abstract = {Much is known about young children's use of deictic gestures such as pointing. Much less is known about their use of other types of communicative gestures, especially iconic or symbolic gestures. In particular, it is unknown whether children can create iconic gestures on the spot to inform others. Study 1 provided 27-month-olds with the opportunity to inform a novice how to perform a task. The majority of children created appropriate iconic gestures, and they did so significantly more than in a control condition in which the need to inform someone was removed. In Study 2, some of the 21-month-olds tested also created novel iconic gestures but to a lesser extent. Results are discussed in relation to children's symbolic, linguistic, and social-cognitive development.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0037224}, Key = {fds351628} } @article{fds351629, Author = {Austin, K and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of denial.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {50}, Number = {8}, Pages = {2061-2070}, Year = {2014}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037179}, Abstract = {Although a fair amount is known about young children's production of negation, little is known about their comprehension. Here, we focus on arguably the most complex basic form, denial, and how young children understand denial, when it is expressed in response to a question with gesture, single word, or sentence. One hundred twenty-six children in 3 age groups (Ms = 1 year 9 months, 2 years 0 months, and 2 years 4 months) witnessed an adult look into 1 of 2 buckets and then, in response to a question about whether the toy was in there, communicate either something positive (positive head nod, "yes," "it is in this bucket") or negative (negative head shake, "No," "It's not in this bucket"). The youngest children did not search differently in response to any of the communicative cues (nor in response to an additional cue using both gesture and single word). Children at 2 years 0 months searched at above-chance levels only in response to the negative word and negative sentence. Children at 2 years 4 months were successful with all 3 types of cues in both positive and negative modalities, with the exception of the positive sentence. Young children thus seem to understand the denial of a statement before they understand its affirmation, and they understand linguistic means of expressing denial before they understand gestural means.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0037179}, Key = {fds351629} } @article{fds351624, Author = {Köymen, B and Rosenbaum, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Reasoning during joint decision-making by preschool peers}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {32}, Pages = {74-85}, Year = {2014}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.09.001}, Abstract = {Reasoning with a peer to make a joint decision involves making a proposal (e.g., "Polar bears go here") and justifying it with relevant facts (e.g., "This is ice") based on common ground assumptions or warrants (e.g., polar bears need ice). Twenty-four dyads of 3- and 5-year-olds built a zoo with toy items that were either conventional (e.g., animals, cages) or unconventional (e.g., piano). For conventional items, both participants in both age groups used justifications that relied on implicit warrants (e.g., stating only the fact "This is ice", assuming that both partners know that polar bears need ice). For unconventional items, they more often articulated the warrant explicitly, arguably to create the necessary common ground. Five-year-olds made warrants explicit more often, produced more justifications, and reached mutual agreement more often than did 3-year-olds. These results suggest that preschoolers can reason with one another appropriately, specifically in justifying their proposals based on appropriate common ground assumptions.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.09.001}, Key = {fds351624} } @article{fds351625, Author = {Köymen, B and Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children create partner-specific referential pacts with peers.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {50}, Number = {10}, Pages = {2334-2342}, Year = {2014}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037837}, Abstract = {In 2 studies, we investigated how peers establish a referential pact to call something, for example, a cushion versus a pillow (both equally felicitous). In Study 1, pairs of 4- and 6-year-old German-speaking peers established a referential pact for an artifact, for example, a woman's shoe, in a referential communication task. Six-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, continued to use these same expressions with the same partner (even when they were overinformative) but shifted to simpler expressions, for example, shoe, with a new partner. In Study 2, both age groups were successful in establishing such partner-specific referential pacts with a peer when using a proper name. These results suggest that even preschool children appreciate something of the conventional nature of linguistic expressions, with significant flexibility emerging between ages 4 and 6.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0037837}, Key = {fds351625} } @article{fds351626, Author = {Tennie, C and Walter, V and Gampe, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Limitations to the cultural ratchet effect in young children.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {126}, Pages = {152-160}, Year = {2014}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.006}, Abstract = {Although many animal species show at least some evidence of cultural transmission, broadly defined, only humans show clear evidence of cumulative culture. In the current study, we investigated whether young children show the "ratchet effect," an important component of cumulative culture--the ability to accumulate efficient modifications across generations. We tested 16 diffusion chains--altogether consisting of 80 children--to see how they solved an instrumental task (i.e., carrying something from one location to another). We found that when the chain was seeded with an inefficient way of solving the task, 4-year-olds were able to innovate and transmit these innovations so as to reach a more efficient solution. However, when it started out with relatively efficient solutions already (i.e., the ones that children in a control condition discovered for themselves), there were no further techniques invented and/or transmitted beyond that. Thus, young children showed the ratchet effect to a limited extent, accumulating efficient modifications but not going beyond the inventive level of the individual.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.006}, Key = {fds351626} } @article{fds351623, Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {All great ape species (Gorilla gorilla, Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Pongo abelii) and two-and-a-half-year-old children (Homo sapiens) discriminate appearance from reality.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {128}, Number = {4}, Pages = {431-439}, Year = {2014}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037385}, Abstract = {Nonhuman great apes and human children were tested for an understanding that appearance does not always correspond to reality. Subjects were 29 great apes (bonobos [Pan paniscus], chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes], gorillas [Gorilla gorilla], and orangutans [Pongo abelii]) and 24 2½-year-old children. In our task, we occluded portions of 1 large and 1 small food stick such that the size relations seemed reversed. Subjects could then choose which one they wanted. There was 1 control condition and 2 experimental conditions (administered within subjects). In the control condition subjects saw only the apparent stick sizes, whereas in the 2 experimental conditions they saw the true stick sizes as well (the difference between them being what the subjects saw first: the apparent or the real stick sizes). All great ape species and children successfully identified the bigger stick, despite its smaller appearance, in the experimental conditions, but not in the control. We discuss these results in relation to the understanding of object permanence and conservation, and exclude reversed reward contingency learning as an explanation.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0037385}, Key = {fds351623} } @article{fds351621, Author = {Haun, DBM and Rekers, Y and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children conform to the behavior of peers; other great apes stick with what they know.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {25}, Number = {12}, Pages = {2160-2167}, Year = {2014}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797614553235}, Abstract = {All primates learn things from conspecifics socially, but it is not clear whether they conform to the behavior of these conspecifics--if conformity is defined as overriding individually acquired behavioral tendencies in order to copy peers' behavior. In the current study, chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2-year-old human children individually acquired a problem-solving strategy. They then watched several conspecific peers demonstrate an alternative strategy. The children switched to this new, socially demonstrated strategy in roughly half of all instances, whereas the other two great-ape species almost never adjusted their behavior to the majority's. In a follow-up study, children switched much more when the peer demonstrators were still present than when they were absent, which suggests that their conformity arose at least in part from social motivations. These results demonstrate an important difference between the social learning of humans and great apes, a difference that might help to account for differences in human and nonhuman cultures.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797614553235}, Key = {fds351621} } @article{fds351622, Author = {Duguid, S and Wyman, E and Bullinger, AF and Herfurth-Majstorovic, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in a Stag Hunt game.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {281}, Number = {1796}, Pages = {20141973}, Year = {2014}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1973}, Abstract = {Much of human cooperation takes place in mutualistic contexts in which the main challenge for individuals is how to coordinate decisions. In the current studies, we compared the abilities of chimpanzees and young children to coordinate with a partner in two versions of a Stag Hunt game. When risks were low (the hare was of low value) and information was cheap (the partner's behaviour was readily observable), partners of both species were able to successfully coordinate on the higher value stag more than 90% of the time. By contrast, when the risks were raised and observing the partner was more difficult, the chimpanzees became less successful, whereas the children compensated, and so remained highly successful, by communicating more often and more specifically. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that humans evolved unique skills of coordination and communication in the context of especially risky coordination problems.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2014.1973}, Key = {fds351622} } @article{fds321684, Author = {Tomasello, M and Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call,, J}, Title = {Restorative justice in young children}, Journal = {Current Biology}, Volume = {25}, Pages = {1-5}, Year = {2015}, Key = {fds321684} } @article{fds323265, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {"I know you don't know I know…" children use second-order false-belief reasoning for peer coordination.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {86}, Number = {1}, Pages = {287-293}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2015}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12264}, Abstract = {Numerous studies have investigated children's abilities to attribute mental states, but few have examined their ability to recruit these abilities in social interactions. Here, 6-year-olds (N = 104) were tested on whether they can use first- and second-order false-belief understanding to coordinate with peers. Children adjusted their decisions in a coordination game in response to either their partner's erroneous belief or their partner's erroneous belief about their own belief-a result that contrasts with previous findings on the use of higher order "theory of mind" (TOM) reasoning at this age. Six-year-olds are thus able to use their higher order TOM capacities for peer coordination, which marks an important achievement in becoming competent social collaborators.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12264}, Key = {fds323265} } @article{fds351619, Author = {Moore, R and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Production and Comprehension of Gestures between Orang-Utans (Pongo pygmaeus) in a Referential Communication Game.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {10}, Number = {6}, Pages = {e0129726}, Year = {2015}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0129726}, Abstract = {Orang-utans played a communication game in two studies testing their ability to produce and comprehend requestive pointing. While the 'communicator' could see but not obtain hidden food, the 'donor' could release the food to the communicator, but could not see its location for herself. They could coordinate successfully if the communicator pointed to the food, and if the donor comprehended his communicative goal and responded pro-socially. In Study 1, one orang-utan pointed regularly and accurately for peers. However, they responded only rarely. In Study 2, a human experimenter played the communicator's role in three conditions, testing the apes' comprehension of points of different heights and different degrees of ostension. There was no effect of condition. However, across conditions one donor performed well individually, and as a group orang-utans' comprehension performance tended towards significance. We explain this on the grounds that comprehension required inferences that they found difficult - but not impossible. The finding has valuable implications for our thinking about the development of pointing in phylogeny.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0129726}, Key = {fds351619} } @article{fds351620, Author = {Melis, AP and Floedl, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Non-egalitarian allocations among preschool peers in a face-to-face bargaining task.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {10}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e0120494}, Year = {2015}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0120494}, Abstract = {In face-to-face bargaining tasks human adults almost always agree on an equal split of resources. This is due to mutually recognized fairness and equality norms. Early developmental studies on sharing and equality norms found that egalitarian allocations of resources are not common before children are 5 or 6 years old. However, recent studies have shown that in some face-to face collaborative situations, or when recipients express their desires, children at much younger ages choose equal allocations. We investigated the ability of 3.5 and 5-year-olds to negotiate face-to-face, whether to collaborate to obtain an equal or an unequal distribution of rewards. We hypothesized that the face-to-face interaction and interdependency between partners would facilitate egalitarian outcomes at both ages. In the first experiment we found that 5-year-olds were more egalitarian than 3.5-year-olds, but neither of the age classes shared equally. In the second experiment, in which we increased the magnitude of the inequality, we found that children at both ages mostly agreed on the unequal distribution. These results show that communication and face-to-face interactions are not sufficient to guarantee equal allocations at 3-5 years of age. These results add to previous findings suggesting that in the context of non-collaboratively produced resources it is only after 5 years of age that children use equality norms to allocate resources.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0120494}, Key = {fds351620} } @article{fds323266, Author = {Rossano, F and Fiedler, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers' understanding of the role of communication and cooperation in establishing property rights.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {51}, Number = {2}, Pages = {176-184}, Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)}, Year = {2015}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038493}, Abstract = {Property as a social "agreement" comprises both a communicative component, in which someone makes a claim that she is entitled to some piece of property, and a cooperative component, in which others in the community respect that claim as legitimate. In the current study, preschool children were (a) given the opportunity to mark some objects as "theirs" (to claim them in the face of other fictitious children who would supposedly enter the room later); and (b) confronted with stickers in various spatial arrangements (e.g., piled up neatly vs. scattered), told that a fictitious child had previously chosen some for herself but had to suddenly leave the room, and then invited first to choose some stickers for themselves and second to identify which stickers had already been claimed by the fictitious child. Five-year-olds but not 3-year-olds were skillful in both of these tasks, demonstrating an understanding of the crucial role of communication in asserting property claims and the crucial role of cooperation in respecting them.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0038493}, Key = {fds323266} } @article{fds351617, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees trust conspecifics to engage in low-cost reciprocity.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {282}, Number = {1801}, Pages = {20142803}, Year = {2015}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.2803}, Abstract = {Many of humans' most important social interactions rely on trust, including most notably among strangers. But little is known about the evolutionary roots of human trust. We presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a modified version of the human trust game--trust in reciprocity--in which subjects could opt either to obtain a small but safe reward on their own or else to send a larger reward to a partner and trust her to reciprocate a part of the reward that she could not access herself. In a series of three studies, we found strong evidence that in interacting with a conspecific, chimpanzees show spontaneous trust in a novel context; flexibly adjust their level of trust to the trustworthiness of their partner and develop patterns of trusting reciprocity over time. At least in some contexts then, trust in reciprocity is not unique to humans, but rather has its evolutionary roots in the social interactions of humans' closest primate relatives.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2014.2803}, Key = {fds351617} } @article{fds351614, Author = {Moore, R and Mueller, B and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-old children but not domestic dogs understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {18}, Number = {2}, Pages = {232-242}, Year = {2015}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12206}, Abstract = {Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden inside. Great apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly, domestic dogs do. However, whether children and dogs understand these communicative acts in the same way is not yet known. To test this possibility, an experimenter did not point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either bucket, but instead lifted and shook one via a centrally pulled rope. She did this either intentionally or accidentally, and did or did not address her act to the subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but not dogs understood the experimenter's act in intentional conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no difference to children's success, it actually hindered dogs' performance. We conclude that while human children may be capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide variety actions, so long as these actions are performed intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this respect. Their understanding of communicative intention may be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative intent, including gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and vocalizations. This may be because humans have come under selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with absent interlocutors - where bodily co-presence is not possible.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12206}, Key = {fds351614} } @article{fds351615, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Conforming to coordinate: children use majority information for peer coordination.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {33}, Number = {1}, Pages = {136-147}, Year = {2015}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12078}, Abstract = {Humans are constantly required to coordinate their behaviour with others. As this often relies on everyone's convergence on the same strategy (e.g., driving on the left side of the road), a common solution is to conform to majority behaviour. In this study, we presented 5-year-old children with a coordination problem: To retrieve some rewards, they had to choose the same of four options as a peer partner--in reality a stooge--whose decision they were unable to see. Before making a choice, they watched a video showing how other children from their partner's peer group had behaved; a majority chose the same option and a minority chose a different one. In a control condition, children watched the same video but could then retrieve the reward irrespective of their partner's choice (i.e., no coordination was necessary). Children followed the majority more often when coordination was required. Moreover, conformers mostly justified their choices by referring to the majority from the video demonstration. This study is the first to show that young children are able to strategically coordinate decisions with peers by conforming to the majority.}, Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12078}, Key = {fds351615} } @article{fds351616, Author = {Schulze, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {18-month-olds comprehend indirect communicative acts.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {136}, Pages = {91-98}, Year = {2015}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.036}, Abstract = {From soon after their first birthdays young children are able to make inferences from a communicator's referential act (e.g., pointing to a container) to her overall social goal for communication (e.g., to inform that a searched-for toy is inside; see Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012). But in such cases the inferential distance between referential act and communicative intention is still fairly close, as both container and searched-for toy lie in the direction of the pointing gesture. In the current study we tested 18- and 26-month-old children in a situation in which referential act and communicative goal were more distant: In the midst of a game, the child needed a certain toy. The experimenter then held up a key (that they knew in common ground could be used to open a container) to the child ostensively. In two control conditions the experimenter either inadvertently moved the key and so drew the child's attention to it non-ostensively or else held up the key for her own inspection intentionally but non-communicatively. Children of both ages took only the ostensive showing of the key, not the accidental moving or the non-ostensive but intentional inspection of the key, as an indirect request to take the key and open the container to retrieve the toy inside. From soon after they start acquiring language young children thus are able to infer a communicator's social goal for communication not only from directly-referential acts, but from more indirect communicative acts as well.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.036}, Key = {fds351616} } @article{fds351613, Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children show the bystander effect in helping situations.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {4}, Pages = {499-506}, Year = {2015}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615569579}, Abstract = {Much research in social psychology has shown that otherwise helpful people often fail to help when bystanders are present. Research in developmental psychology has shown that even very young children help and that the presence of others can actually increase helping in some cases. In the current study, in contrast, 5-year-old children helped an experimenter at very high levels when they were alone but helped significantly less often in the presence of bystanders who were potentially available to help. In another condition designed to elucidate the mechanism underlying the effect, children's helping was not reduced when bystanders were present but confined behind a barrier and thus unable to help (a condition that has not been run in previous studies with adults). Young children thus show the bystander effect, and it is due not to social referencing or shyness to act in front of others but, rather, to a sense of a diffusion of responsibility.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797615569579}, Key = {fds351613} } @article{fds351612, Author = {Grünloh, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children’s Intonational Marking of New, Given and Contrastive Referents}, Journal = {Language Learning and Development}, Volume = {11}, Number = {2}, Pages = {95-127}, Year = {2015}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2014.889530}, Abstract = {In the current study we investigate whether 2- and 3-year-old German children use intonation productively to mark the informational status of referents. Using a story-telling task, we compared children’s and adults’ intonational realization via pitch accent (H*, L* and de-accentuation) of New, Given, and Contrastive referents. Both children and adults distinguished these elements with different pitch accents. Adults, however, de-accented Given information much more often than the children, especially the younger children. Since a failure to de-accent Given information may be a characteristic of caregiver speech, in a second study we tested how caregivers talking to their young children realize Given and New referents. In this discourse situation, the caregivers quite often failed to de-accent Given information, raising the possibility that the younger children were simply reproducing the pitch accents they had heard adults using.}, Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2014.889530}, Key = {fds351612} } @article{fds323264, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children use salience to solve coordination problems.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {18}, Number = {3}, Pages = {495-501}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2015}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12224}, Abstract = {Humans are routinely required to coordinate with others. When communication is not possible, adults often achieve this by using salient cues in the environment (e.g. going to the Eiffel Tower, as an obvious meeting point). To explore the development of this capacity, we presented dyads of 3-, 5-, and 8-year-olds (N = 144) with a coordination problem: Two balls had to be inserted into the same of four boxes to obtain a reward. Identical pictures were attached to three boxes whereas a unique--and thus salient--picture was attached to the fourth. Children either received one ball each, and so had to choose the same box (experimental condition), or they received both balls and could get the reward independently (control condition). In all cases, children could neither communicate nor see each other's choices. Children were significantly more likely to choose the salient option in the experimental condition than in the control condition. However, only the two older age groups chose the salient box above chance levels. This study is the first to show that children from at least age 5 can solve coordination problems by converging on a salient solution.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12224}, Key = {fds323264} } @article{fds351611, Author = {Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Restorative Justice in Children.}, Journal = {Current biology : CB}, Volume = {25}, Number = {13}, Pages = {1731-1735}, Year = {2015}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.014}, Abstract = {An important, and perhaps uniquely human, mechanism for maintaining cooperation against free riders is third-party punishment. Our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, will not punish third parties even though they will do so when personally affected. Until recently, little attention has been paid to how punishment and a sense of justice develop in children. Children respond to norm violations. They are more likely to share with a puppet that helped another individual as opposed to one who behaved harmfully, and they show a preference for seeing a harmful doll rather than a victim punished. By 6 years of age, children will pay a cost to punish fictional and real peers, and the threat of punishment will lead preschoolers to behave more generously. However, little is known about what motivates a sense of justice in children. We gave 3- and 5-year-old children--the youngest ages yet tested--the opportunity to remove items and prevent a puppet from gaining a reward for second- and third-party violations (experiment 1), and we gave 3-year-olds the opportunity to restore items (experiment 2). Children were as likely to engage in third-party interventions as they were when personally affected, yet they did not discriminate among the different sources of harm for the victim. When given a range of options, 3-year-olds chose restoration over removal. It appears that a sense of justice centered on harm caused to victims emerges early in childhood and highlights the value of third-party interventions for human cooperation.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.014}, Key = {fds351611} } @article{fds323263, Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The goggles experiment: Can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {105}, Pages = {211-221}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028}, Abstract = {In two experiments, we investigated whether chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, can use self-experience to infer what another sees. Subjects first gained self-experience with the visual properties of an object (either opaque or see-through). In a subsequent test phase, a human experimenter interacted with the object and we tested whether chimpanzees understood that the experimenter experienced the object as opaque or as see-through. Crucially, in the test phase, the object seemed opaque to the subject in all cases (while the experimenter could see through the one that they had experienced as see-through before), such that she had to use her previous self-experience with the object to correctly infer whether the experimenter could or could not see when looking at the object. Chimpanzees did not attribute their previous self-experience with the object to the experimenter in a gaze-following task (experiment 1); however, they did so successfully in a competitive context (experiment 2). We conclude that chimpanzees successfully used their self-experience to infer what the competitor sees. We discuss our results in relation to the well-known 'goggles experiment' and address alternative explanations.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028}, Key = {fds323263} } @article{fds351610, Author = {Köymen, B and Schmidt, MFH and Rost, L and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Teaching versus enforcing game rules in preschoolers' peer interactions.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {135}, Pages = {93-101}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.02.005}, Abstract = {Children use normative language in two key contexts: when teaching others and when enforcing social norms. We presented pairs of 3- and 5-year-old peers (N=192) with a sorting game in two experimental conditions (in addition to a third baseline condition). In the teaching condition, one child was knowledgeable, whereas the other child was ignorant and so in need of instruction. In the enforcement condition, children learned conflicting rules so that each child was making mistakes from the other's point of view. When teaching rules to an ignorant partner, both age groups used generic normative language ("Bunnies go here"). When enforcing rules on a rule-breaking partner, 3-year-olds used normative utterances that were not generic and aimed at correcting individual behavior ("No, this goes there"), whereas 5-year-olds again used generic normative language, perhaps because they discerned that instruction was needed in this case as well. Young children normatively correct peers differently depending on their assessment of what their wayward partners need to bring them back into line.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.02.005}, Key = {fds351610} } @article{fds351618, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Late Emergence of the First Possession Heuristic: Evidence From a Small-Scale Culture}, Journal = {Child Development}, Volume = {86}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1282-1289}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12365}, Abstract = {Western preschool children often assign ownership based on first possession and some theorists have proposed that this judgment might be an early emerging, innate bias. Five- to 9-year-olds (n = 112) from a small-scale group in Kenya (Kikuyu) watched videotaped interactions of two women passing an object. The object's starting position and the women's gestures were varied. Use of the first possession heuristic increased with age, and 8- to 9-year-olds performed similarly to German 5-year-olds (n = 24). Starting position and gestures had no effect. A control study confirmed that 5-year-old Kikuyus (n = 20) understood the video material. The findings reveal that the first possession heuristic follows different developmental trajectories cross-culturally and stress the role of children's sociocultural environment.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12365}, Key = {fds351618} } @article{fds359907, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Novel paradigms to measure variability of behavior in early childhood: posture, gaze, and pupil dilation}, Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, Volume = {6}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00858}, Abstract = {A central challenge of investigating the underlying mechanisms of and the individual differences in young children’s behavior is the measurement of the internal physiological mechanism and the involved expressive emotions. Here, we illustrate two paradigms that assess concurrent indicators of both children’s social perception as well as their emotional expression. In one set of studies, children view situations while their eye movements are mapped onto a live scene. In these studies, children’s internal arousal is measured via changes in their pupil dilation by using eye tracking technology. In another set of studies, we measured children’s emotional expression via changes in their upper-body posture by using depth sensor imaging technology. Together, these paradigms can provide new insights into the internal mechanism and outward emotional expression involved in young children’s behavior.}, Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00858}, Key = {fds359907} } @article{fds323262, Author = {Schäfer, M and Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Fair Is Not Fair Everywhere.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {8}, Pages = {1252-1260}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications}, Year = {2015}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615586188}, Abstract = {Distributing the spoils of a joint enterprise on the basis of work contribution or relative productivity seems natural to the modern Western mind. But such notions of merit-based distributive justice may be culturally constructed norms that vary with the social and economic structure of a group. In the present research, we showed that children from three different cultures have very different ideas about distributive justice. Whereas children from a modern Western society distributed the spoils of a joint enterprise precisely in proportion to productivity, children from a gerontocratic pastoralist society in Africa did not take merit into account at all. Children from a partially hunter-gatherer, egalitarian African culture distributed the spoils more equally than did the other two cultures, with merit playing only a limited role. This pattern of results suggests that some basic notions of distributive justice are not universal intuitions of the human species but rather culturally constructed behavioral norms.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797615586188}, Key = {fds323262} } @article{fds351608, Author = {Theakston, AL and Ibbotson, P and Freudenthal, D and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Productivity of Noun Slots in Verb Frames.}, Journal = {Cognitive science}, Volume = {39}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1369-1395}, Year = {2015}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12216}, Abstract = {Productivity is a central concept in the study of language and language acquisition. As a test case for exploring the notion of productivity, we focus on the noun slots of verb frames, such as __want__, __see__, and __get__. We develop a novel combination of measures designed to assess both the flexibility and creativity of use in these slots. We do so using a rigorously controlled sample of child speech and child directed speech from three English-speaking children between the ages of 2-3 years and their caregivers. We find different levels of creativity and flexibility between the adult and child samples for some measures, for some slots, and for some developmental periods. We discuss these differences in the context of verb frame semantics, conventionality versus creativity and child errors, and draw some tentative conclusions regarding developmental changes in children's early grammatical representations.}, Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12216}, Key = {fds351608} } @article{fds351609, Author = {Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Focusing and shifting attention in human children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {129}, Number = {3}, Pages = {268-274}, Year = {2015}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039384}, Abstract = {Humans often must coordinate co-occurring activities, and their flexible skills for doing so would seem to be uniquely powerful. In 2 studies, we compared 4- and 5-year-old children and one of humans' nearest relatives, chimpanzees, in their ability to focus and shift their attention when necessary. The results of Study 1 showed that 4-year-old children and chimpanzees were very similar in their ability to monitor two identical devices and to sequentially switch between the two to collect a reward, and that they were less successful at doing so than 5-year-old children. In Study 2, which required subjects to alternate between two different tasks, one of which had rewards continuously available whereas the other one only occasionally released rewards, no species differences were found. These results suggest that chimpanzees and human children share some fundamental attentional control skills, but that such abilities continue to develop during human ontogeny, resulting in the uniquely human capacity to succeed at complex multitasking.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0039384}, Key = {fds351609} } @article{fds359906, Author = {Grassmann, S and Schulze, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children’s level of word knowledge predicts their exclusion of familiar objects as referents of novel words}, Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, Volume = {6}, Year = {2015}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01200}, Abstract = {When children are learning a novel object label, they tend to exclude as possible referents familiar objects for which they already have a name. In the current study, we wanted to know if children would behave in this same way regardless of how well they knew the name of potential referent objects, specifically, whether they could only comprehend it or they could both comprehend and produce it. Sixty-six monolingual German-speaking 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children participated in two experimental sessions. In one session the familiar objects were chosen such that their labels were in the children’s productive vocabularies, and in the other session the familiar objects were chosen such that their labels were only in the children’s receptive vocabularies. Results indicated that children at all three ages were more likely to exclude a familiar object as the potential referent of the novel word if they could comprehend and produce its name rather than comprehend its name only. Indeed, level of word knowledge as operationalized in this way was a better predictor than was age. These results are discussed in the context of current theories of word learning by exclusion.}, Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01200}, Key = {fds359906} } @article{fds351605, Author = {Cameron-Faulkner, T and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The relationship between infant holdout and gives, and pointing}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {20}, Number = {5}, Pages = {576-586}, Year = {2015}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12085}, Abstract = {We provide an analysis of holdout and giving (Ho&G) behaviours in prelinguistic infants and investigate their relationship with index finger pointing. The frequency of Ho&Gs at 10 and 11 months along with the length of the following social interaction correlated with index finger pointing at 12 months. We conclude that Ho&Gs are a precursor to index finger pointing and that this provides support for social-pragmatic approaches to communicative development.}, Doi = {10.1111/infa.12085}, Key = {fds351605} } @article{fds351606, Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees strategically manipulate what others can see.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {18}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1069-1076}, Year = {2015}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0875-z}, Abstract = {Humans often strategically manipulate the informational access of others to their own advantage. Although chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, it is unclear whether they can strategically manipulate others' visual access. In this study, chimpanzees were given the opportunity to save food for themselves by concealing it from a human competitor and also to get more food for themselves by revealing it to a human cooperator. When knowing that a competitor was approaching, chimpanzees kept more food hidden (left it covered) than when expecting a cooperator to approach. When the experimenter was already at the location of the hidden food, they actively revealed less food to the competitor than to the cooperator. They did not actively hide food (cover up food in the open) from the competitor, however. Chimpanzees thus strategically manipulated what another could see in order to maximize their payoffs and showed their ability to plan for future situations.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-015-0875-z}, Key = {fds351606} } @article{fds351607, Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children use shared experience to interpret definite reference.}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {42}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1146-1157}, Year = {2015}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000914000555}, Abstract = {We investigated whether children at the ages of two and three years understand that a speaker's use of the definite article specifies a referent that is in common ground between speaker and listener. An experimenter and a child engaged in joint actions in which the experimenter chose one of three similar objects of the same category to perform an action. In subsequent interactions children were asked to get 'the X' or 'a X'. When children were instructed with the definite article they chose the shared object significantly more often than when they were instructed with the indefinite article in which case children's choice was at chance. The findings show that in their third year children use shared experiences to interpret the speaker's communicative intention underlying her referential choice. The results are discussed with respect to children's representation of linguistic categories and the role of joint action for establishing common ground.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000914000555}, Key = {fds351607} } @article{fds351604, Author = {Grosse, K and Call, J and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in the Ability of Apes and Children to Instruct Others Using Gestures}, Journal = {Language Learning and Development}, Volume = {11}, Number = {4}, Pages = {310-330}, Year = {2015}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2014.955246}, Abstract = {In all human cultures, people gesture iconically. However, the evolutionary basis of iconic gestures is unknown. In this study, chimpanzees and bonobos, and 2- and 3-year-old children, learned how to operate two apparatuses to get rewards. Then, at test, only a human adult had access to the apparatuses, and participants could instruct her about how to obtain the rewards. Children frequently produced appropriate iconic gestures, but with the exception of one human-raised chimpanzee, great apes did not gesture iconically. However, chimpanzees pointed to a reward outside the apparatus in another experimental condition, showing their motivation and ability to communicate with the human to request it. They also manipulated a duplicate apparatus in appropriate ways, though it was unclear if they did this to communicate with the human. Although great apes may have some of the prerequisite skills involved, iconic gestures come naturally to humans in a way that they do not for great apes.}, Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2014.955246}, Key = {fds351604} } @article{fds323261, Author = {Herrmann, E and Misch, A and Hernandez-Lloreda, V and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Uniquely human self-control begins at school age.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {18}, Number = {6}, Pages = {979-993}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2015}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12272}, Abstract = {Human beings have remarkable skills of self-control, but the evolutionary origins of these skills are unknown. Here we compare children at 3 and 6 years of age with one of humans' two nearest relatives, chimpanzees, on a battery of reactivity and self-control tasks. Three-year-old children and chimpanzees were very similar in their abilities to resist an impulse for immediate gratification, repeat a previously successful action, attend to a distracting noise, and quit in the face of repeated failure. Six-year-old children were more skillful than either 3-year-olds or chimpanzees at controlling their impulses. These results suggest that humans' most fundamental skills of self-control - as part of the overall decision-making process - are a part of their general great ape heritage, and that their species-unique skills of self-control begin at around the age at which many children begin formal schooling.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12272}, Key = {fds323261} } @article{fds351602, Author = {Butler, LP and Schmidt, MFH and Bürgel, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {33}, Number = {4}, Pages = {476-488}, Year = {2015}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12108}, Abstract = {Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind-relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three-year-old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non-pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., 'No, not like that'), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non-conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend - at least for their strength - on the nature of the acquisition process.}, Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12108}, Key = {fds351602} } @article{fds351603, Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The effects of collaboration and minimal-group membership on children's prosocial behavior, liking, affiliation, and trust.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {139}, Pages = {161-173}, Year = {2015}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.05.008}, Abstract = {Recent theoretical work has highlighted potential links between interpersonal collaboration and group membership in the evolution of human sociality. Here we compared the effects of collaboration and minimal-group membership on young children's prosocial behavior (i.e., helping and resource allocation), liking, affiliation, and trust. In a design that matched as closely as possible these two ways of connecting with others, we showed that 5-year-olds' behavior was affected similarly by collaboration and minimal-group membership; both increased children's preference for their partners on multiple dimensions and produced overall effects of a similar magnitude. In contrast, 3.5-year-olds did not have a strong preference for either collaborators or minimal in-group members. Thus, both collaboration and minimal-group membership are similarly effective in their influence on children's prosocial behavior and social preferences.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.05.008}, Key = {fds351603} } @article{fds361386, Title = {Michael Tomasello: Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions.}, Journal = {The American psychologist}, Volume = {70}, Number = {8}, Pages = {680-682}, Year = {2015}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039789}, Abstract = {The APA Awards for Distinguished Scientific Contributions are presented to persons who, in the opinion of the Committee on Scientific Awards, have made distinguished theoretical or empirical contributions to basic research in psychology. One of the 2015 award winners is Michael Tomasello, who received this award for "outstanding empirical and theoretical contributions to understanding what makes the human mind unique. Michael Tomasello's pioneering research on the origins of social cognition has led to revolutionary insights in both developmental psychology and primate cognition." Tomasello's award citation, biography, and a selected bibliography are presented here.}, Doi = {10.1037/a0039789}, Key = {fds361386} } @article{fds351599, Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Communication about absent entities in great apes and human infants.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {145}, Pages = {63-72}, Year = {2015}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.009}, Abstract = {There is currently debate about the extent to which non-linguistic beings such as human infants and great apes are capable of absent reference. In a series of experiments we investigated the flexibility and specificity of great apes' (N=36) and 12 month-old infants' (N=40) requests for absent entities. Subjects had the choice between requesting visible objects directly and using the former location of a depleted option to request more of these now-absent entities. Importantly, we systematically varied the quality of the present and absent options. We found that great apes as well as human infants flexibly adjusted their requests for absent entities to these contextual variations and only requested absent entities when the visible option was of lower quality than the absent option. These results suggest that the most basic cognitive capacities for absent reference do not depend on language and are shared by humans and their closest living relatives.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.009}, Key = {fds351599} } @article{fds351600, Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How 18- and 24-month-old peers divide resources among themselves.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {140}, Pages = {228-244}, Year = {2015}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.009}, Abstract = {Young children are often considered "selfish" with resources because they are reluctant to give up things already in their possession (e.g., as in dictator games). In the current two studies, we presented pairs of 18- and 24-month-old toddlers with various situations involving resources that no one possessed ahead of time. We observed very few instances of individuals attempting to monopolize the resources; rather, the pair peaceably divided them such that each child got something. Equal divisions--even involving one child sacrificing his or her own resources to establish equality-were especially pronounced when children were acting together jointly even in the absence of active collaboration. Children's divisions were also influenced by cues to ownership such as a spatial pre-division of resources and resources marked by color (and originally spatially associated with one individual). These results suggest that young children are not selfish, but instead rather generous, with resources when they are dividing them among themselves.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.009}, Key = {fds351600} } @article{fds351601, Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Procedural justice in children: Preschoolers accept unequal resource distributions if the procedure provides equal opportunities.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {140}, Pages = {197-210}, Year = {2015}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.008}, Abstract = {When it is not possible to distribute resources equitably to everyone, people look for an equitable or just procedure. In the current study, we investigated young children's sense of procedural justice. We tested 32 triads of 5-year-olds in a new resource allocation game. Triads were confronted with three unequal reward packages and then agreed on a procedure to allocate them among themselves. To allocate the rewards, they needed to use a "wheel of fortune." Half of the groups played with a fair wheel (where each child had an equal chance of obtaining each reward package), and the other half played with an unfair wheel. We analyzed children's interactions when using the wheel and conducted an interview with each child after the game was over. Children using the unfair wheel often decided to change the rules of the game, and they also rated it as an unfair procedure in the interview. In contrast, children who played with the fair wheel were mostly accepting of both the outcome and the procedure. Overall, we found that children as young as preschool age are already sensitive not only to distributive justice but to procedural justice as well.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.008}, Key = {fds351601} } @article{fds322246, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Svetlova, M and Johe, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's developing understanding of legitimate reasons for allocating resources unequally}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {37}, Pages = {42-52}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001}, Abstract = {Recent research on distributive justice suggests that young children prefer equal distributions. But sometimes unequal distributions are justified, such as when some individuals deserve more than others based on merit, need, or agreed-upon rules. When and how do children start incorporating such factors in their distributive decisions? Three-, 5-, and 8-year-old children (N= 72) had the opportunity to allocate several items to two individuals. One individual was neutral and the other provided a reason why she should be favored. Three of these reasons were legitimate (based on merit, need, or agreed-upon rules) whereas a fourth was idiosyncratic ("I just want more."). We found that with age, children's equality preference diminished and their acceptance of various reasons for privileged treatment increased. It was not until 8 years, however, that they differentiated between legitimate and idiosyncratic reasons for inequality. These findings suggest that children's sense of distributive justice develops from an early equality preference to a more flexible understanding of the basic normative reasons that inequality may, in some cases, be just.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001}, Key = {fds322246} } @article{fds323260, Author = {Vogelsang, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Giving Is Nicer than Taking: Preschoolers Reciprocate Based on the Social Intentions of the Distributor.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {11}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e0147539}, Publisher = {Public Library of Science (PLoS)}, Editor = {di Pellegrino, G}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147539}, Abstract = {Recent research has found that even preschoolers give more resources to others who have previously given resources to them, but the psychological bases of this reciprocity are unknown. In our study, a puppet distributed resources between herself and a child by taking some from a pile in front of the child or else by giving some from a pile in front of herself. Although the resulting distributions were identical, three- and five-year-olds reciprocated less generously when the puppet had taken rather than given resources. This suggests that children's judgments about resource distribution are more about the social intentions of the distributor and the social framing of the distributional act than about the amount of resources obtained. In order to rule out that the differences in the children's reciprocal behavior were merely due to experiencing gains and losses, we conducted a follow-up study. Here, three- and-five year olds won or lost resources in a lottery draw and could then freely give or take resources to/from a puppet, respectively. In this study, they did not respond differently after winning vs. losing resources.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0147539}, Key = {fds323260} } @article{fds351594, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Precís of a natural history of human thinking}, Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology}, Volume = {2}, Number = {1}, Pages = {59-64}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0041}, Abstract = {A précis of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).}, Doi = {10.1515/jso-2015-0041}, Key = {fds351594} } @article{fds351596, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response to commentators}, Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology}, Volume = {2}, Number = {1}, Pages = {117-123}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0042}, Abstract = {This paper is a reply to the comments by Henrike Moll, Glenda Satne, Ladislav Koreň and Michael Schmitz on Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).}, Doi = {10.1515/jso-2015-0042}, Key = {fds351596} } @article{fds351597, Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {What Is a Group? Young Children's Perceptions of Different Types of Groups and Group Entitativity.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {11}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e0152001}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0152001}, Abstract = {To date, developmental research on groups has focused mainly on in-group biases and intergroup relations. However, little is known about children's general understanding of social groups and their perceptions of different forms of group. In this study, 5- to 6-year-old children were asked to evaluate prototypes of four key types of groups: an intimacy group (friends), a task group (people who are collaborating), a social category (people who look alike), and a loose association (people who coincidently meet at a tram stop). In line with previous work with adults, the vast majority of children perceived the intimacy group, task group, and social category, but not the loose association, to possess entitativity, that is, to be a 'real group.' In addition, children evaluated group member properties, social relations, and social obligations differently in each type of group, demonstrating that young children are able to distinguish between different types of in-group relations. The origins of the general group typology used by adults thus appear early in development. These findings contribute to our knowledge about children's intuitive understanding of groups and group members' behavior.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0152001}, Key = {fds351597} } @article{fds351598, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The effects of being watched on resource acquisition in chimpanzees and human children.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {19}, Number = {1}, Pages = {147-151}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0920-y}, Abstract = {Animals react in many different ways to being watched by others. In the context of cooperation, many theories emphasize reputational effects: Individuals should cooperate more if other potential cooperators are watching. In the context of competition, individuals might want to show off their strength and prowess if other potential competitors are watching. In the current study, we observed chimpanzees and human children in three experimental conditions involving resource acquisition: Participants were either in the presence of a passive observer (observed condition), an active observer who engaged in the same task as the participant (competition condition), or in the presence of but not directly observed by a conspecific (mere presence condition). While both species worked to acquire more resources in the competition condition, children but not chimpanzees also worked to acquire more resources in the observer condition (compared to the mere presence condition). These results suggest evolutionary continuity with regard to competition-based observer effects, but an additional observer effect in young children, potentially arising from an evolutionary-based concern for cooperative reputation.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-015-0920-y}, Key = {fds351598} } @article{fds351593, Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Comprehension of iconic gestures by chimpanzees and human children.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {142}, Pages = {1-17}, Year = {2016}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.09.001}, Abstract = {Iconic gestures-communicative acts using hand or body movements that resemble their referent-figure prominently in theories of language evolution and development. This study contrasted the abilities of chimpanzees (N=11) and 4-year-old human children (N=24) to comprehend novel iconic gestures. Participants learned to retrieve rewards from apparatuses in two distinct locations, each requiring a different action. In the test, a human adult informed the participant where to go by miming the action needed to obtain the reward. Children used the iconic gestures (more than arbitrary gestures) to locate the reward, whereas chimpanzees did not. Some children also used arbitrary gestures in the same way, but only after they had previously shown comprehension for iconic gestures. Over time, chimpanzees learned to associate iconic gestures with the appropriate location faster than arbitrary gestures, suggesting at least some recognition of the iconicity involved. These results demonstrate the importance of iconicity in referential communication.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.09.001}, Key = {fds351593} } @article{fds323258, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers understand the normativity of cooperatively structured competition.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {143}, Pages = {34-47}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014}, Abstract = {Human institutional practices often involve competition within a cooperative structure of mutually accepted rules. In a competitive game, for instance, we not only expect adherence to the rules of the game but also expect an opponent who tries to win and, thus, follows a rational game-playing strategy. We had 3- and 5-year-olds (N=48) play for a prize against an opponent (a puppet) who played either rationally (trying to win) or irrationally (helping the children to win) while either following or breaking the rules of the game. Both age groups performed costly protest against an opponent who followed the rules but played irrationally by helping the children to win. When facing a rule-breaking opponent, 3-year-olds protested only the rule breaches of an irrational opponent but not irrational play. Five-year-olds also protested the rule breaches of a rational opponent, but in contrast to the 3-year-olds, they protested irrational behavior even in the context of rule breaches. Moreover, many children, in particular 3-year-olds, refrained from protesting. These findings suggest that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, fully understand the dual-level normative structure of cooperatively regulated competition.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014}, Key = {fds323258} } @article{fds323259, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Mietzsch, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children Understand the Role of Agreement in Establishing Arbitrary Norms-But Unanimity Is Key.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {2}, Pages = {612-626}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2016}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12510}, Abstract = {Human cultural groups value conformity to arbitrary norms (e.g., rituals, games) that are the result of collective "agreement." Ninety-six 3-year-olds had the opportunity to agree upon arbitrary norms with puppets. Results revealed that children normatively enforced these novel norms only on a deviator who had actually entered into the agreement (not on dissenting or ignorant individuals). Interestingly, any dissent during the norm-setting process (even if a majority of 90% preferred one course of action) prevented children from seeing a norm as established for anyone at all. These findings suggest that even young children understand something of the role of agreement in establishing mutually binding social norms, but that their notion of norm formation may be confined to conditions of unanimity.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12510}, Key = {fds323259} } @article{fds351592, Author = {Köymen, B and Mammen, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers use common ground in their justificatory reasoning with peers.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {52}, Number = {3}, Pages = {423-429}, Year = {2016}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000089}, Abstract = {In the context of joint decision-making, we investigated whether preschoolers alter the informativeness of their justifications depending on the common ground that they share with their partner. Pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 146) were introduced to a novel animal with unique characteristics (e.g., eating rocks). In the common ground condition, the children learned about the animal together. In the one-expert condition, one learned about it, the other was naïve. In the two-experts condition, children learned about it separately. Later, the pairs had to decide together on 3 items that the novel animal might need. Both age groups referred to the unique characteristics of the animal in their justifications more in the 2 conditions without common ground than in the common ground condition. Thus, preschoolers begin to use common ground flexibly in their justifications and reason-giving in peer interactions.}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000089}, Key = {fds351592} } @article{fds323843, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The ontogeny of cultural learning}, Journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology}, Volume = {8}, Pages = {1-4}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008}, Abstract = {All primates engage in one or another form of social learning. Humans engage in cultural learning. From very early in ontogeny human infants and young children do not just learn useful things from others, they conform to others in order to affiliate with them and to identify with the cultural group. The cultural group normatively expects such conformity, and adults actively instruct children so as to ensure it. Young children learn from this instruction how the world is viewed and how it works in their culture. These special forms of cultural learning enable powerful and species-unique processes of cumulative cultural evolution.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008}, Key = {fds323843} } @article{fds351591, Author = {Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {German Children’s Use of Word Order and Case Marking to Interpret Simple and Complex Sentences: Testing Differences Between Constructions and Lexical Items}, Journal = {Language Learning and Development}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {156-182}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2015.1052448}, Abstract = {ABSTRACT: Children and adults follow cues such as case marking and word order in their assignment of semantic roles in simple transitives (e.g., the dog chased the cat). It has been suggested that the same cues are used for the interpretation of complex sentences, such as transitive relative clauses (RCs) (e.g., that’s the dog that chased the cat) (Bates, Devescovi, & D’Amico, 1999). We used a pointing paradigm to test German-speaking 3-, 4-, and 6-year-old children’s sensitivity to case marking and word order in their interpretation of simple transitives and transitive RCs. In Experiment 1, case marking was ambiguous. The only cue available was word order. In Experiment 2, case was marked on lexical NPs or demonstrative pronouns. In Experiment 3, case was marked on lexical NPs or personal pronouns. Whereas the younger children mainly followed word order, the older children were more likely to base their interpretations on the more reliable case-marking cue. In most cases, children from both age groups were more likely to use these cues in their interpretation of simple transitives than in their interpretation of transitive RCs. Finally, children paid more attention to nominative case when it was marked on first-person personal pronouns than when it was marked on third-person lexical NPs or demonstrative pronouns, such as der Löwe ‘the-NOM lion’ or der ‘he-NOM.’ They were able to successfully integrate this case-marking cue in their sentence processing even when it appeared late in the sentence. We discuss four potential reasons for these differences across development, constructions, and lexical items. (1) Older children are relatively more sensitive to cue reliability. (2) Word order is more reliable in simple transitives than in transitive RCs. (3) The processing of case marking might initially be item-specific. (4) The processing of case marking might depend on its saliency and position in the sentence.}, Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2015.1052448}, Key = {fds351591} } @article{fds351587, Author = {Butler, LP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two- and 3-year-olds integrate linguistic and pedagogical cues in guiding inductive generalization and exploration.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {145}, Pages = {64-78}, Year = {2016}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.12.001}, Abstract = {Young children can in principle make generic inferences (e.g., "doffels are magnetic") on the basis of their own individual experience. Recent evidence, however, shows that by 4 years of age children make strong generic inferences on the basis of a single pedagogical demonstration with an individual (e.g., an adult demonstrates for the child that a single "doffel" is magnetic). In the current experiments, we extended this to look at younger children, investigating how the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are integrated with other aspects of inductive inference during early development. We found that both 2- and 3-year-olds used pedagogical cues to guide such generic inferences, but only so long as the "doffel" was linguistically labeled. In a follow-up study, 3-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, continued to make this generic inference even if the word "doffel" was uttered incidentally and non-referentially in a context preceding the pedagogical demonstration, thereby simply marking the opportunity to learn about a culturally important category. By 3 years of age, then, young children show a remarkable ability to flexibly combine different sources of culturally relevant information (e.g., linguistic labeling, pedagogy) to make the kinds of generic inferences so central in human cultural learning.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.12.001}, Key = {fds351587} } @article{fds351588, Author = {Zeidler, H and Herrmann, E and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Taking Turns or Not? Children's Approach to Limited Resource Problems in Three Different Cultures.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {3}, Pages = {677-688}, Year = {2016}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12505}, Abstract = {Some problems of resource distribution can be solved on equal terms only by taking turns. We presented such a problem to 168 pairs of 5- to 10-year-old children from one Western and two non-Western societies (German, Samburu, Kikuyu). Almost all German pairs solved the problem by taking turns immediately, resulting in an equal distribution of resources throughout the game. In the other groups, one child usually monopolized the resource in Trial 1 and sometimes let the partner monopolize it in Trial 2, resulting in an equal distribution in only half the dyads. These results suggest that turn-taking is not a natural strategy uniformly across human cultures, but rather that different cultures use it to different degrees and in different contexts.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12505}, Key = {fds351588} } @article{fds351589, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cultural Learning Redux.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {3}, Pages = {643-653}, Year = {2016}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12499}, Abstract = {M. Tomasello, A. Kruger, and H. Ratner (1993) proposed a theory of cultural learning comprising imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning. Empirical and theoretical advances in the past 20 years suggest modifications to the theory; for example, children do not just imitate but overimitate in order to identify and affiliate with others in their cultural group, children learn from pedagogy not just episodic facts but the generic structure of their cultural worlds, and children collaboratively co-construct with those in their culture normative rules for doing things. In all, human children do not just culturally learn useful instrumental activities and information, they conform to the normative expectations of the cultural group and even contribute themselves to the creation of such normative expectations.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12499}, Key = {fds351589} } @article{fds351590, Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differing views: Can chimpanzees do Level 2 perspective-taking?}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {19}, Number = {3}, Pages = {555-564}, Year = {2016}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7}, Abstract = {Although chimpanzees understand what others may see, it is unclear whether they understand how others see things (Level 2 perspective-taking). We investigated whether chimpanzees can predict the behavior of a conspecific which is holding a mistaken perspective that differs from their own. The subject competed with a conspecific over two food sticks. While the subject could see that both were the same size, to the competitor one appeared bigger than the other. In a previously established game, the competitor chose one stick in private first and the subject chose thereafter, without knowing which of the sticks was gone. Chimpanzees and 6-year-old children chose the 'riskier' stick (that looked bigger to the competitor) significantly less in the game than in a nonsocial control. Children chose randomly in the control, thus showing Level 2 perspective-taking skills; in contrast, chimpanzees had a preference for the 'riskier' stick here, rendering it possible that they attributed their own preference to the competitor to predict her choice. We thus run a follow-up in which chimpanzees did not have a preference in the control. Now, they also chose randomly in the game. We conclude that chimpanzees solved the task by attributing their own preference to the other, while children truly understood the other's mistaken perspective.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7}, Key = {fds351590} } @article{fds351586, Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees coordinate in a snowdrift game}, Journal = {Animal Behaviour}, Volume = {116}, Pages = {61-74}, Year = {2016}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.03.030}, Abstract = {The snowdrift game is a model for studying social coordination in the context of competing interests. We presented pairs of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, with a situation in which they could either pull a weighted tray together or pull alone to obtain food. Ultimately chimpanzees should coordinate their actions because if no one pulled, they would both lose the reward. There were two experimental manipulations: the tray's weight (low or high weight condition) and the time to solve the dilemma before the rewards became inaccessible (40 s or 10 s). When the costs were high (i.e. high weight condition), chimpanzees waited longer to act. Cooperation tended to increase in frequency across sessions. The pulling effort invested in the task also became more skewed between subjects. The subjects also adjusted their behaviour by changing their pulling effort for different partners. These results demonstrate that chimpanzees can coordinate their actions in situations where there is a conflict of interest.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.03.030}, Key = {fds351586} } @article{fds340136, Author = {Melis, A and Grocke, P and Kalbitz, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {One for you, one for me: Humans' unique turn-taking skills}, Journal = {Psychological Science}, Volume = {27}, Number = {7}, Pages = {987-996}, Publisher = {Association for Psychological Science}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616644070}, Abstract = {Long-term collaborative relationships require that any jointly produced resources be shared in mutually satisfactory ways. Prototypically, this sharing involves partners dividing up simultaneously available resources, but sometimes the collaboration makes a resource available to only one individual, and any sharing of resources must take place across repeated instances over time. Here, we show that beginning at 5 years of age, human children stabilize cooperation in such cases by taking turns across instances of obtaining a resource. In contrast, chimpanzees do not take turns in this way, and so their collaboration tends to disintegrate over time. Alternating turns in obtaining a collaboratively produced resource does not necessarily require a prosocial concern for the other, but rather requires only a strategic judgment that partners need incentives to continue collaborating. These results suggest that human beings are adapted for thinking strategically in ways that sustain long-term cooperative relationships and that are absent in their nearest primate relatives.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797616644070}, Key = {fds340136} } @article{fds323257, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Rapp, DJ and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children (sometimes) do the right thing even when their peers do not}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {39}, Pages = {86-92}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004}, Abstract = {Children must sometimes decide between conforming to peer behavior and doing what is right. While research shows that children have a strong inclination to act prosocially and to help conspecifics in need, many studies also demonstrate that children tend to adopt peer behavior. In two studies (N = 96), we investigated whether children would conform to an antisocial majority or, whether they would do the right thing even under peer pressure. Results show that if a recipient is in need, 5-year-old children act prosocially in two different contexts even when there is a strong selfish incentive not to. However, once the severity of the recipient's need is reduced, children conform to the antisocial group. The current studies suggest that children's prosocial motivation sometimes wins out against more selfish drives.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004}, Key = {fds323257} } @article{fds351585, Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Extrinsic Rewards Diminish Costly Sharing in 3-Year-Olds.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1192-1203}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12534}, Abstract = {Two studies investigated the influence of external rewards and social praise in young children's fairness-related behavior. The motivation of ninety-six 3-year-olds' to equalize unfair resource allocations was measured in three scenarios (collaboration, windfall, and dictator game) following three different treatments (material reward, verbal praise, and neutral response). In all scenarios, children's willingness to engage in costly sharing was negatively influenced when they had received a reward for equal sharing during treatment than when they had received praise or no reward. The negative effect of material rewards was not due to subjects responding in kind to their partner's termination of rewards. These results provide new evidence for the intrinsic motivation of prosociality-in this case, costly sharing behavior-in preschool children.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12534}, Key = {fds351585} } @article{fds323256, Author = {Vaish, A and Herrmann, E and Markmann, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {153}, Pages = {43-51}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011}, Abstract = {Large-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution is that enforcers receive benefits relative to non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not 4-year-old) children judged enforcers of norms more positively, preferred enforcers, and distributed more resources to enforcers than to non-enforcers. The ability to sustain not only first-order but also second-order cooperation thus emerges quite early in human ontogeny, providing a viable solution to the problem of higher-order cooperation.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011}, Key = {fds323256} } @article{fds320790, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915-2016].}, Journal = {Journal of child language}, Volume = {43}, Number = {5}, Pages = {967-968}, Year = {2016}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000916000374}, Doi = {10.1017/s0305000916000374}, Key = {fds320790} } @article{fds351584, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers affect others' reputations through prosocial gossip.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {34}, Number = {3}, Pages = {447-460}, Year = {2016}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12143}, Abstract = {Providing evaluative information to others about absent third parties helps them to identify cooperators and avoid cheaters. Here, we show that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, reliably engage in such prosocial gossip. In an experimental setting, 5-year-old children spontaneously offered relevant reputational information to guide a peer towards a cooperative partner. Three-year-old children offered such evaluative information only rarely, although they still showed a willingness to inform in a non-evaluative manner. A follow-up study revealed that one component involved in this age difference is children's developing ability to provide justifications. The current results extend previous work on young children's tendency to manage their own reputation by showing that preschoolers also influence others' reputations via gossip.}, Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12143}, Key = {fds351584} } @article{fds320788, Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs.}, Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)}, Volume = {354}, Number = {6308}, Pages = {110-114}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf8110}, Abstract = {Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are able to understand that others' actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for human infants) to show that three species of great apes reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a location where he falsely believes an object to be, even though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false beliefs.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.aaf8110}, Key = {fds320788} } @article{fds320789, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {In Memoriam: Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915–2016]}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {155}, Pages = {iii-iv}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013}, Key = {fds320789} } @article{fds321683, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Butler, LP and Heinz, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {27}, Number = {10}, Pages = {1360-1370}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616661182}, Abstract = {Human social life depends heavily on social norms that prescribe and proscribe specific actions. Typically, young children learn social norms from adult instruction. In the work reported here, we showed that this is not the whole story: Three-year-old children are promiscuous normativists. In other words, they spontaneously inferred the presence of social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate such a norm in either language or behavior. And children of this age even went so far as to enforce these self-inferred norms when third parties "broke" them. These results suggest that children do not just passively acquire social norms from adult behavior and instruction; rather, they have a natural and proactive tendency to go from "is" to "ought." That is, children go from observed actions to prescribed actions and do not perceive them simply as guidelines for their own behavior but rather as objective normative rules applying to everyone equally.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797616661182}, Key = {fds321683} } @article{fds351581, Author = {Over, H and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do young children accept responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members?}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {40}, Pages = {24-32}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.004}, Abstract = {This study investigated whether young children accept responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members. Five-year-old children watched a transgressor break someone else's valued possession. Depending on condition, this transgressor either belonged to the same group as the child or a different group from the child. Coding of children's nonverbal behaviour indicated that they displayed more signs of guilt (but not other negative emotions) when the transgressor belonged to their own group than the other group. Furthermore, when the transgressor belonged to their own group, children were more likely to say that their own group should apologise for the damage and that they themselves should try to repair the broken object. Children's connections to their groups are thus so profound that they appear to feel responsible for the negative actions of their group members even when they had no personal involvement in the harm those actions caused.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.004}, Key = {fds351581} } @article{fds351582, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Language in a New Key.}, Journal = {Scientific American}, Volume = {315}, Number = {5}, Pages = {70-75}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1116-70}, Doi = {10.1038/scientificamerican1116-70}, Key = {fds351582} } @article{fds351583, Author = {Hardecker, S and Schmidt, MFH and Roden, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's behavioral and emotional responses to different social norm violations.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {150}, Pages = {364-379}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.012}, Abstract = {From an early age, children can talk meaningfully about differences between moral and conventional norms. But does their understanding of these differences manifest itself in their actual behavioral and emotional reactions to norm violations? And do children discriminate between norm violations that affect either themselves or a third party? Two studies (N=224) were conducted in which children observed conventional game rule violations and moral transgressions that either disadvantaged themselves directly or disadvantaged an absent third party. Results revealed that 3- and 5-year-olds evaluated both conventional and moral transgressions as normative breaches and protested against them. However, 5-year-olds also clearly discriminated these types of transgressions along further dimensions in that (a) they tattled largely on the moral violation and less on the conventional violation and (b) they showed stronger emotional reactions to moral violations compared to conventional violations. The 3-year-olds' responses to moral and conventional transgressions, however, were less discriminatory, and these younger children responded rather similarly to both kinds of violations. Importantly, most children intervened both as victims of the transgression and as unaffected third parties alike, providing strong evidence for their agent-neutral understanding of social norms.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.012}, Key = {fds351583} } @article{fds320786, Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Early Emergence of Guilt-Motivated Prosocial Behavior.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1772-1782}, Year = {2016}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12628}, Abstract = {Guilt serves vital prosocial functions: It motivates transgressors to make amends, thus restoring damaged relationships. Previous developmental research on guilt has not clearly distinguished it from sympathy for a victim or a tendency to repair damage in general. The authors tested 2- and 3-year-old children (N = 62 and 64, respectively) in a 2 × 2 design, varying whether or not a mishap caused harm to someone and whether children themselves caused that mishap. Three-year-olds showed greatest reparative behavior when they had caused the mishap and it caused harm, thus showing a specific effect of guilt. Two-year-olds repaired more whenever harm was caused, no matter by whom, thus showing only an effect of sympathy. Guilt as a distinct motivator of prosocial behavior thus emerges by at least 3 years.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12628}, Key = {fds320786} } @article{fds320787, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Grossmann, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children Want to See Others Get the Help They Need.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {87}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1703-1714}, Year = {2016}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12633}, Abstract = {Children's instrumental helping has sometimes been interpreted as a desire to complete action sequences or to restore the physical order of things. Two-year-old children (n = 51) selectively retrieved for an adult the object he needed rather than one he did not (but which equally served to restore the previous order of things), and those with greater internal arousal (i.e., pupil dilation) were faster to help. In a second experiment (n = 64), children's arousal increased when they witnessed an adult respond inappropriately to another adult's need. This was not the case in a nonsocial control condition. These findings suggest that children's helping is not aimed at restoring the order of things but rather at seeing another person's need fulfilled.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12633}, Key = {fds320787} } @article{fds320784, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How chimpanzees cooperate: If dominance is artificially constrained.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {113}, Number = {44}, Pages = {E6728-E6729}, Year = {2016}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1614378113}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1614378113}, Key = {fds320784} } @article{fds351579, Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of past interactions in great apes' communication about absent entities.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {130}, Number = {4}, Pages = {351-357}, Year = {2016}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000042}, Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that great apes can use the former location of an entity to communicate about it. In this study we built on these findings to investigate the social-cognitive foundations of great apes' communicative abilities. We tested whether great apes (n = 35) would adjust their requests for absent entities to previous interactions they had with their interlocutor. We manipulated the apes' experience with respect to the interlocutor's knowledge about the previous content of the now-empty location as well as their experience with the interlocutor's competence to provide additional food items. We found that apes adjusted their requests to both of these aspects but failed to integrate them with one another. These results demonstrate a surprising amount of flexibility in great apes' communicative abilities while at the same time suggesting some important limitations in their social communicative skills. (PsycINFO Database Record}, Doi = {10.1037/com0000042}, Key = {fds351579} } @article{fds351580, Author = {Brandt, S and Buttelmann, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {151}, Pages = {131-143}, Year = {2016}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004}, Abstract = {De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004}, Key = {fds351580} } @article{fds351578, Author = {Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How to Compare Across Species.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {27}, Number = {12}, Pages = {1670-1672}, Year = {2016}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616671336}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797616671336}, Key = {fds351578} } @article{fds329018, Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control.}, Journal = {Communicative & integrative biology}, Volume = {10}, Number = {4}, Pages = {e1343771}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771}, Abstract = {Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.}, Doi = {10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771}, Key = {fds329018} } @article{fds322245, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The fulfillment of others' needs elevates children's body posture.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {53}, Number = {1}, Pages = {100-113}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000173}, Abstract = {Much is known about young children's helping behavior, but little is known about the underlying motivations and emotions involved. In 2 studies we found that 2-year-old children showed positive emotions of similar magnitude-as measured by changes in their postural elevation using depth sensor imaging technology-after they achieved a goal for themselves and after they helped another person achieve her goal. Conversely, children's posture decreased in elevation when their actions did not result in a positive outcome. These results suggest that for young children, working for themselves and helping others are similarly rewarding. (PsycINFO Database Record}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000173}, Key = {fds322245} } @article{fds326212, Author = {Buttelmann, D and Buttelmann, F and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {e0173793}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173793}, Abstract = {Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0173793}, Key = {fds326212} } @article{fds351576, Author = {Hepach, R and Haberl, K and Lambert, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Toddlers Help Anonymously}, Journal = {Infancy}, Volume = {22}, Number = {1}, Pages = {130-145}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12143}, Abstract = {Young children are extremely motivated to help others, but it is not clear whether they do so in anonymous situations without social recognition. In two studies, we found that 18-month-old toddlers provided help equally in situations where an adult recipient was present and in situations where an adult recipient was not present. We included several control conditions to rule out that toddlers were simply unaware of their anonymity or were merely motivated to restore the physical order of things. Together, these findings suggest that early in ontogeny children are motivated to help others in need regardless of whether they can immediately be recognized for their prosocial intentions.}, Doi = {10.1111/infa.12143}, Key = {fds351576} } @article{fds351577, Author = {Schmid, B and Karg, K and Perner, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes are sensitive to prior reliability of an informant in a gaze following task.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {12}, Number = {11}, Pages = {e0187451}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187451}, Abstract = {Social animals frequently rely on information from other individuals. This can be costly in case the other individual is mistaken or even deceptive. Human infants below 4 years of age show proficiency in their reliance on differently reliable informants. They can infer the reliability of an informant from few interactions and use that assessment in later interactions with the same informant in a different context. To explore whether great apes share that ability, in our study we confronted great apes with a reliable or unreliable informant in an object choice task, to see whether that would in a subsequent task affect their gaze following behaviour in response to the same informant. In our study, prior reliability of the informant and habituation during the gaze following task affected both great apes' automatic gaze following response and their more deliberate response of gaze following behind barriers. As habituation is very context specific, it is unlikely that habituation in the reliability task affected the gaze following task. Rather it seems that apes employ a reliability tracking strategy that results in a general avoidance of additional information from an unreliable informant.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0187451}, Key = {fds351577} } @article{fds325489, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by taking turns and along dominance asymmetries.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {53}, Number = {2}, Pages = {265-273}, Year = {2017}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000236}, Abstract = {Humans constantly have to coordinate their decisions with others even when their interests are conflicting (e.g., when 2 drivers have to decide who yields at an intersection). So far, however, little is known about the development of these abilities. Here, we present dyads of 5-year-olds (N = 40) with a repeated chicken game using a novel methodology: Two children each steered an automated toy train carrying a reward. The trains simultaneously moved toward each other so that in order to avoid a crash-which left both children empty-handed-1 train had to swerve. By swerving, however, the trains lost a portion of the rewards so that it was in each child's interest to go straight. Children coordinated their decisions successfully over multiple rounds, and they mostly did so by taking turns at swerving. In dyads in which turn-taking was rare, dominant children obtained significantly higher payoffs than their partners. Moreover, the coordination process was more efficient in turn-taking dyads as indicated by a significant reduction in conflicts and verbal protest. These findings indicate that already by the late preschool years children can independently coordinate decisions with peers in recurrent conflicts of interest. (PsycINFO Database Record}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000236}, Key = {fds325489} } @article{fds320782, Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children, but not chimpanzees, are averse to disadvantageous and advantageous inequities.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {155}, Pages = {48-66}, Year = {2017}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013}, Abstract = {The age at which young children show an aversion to inequitable resource distributions, especially those favoring themselves, is unclear. It is also unclear whether great apes, as humans' nearest evolutionary relatives, have an aversion to inequitable resource distributions at all. Using a common methodology across species and child ages, the current two studies found that 3- and 4-year-old children (N=64) not only objected when they received less than a collaborative partner but also sacrificed to equalize when they received more. They did neither of these things in a nonsocial situation, demonstrating the fundamental role of social comparison. In contrast, chimpanzees (N=9) showed no aversion to inequitable distributions, only a concern for maximizing their own resources, with no differences between social and nonsocial conditions. These results underscore the unique importance for humans, even early in ontogeny, for treating others fairly, presumably as a way of becoming a cooperative member of one's cultural group.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013}, Key = {fds320782} } @article{fds320783, Author = {Hardecker, S and Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children’s Developing Understanding of the Conventionality of Rules}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {18}, Number = {2}, Pages = {163-188}, Publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, Year = {2017}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624}, Abstract = {Much research has investigated how children relate to norms taught to them by adult authorities. Very few studies have investigated norms that arise out of children’s own peer interactions. In two studies, we investigated how 5- and 7-year-old children teach, enforce, and understand rules that they either created themselves or were taught by an adult. Children (N = 240) were asked to either invent game rules on their own or were taught these exact same rules by an adult (yoked design). Children of both ages enforced and transmitted the rules in a normative way, regardless of whether they had invented them or were taught the rules by an adult, suggesting that they viewed even their own self-made rules as normatively binding. However, creating the rules led 5-year-old children to understand them as much more changeable as compared with adult-taught rules. Seven-year-olds, in contrast, regarded both kinds of rules as equally changeable, indeed allowing fewer changes to their self-created rules than 5-year-olds. While the process of creating rules seemed to enlighten preschoolers’ understanding of the conventionality of the rules, school-aged children regarded both self-created rules and adult-taught rules in a similar manner, suggesting a deeper understanding of rule normativity as arising from social agreement and commitment.}, Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624}, Key = {fds320783} } @article{fds326491, Author = {Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {From imitation to implementation: How two- and three-year-old children learn to enforce social norms.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {35}, Number = {2}, Pages = {237-248}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12159}, Abstract = {Young children enforce social norms from early on, but little research has examined how this enforcement behaviour emerges. This study investigated whether observing an adult's norm enforcement influences children's own enforcement of that norm compared with observing an action demonstration without enforcement. Additionally, children experienced enforcement either following their own (second-party) or a third-party's transgression (N = 120). Results revealed that observing enforcement increased two- and three-year-old children's protest against the sanctioned action regardless of second- or third-party context. However, only three-year-olds generalized their enforcement to a novel action not matching the norm, whereas two-year-olds only protested against the previously sanctioned action. Importantly, without any enforcement demonstration, two-year-olds rarely protested at all while three-year-olds did so quite frequently. Thus, providing an opportunity to imitate enforcement seems to give rise to enforcement behaviour in two-year-olds while three-year-olds already understand normative implications following a variety of cues and even apply norm enforcement without any demonstration of how to do it. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Children conform to social norms from early in development. Young children from 2 to 3 years of age also enforce social norms on third parties. What does this study add? Observing enforcement by an adult increases two- and three-year-olds' protest against the sanctioned action. It does not matter whether children experienced enforcement on their own or a third party's action. Three-, but not two-year-olds, generalize their enforcement to novel actions that do not match the norm.}, Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12159}, Key = {fds326491} } @article{fds326492, Author = {Rapp, DJ and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The impact of choice on young children's prosocial motivation.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {158}, Pages = {112-121}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004}, Abstract = {The current study explored how freedom of choice affects preschoolers' prosocial motivation. Children (3- and 5-year-olds) participated in either a choice condition (where they could decide for themselves whether to help or not) or a no-choice condition (where they were instructed to help). Prosocial motivation was subsequently assessed by measuring the amount children helped an absent peer in the face of an attractive alternative game. The 5-year-olds provided with choice helped more than the children not provided with choice, and this effect was stronger for girls than for boys. There was no difference between conditions for the 3-year-olds. These results highlight the importance of choice in young children's prosocial development.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004}, Key = {fds326492} } @article{fds326490, Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees, bonobos, and children successfully coordinate in conflict situations.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, Volume = {284}, Number = {1856}, Publisher = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.0259}, Abstract = {Social animals need to coordinate with others to reap the benefits of group-living even when individuals’ interests are misaligned. We compare how chimpanzees, bonobos and children coordinate their actions with a conspecific in a Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict. In study 1, we presented pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and children with an unequal reward distribution. In the critical condition, the preferred reward could only be obtained by waiting for the partner to act, with the risk that if no one acted, both would lose the rewards. Apes and children successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards. Children used a ‘both-partner-pull’ strategy and communicated during the task, while some apes relied on an ‘only-one-partner-pulls’ strategy to solve the task, although there were also signs of strategic behaviour as they waited for their partner to pull when that strategy led to the preferred reward. In study 2, we presented pairs of chimpanzees and bonobos with the same set-up as in study 1 with the addition of a non-social option that provided them with a secure reward. In this situation, apes had to actively decide between the unequal distribution and the alternative. In this set-up, apes maximized their rewards by taking their partners’ potential actions into account. In conclusion, children and apes showed clear instances of strategic decision-making to maximize their own rewards while maintaining successful coordination.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.0259}, Key = {fds326490} } @article{fds320785, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's Intrinsic Motivation to Provide Help Themselves After Accidentally Harming Others.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {88}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1251-1264}, Year = {2017}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12646}, Abstract = {Little is known about the flexibility of children's prosocial motivation. Here, 2- and 3-year-old children's (n = 128) internal arousal, as measured via changes in pupil dilation, was increased after they accidentally harmed a victim but were unable to repair the harm. If they were able to repair (or if they themselves did not cause the harm and the help was provided by someone else) their arousal subsided. This suggests that children are especially motivated to help those whom they have harmed, perhaps out of a sense of guilt and a desire to reconcile with them. Young children care not only about the well-being of others but also about the relationship they have with those who depend on their help.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12646}, Key = {fds320785} } @article{fds325488, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children mostly keep, and expect others to keep, their promises.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {159}, Pages = {140-158}, Year = {2017}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004}, Abstract = {Promises are speech acts that create an obligation to do the promised action. In three studies, we investigated whether 3- and 5-year-olds (N=278) understand the normative implications of promising in prosocial interactions. In Study 1, children helped a partner who promised to share stickers. When the partner failed to uphold the promise, 3- and 5-year-olds protested and referred to promise norms. In Study 2, when children in this same age range were asked to promise to continue a cleaning task-and they agreed-they persisted longer on the task and mentioned their obligation more frequently than without such a promise. They also persisted longer after a promise than after a cleaning reminder (Study 3). In prosocial interactions, thus, young children feel a normative obligation to keep their promises and expect others to keep their promises as well.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004}, Key = {fds325488} } @article{fds327020, Author = {Schmelz, M and Grueneisen, S and Kabalak, A and Jost, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees return favors at a personal cost.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {114}, Number = {28}, Pages = {7462-7467}, Year = {2017}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1700351114}, Abstract = {Humans regularly provide others with resources at a personal cost to themselves. Chimpanzees engage in some cooperative behaviors in the wild as well, but their motivational underpinnings are unclear. In three experiments, chimpanzees (<i>Pan troglodytes</i>) always chose between an option delivering food both to themselves and a partner and one delivering food only to themselves. In one condition, a conspecific partner had just previously taken a personal risk to make this choice available. In another condition, no assistance from the partner preceded the subject's decision. Chimpanzees made significantly more prosocial choices after receiving their partner's assistance than when no assistance was given (experiment 1) and, crucially, this was the case even when choosing the prosocial option was materially costly for the subject (experiment 2). Moreover, subjects appeared sensitive to the risk of their partner's assistance and chose prosocially more often when their partner risked losing food by helping (experiment 3). These findings demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees are willing to incur a material cost to deliver rewards to a conspecific, but only if that conspecific previously assisted them, and particularly when this assistance was risky. Some key motivations involved in human cooperation thus may have deeper phylogenetic roots than previously suspected.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1700351114}, Key = {fds327020} } @article{fds326494, Author = {Haux, L and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do young children preferentially trust gossip or firsthand observation in choosing a collaborative partner?}, Journal = {Social Development}, Volume = {26}, Number = {3}, Pages = {466-474}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2017}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sode.12225}, Abstract = {From early on in ontogeny, young children hear things being said about particular individuals. Here we investigate the ways in which testimony with social content, that is, gossip, influences children's decision-making. We explored whether five-year-old (N = 72) and seven-year-old (N = 72) children trust gossip or firsthand observation in a partner choice setting. Seven-year-old children preferentially trusted what they had seen firsthand over gossip; five-year-old children, in contrast, did not differentiate between these two sources of information. However, five-year-old children (but not seven-year-olds) generally gave negative information more weight, that is, they showed a “negativity bias.” These results suggest that at around school age, young children become more “epistemically vigilant” about gossip.}, Doi = {10.1111/sode.12225}, Key = {fds326494} } @article{fds328849, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Duguid, S and Saur, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children, chimpanzees, and bonobos adjust the visibility of their actions for cooperators and competitors.}, Journal = {Scientific reports}, Volume = {7}, Number = {1}, Pages = {8504}, Year = {2017}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees and bonobos are highly capable of tracking other's mental states. It has been proposed, however, that in contrast to humans, chimpanzees are only able to do this in competitive interactions but this has rarely been directly tested. Here, pairs of chimpanzees or bonobos (Study 1) and 4-year-old children (Study 2) were presented with two almost identical tasks differing only regarding the social context. In the cooperation condition, players' interests were matched: they had to make corresponding choices to be mutually rewarded. To facilitate coordination, subjects should thus make their actions visible to their partner whose view was partially occluded. In the competition condition, players' interests were directly opposed: the partner tried to match the subject's choice but subjects were only rewarded if they chose differently, so that they benefited from hiding their actions. The apes successfully adapted their decisions to the social context and their performance was markedly better in the cooperation condition. Children also distinguished between the two contexts, but somewhat surprisingly, performed better in the competitive condition. These findings demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees and bonobos can take into account what others can see in cooperative interactions. Their social-cognitive skills are thus more flexible than previously assumed.}, Doi = {10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7}, Key = {fds328849} } @article{fds328850, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Clift, JB and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social disappointment explains chimpanzees' behaviour in the inequity aversion task.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {284}, Number = {1861}, Pages = {20171502}, Year = {2017}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1502}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees' refusal of less-preferred food when an experimenter has previously provided preferred food to a conspecific has been taken as evidence for a sense of fairness. Here, we present a novel hypothesis-the social disappointment hypothesis-according to which food refusals express chimpanzees' disappointment in the human experimenter for not rewarding them as well as they could have. We tested this hypothesis using a two-by-two design in which food was either distributed by an experimenter or a machine and with a partner present or absent. We found that chimpanzees were more likely to reject food when it was distributed by an experimenter rather than by a machine and that they were not more likely to do so when a partner was present. These results suggest that chimpanzees' refusal of less-preferred food stems from social disappointment in the experimenter and not from a sense of fairness.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.1502}, Key = {fds328850} } @article{fds326493, Author = {Tomasello, M and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I}, Title = {The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of Human Cooperation.}, Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)}, Volume = {28}, Number = {3}, Pages = {274-288}, Year = {2017}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1}, Abstract = {To explain the evolutionary emergence of uniquely human skills and motivations for cooperation, Tomasello et al. (2012, in Current Anthropology 53(6):673-92) proposed the interdependence hypothesis. The key adaptive context in this account was the obligate collaborative foraging of early human adults. Hawkes (2014, in Human Nature 25(1):28-48), following Hrdy (Mothers and Others, Harvard University Press, 2009), provided an alternative account for the emergence of uniquely human cooperative skills in which the key was early human infants' attempts to solicit care and attention from adults in a cooperative breeding context. Here we attempt to reconcile these two accounts. Our composite account accepts Hrdy's and Hawkes's contention that the extremely early emergence of human infants' cooperative skills suggests an important role for cooperative breeding as adaptive context, perhaps in early Homo. But our account also insists that human cooperation goes well beyond these nascent skills to include such things as the communicative and cultural conventions, norms, and institutions created by later Homo and early modern humans to deal with adult problems of social coordination. As part of this account we hypothesize how each of the main stages of human ontogeny (infancy, childhood, adolescence) was transformed during evolution both by infants' cooperative skills "migrating up" in age and by adults' cooperative skills "migrating down" in age.}, Doi = {10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1}, Key = {fds326493} } @article{fds320781, Author = {Hepach, R and Kante, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Toddlers Help a Peer.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {88}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1642-1652}, Year = {2017}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12686}, Abstract = {Toddlers are remarkably prosocial toward adults, yet little is known about their helping behavior toward peers. In the present study with 18- and 30-month-old toddlers (n = 192, 48 dyads per age group), one child needed help reaching an object to continue a task that was engaging for both children. The object was within reach of the second child who helped significantly more often compared to a no-need control condition. The helper also fulfilled the peer's need when the task was engaging only for the child needing help. These findings suggest that toddlers' skills and motivations of helping do not depend on having a competent and helpful recipient, such as an adult, but rather they are much more flexible and general.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12686}, Key = {fds320781} } @article{fds327646, Author = {Kano, F and Krupenye, C and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Submentalizing Cannot Explain Belief-Based Action Anticipation in Apes.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {21}, Number = {9}, Pages = {633-634}, Year = {2017}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011}, Key = {fds327646} } @article{fds328848, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's developing metaethical judgments.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {164}, Pages = {163-177}, Year = {2017}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008}, Abstract = {Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N=136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008}, Key = {fds328848} } @article{fds335758, Author = {Halina, M and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The goal of ape pointing.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {13}, Number = {4}, Pages = {e0195182}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195182}, Abstract = {Captive great apes regularly use pointing gestures in their interactions with humans. However, the precise function of this gesture is unknown. One possibility is that apes use pointing primarily to direct attention (as in "please look at that"); another is that they point mainly as an action request (such as "can you give that to me?"). We investigated these two possibilities here by examining how the looking behavior of recipients affects pointing in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Upon pointing to food, subjects were faced with a recipient who either looked at the indicated object (successful-look) or failed to look at the indicated object (failed-look). We predicted that, if apes point primarily to direct attention, subjects would spend more time pointing in the failed-look condition because the goal of their gesture had not been met. Alternatively, we expected that, if apes point primarily to request an object, subjects would not differ in their pointing behavior between the successful-look and failed-look conditions because these conditions differed only in the looking behavior of the recipient. We found that subjects did differ in their pointing behavior across the successful-look and failed-look conditions, but contrary to our prediction subjects spent more time pointing in the successful-look condition. These results suggest that apes are sensitive to the attentional states of gestural recipients, but their adjustments are aimed at multiple goals. We also found a greater number of individuals with a strong right-hand than left-hand preference for pointing.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0195182}, Key = {fds335758} } @article{fds366591, Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Backus, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Constructively combining languages}, Journal = {Linguistic Approaches to Bilingualism}, Volume = {8}, Number = {3}, Pages = {393-409}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lab.17008.qui}, Abstract = {Language development in bilingual children is often related to differing levels of proficiency. Objective measurements of bilingual development include for example mean length of utterance (MLU). MLU is almost always calculated for each language context (including both monolingual and code-mixed utterances). In the current study, we analyzed the MLUs of three German-English bilingual children, aged 2;3-3;11 separately for the monolingual and code-mixed utterances. Our results showed that language preference was reflected in MLU values: the more children spoke in one language the higher the MLU was in that language. However, it was the mixed utterances that had the highest MLU for all three children. We support the results with a construction type analysis and suggest a potential usage-based explanation for these results based on individual differences in each child's developmental inventory of words and constructions.}, Doi = {10.1075/lab.17008.qui}, Key = {fds366591} } @article{fds366593, Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Identifying partially schematic units in the code-mixing of an English and German speaking child}, Journal = {Linguistic Approaches to Bilingualism}, Volume = {8}, Number = {4}, Pages = {477-501}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lab.15049.qui}, Abstract = {Intra-sentential code-mixing presents a number of puzzles for theories of bilingualism. In this paper, we examine the code-mixed English-German utterances of a young English-German-Spanish trilingual child between 1;10 – 3;1, using both an extensive diary kept by the mother and audio recordings. We address the interplay between lexical and syntactic aspects of language use outlined in the usage-based approach (e.g. Tomasello, 2003). The data suggest that partially schematic constructions play an important role in the code-mixing of this child. In addition, we find, first, that the code-mixing was not mainly the result of lexical gaps. Second, there was more mixing of German function words than content words. Third, code-mixed utterances often consisted of the use of a partially schematic construction with the open slot filled by material from the other language. These results raise a number of important issues for all theoretical approaches to code mixing, which we discuss.}, Doi = {10.1075/lab.15049.qui}, Key = {fds366593} } @article{fds366594, Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees' understanding of social leverage.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {13}, Number = {12}, Pages = {e0207868}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207868}, Abstract = {Social primates can influence others through the control of resources. For instance, dominant male chimpanzees might allow subordinates access to mate with females in exchange for social support. However, little is known about how chimpanzees strategically use a position of leverage to maximize their own benefits. We address this question by presenting dyads of captive chimpanzee (N = 6) with a task resulting in an unequal reward distribution. To gain the higher reward each individual should wait for their partner to act. In addition, one participant had leverage: access to an alternative secure reward. By varying the presence and value of the leverage we tested whether individuals used it strategically (e.g. by waiting longer for partners to act when they had leverage in the form of alternatives). Additionally, non-social controls served to show if chimpanzees understood the social dilemma. We measured the likelihood to choose the leverage and their latencies to act. The final decision made by the chimpanzees did not differ as a function of condition (test versus non-social control) or the value of the leverage, but they did wait longer to act when the leverage was smaller-particularly in test (versus non-social control) trials suggesting that they understood the conflict of interest involved. The chimpanzees thus recognized the existence of social leverage, but did not use it strategically to maximize their rewards.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0207868}, Key = {fds366594} } @article{fds330413, Author = {Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making with peers.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {166}, Pages = {549-566}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018}, Abstract = {In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality of their respective proposals with their partners. In the main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were presented with a novel animal. In the key condition, children in a dyad individually received conflicting information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs. sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups were able to reliably settle on the option with the best supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision, children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried to convince children to change their minds by producing meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change their minds if their information was unreliable. These results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine the evidence emerges only during the early school years.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018}, Key = {fds330413} } @article{fds330414, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Concern for Group Reputation Increases Prosociality in Young Children.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {29}, Number = {2}, Pages = {181-190}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617733830}, Abstract = {The motivation to build and maintain a positive personal reputation promotes prosocial behavior. But individuals also identify with their groups, and so it is possible that the desire to maintain or enhance group reputation may have similar effects. Here, we show that 5-year-old children actively invest in the reputation of their group by acting more generously when their group's reputation is at stake. Children shared significantly more resources with fictitious other children not only when their individual donations were public rather than private but also when their group's donations (effacing individual donations) were public rather than private. These results provide the first experimental evidence that concern for group reputation can lead to higher levels of prosociality.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797617733830}, Key = {fds330414} } @article{fds332050, Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The reasons young children give to peers when explaining their judgments of moral and conventional rules.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {54}, Number = {2}, Pages = {254-262}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000424}, Abstract = {Moral justifications work, when they do, by invoking values that are shared in the common ground of the interlocutors. We asked 3- and 5-year-old peer dyads (N = 144) to identify and punish norm transgressors. In the moral condition, the transgressor violated a moral norm (e.g., by stealing); in the social rules condition, she/he violated a context-specific rule (e.g., by placing a yellow toy in a green box, instead of a yellow box). Children in both age groups justified their punishment in the social rules condition mostly by referring to the rule (e.g., "He must put yellow toys in the yellow box"). In contrast, in the moral condition they mostly justified their punishment by simply referring to the observed fact (e.g., "He stole"), seeing no need to state the norm involved (e.g., "He must not steal"), presumably because they assumed this as part of their moral common ground with their partner. These results suggest that preschoolers assume certain common ground moral values with their peers and use these in formulating explicit moral judgments and justifications. (PsycINFO Database Record}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000424}, Key = {fds332050} } @article{fds329017, Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children are more willing to accept group decisions in which they have had a voice.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {166}, Pages = {67-78}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003}, Abstract = {People accept an unequal distribution of resources if they judge that the decision-making process was fair. In this study, 3- and 5-year-old children played an allocation game with two puppets. The puppets decided against a fair distribution in all conditions, but they allowed children to have various degrees of participation in the decision-making process. Children of both ages protested less when they were first asked to agree with the puppets' decision compared with when there was no agreement. When ignored, the younger children protested less than the older children-perhaps because they did not expect to have a say in the process-whereas they protested more when they were given an opportunity to voice their opinion-perhaps because their stated opinion was ignored. These results suggest that during the preschool years, children begin to expect to be asked for their opinion in a decision, and they accept disadvantageous decisions if they feel that they have had a voice in the decision-making process.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003}, Key = {fds329017} } @article{fds329386, Author = {Domberg, A and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts.}, Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology}, Volume = {36}, Number = {1}, Pages = {64-77}, Year = {2018}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12213}, Abstract = {We report two studies that demonstrate how five- and seven-year-olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more 'two-sided' arguments. Also, seven-year-olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions. Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations. By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals). What the present study adds? Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production. Seven-year-olds are more strategic than five-year-olds in their reasoning with peers. Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.}, Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12213}, Key = {fds329386} } @article{fds331567, Author = {Vaish, A and Hepach, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The specificity of reciprocity: Young children reciprocate more generously to those who intentionally benefit them.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {167}, Pages = {336-353}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2018}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005}, Abstract = {Young children engage in direct reciprocity, but the mechanisms underlying such reciprocity remain unclear. In particular, prior work leaves unclear whether children's reciprocity is simply a response to receiving benefits (regardless of whether the benefits were intended) or driven by a mechanism of rewarding or preferring all benefactors (regardless of whom they benefited). Alternatively, perhaps children engage in genuine reciprocity such that they are particularly prosocial toward benefactors who intentionally provided them with benefits. Our findings support this third, richer possibility; the 3-year-olds who received benefits through the good intentions of a benefactor were subsequently more generous toward the benefactor than children who either (a) received the same benefits from the benefactor unintentionally or (b) observed the benefactor bestow the same benefits on another individual. Thus, young children are especially motivated to benefit those who have demonstrated goodwill toward them, suggesting, as one possible mechanism, an early sense of gratitude.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005}, Key = {fds331567} } @article{fds351573, Author = {Li, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The development of intention-based sociomoral judgment and distribution behavior from a third-party stance.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {167}, Pages = {78-92}, Year = {2018}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.021}, Abstract = {The current study investigated children's intention-based sociomoral judgments and distribution behavior from a third-party stance. An actor puppet showed either positive or negative intention toward a target puppet, which had previously performed a prosocial or antisocial action toward others (i.e., children witnessed various types of indirect reciprocity). Children (3- and 5-year-olds) were asked to make sociomoral judgments and to distribute resources to the actor puppet. Results showed that 5-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to be influenced by intention when they made their judgment and distributed resources. The target's previous actions affected only 5-year-olds' intent-based social preference. These results suggest that children's judgments about intent-based indirect reciprocity develop from ages 3 to 5 years.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.021}, Key = {fds351573} } @article{fds333647, Author = {House, BR and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Modeling social norms increasingly influences costly sharing in middle childhood.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {171}, Pages = {84-98}, Year = {2018}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014}, Abstract = {Prosocial and normative behavior emerges in early childhood, but substantial changes in prosocial behavior in middle childhood may be due to it becoming integrated with children's understanding of what is normative. Here we show that information about what is normative begins influencing children's costly sharing in middle childhood in a sample of 6- to 11-year-old German children. Information about what is normative was most influential when indicating what was "right" (i.e., "The right thing is to choose this"). It was less influential when indicating what was prescribed by a rule (i.e., "There is a rule that says to choose this") or when it indicated what the majority of people do (i.e., "Most people choose this"). These findings support the idea that middle childhood is when social norms begin to shape children's costly sharing and provide insight into the psychological foundations of the relationship between norms and prosocial behavior.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014}, Key = {fds333647} } @article{fds366589, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Precís of a natural history of human morality}, Journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, Volume = {31}, Number = {5}, Pages = {661-668}, Year = {2018}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1486605}, Abstract = {Here I summarize the main points in my 2016 book, A Natural History of Human Morality. Taking an evolutionary point of view, I characterize human morality as a special form of cooperation. In particular, human morality represents a kind of we > me orientation and valuation that emanates from the logic of social interdependence, both at the level of individual collaboration and at the level of the cultural group. Human morality emanates from psychological processes of shared intentionality evolved to enable individuals to function effectively in ever more cooperative lifeways.}, Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2018.1486605}, Key = {fds366589} } @article{fds366590, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response to commentators}, Journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, Volume = {31}, Number = {5}, Pages = {817-829}, Year = {2018}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1486604}, Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2018.1486604}, Key = {fds366590} } @article{fds337395, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {115}, Number = {34}, Pages = {8491-8498}, Year = {2018}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804761115}, Abstract = {To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must understand that their actions are determined not by reality but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not possible with current theories based on individual cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing that the key processes in constructing an understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in such social and mental coordination involves species-unique skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive function to coordinate the different perspectives involved. This shared intentionality account accords well with documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great apes and human children, and it explains why infants and apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only older children pass others.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1804761115}, Key = {fds337395} } @article{fds335757, Author = {Bohn, M and Zimmermann, L and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The social-cognitive basis of infants' reference to absent entities.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {177}, Pages = {41-48}, Year = {2018}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024}, Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that infants as young as 12 month of age use pointing to communicate about absent entities. The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that infants do so based on tracking what their interlocutor experienced in a previous shared interaction. The present study addresses this assumption empirically. In three experiments, 12-month-old infants could request additional desired objects by pointing to the location in which these objects were previously located. We systematically varied whether the adult from whom infants were requesting had previously experienced the former content of the location with the infant. Infants systematically adjusted their pointing to the now empty location to what they experienced with the adult previously. These results suggest that infants' ability to communicate about absent referents is based on an incipient form of common ground.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024}, Key = {fds335757} } @article{fds366588, Author = {John, M and Melis, AP and Read, D and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The preference for scarcity: A developmental and comparative perspective}, Journal = {Psychology and Marketing}, Volume = {35}, Number = {8}, Pages = {603-615}, Year = {2018}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.21109}, Abstract = {Human adults often show a preference for scarce over abundant goods. In this paper, we investigate whether this preference was shared by 4- and 6-year-old children as well as chimpanzees, humans’ nearest primate relative. Neither chimpanzees nor 4-year-olds displayed a scarcity preference, but 6-year-olds did, especially in the presence of competitors. We conclude that scarcity preference is a human-unique preference that develops as humans increase their cognitive skills and social experiences with peers and competitors. We explore different potential psychological explanations for scarcity preference and conclude scarcity preference is based on children's fear of missing out an opportunity, especially when dealing with uncertainty or goods of unknown value in the presence of competitors. Furthermore, the results are in line with studies showing that supply-based scarcity increases the desirability of hedonic goods, suggesting that even as early as 6 years of age humans may use scarce goods to feel unique or special.}, Doi = {10.1002/mar.21109}, Key = {fds366588} } @article{fds326700, Author = {Kachel, U and Svetlova, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three-Year-Olds' Reactions to a Partner's Failure to Perform Her Role in a Joint Commitment.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {89}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1691-1703}, Year = {2018}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12816}, Abstract = {When children make a joint commitment to collaborate, obligations are created. Pairs of 3-year-old children (N = 144) made a joint commitment to play a game. In three different conditions the game was interrupted in the middle either because: (a) the partner child intentionally defected, (b) the partner child was ignorant about how to play, or (c) the apparatus broke. The subject child reacted differently in the three cases, protesting normatively against defection (with emotional arousal and later tattling), teaching when the partner seemed to be ignorant, or simply blaming the apparatus when it broke. These results suggest that 3-year-old children are competent in making appropriate normative evaluations of intentions and obligations of collaborative partners.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12816}, Key = {fds326700} } @article{fds333648, Author = {Kachel, G and Moore, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Two-year-olds use adults' but not peers' points.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {21}, Number = {5}, Pages = {e12660}, Year = {2018}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12660}, Abstract = {In the current study, 24- to 27-month-old children (N = 37) used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding places, children used adults' pointing to find a hidden toy significantly more often than they used peers'. In interaction with peers, children's choice behavior was at chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe informative value to adults' but not peers' pointing gestures, and highlight the role of children's social expectations in their communicative development.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12660}, Key = {fds333648} } @article{fds332985, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great Apes and Human Development: A Personal History}, Journal = {Child Development Perspectives}, Volume = {12}, Number = {3}, Pages = {189-193}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2018}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12281}, Abstract = {In this article, I recount my history of research with great apes. From the beginning, the idea was to compare apes to human children, with an eye to discovering facts relevant to describing and explaining processes of human development. The research went through three more or less distinct stages, focusing on communication and social learning, social cognition and theory of mind, and cooperation and shared intentionality. I conclude by identifying problems and prospects for comparative research in developmental psychology.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdep.12281}, Key = {fds332985} } @article{fds349845, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {HOW WE LEARNED TO PUT OUR FATE IN ONE ANOTHER'S HANDS THE ORIGINS OF MORALITY}, Journal = {SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN}, Volume = {319}, Number = {3}, Pages = {70-75}, Publisher = {SPRINGER}, Year = {2018}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0918-70}, Doi = {10.1038/scientificamerican0918-70}, Key = {fds349845} } @article{fds349843, Author = {Stengelin, R and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Why should I trust you? Investigating young children's spontaneous mistrust in potential deceivers}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {48}, Pages = {146-154}, Year = {2018}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.08.006}, Abstract = {Children must learn not to trust everyone to avoid being taken advantage of. In the current study, 5- and 7-year-old children were paired with a partner whose incentives were either congruent (cooperative condition) or conflicting (competitive condition) with theirs. Children of both ages were more likely to mistrust information spontaneously provided by the competitive than the cooperative partner, showing a capacity for detecting contextual effects on incentives. However, a high proportion of children, even at age 7, initially trusted the competitive partner. After being misled once, almost all children mistrusted the partner on a second trial irrespective of the partner's incentives. These results demonstrate that while even school age children are mostly trusting, they are only beginning to spontaneously consider other's incentives when interpreting the truthfulness of their utterances. However, after receiving false information only once they immediately switch to an untrusting attitude.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.08.006}, Key = {fds349843} } @article{fds349844, Author = {Siposova, B and Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M}, Title = {Communicative eye contact signals a commitment to cooperate for young children.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {179}, Pages = {192-201}, Year = {2018}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.010}, Abstract = {Making commitments to cooperate facilitates cooperation. There is a long-standing theoretical debate about how promissory obligations come into existence, and whether linguistic acts (such as saying "I promise") are a necessary part of the process. To inform this debate we experimentally investigated whether even minimal, nonverbal behavior can be taken as a commitment to cooperate, as long as it is communicative. Five- to 7-year-old children played a Stag Hunt coordination game in which they needed to decide whether to cooperate or play individually. During the decision-making phase, children's partner made either ostensive, communicative eye contact or looked non-communicatively at them. In Study 1 we found that communicative looks produced an expectation of collaboration in children. In Study 2 we found that children in the communicative look condition normatively protested when their partner did not cooperate, thus showing an understanding of the communicative looks as a commitment to cooperate. This is the first experimental evidence, in adults or children, that in the right context, communicative, but not non-communicative, looks can signal a commitment.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.010}, Key = {fds349844} } @article{fds366587, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The normative turn in early moral development}, Journal = {Human Development}, Volume = {61}, Number = {4-5}, Pages = {248-263}, Year = {2018}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000492802}, Abstract = {The Cooperation Theory of moral development starts from the premise that morality is a special form of cooperation. Before 3 years of age, children help and share with others prosocially, and they collaborate with others in ways that foster a sense of equally deserving partners. But then, at around the age of 3, their social interactions are transformed by an emerging understanding of, and respect for, normative standards. Three-year-olds become capable of making and respecting joint commitments, treating collaborative partners fairly, enforcing social norms, and feeling guilty when they violate any of these. The almost simultaneous emergence of a normative attitude in all of these interactional contexts demands explanation. We suggest a transactional causal model: the maturation of capacities for shared intentionality (adaptations for cultural life) makes possible new forms of cooperative social interaction, and these new forms of cooperative social interaction foster and guide moral development.}, Doi = {10.1159/000492802}, Key = {fds366587} } @article{fds349840, Author = {Kachel, U and Tomasello, M}, Title = {3- and 5-year-old children's adherence to explicit and implicit joint commitments.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {55}, Number = {1}, Pages = {80-88}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000632}, Abstract = {The problem with collaboration is that there are temptations to defect. Explicit joint commitments are designed to mitigate some of the risks, but people also feel committed to others implicitly when they both know together that they each hold the other's fate in their hands. In the current study, pairs of 3-year-old and 5-year-old children (<i>N</i> = 192) played a collaborative game. One child was offered individual rewards (bribed) to opt out of the collaboration. In 3 different conditions, the level of the commitment was manipulated. Three-year-old children were more likely to resist the bribes when there was an explicit joint commitment to the partner than when they were only playing in parallel, with their reactions to an implicit commitment falling in between. Five-year-olds were more likely to resist bribes in both the implicit and explicit commitment conditions than in the no-commitment condition. Thus, children at both ages showed some level of commitment to a collaborative partner in the face of bribes to defect, but only 5-year-olds clearly appreciated that a common-ground understanding of interdependence between partners generates an implicit commitment or obligation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000632}, Key = {fds349840} } @article{fds349841, Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers consider (absent) others when choosing a distribution procedure.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {14}, Number = {8}, Pages = {e0221186}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221186}, Abstract = {This study investigated how the presence of others and anticipated distributions for self influence children's fairness-related decisions in two different socio-moral contexts. In the first part, three- and five-year-old children (N = 120) decided between a fair and an unfair wheel of fortune to allocate resources (procedural justice). In the second part, they directly chose between two distributions of resources (distributive justice). While making a decision, each child was either observed by the affected group members (public), alone (private), or no others were introduced (non-social control). Children choose the fair option more often when others were affected (independently of their presence) only in the procedural justice task. These results suggest that using a fair procedure to distribute resources allows young preschoolers to overcome selfish tendencies.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0221186}, Key = {fds349841} } @article{fds349842, Author = {John, M and Duguid, S and Tomasello, M and Melis, AP}, Title = {How chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) share the spoils with collaborators and bystanders.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {14}, Number = {9}, Pages = {e0222795}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222795}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees hunt cooperatively in the wild, but the factors influencing food sharing after the hunt are not well understood. In an experimental study, groups of three captive chimpanzees obtained a monopolizable food resource, either via two individuals cooperating (with the third as bystander) or via one individual acting alone alongside two bystanders. The individual that obtained the resource first retained most of the food but the other two individuals attempted to obtain food from the "captor" by begging. We found the main predictor of the overall amount of food obtained by bystanders was proximity to the food at the moment it was obtained by the captor. Whether or not an individual had cooperated to obtain the food had no effect. Interestingly, however, cooperators begged more from captors than did bystanders, suggesting that they were more motivated or had a greater expectation to obtain food. These results suggest that while chimpanzee captors in cooperative hunting may not reward cooperative participation directly, cooperators may influence sharing behavior through increased begging.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0222795}, Key = {fds349842} } @article{fds366586, Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees and children avoid mutual defection in a social dilemma}, Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior}, Volume = {40}, Number = {1}, Pages = {46-54}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.07.004}, Abstract = {Cooperation often comes with the temptation to defect and benefit at the cost of others. This tension between cooperation and defection is best captured in social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma. Adult humans have specific strategies to maintain cooperation during Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. Yet, little is known about the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of human decision-making strategies in conflict scenarios. To shed light on this question, we compared the strategies used by chimpanzees and 5-year old children to overcome a social dilemma. In our task, waiting for the partner to act first produced the best results for the subject. Alternatively, they could mutually cooperate and divide the rewards. Our findings indicate that the two species differed substantially in their strategies to solve the task. Chimpanzees became more strategic across the study period by waiting longer to act in the social dilemma. Children developed a more efficient strategy of taking turns to reciprocate their rewards. Moreover, children used specific types of communication to coordinate with their partners. These results suggest that while both species behaved strategically to overcome a conflict situation, only children engaged in active cooperation to solve a social dilemma.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.07.004}, Key = {fds366586} } @article{fds349839, Author = {Rapp, DJ and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's reputational strategies in a peer group context.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {55}, Number = {2}, Pages = {329-336}, Year = {2019}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000639}, Abstract = {Reputational concerns are known to promote cooperation. Individuals regularly act more prosocially when their behavior is observable by others. Here, we investigate 4- and 5-year-old (N = 144) children's reputational strategies in a competitive group setting. The aim of the current study was to explore whether children's sharing behavior is affected by the future possibility of being singled out publicly as the most generous or, alternatively, the least generous member of the group. Children were told that they could share stickers with other children and that the picture of either the (1) most generous or (2) least generous donor would be displayed publicly. In both conditions, children shared significantly more than in a control condition. Moreover, 5-year-old, but not 4-year-old children's sharing was affected more by the possibility of being presented as the most generous than being presented as the least generous member of the group. This study is the first to show that children as young as 4 invest in their future reputation and that by age 5 children flexibly apply different reputational strategies depending on context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000639}, Key = {fds349839} } @article{fds329385, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Müller, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The relation between young children's physiological arousal and their motivation to help others.}, Journal = {Neuropsychologia}, Volume = {126}, Pages = {113-119}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010}, Abstract = {Children are motivated to help others from an early age. However, little is known about the internal biological mechanisms underlying their motivation to help. Here, we compiled data from five separate studies in which children, ranging in age from 18 months to 5.5 years, witnessed an adult needing help. In all studies, we assessed both (1) children's internal physiological arousal via changes in their pupil dilation, and (2) the latency and likelihood of them providing help. The results showed that the greater the baseline-corrected change in children's internal arousal in response to witnessing the need situation, the faster and more likely children were to help the adult. This was not the case for the baseline measure of children's tonic arousal state. Together, these results suggest that children's propensity to help is systematically related to their physiological arousal after they witness others needing help. This sheds new light on the biological mechanisms underlying not only young children's social perception but also their prosocial motivation more generally.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010}, Key = {fds329385} } @article{fds349836, Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Natural reference: A phylo- and ontogenetic perspective on the comprehension of iconic gestures and vocalizations.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {e12757}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12757}, Abstract = {The recognition of iconic correspondence between signal and referent has been argued to bootstrap the acquisition and emergence of language. Here, we study the ontogeny, and to some extent the phylogeny, of the ability to spontaneously relate iconic signals, gestures, and/or vocalizations, to previous experience. Children at 18, 24, and 36 months of age (N = 216) and great apes (N = 13) interacted with two apparatuses, each comprising a distinct action and sound. Subsequently, an experimenter mimicked either the action, the sound, or both in combination to refer to one of the apparatuses. Experiments 1 and 2 found no spontaneous comprehension in great apes and in 18-month-old children. At 24 months of age, children were successful with a composite vocalization-gesture signal but not with either vocalization or gesture alone. At 36 months, children succeeded both with a composite vocalization-gesture signal and with gesture alone, but not with vocalization alone. In general, gestures were understood better compared to vocalizations. Experiment 4 showed that gestures were understood irrespective of how children learned about the corresponding action (through observation or self-experience). This pattern of results demonstrates that iconic signals can be a powerful way to establish reference in the absence of language, but they are not trivial for children to comprehend and not all iconic signals are created equal.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12757}, Key = {fds349836} } @article{fds349837, Author = {Herrmann, E and Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children engage in competitive altruism.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {179}, Pages = {176-189}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.008}, Abstract = {Humans cultivate their reputations as good cooperators, sometimes even competing with group mates, to appear most cooperative to individuals during the process of selecting partners. To investigate the ontogenetic origins of such "competitive altruism," we presented 5- and 8-year-old children with a dyadic sharing game in which both children simultaneously decided how many rewards to share with each other. The children were either observed by a third-person peer or not. In addition, the children either knew that one of them would be picked for a subsequent collaborative game or had no such knowledge. We found that by 8 years of age, children were more generous in the sharing game not only when their behavior was observed by a third party but also when it could affect their chances of being chosen for a subsequent game. This is the first demonstration of competitive altruism in young children, and as such it underscores the important role of partner choice (and individual awareness of the process) in encouraging human cooperation from an early age.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.008}, Key = {fds349837} } @article{fds349838, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children use rules to coordinate in a social dilemma.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {179}, Pages = {362-374}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.001}, Abstract = {Humans are frequently required to coordinate their actions in social dilemmas (e.g. when one of two drivers has to yield for the other at an intersection). This is commonly achieved by individuals following communally known rules that prescribe how people should behave. From relatively early in development, children swiftly pick up the rules of their culture and even start creating game rules among peers. Thus far, however, little is known about children's abilities create rules to regulate their own interactions in social dilemma situations in which individuals' interests are partially in conflict. Here, we repeatedly selected dyads of children (5- and 8-year-olds, N = 144) at random from a group and presented them with a chicken game - a social dilemma in which individuals have conflicting motives but coordination is required to avoid mutual failure. In game breaks, groups reconvened and had the opportunity to think of additional game rules. Eight- but not five-year-olds readily came up with and agreed upon impartial rules to guide their subsequent game behavior (but only after adult prompting). Moreover, when playing by the self-made rules, children achieved higher payoffs, had fewer conflicts, and coordinated with greater efficiency than when playing without a rule - which mimics the functional consequences of rules on a societal level. These findings suggest that by at least age 8, children are capable of using rules to independently self-regulate potential conflicts of interest with peers.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.001}, Key = {fds349838} } @article{fds349835, Author = {Melis, AP and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) coordinate by communicating in a collaborative problem-solving task.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {286}, Number = {1901}, Pages = {20190408}, Year = {2019}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0408}, Abstract = {Successful collaboration often relies on individuals' capacity to communicate with each other. Despite extensive research on chimpanzee communication, there is little evidence that chimpanzees are capable, without extensive human training, of regulating collaborative activities via communication. This study investigated whether pairs of chimpanzees were capable of communicating to ensure coordination during collaborative problem-solving. The chimpanzee pairs needed two tools to extract fruits from an apparatus. The communicator in each pair could see the location of the tools (hidden in one of two boxes), whereas only the recipient could open the boxes. The subjects were first successfully tested for their capacity to understand the pointing gestures of a human who indicated the location of the tools. In a subsequent conspecifics test, the communicator increasingly communicated the tools' location, by approaching the baited box and giving the key needed to open it to the recipients. The recipient used these signals and obtained the tools, transferring one of the tools to the communicator so that the pair could collaborate in obtaining the fruits. The study suggests that chimpanzees have the necessary socio-cognitive skills to naturally develop a simple communicative strategy to ensure coordination in a collaborative task.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2019.0408}, Key = {fds349835} } @article{fds349833, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The moral psychology of obligation.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {43}, Pages = {e56}, Year = {2019}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19001742}, Abstract = {Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent "we," which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration - scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group - this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that "we" put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this "we") to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19001742}, Key = {fds349833} } @article{fds349834, Author = {Knofe, H and Engelmann, J and Tomasello, M and Herrmann, E}, Title = {Chimpanzees monopolize and children take turns in a limited resource problem.}, Journal = {Scientific reports}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {7597}, Year = {2019}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-44096-4}, Abstract = {Competition over scarce resources is common across the animal kingdom. Here we investigate the strategies of chimpanzees and children in a limited resource problem. Both species were presented with a tug-of-war apparatus in which each individual in a dyad received a tool to access a reward, but tools could not be used simultaneously. We assessed the equality of tool use as well as the frequency of turn taking. Both species managed to overcome this conflict of interest but used different strategies to do so. While there was substantial variation in chimpanzee behaviour, monopolization was the common course of action: tool use was asymmetric with individual chimpanzees monopolizing the resource. In children, turn-taking emerged as the dominant strategy: tool use was symmetric and children alternated access to the tool at a high rate. These results suggest that while both species possess strategies for solving limited resource problems, humans might have evolved species unique motivations and socio-cognitive skills for dealing with such conflicts of interest.}, Doi = {10.1038/s41598-019-44096-4}, Key = {fds349834} } @article{fds349832, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's Sense of Fairness as Equal Respect.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {23}, Number = {6}, Pages = {454-463}, Year = {2019}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.03.001}, Abstract = {One influential view holds that children's sense of fairness emerges at age 8 and is rooted in the development of an aversion to unequal resource distributions. Here, we suggest two amendments to this view. First, we argue and present evidence that children's sense of fairness emerges already at age 3 in (and only in) the context of collaborative activities. This is because, in our theoretical view, collaboration creates a sense of equal respect among partners. Second, we argue and present evidence that children's judgments about what is fair are essentially judgments about the social meaning of the distributive act; for example, children accept unequal distributions if the procedure gave everyone an equal chance (so-called distributive justice). Children thus respond to unequal (and other) distributions not based on material concerns, but rather based on interpersonal concerns: they want equal respect.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2019.03.001}, Key = {fds349832} } @article{fds332984, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Thirty years of great ape gestures.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {22}, Number = {4}, Pages = {461-469}, Year = {2019}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1}, Abstract = {We and our colleagues have been doing studies of great ape gestural communication for more than 30 years. Here we attempt to spell out what we have learned. Some aspects of the process have been reliably established by multiple researchers, for example, its intentional structure and its sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient. Other aspects are more controversial. We argue here that it is a mistake to assimilate great ape gestures to the species-typical displays of other mammals by claiming that they are fixed action patterns, as there are many differences, including the use of attention-getters. It is also a mistake, we argue, to assimilate great ape gestures to human gestures by claiming that they are used referentially and declaratively in a human-like manner, as apes' "pointing" gesture has many limitations and they do not gesture iconically. Great ape gestures constitute a unique form of primate communication with their own unique qualities.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1}, Key = {fds332984} } @article{fds349830, Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Visually attending to a video together facilitates great ape social closeness.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {286}, Number = {1907}, Pages = {20190488}, Year = {2019}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0488}, Abstract = {Humans create social closeness with one another through a variety of shared social activities in which they align their emotions or mental states towards an external stimulus such as dancing to music together, playing board games together or even engaging in minimal shared experiences such as watching a movie together. Although these specific behaviours would seem to be uniquely human, it is unclear whether the underlying psychology is unique to the species, or if other species might possess some form of this psychological mechanism as well. Here we show that great apes who have visually attended to a video together with a human (study 1) and a conspecific (study 2) subsequently approach that individual faster (study 1) or spend more time in their proximity (study 2) than when they had attended to something different. Our results suggest that one of the most basic mechanisms of human social bonding-feeling closer to those with whom we act or attend together-is present in both humans and great apes, and thus has deeper evolutionary roots than previously suspected.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2019.0488}, Key = {fds349830} } @article{fds349831, Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Correct Non-Conforming Actions by Others.}, Journal = {Infancy : the official journal of the International Society on Infant Studies}, Volume = {24}, Number = {4}, Pages = {613-635}, Year = {2019}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12292}, Abstract = {At around their third birthday, children begin to enforce social norms on others impersonally, often using generic normative language, but little is known about the developmental building blocks of this abstract norm understanding. Here, we investigate whether even toddlers show signs of enforcing on others interpersonally how "we" do things. In an initial dyad, 18-month-old infants learnt a simple game-like action from an adult. In two experiments, the adult either engaged infants in a normative interactive activity (stressing that this is the way "we" do it) or, as a non-normative control, marked the same action as idiosyncratic, based on individual preference. In a test dyad, infants had the opportunity to spontaneously intervene when a puppet partner performed an alternative action. Infants intervened, corrected, and directed the puppet more in the normative than in the non-normative conditions. These findings suggest that, during the second year of life, infants develop second-personal normative expectations about their partner's behavior ("You should do X!") in social interactions, thus making an important step toward understanding the normative structure of human cultural activities. These simple normative expectations will later be scaled up to group-minded and abstract social norms.}, Doi = {10.1111/infa.12292}, Key = {fds349831} } @article{fds349829, Author = {Kachel, U and Svetlova, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Three- and 5-year-old children's understanding of how to dissolve a joint commitment.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {184}, Pages = {34-47}, Year = {2019}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.03.008}, Abstract = {When young children form a joint commitment with a partner, they understand that this agreement generates obligations. In this study, we investigated whether young children understand that joint commitments, and their associated obligations, may likewise be dissolved by agreement. The participants (3- and 5-year-olds; N = 144) formed a joint commitment with a puppet to play a collaborative game. In one condition, the puppet asked permission to break off and the children agreed; in a second condition, the puppet notified the children of his or her leaving; and in a third condition, the puppet just left abruptly. Children at both ages protested more and waited longer for the puppet's return (and said that the puppet deserved scolding and no prize at the end) when the puppet left abruptly than in the other two conditions (with "asking permission" leading to the least protest of all). Overall, 3-year-olds protested more, and waited longer for the partner's return, than 5-year-olds. Preschool children understand that the obligations of a joint commitment may be dissolved by agreement or, to a lesser degree, by notification.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.03.008}, Key = {fds349829} } @article{fds349828, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Respect Defended.}, Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences}, Volume = {23}, Number = {9}, Pages = {716-717}, Year = {2019}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.001}, Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.001}, Key = {fds349828} } @article{fds349827, Author = {Domberg, A and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children choose to reason with partners who submit to reason}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {52}, Year = {2019}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100824}, Abstract = {When reasoning with others, the reasons used in an exchange can have varying degrees of quality, irrespective of the facts under discussion. Partners often evaluate one another's evaluation of reasons – one another's reasoning. Can children evaluate their partner's judgment of the quality of reasons independent of objective truth? 5- and 7-year-olds (N = 122) chose among two partners for cooperation. In the experimental condition, one acceded to a good reason, the other to a poor reason. In the control condition, each agreed to a different good reason. Crucially, in both conditions, both partners arrived at the wrong conclusion. Results suggested that 7-year-olds, and 5-year-olds to a lesser degree, chose the partner who endorsed the good reason in the experimental condition, but showed no preference for partners in the control condition. Thus, young children distinguish good from poor reasons, even if neither leads to success, and choose partners who do the same.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100824}, Key = {fds349827} } @article{fds349821, Author = {Isella, M and Kanngiesser, P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's Selective Trust in Promises.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {90}, Number = {6}, Pages = {e868-e887}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13105}, Abstract = {There has been extensive research into the development of selective trust in testimony, but little is known about the development of selective trust in promises. The present research investigates children's (N = 264) selective trust in others' promises to help. In Study 1, 6-year-olds selectively trusted speakers who had previously kept a promise. In Study 2, 5-year-olds displayed selective trust for speakers who had previously kept a prosocial promise (promise to help). In Study 3, 5-year-olds trusted a speaker, who kept a prosocial promise, over a helper. These data suggest that from the age of 5 children show selective trust in others' promises using prosociality, promise keeping, or both to inform their judgments.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13105}, Key = {fds349821} } @article{fds349822, Author = {Zhang, Z and Grocke, P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The influence of intention and outcome on young children's reciprocal sharing.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {187}, Pages = {104645}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.05.012}, Abstract = {This study investigated the influence of underlying intentions and outcomes of a partner's sharing behavior on young children's reciprocity. We provided 3- and 5-year-old children with the opportunity to share with a partner following different treatments of a partner's intention (to share or not to share) that led to different outcomes (children got or did not get stickers from their partner). For the 3-year-olds, we found that the outcome of the previous interaction influenced how much they shared, whereas the intention of their partner affected how readily they initiated sharing in response to social cues. For the 5-year-olds, we found that both outcome and intention affected how much they shared as well as how readily they initiated sharing. This suggests that already 3-year-olds are able to take into account outcome and intention information separately in reciprocal sharing. However, only 5-year-olds can combine both to flexibly maintain social interactions without running the risk of being exploited by others.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.05.012}, Key = {fds349822} } @article{fds349823, Author = {Hardecker, S and Buryn-Weitzel, JC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Adult instruction limits children's flexibility in moral decision making.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {187}, Pages = {104652}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.005}, Abstract = {Children's moral behavior is guided, in part, by adults teaching children how to treat others. However, when circumstances change, such instructions may become either unhelpful or limiting. In the current study, 48 dyads of 5-year-olds played a collaborative game and either (a) received an instruction by an adult to share the spoils of the game equally, (b) did not receive any instruction (but still chose to share equally), or (c) agreed between themselves on a rule to share equally. Afterward, each child played with a new partner who was needier or worked harder in his or her collaboration and so plausibly deserved more than just half of the spoils. Results showed that children who were instructed by an adult shared less with their more deserving partner than children who did not receive any instruction. Thus, moral instruction by adults may, in some circumstances, make children more rigid in their moral decisions.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.005}, Key = {fds349823} } @article{fds349824, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Zeidler, H and Haun, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's respect for ownership across diverse societies.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {55}, Number = {11}, Pages = {2286-2298}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000787}, Abstract = {Ownership is a cornerstone of many human societies and can be understood as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals refrain from taking each other's property. Owners can thus trust others to respect their property even in their absence. We investigated this principle in 5- to 7-year-olds (N = 152) from 4 diverse societies. Children participated in a resource task with a peer-partner, where we established ownership by assigning children to one side or the other of an apparatus and by marking resources with colors to help children keep track of them. When retrieving resources in the partner's presence, the majority of children took their own things and respected what belonged to their partner. A proportion of children in all societies also respected ownership in their partner's absence, although the strength of respect varied considerably across societies. We discuss implications for the development of ownership concepts and possible explanations for societal differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000787}, Key = {fds349824} } @article{fds349825, Author = {Tennie, C and Völter, CJ and Vonau, V and Hanus, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees use observed temporal directionality to learn novel causal relations.}, Journal = {Primates; journal of primatology}, Volume = {60}, Number = {6}, Pages = {517-524}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10329-019-00754-9}, Abstract = {We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal sequence of external events to determine causation. Seventeen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human experimenter press a button in two different conditions. When she pressed the "causal button" the delivery of juice and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In contrast, she pressed the "non-causal button" only after the delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given the opportunity to produce the desired juice delivery themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., the one that preceded the effect. Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even though both buttons were equally associated with juice delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make use of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these findings in relation to the literature on causal inferences as well as associative learning.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10329-019-00754-9}, Key = {fds349825} } @article{fds349826, Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's reasoning with peers and parents about moral dilemmas.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {55}, Number = {11}, Pages = {2324-2335}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000807}, Abstract = {Children encounter moral norms in several different social contexts. Often it is in hierarchically structured interactions with parents or other adults, but sometimes it is in more symmetrically structured interactions with peers. Our question was whether children's discussions of moral norms differ in these two contexts. Consequently, we had 4- and 6-year-old children (<i>N</i> = 72) reason about moral dilemmas with their mothers or peers. Both age groups opposed their partner's views and explicitly justified their own views more often with peers than with mothers. Mothers adapted their discussions to the cognitive levels of their children (e.g., focused more on the abstract moral norms with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children), but almost always with a pedagogical intent. Our results suggest that with mothers, moral judgments are experienced mostly as non-negotiable dictums, but with coequal peers they are experienced more as personal beliefs that can be actively negotiated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000807}, Key = {fds349826} } @article{fds349818, Author = {Bohn, M and Kachel, G and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children spontaneously recreate core properties of language in a new modality.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {116}, Number = {51}, Pages = {26072-26077}, Year = {2019}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1904871116}, Abstract = {How the world's 6,000+ natural languages have arisen is mostly unknown. Yet, new sign languages have emerged recently among deaf people brought together in a community, offering insights into the dynamics of language evolution. However, documenting the emergence of these languages has mostly consisted of studying the end product; the process by which ad hoc signs are transformed into a structured communication system has not been directly observed. Here we show how young children create new communication systems that exhibit core features of natural languages in less than 30 min. In a controlled setting, we blocked the possibility of using spoken language. In order to communicate novel messages, including abstract concepts, dyads of children spontaneously created novel gestural signs. Over usage, these signs became increasingly arbitrary and conventionalized. When confronted with the need to communicate more complex meanings, children began to grammatically structure their gestures. Together with previous work, these results suggest that children have the basic skills necessary, not only to acquire a natural language, but also to spontaneously create a new one. The speed with which children create these structured systems has profound implications for theorizing about language evolution, a process which is generally thought to span across many generations, if not millennia.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1904871116}, Key = {fds349818} } @article{fds349819, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Müller, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Toddlers' intrinsic motivation to return help to their benefactor.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {188}, Pages = {104658}, Year = {2019}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.011}, Abstract = {A natural reaction to receiving help from someone is to help that person in return. In two studies, we investigated the developmental origins of children's motivation to return help. In Study 1, 18- and 24-month-old toddlers were either helped or not helped by an adult, and they could subsequently provide that adult with help or else observe another person providing help. We measured children's internal arousal, via changes in pupil dilation, both before and after help was provided. At both ages, children's internal arousal was higher when they could not help the adult who had previously helped them (and was lower when they could). On the other hand, if the adult needing help had not previously helped children, their internal arousal was equally low regardless of whether they or another person provided the help. Study 2 replicated this result and also found that if children had previously been helped but the person needing help was a different adult (not their benefactor), children's internal arousal was equally low regardless of whether they or another person provided the help. Together, these results suggest that young children are intrinsically motivated to return a received favor specifically to the previous benefactor, perhaps indicating a nascent sense of gratitude.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.011}, Key = {fds349819} } @article{fds349815, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Frickel, R and Tomm, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children, but not great apes, respect ownership.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {23}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e12842}, Year = {2020}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12842}, Abstract = {Access to and control of resources is a major source of costly conflicts. Animals, under some conditions, respect what others control and use (i.e. possession). Humans not only respect possession of resources, they also respect ownership. Ownership can be viewed as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals inhibit their tendency to take others' property on the condition that those others will do the same. We investigated to what degree great apes follow this principle, as compared to human children. We conducted two experiments, in which dyads of individuals could access the same food resources. The main test of respect for ownership was whether individuals would refrain from taking their partner's resources even when the partner could not immediately access and control them. Captive apes (N = 14 dyads) failed to respect their partner's claim on food resources and frequently monopolized the resources when given the opportunity. Human children (N = 14 dyads), tested with a similar apparatus and procedure, respected their partner's claim and made spontaneous verbal references to ownership. Such respect for the property of others highlights the uniquely cooperative nature of human ownership arrangements.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12842}, Key = {fds349815} } @article{fds349816, Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Watching a video together creates social closeness between children and adults.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {189}, Pages = {104712}, Year = {2020}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104712}, Abstract = {Human social relationships are often formed through shared social activities in which individuals share mental states about external stimuli. Previous work on joint attention has shown that even minimal shared experiences such as watching something together facilitates social closeness between individuals. Here, we examined whether young children already connect with others through joint attention. In the current studies, children sat next to a novel adult who either watched a film with them or was not able to see the film and read a book instead. After the video, we measured children's willingness (i.e., latency) to approach the experimenter holding out a toy. In both studies, the 2.5-year-olds who watched the film together approached more quickly than the other children. These results show that both minimally interactive shared experiences and noninteractive shared experiences lead children to feel more comfortable with a novel adult. This suggests that joint attention interactions, and shared experiences in general, play an important role not only in children's cognitive development but also in their social development and the formation of their social relationships.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104712}, Key = {fds349816} } @article{fds349817, Author = {Pouscoulous, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Early birds: Metaphor understanding in 3-year-olds}, Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics}, Volume = {156}, Pages = {160-167}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2020}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2019.05.021}, Abstract = {To assess children's cognitive capacities to understand (rather than explain or paraphrase) metaphors, we investigated how 3-year-olds (n = 36; 3;0–3;3) fare with novel metaphors corresponding to their world knowledge and linguistic competences using a behavioural choice paradigm. In a game, participants had to give the experimenter one of two objects referred to by a metaphorical expression. Unlike what previous literature suggests, our results indicate that 3-year-olds are able to understand novel metaphors that are appropriate for their vocabulary and world knowledge, based on action measures rather than metalinguistic responses. We discuss how factors other than incompetence with pragmatic inferencing can explain difficulties with metaphor comprehension.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2019.05.021}, Key = {fds349817} } @article{fds349813, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The role of roles in uniquely human cognition and sociality}, Journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, Volume = {50}, Number = {1}, Pages = {2-19}, Year = {2020}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12223}, Abstract = {To understand themselves as playing a social role, individuals must understand themselves to be contributing to a cooperative endeavor. Psychologically, the form of cooperation required is a specific type that only humans may possess, namely, one in which individuals form a joint or collective agency to pursue a common end. This begins ontogenetically not with the societal level but rather with more local collaboration between individuals. Participating in collaborative endeavors of this type leads young children, cognitively, to think in terms of different perspectives on a joint focus of attention - including ultimately an objective perspective - and to organize their experience in terms of a relational-thematic-narrative dimension. Socially, such participation leads young children to an understanding of self-other equivalence with mutual respect among collaborative partners and, ultimately, to a normative (i.e. moral) stance toward “we” in the community within which one is forming a moral role or identity. The dual-level structure of shared endeavors/realities with individual roles/perspectives is responsible for many aspects of the human species' most distinctive psychology.}, Doi = {10.1111/jtsb.12223}, Key = {fds349813} } @article{fds349812, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The many faces of obligation.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {43}, Pages = {e89}, Year = {2020}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19002620}, Abstract = {My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general - which are pitched as not totally empirical - and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19002620}, Key = {fds349812} } @article{fds349811, Author = {Schmelz, M and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The psychological mechanisms underlying reciprocal prosociality in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {134}, Number = {2}, Pages = {149-157}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000200}, Abstract = {In both the wild and captivity, chimpanzees engage in reciprocal patterns of prosocial behavior. However, the proximate mechanisms underlying these patterns are unclear. In the current study, we investigated whether chimpanzees prefer to act prosocially toward conspecifics who have directly benefited them (perhaps based on an affective bond) or whether they simply observe the prosocial behavior of others in general (including indirectly to third parties) and preferentially interact with and behave prosocially toward the most prosocial individuals. We found good evidence for direct reciprocity but little evidence for a general (indirect) preference for prosocial individuals. These results suggest that cooperative reciprocity in chimpanzees may be based mostly on social-affective processes and direct interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/com0000200}, Key = {fds349811} } @article{fds349809, Author = {Hepach, R and Benziad, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees help others with what they want; children help them with what they need.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e12922}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12922}, Abstract = {Humans, including young children, are strongly motivated to help others, even paying a cost to do so. Humans' nearest primate relatives, great apes, are likewise motivated to help others, raising the question of whether the motivations of humans and apes are the same. Here we compared the underlying motivation to help in human children and chimpanzees. Both species understood the situation and helped a conspecific in a straightforward situation. However, when helpers knew that what the other was requesting would not actually help her, only children gave her what she needed instead of giving her what she requested. These results suggest that both chimpanzees and human children help others but the underlying motivation for why they help differs. In comparison to chimpanzees, young children help in a paternalistic manner. The evolutionary hypothesis is that uniquely human socio-ecologies based on interdependent cooperation gave rise to uniquely human prosocial motivations to help others paternalistically.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.12922}, Key = {fds349809} } @article{fds349810, Author = {Köymen, B and Jurkat, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Preschoolers refer to direct and indirect evidence in their collaborative reasoning.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {193}, Pages = {104806}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104806}, Abstract = {Collaborative reasoning requires partners to evaluate options and the evidence for or against each option. We investigated whether preschoolers can explain why one option is best (direct reasons) and why the other option is not (indirect reasons), looking at both problems that have a correct answer and those that require choosing the better option. In Study 1, both age groups produced direct reasons equally frequently in both problems. However, 5-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than 3-year-olds, especially when there was a correct answer. In Study 2 with a nonverbal task with a correct answer, 3-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than in Study 1, although 5-year-olds' indirect reasons were more efficiently stated. These results demonstrate that even 3-year-olds, and even nonverbally, can point out to a partner a fact that constitutes a reason for them to arrive at a correct joint decision.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104806}, Key = {fds349810} } @article{fds349820, Author = {Köymen, B and O'Madagain, C and Domberg, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young Children's Ability to Produce Valid and Relevant Counter-Arguments.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {91}, Number = {3}, Pages = {685-693}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13338}, Abstract = {In collaborative problem solving, children produce and evaluate arguments for proposals. We investigated whether 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 192) can produce and evaluate arguments against those arguments (i.e., counter-arguments). In Study 1, each child within a peer dyad was privately given a reason to prefer one over another solution to a task. One child, however, was given further information that would refute the reasoning of their partner. Five-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, identified and produced valid and relevant counter-arguments. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were given discourse training (discourse that contrasted valid and invalid counter-arguments) and then given the same problem-solving tasks. After training, 3-year-olds could also identify and produce valid and relevant counter-arguments. Thus, participating in discourse about reasons facilitates children's counter-argumentation.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13338}, Key = {fds349820} } @article{fds351571, Author = {Duguid, S and Wyman, E and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The strategies used by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens) to solve a simple coordination problem.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000220}, Abstract = {One of the challenges of collaboration is to coordinate decisions with others, and recent theories have proposed that humans, in particular, evolved skills to address this challenge. To test this hypothesis, we compared the coordination abilities of 4-year-old children and chimpanzees with a simple coordination problem. To retrieve a reward from a "puzzle box," pairs of individuals were simply required to choose the same 1 of 4 options. If successful, they each received the same reward, so there were no conflicts of interest. Individuals were paired with multiple partners over time. Both species were able to coordinate, but there were marked differences in the way they did so. Children were able to coordinate quickly and flexibly, adjusting easily to new partners, suggesting an understanding of the coordination process. In contrast, chimpanzees took time to converge on a single solution with each new partner, with no gains across partners, suggesting that their coordination was based only on repeating successful past choices. Together, these results support the hypothesis that humans have evolved unique skills for coordinating decisions and actions with others in the pursuit of common interests. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/com0000220}, Key = {fds351571} } @article{fds349807, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The development of coordination via joint expectations for shared benefits.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {56}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1149-1156}, Year = {2020}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000936}, Abstract = {People frequently need to cooperate despite having strong self-serving motives. In the current study, pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds (<i>N</i> = 160) faced a one-shot coordination problem: To benefit, children had to choose the same of 3 reward divisions. They could not communicate or see each other and thus had to accurately predict each other's choices to succeed. One division split the rewards evenly, while the others each favored one child. Five-year-olds mostly chose the division favorable to themselves, resulting in coordination failure. By contrast, 7-year-olds mostly coordinated successfully by choosing the division that split the rewards equally (even though they behaved selfishly in a control condition in which they could choose independently). This suggests that by age 7, children jointly expect benefits to be shared among interdependent social partners "fairly" and that fair compromises can emanate from a cooperative rationality adapted for social coordination. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0000936}, Key = {fds349807} } @article{fds349805, Author = {Gopnik, A and Frankenhuis, WE and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction to special issue: 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {375}, Number = {1803}, Pages = {20190489}, Year = {2020}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0489}, Abstract = {This special issue focuses on the relationship between life history and learning, especially during human evolution. 'Life history' refers to the developmental programme of an organism, including its period of immaturity, reproductive rate and timing, caregiving investment and longevity. Across many species an extended childhood and high caregiving investment appear to be correlated with particular kinds of plasticity and learning. Human life history is particularly distinctive; humans evolved an exceptionally long childhood and old age, and an unusually high level of caregiving investment, at the same time that they evolved distinctive capacities for cognition and culture. The contributors explore the relations between life history, plasticity and learning across a wide range of methods and populations, including theoretical and empirical work in biology, anthropology and developmental psychology. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2019.0489}, Key = {fds349805} } @article{fds349806, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The adaptive origins of uniquely human sociality.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {375}, Number = {1803}, Pages = {20190493}, Year = {2020}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0493}, Abstract = {Humans possess some unique social-cognitive skills and motivations, involving such things as joint attention, cooperative communication, dual-level collaboration and cultural learning. These are almost certainly adaptations for humans' especially complex sociocultural lives. The common assumption has been that these unique skills and motivations emerge in human infancy and early childhood as preparations for the challenges of adult life, for example, in collaborative foraging. In the current paper, I propose that the curiously early emergence of these skills in infancy--well before they are needed in adulthood--along with other pieces of evidence (such as almost exclusive use with adults not peers) suggests that aspects of the evolution of these skills represent ontogenetic adaptations to the unique socio-ecological challenges human infants face in the context of a regime of cooperative breeding and childcare. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2019.0493}, Key = {fds349806} } @article{fds349808, Author = {Bohn, M and Kordt, C and Braun, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Learning Novel Skills From Iconic Gestures: A Developmental and Evolutionary Perspective.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {31}, Number = {7}, Pages = {873-880}, Year = {2020}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797620921519}, Abstract = {Cumulative cultural learning has been argued to rely on high-fidelity copying of other individuals' actions. Iconic gestures of actions have no physical effect on objects in the world but merely represent actions that would have an effect. Learning from iconic gestures thus requires paying close attention to the teacher's precise bodily movements-a prerequisite for high-fidelity copying. In three studies, we investigated whether 2- and 3-year-old children (<i>N</i> = 122) and great apes (<i>N</i> = 36) learn novel skills from iconic gestures. When faced with a novel apparatus, participants watched an experimenter perform either an iconic gesture depicting the action necessary to open the apparatus or a gesture depicting a different action. Children, but not great apes, profited from iconic gestures, with older children doing so to a larger extent. These results suggest that high-fidelity copying abilities are firmly in place in humans by at least 3 years of age.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797620921519}, Key = {fds349808} } @article{fds349814, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Ontogenetic Foundations of Epistemic Norms}, Journal = {Episteme}, Volume = {17}, Number = {3}, Pages = {301-315}, Year = {2020}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.50}, Abstract = {In this paper, I approach epistemic norms from an ontogenetic point of view. I argue and present evidence that to understand epistemic norms - e.g., scientific norms of methodology and the evaluation of evidence - children must first develop through their social interactions with others three key concepts. First is the concept of belief, which provides the most basic distinction on which scientific investigations rest: the distinction between individual subjective perspectives and an objective reality. Second is the concept of reason, which in the context of science obligates practitioners to justify their claims to others with reasons by grounding them in beliefs that are universally shared within the community. Third is the concept of social norm, which is not primarily epistemic, but provides children with an understanding of norms as collective agreements. The theoretical argument is that all three of these concepts emerge not from just any kind of social interaction, but specifically from social interactions structured by the human species' unique capacities for shared intentionality.}, Doi = {10.1017/epi.2019.50}, Key = {fds349814} } @article{fds351569, Author = {Ulber, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's prosocial responses toward peers and adults in two social contexts.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {198}, Pages = {104888}, Year = {2020}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104888}, Abstract = {Young children help and share with others, but little is known about the "how" and "who" of this early prosocial behavior. In the current study, we compared 2- and 3-year-old children's (N = 203; 101 girls) prosocial behavior of sharing and helping. We asked whether the process was different (a) if the social partner was an adult or a same-age peer and (b) if the child was actively interacting and engaged with the partner or not. The highest prosocial responses were found in bilateral joint tasks such as sharing the spoils after a collaborative effort and helping a partner finish a mutual activity. Prosocial responses were lower in unilateral autonomous tasks such as assisting another person in opening a locked box and distributing a windfall of resources. Children did not show an overall preference for helping or sharing with adults versus peers except that they were more likely to support a peer than an adult in an instrumental helping task. Together, these findings suggest that toddlers' early prosocial skills and motivations are more sensitive to how toddlers are engaged with a partner than to who that partner is, implying that children have a nondiscriminatory general inclination to benefit others, especially in bilateral interactive scenarios.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104888}, Key = {fds351569} } @article{fds353880, Author = {Hepach, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children show positive emotions when seeing someone get the help they deserve}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {56}, Year = {2020}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100935}, Abstract = {Little is known about the underlying emotional bases of children's prosociality. Here we engaged 32 dyads of 4-year-old children in a reward-collecting task at the end of which one child was more in need of help. An adult then either helped the needier child (deserving outcome) or the less needy child (less deserving outcome). Both children expressed elevated upper-body posture (positively valenced emotions) when the more needy (but not the less needy) child was helped, whether it was themselves or not. In contrast, both children showed decreased elevation when the less needy (but not the more needy) child received the help, again whether it was themselves or not. These results suggest that preschool children's prosocial emotions are regulated not only by sympathy for those needing help, but also by a sense of deservingness as determined by social comparison.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100935}, Key = {fds353880} } @article{fds351010, Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Human children, but not great apes, become socially closer by sharing an experience in common ground.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {199}, Pages = {104930}, Year = {2020}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104930}, Abstract = {To create social closeness, humans engage in a variety of social activities centered around shared experiences. Even simply watching the same video side by side creates social closeness in adults and children. However, perhaps surprisingly, a similar psychological mechanism was recently shown in great apes. Here we asked whether the process by which this social closeness is created is the same for children and great apes. Each participant entered a room to see an experimenter (E1) watching a video. In one condition, E1 looked to the participant at the start of the video to establish common ground that they were watching the video together. In another condition, E1 did not look to the participant in this way so that the participant knew they were watching the same video, but the participant did not know whether E1 was aware of this as well, so there was no common ground (E1 looked to the participant later in the procedure). Children, but not great apes, approached the experimenter faster after the common ground condition, suggesting that although both humans and great apes create social closeness by co-attending to something in close proximity, creating social closeness by sharing experiences in common ground may be a uniquely human social-cognitive process.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104930}, Key = {fds351010} } @article{fds351568, Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Do 7-year-old children understand social leverage?}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {199}, Pages = {104963}, Year = {2020}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104963}, Abstract = {Individuals with an advantageous position during a negotiation possess leverage over their partners. Several studies with adults have investigated how leverage can influence the coordination strategies of individuals when conflicts of interest arise. In this study, we explored how pairs of 7-year-old children solved a coordination game (based on the Snowdrift scenario) when one child had leverage over the other child. We presented a social dilemma in the form of an unequal reward distribution on a rotating tray. The rotating tray could be accessed by both children. The child who waited longer to act received the best outcome, but if both children waited too long, they would lose the rewards. In addition, one child could forgo the access to the rotating tray for an alternative option-the leverage. Although children rarely used their leverage strategically, children with access to the alternative were less likely to play the social dilemma, especially when their leverage was larger. Furthermore, children waited longer to act as the leverage decreased. Finally, children almost never failed to coordinate. The results hint to a trade-off between maximizing benefits while maintaining long-term collaboration in complex scenarios where strategies such as turn taking are hard to implement.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104963}, Key = {fds351568} } @article{fds351570, Author = {Li, J and Hou, W and Zhu, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The development of intent-based moral judgment and moral behavior in the context of indirect reciprocity: A cross-cultural study}, Journal = {International Journal of Behavioral Development}, Volume = {44}, Number = {6}, Pages = {525-533}, Year = {2020}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0165025420935636}, Abstract = {The current study aimed to investigate the cultural differences in the developmental origins of children’s intent-based moral judgment and moral behavior in the context of indirect reciprocity. To this end, we compared how German and Chinese children interpret and react to antisocial and prosocial interactions between puppets. An actor puppet performed either a positive or negative act toward a prosocial or antisocial target puppet with the intention to cause harm or not; 197 three and five-year-old children participated as a third party and were asked to judge the actor puppet’s behavior and to distribute stickers. Results showed that 3-year-old Chinese children were able to take intention and context into account when making moral judgments and distributing resources, whereas German children did not show sensitivity to intention until the age of 5. These findings suggest that culture may mediate children’s intent-based moral judgment and moral behavior in the context of indirect reciprocity.}, Doi = {10.1177/0165025420935636}, Key = {fds351570} } @article{fds352447, Author = {Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Early Ontogeny of Reason Giving}, Journal = {Child Development Perspectives}, Volume = {14}, Number = {4}, Pages = {215-220}, Year = {2020}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12384}, Abstract = {The key context within which preschool children learn to justify beliefs with reasons is collaborative problem-solving and decision-making with peers, including in the moral domain, in which they engage with another coequal mind in a cooperative spirit. Evidence for this proposal comes from recent studies in which children demonstrated sensitivity to the common ground assumptions they shared with their peer partners in decision-making, as well as an ability to provide reasons relevant to their shared understanding. Training studies suggest that discourse with others about reasons for beliefs provides children with the appropriate learning experiences. Internalizing this communicative process may be crucial for individual deliberative reasoning.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdep.12384}, Key = {fds352447} } @article{fds355827, Author = {Li, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {On the moral functions of language}, Journal = {Social Cognition}, Volume = {39}, Number = {1}, Pages = {99-116}, Publisher = {Guilford Press}, Year = {2021}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.99}, Abstract = {Previous comparisons of language and morality have taken a cognitively internalist (i.e., within-minds) perspective. We take a socially externalist (i.e., between-minds) perspective, viewing both language and morality as forms of social action. During human evolution, social cognitive adaptations for cooperation evolved, including cooperative communication (social acts to mentally coordinate with others for common goals) and social normativity (social acts to regulate cooperative social relationships). As human cooperation scaled up in complexity, cooperative communication and social normativity scaled up as well, leading to the development of culturally elaborated forms of language and morality. Language facilitates all aspects of morality and is even necessary for certain aspects. Humans use language to (1) initiate, (2) preserve, (3) revise, and (4) act on morality in ways such as forming joint commitments, teaching norms, modifying social realities, and engaging in moral reason-giving.}, Doi = {10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.99}, Key = {fds355827} } @article{fds352900, Author = {Siposova, B and Grueneisen, S and Helming, K and Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M}, Title = {Common knowledge that help is needed increases helping behavior in children.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {201}, Pages = {104973}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104973}, Abstract = {Although there is considerable evidence that at least some helping behavior is motivated by genuine concern for others' well-being, sometimes we also help solely out of a sense of obligation to the persons in need. Our sense of obligation to help may be particularly strong when there is common knowledge between the helper and the helpee that the helpee needs help. To test whether children's helping behavior is affected by having common knowledge with the recipient about the recipient's need, 6-year-olds faced a dilemma: They could either collect stickers or help an experimenter. Children were more likely to help when they and the experimenter had common knowledge about the experimenter's plight (because they heard it together) than when they each had private knowledge about it (because they heard it individually). These results suggest that already in young children common knowledge can heighten the sense of obligation to help others in need.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104973}, Key = {fds352900} } @article{fds354956, Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's moral judgments depend on the social relationship between agents}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {57}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100973}, Abstract = {Moral judgments can vary depending on the social relationship between agents. We presented 4- and 6-year-old peer dyads (N = 128) with stories, in which a parent (parent condition) or a peer protagonist (peer condition) faced a child in need of help (e.g., the child is thirsty). The dyads had to decide whether the protagonist helped at a cost (e.g., by giving up their water) or not. 6-year-olds expected a parent to help their child more than they expected a child to help their peer. Moreover, children justified their expectations more often with normative statements (e.g., “She has to help”) in the parent condition than in the peer condition. Thus, refusal to help a child was more acceptable coming from a peer than from a parent. The results suggest that young children take into account multiple perspectives and form different normative expectations for different social agents when making moral judgments.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100973}, Key = {fds354956} } @article{fds355300, Author = {Domberg, A and Tomasello, M and Köymen, B}, Title = {Collaborative reasoning in the context of group competition.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {16}, Number = {2}, Pages = {e0246589}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246589}, Abstract = {A key skill in collaborative problem-solving is to communicate and evaluate reasons for proposals to arrive at the decision benefiting all group members. Although it is well-documented that collaborative contexts facilitate young children's reasoning, less is known about whether competition with other groups contributes to children's collaborative reasoning. We investigated whether between-group competition facilitates children's within-group collaborative reasoning, regarding their production of reasons and their use of transacts, communicative acts that operate on one another's proposals and reasoning. We presented 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads with two collaborative problem-solving tasks (decorating a zoo and a dollhouse). In one task, children competed against another group (the competitive condition); whereas in the other task, they did not (non-competitive condition). Our results suggest that children's sensitivity to group competition as reflected in their reasoning changed depending on the task. When they decorated a house, they produced more transacts in the competitive condition than in the non-competitive condition; whereas when they decorated a zoo, this pattern was reversed. Thus, our results highlight that group competition did not influence children's collaborative reasoning consistently across different contexts.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0246589}, Key = {fds355300} } @article{fds355723, Author = {Plötner, M and Hepach, R and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children share more under time pressure than after a delay.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {16}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e0248121}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248121}, Abstract = {Adults under time pressure share with others generously, but with more time they act more selfishly. In the current study, we investigated whether young children already operate in this same way, and, if so, whether this changes over the preschool and early school age years. We tested 144 children in three age groups (3-, 5-, and 7-year olds) in a one-shot dictator game: Children were given nine stickers and had the possibility to share stickers with another child who was absent. Children in the Time Pressure condition were instructed to share quickly, whereas children in the Delay condition were instructed to take time and consider their decision carefully. Across ages, children in the Time Pressure condition shared significantly more stickers than children in the Delay condition. Moreover, the longer children waited, the less they shared. Thus, children, like adults, are more prosocial when acting spontaneously than after considering their decision more carefully.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0248121}, Key = {fds355723} } @article{fds356997, Author = {Li, L and Britvan, B and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children conform more to norms than to preferences.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {16}, Number = {5}, Pages = {e0251228}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0251228}, Abstract = {As members of cultural groups, humans continually adhere to social norms and conventions. Researchers have hypothesized that even young children are motivated to act conventionally, but support for this hypothesis has been indirect and open to other interpretations. To further test this hypothesis, we invited 3.5-year-old children (N = 104) to help set up items for a tea party. Children first indicated which items they preferred but then heard an informant (either an adult or another child) endorse other items in terms of either conventional norms or personal preferences. Children conformed (i.e., overrode their own preference to follow the endorsement) more when the endorsements were framed as norms than when they were framed as preferences, and this was the case whether the informant was an adult or another child. The priority of norms even when stated by another child opposes the interpretation that children only conformed in deference to adult authority. These findings suggest that children are motivated to act conventionally, possibly as an adaptation for living in cultural groups.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0251228}, Key = {fds356997} } @article{fds358692, Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Kano, F and Albiach-Serrano, A and Benziad, L and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) internal arousal remains elevated if they cannot themselves help a conspecific.}, Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983)}, Volume = {135}, Number = {2}, Pages = {196-207}, Year = {2021}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000255}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees help conspecifics achieve their goals in instrumental situations, but neither their immediate motivation nor the evolutionary basis of their motivation is clear. In the current study, we gave chimpanzees the opportunity to instrumentally help a conspecific to obtain food. Following recent studies with human children, we measured their pupil diameter at various points in the process. Like young children, chimpanzees' pupil diameter decreased soon after they had helped. However, unlike children, chimpanzees' pupils remained more dilated upon watching a third party provide the needed help instead of them. Our interpretation is that chimpanzees are motivated to help others, and the evolutionary basis is direct or indirect reciprocity, as providing help oneself sets the conditions for a payback. This is in contrast to young children whose goal is to see others being helped-by whomever-presumably because their helping is not based on reciprocity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/com0000255}, Key = {fds358692} } @article{fds356461, Author = {Wolf, W and Nafe, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Development of the Liking Gap: Children Older Than 5 Years Think That Partners Evaluate Them Less Positively Than They Evaluate Their Partners.}, Journal = {Psychological science}, Volume = {32}, Number = {5}, Pages = {789-798}, Year = {2021}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797620980754}, Abstract = {After two strangers have briefly interacted with one another, both believe that they like their partner more than their partner likes them. A plausible explanation for this <i>liking gap</i> is that people are constantly worrying about how others are evaluating them. If so, one would expect the liking gap to emerge in young children as they become more concerned with their reputations and the impression they make on other people. The current study (<i>N</i> = 241 U.S. children; age range = 4-11 years) supported this hypothesis, showing a liking gap beginning when children were 5 years old, the age at which they first become concerned with other people's evaluations of them. Moreover, the liking gap became more pronounced as children got older. These findings provide the first developmental description of the liking gap and support the hypothesis that this phenomenon is related to individuals' concerns for how others evaluate them.}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797620980754}, Key = {fds356461} } @article{fds356996, Author = {O’Madagain, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Joint attention to mental content and the social origin of reasoning}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {198}, Number = {5}, Pages = {4057-4078}, Year = {2021}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02327-1}, Abstract = {Growing evidence indicates that our higher rational capacities depend on social interaction—that only through engaging with others do we acquire the ability to evaluate beliefs as true or false, or to reflect on and evaluate the reasons that support our beliefs. Up to now, however, we have had little understanding of how this works. Here we argue that a uniquely human socio-linguistic phenomenon which we call ‘joint attention to mental content’ (JAM) plays a key role. JAM is the ability to focus together in conversation on the content of our mental states, such as beliefs and reasons. In such conversations it can be made clear that our attitudes to beliefs or reasons may conflict—that what I think is true, you might think is false, or that what I think is a good reason for believing something, you might think is a bad reason. We argue that through JAM, children discover that mental contents can be evaluated under various attitudes, and that this discovery transforms their mind-reading and reasoning abilities.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02327-1}, Key = {fds356996} } @article{fds352448, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Response to: Rethinking Human Development and the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis}, Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {465-468}, Year = {2021}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00510-9}, Abstract = {I respond to Moll, Nichols, and Mackey’s review of my book Becoming Human. I agree with many of their points, but have my own point of view on some others.}, Doi = {10.1007/s13164-020-00510-9}, Key = {fds352448} } @article{fds357565, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Norms Require Not Just Technical Skill and Social Learning, but Real Cooperation}, Journal = {Analyse und Kritik}, Volume = {43}, Number = {1}, Pages = {219-223}, Year = {2021}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2021-0012}, Abstract = {Birch's account of the evolutionary origins of social norms is essentially individualistic. It begins with individuals regulating their own actions toward internally represented goals, as evaluative standards, and adds in a social dimension only secondarily. I argue that a better account begins at the outset with uniquely human collaborative activity in which individuals share evaluative standards about how anyone who would play a given role must behave both toward their joint goal and toward one another. This then scaled up to the shared normative standards for anyone who would be a member of 'our' social group.}, Doi = {10.1515/auk-2021-0012}, Key = {fds357565} } @article{fds355156, Author = {Kachel, G and Moore, R and Hepach, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Toddlers Prefer Adults as Informants: 2- and 3-Year-Olds' Use of and Attention to Pointing Gestures From Peer and Adult Partners.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {92}, Number = {4}, Pages = {e635-e652}, Year = {2021}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13544}, Abstract = {Two- and 3-year-old children (N = 96) were tested in an object-choice task with video presentations of peer and adult partners. An immersive, semi-interactive procedure enabled both the close matching of adult and peer conditions and the combination of participants' choice behavior with looking time measures. Children were more likely to use information provided by adults. As the effect was more pronounced in the younger age-group, the observed bias may fade during toddlerhood. As there were no differences in children's propensity to follow peer and adult gestures with their gaze, these findings provide some of the earliest evidence to date that young children take an interlocutor's age into account when judging ostensively communicated testimony.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13544}, Key = {fds355156} } @article{fds359733, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Mammen, M and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children's understanding of justifications for breaking a promise}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {60}, Year = {2021}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101127}, Abstract = {There are sometimes legitimate reasons for breaking a promise when circumstances change. We investigated 3- and 5-year-old German children's understanding of promise breaking in prosocial (helping someone else) and selfish (playing with someone else) conditions. In Study 1 (n = 80, 50% girls), preschoolers initially kept their own promise in all conditions. When they eventually broke their promise, 3-year-olds’ justifications mostly referenced salient events, whereas 5-year-olds also referenced social norms. In Study 2 (n = 65, 49% girls), 5-year-olds preferred others’ promise-breaking more in prosocial than selfish conditions; 3-year-olds showed the reverse pattern. Three-year-olds’ justifications focused on desires, whereas 5-year-olds focused on relevant events. Overall, 3-year-olds were able to offer justifications, but 5-year-olds started to distinguish what counted in the eyes of others as “good” and “bad” reasons for promise breaking.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101127}, Key = {fds359733} } @article{fds359681, Author = {Straka, BC and Stanaland, A and Tomasello, M and Gaither, SE}, Title = {Who can be in a group? 3- to 5-year-old children construe realistic social groups through mutual intentionality}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {60}, Year = {2021}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101097}, Abstract = {Recent research suggests that young children's causal justification for minimal group membership can be induced via a cognitive framework of mutual intentionality. That is, an individual can become a group member when both the individual and group agree to membership. Here, we investigated if children ages 3–5 understand groups formed by mutual intentions and whether they apply mutual intentions to realistic groups with varying entitative and essentialized qualities. In two studies (N = 197), we asked 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children if a novel character could join an existing group based on intentionality (mutual, individual-, group-only) and group type (task, friends, family). We find that 4- and 5-year-olds robustly relied on mutual intentions to constitute group membership and 3-year-olds also demonstrated emerging usage of this cognitive framework. Moreover, children employed mutual intentionality across different group types, suggesting a general framework for children's understanding of different social groups.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101097}, Key = {fds359681} } @article{fds359904, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Knowledge-by-acquaintance before propositional knowledge/belief.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {44}, Pages = {e173}, Year = {2021}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x20001387}, Abstract = {More basic than the authors' distinction between knowing and believing is a distinction between knowledge-by-acquaintance (I know John Smith) and propositional knowledge/belief (I know/believe that John Smith lives in Durham). This distinction provides a better account of both the comparative and developmental data.}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x20001387}, Key = {fds359904} } @article{fds360579, Author = {O'Madagain, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Shared intentionality, reason-giving and the evolution of human culture.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {377}, Number = {1843}, Pages = {20200320}, Year = {2022}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0320}, Abstract = {The biological approach to culture focuses almost exclusively on processes of social learning, to the neglect of processes of cultural coordination including joint action and shared intentionality. In this paper, we argue that the distinctive features of human culture derive from humans' unique skills and motivations for coordinating with one another around different types of action and information. As different levels of these skills of 'shared intentionality' emerged over the last several hundred thousand years, human culture became characterized first by such things as collaborative activities and pedagogy based on cooperative communication, and then by such things as collaborative innovations and normatively structured pedagogy. As a kind of capstone of this trajectory, humans began to coordinate not just on joint actions and shared beliefs, but on the reasons for what we believe or how we act. Coordinating on reasons powered the kinds of extremely rapid innovation and stable cumulative cultural evolution especially characteristic of the human species in the last several tens of thousands of years. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2020.0320}, Key = {fds360579} } @article{fds362756, Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Schäfer, M and Herrmann, E and Zeidler, H and Haun, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children across societies enforce conventional norms but in culturally variable ways.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {119}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e2112521118}, Year = {2022}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2112521118}, Abstract = {Individuals in all societies conform to their cultural group's conventional norms, from how to dress on certain occasions to how to play certain games. It is an open question, however, whether individuals in all societies actively enforce the group's conventional norms when others break them. We investigated third-party enforcement of conventional norms in 5- to 8-y-old children (<i>n</i> = 376) from eight diverse small-scale and large-scale societies. Children learned the rules for playing a new sorting game and then, observed a peer who was apparently breaking them. Across societies, observer children intervened frequently to correct their misguided peer (i.e., more frequently than when the peer was following the rules). However, both the magnitude and the style of interventions varied across societies. Detailed analyses of children's interactions revealed societal differences in children's verbal protest styles as well as in their use of actions, gestures, and nonverbal expressions to intervene. Observers' interventions predicted whether their peer adopted the observer's sorting rule. Enforcement of conventional norms appears to be an early emerging human universal that comes to be expressed in culturally variable ways.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2112521118}, Key = {fds362756} } @article{fds359682, Author = {Vasil, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Effects of "we"-framing on young children's commitment, sharing, and helping.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {214}, Pages = {105278}, Year = {2022}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105278}, Abstract = {By around 3 years of age, collaboration induces in young children a normative sense of "we" that creates a sense of obligation (e.g., commitment, fairness) toward their collaborative partner. The current study investigated whether this normative sense of we could be induced purely verbally in 3- and 4-year-old children. Children joined a puppet at a table to draw. In one condition the puppet repeatedly framed things as "we" are going to sit at the table, "we" are going to draw, and so forth, whereas in the other condition the pronoun used was always "you." Dependent measures gauged children's commitment, resource distribution, and helping behavior toward their partner. Results showed that both 3- and 4-year-olds felt a greater sense of commitment to their partner after "we"-framing than after "you"-framing. The 4-year-olds evidenced this commitment by showing a greater reluctance to abandon their partner for a more fun game compared with the 3-year-olds. The 3-year-olds did not share this reluctance, but when they did abandon their partner they more often took leave following we-framing by "announcing" their leaving. There were no effects of we-framing on children's sharing with their partner or helping behavior. These results suggest that verbal we-framing, as compared with you-framing, is an effective means of inducing in children a sense of shared agency and commitment with a partner.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105278}, Key = {fds359682} } @article{fds362632, Author = {O'Madagain, C and Helming, KA and Schmidt, MFH and Shupe, E and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {289}, Number = {1971}, Pages = {20212686}, Year = {2022}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686}, Abstract = {Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2021.2686}, Key = {fds362632} } @article{fds362986, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {What is it like to be a chimpanzee?}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {200}, Number = {2}, Year = {2022}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03574-5}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees and humans are close evolutionary relatives who behave in many of the same ways based on a similar type of agentive organization. To what degree do they experience the world in similar ways as well? Using contemporary research in evolutionarily biology and animal cognition, I explicitly compare the kinds of experience the two species of capable of having. I conclude that chimpanzees’ experience of the world, their experiential niche as I call it, is: (i) intentional in basically the same way as humans’; (ii) rational in the sense that it is self-critical and operates with logically structured causal and intentional inferences; but (iii) not normative at all in that it does not operate with “objective” evaluative standards. Scientific data do not answer philosophical questions, but they provide rich raw material for scientists and philosophers alike to reflect on and clarify fundamental psychological concepts.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-022-03574-5}, Key = {fds362986} } @article{fds362987, Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {How fairness and dominance guide young children's bargaining decisions.}, Journal = {Child development}, Volume = {93}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1318-1333}, Year = {2022}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13757}, Abstract = {Reaching agreements in conflicts is an important developmental challenge. Here, German 5-year-olds (N = 284, 49% female, mostly White, mixed socioeconomic backgrounds; data collection: June 2016-November 2017) faced repeated face-to-face bargaining problems in which they chose between fair and unfair reward divisions. Across three studies, children mostly settled on fair divisions. However, dominant children tended to benefit more from bargaining outcomes (in Study 1 and 2 but not Study 3) and children mostly failed to use leverage to enforce fairness. Communication analyses revealed that children giving orders to their partner had a bargaining advantage and that children provided and responded to fairness reasons. These findings indicate that fairness concerns and dominance are both key factors that shape young children's bargaining decisions.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13757}, Key = {fds362987} } @article{fds364336, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The coordination of attention and action in great apes and humans.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {377}, Number = {1859}, Pages = {20210093}, Year = {2022}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0093}, Abstract = {Great apes can discern what others are attending to and even direct others' attention to themselves in flexible ways. But they seemingly do not coordinate their attention with one another recursively-understanding that the other is monitoring their attention just as they are monitoring hers-in acts of joint attention, at least not in the same way as young human children. Similarly, great apes collaborate with partners in many flexible ways, but they seemingly do not coordinate with others to form mutually obligating joint goals and commitments, nor regulate the collaboration via acts of intentional communication, at least not in the same way as young human children. The hypothesis defended here is that it is precisely in their capacities to coordinate attention and action with others-that is, in their capacities for shared intentionality-that humans are most clearly distinguished from other great apes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0093}, Key = {fds364336} } @article{fds367772, Author = {Li, L and Tucker, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Young children judge defection less negatively when there's a good justification}, Journal = {Cognitive Development}, Volume = {64}, Year = {2022}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101268}, Abstract = {Morality includes a common ground ranking of values, of which a central theme is that prosocial actions are more justifiable than selfish ones. Learning to distinguish between good versus bad justifications for actions based on a common ground ranking of values is a key aspect of moral development. The current study assessed this type of understanding in young children. In a within-participants design, young children (N = 64) saw puppets who promised to show them a cool toy, failed to fulfill their promise, and then gave either a good (prosocial), bad (selfish), or no justification for their defection. Children's judgments about defection following good justifications were less negative than their judgments about defection following bad or no justifications, which did not differ. When asked to justify their judgments, 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) made more normative or promise-referencing statements when reasoning about puppets who gave good justifications as opposed to bad or no justifications. Children's rates of tattling on, liking, and inviting puppets to play did not vary by the type of justification that a puppet gave. Overall, the findings suggest that the capacity to reference a common ground ranking of values, a key component of human cooperation and morality, is present in young children.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101268}, Key = {fds367772} } @article{fds364183, Author = {Li, L and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Disagreement, justification, and equitable moral judgments: A brief training study.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {223}, Pages = {105494}, Year = {2022}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494}, Abstract = {Although theorists agree that social interactions play a major role in moral development, previous research has not experimentally assessed how specific features of social interactions affect children's moral judgments and reasoning. The current study assessed two features: disagreement and justification. In a brief training phase, children aged 4-5.5 years (N = 129) discussed simple moral scenarios about issues of fairness (how to allocate things between individuals) with a puppet who, in a between-participants factorial design, either agreed or disagreed with the children's ideas and either asked or did not ask the children to justify their ideas. Children then responded to another set of moral scenarios in a test phase that was the same for all children. Children in the "agree and do not justify" baseline condition showed an inflexible equality bias (preferring only equal allocations regardless of context), but children who had experiences of disagreement or experiences of being asked to justify themselves shifted toward making equitable decisions based on common ground norms and values. Furthermore, false belief competence was related to children's decisions and justifications. These findings support the classic Piagetian hypothesis that social interactions are a catalyst of cognitive disequilibrium and moral development.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494}, Key = {fds364183} } @article{fds362755, Author = {Hepach, R and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Gerdemann, SC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation underlying helping in early childhood.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e13253}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253}, Abstract = {We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-, and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an individual or watch as another person provided help. Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging, we measured children's positive emotions through changes in postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual and watching another person help was equally rewarding; 5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive emotions following helping were greater when an audience was watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional, strategic motivation to improve their reputation by helping.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.13253}, Key = {fds362755} } @article{fds365125, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a theory.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {25-35}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0}, Abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal, there existed only a few conflicting findings about great apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others, and they use this knowledge to their advantage in competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past 25 years of research on great ape social cognition and metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are evolutionarily related.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0}, Key = {fds365125} } @article{fds371813, Author = {Wolf, W and Thielhelm, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for faces with white sclera.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {225}, Pages = {105532}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532}, Abstract = {The cooperative eye hypothesis posits that human eye morphology evolved to facilitate cooperation. Although it is known that young children prefer stimuli with eyes that contain white sclera, it is unknown whether white sclera influences children's perception of a partner's cooperativeness specifically. In the current studies, we used an online methodology to present 5-year-old children with moving three-dimensional face models in which facial morphology was manipulated. Children found "alien" faces with human eyes more cooperative than faces with dark sclera (Study 2) but not faces with enlarged irises (Study 1). For more human-like faces (Study 3), children found human eyes more cooperative than either enlarged irises or dark sclera and found faces with enlarged irises cuter (but not more cooperative) than eyes with dark sclera. Together, these results provide strong support for the cooperative eye hypothesis.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532}, Key = {fds371813} } @article{fds367773, Author = {Colle, L and Grosse, G and Behne, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Just teasing! - Infants' and toddlers' understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on social bonding.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {231}, Pages = {105314}, Year = {2023}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314}, Abstract = {The current study investigates infants' and toddlers' understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an especially interesting test case to inform us about young children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions. In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and 18-month-old infants' ability to understand and differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age, infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old children in closely matched purely playful and teasing situations. We also investigated potential social effects of teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence. Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers, additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from superficially similar but serious behavior and from around 18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers are able to process a complex social intention like teasing. Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler intention understanding abilities.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314}, Key = {fds367773} } @article{fds368903, Author = {Schäfer, M and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's consideration of collaboration and merit when making sharing decisions in private.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {228}, Pages = {105609}, Year = {2023}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609}, Abstract = {Young children share equally when they acquire resources through collaboration with a partner, yet it is unclear whether they do so because in such contexts resources are encountered as common and distributed in front of the recipient or because collaboration promotes a sense of work-based fairness. In the current studies, 5- and 8-year-old children from Germany (N = 193) acquired resources either by working individually alongside or by collaborating with a peer. After finding out that the partner's container was empty, they decided in private whether they wanted to donate some resources to the peer. When both partners had worked with equal efforts (Study 1), children shared more after collaboration than after individual work. When one partner had worked with much more effort than the other (Study 2), children shared more with a harder-working partner than with a less-working partner independently of whether they had collaborated or worked individually. Younger children were more generous than older children, in particular after collaboration. These findings support the view that collaboration promotes a genuine sense of fairness in young children, but they also indicate that merit-based notions of fairness in the context of work may develop independently of collaboration, at least by the beginning of middle childhood and in Western societies.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609}, Key = {fds368903} } @article{fds370629, Author = {Benozio, A and House, BR and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Apes reciprocate food positively and negatively.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {290}, Number = {1998}, Pages = {20222541}, Year = {2023}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2541}, Abstract = {Reciprocal food exchange is widespread in human societies but not among great apes, who may view food mainly as a target for competition. Understanding the similarities and differences between great apes' and humans' willingness to exchange food is important for our models regarding the origins of uniquely human forms of cooperation. Here, we demonstrate in-kind food exchanges in experimental settings with great apes for the first time. The initial sample consisted of 13 chimpanzees and 5 bonobos in the control phases, and the test phases included 10 chimpanzees and 2 bonobos, compared with a sample of 48 human children aged 4 years. First, we replicated prior findings showing no spontaneous food exchanges in great apes. Second, we discovered that when apes believe that conspecifics have 'intentionally' transferred food to them, positive reciprocal food exchanges (food-for-food) are not only possible but reach the same levels as in young children (approx. 75-80%). Third, we found that great apes engage in negative reciprocal food exchanges (no-food for no-food) but to a lower extent than children. This provides evidence for reciprocal food exchange in great apes in experimental settings and suggests that while a potential mechanism of <i>fostering</i> cooperation (via positive reciprocal exchanges) may be shared across species, a stabilizing mechanism (via negative reciprocity) is not.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2022.2541}, Key = {fds370629} } @article{fds373982, Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social Bonding.}, Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science}, Pages = {17456916231201795}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17456916231201795}, Abstract = {Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are unique to the species. These involve various kinds of interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding have no explanation for why humans should have these unique bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and communicative activities that both depend on and create shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation toward them and because the shared representations created during such interactions make subsequent cooperative interactions easier and more effective.}, Doi = {10.1177/17456916231201795}, Key = {fds373982} } @article{fds370890, Author = {Vasil, J and Moore, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with young English-speaking children’s production of pronouns}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {43}, Number = {5}, Pages = {516-538}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01427237231169398}, Abstract = {Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use. We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking children’s first-person plural, first-person singular, second-person, third-person plural, and third-person singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0 compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp. pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were used more often as children aged. These findings suggest that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.}, Doi = {10.1177/01427237231169398}, Key = {fds370890} } @article{fds374236, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans and Other Great Apes.}, Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)}, Volume = {34}, Number = {4}, Pages = {588-604}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0}, Abstract = {Humans share with other mammals and primates many social motivations and emotions, but they are also much more cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i) 'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me' (e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment); (iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt); and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group biases). The existence of these species-typical and species-universal motivations and emotions provides compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative activities in the human species.}, Doi = {10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0}, Key = {fds374236} } @article{fds374400, Author = {Vasil, J and Price, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Thought and language: Effects of group-mindedness on young children's interpretation of exclusive we.}, Journal = {Child development}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.14049}, Abstract = {The current study investigated whether age-related changes in the conceptualization of social groups influences interpretation of the pronoun we. Sixty-four 2- and 4-year-olds (N = 29 female, 50 White-identifying) viewed scenarios in which it was ambiguous how many puppets performed an activity together. When asked who performed the activity, a speaker puppet responded, "We did!" In one condition, the speaker was near one and distant from another puppet, implying a dyadic interpretation of we. In another condition, the speaker was distant from both, thus pulling for a group interpretation. In the former condition, 2- and 4-year-olds favored the dyadic interpretation. In the latter condition, only 4-year-olds favored the group interpretation. Age-related conceptual development "expands" the set of conceivable plural person referents.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.14049}, Key = {fds374400} } @article{fds374171, Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and cost affects this tendency.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {237}, Pages = {105764}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance their reputations through communicative acts. In the experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to inform a social partner that they had helped him in his absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to protest when another individual was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we replicated the prosocial condition but with a new manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even 4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost as a moderating factor.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Key = {fds374171} } @article{fds374401, Author = {Winter Née Grocke and P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {From what I want to do to what we decided to do: 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, honor their agreements with peers.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {239}, Pages = {105811}, Year = {2024}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811}, Abstract = {Sometimes we have a personal preference but we agree with others to follow a different course of action. In this study, 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 160) expressed a preference for playing a game one way and were then confronted with peers who expressed a different preference. The experimenter then either got the participants to agree with the peers explicitly or just shrugged her shoulders and moved on. The children were then left alone to play the game unobserved. Only the older children stuck to their agreement to play the game as the peers wished. These results suggest that by 5 years of age children's sense of commitment to agreements is strong enough to override their personal preferences.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811}, Key = {fds374401} } %% Books @book{fds351911, Author = {Slobin, DI and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction}, Pages = {xv-xxiv}, Year = {2004}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9781410611192}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781410611192}, Doi = {10.4324/9781410611192}, Key = {fds351911} } @book{fds351638, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction to the classic edition}, Pages = {vii-xiii}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725911}, Key = {fds351638} } @book{fds351639, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction: A cognitive-functional perspective on language structure}, Pages = {xiv-xxix}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725911}, Key = {fds351639} } @book{fds351640, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure, volume ii classic edition}, Pages = {1-278}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725935}, Abstract = {From the point of view of psychology and cognitive science, much of modern linguistics is too formal and mathematical to be of much use. The New Psychology of Language volumes broke new ground by introducing functional and cognitive approaches to language structure in terms already familiar to psychologists, thus defining the next era in the scientific study of language. The Classic Edition volumes re-introduce some of the most important cognitive and functional linguists working in the field. They include a new introduction by Michael Tomasello in which he reviews what has changed since the volumes were first published and highlights the fundamental insights of the original authors. The New Psychology of Language volumes are a must-read for anyone interested in understanding how cognitive and functional linguistics has become the thriving perspective on the scientific study of language that it is today.}, Key = {fds351640} } @book{fds351641, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction to the classic edition}, Pages = {vii-xiii}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725935}, Key = {fds351641} } @book{fds351642, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure, volume I classic edition}, Pages = {1-268}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725911}, Abstract = {From the point of view of psychology and cognitive science, much of modern linguistics is too formal and mathematical to be of much use. The New Psychology of Language volumes broke new ground by introducing functional and cognitive approaches to language structure in terms already familiar to psychologists, thus defining the next era in the scientific study of language. The Classic Edition volumes re-introduce some of the most important cognitive and functional linguists working in the field. They include a new introduction by Michael Tomasello in which he reviews what has changed since the volumes first published and highlights the fundamental insights of the original authors. The New Psychology of Language volumes are a must-read for anyone interested in understanding how cognitive and functional linguistics has become the thriving perspective on the scientific study of language that it is today.}, Key = {fds351642} } @book{fds351643, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction: Some surprises for psychologists}, Pages = {1-14}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848725935}, Key = {fds351643} } @book{fds321686, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {A Natural History of Human Thinking}, Pages = {1-192}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {2014}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9780674724778}, Abstract = {Tool-making or culture, language or religious belief: ever since Darwin, thinkers have struggled to identify what fundamentally differentiates human beings from other animals. In this much-anticipated book, Michael Tomasello weaves his twenty years of comparative studies of humans and great apes into a compelling argument that cooperative social interaction is the key to our cognitive uniqueness. Once our ancestors learned to put their heads together with others to pursue shared goals, humankind was on an evolutionary path all its own. Tomasello argues that our prehuman ancestors, like today’s great apes, were social beings who could solve problems by thinking. But they were almost entirely competitive, aiming only at their individual goals. As ecological changes forced them into more cooperative living arrangements, early humans had to coordinate their actions and communicate their thoughts with collaborative partners. Tomasello’s “shared intentionality hypothesis” captures how these more socially complex forms of life led to more conceptually complex forms of thinking. In order to survive, humans had to learn to see the world from multiple social perspectives, to draw socially recursive inferences, and to monitor their own thinking via the normative standards of the group. Even language and culture arose from the preexisting need to work together. What differentiates us most from other great apes, Tomasello proposes, are the new forms of thinking engendered by our new forms of collaborative and communicative interaction. A Natural History of Human Thinking is the most detailed scientific analysis to date of the connection between human sociality and cognition.}, Key = {fds321686} } @book{fds320791, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {A Natural History of Human Morality}, Pages = {180 pages}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780674088641}, Abstract = {Michael Tomasello offers the most detailed account to date of the evolution of human moral psychology.}, Key = {fds320791} } @book{fds351574, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Introduction: A cognitive-functional perspective on language structure}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {vii-xxiii}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780585115191}, Key = {fds351574} } @book{fds351575, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {1-292}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780585115191}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315085678}, Abstract = {This book, which gathers in one place the theories of 10 leading cognitive and functional linguists, represents a new approach that may define the next era in the history of psychology: It promises to give psychologists a new appreciation of what this variety of linguistics can offer their study of language and communication. In addition, it provides cognitive-functional linguists new models for presenting their work to audiences outside the boundaries of traditional linguistics. Thus, it serves as an excellent text for courses in psycholinguistics, and appeal to students and researchers in cognitive science and functional linguistics.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315085678}, Key = {fds351575} } @book{fds359683, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Foreword}, Volume = {27}, Pages = {VII-IX}, Year = {2020}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9789027261007}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/tilar.27.for}, Doi = {10.1075/tilar.27.for}, Key = {fds359683} } @book{fds352651, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The gestural communication of apes and monkeys}, Pages = {1-256}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9780805853650}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003064541}, Abstract = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys is an intriguing compilation of naturalistic and experimental research conducted over the course of 20 years on gestural communication in primates, as well as a comparison to what is known about the vocal communication of nonhuman primates. The editors also make systematic comparisons to the gestural communication of prelinguistic and just-linguistic human children. An enlightening exploration unfolds into what may represent the starting point for the evolution of human communication and language. This especially significant read is organized into nine chapters that discuss: *the gestural repertoire of chimpanzees; *gestures in orangutans, subadult gorillas, and siamangs; *gestural communication in Barbary macaques; and *a comparison of the gestures of apes and monkeys. This book will appeal to psychologists, anthropologists, and linguists interested in the evolutionary origins of language and/or gestures, as well as to all primatologists. A CD insert offers video of gestures for each of the species.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781003064541}, Key = {fds352651} } %% Book Sections/Chapters @misc{fds351988, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Understanding the self as social agent}, Volume = {112}, Pages = {449-460}, Booktitle = {Advances in Psychology}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4115(05)80024-X}, Abstract = {This chapter discusses the early development of the understanding of self as social agent in the human species, and briefly discusses its ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins. The chapter outlines the canonical developmental sequence, focusing especially on the social-cognitive revolution that occurs at around the infant's first birthday. The chapter also focuses on the early ontogeny of self and investigates in more detail the ontogenetic processes that might lead to the social-cognitive revolution. The process of understanding one's self as a social agent involves: 1) an early identification with but differentiation from others in the first 6–8 months of life; 2) a clear demonstration of intentionality toward the world in one's own behavior; 3) the combination of these two developments leading to an understanding of others as intentional agents at 9–12 months; and 4) the application of that understanding when others regard the self. This is the developmental foundation for the uniquely human version of self-concept in which the self is understood as a social agent in the midst of other social agents, all of whom are regarding one another simultaneously. © 1995 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0166-4115(05)80024-X}, Key = {fds351988} } @misc{fds351839, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cultural transmission: A view from chimpanzees and human infants}, Pages = {33-47}, Booktitle = {Cultural Transmission: Psychological, Developmental, Social, and Methodological Aspects}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780521880435}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804670.004}, Abstract = {Introduction Primates are highly social beings. They begin their lives clinging to their mother and nursing, and they spend their next few months, or even years, still in proximity to her. Adult primates live in close-knit social groups, for the most part, in which members individually recognize one another and form various types of long-term social relationships (Tomasello & Call, 1994, 1997). As primates, human beings follow this same pattern, of course, but they also have unique forms of sociality that may be characterized as “ultrasocial” or, in more common parlance, “cultural” (Tomasello, Krüger, & Ratner, 1993). The forms of sociality that are mostly clearly unique to human beings emerge in their ontogeny at approximately 9 months of age - what I have called the 9-month social-cognitive revolution (Tomasello, 1995). This is the age at which infants typically begin to engage in the kinds of joint-attentional interactions in which they master the use of cultural artifacts, including tools and language, and become fully active participants in all types of cultural rituals, scripts, and games. In this chapter, my goals are to (1) characterize the primate and human forms of sociality and cultural transmission, and (2) characterize in more detail the ontogeny of human cultural propensities.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511804670.004}, Key = {fds351839} } @misc{fds368904, Author = {Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {CHILDREN’S FIRST LANGUAGE ACQUISITION FROM A USAGE-BASED PERSPECTIVE1}, Pages = {168-196}, Booktitle = {Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780203938560}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203938560-16}, Abstract = {There are, however, major debates as to what they bring to this language learning: do they come with innate, specifically syntactic skills or, rather, with more general cognitive and interactive skills? In this chapter, we will argue for the latter and suggest that children’s language development can be explained in terms of species-specific learning and intentional communication. We argue that the child learns language from actual “usage events,” i.e. from particular utterances in particular contexts, and builds up increasingly complex and abstract linguistic representations from these.}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203938560-16}, Key = {fds368904} } @misc{fds376753, Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Grammar}, Volume = {2}, Pages = {V2-38-V2-50}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development, Three-Volume Set}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780123704603}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6}, Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young children must master the grammatical constructions of their language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical issues in the field and trace the developmental path children follow from talking in single-unit ‘holophrases’ to using complex, abstract constructions. We describe the development of children’s initial skills with word order, case marking, and morphology as abstract elements in early constructions, and we discuss the level of abstraction characteristic of young children’s grammatical constructions at different stages of development and in some different languages of the world. Finally, we consider the learning processes that enable young children both to acquire and to abstract across grammatical constructions.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6}, Key = {fds376753} } @misc{fds351835, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cognitive Linguistics}, Pages = {477-487}, Booktitle = {A Companion to Cognitive Science}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9780631218517}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch37}, Abstract = {A central goal of cognitive science is to understand how human beings comprehend, produce, and acquire natural languages. Throughout the brief history of modern cognitive science, the linguistic theory that has been most prominent in this endeavor is generative grammar as espoused by Noam Chomsky and colleagues. Generative grammar is a theoretical approach that seeks to describe and explain natural language in terms of its mathematical form, using formal languages such as propositional logic and automata theory. The most fundamental distinction in generative grammar is therefore the formal distinction between semantics and syntax. The semantics of a linguistic proposition are the objective conditions under which it may truthfully be stated, and the syntax of that proposition is the mathematical structure of its linguistic elements and relations irrespective of their semantics.}, Doi = {10.1002/9781405164535.ch37}, Key = {fds351835} } @misc{fds351834, Author = {Kruger, AC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cultural Learning and Learning Culture}, Pages = {353-372}, Booktitle = {The Handbook of Education and Human Development: New Models of Learning, Teaching and Schooling}, Year = {2008}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9780631211860}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/b.9780631211860.1998.00018.x}, Abstract = {The universals and cultural variations of human development have been the focus of fruitful study by anthropologists for decades. In recent years psychologists also have directed their attention, long overdue, to understanding development in cultural context. There are striking differences among psychologists, however, in the approaches they take to culture and development. Most markedly, Cole (1989) distinguishes two very different theoretical perspectives on cultural psychology and its approach to human development. In one perspective the focus is on culture as a collective enterprise (e.g., Gauvain, in press: Shweder, 1990; Super and Harkness, 1986). There is no need in this view for focusing on the individual development of individual children since all important forms of learning are socially distributed; children simply become more skillful over time at participating in various collective activities (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Indeed, in some versions of this more sociological view of cultural psychology the focus on the cultural collective is so strong that there is really no justification for reference to the development of individuals at all: "Individual, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes constitute each other and cannot be separated" (Rogoff, Chavajay, and Matusov, 1993, p. 533).}, Doi = {10.1111/b.9780631211860.1998.00018.x}, Key = {fds351834} } @misc{fds351821, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {First steps toward a usage-based theory of language acquisition}, Pages = {439-458}, Booktitle = {Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings}, Year = {2008}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9783110190847}, Key = {fds351821} } @misc{fds351811, Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Punishment}, Volume = {2}, Pages = {800-805}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior}, Year = {2009}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780080453378}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-045337-8.00106-6}, Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment, third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale nonkin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment in other animals.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-045337-8.00106-6}, Key = {fds351811} } @misc{fds351773, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {On the Different Origins of Symbols and Grammar}, Booktitle = {Language Evolution}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780199244843}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244843.003.0006}, Abstract = {This chapter emphasises the role of psychology in language evolution, but claims that it was the separate evolution of capacities for using symbols and grammar (that is, syntactic structure) that distinguishes human communication from the communication of other primates. It suggests that there was no specific biological adaptation for linguistic communication. Rather, there was an adaptation for a broader kind of complex social cognition that enabled human culture and, as a special case of that, human symbolic communication. A crucial part of this adaptation was an evolved ability to recognise other individuals as intentional agents whose attention and behaviour could be shared and manipulated. The capacity for grammar subsequently developed, and became refined through processes of grammaticalisation occurring across generations - but with no additional biological adaptations. In support of this perspective, psychological data from the study of language development in young children and from comparisons with the linguistic, social, and mental capacities of nonhuman primates are presented. More generally, this chapter sees the origin and emergence of language as merely one part in the much larger process of the evolution of human culture.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244843.003.0006}, Key = {fds351773} } @misc{fds351774, Author = {Tomasello, M and Moll, H}, Title = {The gap is social: Human shared intentionality and culture}, Pages = {331-349}, Booktitle = {Mind the Gap: Tracing the Origins of Human Universals}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9783642027246}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_16}, Abstract = {Human beings share many cognitive skills with their nearest primate relatives, especially those for dealing with the physical world of objects (and categories and quantities of objects) in space and their causal interrelations. But humans are, in addition, biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not. Specifically, humans have evolved unique motivations and cognitive skills for understanding other persons as cooperative agents with whom one can share emotions, experience, and collaborative actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional activities. Participation in such activities leads humans to construct during ontogeny, perspectival and dialogical cognitive representations.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_16}, Key = {fds351774} } @misc{fds351769, Author = {Golinkoff, RM and Hirsh-Pasek, K and Bloom, L and Smith, LB and Woodward, AL and Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M and Hollich, G}, Title = {Counterpoint commentary}, Booktitle = {Becoming a Word Learner: A Debate on Lexical Acquisition}, Year = {2010}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9780195130324}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.007}, Abstract = {This chapter contains the authors' reactions to the previous chapters and stresses the similarities and differences between these theoretical views. It discusses that part of the debate concerns whether the first words are more like the indexical signs of most nonhumans or like the symbols of the human 4-year-old. It argues that although there are marked contrasts between the views, the work of all the authors focuses on a central issue: an understanding of how infants break the language barrier by learning words.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.007}, Key = {fds351769} } @misc{fds351770, Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Social Nature of Words and Word Learning}, Booktitle = {Becoming a Word Learner: A Debate on Lexical Acquisition}, Year = {2010}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9780195130324}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.005}, Abstract = {This chapter describes research findings from the social-pragmatic approach. It discusses that Nameera Akhtar and Michael Tomasello's dramatic findings demonstrate how word learning occurs in some fairly complex, nonostensive situations amid the flow of social interaction. It states that current models of word learning, as suggested by Akhtar and Tomasello, undervalue the role of social interaction. It explains that because language has social goals as its ultimate purpose, social interactions are the outcome of word learning.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.005}, Key = {fds351770} } @misc{fds351771, Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Are Nouns Easier to Learn Than Verbs? Three Experimental Studies}, Booktitle = {Action Meets Word: How Children Learn Verbs}, Year = {2010}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9780195170009}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170009.003.0013}, Abstract = {A current controversy in the study of word learning is whether it is conceptually easier to learn nouns as compared to verbs early in development. This chapter describes three experiments which address the noun-verb question in different ways. In the first experiment, researchers asked how many times (and on how many days) does a 2-yearold need to hear a word to be able to learn it, and does this differ for nouns and verbs? This second study investigates whether-when nouns and verbs are presented in comparable sentence contexts, controlling the number of exposures, and presenting a dynamic event in both the noun and verb conditions-nouns are easier to learn than are verbs. In Study 3, researchers compared children's ability to learn intransitive and transitive verbs and their ability to understand verbs for self-action as opposed to other action, to determine whether some of these verb and referent types are learned more quickly than are others.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170009.003.0013}, Key = {fds351771} } @misc{fds351764, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Language Development}, Pages = {239-257}, Booktitle = {The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development, Second edition}, Year = {2010}, Month = {July}, ISBN = {9781405191166}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444325485.ch9}, Doi = {10.1002/9781444325485.ch9}, Key = {fds351764} } @misc{fds351760, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {What Chimpanzees Know about Seeing, Revisited: An Explanation of the Third Kind}, Booktitle = {Joint Attention Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780199245635}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0003}, Abstract = {Chimpanzees follow the gaze of conspecifics and humans -follow it past distractors and behind barriers, 'check back' with humans when gaze following does not yield interesting sights, use gestures appropriately depending on the visual access of their recipient, and select different pieces of food depending on whether their competitor has visual access to them. Taken together, these findings make a strong case for the hypothesis that chimpanzees have some understanding of what other individuals can and cannot see. However, chimpanzees do not seem nearly so skillful in the Gesture Choice and Object Choice experimental paradigms. Neither behavioral conditioning nor theory of mind explanations can account for these results satisfactorily. Instead this chapter proposes the idea that chimpanzees have the cognitive skills to recall, represent, categorize, and reason about the behavior and perception of others, but not their intentional or mental states, because they do not know that others have such states since they cannot make a link to their own. Human beings began their own evolutionary trajectory with these same skills, but then at some point in their evolution (probably quite recently) they began to understand that their own experience could serve as some kind of model for that of other persons. This allowed for even better prediction and control of the behavior of others and better communication and cooperation with them as well, and so it was an adaptation with immediate adaptive consequences that ensured its survival.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0003}, Key = {fds351760} } @misc{fds351752, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Human Culture in Evolutionary Perspective}, Volume = {1}, Booktitle = {Advances in Culture and Psychology}, Year = {2010}, Month = {December}, ISBN = {9780195380392}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380392.003.0001}, Abstract = {Many animal species live in complex social groups, some of whom transmit information across generations "culturally". Humans' uniquely cultural way of life began with this kind of social organization but then acquired novel characteristics as a result of biological adaptations for interacting with other persons in species-unique forms of cooperative activity, including collaborative problem-solving, cooperative communication, and instructed learning. These more cooperative, cultural ways of doing things have as their psychological foundation various skills and motivations for shared intentionality.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380392.003.0001}, Key = {fds351752} } @misc{fds351710, Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Gräfenhain, M and Liebal, K and Liszkowski, U and Moll, H and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Warneken, F and Wyman, E}, Title = {Cultural learning and cultural creation}, Pages = {65-101}, Booktitle = {Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780203809587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203809587}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203809587}, Key = {fds351710} } @misc{fds375279, Author = {Ibbotson, P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Analogical mapping in construction learning}, Pages = {21-22}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Encyclopedia of Second Language Acquisition}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780415877510}, Key = {fds375279} } @misc{fds351706, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Do chimpanzees know what others see-or only what they are looking at?}, Booktitle = {Rational Animals?}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, ISBN = {9780198528272}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0017}, Abstract = {This chapter examines the distinction between two approaches in interpreting the behaviour in non-human animals. It explains the 'boosters' interpret behaviour in psychologically rich ways while 'scoffers' prefer psychologically lean interpretations. It compares richer and leaner interpretations of recent data from four experimental paradigms concerning whether chimpanzees know what others can or cannot see and argues that the 'booster' hypothesis is better supported by the experimental results.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0017}, Key = {fds351706} } @misc{fds351707, Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M and Meyer, S}, Title = {Linguistic Communication and Social Understanding}, Booktitle = {Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, ISBN = {9780195159912}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0012}, Abstract = {This chapter explores the early stages of pragmatic language acquisition before taking up the issue of syntax and semantics. It suggests that the relation between language and theory of mind is different depending on which aspect of social understanding is at issue. In particular, it argues that an appreciation of other persons as intentional agents-the first level of social understanding-is a prerequisite for language acquisition. The chapter presents evidence from a training study aimed at developing false-belief reasoning to show that both conversation about deceptive objects and training on the syntax of complementation (in the absence of deceptive objects) promote three-year-olds' falsebelief understanding. The largest training effect occurred in a condition that combined conversation and complements. The fact that manipulating the deceptive objects without any conversation about them was ineffective leads to the conclusion that language is a necessary condition for children to make progress in their understanding of false beliefs, lending support to the claim that language plays a causal role in the ontogeny of social understanding.}, Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0012}, Key = {fds351707} } @misc{fds351692, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cognitive Linguistics and First Language Acquisition}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780199738632}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.013.0041}, Abstract = {This article reviews some of the best-known and most interesting work on language acquisition from within the framework of functional-cognitive linguistics, particularly those on meaning and conceptualization as well as usage and grammar (grammatical constructions). Although the term is often used more narrowly, the article calls this general theoretical approach "usage-based" to emphasize the assumption common to all functional and cognitive approaches that linguistic structure emerges from use, both historically and ontogenetically. This is as opposed to the dominant view in the field of language acquisition today in which "core" grammatical competence is innately given, and all that develops is peripheral skills involving the lexicon, pragmatics, information processing, and the like. The article discusses meaning and conceptualization in child language, focusing on image schemas and word meanings as well as social cognition, perspective-taking, and culture. It also considers usage and grammar in child language, including usage-based syntax.}, Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.013.0041}, Key = {fds351692} } @misc{fds351693, Author = {Wyman, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The ontogenetic origins of human cooperation}, Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780198568308}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198568308.013.0017}, Abstract = {This article suggests that the ontogenesis of shared intentionality depends on the developmentally primitive phenomenon of 'joint attention'. This is the ability of the infant to understand that they and other individuals can attend to the same object and each other's attention simultaneously and provides a shared, interpersonal frame in which young infants can share experience with others. This article compares the skills and motivations involved in shared intentionality between humans and chimpanzees. It also emphasises a marked difference in their joint attention abilities. It suggests that this may explain various differences in social-cognitive skills between the two species, and proposes that the phylogenesis of joint attention may account for the evolution of complex forms of cooperation and uniquely human cultural practices.}, Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198568308.013.0017}, Key = {fds351693} } @misc{fds351681, Author = {Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The early ontogeny of human cooperation and morality}, Pages = {279-298}, Booktitle = {Handbook of Moral Development, Second Edition}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781848729599}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203581957}, Abstract = {The seminal work in the modern study of children’s moral development is Piaget’s (1932/1997) The Moral Judgment of the Child. As is well known, Piaget claimed that before the age of 8 or 9 years children make moral judgments based only on a respect for authority and the social norms emanating from this authority-and so they are not really autonomous moral agents. But, as is also well known, Piaget focused exclusively on the explicit moral judgments that children were capable of formulating in language. Kohlberg’s extension of Piaget’s framework (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976) also asked children to express their reasoned moral judgments linguistically, and also found that preschool children were essentially premoral (i.e., preconventional).}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203581957}, Key = {fds351681} } @misc{fds351595, Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Grammar}, Pages = {38-50}, Booktitle = {The Curated Reference Collection in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology}, Year = {2016}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780128093245}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.05819-3}, Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young children must master the grammatical constructions of their language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical issues in the field and trace the developmental path children follow from talking in single-unit “holophrases” to using complex, abstract constructions. We describe the development of children’s initial skills with word order, case marking, and morphology as abstract elements in early constructions, and we discuss the level of abstraction characteristic of young children’s grammatical constructions at different stages of development and in some different languages of the world. Finally, we consider the learning processes that enable young children both to acquire and to abstract across grammatical constructions.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.05819-3}, Key = {fds351595} } @misc{fds359905, Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Mixed NPs in German-English and German-Russian bilingual children}, Pages = {127-146}, Booktitle = {Cognitive Perspectives on Bilingualism}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9781614515852}, Abstract = {Both cross-linguistic priming methodologies and research on codemixed utterances have been concerned with the nature of the underlying syntactic representations of bilinguals. The present paper investigated code-mixing at the morphosyntactic level (NP) by comparing German-English (G-E) and German- Russian (G-R) bilingual children between the ages of 3;6 and 5;6. Using a language priming paradigm and a monolingual interlocutor in each language, we attempted to elicit mixed NPs from these children. Results showed that G-E bilingual children produced mixed NPs significantly more often than G-R bilinguals, providing support for the importance of structural similarity in this type of mixing. A second finding was that children who were reported as code-mixing at home were significantly more likely to provide answers while children who did not code-mix remained silent. Explanations in terms of individual differences and/or balanced competence are discussed.}, Key = {fds359905} } @misc{fds365126, Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The Middle Step: Joint Intentionality as a Human-Unique Form of Second-Personal Engagement}, Pages = {433-446}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781138783638}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315768571-41}, Abstract = {The crucial middle step consists in second-personal engagement with engagement others. In this chapter, the authors present face-to-face interactions joint intentionality. On the other hand there are capacities for acting collectively within a social group or culture, relying on an understanding and sensitivity to supra-individual constructions as cultural conventions, norms, and institutional reality. Much attention has been paid to processes of collective intentionality, often under the rubric of “social ontology”. While the social life of even our nearest living relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos is characterized by individual intentions, humans routinely coordinate with others to form intricate modes of collective intentions and enduring cultural practices. Chimpanzees have robust and selective intentions to behave cooperatively toward their bond partners, including a tendency to preferentially trust those partners. The authors discuss how early humans evolved new cognitive adaptations, most importantly and fundamentally the dual-level cognitive structure of joint intentionality.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315768571-41}, Key = {fds365126} } @misc{fds366595, Author = {Engelmann, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Prosociality and morality in children and chimpanzees}, Pages = {15-32}, Booktitle = {New Perspectives on Moral Development}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781138188013}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315642758}, Abstract = {The modern study of moral development began with Piaget’s (1932) The Moral Judgment of the Child, which although originally published in the 1930s only became internationally known in the 1960s through its influence on Kohlberg’s theory (e.g. Kohlberg, 1981). Piaget and Kohlberg were both explicit that they were not studying children’s moral motivations or behaviour, but only their judgements, indeed typically judgements about other people’s interactions from a third-party perspective. Much of the work in social domain theory championed by Turiel (1983), though coming from a somewhat different theoretical perspective, also focused on children’s judgements about third parties’ interactions.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315642758}, Key = {fds366595} } @misc{fds361197, Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T}, Title = {How children turn objects into symbols: A cultural learning account}, Pages = {69-97}, Booktitle = {Symbol Use and Symbolic Representation: Developmental and Comparative Perspectives}, Year = {2017}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780805845976}, Key = {fds361197} } @misc{fds349846, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {What did we learn from theape language studies?}, Pages = {95-104}, Booktitle = {Bonobos: Unique in Mind, Brain, and Behavior}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780198728511}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007}, Abstract = {The ‘ape language’ studies have come and gone, with wildly divergent claims about what they have shown. Without question, the most sophisticated skills have been displayed by Kanzi, a male bonobo exposed from youth to a human-like communicative system. This chapter attempts to assess, in an objective a manner as possible, the nature of the communicative skills that Kanzi and other great apes acquired during the various ape language projects. The overall conclusion is that bonobos and other apes possess most of the requisite cognitive skills for something like a human language, including such things as basic symbol learning, categorization, sequential (statistical) learning, etc. What they lack are the skills and motivations of shared intentionality-such things as joint attention, perspective-taking and cooperative motives- for adjusting their communicative acts for others pragmatically, or for learning symbols whose main function is pragmatic.}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007}, Key = {fds349846} } @misc{fds351572, Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Punishment}, Pages = {214-221}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780128132517}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1}, Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment, third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale non-kin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment in other animals.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1}, Key = {fds351572} } @misc{fds372674, Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Punishment}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {V1-214-V1-219}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior, Second Edition: Volume 1-5}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780128132517}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1}, Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment, third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale non-kin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment in other animals.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1}, Key = {fds372674} } @misc{fds352650, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Introduction: Intentional communication in nonhuman primates}, Pages = {1-15}, Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9780805853650}, Key = {fds352650} } @misc{fds352649, Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J}, Title = {Ape gestures and the origins of language}, Pages = {221-239}, Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9780805853650}, Key = {fds352649} } @misc{fds352648, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {The gestural repertoire of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)}, Pages = {17-39}, Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9780805853650}, Key = {fds352648} } @misc{fds352652, Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Comparing the gestures of apes and monkeys}, Pages = {197-220}, Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9780805853650}, Key = {fds352652} } @misc{fds353328, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Why don't apes point?}, Pages = {506-524}, Booktitle = {Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9781845203948}, Key = {fds353328} } @misc{fds358297, Author = {Mannle, S and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Fathers, siblings, and the bridge hypothesis}, Pages = {23-41}, Booktitle = {Children’s Language: Volume 6}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780898597608}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315792668-2}, Abstract = {The underlying assumption of the Bridge Hypothesis-which is not shared by all developmental psycholinguists-is that communication pressure is beneficial to the child’s development of communicative competence, including the acquisition of linguistic skills. This chapter reviews the existing research on fathers’ and siblings’ linguistic interactions with young children, including some recent research from our own laboratory. In the traditional family situation, fathers spend significantly less time than mothers interacting with their children, and so presumably are less familiar with the everyday behavioral routines that are so important for early language acquisition. As with fathers, the research on siblings’ communicative interactions with young children has just begun. Most of the relevant research on sibling speech to infants is concerned with structural/linguistic features, and it is thus unclear in this case as well whether siblings do in fact place communication pressure on the language learning child and thereby act as a linguistic bridge.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315792668-2}, Key = {fds358297} } @misc{fds368121, Author = {Vaish, A and Tomasello, M}, Title = {THE EARLY ONTOGENY OF HUMAN COOPERATION AND MORALITY}, Pages = {200-216}, Booktitle = {Handbook of Moral Development, Third Edition}, Year = {2022}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780367497569}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003047247-16}, Abstract = {In this chapter, we consider children’s moral development from an evolutionary perspective. We propose that human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating with others. Following recent accounts by Tomasello and colleagues of a two-step sequence in the evolution of human cooperation and morality, we propose and review empirical evidence in support of a two-step sequence in the ontogeny of human cooperation and morality: first, a second-personal morality that emerges in infancy and toddlerhood, in which children are sympathetic or fair to particular others, and second, a norm-based morality that emerges during the preschool years, in which children follow and enforce group-wide social norms. These prosocial and moral tendencies compete throughout ontogeny with children’s selfish tendencies and are modified significantly by socialization and culture.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781003047247-16}, Key = {fds368121} } @misc{fds371506, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Having Intentions, Understanding Intentions, and Understanding Communicative Intentions}, Pages = {63-75}, Booktitle = {Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and Self-Control}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780805831412}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003417927-5}, Abstract = {This chapter looks at a major cause and a major consequence of the 9-month social-cognitive revolution; and both of these also concern infant intentionality. It argues that young children’s understanding of other persons as intentional agents results in large part from newly emerging forms of intentionality in their own sensory-motor actions. The chapter explores young children’s understanding of a special type of intention that emerges directly on the heels of the 9-month revolution, namely, communicative intentions. Intentional agents have goals and make active choices among behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents also make active choices about what they pay attention to in pursuing those goals. ntentional agents have goals and make active choices among behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents also make active choices about what they pay attention to in pursuing those goals.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781003417927-5}, Key = {fds371506} } %% Chapters in Books @misc{fds351855, Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {362}, Number = {1480}, Pages = {639-648}, Year = {2007}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.2000}, Abstract = {Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2006.2000}, Key = {fds351855} } @misc{fds320796, Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Species differences in the rate of cognitive ontogeny among humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos}, Journal = {AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY}, Volume = {144}, Pages = {313-314}, Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds320796} } @misc{fds367354, Author = {Bara, BG and Chater, N and Tomasello, M and Varley, R}, Title = {Symposium Communicative Intentions in the Mind/Brain}, Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2013}, Pages = {65-66}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780976831891}, Key = {fds367354} } @misc{fds367355, Author = {Call, J and Goldin-Meadow, S and Hobaiter, C and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Language and Gesture Evolution}, Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2013}, Pages = {57-58}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780976831891}, Key = {fds367355} } @misc{fds330415, Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Great apes anticipate actions based on agents' (false) beliefs}, Journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY}, Volume = {51}, Pages = {255-255}, Publisher = {ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD}, Year = {2016}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds330415} } @misc{fds366592, Author = {Sanchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Coordination Strategies of Chimpanzees and Children in a Prisoner's Dilemma}, Journal = {FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA}, Volume = {89}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {186-186}, Publisher = {KARGER}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds366592} } | |
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