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Publications of Richard P. Larrick    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Papers Published   
@article{fds373576,
   Author = {Fath, S and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Encouraging self-blinding in hiring},
   Journal = {Behavioral Science and Policy},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {45-57},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23794607231192721},
   Abstract = {One strategy for minimizing bias in hiring is
             blinding—purposefully limiting the information used when
             screening applicants to that which is directly relevant to
             the job and does not elicit bias based on race, gender, age,
             or other irrelevant characteristics. Blinding policies
             remain rare, however. An alternative to blinding policies is
             self-blinding, in which people performing hiring-related
             evaluations blind themselves to biasing information about
             applicants. Using a mock-hiring task, we tested ways to
             encourage self-blinding that take into consideration three
             variables likely to affect whether people self-blind:
             default effects on choices, people’s inability to assess
             their susceptibility to bias, and people’s tendency not to
             recognize the full range of information that can elicit that
             bias. Participants with hiring experience chose to receive
             or be blind to various pieces of information about
             applicants, some of which were potentially biasing. They
             selected potentially biasing information less often when
             asked to specify the applicant information they wanted to
             receive than when asked to specify the information they did
             not want to receive, when prescribing selections for other
             people than when making the selections for themselves, and
             when the information was obviously biasing than when it was
             less obviously so. On the basis of these findings, we
             propose a multipronged strategy that human resources leaders
             could use to enable and encourage hiring managers to
             self-blind when screening job applicants.},
   Doi = {10.1177/23794607231192721},
   Key = {fds373576}
}

@article{fds368088,
   Author = {Lawson, MA and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {When and why people perform mindless math},
   Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1208-1228},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {November},
   Abstract = {In this paper, we show that the presence of numbers in a
             problem tempts people to perform mathematical operations
             even when the correct answer requires no math, which we term
             “mindless math”. In three pre-registered studies across
             two survey platforms (total N = 3,193), we investigate how
             mindless math relates to perceived problem difficulty,
             problem representation, and accuracy. In Study 1, we show
             that increasing the numeric demands of problems leads to
             more mindless math (and fewer correct answers). Study 2
             shows that this effect is not caused by people being wary of
             problems that seem too easy. In Study 3, we show that this
             effect is robust over a wider range of numeric demands, and
             in the discussion we offer two possible mechanisms that
             would explain this effect, and the caveat that at even
             harder levels of numeric demands the effect may invert such
             that much harder math increases accuracy relative to
             moderately hard math.},
   Key = {fds368088}
}

@article{fds360050,
   Author = {Chun, JS and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {The power of rank information.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {122},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {983-1003},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000289},
   Abstract = {People, organizations, and products are continuously ranked.
             The explosion of data has made it easy to rank everything,
             and, increasingly, outlets for information try to reduce
             information loads by providing rankings. In the present
             research, we find that rank information exerts a strong
             effect on decision making over and above the underlying
             information it summarizes. For example, when multiple
             options are presented with ratings alone (e.g., "9.7" vs.
             "9.5") versus with ratings and corresponding ranks (e.g.,
             "9.7" and "1st" vs. "9.5" and "2nd"), the presence of rank
             information increases preference for the top ranked option.
             This effect of ranking is found in a variety of contexts,
             ranging from award decisions in a professional sports league
             to hiring decisions to consumer choices, and it is
             independent of other well-known effects (such as the effect
             of sorting). We find that the influence of ranks is
             explained by the extent to which decision makers attend to
             the top ranked option and overlook the other options when
             they are given rank information. Because they invest a
             disproportionate amount of attention to the top ranked
             option when they are given rank information, decision makers
             tend to learn the strength of the top ranked option, but
             they fail to process the strengths of the other options. We
             discuss how rank information may operate as one of the
             processes by which those at the top of the hierarchy
             maintain a disproportionate level of popularity in the
             market. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights
             reserved).},
   Doi = {10.1037/pspa0000289},
   Key = {fds360050}
}

@article{fds363671,
   Author = {Ponce de Leon and R and Rifkin, JR and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {"They're Everywhere!": Symbolically Threatening Groups Seem
             More Pervasive Than Nonthreatening Groups.},
   Journal = {Psychological science},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {957-970},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09567976211060009},
   Abstract = {The meaning of places is socially constructed, often
             informed by the groups that seem pervasive there. For
             instance, the University of Pennsylvania is sometimes
             pejoratively called "Jew-niversity of Pennsylvania," and the
             city of Decatur, Georgia, is disparagingly nicknamed
             "Dyke-atur," connoting the respective pervasiveness of
             Jewish students and gay residents. Because these
             pervasiveness perceptions meaningfully impact how people
             navigate the social world, it is critical to understand the
             factors that influence their formation. Across surveys,
             experiments, and archival data, six studies (<i>N</i> =
             3,039 American adults) revealed the role of symbolic threat
             (i.e., perceived differences in values and worldviews).
             Specifically, holding constant important features of the
             group and context, we demonstrated that groups higher in
             symbolic threat are perceived as more populous in a place
             and more associated with that place than groups lower in
             symbolic threat. Ultimately, this work reveals that symbolic
             threat can both distort how people understand their
             surroundings and shape the meaning of places.},
   Doi = {10.1177/09567976211060009},
   Key = {fds363671}
}

@article{fds362377,
   Author = {Fath, S and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Blinding curiosity: Exploring preferences for “blinding”
             one's own judgment},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {170},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2022.104135},
   Abstract = {We perform the first tests of individual-level preferences
             for “blinding” in decision making: purposefully
             restricting the information one sees in order to form a more
             objective evaluation. For example, when grading her
             students’ papers, a professor might choose to “blind”
             herself to students’ names by anonymizing them, thus
             evaluating the papers on content alone. We predict that
             curiosity will shape blinding preferences, motivating people
             to seek out (vs. be blind to) irrelevant, potentially
             biasing information about a target of evaluation. We further
             predict that decision frames that reduce or satisfy
             curiosity about potentially biasing information will
             encourage choices to be blind to that information. We find
             support for these hypotheses across seven studies (N =
             4,356) and multiple replications (N = 9,570), demonstrating
             consequences for bias and accuracy across a variety of
             evaluation contexts. We discuss implications for research on
             mental contamination as well as the “dark side” of
             curiosity.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2022.104135},
   Key = {fds362377}
}

@article{fds373577,
   Author = {Fath, S and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB and Zhu, S},
   Title = {Why Putting On Blinders Can Help Us See More
             Clearly},
   Journal = {MIT Sloan Management Review},
   Volume = {62},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {38-45},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {June},
   Key = {fds373577}
}

@article{fds373578,
   Author = {Gainsburg, I and Cunningham, JL and Klotz, L and Larrick,
             R},
   Title = {editors’ note},
   Journal = {Behavioral Science and Policy},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {ii-iii},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/bsp.2021.0005},
   Doi = {10.1353/bsp.2021.0005},
   Key = {fds373578}
}

@article{fds348813,
   Author = {Tang, S and Koval, CZ and Larrick, RP and Harris,
             L},
   Title = {The morality of organization versus organized members:
             Organizations are attributed more control and responsibility
             for negative outcomes than are equivalent
             members.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {119},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {901-919},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000229},
   Abstract = {Seven experiments demonstrate that framing an organizational
             entity (the target) as an organization ("an organization
             comprised of its constituent members") versus its members
             ("constituent members comprising an organization") increases
             attribution of responsibility to the target following a
             negative outcome, despite identical information conveyed.
             Specifically, the target in the organization (vs. members)
             frame was perceived to have more control over a negative
             outcome, which led to an increased attribution of
             responsibility (Studies 1-3). This effect surfaced for both
             for-profits and nonprofits (Study 5). However, when the
             target in the members frame had explicit control over the
             outcome (Study 3), or when participants held strong beliefs
             in individual free will (Study 4), the effect of frame on
             responsibility attenuated. To the extent that framing
             increased perceptions of control, punishment for the target
             also increased (Studies 6a and 6b). By demonstrating how a
             subtle shift in framing can impact people's perceptions and
             judgments of organizations, we reveal important knowledge
             about how people understand organizations and the
             psychological nature of organizational and group perception.
             (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights
             reserved).},
   Doi = {10.1037/pspi0000229},
   Key = {fds348813}
}

@article{fds352677,
   Author = {Lawson, MA and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Comparing fast thinking and slow thinking: The relative
             benefits of interventions, individual differences, and
             inferential rules},
   Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {660-684},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {Research on judgment and decision making has suggested that
             the System 2 process of slow thinking can help people to
             improve their decision making by reducing well-established
             statistical decision biases (including base rate neglect,
             probability matching, and the conjunction fallacy). In a
             large pre-registered study with 1,706 participants and
             23,292 unique observations, we compare the effects of
             individual differences and behavioral interventions to test
             the relative benefits of slow thinking on performance in
             canonical judgment and decision-making problems, compared to
             a control condition, a fast thinking condition, an incentive
             condition, and a condition that combines fast and slow
             thinking. We also draw on the rule-based reasoning
             literature to examine the benefits of having access to a
             simple form of the rule needed to solve a specific focal
             problem. Overall, we find equivocal evidence of a small
             benefit from slow thinking, evidence for a small benefit to
             accuracy incentives, and clear evidence of a larger cost
             from fast thinking. The difference in performance between
             fast-thinking and slow-thinking interventions is comparable
             to a one-scale point difference on the 4-point Cognitive
             Reflection Test (CRT). Inferential rules contribute unique
             explanatory power and interact with individual differences
             to support the idea that System 2 benefits from a
             combination of slower processes and knowledge appropriate to
             the problem.},
   Key = {fds352677}
}

@article{fds341939,
   Author = {Camilleri, AR and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {The collective aggregation effect: Aggregating potential
             collective action increases prosocial behavior.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
   Volume = {148},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {550-569},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000563},
   Abstract = {The authors investigated the effectiveness of aggregating
             over potential noncontingent collective action ("If X people
             all do Y action, then Z outcomes will be achieved") to
             increase prosocial behavior. They carried out 6 experiments
             encouraging 4 different prosocial activities and found that
             aggregating potential benefits over 1,000 people produced
             more prosocial intentions and actions than aggregating over
             1 person did. The authors further showed that aggregating
             potential benefits over 1,000 people produced more prosocial
             intentions than aggregating benefits over 1,000 days did.
             This collective aggregation effect was due to the
             presentation of larger aggregated benefits (Experiments
             1-6), attenuation of psychological discounting (Experiment
             4), and increased perceptions of outcome efficacy
             (Experiments 5-6). The effect was not due to social norms
             (Experiment 3) or a simple anchoring process (Experiments
             4-5). Often individual contributions to societal ills seem
             like mere "drops in a bucket"; collective aggregation helps
             by making individual actions seem bucket-sized, immediate,
             important, and effective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019
             APA, all rights reserved).},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000563},
   Key = {fds341939}
}

@article{fds340527,
   Author = {Camilleri, AR and Larrick, RP and Hossain, S and Patino-Echeverri,
             D},
   Title = {Consumers underestimate the emissions associated with food
             but are aided by labels},
   Journal = {Nature Climate Change},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {53-58},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0354-z},
   Abstract = {Food production is a major cause of energy use and GHG
             emissions, and therefore diet change is an important
             behavioural strategy for reducing associated environmental
             impacts. However, a severe obstacle to diet change may be
             consumers’ underestimation of the environmental impacts of
             different types of food. Here we show that energy
             consumption and GHG emission estimates are significantly
             underestimated for foods, suggesting a possible blind spot
             suitable for intervention. In a second study, we find that
             providing consumers with information regarding the GHG
             emissions associated with the life cycle of food, presented
             in terms of a familiar reference unit (light-bulb minutes),
             shifts their actual purchase choices away from
             higher-emission options. Thus, although consumers’ poor
             understanding of the food system is a barrier to reducing
             energy use and GHG emissions, it also represents a promising
             area for simple interventions such as a well-designed carbon
             label.},
   Doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0354-z},
   Key = {fds340527}
}

@article{fds333267,
   Author = {Minson, JA and Mueller, JS and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {The contingent wisdom of dyads: When discussion enhances vs.
             undermines the accuracy of collaborative
             judgments},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {4177-4192},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2823},
   Abstract = {We evaluate the effect of discussion on the accuracy of
             collaborative judgments. In contrast to prior research, we
             show that discussion can either aid or impede accuracy
             relative to the averaging of collaborators' independent
             judgments, as a systematic function of task type and
             interaction process. For estimation tasks with a wide range
             of potential estimates, discussion aided accuracy by helping
             participants prevent and eliminate egregious errors. For
             estimation tasks with a naturally bounded range, discussion
             following independent estimates performed on par with
             averaging. Importantly, if participants did not first make
             independent estimates, discussion greatly harmed accuracy by
             limiting the range of considered estimates, independent of
             task type. Our research shows that discussion can be a
             powerful tool for error reduction, but only when
             appropriately structured: Decision makers should
             formindependent judgments to consider a wide range of
             possible answers, and then use discussion to eliminate
             extremely large errors.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2017.2823},
   Key = {fds333267}
}

@article{fds333265,
   Author = {Schaerer, M and Tost, LP and Huang, L and Gino, F and Larrick,
             R},
   Title = {Advice Giving: A Subtle Pathway to Power.},
   Journal = {Personality & social psychology bulletin},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {746-761},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167217746341},
   Abstract = {We propose that interpersonal behaviors can activate
             feelings of power, and we examine this idea in the context
             of advice giving. Specifically, we show (a) that advice
             giving is an interpersonal behavior that enhances
             individuals' sense of power and (b) that those who seek
             power are motivated to engage in advice giving. Four
             studies, including two experiments ( N = 290, N = 188), an
             organization-based field study ( N = 94), and a negotiation
             simulation ( N = 124), demonstrate that giving advice
             enhances the adviser's sense of power because it gives the
             adviser perceived influence over others' actions. Two of our
             studies further demonstrate that people with a high tendency
             to seek power are more likely to give advice than those with
             a low tendency. This research establishes advice giving as a
             subtle route to a sense of power, shows that the desire to
             feel powerful motivates advice giving, and highlights the
             dynamic interplay between power and advice.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0146167217746341},
   Key = {fds333265}
}

@article{fds333266,
   Author = {Ungemach, C and Camilleri, AR and Johnson, EJ and Larrick, RP and Weber,
             EU},
   Title = {Translated attributes as choice architecture: Aligning
             objectives and choices through decision signposts},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {2445-2459},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2703},
   Abstract = {Every attribute can be expressed in multiple ways. For
             example, car fuel economy can be expressed as fuel
             efficiency ("miles per gallon"), fuel cost in dollars, or
             tons of greenhouse gases emitted. Each expression, or
             "translation," highlights a different aspect of the same
             attribute. We describe a new mechanism whereby translated
             attributes can serve as decision "signposts" because they
             (1) activate otherwise dormant objectives, such as
             proenvironmental values and goals, and (2) direct the person
             toward the option that best achieves the activated
             objective. Across three experiments, we provide evidence for
             the occurrence of such signpost effects as well as the
             underlying psychological mechanism. We demonstrate that
             expressing an attribute such as fuel economy in terms of
             multiple translations can increase preference for the option
             that is better aligned with objectives congruent with this
             attribute (e.g., the more fuel-efficient car for those with
             proenvironmental attitudes), even when the new information
             is derivable from other known attributes. We discuss how
             using translated attributes appropriately can help align a
             person's choices with their personal objectives.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2016.2703},
   Key = {fds333266}
}

@article{fds330876,
   Author = {Kay, MB and Proudfoot, D and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {There's no team in I: How observers perceive individual
             creativity in a team setting.},
   Journal = {The Journal of applied psychology},
   Volume = {103},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {432-442},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000270},
   Abstract = {Creativity is highly valued in organizations as an important
             source of innovation. As most creative projects require the
             efforts of groups of individuals working together, it is
             important to understand how creativity is perceived for team
             products, including how observers attribute creative ability
             to focal actors who worked as part of a creative team.
             Evidence from three experiments suggests that observers
             commit the fundamental attribution error-systematically
             discounting the contribution of the group when assessing the
             creative ability of a single group representative,
             particularly when the group itself is not visually salient.
             In a pilot study, we found that, in the context of the
             design team at Apple, a target group member visually
             depicted alone is perceived to have greater personal
             creative ability than when he is visually depicted with his
             team. In Study 1, using a sample of managers, we
             conceptually replicated this finding and further observed
             that, when shown alone, a target member of a group that
             produced a creative product is perceived to be as creative
             as an individual described as working alone on the same
             output. In Study 2, we replicated the findings of Study 1
             and also observed that a target group member depicted alone,
             rather than with his team, is also attributed less creative
             ability for uncreative group output. Findings are discussed
             in light of how overattribution of individual creative
             ability can harm organizations in the long run. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/apl0000270},
   Key = {fds330876}
}

@article{fds331495,
   Author = {Tong, J and Feiler, D and Larrick, R},
   Title = {A Behavioral Remedy for the Censorship Bias},
   Journal = {Production and Operations Management},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {624-643},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12823},
   Abstract = {Existing evidence suggests that managers exhibit a
             censorship bias: demand beliefs tend to be biased low when
             lost sales from stockouts are unobservable (censored demand)
             compared to when they are observable (uncensored demand). We
             develop a non-constraining, easily implementable behavioral
             debias technique to help mitigate this tendency in demand
             forecasting and inventory decision-making settings. The
             debiasing technique has individuals record estimates of
             demand outcomes (REDO): participants explicitly record a
             self-generated estimate of every demand realization,
             allowing them to record a different value than the number of
             sales in periods with stockouts. In doing so, they construct
             a more representative sample of demand realizations (that
             differs from the sales sample). In three laboratory
             experiments with MBA and undergraduate students, this remedy
             significantly reduces downward bias in demand beliefs under
             censorship and leads to higher inventory order
             decisions.},
   Doi = {10.1111/poms.12823},
   Key = {fds331495}
}

@article{fds336087,
   Author = {Morewedge, CK and Tang, S and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Betting your favorite to win: Costly reluctance to hedge
             desired outcomes},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {997-1014},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2656},
   Abstract = {We examined whether people reduce the impact of negative
             outcomes through emotional hedging-betting against the
             occurrence of desired outcomes. We found substantial
             reluctance to bet against the success of preferred U.S.
             Presidential candidates and Major League Baseball, National
             Football League, National Collegiate Athletic Association
             (NCAA) basketball, andNCAA hockey teams. This reluctancewas
             not attributable to optimism or a general aversion to
             hedging. Reluctance to hedge desired outcomes stemmed from
             identity signaling, a desire to preserve an important aspect
             of the bettor's identity. Reluctance to hedge occurred when
             the diagnostic cost of the negative self-signal that hedging
             would produce outweighed the pecuniary rewards associated
             with hedging. Participants readily accepted hedges and pure
             gambles with no diagnostic costs. They also more readily
             accepted hedges with diagnostic costs when the pecuniary
             rewards associated with those hedges were greater.
             Reluctance to hedge identity-relevant outcomes produced two
             anomalies in decision making, risk seeking and dominance
             violations. More than 45% of NCAA fans in Studies 5 and 6,
             for instance, turned down a "free" real $5 bet against their
             team. The results elucidate anomalous decisions in which
             people exhibit disloyalty aversion, forgoing personal
             rewards that would conflict with their loyalties and
             commitments to others, beliefs, and ideals.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2016.2656},
   Key = {fds336087}
}

@article{fds328721,
   Author = {Rader, CA and Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Advice as a form of social influence: Informational motives
             and the consequences for accuracy},
   Journal = {Social and Personality Psychology Compass},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {8},
   Pages = {e12329-e12329},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12329},
   Abstract = {In this article, we ask how well people fulfill
             informational motives by using the judgments of others. We
             build on advice-taking research from the judgment and
             decision making literature, which has developed a distinct
             paradigm to test how accurately people incorporate
             information from others. We use a literature review to show
             that people have mixed success in fulfilling informational
             motives—they increase their accuracy through the use of
             advice, but not as much as they could. We develop insights
             about how people perceive advisors and try to pursue
             advice—and where their perceptions may lead them astray.
             We conclude by proposing that future work further
             investigate the reasons people fail to use advice by
             building on the current advice taking paradigm used in
             judgment and decision making, but with a richer
             understanding of advice taking as a dynamic process that
             often entails complex decisions and normative
             motives.},
   Doi = {10.1111/spc3.12329},
   Key = {fds328721}
}

@article{fds327421,
   Author = {de Langhe, B and Puntoni, S and Larrick, R},
   Title = {Linear thinking in a nonlinear world: The obvious choice is
             often wrong},
   Journal = {Harvard Business Review},
   Volume = {2017},
   Number = {July-August},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds327421}
}

@article{fds325129,
   Author = {Tang, S and Morewedge, CM and Larrick, RP and Klein,
             JG},
   Title = {Disloyalty aversion: Greater reluctance to bet against close
             others than the self},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {140},
   Pages = {1-13},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.02.001},
   Abstract = {We examine the mechanisms by which loyalty can induce risk
             seeking. In seven studies, participants exhibited disloyalty
             aversion—they were more reluctant to bet on the failure of
             a close other than on their own failure. In contrast,
             participants were just as willing to bet on the failure of
             strangers as on their own failure. This effect persisted
             when bets were made in private, payouts were larger for
             betting on failure than success (Studies 1–4, 6), and
             failure was most likely (Studies 2–6). We propose that
             disloyalty aversion occurs because the negative identity
             signal to the self that hedging creates can outweigh the
             rewards conferred by hedging. Indeed, disloyalty aversion
             was moderated by factors affecting the strength of this
             self-signal and the payout of the hedge, including the
             closeness of the other person, bettors’ trait loyalty, and
             payout magnitude (Studies 3–5). Disloyalty aversion
             strongly influences social preferences involving
             risk.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.02.001},
   Key = {fds325129}
}

@article{fds326636,
   Author = {De Langhe and B and Puntoni, S and Larrick, R},
   Title = {LINEAR THINKING IN A NONLINEAR WORLD},
   Journal = {HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW},
   Volume = {95},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {130-139},
   Publisher = {HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL PUBLISHING CORPORATION},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds326636}
}

@article{fds327118,
   Author = {Aribarg, A and Burson, KA and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Tipping the scale: The role of discriminability in conjoint
             analysis},
   Journal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {279-292},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmr.14.0659},
   Abstract = {Conjoint analysis is a widely used method for determining
             how much certain attributes matter to consumers by observing
             a series of their choices. However, how those attributes are
             expressed has important consequences for their choices and
             thus for conclusions drawn by market researchers about
             attribute importance. Expanded attribute scales (e.g.,
             expressing exercise time in minutes) leads consumers to
             perceive greater differences between scale levels than
             contracted scales (e.g., expressing exercise time in hours).
             The authors show in two domains that simply expanding an
             attribute's scale can shift choice toward alternatives that
             perform well on a scale that is expanded and thus can impact
             conjoint results such as attribute importance and screening.
             Thus, practitioners should take care when they choose
             precisely how to elicit preferences or how to describe their
             products: the extent of the scale's expansion will determine
             researchers' inferences about the importance of the
             attribute it describes. By illustrating the curvilinear
             relationship between scale expansion and multiple measures,
             the authors also offer practitioners some insight into the
             limits of scale expansion.},
   Doi = {10.1509/jmr.14.0659},
   Key = {fds327118}
}

@article{fds274114,
   Author = {Arora, P and Logg, J and Larrick, R},
   Title = {Acting for the Greater Good: Identification with Group
             Determines Choices in Sequential Contribution
             Dilemmas},
   Journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {499-510},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0894-3257},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1892},
   Abstract = {In mixed-motive interactions, defection is the rational and
             common response to the defection of others. In some cases,
             however, group members not only cooperate in the face of
             defection but also compensate for the shortfalls caused by
             others' defection. In one field and two lab studies, we
             examined when group members were willing to compensate for
             versus match defection using sequential dilemmas. We found
             that the level of identification with the broader group
             increased willingness to compensate for intragroup
             defection, even when it was personally costly. Compensating
             for a defecting partner's actions, however, is not an act of
             unconditional cooperation: It is accompanied by a lack of
             trust in the errant group member and a desire to be
             perceived as more ethical. Cooperation by others, on the
             other hand, is matched independent of whether the cooperator
             was an in-group or out-group member. We find similar
             patterns of compensation and matching when the personal cost
             involved contributing money or effort. Copyright © 2015
             John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1002/bdm.1892},
   Key = {fds274114}
}

@article{fds326637,
   Author = {Larrick, RP},
   Title = {The Social Context of Decisions},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and
             Organizational Behavior},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {441-467},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062445},
   Abstract = {The past 40 years of psychological research on decision
             making has identified a number of important cognitive
             biases. However, the psychological study of decision making
             tends to focus on individuals making decisions in isolation.
             This article explores the social context of individual
             decision making by considering three lenses: individual
             contributions in social decision processes, individuals as
             social products, and individuals as sources of social
             preferences. The social context of decision making both
             improves decision making by allowing diverse knowledge to be
             pooled and creates shared perspectives'including shared
             blind spots. The article offers conjectures on managerial
             insight about social settings that can inform future
             research.},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062445},
   Key = {fds326637}
}

@article{fds274115,
   Author = {Rader, CA and Soll, JB and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Pushing away from representative advice: Advice taking,
             anchoring, and adjustment},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {130},
   Pages = {26-43},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.05.004},
   Abstract = {Five studies compare the effects of forming an independent
             judgment prior to receiving advice with the effects of
             receiving advice before forming one's own opinion. We call
             these the independent-then-revise sequence and the dependent
             sequence, respectively. We found that dependent participants
             adjusted away from advice, leading to fewer estimates close
             to the advice compared to independent-then-revise
             participants (Studies 1-5). This "push-away" effect was
             mediated by confidence in the advice (Study 2), with
             dependent participants more likely to evaluate advice
             unfavorably and to search for additional cues than
             independent-then-revise participants (Study 3). Study 4
             tested accuracy under different advice sequences. Study 5
             found that classic anchoring paradigms also show the
             push-away effect for median advice. Overall, the research
             shows that people adjust from representative (median)
             advice. The paper concludes by discussing when push-away
             effects occur in advice taking and anchoring studies and the
             value of independent distributions for observing these
             effects.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.05.004},
   Key = {fds274115}
}

@article{fds312818,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soll, JB and Keeney, RL},
   Title = {Designing better energy metrics for consumers},
   Journal = {Behavioral Science & Policy},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {63-75},
   Booktitle = {Energy Accounts: Architectural Representations of Energy,
             Climate, and the Future},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2015},
   ISBN = {9781138914063},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/bsp.2015.0005},
   Doi = {10.1353/bsp.2015.0005},
   Key = {fds312818}
}

@article{fds274123,
   Author = {Mannes, AE and Soll, JB and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {The wisdom of select crowds.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {276-299},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036677},
   Abstract = {Social psychologists have long recognized the power of
             statisticized groups. When individual judgments about some
             fact (e.g., the unemployment rate for next quarter) are
             averaged together, the average opinion is typically more
             accurate than most of the individual estimates, a pattern
             often referred to as the wisdom of crowds. The accuracy of
             averaging also often exceeds that of the individual
             perceived as most knowledgeable in the group. However,
             neither averaging nor relying on a single judge is a robust
             strategy; each performs well in some settings and poorly in
             others. As an alternative, we introduce the select-crowd
             strategy, which ranks judges based on a cue to ability
             (e.g., the accuracy of several recent judgments) and
             averages the opinions of the top judges, such as the top 5.
             Through both simulation and an analysis of 90 archival data
             sets, we show that select crowds of 5 knowledgeable judges
             yield very accurate judgments across a wide range of
             possible settings-the strategy is both accurate and robust.
             Following this, we examine how people prefer to use
             information from a crowd. Previous research suggests that
             people are distrustful of crowds and of mechanical processes
             such as averaging. We show in 3 experiments that, as
             expected, people are drawn to experts and dislike crowd
             averages-but, critically, they view the select-crowd
             strategy favorably and are willing to use it. The
             select-crowd strategy is thus accurate, robust, and
             appealing as a mechanism for helping individuals tap
             collective wisdom.},
   Doi = {10.1037/a0036677},
   Key = {fds274123}
}

@article{fds274124,
   Author = {Camilleri, AR and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Metric and scale design as choice architecture
             tools},
   Journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Marketing},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {108-125},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0743-9156},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jppm.12.151},
   Abstract = {Interest is increasing in using behavioral decision insights
             to design better product labels. A specific policy target is
             the fuel economy label, which policy makers can use to
             encourage reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from
             transport-related fossil-fuel combustion. In two online
             experiments, the authors examine whether vehicle preferences
             can be shifted toward more fuel-efficient vehicles by
             manipulating the metric (consumption of gas vs. cost of gas)
             and scale (100 miles vs. 15, 000 miles vs. 100, 000 miles)
             on which fuel economy information is expressed. They find
             that preference for fuel-efficient vehicles is highest when
             fuel economy is expressed in terms of the cost of gas over
             100, 000 miles, regardless of whether the vehicle pays for
             its higher price in gas savings. The authors discuss the
             underlying psychological mechanisms for this finding,
             including compatibility, anchoring, and familiarity effects,
             and conclude that policy makers should initiate programs
             that communicate fuel-efficiency information in terms of
             costs over an expanded, lifetime scale. © 2014, American
             Marketing Association.},
   Doi = {10.1509/jppm.12.151},
   Key = {fds274124}
}

@article{fds274129,
   Author = {Gromet, DM and Kunreuther, H and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Political ideology affects energy-efficiency attitudes and
             choices.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {110},
   Number = {23},
   Pages = {9314-9319},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23630266},
   Abstract = {This research demonstrates how promoting the environment can
             negatively affect adoption of energy efficiency in the
             United States because of the political polarization
             surrounding environmental issues. Study 1 demonstrated that
             more politically conservative individuals were less in favor
             of investment in energy-efficient technology than were those
             who were more politically liberal. This finding was driven
             primarily by the lessened psychological value that more
             conservative individuals placed on reducing carbon
             emissions. Study 2 showed that this difference has
             consequences: In a real-choice context, more conservative
             individuals were less likely to purchase a more expensive
             energy-efficient light bulb when it was labeled with an
             environmental message than when it was unlabeled. These
             results highlight the importance of taking into account
             psychological value-based considerations in the individual
             adoption of energy-efficient technology in the United States
             and beyond.},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1218453110},
   Key = {fds274129}
}

@article{fds274130,
   Author = {Feiler, DC and Tong, JD and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Biased judgment in censored environments},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {573-591},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1612},
   Abstract = {Some environments constrain the information that managers
             and decision makers can observe. We examine judgment in
             censored environments where a constraint, the censorship
             point, systematically distorts the observed sample. Random
             instances beyond the censorship point are observed at the
             censorship point, whereas uncensored instances are observed
             at their true value. Many important managerial decisions
             occur in censored environments, such as inventory, risk
             taking, and employee evaluation decisions. In this research,
             we demonstrate a censorship bias-individuals tend to rely
             too heavily on the observed censored sample, biasing their
             belief about the underlying population. We further show that
             the censorship bias is exacerbated for higher degrees of
             censorship, higher variance in the population, and higher
             variability in the censorship points. In four studies, we
             find evidence of the censorship bias across the domains of
             demand estimation and sequential risk taking. The bias
             causes individuals to make costly decisions and behave in an
             overly risk-averse manner. © 2013 INFORMS.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.1120.1612},
   Key = {fds274130}
}

@article{fds274127,
   Author = {Soll, JB and Keeney, RL and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Consumer misunderstanding of credit card
             use},
   Journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Marketing},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {66-81},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0743-9156},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jppm.11.061},
   Abstract = {The authors identify several judgmental biases related to
             paying off credit card debt. Participants with stronger
             numerical skills made fewer errors, as did those who used
             the new statement format mandated by Congress in the CARD
             Act of 2009. Study 1 shows that people underestimate how
             long it takes to eliminate a debt when payments barely cover
             interest owed. Study 2 shows that less numerate people tend
             to underestimate the monthly payment required to pay off a
             debt in three years, whereas more numerate people tend to
             overestimate the payment. The newly revised statement
             required by the CARD Act substantially reduced these biases.
             However, even with the new statement, many people still
             underestimate required payments when still using the credit
             card. Study 3 identifies ambiguities in the revised
             statement that can lead to misjudgments about how much to
             pay on monthly bills. The authors recommend additional
             public policy actions to help cardholders understand the
             relationship between payments and debt elimination. © 2013
             American Marketing Association.},
   Doi = {10.1509/jppm.11.061},
   Key = {fds274127}
}

@article{fds312817,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Tost, LP and Gino, F},
   Title = {When Power Makes Others Speechless: The Negative Impact of
             Leader Power on Team Performance},
   Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
   Volume = {56},
   Pages = {1465-1486},
   Publisher = {Academy of Management},
   Year = {2013},
   ISSN = {1948-0989},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0180},
   Abstract = {We examine the impact of the subjective experience of power
             on leadership dynamics and team performance and find that
             the psychological effect of power on formal leaders spills
             over to affect team performance. We argue that a formal
             leader's experience of heightened power produces verbal
             dominance, which reduces team communication and consequently
             diminishes performance. Importantly, because these dynamics
             rely on the acquiescence of other team members to the
             leader's dominant behavior, the effects only emerge when the
             leader holds a formal leadership position. Three studies
             offer consistent support for this argument. The implications
             for theory and practice are discussed. © Academy of
             Management Journal.},
   Doi = {10.5465/amj.2011.0180},
   Key = {fds312817}
}

@article{fds274160,
   Author = {Wade-Benzoni, KA and Tost, LP and Hernandez, M and Larrick,
             RP},
   Title = {It's only a matter of time: death, legacies, and
             intergenerational decisions.},
   Journal = {Psychological science},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {704-709},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22692338},
   Abstract = {Intergenerational decisions affect other people in the
             future. The combination of intertemporal and interpersonal
             distance between decision makers in the present and other
             people in the future may lead one to expect little
             intergenerational generosity. In the experiments reported
             here, however, we posited that the negative effect of
             intertemporal distance on intergenerational beneficence
             would be reversed when people were primed with thoughts of
             death. This reversal would occur because death priming leads
             individuals to be concerned with having a lasting impact on
             other people in the future. Our experiments show that when
             individuals are exposed to death priming, the expected
             tendency to allocate fewer resources to others in the
             future, as compared with others in the present, is reversed.
             Our findings suggest that legacy motivations triggered by
             death priming can trump intergenerational discounting
             tendencies and promote intergenerational
             beneficence.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797612443967},
   Key = {fds274160}
}

@article{fds274158,
   Author = {Johnson, EJ and Shu, SB and Dellaert, BGC and Fox, C and Goldstein, DG and Häubl, G and Larrick, RP and Payne, JW and Peters, E and Schkade, D and Wansink, B and Weber, EU},
   Title = {Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture},
   Journal = {Marketing Letters},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {487-504},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0923-0645},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11002-012-9186-1},
   Abstract = {The way a choice is presented influences what a
             decision-maker chooses. This paper outlines the tools
             available to choice architects, that is anyone who present
             people with choices. We divide these tools into two
             categories: those used in structuring the choice task and
             those used in describing the choice options. Tools for
             structuring the choice task address the idea of what to
             present to decision-makers, and tools for describing the
             choice options address the idea of how to present it. We
             discuss implementation issues in using choice architecture
             tools, including individual differences and errors in
             evaluation of choice outcomes. Finally, this paper presents
             a few applications that illustrate the positive effect
             choice architecture can have on real-world decisions. ©
             2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11002-012-9186-1},
   Key = {fds274158}
}

@article{fds274156,
   Author = {Tost, LP and Gino, F and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Power, competitiveness, and advice taking: Why the powerful
             don't listen},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {117},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {53-65},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.10.001},
   Abstract = {Four experiments test the prediction that feelings of power
             lead individuals to discount advice received from both
             experts and novices. Experiment 1 documents a negative
             relationship between subjective feelings of power and use of
             advice. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that individuals
             experiencing neutral and low levels of power weigh advice
             from experts and experienced advisors more heavily than
             advice from novices, but individuals experiencing high
             levels of power discount both novice and expert advice.
             Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that this tendency of
             individuals experiencing high levels of power to discount
             advice from experts and novices equally is mediated by
             feelings of competitiveness (Experiment 3) and confidence
             (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, Experiment 4 shows that
             inducing high power individuals to feel cooperative with
             their advisors can mitigate this tendency, leading them to
             weigh expert advice more heavily than advice from novices.
             Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed. ©
             2011 Elsevier Inc.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.10.001},
   Key = {fds274156}
}

@article{fds274159,
   Author = {Aggarwal, P and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {When consumers care about being treated fairly: The
             interaction of relationship norms and fairness
             norms},
   Journal = {Journal of Consumer Psychology},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {114-127},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1057-7408},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2011.11.009},
   Abstract = {Prior research suggests that people assess overall fairness
             of an event by focusing on the distribution of the final
             outcome (distributive fairness) and on how they are treated
             by others during the conflict resolution process
             (interactional fairness). The primary goal of this work is
             to use a social relationship framework to study differences
             in consumers' responses to interactional fairness as
             revealed by their evaluations of a brand. Two types of
             relationships are examined-exchange relationships in which
             benefits are given to get something back in return; and
             communal relationships in which benefits are given to take
             care of others' needs. Results of two studies suggest that
             the type of consumers' relationship with the brand moderates
             the effect of interactional fairness such that consumers who
             have a communal relationship are more responsive to
             interactional fairness under conditions of low distributive
             fairness while those who have an exchange relationship are
             more responsive under conditions of high distributive
             fairness. © 2011 Society for Consumer Psychology.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jcps.2011.11.009},
   Key = {fds274159}
}

@article{fds274154,
   Author = {Carton, AM and Larrick, RP and Page, L},
   Title = {Back to the grind: How attention affects satisfaction during
             goal pursuit},
   Journal = {Academy of Management 2011 Annual Meeting - West Meets East:
             Enlightening. Balancing. Transcending, AOM
             2011},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5464/AMBPP.2011.242.a},
   Abstract = {A recent trend in job satisfaction research involves
             focusing not on overall satisfaction or satisfaction at any
             given moment, but instead on how satisfaction changes over
             time. One well-known but understudied example of how job
             satisfaction changes over time is "the grind," which is the
             period during goal pursuit when workers experience the least
             marginal gains in satisfaction. We demonstrate that whether
             people experience the grind during the beginning, middle, or
             the end of goal pursuit can be systematically manipulated
             according to the tenets of the value function in prospect
             theory. We also predict a way to "beat the grind." Results
             of three studies support our predictions.},
   Doi = {10.5464/AMBPP.2011.242.a},
   Key = {fds274154}
}

@article{fds274157,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Cameron, KW},
   Title = {Consumption-based metrics: From autos to
             IT},
   Journal = {Computer},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {97-99},
   Publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
             (IEEE)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {0018-9162},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MC.2011.205},
   Abstract = {In comparing computing systems, IT professionals need the
             ability to both gauge energy efficiency and understand the
             magnitude of improvements in power consumption. © 2011
             IEEE.},
   Doi = {10.1109/MC.2011.205},
   Key = {fds274157}
}

@article{fds274155,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Timmerman, TA and Carton, AM and Abrevaya,
             J},
   Title = {Temper, temperature, and temptation: heat-related
             retaliation in baseball.},
   Journal = {Psychological science},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {423-428},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21350182},
   Abstract = {In this study, we analyzed data from 57,293 Major League
             Baseball games to test whether high temperatures interact
             with provocation to increase the likelihood that batters
             will be hit by a pitch. Controlling for a number of other
             variables, we conducted analyses showing that the
             probability of a pitcher hitting a batter increases sharply
             at high temperatures when more of the pitcher's teammates
             have been hit by the opposing team earlier in the game. We
             suggest that high temperatures increase retaliation by
             increasing hostile attributions when teammates are hit by a
             pitch and by lowering inhibitions against
             retaliation.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797611399292},
   Key = {fds274155}
}

@article{fds274151,
   Author = {Jeffrey, SA and Onay, S and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Goal attainment as a resource: The cushion effect in risky
             choice above a goal},
   Journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {191-202},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0894-3257},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.645},
   Abstract = {Goals are a ubiquitous part of life and have been shown to
             change behavior in many domains. This research studied the
             influence of goal attainment on risky choice behavior.
             Previous research has shown that goals tend to increase
             risk-seeking behavior when potential outcomes fall below a
             goal. We examined a new problem: Choice behavior when all
             potential outcomes in a choice set achieve or exceed the
             goal. Two studies show a "cushion effect" of goal attainment
             on choice under risk. When all possible outcomes of all
             options are above a salient and specific goal, decision
             makers are more likely to choose a risky option over a
             certain outcome with equal expected value (EV). We
             hypothesized that the attainment of a goal serves as a
             cushion that softens the negative emotions associated with
             receiving a gamble's low outcome. This allows risk taking
             that would otherwise be unattractive. © 2009 John Wiley &
             Sons, Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1002/bdm.645},
   Key = {fds274151}
}

@article{fds274153,
   Author = {Burson, KA and Larrick, RP and Lynch, JG},
   Title = {Six of one, half dozen of the other: expanding and
             contracting numerical dimensions produces preference
             reversals.},
   Journal = {Psychological science},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {1074-1078},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19572972},
   Abstract = {The scales used to describe the attributes of different
             choice options are usually open to alternative expressions,
             such as inches versus feet or minutes versus hours. More
             generally, a ratio scale can be multiplied by an arbitrary
             factor (e.g., 12) while preserving all of the information it
             conveys about different choice alternatives. We propose that
             expanded scales (e.g., price per year) lead decision makers
             to discriminate between choice options more than do
             contracted scales (e.g., price per month) because they
             exaggerate the difference between options on the expanded
             attribute. Two studies show that simply increasing the size
             of an attribute's scale systematically changes its weight in
             both multiattribute preferences and willingness to pay:
             Expanding scales for one attribute shifts preferences to
             alternatives favored on that attribute.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02394.x},
   Key = {fds274153}
}

@article{fds274152,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Heath, C and Wu, G},
   Title = {Goal-induced risktaking in negotiation and decision
             making},
   Journal = {Social Cognition},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {342-364},
   Publisher = {Guilford Publications},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0278-016X},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2009.27.3.342},
   Abstract = {Three experiments test whether specific, challenging goals
             increase risk taking. We propose that goals serve as
             reference points, creating a region of perceived losses for
             outcomes below a goal (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
             Kahneman, 1992). According to the Prospect Theory value
             function, decision makers become more risk seeking in the
             domain of losses. In all three experiments we compared a "do
             your best" condition with a "specific, challenging goal"
             condition. The goal condition consistently increased risky
             behavior in both negotiation and decision making tasks. The
             discussion considers how goals influence expectations,
             strategy choice, and unethical behavior.},
   Doi = {10.1521/soco.2009.27.3.342},
   Key = {fds274152}
}

@article{fds274150,
   Author = {Soll, JB and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Strategies for revising judgment: how (and how well) people
             use others' opinions.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and
             cognition},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {780-805},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0278-7393},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19379049},
   Abstract = {A basic issue in social influence is how best to change
             one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of
             others. This article examines the strategies that people use
             to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the
             estimates of another person. The authors note that people
             tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates:
             choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The
             authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy
             (PAR) model to examine the relative effectiveness of these
             two strategies across judgment environments. A surprising
             result was that averaging was the more effective strategy
             across a wide range of commonly encountered environments.
             The authors observed that despite this finding, people tend
             to favor the choosing strategy. Most participants in these
             studies would have achieved greater accuracy had they always
             averaged. The identification of intuitive strategies, along
             with a formal analysis of when they are accurate, provides a
             basis for examining how effectively people use the judgments
             of others. Although a portfolio of strategies that includes
             averaging and choosing can be highly effective, the authors
             argue that people are not generally well adapted to the
             environment in terms of strategy selection.},
   Doi = {10.1037/a0015145},
   Key = {fds274150}
}

@article{fds274162,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Economics. The MPG illusion.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {320},
   Number = {5883},
   Pages = {1593-1594},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18566271},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.1154983},
   Key = {fds274162}
}

@article{fds274125,
   Author = {Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Debiasing},
   Pages = {316-338},
   Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470752937.ch16},
   Doi = {10.1002/9780470752937.ch16},
   Key = {fds274125}
}

@article{fds274149,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Wu, G},
   Title = {Claiming a large slice of a small pie: asymmetric
             disconfirmation in negotiation.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {93},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {212-233},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17645396},
   Abstract = {Three studies show that negotiators consistently
             underestimate the size of the bargaining zone in
             distributive negotiations (the small-pie bias) and, by
             implication, overestimate the share of the surplus they
             claim (the large-slice bias). The authors explain the
             results by asymmetric disconfirmation: Negotiators with
             initial estimates of their counterpart's reservation price
             that are "inside" the bargaining zone tend to behave
             consistently with these estimates, which become
             self-fulfilling, whereas negotiators with initial "outside"
             estimates revise their perceptions in the face of strong
             disconfirming evidence. Asymmetric disconfirmation can
             produce a population-level bias, even when initial
             perceptions are accurate on average. The authors suggest
             that asymmetric disconfirmation has implications for
             confirmation bias and self-fulfilling-prophecy research in
             social perception.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.212},
   Key = {fds274149}
}

@article{fds274148,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Burson, KA and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Social comparison and confidence: When thinking you're
             better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it
             does not)},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {102},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {76-94},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.10.002},
   Abstract = {A common social comparison bias-the better-than-average-effect-is
             frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the
             individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence.
             However, research has found "Hard-easy" effects for each
             bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks
             tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average
             perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce
             underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue
             that the two biases are in fact positively related because
             they share a common psychological basis in subjective
             feelings of competence, but that the "hard-easy" reversal is
             both empirically possible and logically necessary under
             specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support
             these arguments. We find little support for personality
             differences in these biases, and conclude that
             domain-specific feelings of competence account best for
             their relationship to each other. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.10.002},
   Key = {fds274148}
}

@article{fds330877,
   Author = {Larrick, R},
   Title = {If you can't draw it, you don't understand
             it},
   Journal = {Paper360},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {41},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds330877}
}

@article{fds330878,
   Author = {Larrick, R},
   Title = {Beginnings are important},
   Journal = {Paper360},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {24},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Proper beginnings in business plans play a vital role in
             identifying and quantifying an organization's future
             improvement or innovation efforts. Business managers should
             start it with the setting of direction, and once the
             direction is clear, it is easy to develop focus and team
             spirit. Managers must set goals to their teams or employees
             using a specific, measurable, attainable, results-oriented,
             and time-bound (SMART) approach while assigning jobs or
             launching teams or group efforts. An efficient leader must
             also use beginnings as an important tool to generate
             enthusiasm and commitment within his teams. Holding staff
             meetings early in week can help the team to focus on what
             needs to be done to achieve near-term measurable
             goals.},
   Key = {fds330878}
}

@article{fds274147,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soil, JB},
   Title = {Erratum: Intuitions about combining opinions:
             Misappreciation of the averaging principle (Management
             Science (January 2006) 52:1 (111-127) 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0518)},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {309-310},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {0025-1909},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0518},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.1060.0518},
   Key = {fds274147}
}

@article{fds274146,
   Author = {Burson, KA and Larrick, RP and Klayman, J},
   Title = {Skilled or unskilled, but still unaware of it: how
             perceptions of difficulty drive miscalibration in relative
             comparisons.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {90},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {60-77},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16448310},
   Abstract = {People are inaccurate judges of how their abilities compare
             to others'. J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999, 2002) argued
             that unskilled performers in particular lack metacognitive
             insight about their relative performance and
             disproportionately account for better-than-average effects.
             The unskilled overestimate their actual percentile of
             performance, whereas skilled performers more accurately
             predict theirs. However, not all tasks show this bias. In a
             series of 12 tasks across 3 studies, the authors show that
             on moderately difficult tasks, best and worst performers
             differ very little in accuracy, and on more difficult tasks,
             best performers are less accurate than worst performers in
             their judgments. This pattern suggests that judges at all
             skill levels are subject to similar degrees of error. The
             authors propose that a noise-plus-bias model of judgment is
             sufficient to explain the relation between skill level and
             accuracy of judgments of relative standing.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.60},
   Key = {fds274146}
}

@article{fds274161,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {Intuitions about combining opinions: Misappreciation of the
             averaging principle},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {111-127},
   Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
             Sciences (INFORMS)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0025-1909},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0459},
   Abstract = {Averaging estimates is an effective way to improve accuracy
             when combining expert judgments, integrating group members'
             judgments, or using advice to modify personal judgments. If
             the estimates of two judges ever fall on different sides of
             the truth, which we term bracketing, averaging must
             outperform the average judge for convex loss functions, such
             as mean absolute deviation (MAD). We hypothesized that
             people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging, falsely
             concluding that the average of two judges' estimates would
             be no more accurate than the average judge. The experiments
             confirmed that this misconception was common across a range
             of tasks that involved reasoning from summary data
             (Experiment 1), from specific instances (Experiment 2), and
             conceptually (Experiment 3). However, this misconception
             decreased as observed or assumed bracketing rate increased
             (all three studies) and when bracketing was made more
             transparent (Experiment 2). Experiment 4 showed that flawed
             inferential rules and poor extensional reasoning abilities
             contributed to the misconception. We conclude by describing
             how people may face few opportunities to learn the benefits
             of averaging and how misappreciating averaging contributes
             to poor intuitive strategies for combining estimates. ©
             2006 INFORMS.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.1050.0459},
   Key = {fds274161}
}

@article{fds330879,
   Author = {Larrick, R},
   Title = {A universal diagnostic process can lead to focused
             improvement},
   Journal = {Paper360},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {30},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {A universal diagnostic process can help in creating a
             focused improvement effort in a business process of an
             organization. A company should focus on effective measures
             such as metric, map, gap, ideation, opportunity, selection,
             team launch, and quantification, which should be carried out
             in proper sequence to improve the business process. A
             company, which is launching an improvement effort, should
             define one metric to measure improvement that can influence
             or limit the improvement ideas generated. A particular
             process should be drawn for improvement and few big
             opportunity gaps also should be determined in the process.
             The organization should also appoint an individual or a team
             who would be accountable for making this improvement and
             should also focus on the boundaries and resources needed for
             the improvement effort.},
   Key = {fds330879}
}

@article{fds330880,
   Author = {Larrick, R},
   Title = {You can't control what you don't understand},
   Journal = {Paper360},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {30},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Rick Larrick, retired mill manager from Georgia-Pacific
             Corp., offers his views on the importance of understanding
             business processes in the paper industry for a successful
             business management. Larrick suggests that mill managers
             should adopt lean manufacturing techniques such as the
             Toyota Production System value stream mapping, which will
             allow them to look for waste in the manufacturing process in
             the form of in-process inventory, time losses, and excess
             handling. They can understand the processes by interviewing
             their direct reports to find out their activities, and also
             by giving quality time to each. Larrick also wants the
             managers to define the fundamental process for which they
             are responsible, engage the employees to accurately plan
             their processes in detail, and thereby improve process,
             engaging the employees in that improvement.},
   Key = {fds330880}
}

@article{fds274145,
   Author = {Janicik, GA and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Social network schemas and the learning of incomplete
             networks.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {88},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {348-364},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15841863},
   Abstract = {Social networks that are missing relations among some of
             their members--termed incomplete networks--have been of
             critical theoretical and empirical interest in sociological
             research on weak ties and structural holes but typically
             have been overlooked in social psychological studies of
             network learning. Five studies tested for schematic
             processing differences in the encoding and recalling of
             incomplete networks. In Studies 1 and 2, prior knowledge of
             missing relations facilitated learning an unfamiliar,
             incomplete network. Study 3 ruled out differences in general
             pattern recognition ability as an explanation. Study 4
             manipulated the degree of familiarity with missing
             relations, which produced predicted differences in learning
             rates. Finally, Study 5 examined how improved learning of an
             incomplete network affected a strategic organizational
             choice. The findings suggest that people can become
             schematic for complex, incomplete social
             networks.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.348},
   Key = {fds274145}
}

@article{fds274144,
   Author = {Blount, S and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Framing the Game: Examining Frame Choice in
             Bargaining.},
   Journal = {Organizational behavior and human decision
             processes},
   Volume = {81},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {43-71},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10631068},
   Abstract = {This article introduces the study of frame choice in
             negotiation. Here, the selection of a procedural frame is
             treated as a dependent variable-a choice that bargainers
             make in addition to determining their offers. The empirical
             focus of the article is on whether, when given a choice
             between two alternative versions of the ultimatum bargaining
             game, negotiators choose the description that maximizes
             their expected payoffs. For example, in one frame-choice
             task, negotiators assigned to the Player 1 role were asked
             to select between framing the game as "Player 1 proposes a
             division and Player 2 accepts or rejects it" or "Player 1
             makes a claim from a common pool and Player 2 makes a
             counterclaim." Past research has shown that the second frame
             leads to higher expected payoffs for Player 1 than does the
             first. Across four studies and three established framing
             effects, it is found that participants consistently fail to
             select the procedural frames that optimize monetary
             outcomes. Subsequent analyses suggest that this tendency is
             due to two factors: (a) nonmonetary motivations, such as
             fairness and respect, that influence frame-choice
             preferences and (b) cognitive limitations that inhibit the
             ability to accurately predict the effect of alternative
             procedural frames on opponents' responses Copyright 2000
             Academic Press.},
   Doi = {10.1006/obhd.1999.2866},
   Key = {fds274144}
}

@article{fds274143,
   Author = {Morris, MW and Larrick, RP and Su, SK},
   Title = {Misperceiving negotiation counterparts: When situationally
             determined bargaining behaviors are attributed to
             personality traits},
   Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
   Volume = {77},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {52-67},
   Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.1.52},
   Abstract = {Several experiments provided evidence that negotiators make
             systematic errors in personality-trait attributions for the
             bargaining behaviors of their counterparts. Although basic
             negotiation behavior is highly determined by bargaining
             positions, negotiators primarily interpret their
             counterpart's behavior in terms of the counterpart's
             personality, such as his or her level of cooperativeness or
             agreeableness. Data support a model of 4 processes that
             contribute to misperceptions: (a) the primacy of situations
             in determining bargaining behavior, (b) the primacy of
             personality traits in attributions, (c) the lack of
             sufficient information about the other's situation to
             discount personality attributions, and (d) the potentially
             self-confirming consequences of personality attributions for
             subsequent interactions. The authors discuss implications
             for research areas such as social cognition in negotiation,
             accuracy in social perception, and the dynamics of belief
             confirmation.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.77.1.52},
   Key = {fds274143}
}

@article{fds274142,
   Author = {Heath, C and Larrick, RP and Wu, G},
   Title = {Goals as reference points.},
   Journal = {Cognitive psychology},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {79-109},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {0010-0285},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10090799},
   Abstract = {We argue that goals serve as reference points and alter
             outcomes in a manner consistent with the value function of
             Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
             Kahneman, 1992). We present new evidence that goals inherit
             the properties of the value function-not only a reference
             point, but also loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.
             We also use the value function to explain previous empirical
             results in the goal literature on affect, effort,
             persistence, and performance.},
   Doi = {10.1006/cogp.1998.0708},
   Key = {fds274142}
}

@article{fds274133,
   Author = {Heath, C and Larrick, RP and Klayman, J},
   Title = {Cognitive repairs: How organizational practices can
             compensate for individual shortcomings},
   Journal = {RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, VOL 20,
             1998},
   Volume = {20},
   Pages = {1-37},
   Publisher = {JAI PRESS INC},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0191-3085},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000072957700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Key = {fds274133}
}

@article{fds274140,
   Author = {Drolet, A and Larrick, R and Morris, MW},
   Title = {Thinking of others: How perspective taking changes
             negotiators' aspirations and fairness perceptions as a
             function of negotiator relationships},
   Journal = {Basic and Applied Social Psychology},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {23-31},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp2001_3},
   Abstract = {The current research investigates two factors that might
             moderate the effects of competitive demands and biased
             fairness perceptions on conflict resolution: the
             relationship between the negotiators and perspective taking.
             In an experiment, we found that negotiators in a positive
             relationship were more self-serving in aspirations and
             fairness judgments than negotiators in a negative
             relationship. Furthermore, we found support for a
             social-motive priming hypothesis, which predicts that the
             relationship between negotiators will significantly impact
             the effects of perspective taking on aspirations and
             fairness judgments. Finally, we found that discrepancies in
             fairness judgments significantly predicted conflict delay in
             positive relationships but not in negative relationships
             where differences in aspirations played a larger role,
             thereby lending support to past researchers' findings that
             fairness considerations figure larger in negotiations
             involving a positive relationship between negotiators
             whereas equity considerations figure larger in negotiations
             involving a negative relationship between
             negotiators.},
   Doi = {10.1207/s15324834basp2001_3},
   Key = {fds274140}
}

@article{fds274141,
   Author = {Morris, MW and Williams, KY and Leung, K and Larrick, R and Mendoza, MT and Bhatnagar, D and Li, J and Kondo, M and Luo, JL and Hu,
             JC},
   Title = {Conflict management style: Accounting for cross-national
             differences},
   Journal = {Journal of International Business Studies},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {729-747},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490050},
   Abstract = {A problem in joint ventures between U.S. and Asian firms is
             that cultural differences impede the smooth resolution of
             conflicts between managers. In a survey of young managers in
             the U.S., China, Philippines, and India we find support for
             two hypotheses about cultural differences in conflict style
             and the cultural values that account for these differences:
             Chinese managers rely more on an avoiding style because of
             their relatively high value on conformity and tradition.
             U.S. managers rely more on a competing style because of
             their relatively high value on individual achievement. ©
             1998, Academy of International Business. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490050},
   Key = {fds274141}
}

@article{fds274139,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Blount, S},
   Title = {The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social
             dilemmas than in ultimatum games},
   Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {810-825},
   Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.810},
   Abstract = {The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as
             different representations of structurally equivalent
             allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games,
             sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that
             share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of
             a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny
             it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable
             allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable
             allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent
             ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical
             determinant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an
             allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum
             game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two
             additional studies explored how these actions are perceived.
             The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames
             raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal
             processes that guide allocation. Copyright 1997 by the
             American Psychological Association, Inc.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.810},
   Key = {fds274139}
}

@article{fds274137,
   Author = {Morris, MW and Larrick, RP},
   Title = {When one cause casts doubt on another: A normative analysis
             of discounting in causal attribution},
   Journal = {Psychological Review},
   Volume = {102},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {331-355},
   Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
   Year = {1995},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.102.2.331},
   Abstract = {The question of whether lay attributors are biased in their
             discounting of 1 cause given an alternative cause has not
             been resolved by decades of research, largely due to the
             lack of a clear standard for the rational amount of
             discounting. The authors propose a normative model in which
             the attributor's causal schemas and discounting inferences
             are represented in terms of subjective probability. The
             analysis examines Kelley's (1972b) proposed causal schemas
             and then other schemas for multiple causes (varying in
             assumptions about prior probability, sufficiency,
             correlation, and number of causes) to determine when
             discounting is rational. It reveals that discounting is
             implied from most, but not all, possible causal schemas,
             albeit at varying amounts. Hence, certain patterns of
             discounting previously interpreted as biases may, in fact,
             reflect coherent inferences from causal schemas. Results of
             2 studies, which measured causal assumptions and inferences,
             support this interpretation.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0033-295X.102.2.331},
   Key = {fds274137}
}

@article{fds274138,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Boles, TL},
   Title = {Avoiding regret in decisions with feedback: A negotiation
             example},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {87-97},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1995},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1064},
   Abstract = {Regret theory (Bell, 1983) posits that learning about the
             outcome of a foregone alternative creates the possibility of
             experiencing regret. In a choice between a certain outcome
             and a gamble with a similar expected value, regret theory
             predicts the following: Decision makers will be more likely
             to choose the certain outcome when they expect they will not
             learn the outcome of the gamble than when they expect they
             will. The difference in risk aversion between these two
             feedback conditions is a measure of regret aversion. In this
             study, a negotiation exercise was used to examine how the
             expectation of receiving feedback on a foregone alternative
             influenced negotiators′ risk preferences. Consistent with
             the regret theory prediction, we found subjects to be more
             risk averse in their negotiation decisions when they did not
             expect feedback on a foregone risky alternative than when
             they did. As a consequence, negotiators who did not expect
             feedback on a foregone risky alternative were more likely to
             reach agreement in their negotiation than were negotiators
             who did expect feedback. The results have implications for
             the importance of considering motivational factors, such as
             regret avoidance, in both decision and negotiation theories.
             © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1006/obhd.1995.1064},
   Key = {fds274138}
}

@article{fds343765,
   Author = {LARRICK, R},
   Title = {ATTENTION K-MORT SHOPPERS},
   Journal = {NEW REPUBLIC},
   Volume = {208},
   Number = {16},
   Pages = {5-5},
   Publisher = {NEW REPUBLIC INC},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {April},
   Key = {fds343765}
}

@article{fds274135,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Nisbett, RE and Morgan, JN},
   Title = {Who uses the cost-benefit rules of choice? implications for
             the normative status of microeconomic theory},
   Journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
             Processes},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {331-347},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0749-5978},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1993.1058},
   Abstract = {We find three factors to be associated with use of
             cost-benefit rules in everyday decisions. These are
             effectiveness in achieving desirable life outcomes,
             intelligence, and training in economics. We argue that these
             empirical findings support the claim that cost-benefit
             reasoning is normative. © 1993 Academic Press,
             Inc.},
   Doi = {10.1006/obhd.1993.1058},
   Key = {fds274135}
}

@article{fds274136,
   Author = {Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Motivational factors in decision theories: The role of
             self-protection},
   Journal = {Psychological Bulletin},
   Volume = {113},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {440-450},
   Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.440},
   Abstract = {This article reviews the standard economic and cognitive
             models of decision making under risk and describes the
             psychological assumptions that underlie these models. It
             then reviews important motivational factors that are
             typically underemphasized by the standard theories,
             including the motivation to protect one's self-image from
             failure and regret. An integrated view of decision making is
             offered on the basis of a more comprehensive set of
             psychological assumptions.},
   Doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.440},
   Key = {fds274136}
}

@article{fds274134,
   Author = {Josephs, RA and Larrick, RP and Steele, CM and Nisbett,
             RE},
   Title = {Protecting the self from the negative consequences of risky
             decisions.},
   Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
   Volume = {62},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {26-37},
   Year = {1992},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0022-3514},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1538314},
   Abstract = {Three experiments tested the idea that a motive to protect
             self-esteem (SE) from the threat of regret can influence
             decision making. Threat to SE was manipulated by varying
             whether people expected to know the outcome of their
             decisions. Study 1 showed that when Ss expected feedback
             about their decisions, only Ss low in SE made
             regret-minimizing choices. Study 2 showed that when Ss did
             not expect to know the outcome of their decisions, SE
             differences in choice strategies disappeared. Study 3
             manipulated expectations about feedback on chosen and
             unchosen alternatives and showed that the more feedback that
             was expected, the more likely low but not high SE Ss were to
             make regret-minimizing choices. These studies suggest that
             people base decisions not only on objective attributes of
             choice alternatives, but also on the damage to SE that is
             perceived to result from a poor-decision
             outcome.},
   Doi = {10.1037//0022-3514.62.1.26},
   Key = {fds274134}
}

@article{fds274132,
   Author = {Reifman, AS and Larrick, RP and Fein, S},
   Title = {Temper and Temperature on the Diamond: The Heat-Aggression
             Relationship in Major League Baseball},
   Journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {580-585},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0146-1672},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991GJ92300013&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {<jats:p> Archival data from major league baseball games
             played during the 1986, 1987, and 1988 seasons (total N =
             826 games) were used to assess the association between the
             temperatures at the games and the number of batters hit by a
             pitch during them. A positive and significant relationship
             was found between temperature and the number of hit batters
             per game, even when potentially confounding variables having
             nothing to do with aggression were partialed out. A similar
             relationship was found for games played during the 1962
             season. The shape of this relationship appears to be linear,
             suggesting that higher temperatures lead major league
             pitchers to become more aggressive in pitching to batters.
             </jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1177/0146167291175013},
   Key = {fds274132}
}

@article{fds274131,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Morgan, JN and Nisbett, RE},
   Title = {Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday
             Life},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {362-370},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1990},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0956-7976},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990EG38800011&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Our research shows that people can apply the cost-benefit
             rules of microeconomic theory to their everyday decisions.
             Two populations were examined: (a) people who had previously
             received extensive formal training in the rules and (b)
             naive subjects who were randomly assigned to receive brief
             training in the rules. Training affected reasoning and
             reported behavior in both populations. The results indicate
             that extremely general rules govern choices across a wide
             range of domains and that use of the cost-benefit rules can
             be improved through training. © 1990, Association for
             Psychological Science. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.1990.tb00243.x},
   Key = {fds274131}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds312819,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Feiler, DC},
   Title = {Expertise in Decision Making},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {696-722},
   Booktitle = {The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision
             Making, 2 Volume Set},
   Publisher = {John Wiley & Sons},
   Editor = {Keren, GB and Wu, G},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781118468395},
   Abstract = {This two-volume reference is a comprehensive, up-to-date
             examination of the most important theory, concepts,
             methodological approaches, and applications in the
             burgeoning field of judgment and decision making
             (JDM).},
   Key = {fds312819}
}

@misc{fds304105,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Camilleri, AR},
   Title = {Choice architecture},
   Booktitle = {Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral
             Sciences},
   Publisher = {John Wiley and Sons},
   Editor = {Scott, R and Kosslyn, S},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds304105}
}

@misc{fds304106,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Feiler, DC},
   Title = {Expertise in decision making},
   Pages = {696-721},
   Booktitle = {Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision
             Making},
   Publisher = {Blackwell},
   Editor = {Keren, GB and Wu, G},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781118468395},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118468333.ch24},
   Abstract = {This chapter reviews the literatures on expertise and on
             decision making to consider the nature and development of
             decision making expertise, including its strengths and
             weaknesses. It provides a framework for identifying when
             expertise in decision making can emerge. The chapter
             highlights that the ability to escape checkmate is unrelated
             to the ability to detect fraud. It discusses the
             domain-specific, schematic nature of expertise and explores
             some of the limitations of such knowledge. For expertise to
             arise from experience and training, decision makers must be
             exposed to experiences that provide immediate, accurate
             feedback about relationships in the world. The chapter
             discusses research on expertise, general decision making
             expertise, the role of the environment in the development of
             expertise, and some general directions in which research on
             expertise in decision making might go next.},
   Doi = {10.1002/9781118468333.ch24},
   Key = {fds304106}
}

@misc{fds274116,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soll, JB and Mannes, AE},
   Title = {The 'wisdom of crowds' effect},
   Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Mind},
   Publisher = {Sage Publications},
   Editor = {Pashler, H},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds274116}
}

@misc{fds274119,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Feiler, DC},
   Title = {Theory X and Theory Y: HR Strategy},
   Booktitle = {The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management},
   Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
   Editor = {Teece, DJ and Augier, M},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds274119}
}

@misc{fds274122,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Soll, JB},
   Title = {The social psychology of the wisdom of crowds},
   Pages = {227-242},
   Booktitle = {Social Judgment and Decision Making},
   Publisher = {PSYCHOLOGY PRESS},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780203854150},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203854150},
   Doi = {10.4324/9780203854150},
   Key = {fds274122}
}

@misc{fds274117,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Wu, G and Tennant, R},
   Title = {Biased beliefs in negotiation},
   Pages = {254-264},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict
             Resolution},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Bolton, GE and Croson, RTA},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds274117}
}

@misc{fds274118,
   Author = {Larrick, RP and Wu, G},
   Title = {Risk in negotiation: Judgments of likelihood and
             value},
   Pages = {279-291},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict
             Resolution},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Editor = {Bolton, GE and Croson, RT},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds274118}
}

@misc{fds274121,
   Author = {Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Broaden the decision frame to make effective
             decisions},
   Pages = {461-480},
   Booktitle = {Handbook of Principles of Organizational
             Behavior},
   Publisher = {Wiley and Sons},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds274121}
}

@misc{fds274120,
   Author = {Larrick, RP},
   Title = {Debiasing},
   Pages = {316-337},
   Booktitle = {Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision
             Making},
   Publisher = {Blackwell},
   Year = {2004},
   Key = {fds274120}
}


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