Daniel A. Graham conducts research exploring the general subjects of game theory, the economics of information, and microeconomic theory. His microeconomic investigations focus specifically on uncertainty, including cost/benefit analysis, insurance, and incentives. His most recent research projects involve the general multi-object auction, pure trade with private information, and information and queues. For his work, he has received funding from various grants including those awarded by the National Science Foundation for his projects, “Collusive Behavior at Auctions” and “Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non-Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior”, completed in collaboration with Robert Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard. Some titles of his published papers, completed throughout his career, include, “Liftlining” with Robert C. Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard; “Public Expenditure Under Uncertainty: The Net-Benefit Criteria;” “A Note on Decentralized Utility Regulation” with John M. Vernon; “Contingent Damages: A New Approach to Products Liability” with Ellen R. Peirce; “Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Uncertainty,” and more. Along with his independent projects, Professor Graham has also served as a visiting research fellow for the National Bureau of Economic Research.