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Publications [#340151] of Leslie M. Marx

Journal Articles

  1. Delacrétaz, D; Loertscher, S; Marx, LM; Wilkening, T, Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 179 (January, 2019), pp. 416-454, Elsevier BV [doi]
    (last updated on 2019/06/24)

    Abstract:
    © 2018 Elsevier Inc. Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as an assignment game and impossibility obtains through a generalization of Shapley's (1962) result that buyers and sellers are complements. We introduce a general family of payoff functions that ensures decomposability and thus impossibility.


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