Papers Accepted

1. De Brigard, F, Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing, in New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (January, 2018), pp. 200-220, Routledge [doi].
   (last updated on 2024/04/17)

   Abstract:
   When people jointly reminisce, they often talk about past objects, which may or may no longer exist. How can two or more people jointly refer to an object that is long gone-or at least, that is not present in their surrounding? In this chapter, I offer a three-part answer to this question. First, I suggest that our capacity to remember intentional objects during memory retrieval depends on our capacity to direct our attention inwardly toward the relevant component of a memorial content-a mental act I call mental ostension. Second, I argue that, for us to refer to remembered intentional objects, we must possess the ability to refer to them indirectly or “deferredly” by way of mentally ostending toward a present mental content; in short, we must be capable of deferred mental ostension. Finally, I claim that to jointly reminisce, we must have the capacity to guide someone else’s attention inwardly toward the relevant aspect of the mental content we want them to focus on so that they become aware of the past object we are deferredly ostending; that is, we need concerted deferred mental ostension.