Papers Published
- Hawkins, J, Well-Being, Time, and Dementia,
Ethics, vol. 124 no. 3
(2014),
pp. 507-542, University of Chicago Press [675365], [doi].
(last updated on 2024/03/29)
Abstract: Philosophers concerned with what would be good for a person sometimes consider a person's past desires. Indeed, some theorists have argued by appeal to past desires that it is in the best interests of certain dementia patients to die. I reject this conclusion. I consider three different ways one might appeal to a person's past desires in arguing for conclusions about the good of such patients, finding flaws with each. Of the views I reject, the most interesting one is the view that prudential value is, at least partly, concerned with the shape of a life as a whole. © 2014 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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