Research Interests for Mathew D. McCubbins

McCubbins is perhaps best known for the argument that legislative majorities, whether they be the dominant legislative party or a coalition parties governments (even supported minority coalitions) usurp the power resident in the legislature for their own purposes. Within busy legislatures, legislation is controlled as a consequence of a party or coalition of parties capturing control of key legislative assets, such as congressional committee in the US Congress, which because of the rules have blocking (or veto power) and thus serve as a gateway (or gate) to discussion of a bill by the full plenum. The legislative process is replete with gates that are both subtle and gross. All other powers to set the agenda arise as a consequence of creating and controlling the legislative process.

Recent Publications

1. McCubbins, M; McCubbins, C; Turner, M, Building a New Rationality from the New Cognitive Neuroscience, in Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality (2021), pp. 409-419, Routledge
2. McCubbins, M; Burnett, C, Is Political Knowledge Unique?, Political Science Research and Methods, vol. 8 no. 1 (2020), pp. 188-195, Cambridge University Press (CUP) [doi] [abs]
3. McCubbins, M; Turner, M, Collective Action in the Wild, in The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity (2020), pp. 89-102, SPRINGER
4. McCubbins, M; Weller, N, Coordination, Communication, and Information: How Network Structure and Knowledge Affect Group Behavior, Journal of Experimental Political Science, vol. 7 no. 1 (2020), pp. 1-12 [doi] [abs]
5. Cox, GW; McCubbins, MD, Divided control of fiscal policy, in The Politics of Divided Government (January, 2019), pp. 155-175, ISBN 9780367295097 [doi] [abs]