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Publications [#296269] of David P. Kraines

Papers Published

  1. Kraines, D; Kraines, V, Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise, Theory and Decision, vol. 35 no. 2 (1993), pp. 107-150, ISSN 0040-5833 [doi]
    (last updated on 2017/12/10)

    Conflict of interest may be modeled, heuristically, by the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although several researchers have shown that the Tit-For-Tat strategy can encourage the evolution of cooperation, this strategy can never outscore any opponent and it does poorly against its clone in a noisy environment. Here we examine the family of Pavlovian strategies which adapts its play by positive and negative conditioning, much as many animals do. Mutual cooperation will evolve in a contest with Pavlov against a wide variety of opponents and in particular against its clone. And the strategy is quite stable in a noisy environment. Although this strategy cooperates and retaliates, as does Tit-For-Tat, it is not forgiving; Pavlov will exploit altruistic strategies until he is punished by mutual defection. Moreover, Pavlovian strategies are natural models for many real life conflict-of-interest encounters as well as human and computer simulations. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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