Publications [#377781] of Robert L. Winkler
Papers Published
- Babic, B; Gaba, A; Tsetlin, I; Winkler, RL. "Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75.1 (March, 2024): 153-176. [doi]
(last updated on 2024/08/25)Abstract:
Many philosophers have argued that statistical evidence regarding group characteristics (particularly stereotypical ones) can create normative conflicts between the requirements of epistemic rationality and our moral obligations to each other. In a recent article, Johnson-King and Babic argue that such conflicts can usually be avoided: what ordinary morality requires, they argue, epistemic rationality permits. In this article, we show that as data get large, Johnson-King and Babic’s approach becomes less plausible. More constructively, we build on their project and develop a generalized model of reasoning about stereotypes under which one can indeed avoid normative conflicts, even in a big data world, when data contain some noise. In doing so, we also articulate a general approach to rational belief updating for noisy data.