

## **APPENDIX**

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**Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control (2013)**

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### ***Overview of the Dataset of IGO Creation (Version 1.0)***

The *Dataset of IGO Creation (Version 1.0)* consists of 180 international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) randomly selected from the universe of existing IGOs as delineated in the 2007–2008 online edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*.<sup>1</sup>

There is a four-fold rationale for capturing formal state control mechanisms in a recent year rather than in the creation year. First, this ensures that the key explanatory variable *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* temporally precedes the dependent variables. Second, these formal state control mechanisms are often delineated in an organization's charter or statutes, which generally change only with super-majority approval by member-states. Therefore, they are resistant to change between the time of creation and today. Third, to the extent that these formal state control mechanisms change in the direction of *more* insulation over time (e.g., because international bureaucrats working within IGOs transform their own institutions), the continuous variable *Organization Age* will control for this. Fourth, to the extent that these formal state control mechanisms change in the direction of *less* insulation over time (e.g., because states roll back insulation put into place by international bureaucrats), this biases the analysis *against* my argument about the impact of international bureaucrats in institutional design. That is, it sets a higher bar, by considering whether insulation “stuck”—not simply whether it was implemented initially but may have been rolled back later.

For further details about the dataset, see the codebook and replication materials made publicly available upon publication, as referenced in the first endnote of the article.

### ***Supplemental Sources for Verification***

For every observation in the dataset, *Yearbook* information was supplemented and verified with numerous other sources: the individual web sites of the intergovernmental organizations, periodic reports and other documents produced by the intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations Treaty Series, the Register of United Nations Bodies, the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, the international organizations portion of the International Correlates of War project, *Political Handbook of the World*, and *International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory*. In cases of discrepancies among sources, direct sources (e.g., the IGO's own web site) generally were privileged over indirect sources (e.g., a directory of IGOs).

### ***Notes on the Dependent Variables (Formal Mechanisms of State Control)***

Formal mechanisms of state control are captured according to the characteristics in place as of 2008, in four alternative ways: (1) *State Financing*, the extent to which states monopolize an IGO's financing, (2) *Oversight Meetings*, the number of times an IGO's full state membership meets to oversee organizational activities, (3) *Unilateral Vetoes*, whether any state possesses

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<sup>1</sup> Available at: <http://www.uia.be>.

unilateral veto power within an IGO, and (4) *Government Representatives*, the extent to which states' representatives to an IGO hail from official government positions.

### *State Financing*

The first operationalization, *State Financing*, takes on the following values: 2 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 1 if from state sources but also from IGO sources and/or other sources, and 0 if from other sources only. "Other" refers to nonstate, non-IGO sources: private entities, nongovernmental organizations, interest earnings, fees for services rendered, and so on. The ordering captures the extent to which states monopolize an organization's material resources, for states exert direct control over their own contributions, indirect control over the contributions of intergovernmental organizations, and little control over contributions from other sources. Thus, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if states monopolize funding. State control is lowest (and insulation is highest) if nonstate, non-IGO sources do.

*State Financing*'s intermediate category encompasses several different funding compositions. To parse these out, I also ran the models with a richer, seven-category version of this dependent variable, taking on the following values: 6 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 5 if from state and IGO sources, 4 if from state and IGO and other sources, 3 if from state and other sources, 2 if from IGO sources only, 1 if from IGO and other sources, and 0 if from other sources only. Again, the ordering reflects that states exert direct control over their own contributions, indirect control over the contributions of intergovernmental organizations, and little control over contributions from other sources. Employing the seven-category version produces no differences in the main results.

### *Oversight Meetings*

The second operationalization, *Oversight Meetings*, measures the number of times an IGO's full membership meets to oversee organizational activities within a given time period. In terms of member meetings, intergovernmental organizations operate in numerous ways. In some, meetings consist *only* of the full membership. In others, a *single* "Board" comprised of a subset of the membership meets between meetings of the full membership. In yet others, the full membership meets periodically but there are also meetings of *multiple* internal bodies comprised of various subsets of the membership. Amidst this variation, there is a point of relative consistency: in most IGOs, the full membership does meet. Thus, the coding captures full-membership meetings, which are relevant to the vast majority of IGOs.

The largest time span observed in the random sample is five years between meetings of the full membership, so a five-year period is used for the count. Thus, *Oversight Meetings* ranges from a high of 240 meetings within five years (for bodies in which members' representatives meet weekly) to a low of 0 meetings within five years (for bodies whose *full* membership never meets). Values of 0 are rare, but there are a few IGOs (e.g., the World Food Program) in which oversight meetings occur only with a subset of the member-states (e.g., with a Board with seats that rotate among member-states), so that the full membership never meets. The higher the number of oversight meetings, the greater the opportunities for states to monitor, steer, or reverse organizational activities. That is, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if the full membership convenes often for oversight meetings.

### *Unilateral Vetoes*

The third operationalization, *Unilateral Vetoes*, is a binary variable indicating whether an organization's decision-making rules permit states to wield unilateral vetoes. A value of 1 indicates that states make decisions according to unanimity, weighted voting, super-majority, or other rules that allow a single member to block an initiative. A value of 0 indicates states' inability to formally and unilaterally thwart a proposal within an intergovernmental organization. States are presumed to exert more direct control over an IGO if proposals can be blocked even by a single member. Thus, an organization's insulation from state control may be higher if states do not possess any unilateral vetoes than if they do.

This variable is included due to the prevalence of decision-making rules in discussions of state control (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001), but it must be considered with caution, for three reasons. First, there are issues with missing data. An ideal approach would be to code decision-making rules as a continuous variable, such as the percentage of affirmative votes required or the number of veto players. Unfortunately, this requires fine-grained information that is not readily available for many intergovernmental organizations. Details on decision-making rules are spotty in the *Yearbook* and other sources. Even when one turns to organizations' official charters, it is common to find that decision rules are not specified—rather, subbodies themselves often are charged with setting on their own rules and procedures, which are not necessarily made transparent with descriptions on organizational web sites and elsewhere. With binary coding that simply indicates whether or not unilateral vetoes exist, the information requirements are less arduous and therefore missing data is somewhat alleviated—but it persists.

A second issue is that member-states sometimes make decisions informally rather than taking a formal vote. This means that even where decision-making rules are not missing, they may be incomplete reflections of actual decision-making processes.

Third, although decision-making rules constitute a widely used shortcut for thinking about the extent of state control over an IGO, it is not clear that vetoes, weighting schemes, super-majority voting, and the like *always* ensure more stringent state control of IGOs. Suppose, for example, that a proposal under consideration by states would expand the tasks and resources entrusted to the staff of a particular IGO. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *reward* organizational activities. But suppose, in contrast, that a proposal under consideration by states would sanction IGO staff for doing something that displeased states. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *sanction* organizational activities. Due to the prevalence of decision-making rules in discussions of state control, an operationalization is included here—but it should be considered cautiously.

### *Government Representatives*

The fourth operationalization, *Government Representatives*, is an ordered variable capturing the extent to which members' representatives to an IGO hail from official government positions. Higher values indicate more stringent state control via the representatives that members send to an IGO to make decisions on their behalf. The variable is coded as follows: 3 if all of members' representatives to the decision-making body are active government officials; 2 if a majority (but less than all) are active government officials; 1 if a minority (but more than none) are active government officials; 0 if none are active government officials. States exert more direct control through representatives who are active government officials (e.g., Secretary of State or Deputy Minister of Agriculture), but less direct control through representatives who are

not (e.g., representatives from educational institutions, law firms, corporations, or other private enterprises). Thus, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if active government officials monopolize governing bodies. State control is lowest (and insulation is highest) if nongovernment representatives do.

Identifying the “all” or “none” categories of the variable *Government Representatives* is straightforward, since stipulations requiring or prohibiting representation by active government officials frequently are laid out in the organization’s charter or other documents. The precise *mixture* of active government officials with other representatives is rarely stipulated formally, however, and therefore fluctuates somewhat from year to year. Thus, for an organization without formal stipulations regarding the mix of representation, the organization’s latest annual reports and/or meeting minutes were consulted to ascertain whether a majority or minority of states’ representatives hailed from official government positions. While the exact *percentage* fluctuates somewhat from year to year, the majority/minority distinction is generally stable. Using the latter, therefore, provides a more generalizable snapshot and avoids overstating the level of precision available in the data.

### ***Notes on the Key Explanatory Variable (Design Role of International Bureaucrats)***

*Design Role of International Bureaucrats* is an ordered variable capturing the extent to which staff of a pre-existing IGO participated in the creation of each organization in the dataset. With higher values indicating more proactive institutional design roles, the variable takes on the following values: 0 if it was launched by states alone; 1 if it was created through inter-state negotiations for which IGO staff provided administrative services; 2 if it was designed largely by states, but with moderate input by IGO staff (e.g., staff participated in the negotiations at states’ invitation, or staff organized a conference that brought states’ attention to the issue); 3 if it was based on designs proposed by IGO staff and revised by states; and 4 if it was set up by IGO staff, with limited or no input from states.

The *Yearbook of International Organizations* describes the manner in which an organization was created. In some cases, states conduct institutional design negotiations without involvement by international bureaucrats from any pre-existing organization. In other cases, international bureaucrats participated in the creation of a new body. Sometimes that participation is quite proactive, other times it is not. This variation is reflected in the *Yearbook*’s descriptions, which form the basis for a provisional coding that is then checked against multiple other sources and updated in light of any new or additional information found there.

For examples of the coding process, see the codebook made publicly available upon publication, as referenced in the first endnote of the article.

### ***Notes on Other Variables***

The *Dataset of IGO Creation* also contains numerous control variables capturing other aspects of the context in which institutional design negotiations take place.

### ***Set of Binary Variables Capturing Issues of High-Politics***

Military and energy issues are oft-cited high-politics concerns, but issues of governance (e.g., election monitoring) and law (e.g., international legal disputes) also are important. Some IGOs—for example, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum or the International Court of Justice—focus on such issues. Other IGOs—for example, the United Nations or the Organization of American States—are all-purpose and encompass such issues as part of their broader

mandates to promote general cooperation in a variety of political and economic and social issues. Thus, a set of binary variables captures whether a sampled IGO deals with any of the following: *Governance/administration, Law/arbitration, Security/military/defense, Energy, or General Cooperation.*

#### *Developed-Area Focus*

The binary variable *Developed-Area Focus* equals 1 if a sampled IGO concentrates on more economically and socially developed parts of the world. This applies to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance. A value of 0 indicates that the sampled IGO does *not* concentrate on more economically and socially developed parts of the world. This is true for IGOs that concentrate on developing areas, for IGOs that concentrate on regions containing both developed and developing states, or for IGOs that have no concentration.

#### *Number of Great Powers Negotiating*

Great-power states are defined according to the major powers portion of the Correlates of War project: Austria-Hungary (1816–1918), China (1950 to present), France (1816–1940, 1945 to present), Germany (1816–1918, 1925–45, 1991 to present), Italy (1860–1943), Japan (1895–1945, 1991–present), Russia (1816–1917, 1922 to present), United Kingdom (1815–present), United States (1898–present). The great-power status of Austria-Hungary and Italy do not overlap with the creation years of any of the sampled organizations. Meanwhile, the great-power status of Germany and Japan begins only in 1991 and therefore overlaps with only a handful of the sampled organizations. Note, too, that it was not until 1971 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to occupy the seat of “China” in the United Nations and other organizations—previously, the seat had been occupied by Taiwan (“Republic of China”).

#### *Need for Expertise*

Intergovernmental organizations generally require *some* form of expertise (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Therefore, the coding approach distinguishes the organizations that stand out in this regard: (a) those that deal with highly technical issues and therefore are likely to require considerable expertise, and (b) those that serve largely as mere forums for states and therefore require relatively little expertise to operate. For each intergovernmental organization in the sample, the ordered variable *Need for Expertise* takes on the following values: 2 if the IGO deals with highly technical or scientific issues; 1 if it is an ordinary organization, requiring some form of expertise; and 0 if it serves largely as a forum for states and is unlikely to require much specialized expertise.

In pursuit of an objective and replicable approach, coding of this variable followed Johnson and Urpelainen (2014) and used a keyword search of each IGO’s description in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Observations coded as “2” are those for which the IGO name itself, the *Yearbook* entry on organizational aims, or the *Yearbook* entry on organizational classification contains at least one of the following words: data, expert, expertise, informatics, innovation, Internet, invention, measurement, patent, research, satellite, science, scientific, statistics, technology, technological, telecommunications. Observations coded as “0” are those for which the IGO name itself, the *Yearbook* entry on organizational aims, or the *Yearbook* entry on organizational classification contains at least one of the following phrases: forum, legislature, minister, no permanent secretariat, officials, parliament, secretariat rotates. Remaining observations are coded as “1.”

### *Number of States Negotiating*

For some intergovernmental organizations, the *Yearbook* indicates the number of states involved in initial design negotiations. For others, the information can be gleaned from supplementary sources, such as the organization's web site. If none of the information sources specify this, the IGO's initial membership is used as proxy. In general, states that immediately joined the organization were also involved in the preceding negotiations. While this proxy does omit states that were involved in the negotiations but did not immediately join the organization, it captures the vast majority of the participants and is a substantial improvement over missing data.

### *Extent of Geographic Focus*

The ordered variable *Extent of Geographic Focus* tracks the extent to which an intergovernmental organization was set up by and serves states from various parts of the world. It takes on the following values: 0 if the focus is on a specific geographic region; 1 if the focus is cross-regional; and 2 if the focus is global.

### *Organization Age*

The continuous variable *Organization Age* captures the number of years that have passed since an organization was created.

### ***Robustness***

Ten variants of each of the four original models are run to probe the robustness of the main results. *Across these 40 robustness checks, the sign and statistical significance of the key explanatory variable remain almost universally unchanged.*

First, *Organization Age* is replaced by indicator variables to control for the time period in which an institution was created. Since many perceptions about institutional design are informed by the way that design occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the robustness checks use the period between 1945 and 1949 as the reference category and examine whether institutions created in other time periods display systematic differences. At standard levels, *Created before 1945* is statistically significant in the model for representatives; *Created in the 1960s* and *Created in the 1970s* are statistically significant in the model for vetoes; and *Created in the 1970s* is statistically significant in the model for financing.

Second, additional indicator variables control for participation by the five IGOs whose international bureaucrats are most frequently involved in institutional design. These are the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Organization of America States (OAS), United Nations (UN), and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these additional controls are negatively signed, although they are not always statistically significant at standard levels.

Third, an additional indicator variable controls for the two types of intergovernmental organizations that the *Yearbook of International Organizations* classifies as "nonconventional." "Emanations" (Type E-g) and "organizations of special forms" (Type F-g) are the most common types of organizations but are sometimes omitted from other datasets of intergovernmental organizations. The coefficient on this control variable is generally negative, and it is statistically significant at standard levels in the models for financing or representatives.

Fourth, to control for regional idiosyncrasies, additional indicator variables control for a

focus on specific regions of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. In organizations with a focus on Africa or the Middle East, states are more likely to be represented by government officials. In organizations with a focus on Europe, states are more likely to meet frequently to oversee organizations. None of the other regional controls is statistically significant.

Fifth, additional indicator variables control for the involvement of specific states that were great powers at the time of institutional design negotiations: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The coefficients on these additional variables are usually positive, supporting the intuition that great powers impede organizations' insulation from state control. In other words, states' control mechanisms tend to be quite stringent when great powers participate in the design process. Only a few of the controls for great powers exhibit statistical significance at standard levels, however.

Sixth, the continuous variable *Staff Size* is included as a proxy for an IGO's "importance." The more people an IGO employs, the more "important" it may be. For all dependent variables except *Unilateral Vetoes*, the coefficients on this additional variable are negative and statistically significant. Meanwhile, the key explanatory variable *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* remains negative and statistically significant in the models with *State Financing* or *Oversight Meetings* as dependent variables. This suggests that it is not only small, unimportant IGOs that are somewhat insulated from formal mechanisms of state control.

Seventh, the second-stage models are run without any of the control variables that appeared in the first-stage model. That is, the six types of variables (the set of binary variables capturing high-politics issues, *Developed-Area Focus*, *Number of Great Powers Negotiating*, *Need for Expertise*, *Number of States Negotiating*, *Extent of Geographic Focus*) are used as before to generate *International Bureaucrats' Propensity To Be Involved* in the first stage. However, those variables are omitted from the second-stage models, which include only *Design Role of International Bureaucrats*, *International Bureaucrats' Propensity To Be Involved*, and *Organization Age* as predictors of the stringency of formal state control mechanisms. The results for the key explanatory variable remain unchanged, but the coefficients for *International Bureaucrats' Propensity To Be Involved* now are uniformly negative and generally reach statistical significance.

Eighth, the propensity score is omitted and an alternative approach to control for potential endogeneity is employed. Instead of the binary variable *Involvement of International Bureaucrats* as the dependent variable of the first stage, I use a regression model with the ordered dependent variable *Design Role of International Bureaucrats*. The other variables remain the same. Then residuals from this first stage—that is, the portion of *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* that remains unexplained by salience to states or the capabilities of states—replace *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* as the key explanatory variable in the second-stage models. This alternative key explanatory variable is negative and statistically significant, like *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* in the original models.

Ninth, the first stage is replaced by data pre-processing with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) software (Iacus et al. 2012), in order to account for systematic differences between IGOs that are "treated" (i.e., created with international bureaucrats' involvement) and "untreated" (i.e., created by states alone). This is an alternative approach for addressing the possibility that international bureaucrats participate in design negotiations only where conditions already make stringent state control mechanisms unlikely. The observations are matched on coarsened versions of the variables that appeared in the first stage of the original analysis, and unmatched

observations are pruned. This makes it unnecessary to further control for these variables, for matching has ensured that they now are unrelated to whether international bureaucrats have a role in institutional design negotiations. Instead, the models are run with only *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* and *Organization Age* as explanatory variables. The former remains negative and statistically significant, as in the original models.

Tenth, the possibility of endogeneity is set aside, and the first stage is dropped entirely. Thus, only *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* is used alongside *Organization Age* and the six types of state-based factors to predict the stringency of state control mechanisms. Neither propensity scores nor residuals from a first-stage model are included, and no pre-processing matching is done. The key explanatory variable, *Design Role of International Bureaucrats*, is negative and statistically significant as in the original models.

These 10 robustness checks across all four models have essentially no impact on the sign or significance of the coefficient on *Design Role of International Bureaucrats*. Lack of statistical significance remains concentrated in the models that operationalize a body's insulation as the presence of unilateral vetoes—concerns about this variable are noted elsewhere in the appendix.



***Randomly Selected Intergovernmental Organizations in Dataset of IGO Creation v 1.0***

Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean (MAP)  
African Development Bank (ADB)  
African Economic Community (AEC)  
African Information Society Initiative (AISII)  
African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA)  
African Telecommunications Union (ATU)  
Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC)  
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)  
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)  
Amazonian Parliament  
Andean Community  
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF)  
Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO)  
Arab Investment Company (TAIC)  
ASEAN Central Bank Governors Forum (ACBGF)  
Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics (APCAS)  
Asia Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC)  
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)  
Association of Agricultural Research Institutions in the Near East and North Africa (AARINENA)  
AVRDC—The World Vegetable Center  
Baltic Council  
Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC)  
Berne Club  
BioNET INTERNATIONAL Consultative Group (BICG)  
Black Sea Action Plan (BSAP)  
Board of Governors of the European Schools  
Budapest Union for the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (Budapest Union)  
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)  
Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP)  
Caribbean Festival of Creative Arts (CARIFESTA)  
Caribbean Information System for the Agricultural Sciences (CAGRIS)  
Caspian Environment Programme (CEP)  
Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA)  
Central American Council on Housing and Human Settlements (CCVAH)  
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CST)  
Commission for Inland Fisheries of Latin America (COPESCAL)  
Commission for the Scientific and Technological Development of Central America and Panama (CTCAP)  
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW)  
 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)  
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)  
 Commonwealth Youth Programme (CYP)  
 Conference des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays d'expression française (CONFEJES)  
 Conference of the European Regional Legislative Parliaments (CALRE)  
 Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas de Centroamérica (CFAC)  
 Consultative Committee on Industrial Change (CCMI)  
 Cospas-Sarsat  
 Council of Arab Ministers for Social Affairs  
 Council of Arab Ministers for Youth and Sports  
 Council of Europe (CE)  
 Council of Legal Education (CLE)  
 Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP)  
 Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA Court of Justice)  
 ECA Subregional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA Kigali)  
 Environmental Crime Prevention Programme (ECPP)  
 Euro-Mediterranean Legal Metrology Forum (EMLMF)  
 European Commission  
 European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET)  
 European Forestry Commission (EFC)  
 European Health Committee (CDSP)  
 European Network on Teacher Education Policies (ENTEP)  
 European Nuclear Energy Tribunal (ENET)  
 European Sub-Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (AVSEC)  
 European Youth Foundation (EYF)  
 FAO/WHO Coordinating Committee for the Near East (CCNE)  
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF)  
 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  
 Galileo Satellite Navigation Project  
 Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)  
 Group of Eight (G8)  
 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)  
 Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)  
 Ibero-American Social Security Organization (OISS)  
 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)  
 Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE)  
 Inter-American Center for Crafts and Popular Arts  
 Inter-American Center for Development and Environmental and Territorial Research (CIDIAT)  
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)  
 Inter-American Committee on Social Development (CIDES)  
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH)

Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)  
 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)  
 Intergovernmental Committee for the Application of the International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean  
 Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG IOTWS)  
 Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region (INFOFISH)  
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDB)  
 International Centre for Promotion of Enterprises (ICPE)  
 International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR)  
 International Commission of the Schelde River (ICS)  
 International Commissions for the Protection of the Moselle and Saar (ICPMS)  
 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)  
 International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)  
 International E-Road Network  
 International Energy Agency (IEA)  
 International Hydrological Programme (IHP)  
 International Seabed Authority (ISBA)  
 International Tropical Fruits Network (TFNet)  
 Internet Governance Forum (IGF)  
 Joint Force Command South (JFC Naples)  
 Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Health of Seafarers  
 League of Arab States (LAS)  
 Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)  
 Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Scheme (MGC)  
 Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE)  
 Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)  
 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)  
 NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Command (NAEW&C FC)  
 Near East Forestry Commission (NEFC)  
 Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA)  
 Niger Basin Authority (ABN)  
 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)  
 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)  
 Nordic Committee for Nuclear Safety Research (NKS)  
 Nordic Contact Agency for Agricultural and Forestry Affairs (NKJS)  
 Nordic Council (NC)  
 Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)  
 Nordic Film and Television Fund (NFTF)  
 Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)  
 Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO)  
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)  
 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)  
 Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)  
 Parliamentary Commission of the Central European Initiative  
 Permanent Committee on Cadastre in the European Union (PCC)  
 Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE)  
 Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM)  
 Regional Centre on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development for the Near East (CARDNE)  
 Regional Centre on Urban Water Management, Teheran (RCUWM)  
 Regional Information System (SIRI)  
 Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Centre - Wider Caribbean (REMPEITC-Carib)  
 Regional Maritime Academy, Accra (RMA)  
 Regional Network for the Chemistry of Natural Products in Southeast Asia  
 SAARC Network of Researchers on Global Financial and Economic Issues  
 SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF)  
 SECI Regional Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime (SECI Center Bucharest)  
 Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (UNEP/CMS)  
 Sistema Regional de Informacion sobre Formacion Profesional (SIRFO)  
 Six Countries Programme (6CP)  
 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)  
 South Centre  
 South-South Cooperation WIDE (SSC WIDE)  
 Southern Africa Postal Operators Association (SAPOA)  
 Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC)  
 Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)  
 Standing Committee on Commonwealth Forestry  
 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)  
 Trade and Investment Council  
 Trans-European North-South Motorway Project (TEM)  
 Transit Transport Coordination Authority of the Northern Corridor (TTCA)  
 UNESCO Regional Office for Education in the Arab States (UNEDBAS)  
 United Nations (UN)  
 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI)  
 United Nations Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL)  
 United Nations Committee on Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies  
 United Nations Development Group (UNDG)  
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)  
 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)  
 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)  
 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)  
 United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)  
 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MUNOC)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)  
United Nations Programme on Space Applications (PSA)  
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  
United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of  
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special  
Committee of Twenty Four)  
United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)  
United Nations Statistical Commission  
UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (IUNRWA/UNESCO IE)  
Venice European Centre for the Trades and Professions of the Conservation of Architectural  
Heritage  
Visegrád Group  
West-Nordic Foundation (Vestnordenfonden)  
Western European Union (WEU)  
World Food Programme (WFP)  
World Health Organization (WHO)  
YOUTH Community Action Programme  
ZEP-RE - PTA Reinsurance Company

**Table A1: Summary Statistics for All Variables**

|   | Observations | Mean  | Standard Deviation | Range         |
|---|--------------|-------|--------------------|---------------|
| <b>Dependent Variables (Second-Stage)</b>                   |              |       |                    |               |
| <i>State Financing</i>                                      | 133          | 1.23  | 0.65               | [0, 2]        |
| <i>Oversight Meetings</i>                                   | 134          | 13.26 | 36.77              | [0, 240]      |
| <i>Unilateral Vetoes</i>                                    | 84           | 0.44  | 0.50               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Government Representatives</i>                           | 117          | 2.36  | 0.99               | [0, 3]        |
| <b>Key Explanatory Variable</b>                             |              |       |                    |               |
| <i>Design Role of International Bureaucrats</i>             | 180          | 0.92  | 0.94               | [0, 4]        |
| <b>Other Main Variables</b>                                 |              |       |                    |               |
| <i>International Bureaucrats' Propensity To Be Involved</i> | 144          | 0.59  | 0.21               | [0.16, 0.99]  |
| <i>Governance/administration</i>                            | 180          | 0.06  | 0.24               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Law/arbitration</i>                                      | 180          | 0.04  | 0.21               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Security/military/defense</i>                            | 180          | 0.09  | 0.29               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Energy</i>   | 180          | 0.04  | 0.19               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>General Cooperation</i>                                  | 180          | 0.12  | 0.32               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Developed-Area Focus</i>                                 | 180          | 0.05  | 0.22               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Number of Great Powers Negotiating</i>                   | 155          | 1.17  | 1.48               | [0, 7]        |
| <i>Squared Number of Great Powers Negotiating</i>           | 155          | 3.54  | 6.65               | [0, 49]       |
| <i>Need for Expertise</i>                                   | 180          | 1.00  | 0.66               | [0, 2]        |
| <i>Number of States Negotiating</i>                         | 145          | 17.78 | 24.21              | [3, 166]      |
| <i>Extent of Geographic Focus</i>                           | 180          | 0.48  | 0.74               | [0, 2]        |
| <i>Organization Age</i>                                     | 175          | 30.91 | 20.03              | [2, 106]      |
| <b>Variables for Robustness Checks</b>                      |              |       |                    |               |
| <i>Created before 1945</i>                                  | 175          | 0.03  | 0.17               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created between 1945 and 1949</i>                        | 175          | 0.10  | 0.30               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 1950s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.07  | 0.25               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 1960s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.14  | 0.34               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 1970s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.18  | 0.38               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 1980s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.12  | 0.33               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 1990s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.25  | 0.43               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Created in the 2000s</i>                                 | 175          | 0.13  | 0.33               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>ECOSOC Involved</i>                                      | 180          | 0.03  | 0.18               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>FAO Involved</i>   | 180          | 0.06  | 0.24               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>OAS Involved</i>   | 180          | 0.04  | 0.21               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>UN Involved</i>  | 180          | 0.06  | 0.23               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>UNESCO Involved</i>                                      | 180          | 0.03  | 0.18               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Nonconventional Body</i>                                 | 180          | 0.86  | 0.34               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Focus on Africa</i>                                      | 180          | 0.12  | 0.33               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Focus on Americas</i>                                    | 180          | 0.16  | 0.36               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Focus on Asia-Pacific</i>                                | 180          | 0.08  | 0.27               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Focus on Europe</i>                                      | 180          | 0.24  | 0.43               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Focus on Middle East</i>                                 | 180          | 0.08  | 0.28               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>China Involved</i>                                       | 163          | 0.05  | 0.22               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>France Involved</i>                                      | 160          | 0.32  | 0.47               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Russia Involved</i>                                      | 161          | 0.13  | 0.34               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>UK Involved</i>  | 160          | 0.29  | 0.46               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>USA Involved</i>   | 161          | 0.27  | 0.44               | [0, 1]        |
| <i>Staff Size</i>   | 112          | 1366  | 5049               | [0, 40000]    |
| <i>Residuals from Ordered First-Stage Model</i>             | 144          | 0.00  | 0.91               | [-1.35, 3.78] |

**Table A2: Predicting International Bureaucrats' Propensity to Be Involved**

|   | <i><b>Involvement of<br/>International Bureaucrats</b></i> |
|---|--|
| <i>Governance/Administration</i>                  | -0.387<br>(0.524)  |
| <i>Law/arbitration</i>                            | -0.498<br>(0.601)  |
| <i>Security/military/defense</i>                  | -0.800*<br>(0.383)   |
| <i>Energy</i>                                     | 0.631<br>(0.719)   |
| <i>General Cooperation</i>                        | -0.988*<br>(0.375)   |
| <i>Developed-Area Focus</i>                       | -0.678<br>(0.517)  |
| <i>Number of Great Powers Negotiating</i>         | 0.066<br>(0.228)   |
| <i>Squared Number of Great Powers Negotiating</i> | 0.034<br>(0.060)   |
| <i>Need for Expertise</i>                         | 0.169<br>(0.204)   |
| <i>Number of States Negotiating</i>               | 0.005<br>(0.007)   |
| <i>Extent of Geographic Focus</i>                 | -0.252<br>(0.191)  |
| Constant  | 0.176<br>(0.283)   |
| Observations                                      | 144  |
| Model Type  | Probit   |

*Note:* Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* Statistically significant at the 10% level or better

**Table A3: Robustness of Sign and Significance of the Key Explanatory Variable**

|   | <i>State<br/>Financing</i> | <i>Oversight<br/>Meetings</i> | <i>Unilateral<br/>Vetoes</i> | <i>Government<br/>Representatives</i> |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b><i>Design Role of International Bureaucrats</i></b>  |                            |                               |                              |                                       |
| 1) Controlled for specific decade of creation   | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 2) Controlled for specific international bureaucracies involved   | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 3) Controlled for nonconventional IGOs  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | -                                     |
| 4) Controlled for specific region involved  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 5) Controlled for specific great powers involved  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 6) Controlled for IGO staff size  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | -                                     |
| 7) Omitted control variables that appeared in first-stage models  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 8) Used first-stage residuals as sole key explanatory variable  | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 9) Used Coarsened Exact Matching to account for systematic differences between “treated” and “untreated” IGOs | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |
| 10) Did not use matching or any controls generated by a first-stage model                                     | ⊖                          | ⊖                             | -                            | ⊖                                     |

*Note:* ⊖ indicates that coefficient on key explanatory variable is negative and statistically significant at standard levels; - indicates that coefficient is negative but not significant

The key explanatory variable is *Design Role of International Bureaucrats* except in the eighth robustness check, where the residuals from the first-stage model are used as the sole key explanatory variable.