Publications of Attila Ambrus

  1. Ambrus, A; En Lu, SE, A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7 no. 1 (January, 2015), pp. 208-249, American Economic Association
  2. Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 193 (September, 2015), pp. 45 pages
  3. Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 13 no. 4 (November, 2021), pp. 373-419, American Economic Association
  4. Ambrus, A; Lu, SE, Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 88 (November, 2014), pp. 174-189, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256
  5. Ambrus, A; Chaney, EJ; Salitskiy, I, Appendix for Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper no. 116 (December, 2011)
  6. Ambrus, A; Argenziano, R, Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 1 no. 1 (February, 2009), pp. 17-52, American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7669
  7. Ambrus, A, Coalitional rationalizability, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121 no. 3 (August, 2006), pp. 903-929, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533
  8. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility", Econometrica, vol. 81 no. 5 (January, 2013), pp. 2113-2124, The Econometric Society, ISSN 0012-9682
  9. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 130 (March, 2012), pp. 29 pages
  10. Ambrus, A; Ásgeirsdóttir, T; Noor, J; Sandor, L, Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 168 (March, 2015), pp. 43 pages
  11. Ambrus, A; Mobius, M; Szeidl, A, Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks, American Economic Review, vol. 104 no. 1 (January, 2014)
  12. Ambrus, A; Pathak, P, Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95 no. 1-2 (2011), pp. 500-512, Elsevier BV
  13. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), vol. 171 no. 200 (December, 2015), pp. 49 pages, Elsevier BV
  14. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 183 (August, 2015), pp. 27 pages
  15. Field, E; Ambrus, A, Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 116 no. 5 (October, 2008), pp. 881-891, University of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-3808
  16. Ambrus, A; Calvano, E; Reisinger, M, Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 8 no. 3 (August, 2016), pp. 189-222, American Economic Association
  17. Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y; Burns, J, Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 129 (September, 2013), pp. 59 pages
  18. Ambrus, A; Azevedo, E; Kamada, Y, Hierarchical cheap talk, Accepted by Theoretical Economics, vol. 8 no. 1 (2011), pp. 233-261, The Econometric Society
  19. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Pathak, P, How Individual Preferences Get Aggregated in Groups - An Experimental Study, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 158 (September, 2013), pp. 37 pages
  20. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study, American Economic Review, vol. 102 no. 7 (December, 2012), pp. 3317-3332, American Economic Association, ISSN 0002-8282
  21. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 178 (October, 2019)
  22. Ambrus, A; Wayne, GAO; Milán, P, Informal Risk Sharing with Local Information, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 89 no. 5 (October, 2022), pp. 2329-2380
  23. Ambrus, A; Elliott, M, Investments in social ties, risk sharing, and inequality, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 88 no. 4 (July, 2021), pp. 1624-1664, Oxford University Press
  24. Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y; Takagi, Y, Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 94 (2013), pp. 103-115, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0167-2681
  25. Ambrus, A; Field, E; Gonzalez, R, Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease epidemic on the urban landscape, American Economic Review, vol. 110 no. 2 (January, 2020), pp. 475-525
  26. Ambrus, A; Takahashi, S, Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 1 (March, 2008), pp. 1-27, ISSN 1555-7561
  27. Ambrus, A; Field, E; Torero, M, Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 125 no. 3 (August, 2010), pp. 1349-1397, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533
  28. Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y, On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 185 (March, 2015), pp. 47 pages
  29. Ambrus, A; Kolb, A, On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior, Economic Theory, vol. 72 no. 2 (September, 2021), pp. 445-472
  30. Ambrus, A; Chaney, E; Salitskiy, I, Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information, Quantitative Economics, vol. 9 no. 1 (March, 2018), pp. 217-246, The Econometric Society
  31. Ambrus, A; Weinstein, J, Price dispersion and loss leaders, Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 4 (December, 2008), pp. 525-537, ISSN 1555-7561
  32. Ambrus, A; Rozen, K, Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), vol. 125 no. 128 (May, 2012), pp. 42 pages
  33. Ambrus, A; Chandrasekhar, AG; Elliott, M, Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper no. 179 (March, 2015)
  34. Ambrus, A; Asgeirsdottir, TL; Noor, J; Sándor, L, Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper no. 169 (March, 2015)
  35. Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 194 (September, 2015), pp. 16 pages
  36. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 201 (December, 2015), pp. 21 pages
  37. Ambrus, A; Sandor, L; You, H, Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) no. 122 (October, 2012), pp. 13 pages
  38. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Sastro, A, The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior Under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), vol. 154 no. 199 (December, 2015), pp. 66 pages, Elsevier BV
  39. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Zednik, A, The Effects of a ‘None of the Above’ Ballot Paper Option on Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper no. 277 (March, 2019)
  40. Ambrus, A, Theories of coalitional rationality, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144 no. 2 (March, 2009), pp. 676-695, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0531