Publications of Emerson S. Niou
%% Books
@book{fds372047,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game
Theory},
Pages = {1-423},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138019485},
Abstract = {Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory is
designed to introduce students with no background in formal
theory to the application of game theory to modeling
political processes. This accessible text covers the
essential aspects of game theory while keeping the reader
constantly in touch with why political science as a whole
would benefit from considering this method. Examining the
very phenomena that power political machineries—elections,
legislative and committee processes, and international
conflict, the book attempts to answer fundamental questions
about their nature and function in a clear, accessible
manner. Included at the end of each chapter is a set of
exercises designed to allow students to practice the
construction and analysis of political models. Although the
text assumes only an elementary-level training in algebra,
students who complete a course around this text will be
equipped to read nearly all of the professional literature
that makes use of game theoretic analysis.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315735153},
Key = {fds372047}
}
@book{fds297349,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
Title = {Strategy and Politics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds297349}
}
@book{fds211705,
Author = {Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook},
Title = {Games and Politics},
Publisher = {Rutledge},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds211705}
}
@book{fds297348,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {An Introduction to Community Compacts in China (in
Chinese)},
Series = {revised edition},
Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds297348}
}
@book{fds297350,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {Bean Voting: The History and Politics of Secret Ballot (in
Chinese)},
Publisher = {People’s University Press},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds297350}
}
@book{fds51152,
Author = {E. Niou},
Title = {Community Compacts in China: Theory and Practice},
Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds51152}
}
@book{fds297347,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {An Introduction to Community Compacts in China (in
Chinese)},
Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds297347}
}
@book{fds297346,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {The Balance of Power: Stability in International
Systems},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds297346}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds332014,
Author = {Niou, EMS},
Title = {On local governance in China: From feudalism, centralized
bureaucracy, to self-governance},
Pages = {225-246},
Booktitle = {Confucian Culture and Democracy},
Publisher = {World Scientific},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9789814596381},
Abstract = {Prior to the introduction of Western political thoughts on
local governance to China in the 19th century, for centuries
Chinese intellectuals had also been engaging in extensive
debates on the advantages and disadvantages of various forms
of local governance. The debate was at first centering on
whether feudalism is a better system than a centralized
bureaucracy. Then, during the Song and Yuan Dynasties,
scholars began to question whether either system was
superior to the other. They argued that optimal
institutional choice might depend on the particular
circumstances. During the Ming Dynasty, Gu Yanwu proposed an
alternative system named “embodying feudalism in
centralized bureaucracy,” wherein county magistrates are
selected and evaluated by the local constituents. To be
reappointed, the incumbent magistrate must perform well.
After each successful reappointment, the magistrate will be
vested more power in personnel appointment and budgeting.
After three successful terms, the incumbent magistrate will
be granted tenure of his position. The system of
“embodying feudalism in centralized bureaucracy”
proposed by Gu Yanwu is in nature a form of local
self-government, a path breaking institutional renovation in
Chinese history…},
Doi = {10.1142/9789814596398_0010},
Key = {fds332014}
}
@misc{fds297338,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
Title = {Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in
Elections},
Booktitle = {Advances in Political Economy: Instituions, Modeling, and
Empirical Analysis},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Schofield, N and Kselman, D},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds297338}
}
@misc{fds297337,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {The China Factor in Taiwan’s Electoral
Politics},
Booktitle = {Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in
Transformation},
Publisher = {Ashgate Publishing},
Editor = {Meernik, J and Paolino, P},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds297337}
}
@misc{fds140134,
Author = {Emerson Niou},
Title = {On Cultivating the Spirit of Self-Governance (in
Chinese)},
Booktitle = {Prospects of Grassroots Democracy in China},
Editor = {Yong Xu and Zengyang Xu},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds140134}
}
@misc{fds297336,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {論如何培養自治的真精神 [On Cultivating the Spirit
of Self-Governance]},
Booktitle = {Prospects of Grassroots Democracy in China},
Editor = {Xu, Y and Xu, Z},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds297336}
}
@misc{fds297335,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in
China},
Booktitle = {How Asia Votes},
Publisher = {Chatham House},
Editor = {Hsieh, J and Newman, D},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds297335}
}
@misc{fds297334,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {An Introduction to the Electoral Systems Used in Chinese
Village Elections},
Booktitle = {Contemporary China: Approaching the 21st
Century},
Publisher = {University Press of Maryland},
Editor = {Lilley, JR and McGinnis, RW and Panko, BA},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds297334}
}
@misc{fds297333,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
Title = {Designing Government for Coherent Domestic and Foreign
Policy: Taiwan as a Test Case},
Booktitle = {Consolidating The Third Wave Democracies: Themes and
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Editor = {Diamond, L and Plattner, M and Chu, Y-H and Tien,
H-M},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds297333}
}
@misc{fds297332,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis},
Booktitle = {Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the
Future of Nuclear Disarmament},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Editor = {Melvin L Best and J},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds297332}
}
@misc{fds297330,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {The Prospects for a New International Order based on
Collective Security},
Booktitle = {Collective Security beyond the Cold War},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
Editor = {Downs, GW},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds297330}
}
@misc{fds297331,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {An Evaluation of the Republic of China’s Foreign Policy
Alternatives},
Booktitle = {The Permutation Across the Taiwan Straits},
Publisher = {Lynn Reiner Press},
Editor = {Cheng, TJ and Hwang, C and Wu, S},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds297331}
}
@misc{fds297329,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Stability in International Systems and The Costs of
War},
Booktitle = {Models of Strategic Choices in Politics},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
Editor = {Ordeshook, PC},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds297329}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds371123,
Author = {Niou, E and Zeigler, SM},
Title = {Entente versus Alliance: When Should States Be Friends but
Not Allies?},
Journal = {Defence and Peace Economics},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {When faced with a common threat, states have various
alignment choices. Formal alliances offer explicit military
obligations of support. Others, such as the Triple Entente
that preceded World War I, are more ambiguous
understandings. These entente-like alignments make no formal
pledges of armed support in the event of hostilities.
However, they do not entirely rule out military support
either. Why might states embrace this form of strategic
ambiguity over firm alliance commitments? Our formal
explication addresses this question via the prism of
collective action. Our modeling efforts, combined with
historical precedents, suggest that an entente might be a
more effective alignment choice than a formal alliance for
states to balance against powerful threats. An entente
permits states to strike the middle ground between
entrapment and deterrence. The strategic ambiguity inherent
in these two seemingly self-contradictory goals of an
entente is a key component of its success as an alignment
strategy, especially when external threats are large.
However, asymmetry in strength between two states can result
in divergent preferences between alliance and
entente.},
Doi = {10.1080/10242694.2023.2213468},
Key = {fds371123}
}
@article{fds352790,
Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E and Wang, AHE},
Title = {Measuring ‘closeness’ in 3-candidate elections:
Methodology and an application to strategic
voting},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {68},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Past research suggests that voter behavior is influenced by
perceptions of electoral competitiveness. For example, when
an election is perceived to be close, voters will be more
likely to turnout and/or cast strategic votes for their
second-most preferred candidate. Operationalizing electoral
competitiveness in three-candidate elections presents
previously unrecognized methodological challenges. This
paper first shows that many past strategies for measuring
‘closeness’ in three-candidate contests have violated at
least one of three basic properties that any such measure
should satisfy. We then propose a new measurement grounded
in probability ratios, and prove formally that ratio-indices
satisfy these axiomatic criteria. Empirical analyses using
this new index provide novel and nuanced findings on the
extent and causes of strategic voting in the 2010 British
general election. The paper's operational strategy should be
generally applicable to research on voting in elections,
legislatures, and organizations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102220},
Key = {fds352790}
}
@article{fds297341,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Zeigler, SM},
Title = {External threat, internal rivalry, and alliance
formation},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {81},
Number = {2},
Pages = {571-584},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
Abstract = {History reveals enemies often ally to confront a common
threat. In such competitive coalitions actors must balance
the simultaneous risk of distrust of their ally against
external danger. We model this interactive relationship and
generate several novel outcomes. Intra-alliance rivalry
forces allying players to preemptively commit more resources
to conflict and to free ride less. Consequently, their
likelihood of conflict success increases. However,
intra-alliance instability forces weaker players to commit a
higher proportion of resources to fighting than do their
stronger allies. This outcome runs contrary to Mancur
Olson’s classic collective action result that the “small
exploit the great.” Furthermore, allies do not demonstrate
a uniform preference for bandwagoning or balancing. In
general, it is preferable to bandwagon with friends but to
balance with enemies. Finally, because rivalry can raise
alliance payoffs, actors may rationally seek out risky
partnerships with so-called enemies rather than molding more
certain alliances with friends.},
Doi = {10.1086/701724},
Key = {fds297341}
}
@article{fds332013,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS and Paolino, P and Rein, RA},
Title = {Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans
Want Divided Government and Vote to Create
It},
Journal = {Political Behavior},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-103},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Tests of theories of the electoral origins of divided
government hinge on the proper measurement of voter
preferences for divided government. Deriving preferences for
divided government from voters’ ideological positions or
responses to the standard American National Election Studies
question inflates estimates of the proportion of people who
prefer divided government. We present two alternative survey
measures of preferences for divided government and evaluate
the measures across multiple surveys. We find that the
percentage of voters who prefer divided government is
smaller than previous studies suggest. Voters who prefer
divided government according to the new measures are
significantly more likely than other voters to vote in ways
that create divided government in both presidential year and
midterm congressional elections.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11109-017-9442-4},
Key = {fds332013}
}
@article{fds327643,
Author = {Hickey, DV and Niou, EMS},
Title = {Taiwan in 2016: A new era?},
Journal = {Asian Survey},
Volume = {57},
Number = {1},
Pages = {111-118},
Publisher = {University of California Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
Abstract = {The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive
victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential
elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a
difficult year for Taiwan's new ruling party. As 2016 drew
to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan's population
disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen's performance as
president.},
Doi = {10.1525/AS.2017.57.1.111},
Key = {fds327643}
}
@article{fds321647,
Author = {Hickey, DV and Niou, E},
Title = {Taiwan in 2015: A turning point?},
Journal = {Asian Survey},
Volume = {56},
Number = {1},
Pages = {57-67},
Publisher = {University of California Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In 2015, Taipei's relations with Washington moved forward in
parallel with the improvements in cross-Strait relations
initiated in 2008. Perhaps most notable was President Ma
Ying-jeou's summit meeting with China's President Xi
Jinping. Despite gains in external relations, however, the
island was plagued by partisan gridlock, a stagnating
economy, and political unrest. Most anticipated a Democratic
Progressive Party victory over the ruling Kuomintang in the
January 2016 presidential election. But few could predict
what kind of fallout the election might generate.},
Doi = {10.1525/AS.2016.56.1.57},
Key = {fds321647}
}
@article{fds297339,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
Title = {Information and Issue Voting in Taiwan},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds297339}
}
@article{fds297342,
Author = {Song, J and Niou, E},
Title = {日本地方财政的财源结构与地方自治的特征
[The Financial Politics of Local Self-Government in
Japan]},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {172-195},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds297342}
}
@article{fds297351,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {The China Factor in Taiwanese Politics},
Journal = {Journal of Social Science, University of
Tokyo},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds297351}
}
@article{fds297352,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
Title = {“Information and Heterogeneity in Issue Voting: Evidence
from the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan,”},
Journal = {Journal of East Asian Studies},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {119-141},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {A voter's capacity to acquire and retain information
moderates the relationship between issues and the vote.
Issues differ in their distance from the voter's personal
experience. Proximate issues, such as personal economic
conditions, affect the vote decisions of highly informed and
less informed voters equally. Distant issues, such as
national economic conditions and foreign affairs, affect the
vote of highly informed voters but not less informed voters.
The 2008 presidential election on Taiwan provides a critical
test of the effect of information on issue voting.
Unification with mainland China versus Taiwan independence
is the most important issue in the 2008 election, and voters
with higher levels of political information show a larger
effect of the issue on their vote. The national economy is
also a significant predictor of vote choice, but only for
highly informed voters. Personal economic conditions and
other proximate issues are not significant predictors of the
vote at any information level.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1598240800007645},
Key = {fds297352}
}
@article{fds297354,
Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E},
Title = {Protest Voting in Plurality Elections: A Theory of Voter
Signaling},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {148},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {395-418},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {This paper develops a model of protest voting in which
unsatisfied voters may abandon their most-preferred
candidate even though he or she has a good chance of
winning, in the hope that this signal of disaffection will
lead to downstream improvements in that candidate's
performance. We use a spatial model to identify voters whose
ideological profile makes protest voting an option, and an
expected utility model to identify the conditions under
which potential protest voters will in fact use their vote
as a signaling device. Aggregate-level data provide
suggestive evidence in the argument's favor. © 2010
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9661-2},
Key = {fds297354}
}
@article{fds297353,
Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E},
Title = {Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections},
Journal = {Political Analysis},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {227-244},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {This paper extends McKelvey and Ordeshook’s (1972)
Calculus of Voting, providing a direct derivation of the
conditions under which voters will vote strategically:
choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to
prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning.
Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly
all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly
or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from this
seminal model. The formal result allows us to isolate the
subset of voters to which strategic voting hypotheses
properly apply, and in turn motivates a critical
reevaluation of past empirical work. In making this
argument, we develop a unified and parsimonious framework
for understanding competing models of tactical voter choice.
The typology helps to elucidate the methodological
difficulties in studying tactical behavior when faced with
heterogeneous explanatory models, and suggests the need for
both theoretical caution and more precise data instruments
in future empirical work.},
Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpp027},
Key = {fds297353}
}
@article{fds297355,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {中國地方自治爲何總不成功 [Why Has the
Self-Government Movement Not Been Successful in China?
]},
Journal = {Fudan Univeristy Political Science Review},
Number = {6},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds297355}
}
@article{fds297357,
Author = {Benson, B and Niou, E},
Title = {Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of East Asian Studies},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-59},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Spring},
Keywords = {economic interdependence • dependence theory •
trade and peace • economic sanction • issue
linkage • cross-strait relations • Taiwan
Strait},
Abstract = {Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding economic
interdependence and peace has focused on devising responses
either in favor of or in opposition to the long prevailing
notion that trade is positively and unconditionally
correlated with peace. The China and Taiwan case –
noteworthy for the simultaneous presence of an
ever-increasing economic interdependence and an adversarial
political relationship -- provides an interesting
counter-example to the leading positions in the literature.
What is missing in the literature is a model that studies
states’ decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a
function, not only of their own utility, but also of their
perceptions about how their opponent will respond. States’
decisions to trade depend upon the likelihood that their
prospective trade partner will initiate a conflict, and
decisions to initiate a conflict depend upon perceptions of
the likelihood that the target will concede. In this paper,
we develop a model that expands the domain of the
trade-peace analysis by endogenizing and analyzing states’
decisions to trade and initiate conflicts.},
Key = {fds297357}
}
@article{fds297356,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {彭真与中國地方自治的再起 [Peng Zhen and the
Reemergence of Self-Governance in China]},
Journal = {Zhejiang Academic Journal},
Number = {1},
Pages = {99-106},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds297356}
}
@article{fds51154,
Title = {Lessons from the self-government movement in the late Qing
Dynasty (in Chinese)},
Journal = {21 Century Bi-Monthly},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds51154}
}
@article{fds297345,
Author = {Niou, ES},
Title = {清末地方自治運動的反思 [Lessons from the
self-government movement in the late Qing
Dynasty]},
Journal = {21 Century Bi-Monthly},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297345}
}
@article{fds297358,
Author = {E.S. Niou and Chu, C and Niou, E},
Title = {The Strategy of Ambiguity in Electoral Competition},
Journal = {Academia Economic Papers},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {279-302},
Year = {2005},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds297358}
}
@article{fds297363,
Author = {Niou, E and Tan, G},
Title = {External Threat and Collective Action},
Journal = {Economic Inquiry},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {519-530},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
Abstract = {This article studies how players allocate their endowed
resources between productive and conflictual activities in
the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the
suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by
Olson (1965) do not necessarily apply when external threat
is endogenized. We also illustrate that it does not always
pay to take an offensive stance. When competing with an
offensive group, it might be better for members of a
defensive group to remain defensive. Furthermore, in the
context of rivalry between two groups, free riding can
actually benefit everyone in the system. (JEL D70, D74). ©
Western Economic Association International.},
Doi = {10.1093/ei/cbi035},
Key = {fds297363}
}
@article{fds297366,
Author = {Niou, E and Chen, K},
Title = {Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {67},
Number = {2},
Pages = {390-406},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {In this paper we develop a spatial model to provide an
explanation for the seeming paradox that voters in some
states reelect incumbents while unilaterally self-imposing
legislative term limits. The model shows that voters are
more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's
position is farther from the median voter position or if the
incumbent's party is more moderate. Furthermore, it suggests
that term limits, or the threat of term limits, increases
the responsiveness of politicians' policy platforms. © 2005
Southern Political Science Association.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00322.x},
Key = {fds297366}
}
@article{fds297361,
Author = {Hsieh, J and Niou, E},
Title = {Measuring Taiwanese Public Opinion on the Taiwan
Independence Issue: A Methodological Note},
Journal = {China Quarterly},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {158-168},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds297361}
}
@article{fds321648,
Author = {Hsieh, JFS and Niou, EMS},
Title = {Measuring Taiwanese public opinion on Taiwanese
independence},
Journal = {China Quarterly},
Volume = {181},
Number = {181},
Pages = {158-168},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Whether there will be a war between China and Taiwan depends
very much upon whether Taiwan will declare independence. And
given that Taiwan is a democracy now, public opinion on the
issue will certainly affect the political leaders' decision
to move one way or the other. Since the early 1990s, several
competing methods have been used in surveys to study
Taiwanese attitudes on the independence-unification issue.
The existence of a large percentage of respondents with
conditional preferences makes us realize that the
traditional six-point or 11-point scale measures of
preferences oversimplify the situation. In this article, we
construct a new measure of preferences and show that it
clearly outperforms the traditional methods. © The China
Quartery, 2005.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305741005000093},
Key = {fds321648}
}
@article{fds297364,
Author = {Niou, E and Benson, B},
Title = {Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in
the Taiwan Strait},
Journal = {Security Studies},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {274-289},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2005},
Abstract = {The delicate security balance in the Taiwan Strait is
threatened on several fronts. In Taiwan, democratization has
placed Taiwan independence as one of the most salient issues
in its domestic politics, and the rise of the
pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to power has
created uncertainty regarding Taiwan's future policy on the
Taiwan independence-unification issue. In this paper, we
investigate whether external factors such as China's
military threat and the United States' security commitment
to Taiwan can affect the development of the Taiwan
independence movement. An interesting finding from our
analysis is approximately one-third of the people in Taiwan
can agree simultaneously on two seemingly contradictory
issues: to unite with China if China becomes democratic and
to declare independence if China will not use force and
peace can be maintained. Voters in Taiwan with conditional
preferences create opportunities for China and the United
States to formulate foreign policy that will restrain
Taiwan's drive toward independence. Copyright © Taylor &
Francis Inc.},
Doi = {10.1080/09636410500232933},
Key = {fds297364}
}
@article{fds297365,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {A New Measure of the Preferences on the Independence-Unification
Issue in Taiwan},
Journal = {Journal of Asian and African Studies},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {91-104},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2005},
Abstract = {An accurate and reliable measure of preferences on the
independence- unification issue is indispensable to the
study of Taiwanese politics. In the foreseeable future the
study of Taiwanese politics and the cross-Strait relations
will continue to focus on Taiwanese preferences on the
independence-unification issue. These preferences, however,
are neither readily identifiable nor easily defined. For
many people, it might be a simple and a straightforward
choice between for or against Taiwan's independence, but
others are less decisive because their preferences are
conditional on factors such as China's military threat, the
USA security commitment to Taiwan, and China's prospects of
becoming democratic and prosperous. In this article I devise
a new measure of people's preferences regarding this issue.
I show that a large percentage of the people in Taiwan can
agree simultaneously to unite with China if China becomes
modernized and democratic and to declare independence if
China will not use force and peace can be maintained.
Because independence and unification are not necessarily
mutually exclusive alternatives, this empirical finding
questions the appropriateness of the traditional six-point
scale one-dimensional representation of Taiwanese
preferences on the independence-unification issue. Copyright
© 2005 SAGE Publications.},
Doi = {10.1177/0021909605052946},
Key = {fds297365}
}
@article{fds321649,
Author = {Niou, EMS},
Title = {Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy
implications},
Journal = {Asian Survey},
Volume = {44},
Number = {4},
Pages = {555-567},
Publisher = {University of California Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {July},
Abstract = {Taiwan's democratization has placed Taiwan independence as
one of the most important issues for its domestic politics
and for the security balance in the Taiwan Strait. Surveys
have been conducted regularly to track shifts in Taiwanese
public sentiment on this issue. This article presents a new
measure of the Taiwan independence issue and shows how
voters' preferences can be influenced. © 2004 by The
Regents of the University of California. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1525/as.2004.44.4.555},
Key = {fds321649}
}
@article{fds297325,
Author = {Niou, ES},
Title = {中外選舉制度的類別及特點 [An Introduction to
Voting Methods]},
Journal = {21st Century Bi-Monthly},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds297325}
}
@article{fds321650,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS},
Title = {A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles
of Preferences, Information, and Threats},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-42},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
Abstract = {A realistic theory of economic sanctions should be built on
the facts that sanctions are a game of issue linkage
involving two or more issues, players may not know each
other's preferences for the outcome of the game, and
threatening sanctions may be as important as imposing
sanctions as a strat egy in international disputes. The
threat and use of economic sanctions are modeled as a
multistage game of two-sided incomplete information between
a target and a coercer. The threat stage is criti cally
important for understanding the outcome of sanctions, and
current empirical studies suffer from a case selection bias.
Economic sanctions are likely to be imposed when they are
not likely to succeed in changing the target's behavior.
Sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so at the mere
threat of sanctions. Despite the unlikely success of
sanctions, coercers must sometimes impose sanctions, even
after the threat of sanctions has failed to change the
target's behavior.},
Doi = {10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x},
Key = {fds321650}
}
@article{fds297324,
Author = {Niou, ES},
Title = {從封建、郡縣、到自治: 論中國地方制度的演變
[On Local Governance in China: From Feudalism, Centralized
Bureaucracy, to Self-Government]},
Journal = {Open Times},
Number = {6},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds297324}
}
@article{fds39431,
Author = {E. Niou and Changsheng Lin},
Title = {Analyzing China's Nuclear Deterrence Strategy},
Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds39431}
}
@article{fds297326,
Author = {Niou, ES},
Title = {對中共核威懾的重新審視 [A Reevaluation of
China’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy]},
Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297326}
}
@article{fds297367,
Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
Title = {China’s Nuclear Strategy: Minimal or Limited
Deterrence?},
Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297367}
}
@article{fds297399,
Author = {Niou, E and Paolino, P},
Title = {The Rise of the Opposition Party in Taiwan: Explaining Chen
Shui-bian's Victory in the 2000 Presidential Election in
Taiwan},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {721-740},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {The 2000 Taiwan presidential election drastically changed
Taiwan's political landscape. For the first time in Taiwan,
an opposition party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the
presidential race, receiving 39.3% of the popular vote. To
understand the factors that determined the election's
outcome, we analyze survey data from the 2000 presidential
election. First, we study whether a divided ruling party was
the cause of the opposition party candidate's victory. That
is, would the ruling party have lost if one of the trailing
candidates had opted not to run? Second, there were charges
following the election that the Kuomintang misled people
into believing their candidate was still leading in the
polls, when he was really running third, and this
misinformation led people to vote differently than they
would have otherwise, possibly giving the election to the
opposition party candidate. We examine the validity of this
claim by measuring the degree to which strategic voting
could have influenced the outcome. Third, to understand the
underlying dimensions of the electoral competition in Taiwan
and to understand each candidate's electoral support, we run
a multivariate statistical model to study how strategic
voting, candidate personalities, party identification, and
issues influenced respondents' vote choices. Finally, we
discuss the effects of election polling data on election
outcomes. © 2002 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00010-0},
Key = {fds297399}
}
@article{fds297362,
Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
Title = {Analyzing China’s Nuclear Threat to the United
States},
Journal = {Mainland China Studies},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds297362}
}
@article{fds372048,
Author = {Chen, K-P and Niou, E},
Title = {Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds372048}
}
@article{fds297344,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {經濟因素對中國村民自治發展的影響 [Economic
Development and Local Self-Government in
China]},
Journal = {21 Century Bi-Monthly},
Year = {2003},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds297344}
}
@article{fds297400,
Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
Title = {Counting China’s ICBMs},
Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
Volume = {37},
Number = {7},
Pages = {80-90},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds297400}
}
@article{fds305581,
Author = {Niou, ES and Lin, C},
Title = {中共洲際導彈軍力的建設與實力 [Development of
ICBMs in China]},
Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
Volume = {37},
Number = {7},
Pages = {80-90},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds305581}
}
@article{fds297343,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {患難相恤: 論中國民間的自治與扶貧
[Self-Governance and Poverty Alleviation in
China]},
Journal = {21-Century E-Journal},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds297343}
}
@article{fds297359,
Author = {Lin, C and Niou, E},
Title = {論中共嚇阻美軍介入台海衝突的軍事準備及其影響
[Assessing China's Military Preparation to Deter the US from
Intervening in the Taiwan Strait Conflict]},
Journal = {Mainland China Studies},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds297359}
}
@article{fds297398,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {Strategic Voting under Plurality and Runoff
Rules?},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-227},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2001},
Month = {April},
Abstract = {Choosing a method of electing a president is often a
contentious constitutional issue for newly emerging
democracies. The debate focuses largely on two alternative
electoral procedures: plurality rule and plurality rule with
a runoff. Duverger (1954) argues that plurality rule has a
consolidating influence on parties that a runoff rule lacks.
This paper focuses on the 'psychological effect' identified
by Duverger as the principal basis of consolidation, and
studies the conditions under which strategic voting can
change the sincere voting outcome and identifies the types
of voters who should vote strategically under plurality and
runoff rules. Three interesting findings can be drawn from
the theoretical results. First, strategic voting is needed
more often under plurality rule than under runoff rule to
render the Condorcet winner the voting outcome. Second,
under the plurality rule, strategic voting cannot ensure
that a Condorcet winner will win and cannot even preclude a
Condorcet loser from winning. Under the runoff rule,
however, strategic voting ensures that the Condorcet winner
will win, if one exists. Third, it is easier for a third
candidate to enter the election and win the race under the
plurality rule than under the runoff rule even if the third
candidate is not a Condorcet winner.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692801013002004},
Key = {fds297398}
}
@article{fds297397,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
Title = {全民公決的若干問題 [A Problem with
Referendums]},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-31},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {When some voters have nonseparable preferences across
multiple binary issues, majority rule may not select a
Condorcet winning set of outcomes when one exists, and the
social choice may be a Condorcet loser or Pareto-dominated
by every other set of outcomes. We present an empirical
example of one such paradox from voting on the Internet. We
evaluate potential solutions to the problem of nonseparable
preferences in referendums, including set-wise voting,
sequential voting, and vote-trading. Sequential voting and
vote-trading prevent the selection of Condorcet losers and
universally Pareto-dominated outcomes. Legislatures
facilitate sequential voting and vote-trading better than
referendums, suggesting that referendums increase the
quantity of participants in democratic decision-making but
decrease the quality of participation.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692800012001001},
Key = {fds297397}
}
@article{fds297396,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
Title = {Return of the Luddites},
Journal = {International Security},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {84-96},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Doi = {10.1162/016228899560167},
Key = {fds297396}
}
@article{fds12344,
Author = {E. Niou and Dean Lacy},
Title = {Nonseperable Preference and the Elections in Double-Member
Districts},
Journal = {Journal of Soviet Nationalities},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds12344}
}
@article{fds297395,
Author = {Ordeshook, P and Niou, E},
Title = {Alliances and Federations},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds297395}
}
@article{fds321651,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Alliances versus federations: An extension of riker's
analysis of federal formation},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {271-288},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This essay explores the distinction between federations and
alliances and asks the question: When will states choose to
federate rather than ally? William Poker argues that a
necessary condition for a federal state's formation is that
those offering the federal bargain must seek to "expand
their territorial control, usually either to meet an
external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for
military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement." This
argument, though, does not tell us why states sometimes
respond to threats by forming federations and at other times
by forming alliances. Here we address this issue directly
and use a formal model of alliance formation to illustrate
our arguments. Briefly, that model assumes states have
initial endowments of military and economic resources, where
economic resources enter utility functions directly and
military capability influences preference only insofar as it
determines a state's ability to counter or make threats.
State can divert economic resources to military spending,
and alliances, in turn, are self-enforcing coalitions
designed to augment a state's offensive or defensive
capabilities. Federations, which serve the same ends as
alliances, are coalitions that need to be enforced by the
"higher authority" established when the federation is
formed. Our assumption is that states form federations in
lieu of alliances if and only if (1) a stable alliance
partition does not exist or, if one exists, it is dominated
by an unstable partition and (2) if the cost of the loss of
sovereignty to each state in the federation is offset by the
gains from joining it, relative to what that state secures
as its security value. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1009062602826},
Key = {fds321651}
}
@article{fds321652,
Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS},
Title = {Elections in double-member districts with nonseparable voter
preferences},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {89-110},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We derive Nash equilibrium candidate strategies in a
double-member district election when voters have
nonseparable preferences for candidates in a
single-dimensional policy space. When candidates are elected
simultaneously, nonseparable voter preferences create
multiple equilibria, including some in which candidates
adopt extreme positions. The results are robust to limited
voter uncertainty about candidate interaction in the
legislature. Nonseparable voter preferences create
incentives for the formation of political parties and
disincentives for candidates to moderate their
positions.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010001004},
Key = {fds321652}
}
@article{fds297368,
Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Lacy, D},
Title = {Retrospective and Prospective Voting in a One-Party
Dominance Democracy: Taiwan's 1996 Presidential
Election},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {383-399},
Year = {1998},
Abstract = {Several theories of voting behavior suggest that voters
evaluate candidates in an election based on the candidates'
past performance and future promise. There is a dispute in
the theory and ambiguity in empirical evidence about which
direction voters look when choosing candidates: do voters
weigh past performance or future promise more heavily in the
voting booth? This paper contributes empirical support to
the prospective voting model by testing both retrospective
and prospective voting in a pivotal case: the 1996 Taiwan
presidential election. Taiwan's 1996 election represents the
first popular election of the president from a field of
candidates that included the long-ruling KMT party
incumbent, Lee Tent-hui. In the Taiwan presidential
election, voter evaluations of Lee's prospects for managing
the economy in the future prove statistically significant as
a predictor of voter choice. Voter evaluations of recent
economic conditions do not appear closely related to voter
choice. Voters' perceptions of the candidates' abilities to
influence ethnic relations, domestic safety, and
international security are better predictors of the vote
than past ethnic relations or past security problems, even
in the face of Communist China's pre- election aggression
toward Taiwan.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1005062527921},
Key = {fds297368}
}
@article{fds321653,
Author = {Brehm, J and Niou, EMS},
Title = {A comparative analysis of the control systems used in the
former Soviet Union and Communist China},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {107-130},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The policing systems used in the former Soviet Union and
Communist China are prototypes of control systems found in
many political systems. The system in the former Soviet
Union is a variant on the 'police patrol', while the system
in Communist China is a self-policing system calling upon
citizens to report not only their own behavior, but the
behavior of others. Our paper applies both game-theoretic
and learning models to explore the relative effectiveness of
the two systems.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692897009001010},
Key = {fds321653}
}
@article{fds297369,
Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Paolino, P},
Title = {Strategic Voting in the 1994 Taipei City Mayoral
Election},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {153-163},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1997},
Abstract = {In most multi-candidate, plurality rule elections, voters
often have to consider whether or not to vote strategically;
defecting from a most preferred, but non-viable candidate in
order to reduce the chances that an even less-preferred
candidate would be elected. What makes the 1994 Taipei
election interesting is that the non-viable candidates could
not be easily identified, which created an opportunity for
party elites to manipulate voters' decisions by sending
signals to influence their perceptions of the candidates'
viability. Our analysis has two important results. First,
voters discounted strategic considerations in their vote
calculations early in the campaign, especially when there
was considerable doubt, among both voters and party elites,
over which candidate was unlikely to win the election.
Second, once the election became more proximate and
information about candidate viability was more likely to
accurately reflect the outcome of the election, voters used
signals from party elites and placed greater weight on
strategic considerations. © 1997 Elsevier Science
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/s0261-3794(97)00001-2},
Key = {fds297369}
}
@article{fds297370,
Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J},
Title = {Taiwan's March 1996 Elections},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {15},
Number = {4},
Pages = {545-550},
Year = {1996},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds297370}
}
@article{fds297371,
Author = {Niou, E and Huang, T},
Title = {Party System and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of
Taiwan},
Journal = {American Asian Review},
Year = {1996},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds297371}
}
@article{fds297372,
Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Lacy, D},
Title = {Economic Voting in the 1994 Taiwan Elections},
Journal = {American Asian Review},
Year = {1996},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds297372}
}
@article{fds318630,
Author = {Feaver, PD and Niou, EMS},
Title = {Managing nuclear proliferation: Condemn, strike, or
assist?},
Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
Volume = {40},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-234},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The nonproliferation regime, which denies countries access
to critical materials, makes it more likely that defiant
proliferators will develop unsafe arsenals. In order to
manage proliferation, the U.S. could continue to uphold the
regime, hoping to persuade the proliferator to return to
non-nuclear status. It could attack, thereby ensuring that
the proliferator is unable to join the nuclear club. Or it
could concede the nonproliferation goal and render
assistance to address the attendant safety concerns. Through
a series of deductive models we argue that three factors are
important in determining the right option: (1) U.S.
preferences on proliferation, whether purist or pragmatist;
(2) the proliferator's type, which can vary by size,
affinity, and risk tolerance; and (3) the phase in the
proliferation process to which the proliferator has
advanced: preweaponization, after weaponization but before
deployment, the deployment phase, and, finally, full
deployment. We analyze the special case of proliferation by
a small enemy of the United States such as North Korea as a
signaling game wherein each side attempts to push the
outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium. The North
Koreans prefer the equilibrium in which the United States
never attacks regardless of its type, whereas the United
States prefers the equilibrium in which North Korea never
deploys regardless of its type.},
Doi = {10.2307/2600957},
Key = {fds318630}
}
@article{fds327644,
Author = {Huang, T and Niou, EMS},
Title = {Electoral politics in Taiwan},
Journal = {Asian Affairs},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {128-138},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1080/00927678.1996.9933724},
Key = {fds327644}
}
@article{fds297373,
Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J},
Title = {Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {15},
Number = {2},
Pages = {219-235},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1996},
Abstract = {Electoral politics in Taiwan has undergone drastic change in
the past few years. The Democratic Progressive Party was
established in 1986 and has proven to be a viable political
force challenging the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) which has been
the dominant party in Taiwan since 1945. The dominance of
the KMT in Taiwanese politics was further threatened by the
defection of some KMT members to form the New Party. The new
configuration of Taiwan's party system seriously complicates
Taiwan's electoral politics and increases uncertainty over
the electoral fortune of each political party in future
elections. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role
of issues in voters' evaluations of the political parties.
Information on issue positions and salience and their impact
on vote choice will be helpful to understand each party's
strategy in formulating its party platform to compete for
votes. Survey data from the 1993 election of the county
magistrates and city mayors in the Republic of China on
Taiwan, collected by the Election Study Center of National
Chengchi University in February 1994, are used to explore
voters' preferences; their perception of the parties'
positions on important issues; and the weights they attach
to different issues. We employ a spatial model of party
competition to investigate the impact of the issues and
party identification on voters' evaluation of the parties'
performance. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/0261-3794(95)00031-3},
Key = {fds297373}
}
@article{fds297374,
Author = {Hsieh, J and Niou, E},
Title = {Issue Voting in the Republic of China on Taiwan's 1992
Legislative Yuan Election},
Journal = {International Political Science Review},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {13-27},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1996},
Abstract = {In the past few years, the Republic of China on Taiwan has
undergone a quiet transformation from an authoritarian to a
democratic system. On 19 December 1992, forty-five years
after the first legislative yuan election, voters went to
the poll to elect the entire body of the second legislative
yuan. The 1992 election marks a turning point in the ROC's
electoral history. This paper examines the role that issues
played in that election. The Kuomintang and the Democratic
Progressive Party competed on four main issues during the
1992 legislative yuan election. Based on the survey results,
the paper depicts the salience of these issues to individual
respondents, the distribution of respondents preferences,
and their perceptions of the two parties' policy positions
on these issues. The authors then test whether these issues
play an important role in explaining the variation in
voters' evaluation of the two parties, and, indirectly,
their vote choices. The results show that among the four
issues included in the model, the democracy/stability issue
has the greatest impact on voters' evaluations of parties,
followed by the economic and national identity issues, with
the environmental issue having the smallest impact. In
addition, the paper examines the role of issue salience in
affecting voters' comparative evaluation of the parties. The
results show that on the economic, national identity, and
democracy/stability issues, difference in salience between
those who think of the issue as most important and those who
think otherwise contributes to a difference in the impact of
issues on party evaluation between the two groups, but on
the environmental issue it does not.},
Doi = {10.1177/019251296017001002},
Key = {fds297374}
}
@article{fds297375,
Author = {Brehm, J and Niou, E},
Title = {Police Patrol vs. Self-Policing: A Comparative Analysis of
the Control Systems Used in the Ex-Soviet Union and the
Communist China},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds297375}
}
@article{fds297376,
Author = {Niou, E and Feaver, P},
Title = {Managing Nuclear Proliferation: What Makes
Sense?},
Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds297376}
}
@article{fds305582,
Author = {Niou, ES and Hsieh, JF and Lin, H},
Title = {民國八十三年省市長選舉中之議題投票：理性抉擇理論之分析
[Issue Voting in the 1994 Gubernatorial and Mayoral
Elections: An Application of Rational Choice
Approach]},
Journal = {Journal of Electoral Studies},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds305582}
}
@article{fds297379,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sun Tzu's The Art of
War},
Journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Year = {1994},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds297379}
}
@article{fds297377,
Author = {Niou, E and Tan, G},
Title = {An Analysis of Dr. Sun Yet-sen's Self-Assessment Scheme for
Land Policy},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {78},
Number = {1},
Pages = {103-114},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01053368},
Key = {fds297377}
}
@article{fds297380,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Less Filling, Tastes Great: The Realist-Neoliberal
Debate},
Journal = {World Politics},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-234},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.2307/2950673},
Key = {fds297380}
}
@article{fds297381,
Author = {Niou, E and Cox, G},
Title = {Seat Bonuses under the Single Non-Transferable Vote for
Large Parties: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan},
Journal = {Comparative Politics},
Pages = {351-374},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds297381}
}
@article{fds321654,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's: The Art of
War},
Journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {161-174},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1177/0022343394031002004},
Key = {fds321654}
}
@article{fds297378,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Alliances in Anarchic International Systems},
Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds297378}
}
@article{fds297382,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Notes on Constitutional Change in the Republic of China on
Taiwan},
Journal = {Chinese Political Science Review},
Year = {1993},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297382}
}
@article{fds297383,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC and Tan, G},
Title = {Taiwanese Investment in Mainland China as a Tool of Foreign
Policy},
Journal = {Issues and Studies},
Year = {1992},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds297383}
}
@article{fds297384,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {An Analysis of the Republic Of China's Security
Issues},
Journal = {Issues and Studies},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds297384}
}
@article{fds297385,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's
Emerging Electoral System},
Journal = {International Political Science Review},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-79},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1992},
Abstract = {Despite differences in history, culture, and stages of
political development, the same theoretical constructs used
to study American and European political processes can be
used to understand the Republic of China's evolving
electoral institutions and processes. The particular
theoretical constructs upon which we focus are game theory
and its application to electoral politics, spatial models of
party competition. After reviewing the core results of
spatial analysis — that electoral systems dominated by a
single issue occasion stable and convergent party platforms
and that systems with multiple salient issues occasion
instability — we examine the types of issues that
opposition parties are most likely to use in challenging KMT
rule. Based on this discussion we argue that the ROC ought
to be especially sensitive to Riker's conclusion that
evolving democracies should devote special attention to
developing institutional structures such as bicameralism and
staggered terms of office for legislators that avoid the
populist ideal of direct democracy. Theoretical results
reveal the fragility of the idea of a popular will, so that
populist institutions designed to achieve it can foster
electoral instability. We use a recent result about
multi-candidate elections to argue that the form of
electoral competition and the forces operating to produce
factionalism within parties are functions of the extent to
which voters perceive electoral competition in terms of
individual candidate characteristics versus party labels. To
the extent that voters evaluate candidates on the basis of
their party label, the parties will tend to converge on
issues; whereas, to the extent that voters focus on the
specific characteristics of candidates and their policy
pronouncements, the candidates will diverge on issues.
Finally, we examine the circumstances under which the nature
of the issues that concern an electorate determines the form
of competition in democracies characterized by a single
dominant party. © 1992, Sage Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/019251219201300105},
Key = {fds297385}
}
@article{fds297386,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {Constitutional Design in Taiwan: Presidential versus
Parliamentary Systems},
Journal = {The Annals: Chinese Association of Political
Science},
Year = {1991},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297386}
}
@article{fds297387,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Year = {1991},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds297387}
}
@article{fds297388,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Stability in Anarchic International Systems},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {84},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1207-1234},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Can stability emerge solely from the competition and
self-interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of
anarchy, or does stability depend on restraints from the
complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the
contemporary world economy and its associated institutions?
We suppose some infinitely divisible resource, that all
nation-states are endowed with and maximize and that enables
them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict. We
offer a noncooperative, extensive-form model of
international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to
enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions
balance of power and collective security ensure the
sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems. We conclude
that there exists at least one world—albeit an abstract
one—in which anarchy yields stability. © 1990, American
Political Science Association. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.2307/1963260},
Key = {fds297388}
}
@article{fds321655,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {The geographical imperatives of the balance of power in
3-country systems},
Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modelling},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4-5},
Pages = {519-531},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This paper extends a cooperative game-theoretic model of the
balance of power in anarchic international systems to
include consideration of the asymmetry which geography
occasions in the offensive and defensive capabilities of
countries. The two substantive ideas which concern us are a
formalization of the notion of a "balancer" and that of a
"central power". What we show is that in stable systems,
only specific countries (such as Britain in the eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries) can play the role of balancer,
and that the strategic imperatives of a central country
(e.g. Germany in the period 1871-1945) differ in important
ways from those of "peripheral" countries. ©
1989.},
Doi = {10.1016/0895-7177(89)90422-6},
Key = {fds321655}
}
@article{fds297389,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {The Imperatives of Geography and the Balance of Power in
3-Country Systems},
Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modeling},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds297389}
}
@article{fds297390,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {An Experimental Test of a Theory of the Balance of
Power},
Journal = {Simulation and Games},
Year = {1988},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297390}
}
@article{fds297392,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Preventive War and the Balance of Power: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
Volume = {31},
Number = {3},
Pages = {387-419},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1987},
Month = {September},
Abstract = {Preventive wars are commonly defined as wars initiated by a
major power to preempt an anticipated disadvantageous
position in terms of resources or military capabilities
owing to the differential growth rates of countries. This
essay extends a game-theoretic model of the balance of power
to admit differential growth rates and also to permit
countries to adjust their investments for the future. After
establishing the conditions for equilibrium investment
strategies, we then examine the properties of the
nation-system that this equilibrium implies. Specifically,
using a two-period model, we are interested in those
first-period equilibria in which, because their sovereignty
is subsequently threatened, countries will prefer to
instigate a preventive war. We conclude by arguing that,
although differential growth rates and the period 1
equilibria that initial resources imply can threaten the
sovereignty of countries, there are a variety of coalitional
strategies available to countries and that only some of them
imply preventive war. © 1987, Sage Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/0022002787031003001},
Key = {fds297392}
}
@article{fds297391,
Author = {Niou, E},
Title = {A Note on Nanson's Rule},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {54},
Number = {2},
Pages = {191-193},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1987},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {E.J. Nanson, in 1883, proposed a voting rule designed mainly
to select the Condorcet winner. Unfortunately, much of the
collective choice literature has misstated Nanson's rule.
This note shows that the misstated versions of the rule and
Nanson's actual rule can yield different outcomes, and it
provides a counter example, which shows that Nanson's rule,
although it satisfies the strong Condorcet condition, does
not satisfy the weak Condorcet condition. © 1987 Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00123006},
Key = {fds297391}
}
@article{fds297393,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {A Theory of the Balance of Power},
Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
Year = {1986},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds297393}
}
@article{fds321656,
Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {A Theory of the Balance of Power in International
Systems},
Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {685-715},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Attempts at incorporating the assumption that national
leaders pursue clearly defined objectives, and at applying
the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of
international systems, have led to little success in
formalizing the concept of balance of power, and in
providing a theoretical justification for much of the
scholarly intuition about this concept. But by assuming that
such leaders temper their desire to maximize resources by
the goal of ensuring the survival of their countries, and by
distinguishing between two forms of stability—one in which
no nation's existence is threatened and one in which no
nation's resources are threatened—we offer a model that
yields necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of
stability. Our critical assumption is that before entering
armed conflicts and before forming either offensive or
defensive alliances, national leaders evaluate the future
games that their current actions imply, and the consequences
of participating in such games. © 1986, Sage Publications.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/0022002786030004005},
Key = {fds321656}
}
@article{fds297394,
Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
Title = {Universalism in Congress},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Year = {1985},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds297394}
}