Publications of Erik Wibbels

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@article{fds361809,
   Author = {Timoneda, JC and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Spikes and Variance: Using Google Trends to Detect and
             Forecast Protests},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-18},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Google search is ubiquitous, and Google Trends (GT) is a
             potentially useful access point for big data on many topics
             the world over. We propose a new 'variance-in-time' method
             for forecasting events using GT. By collecting multiple and
             overlapping samples of GT data over time, our algorithm
             leverages variation both in the mean and the variance of a
             search term in order to accommodate some idiosyncracies in
             the GT platform. To elucidate our approach, we use it to
             forecast protests in the United States. We use data from the
             Crowd Counting Consortium between 2017 and 2019 to build a
             sample of true protest events as well as a synthetic control
             group where no protests occurred. The model's out-of-sample
             forecasts predict protests with higher accuracy than extant
             work using structural predictors, high frequency event data,
             or other sources of big data such as Twitter. Our results
             provide new insights into work specifically on political
             protests, while providing a general approach to GT that
             should be useful to researchers of many important, if rare,
             phenomena.},
   Doi = {10.1017/pan.2021.7},
   Key = {fds361809}
}

@article{fds362979,
   Author = {Rains, E and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Informal Work, Risk, and Clientelism: Evidence from 223
             Slums across India},
   Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Most of the poor in the developing world work in the
             informal economy, that is, in occupations that take place
             outside of the legal system of taxing, spending, and
             regulating. This article examines how informal work impacts
             the policy and electoral preferences of the poor. We
             emphasize the importance of the risks inherent in informal
             employment in shaping the responsiveness of citizens to
             clientelism and their policy and voting preferences. Since
             most informal workers are not covered by (formal) social
             insurance, they prefer material goods and candidates that
             produce targeted, clientelistic benefits rather than
             programmatically delivered insurance that is unlikely to
             reach them. As a result, we argue that informal workers are
             more likely to rely on clientelistic relations as a means of
             hedging risks than are formal workers; prefer policies that
             are delivered clientelistically via political mediators
             rather than programmatic solutions; and prefer clientelistic
             over programmatic local candidates. Our findings elucidate
             why the preferences of poor informal workers often diverge
             from those assumed by standard models of social insurance
             and have important implications for the political economy of
             social policy in a world where billions work outside
             work-based tax-transfer systems.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0007123422000011},
   Key = {fds362979}
}

@article{fds355482,
   Author = {Bland, G and Brinkerhoff, D and Romero, D and Wetterberg, A and Wibbels,
             E},
   Title = {Public Services, Geography, and Citizen Perceptions of
             Government in Latin America},
   Journal = {Political Behavior},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {One of the linchpins of democratic accountability runs
             through service quality. Because citizens are sensitive to
             the quality of basic services, they can translate
             (dis)satisfaction into assessments of incumbent politicians.
             Yet, although previous research has shown that both access
             to, and the quality of, basic services decline in rural
             settings, this seems not to translate into increased
             dissatisfaction with incumbents. In this paper we seek to
             understand why. We theorize four potential mechanisms that
             might underpin the weaker accountability for poor service
             outcomes in more remote settings. To test these mechanisms,
             we use data from 34,514 geocoded survey respondents across
             19 countries in Latin America. We show that the likelihood
             of translating dissatisfaction with services into discontent
             with elected officials decreases as distance to urban
             centers increases. We find some evidence that a low sense of
             political efficacy and deference to hierarchy mediate the
             relationship between remoteness, service quality and
             accountability. Nevertheless, some of the direct
             relationship between distance and attitudes towards elected
             officials persists in the face of our mediation analysis,
             suggesting that more work needs to be done on the
             relationship between remoteness, service quality and
             accountability.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11109-021-09691-0},
   Key = {fds355482}
}

@article{fds352567,
   Author = {Krishna, A and Rains, E and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Negotiating Informality– Ambiguity, Intermediation, and a
             Patchwork of Outcomes in Slums of Bengaluru},
   Journal = {The Journal of Development Studies},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {1983-1999},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {November},
   Abstract = {In developing countries, procedural ambiguity due to
             bureaucratic overlap and political discretion gives rise to
             divergence between law and practice. In this context of
             pervasive informality, it is important to consider how local
             negotiations produce disparate outcomes. We examine these
             local negotiations to explain how informal property rights
             are acquired and how markets operate in the slums of
             Bengaluru, India. Drawing on original interview and survey
             data, we describe how at least 18 types of property
             documents issued to urban slum residents can be ordered
             along a tenure continuum. Intermediaries are required to
             negotiate the opportunities that lie hidden within
             ambiguity. A first set of political intermediaries helps
             slum residents acquire property rights incrementally along
             this continuum. A second set of intermediaries helps
             facilitate informal housing transactions, keeping markets
             liquid across the tenure continuum. The mechanics of
             acquiring and transacting informal properties can differ
             across cities and countries, but, across contexts,
             intermediation helps negotiate informality.},
   Doi = {10.1080/00220388.2020.1725483},
   Key = {fds352567}
}

@article{fds348907,
   Author = {Mosley, L and Paniagua, V and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic
             policy changes},
   Journal = {Economics & Politics},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {197-249},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {July},
   Abstract = {Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to
             microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that
             investors are very attentive to supply-side policies such as
             those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and
             product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic
             outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms
             affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as
             emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic
             effects of supply-side policy reforms on sovereign bond
             market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard
             three-equation model of the economy, widely accepted among
             economic and finance professionals. That model makes few
             clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of
             microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that
             such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions.
             Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from
             2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic
             bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to
             corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These
             results call into question the notion that “bond market
             vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments
             to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ecpo.12150},
   Key = {fds348907}
}

@article{fds352500,
   Author = {Tellez, JF and Wibbels, E and Krishna, A},
   Title = {Local Order, Policing, and Bribes},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {377-410},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Day-to-day policing represents a fundamental interface
             between citizens and states. Yet even in the most capable
             states, local policing varies enormously from one community
             to the next. The authors seek to understand this variation
             and in doing so make three contributions: First, they
             conceptualize communities and individuals as networks more
             or less capable of demanding high-quality policing. Second,
             they present original survey data and semistructured
             interviews on local policing from over one hundred sixty
             slums, eight thousand households, and one hundred seventy
             informal neighborhood leaders in India that contribute to
             the nascent empirical work on comparative policing and
             order. Third, they find evidence that well-connected
             individuals and densely connected neighborhoods express
             greater confidence in and satisfaction with local policing.
             Critically, these differences do not appear to be a function
             of a lower propensity for local conflict but rather of an
             increased capacity to leverage neighborhood leaders to
             mediate relations with the police. The combination of
             analytics and empirics in this article provides insight into
             the conditions under which individuals and communities
             experience the police as expropriators of rents or neutral
             providers of order.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0043887120000064},
   Key = {fds352500}
}

@article{fds341123,
   Author = {Rains, E and Krishna, A and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Combining satellite and survey data to study Indian slums:
             evidence on the range of conditions and implications for
             urban policy},
   Journal = {Environment and Urbanization},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {267-292},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   Abstract = {Projections suggest that most of the global growth in
             population in the next few decades will be in urban centres
             in Asia and Africa. Most of these additional urban residents
             will be concentrated in slums. However, government
             documentation of slums is incomplete and unreliable, and
             many slums remain undocumented. It is necessary to employ
             creative methods to locate and sample these understudied
             populations. We used satellite image analysis and fieldwork
             to build a sample of Indian slums. We show that living
             conditions vary along a wide-ranging continuum of wellbeing;
             different points correspond to different policy needs. We
             also show that most variation in conditions is due to
             differences across rather than within neighbourhoods. These
             findings have important implications for urban policy.
             First, satellite data can be a useful tool to locate
             undocumented settlements. Second, policy must be
             appropriately nuanced to respond to wide-ranging needs.
             Finally, variation patterns suggest that policies should be
             targeted at the neighbourhood rather than the individual
             level.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956247818798744},
   Key = {fds341123}
}

@misc{fds354275,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {The social underpinnings of decentralized governance:
             Networks, technology, and the future of social
             accountability},
   Pages = {14-39},
   Booktitle = {Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic
             Research and the Future of Donor Programming},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781108497909},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108615594.002},
   Key = {fds354275}
}

@book{fds354276,
   Author = {Rodden, JA and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Decentralized governance and accountability: Academic
             research and the future of donor programming},
   Pages = {1-300},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781108497909},
   Abstract = {At the end of the twentieth century, academics and
             policymakers welcomed a trend toward fiscal and political
             decentralization as part of a potential solution for slow
             economic growth and poor performance by insulated,
             unaccountable governments. For the last two decades,
             researchers have been trying to answer a series of vexing
             questions about the political economy of multi-layered
             governance. Much of the best recent research on
             decentralization has come from close collaborations between
             university researchers and international aid institutions.
             As the volume and quality of this collaborative research
             have increased in recent decades, the time has come to
             review the lessons from this literature and apply them to
             debates about future programming. In this volume, the
             contributors place this research in the broader history of
             engagement between aid institutions and academics,
             particularly in the area of decentralized governance, and
             outline the challenges and opportunities to link evidence
             and policy action.},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108615594},
   Key = {fds354276}
}

@misc{fds354274,
   Author = {Rodden, JA and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Introduction},
   Pages = {1-13},
   Booktitle = {Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic
             Research and the Future of Donor Programming},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781108497909},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108615594.001},
   Key = {fds354274}
}

@misc{fds343512,
   Author = {Gadiraju, KK and Vatsavai, RR and Kaza, N and Wibbels, E and Krishna,
             A},
   Title = {Machine learning approaches for slum detection using very
             high resolution satellite images},
   Journal = {Ieee International Conference on Data Mining Workshops,
             Icdmw},
   Volume = {2018-November},
   Pages = {1397-1404},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781538692882},
   Abstract = {Detecting informal settlements has become an important area
             of research in the past decade, owing to the availability of
             high resolution satellite imagery. Traditional per-pixel
             based classification methods provide high degree of accuracy
             in distinguishing primitive instances such as buildings,
             roads, forests and water. However, these methods fail to
             capture the complex relationships between neighboring pixels
             that is necessary for distinguishing complex objects such as
             informal and formal settlements. In this paper, we perform
             several experiments to compare and contrast how various
             per-pixel based classification methods, when combined with
             various features perform in detecting slums. In addition, we
             also explored a deep neural network, which showed better
             accuracy than the pixel based methods.},
   Doi = {10.1109/ICDMW.2018.00198},
   Key = {fds343512}
}

@article{fds324428,
   Author = {Brinkerhoff, DW and Wetterberg, A and Wibbels,
             E},
   Title = {Distance, services, and citizen perceptions of the state in
             rural Africa},
   Journal = {Governance},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {103-124},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {In most poor countries, basic services in rural areas are
             less accessible and of lower quality than those in urban
             settings. In this article, we investigate the subnational
             geography of service delivery and its relationship with
             citizens' perceptions of their government by analyzing the
             relationship between service access, satisfaction with
             services and government, and the distance to urban centers
             for more than 21,000 survey respondents across 17 African
             countries. We confirm that access to services and service
             satisfaction suffer from a spatial gradient. However,
             distant citizens are less likely than their urban peers to
             translate service dissatisfaction into discontent with their
             government; distant citizens have more trust in government
             and more positive evaluations of both local and national
             officials. Our findings suggest that increasing
             responsiveness and accountability to citizens as a means of
             improving remote rural services may face more limits than
             promoters of democratic governance and citizen-centered
             accountability presume.},
   Doi = {10.1111/gove.12271},
   Key = {fds324428}
}

@article{fds331647,
   Author = {Pierskalla, J and Schultz, A and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Order, distance, and local development over the
             long-run},
   Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {375-404},
   Publisher = {Now Publishers},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {We argue that local, long-term exposure to a centralized
             political authority determines sub-national patterns of
             contemporary economic development. Older research on
             economic development has focused on cross-national income
             accounts, often ignoring the large sub-national variation in
             income differences. Likewise, research on the effects of
             political institutions on development has mostly neglected
             sub-national variation in the institutional environment. Yet
             a growing body of work shows that the geographic reach of
             states within countries and their ability to foster economic
             exchange have varied dramatically through history. We
             contribute to recent research on sub-national development by
             creating a new measure of local historical exposure to state
             institutions that codes geographic distance to historical
             capital cities and use highly spatially disaggregated data
             on economic development, based on satellite data, to test
             their relationship. We find clear evidence, using
             fixedeffects estimations for both European and global data,
             that local historical proximity to capital cities is
             associated with higher levelsthrough a number of robustness
             checks covering alternative measures, specifications, and
             sensitivity analyses.},
   Doi = {10.1561/100.00016020},
   Key = {fds331647}
}

@article{fds318649,
   Author = {Beramendi, P and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Globalization, public finance, and poverty},
   Journal = {International Studies Review},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {677-685},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {Global economic forces might impact poverty in any number of
             direct ways by reducing prices, providing access to larger
             pools of capital, or creating and destroying jobs. Such
             forces might also work indirectly, that is, through their
             effect on labor standards, unionization rates, or the
             development of labor-saving technology. For countries with
             greater fiscal capacity, there is a growing tension between
             any potential desire for progressivity and the need to
             compete for footloose capital. To the extent the latter
             results in reliance on regressive tax expenditures,
             globalization is likely to worsen the relative position of
             the poor. Together, these points emphasize data challenges
             inherent to establishing a causal relationship between
             globalization and poverty. Taking incidence seriously has
             important analytical implications for understanding the
             political engagement by the poor in developed and developing
             democracies. The government should replace broad and
             probably insupportable claims on the effect of globalization
             on pro-poor tax and expenditure policies with more careful
             analyses of the actual incidence of fiscal
             policy.},
   Doi = {10.1111/misr.12270},
   Key = {fds318649}
}

@article{fds318648,
   Author = {Johnson, SL and Wibbels, E and Wilkinson, R},
   Title = {Economic inequality is related to cross-national prevalence
             of psychotic symptoms.},
   Journal = {Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology},
   Volume = {50},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {1799-1807},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {<h4>Purpose</h4>A burgeoning literature documents robust
             links of income inequality with the prevalence of
             psychological disorders. The aim of this paper is to extend
             this literature by examining the effects of cross-national
             income inequality on prevalence of psychotic
             symptoms.<h4>Method</h4>Analyses used archival data of
             representative samples from 50 countries (N = 249,217).
             Four types of psychotic symptoms were assessed using the
             well-validated CIDI interview. We examined the effects of
             Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)
             measures of the concentration of income in the top
             percentile of people and the Gini coefficient of income
             inequality.<h4>Results</h4>Income inequality was
             significantly correlated with the national prevalence of
             hallucinations, delusions of thought control, and delusional
             mood, and effects withstood control over national indices of
             per capita income and regime type. Findings were also robust
             to nonparametric bootstrapping.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Although
             the cross-sectional design limits ability to claim
             causality, income inequality appears important for
             understanding psychotic symptoms.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s00127-015-1112-4},
   Key = {fds318648}
}

@misc{fds318650,
   Author = {Rueda, D and Wibbels, E and Altamirano, M},
   Title = {The origins of dualism},
   Pages = {89-111},
   Booktitle = {The Politics of Advanced Capitalism},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781107099869},
   Abstract = {From Spain and Greece to Brazil and South Africa, dualized
             labor markets are a worldwide phenomenon. In many countries,
             workers are divided between those with permanent contracts
             that include valuable benefits and extensive labor market
             protections and those who work under contingent contracts or
             no contracts at all. This latter group receives few or no
             labor market protections and lower levels of social
             benefits. They are the world’s labor market outsiders.
             Recent research has suggested that this pool of outsiders
             has important implications for the nature of democratic
             politics in the twenty-first century, an argument that is
             perfectly in line with the core idea of this book, namely,
             that coalitional alignments among different labor market
             groups are at the heart of postindustrial reform strategies.
             Yet the extent of dualization varies hugely across
             countries. Data on the size of the informal sector around
             the world (from Schneider et al. 2010) show that while there
             is clearly a negative association between the wealth of
             societies and the extent of dualization, there is also huge
             variation both within and across rich and developing
             nations. In the OECD context, the process of dualization has
             been linked to a number of political and economic processes:
             increasing competition in manufacturing, the rise of the
             service sector, the decline of unionization, political
             choices by Left governments, and others. Echoes of these
             arguments are present in work on developing countries, where
             dualization is closely linked to the informal sector and has
             received a lot of attention from economists and sociologists
             (if not political scientists). Indeed, a long tradition of
             models in development economics emphasize the stark income
             and productivity gaps inherent in “dual economies” and
             the uneven growth that characterizes broad swaths of the
             developing world (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Ray 2010). Yet
             while all of these arguments emphasize important features of
             dualization, they often focus on the consequences rather
             than the causes of labor market dualism.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781316163245.004},
   Key = {fds318650}
}

@article{fds250548,
   Author = {Huntington, H and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {The Geography of Governance in Africa: New Tools from
             Satellites, Surveys and Mapping Initiatives},
   Journal = {Regional and Federal Studies},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {625-645},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {1359-7566},
   Abstract = {Abstract: Research on decentralization in Africa and beyond
             has made clear that the quality of decentralized governance
             is highly variable across localities within countries. In
             light of that variation, this article has three goals:
             first, we critique existing academic research on the quality
             of governance in light of work on decentralized governance
             in Africa; second, we provide a conceptual map of how to
             theorize subnational variation in the quality of governance
             in settings characterized by considerable dependence on
             higher authorities for revenues; and third, we outline a
             series of data initiatives that offer the opportunity to
             study local and regional politics in new and exciting ways
             across the region. We conclude with great optimism about the
             prospects for innovative work on decentralized governance
             within countries across the region.},
   Doi = {10.1080/13597566.2014.971774},
   Key = {fds250548}
}

@article{fds318651,
   Author = {Christensen, D and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Labor standards, labor endowments, and the evolution of
             inequality},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {362-379},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Proponents often recommend high labor standards as a means
             of reducing inequality between and within countries.
             Opponents suggest that labor standards exacerbate
             international and domestic inequalities. In this paper, we
             forward a simple argument whereby the impact of higher labor
             standards on domestic inequality depends on a country's
             labor endowment. We hypothesize that where labor is
             abundant, higher standards will exacerbate inequality. Where
             labor is scarce, higher labor standards might lower
             inequality. In both cases, the impact of labor standards on
             inequality work through an employment and wage effect. Using
             newly available data on labor standards around the world
             from 1981 to 2000, we provide evidence largely consistent
             with our hypotheses. Higher labor standards do, indeed,
             exacerbate inequality in labor-abundant economies. On the
             other hand, higher labor standards lower inequality in
             labor-scarce economies. We discuss the implications of these
             findings for work on labor market insiders and outsiders as
             well as the political economy of development. © 2013
             International Studies Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/isqu.12066},
   Key = {fds318651}
}

@article{fds250564,
   Author = {Gift, T and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Reading, writing, and the regrettable status of education
             research in comparative politics},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {291-312},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1094-2939},
   Abstract = {Apart from some notable exceptions, education is regrettably
             understudied in comparative politics. This paucity stems
             from both a dearth of reliable data on schooling and the
             fact that education raises analytical issues that fall
             outside the typical domain of political scientists. In light
             of education's crucial role in everything from citizen
             attitudes to earnings to economic growth, we recommend that
             political scientists pay more attention to education. In
             particular, comparative researchers should shift from an
             almost exclusive focus on average levels of schooling to
             explaining the causes and consequences of educational
             inequality. To that end, we provide a broad comparative
             framework for analyzing the politics of education. In our
             formulation, skill-biased technological change and factor
             endowments condition the extent to which firms demand human
             capital. The supply of skills is a function of the interests
             and institutions that link voters and politicians. We
             conclude by positing theoretical and empirical puzzles for
             future research. Copyright © 2014 by Annual Reviews. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-080911-131426},
   Key = {fds250564}
}

@article{fds220867,
   Author = {E. Wibbels and T. Gift},
   Title = {Reading, Writing, and the Regrettable State of Education
             Research in Comparative Politics},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds220867}
}

@book{fds250566,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Trade, Development and Social Insurance},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds250566}
}

@article{fds318652,
   Author = {Barber, B and Beramendi, P and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: Evidence from
             Surveys and a Laboratory Democracy},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {10},
   Pages = {1155-1189},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {October},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414012472467},
   Key = {fds318652}
}

@article{fds250569,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Christensen, D},
   Title = {Labor Standards, Trade and the Evolution of
             Inequality},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~ew41/Research_files/ChristensenWibbels_ForWeb.pdf},
   Key = {fds250569}
}

@article{fds250567,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Beramendi, P and Barber, B},
   Title = {The Behavioral Foundations of Social Policy: Risk and
             Redistribution in a Laboratory Democracy},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~ew41/Research_files/behavioral%20foundations%20revised.pdf},
   Abstract = {Winner of the Fiona McGillivray Award for Best APSA Paper in
             Political Econom},
   Key = {fds250567}
}

@article{fds220872,
   Author = {E. Wibbels and M. Ward and F. Hollenbach},
   Title = {State Building and the Geography of Governance},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds220872}
}

@article{fds220871,
   Author = {E. Wibbels and P. Beramendi},
   Title = {Foundational Bargains: Distributive Conflicts and
             Representation in the Birth of Federations},
   Journal = {Economics and Politics},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds220871}
}

@misc{fds250558,
   Author = {Rueda, D and Wibbels, E and Altamirano, M},
   Title = {The Origins of Dualization},
   Booktitle = {The Future of Democratic Capitalism},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds250558}
}

@article{fds250563,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and McGee, H},
   Title = {The Geography of Governance in Africa: Recent Evidence from
             Satellites, Field Experiments and Other New
             Sources},
   Journal = {Federal and Regional Studies},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds250563}
}

@article{fds348988,
   Author = {Christensen, D and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Labor Standards, Labor Endowments, and the Evolution of
             Inequality},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds348988}
}

@article{fds318653,
   Author = {Ahlquist, JS and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Riding the Wave: World Trade and Factor-Based Models of
             Democratization},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {447-464},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {April},
   Abstract = {Studies of "waves" of regime change, in which large numbers
             of countries experience similar political transitions at
             roughly similar periods of time, though once popular, have
             fallen from favor. Replacing the "third wave" arguments are
             several competing models relating domestic social
             structure-specifically, the distribution of income and
             factor ownership-to regime type. If any of these
             distributive models of regime type is correct, then global
             trade has an important explanatory role to play. Under
             factor-based models, changes in the world trading system
             will have systematic effects on regime dynamics. Trade
             openness determines labor's factor income and ultimately its
             political power. As world trade expands and contracts,
             countries with similar labor endowments should experience
             similar regime pressures at the same time. We propose a
             novel empirical specification that addresses the endogeneity
             and data-quality problems plaguing previous efforts to
             examine these arguments. We investigate the conditional
             impact of the global trading system on democratic
             transitions across 130 years and all of the states in the
             international system. Our findings cast doubt on the utility
             of factor-based models of democratization, despite their
             importance in fueling renewed interest in the topic. ©
             2012, Midwest Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00572.x},
   Key = {fds318653}
}

@article{fds250568,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Ward, M and Hollenbach, F},
   Title = {The Geography of Governance: Evidence from Satellite
             Imagery},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds250568}
}

@article{fds250570,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Beramendi, P},
   Title = {The Political Geography of Constitutional
             Choice},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds250570}
}

@article{fds250573,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Ahlquist, J},
   Title = {Inequality, Factor Prices and Political Regimes},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Pages = {447-464},
   Year = {2012},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~ew41/Research_files/AhlquistWibbelsRidingTheWaveJune2011_forweb.pdf},
   Abstract = {Winner of the AJPS Best Article Award},
   Key = {fds250573}
}

@article{fds318654,
   Author = {Rodden, J and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Dual accountability and the nationalization of party
             competition: Evidence from four federations},
   Journal = {Party Politics},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {629-653},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {This paper assesses the extent to which party systems are
             nationalized in four federations. In doing so, the research
             addresses two questions. First, is dual accountability
             operational across decentralized countries, or do
             sub-national voters turn to national cues as a means to
             economize in a complex information environment? By bringing
             a cross-national dataset to bear on this question, we are
             able to provide insight into where and why dual
             accountability might operate. Second, what explains
             variation in the extent to which party systems are
             nationalized across countries and time? We build on previous
             literature to suggest a number of factors likely to impact
             the extent of nationalization. We examine those factors in
             the context of provincial-level elections in Argentina,
             Canada, Germany and the United States. Using national and
             sub-national economic data, we find little evidence of dual
             accountability in any of our countries. We find that
             economic performance matters little for regional electoral
             outcomes, and where it does, sub-national outcomes reflect
             national rather than sub-national conditions. More important
             are the roles of partisan relations across levels of
             government and election timing. Sub-national co-partisans of
             the nationally governing party lose votes, particularly as
             the time from the most recent national election grows. The
             strength of these effects varies across our cases in
             predictable ways. © The Author(s) 2010.},
   Doi = {10.1177/1354068810376182},
   Key = {fds318654}
}

@article{fds250574,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Ahlquist, JS},
   Title = {Development, Trade, and Social Insurance},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {55},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {125-149},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {0020-8833},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000288076100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Developing countries vary dramatically in the amount they
             spend on social insurance. We establish a theoretical
             framework linking autarkic post-World War II economic
             development strategies with the emergence of insurance-based
             social policies. We argue that a government's choice of
             development strategy is conditioned by the size of the
             domestic market, relative abundance of labor, and land
             inequality in the context of a closed international trading
             system. The development strategy in turn shapes the fiscal
             priority governments place on social insurance. Contrary to
             the compensation hypothesis prominent in studies of the rich
             democracies, protectionist countries emphasize social
             insurance. Empirical analysis finds support for our
             argument. The results suggest that economic policies in the
             1950s, 1960s, and 1970s had important implications for the
             emergence and current contours of social policy in the
             developing world. These differences in priorities swamp
             recent within-country changes. © 2011 International Studies
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00638.x},
   Key = {fds250574}
}

@article{fds250571,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Rodden, J},
   Title = {The Nationalization of Elections},
   Journal = {Party Politics},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {September},
   Pages = {629-654},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds250571}
}

@article{fds250572,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Goldberg, E},
   Title = {The Geography of Natural Resources and Development."},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds250572}
}

@article{fds250579,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Roberts, K},
   Title = {The Politics of Economic Crisis in Latin
             America},
   Journal = {Studies in Comparative International Development},
   Volume = {45},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {383-409},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0039-3606},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000284424200001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Researchers widely recognize that economic crises have
             important political consequences, yet there is little
             systematic research on the political factors that make
             nations more or less susceptible to economic crisis.
             Scholars have long debated the economic consequences of
             party systems, executive powers, and societal interest
             groups, but their relationships to crisis proclivity are
             poorly understood. We assess the political correlates of
             economic crisis using a cross-sectional time-series analysis
             of 17 Latin American countries over nearly three decades.
             Crises are measured along two dimensions-depth and
             duration-and disaggregated into three types: inflationary,
             GDP, and fiscal crises. Statistical results suggest that
             political institutions have a modest, and often unexpected,
             correlation with crises. More important than institutional
             attributes are social organization and the nature of
             party-society linkages, particularly the existence of a
             densely-organized trade union movement and/or a powerful
             leftist party. Strong unions and powerful parties of the
             left are associated with more severe economic crises, though
             there is some evidence that the combination of left-labor
             strength can alleviate inflationary crises. The results
             demonstrate the need to disaggregate the concept of economic
             crisis and incorporate the societal dimension when studying
             the political economy of crisis and reform. © 2010 Springer
             Science+Business Media, LLC.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12116-010-9072-x},
   Key = {fds250579}
}

@article{fds318655,
   Author = {Rodden, J and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Fiscal decentralization and the business cycle: An empirical
             study of seven federations},
   Journal = {Economics & Politics},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {37-67},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {March},
   Abstract = {Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes
             provide modest insurance against regional income shocks,
             this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among
             provincial governments can easily overwhelm these
             stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget
             items among provincial governments in seven federations,
             showing that own-source taxes are generally highly
             procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing
             and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or
             procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to
             smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which
             various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their
             ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial
             fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a
             world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are
             increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are
             being devolved to subnational governments. © 2009 Blackwell
             Publishing Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00350.x},
   Key = {fds318655}
}

@article{fds250580,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Cores, peripheries, and contemporary political
             economy},
   Journal = {Studies in Comparative International Development},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {441-449},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {0039-3606},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000270192200009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {This note underscores the need for more precise causal
             theories linking the international division of labor,
             national economies, and public policies. To that end, the
             author recommends two literatures upon which a revised
             dependency theory might build, namely, those on economic
             geography and the political economy of redistribution. ©
             Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12116-009-9044-1},
   Key = {fds250580}
}

@misc{fds250561,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {A Federal Bailout for the States},
   Journal = {San Diego Tribune, Detroit Free Press, Raleigh News and
             Observer},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds250561}
}

@misc{fds250560,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Pierskalla, J},
   Title = {Natural Resources and Human Development in the American
             States},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds250560}
}

@misc{fds250559,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {The Geography of Peace and Violence in Iraq},
   Journal = {The News and Observer},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds250559}
}

@book{fds309883,
   Author = {E. Wibbels and J. Caporaso and S. Wilkinson and H.
             Kitschelt},
   Title = {Research Frontiers in Comparative Politics: A Special Issue
             of Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {41},
   Number = {4/5},
   Booktitle = {special edited volume of the journal Comparative Political
             Studies},
   Editor = {Wibbels, E and Caporaso, J and Wilkinson, S and Kitschelt,
             H},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds309883}
}

@article{fds318656,
   Author = {Caporaso, JA and Kitschelt, HP and Wibbels, EM and Wilkinson,
             SI},
   Title = {Fortieth anniversary issue},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {41},
   Number = {4-5},
   Pages = {405-411},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {April},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414007313252},
   Key = {fds318656}
}

@article{fds318657,
   Author = {Goldberg, E and Wibbels, E and Mvukiyehe, E},
   Title = {Lessons from strange cases: Democracy, development, and the
             resource curse in the U.S. States},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {41},
   Number = {4-5},
   Pages = {477-514},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {April},
   Abstract = {The work linking natural resource wealth to authoritarianism
             and under-development suffers from several shortcomings. In
             this article, the authors outline those shortcomings and
             address them in a new empirical setting. Using a new data
             set for the U.S. states spanning 73 years and case studies
             of Texas and Louisiana, the authors are able to more
             carefully examine both the diachronic nature and comparative
             legs of the resource curse hypothesis than previous research
             has. They provide evidence that natural resource dependence
             contributes to slower economic growth, poorer developmental
             performance, and less competitive politics. Using this
             empirical setting, they also begin parsing the mechanisms
             that might explain the negative association between resource
             wealth and political and economic development. They draw
             implications from intranational findings for resource
             abundant countries across the world and suggest directions
             for future cross-national and cross-state work. © 2008 Sage
             Publications.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414007313123},
   Key = {fds318657}
}

@article{fds318658,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {No method to the comparative politics madness},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {40},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {39-44},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414006294817},
   Key = {fds318658}
}

@article{fds318659,
   Author = {Bakke, KM and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Diversity, disparity, and civil conflict in federal
             states},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-50},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {October},
   Abstract = {Policymakers and scholars have turned their attention to
             federalism as a means for managing conflicts between central
             governments and subnational interests. But both the
             theoretical literature and the empirical track record of
             federations make for opposing conclusions concerning
             federalism's ability to prevent civil conflict. This article
             argues that the existing literature falls short on two
             accounts: first, it lacks a systematic comparison of
             peaceful and conflict-ridden cases across federal states,
             and second, while some studies acknowledge that there is no
             one-size-fits-all federal solution, the conditional
             ingredients of peace-preserving federalism have not been
             theorized. The authors make the argument that the
             peace-preserving effect of specific federal traits - fiscal
             decentralization, fiscal transfers, and political
             copartisanship - are conditional on a society's income level
             and ethnic composition. The argument is tested across
             twenty-two federal states from 1978 to 2000.},
   Doi = {10.1353/wp.2007.0013},
   Key = {fds318659}
}

@article{fds250575,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Madison in Baghdad? Decentralization and federalism in
             comparative politics},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {165-188},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {1094-2939},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000238980300010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Research on comparative decentralization and federalism is a
             booming industry. Recent research integrates insights from
             political science, economics, and economic history in
             emphasizing the importance of incentives for the operation
             of decentralized government. Such work has focused
             particular attention on fiscal, representative, and party
             institutions. In reviewing the past decade's research, I
             make two arguments. First, the comparative research on
             decentralization and federalism provides a model for how
             comparative politics can address some of the most profound
             questions in social thought by focusing on a theoretically
             and empirically tractable aspect of governance. Second,
             although the research addresses many of the key questions in
             comparative politics, it also struggles with some of the
             same problems and challenges as comparative politics writ
             large, particularly the issue of institutional endogeneity.
             Attention to endogeneity is central to better understanding
             the workings of decentralized governments and providing less
             facile policy recommendations for the reform of places as
             diverse as the United States and Iraq.},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170504},
   Key = {fds250575}
}

@article{fds250576,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Dependency revisited: International markets, business
             cycles, and social spending in the developing
             world},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {60},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {433-468},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0020-8183},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000237364900005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {While increased exposure to the global economy is associated
             with increased welfare effort in the Organization for
             Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the opposite
             holds in the developing world. These differences are
             typically explained with reference to domestic politics.
             Tradables, unions, and the like in the developing world are
             assumed to have less power or interests divergent to those
             in the OECD-interests that militate against social spending.
             I claim that such arguments can be complemented with a
             recognition that developed and developing nations have
             distinct patterns of integration into global markets. While
             income shocks associated with international markets are
             quite modest in the OECD, they are profound in developing
             nations. In the OECD, governments can respond to those
             shocks by borrowing on capital markets and spending
             countercyclically on social programs. No such opportunity
             exists for most governments in the developing world, most of
             which have limited access to capital markets in tough times,
             more significant incentives to balance budgets, and as a
             result cut social spending at the times it is most needed.
             Thus, while internationally inspired volatility and income
             shocks seem not to threaten the underpinnings of the welfare
             state in rich nations, it undercuts the capacity of
             governments in the developing world to smooth consumption
             (and particularly consumption by the poor) across the
             business cycle. © 2006 by The IO Foundation.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818306060139},
   Key = {fds250576}
}

@misc{fds250557,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Rodden, J},
   Title = {Business Cycles and the Political Economy of Decentralized
             Finance: Lessons for Fiscal Federalism in the
             E.U.},
   Booktitle = {Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe},
   Editor = {Wierts, D and Flores, and Turrini},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds250557}
}

@article{fds250577,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Bakke, K},
   Title = {Regional Inequality, Ethnic Diversity, and Conflict in
             Federal States},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {October},
   Pages = {1-50},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds250577}
}

@article{fds348989,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Book Review: Designing Federalism: A Theory of
             Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {446-450},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {May},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414004273207},
   Key = {fds348989}
}

@book{fds318660,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Federalism and the market: Intergovernmental conflict and
             economic reform in the developing world},
   Pages = {1-276},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {0521843812},
   Abstract = {This book, first published in 2005, develops a comparative
             model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for
             variation in the capacity of federations in the developing
             world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that
             many market reform policies are a function of a constant
             process of bargaining between national and regional leaders
             struggling for political survival. As the degree of
             national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on
             reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of
             government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the
             two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual
             electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal
             system, the manner in which regional interests are
             represented in national policy making and the levers of
             partisan influence national leaders have over subnational
             politicians. In testing the argument with a combination of
             cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this
             book contributes to the broad literatures on development and
             the comparative political economy of federalism and
             decentralization.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511510441},
   Key = {fds318660}
}

@article{fds250556,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and
             Redistribution},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {161-188},
   Publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
   Year = {2005},
   ISSN = {1572-9966},
   Abstract = {What determines the relative strength of central and
             regional governments? Why do centers engage in more or less
             geographically based economic redistribution? And why do
             some centers redistribute from urban to rural areas while
             others do the opposite? This research answers these
             questions with reference to decentralized politics at key
             constitutional moments. Much contemporary research
             underscores the importance of the intergovernmental balance
             of power - be it in taxing authority or decision making
             autonomy - on economic outcomes. Many features of that
             balance are rooted in bargains struck at the time of
             constitution writing. Here, I suggest that the key
             ingredients in such bargains are the number of conflicting
             geographically salient factor endowments, the distribution
             of inter-regional inequality, and the degree of intra-state
             inequality within rural and urban regions. The greater the
             level of factoral conflict, the more elites who engage in
             constitutional negotiations are likely to constrain the
             central government by providing for substantial regional
             veto authority. Higher levels of inter-regional inequality
             heighten demands for inter-regional redistribution. Given
             some level of regional demand for central redistribution,
             whether its net effect is in favor of urban or rural regions
             will depend on the coalitional implications of inequality
             within regions. I examine the argument in light of the U.S.,
             Argentine, and Indian processes of constitution formation.
             © 2005 Springer Science+Business Media,
             Inc.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10602-005-2234-6},
   Key = {fds250556}
}

@book{fds250565,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Federalism and the Market},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds250565}
}

@article{fds318661,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Bailouts, budget constraints, and leviathans comparative
             federalism and lessons from the early United
             States},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {36},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {475-508},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {June},
   Abstract = {Recent research on federations, particularly in the
             developing world, emphasizes the importance of hard budget
             constraints and a strong central government to attenuate
             intergovernmental economic conflicts. Such research fails on
             two counts. First, it does not explain how hard budget
             constraints emerge or become self-enforcing. Second, it does
             not take into account the insight of the market-preserving
             federalism literature that central governments strong enough
             to impose restraint on regions are likely too powerful to be
             checked in a manner consistent with the long-term health of
             markets. Unfortunately, the market-preserving federalism
             literature itself provides little insight into how to move
             from a market-distorting to a market-preserving equilibrium.
             This article answers these theoretical shortcomings with
             reference to the evolution of political competition at the
             regional level and the representation of those regions at
             the national level. More specifically, whereas regional
             competition determines the subnational demand for soft
             budget constraints, the coalition of those regions at the
             national level determines the likelihood of their provision.
             Empirically, the research relies on a case study of the
             state debt crisis of the 1840s when the United States made a
             definitive movement toward market-preserving
             federalism.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414003036005001},
   Key = {fds318661}
}

@article{fds318662,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Arce, M},
   Title = {Globalization, taxation, and burden-shifting in Latin
             America},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {111-136},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Most researchers interested in the relationship between
             global markets and public policy focus on advanced
             industrial democracies. In contrast, we examine competing
             hypotheses as 10 globalization's effect on governments by
             expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing
             nations. More specifically, we investigate the relationship
             between international market integration and the evolving
             burden of taxation on capital, as well as the subsequent
             response of markets to shifts in tax policy in Latin America
             since the late 1970s. Consistent with our theoretical
             expectations, we find that global market forces are more
             constraining vis-à-vis tax policy in Latin America than in
             the world's wealthiest nations. Despite these market-based
             pressures, however, national politics continue to influence
             tax policy in Latin America in a manner consistent with
             findings on advanced industrial democracies. As such,
             developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate
             policy, though within the context of a more strictly
             neoliberal context than their counter-parts in advanced
             industrial democracies.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0020818303571041},
   Key = {fds318662}
}

@article{fds250554,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Arce, M},
   Title = {Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin
             America},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {01},
   Pages = {111-136},
   Year = {2003},
   Abstract = {Most researchers interested in the relationship between
             global markets and public policy focus on advanced
             industrial democracies. In contrast, we examine competing
             hypotheses as to globalization's effect on governments by
             expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing
             nations. More specifically, we investigate the relationship
             between international market integration and the evolving
             burden of taxation on capital, as well as the subsequent
             response of markets to shifts in tax policy in Latin America
             since the late 1970s. Consistent with our theoretical
             expectations, we find that global market forces are more
             constraining vis-à-vis tax policy in Latin America than in
             the world's wealthiest nations. Despite these market-based
             pressures, however, national politics continue to influence
             tax policy in Latin America in a manner consistent with
             findings on advanced industrial democracies. As such,
             developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate
             policy, though within the context of a more strictly
             neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced
             industrial democracies.},
   Key = {fds250554}
}

@article{fds250555,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans: Comparative
             Federalism and Lessons from the Early US},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Pages = {475-508},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds250555}
}

@article{fds250553,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Rodden, J},
   Title = {Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management
             in Multitiered Systems},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Pages = {494-531},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds250553}
}

@article{fds318663,
   Author = {Rodden, J and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Beyond the fiction of federalism microeconomic management in
             multitiered systems},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {494-531},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Recent research on federalism is extremely divided. While
             some tout the benefits of "market-preserving" federalism,
             others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy
             in federal states. This research bridges the divide by
             analyzing the political and fiscal structures that are
             likely to account for the highly divergent economic
             experiences of federal systems around the world. To test
             these propositions, the authors use an original data set to
             conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation in fifteen
             federations around the world from 1978 through 1996. The
             empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal
             decentralization, the nature of intergovernmental finance,
             and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic
             outcomes. The findings have broad implications for the
             widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the
             theoretical literatures on federalism and
             macroeconomics.},
   Doi = {10.1353/wp.2002.0016},
   Key = {fds318663}
}

@article{fds250552,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Federal Politics and Market Reform in the Developing
             World},
   Journal = {Studies and Comparative and International
             Development},
   Volume = {36},
   Pages = {27-53},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds250552}
}

@article{fds348990,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Aguilar, EE},
   Title = {Book Reviews},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {34},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {328-334},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {April},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414001034003005},
   Key = {fds348990}
}

@article{fds348991,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of
             Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Scott P.
             Mainwaring},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {341-342},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {February},
   Doi = {10.1086/jop.63.1.2691926},
   Key = {fds348991}
}

@article{fds318664,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Federal politics and market reform in the developing
             world},
   Journal = {Studies in Comparative International Development},
   Volume = {36},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {27-53},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Prior research on the politics of market reform in
             developing nations has generally ignored the significant
             role of federal political and economic arrangements in
             shaping adjustment processes. In contrast, this research
             develops a model of macroeconomic reform that accounts for
             the significance of subnational economic policy in the
             developing world's nine major federations. I examine five
             hypotheses which are expected to influence the capacity of
             developing federations to conduct policy consistent with the
             exigencies of market pressures. With the use of a
             cross-sectional time-series analysis of fiscal and monetary
             policies, I show that the policy divergence between levels
             of government shrinks when provincial governments have
             greater fiscal power and there are high degrees of party
             centralization across levels of government. These findings
             have important implications for the political economy of
             market reform, the widespread move toward fiscal
             decentralization, and the design of regional supranational
             institutions.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF02686208},
   Key = {fds318664}
}

@article{fds250550,
   Author = {Remmer, KL and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {The subnational politics of economic adjustment: Provincial
             politics and fiscal performance in Argentina},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {419-451},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1552-3829},
   Abstract = {Existing research has failed to address the impact of
             subnational politics on economic adjustment. This article
             attempts to fill this gap by outlining theoretical reasons
             for anticipating policy divergences across levels of
             government and by offering three hypotheses to account for
             variation at the subnational level. The authors explore
             these ideas on the basis of the Argentine experience. The
             study traces the impact of subnational policy on Argentine
             economic adjustment and tests hypotheses about subnational
             policy variation on the basis of provincial fiscal data. The
             authors' findings underline the importance of subnational
             policy choice for national performance and suggest a revised
             understanding of the role of political competition in the
             economic adjustment process. The authors find considerable
             evidence that interactions between party competition and the
             structure of the public sector shape provincial fiscal
             performance and thereby condition the capacity for economic
             adjustment at the national level.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414000033004001},
   Key = {fds250550}
}

@article{fds250551,
   Author = {Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Federalism and the politics of macroeconomic policy and
             performance},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {687-702},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1540-5907},
   Abstract = {Using economic data for the period between 1979 and 1995 for
             forty-six large federal and unitary developing nations, I
             analyze the impact of political federalism in the developing
             world on a number of measures of national economic
             adjustment, volatility, and crisis. The findings suggest
             that federalism in the ten nations where it operates has, as
             theoretically predicted, a negative effect on macroeconomic
             performance and reform. I argue that the macroeconomic and
             fiscal imbalances experienced by these federal nations are,
             in part, structurally determined by their devolved political
             and fiscal institutions that create incentives for
             subnational governments to avoid the political costs of
             fiscal adjustment.},
   Doi = {10.2307/2669275},
   Key = {fds250551}
}

@article{fds303791,
   Author = {Wibbels, E and Roberts, K},
   Title = {Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A
             Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural
             Explorations},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {03},
   Pages = {575-590},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {1537-5943},
   Key = {fds303791}
}

@misc{fds318665,
   Author = {Roberts, KM and Wibbels, E},
   Title = {Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A
             test of economic, institutional, and structural
             explanations},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {93},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {575-590},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Three different theoretical explanations are tested for the
             exceptionally high level of electoral volatility found in
             contemporary Latin America: economic voting, institutional
             characteristics of political regimes and party systems, and
             the structure and organization of class cleavages. A pooled
             cross-sectional time-series regression analysis is conducted
             on 58 congressional elections and 43 presidential elections
             in 16 Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s.
             Institutional variables have the most consistent effect on
             volatility, while the influence of economic performance is
             heavily contingent upon the type of election and whether the
             dependent variable is operationalized as incumbent vote
             change or aggregate electoral volatility. The results
             demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of
             short-term economic perturbations, the institutional
             fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems,
             and relatively fluid cleavage structures.},
   Doi = {10.2307/2585575},
   Key = {fds318665}
}