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| Publications of Tracy R. Lewis :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds363208,
Author = {Huntingford, S and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Our lives, the messy PAR projects},
Journal = {Educational Action Research},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {124-139},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09650792.2020.1803940},
Abstract = {Please join us on this learning romp, which includes
anarchists, discomfort, flying projectiles, Ministries of
Truth, anger, and naked emperors. This paper is an example
of, and a reflection on, the praxis of Participatory Action
Research as a way of life. It is the result of a reflective
conversation between two researchers. We got together in
order to reflect on the superpowers that we bring to our
research. We explore three superpowers that we have in
common: unstoppable curiosity, willingness to dissent, and
leveling up. Drawing upon our experience as co-researchers,
we explore the implications of asking who decides when we
qualify as researchers. Reflecting about our research
superpowers helps us to sustain our relationship, and engage
in further shared cycles of reflection and
action.},
Doi = {10.1080/09650792.2020.1803940},
Key = {fds363208}
}
@article{fds349206,
Author = {Lewis, T and Schwartz, A},
Title = {Unenforceable securitization contracts},
Journal = {Yale Journal on Regulation},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {164-218},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {A "portfolio" here is a bundled set of contracts. In this
Article, we address a commercially important example, where
a local bank finances home purchases. The bank bundles the
resultant contracts-the mortgage-backed securities
(MBS)-into a portfolio, which it then sells to a firm,
denoted an "originator. " The originator buys portfolios
from several local banks and sells the portfolios to a large
bank, which markets the portfolios to public-investment
vehicles, such as trusts. "Portfolio contracts" govern each
of these sales. Copyrights},
Key = {fds349206}
}
@article{fds346439,
Author = {Liu, F and Lewis, TR and Song, JS and Kuribko, N},
Title = {Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity
allocation},
Journal = {Operations Research},
Volume = {67},
Number = {4},
Pages = {984-1001},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1878},
Abstract = {We consider a capacity provider and a group of independent
buyers who partner to share a scarce but expensive-to-build
capacity over a finite horizon under privately informed
demand conditions. At the beginning of the time horizon, the
capacity provider must invest in building capacity; all
members may invest in increasing their own and possibly
other members'market sizes. Then eachmemberobserves
andupdates itsprivate, history-dependent demand information
over time. Because the value of the capacity to each member
is highly uncertainwhen investment ismade, achieving the
first-best outcome while sustaining under a dynamic
environment is challenging for the partnership.We address
this issue by proposing a multiperiod membership-type
agreement (referred to as the Agreement) as a series of
singleperiod contractswith flexible terms that are
renegotiated each period. TheAgreement enforces ex post
efficient capacity allocation and ex ante efficient
investment. The set of interpartner transfers in the
Agreement makes each member a residual claimant to the
surplus it creates, and hence induces truthful demand
reports. This contract is also budget balanced and
voluntary. In doing so, we develop a new solution concept
for dynamic collective action mechanisms.},
Doi = {10.1287/opre.2019.1878},
Key = {fds346439}
}
@article{fds324785,
Author = {Chen, Q and Lewis, TR and Schipper, K and Zhang, Y},
Title = {Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting
Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination
Role},
Journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
Volume = {55},
Number = {1},
Pages = {153-196},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12130},
Abstract = {We examine uniform and discretionary regimes for reporting
information about firm performance from the perspective of a
standard setter, in a setting where the precision of
reported information is difficult to verify and the reported
information can help coordinate decisions by users of the
information. The standard setter's task is to choose a
reporting regime to maximize the expected decision value of
reported information for all users at all firms. The uniform
regime requires all firms to report using the same set of
reporting methods regardless of the precision of their
information, and the discretionary regime allows firms to
freely condition their sets of reporting methods on the
precision of their information. We show that when
unverifiable information precision varies across firms and
users' decisions based on reported information have strong
strategic complementarities, a uniform regime can have a
beneficial social effect as compared to a discretionary
reporting regime. Our analysis generates both normative and
positive implications for evaluating the necessity and
effectiveness of reporting under standards.},
Doi = {10.1111/1475-679X.12130},
Key = {fds324785}
}
@article{fds323529,
Author = {Boleslavsky, R and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest
in advisory relationships},
Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
Volume = {98},
Pages = {110-134},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.005},
Abstract = {An advocate for a special interest provides advice to a
planner, who subsequently makes a sequence of decisions. The
advocate is interested only in advancing his cause and will
distort his advice to manipulate the planner's choices. Each
time she acts the planner observes the result, providing a
signal that corroborates or contradicts the advocate's
recommendation. Without commitment, no influential
communication takes place. With commitment, the planner can
exploit the information that is revealed over time to
mitigate the advocate's incentive to lie. We derive the
optimal mechanism for eliciting advice, characterizing the
evolution of the advocate's influence. We also consider
costly information acquisition, the use of transfers, and a
noisy private signal.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.005},
Key = {fds323529}
}
@article{fds323530,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Schwartz, A},
Title = {Pay for Play: A Theory of Hybrid Relationships},
Journal = {American Law and Economics Review},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {462-494},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahv012},
Abstract = {Numerous "arrangements," such as hybrids, alliances, joint
ventures, are formed with the goal of creating a new
product, such as a new drug or software application.
Arrangements commonly require parties to make sunk-cost
investments that the arrangement partner cannot observe, to
disclose private information, and to make financing
commitments. The requirements of efficient
contracting-individual rationality, incentive compatibility,
and budget balance-are difficult to satisfy in arrangement
contexts, so that, as the literature suggests, parties' best
response is to formfirms. We show, in contrast, that
flexible and efficient contracting is possible for
arrangements. With the arrival of new information, each
party is asked to "pay-to -play" which requires the firms to
agree to future terms of exchange that are mutually
beneficial. When properly negotiated, these payments to play
support the efficientmultistage joint development of the new
product, with hybrid relationships that are governed by
conventional control rights and legal enforcement.},
Doi = {10.1093/aler/ahv012},
Key = {fds323530}
}
@article{fds266987,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {A theory of delegated search for the best
alternative},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {391-416},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0741-6261},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00179.x},
Abstract = {Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply
alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently
delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of
delegated search. We show that the principal's ability to
delegate depends on the agent's luck, her initial resources,
and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard,
the optimal contract is characterized by performance
deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance
cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an
option-to-buy contract for the principal. If performance is
partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard
pay-for-performance arrangement. © 2012,
RAND.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00179.x},
Key = {fds266987}
}
@article{fds266940,
Author = {Grabowski, H and Lewis, T and Guha, R and Ivanova, Z and Salgado, M and Woodhouse, S},
Title = {Does generic entry always increase consumer
welfare?},
Journal = {Food and Drug Law Journal},
Volume = {67},
Number = {3},
Pages = {373-ii},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1064-590X},
Abstract = {This article examines how the nature of competition between
brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry
and provide a framework for analyzing the effect of generic
entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the
generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in
competition along dimensions other than retail price--such
as competition in research and development efforts and in
promotional activities--may, in certain situations, result
in generic entry having an overall negative impact on
consumer welfare.},
Key = {fds266940}
}
@article{fds266988,
Author = {Anton, J and Biglaiser, G and Lewis, T},
Title = {Inventory in vertical relationships with private information
and interdependent values},
Journal = {International Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-63},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2011},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1742-7355},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00153.x},
Abstract = {We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better
informed about demand than a manufacturer. We find that when
distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is
optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before
it obtains its private information. We characterize the
final allocation of the good and show that the distributor
may have too few (many) units relative to the efficient
allocation when demand is high (low). ©
IAET.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00153.x},
Key = {fds266988}
}
@article{fds266985,
Author = {Che, YK and Kim, J and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?},
Journal = {Economics Letters},
Volume = {108},
Number = {1},
Pages = {52-54},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0165-1765},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.016},
Abstract = {We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target
firms to recruit white knights in response to a hostile
takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of
the target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize
entry of a subsequent bidder overdisciplines the initial
bidder's preemption and results in excessive entry by a
second bidder. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.016},
Key = {fds266985}
}
@article{fds313476,
Author = {Heaney, C and Carbone, J and Gold, ER and Bubela, T and Holman, CM and Colaianni, A and Lewis, TR and Cook-Deegan, B},
Title = {The Perils of Taking Property Too Far},
Journal = {Stanford Journal of Law, Science and Policy},
Volume = {46},
Year = {2009},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {Many policies governing biobanks revolve around ownership
and control of the materials and information in them. Those
who manage biobanks may be tempted to seek the broadest
legal rights possible over material and data. However, we
suggest that even if ownership and control were clearly
defined by the law and readily obtained by biobanks, how
legal rights are used in practice matters as much or more
than the rules for ownership. We draw lessons from the
stories of genetic testing for Canavan disease and inherited
breast and ovarian cancers. In both cases, the use or
assertion of legal rights led to preventable controversy and
suboptimal outcomes. The attempt to acquire and exercise
intellectual property rights antagonized and alienated
stakeholders, whom we define broadly to include the donors,
patients, doctors, research institutions, health care
providers, governments, and citizens with an interest in
research and its outcomes. By analogy, even if biobanks
could acquire expansive and clear property rights over
materials and data, biobanks that want to maintain
productive relationships with stakeholders must not lose the
trust of those who contribute material or others with an
interest in research.},
Key = {fds313476}
}
@article{fds266986,
Author = {Che, YK and Lewis, TR},
Title = {The role of lockups in takeover contests},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {38},
Number = {3},
Pages = {648-669},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0741-6261},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00105.x},
Abstract = {We examine breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for
prospective target firms to encourage bidder participation
in takeover contests. Unless bidding costs for the first
bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially
desirable degree of competition and ensure the efficient
allocation of the target to the highest-valued buyer in a
takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the
target firm to subsidize entry of a new bidder at the
expense of an incumbent bidder. Stock lockups induce too
much competition when offered to a second bidder and too
little competition when offered to a first bidder. Despite
their socially wasteful properties, target management would
favor stock lockups, as they induce takeover competition at
least cost to the target. Copyright ©2007,
RAND.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00105.x},
Key = {fds266986}
}
@article{fds266984,
Author = {Reichman, J and Lewis, T and So, A},
Title = {The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical
Trials},
Journal = {Economists Voice},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {1553-3832},
Key = {fds266984}
}
@article{fds266983,
Author = {Dai, C and Lewis, TR and Lopomo, G},
Title = {Delegating management to experts},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {37},
Number = {3},
Pages = {503-520},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0741-6261},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x},
Abstract = {Owners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions
about operating and maintaining their property to managers
who are better informed about local market conditions. We
analyze how owners optimally contract with managers who vary
in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the
most expert managers offer the greatest variation in
operating recommendations. Owners benefit from dealing with
experts provided they contract sequentially, whereby terms
are negotiated gradually as the manager acquires
information. Copyright © 2006, RAND.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x},
Key = {fds266983}
}
@article{fds266981,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Yildirim, H},
Title = {Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with
strategic buyers},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1233-1269},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2005},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0020-6598},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00366.x},
Abstract = {This article examines the use of switching costs by
long-lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition
between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may
employ switching costs to their advantage. We show that when
switching costs are high, a buyer may induce suppliers to
price more competitively by credibly threatening to replace
the incumbent supplier with his rivals. The implications of
this finding for adoption of technology and firm
organization are explored in settings in which the buyer is
integrated with the suppliers and where the buyer is an
outsourcer.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00366.x},
Key = {fds266981}
}
@article{fds266980,
Author = {Hadlock, CJ and Lewis, T},
Title = {Bargaining when Exchange Affects the Value of Future
Trade},
Journal = {Journal of Economics
Management Strategy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {557-589},
Publisher = {MIT Press - Journals},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/105864003322538956},
Abstract = {We examine bargaining in a dynamic context where exchange
between two parties affects the potential surplus from
future trade. In this setting traders negotiate current
contracts anticipating the impact of their agreement on
future exchanges. We show that in growing environments these
dynamic considerations will often ameliorate bargaining
inefficiencies associated with private information and
facilitate exchange as both parties cooperate to nurture the
relationship. In contrast, we find that in declining
environments dynamic considerations will often exacerbate
bargaining inefficiencies and hinder trade, as both parties
are hesitant to let the relationship mature. These findings
have implications for preferences to form long-lived
relationships.},
Doi = {10.1162/105864003322538956},
Key = {fds266980}
}
@article{fds266982,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Yildirim, H},
Title = {Managing dynamic competition},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {92},
Number = {4},
Pages = {779-797},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2002},
Month = {September},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1737 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {In many important high-technology markets, including
software development, data processing, communications,
aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience
how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper
examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival
suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the
costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strategies for
controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of
more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions, the
protection and allocation of intellectual property, and the
sharing of information among rival suppliers. (JEL C73, D44,
L10).},
Doi = {10.1257/00028280260344461},
Key = {fds266982}
}
@article{fds266978,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Yildirim, H},
Title = {Learning by doing and dynamic regulation},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-36},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2696373},
Abstract = {From experience, regulated monopolists learn to employ
cost-reducing innovations. We characterize the optimal
regulation of an innovating monopolist with unknown costs.
Regulatory policy is designed to minimize current costs of
service while encouraging development of cost-saving
innovations. We find that under optimal regulation, (i)
innovation is encouraged by light-handed regulation allowing
the monopolist to earn greater information rents while
providing greater service, (ii) innovation occurs in the
absence of long-term agreements when private information is
recurring, and (iii) innovation is more rapid in a durable
franchise, and the regulator prefers durable franchises for
exploiting learning economies.},
Doi = {10.2307/2696373},
Key = {fds266978}
}
@article{fds313474,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof
Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {91},
Number = {3},
Pages = {724-730},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2001},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.724},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.91.3.724},
Key = {fds313474}
}
@article{fds313475,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and
Ability},
Journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
Volume = {68},
Number = {1},
Pages = {21-44},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0034-6527},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00158},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-937x.00158},
Key = {fds313475}
}
@article{fds266976,
Author = {Boyer, M and Lewis, TR and Liu, WL},
Title = {Setting standards for credible compliance and law
enforcement},
Journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {319-340},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0008-4085},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00018},
Abstract = {In this paper we examine the setting of optimal legal
standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care
and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the
law. The strategic interaction between care providers and
law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved
by the standards. Our principal finding is that some
divergence between the marginal benefits and marginal costs
of providing care is required to control enforcement costs.
Further, the setting of standards may effectively substitute
for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are
fixed. In particular, maximal fines may be welfare reducing
when standards are set optimally. © Canadian Economics
Association.},
Doi = {10.1111/0008-4085.00018},
Key = {fds266976}
}
@article{fds266977,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Contracting with wealth-constrained agents},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {41},
Number = {3},
Pages = {743-767},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00082},
Abstract = {We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project
operator and motivates him to deliver an essential
noncontractible input (e.g., effort) when potential
operators are privately informed about their limited wealth.
Truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a
higher probability of operation and, if necessary, a greater
share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond
that a potential operator posts. The project owner benefits
when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential
operators. Under plausible conditions, limited knowledge of
wealth is not constraining for the project
owner.},
Doi = {10.1111/1468-2354.00082},
Key = {fds266977}
}
@article{fds266979,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Motivating wealth-constrained actors},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {90},
Number = {4},
Pages = {944-960},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2097 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public
enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their
resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown
ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise
profit - the resource owner always shares the operator's
profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership -resources are
widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3)
limited benefits of competition - the owner may not benefit
from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes,
(4) diluted incentives for the most capable - more capable
operators receive smaller shares of the returns they
generate. Implications for privatizations and venture
capital arrangements are explored. (JEL D82, D44,
D20).},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.90.4.944},
Key = {fds266979}
}
@article{fds266972,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Access pricing with unregulated downstream
competition},
Journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {73-100},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6245(99)00004-9},
Abstract = {We examine the optimal design of access tariffs when
downstream competition is unregulated but imperfect, and
when the regulator is uncertain about the production costs
of an unregulated competitor. We show: (1) the regulator
optimally sets access prices so as to tilt the playing field
in the direction of the more efficient producer, rather than
level the playing field as is often advocated in policy
debates; (2) the optimal degree of regulatory intervention
declines as downstream competition becomes more pronounced;
and (3) the regulator optimally reveals to the incumbent
supplier any information that arrives about the competitor's
production costs. © Elsevier Science B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0167-6245(99)00004-9},
Key = {fds266972}
}
@article{fds266973,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof
problems},
Journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {275-293},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00009-5},
Abstract = {We examine gow financial penalties for social damages can be
structured to mitigate judgment-proof problems. These
problems occur when a producer has insufficient wealth to
compensate victims for the most serious damages that can
arise from his activities. We demonstrate that a policy in
which assessed penalties are decoupled from realized damages
generally generates greater social surplus than does a
policy of compensatory damages. We also show that a lender's
deep pockets can generally be employed to mitigate
judgment-proof problems, despite recent suggestions to the
contrary in the literature. © 1999 Elsevier Science
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00009-5},
Key = {fds266973}
}
@article{fds266974,
Author = {Demski, JS and Lewis, TR and Yao, D and Yildirim,
H},
Title = {Practices for managing information flows within
organizations},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {107-131},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.1.107},
Abstract = {Firm organization determines how coworkers communicate and
how information flows within the firm. Banking, accounting,
consulting, and legal firms process proprietary information
which their clients wish to protect. The firm's ability to
safeguard and manage information determines its market
demand. Yet employees may leak and otherwise abuse
information to enhance their personal performance and
wealth. This article analyzes how bureaucracies are erected
within the firm to control information flows and protect
cleints.},
Doi = {10.1093/jleo/15.1.107},
Key = {fds266974}
}
@article{fds266975,
Author = {Sappington, DEM and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Using subjective risk adjusting to prevent patient dumping
in the health care industry},
Journal = {Journal of Economics |
Management Strategy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {351-382},
Publisher = {MIT Press - Journals},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/105864099567695},
Abstract = {We examine how to procure health care services at minimum
cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for
high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective
payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for
the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost
sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat
smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small,
screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk
adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting,
the supplier classifies patients according to his personal
assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are
structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are
contrasted with prevailing industry policies.},
Doi = {10.1162/105864099567695},
Key = {fds266975}
}
@article{fds266969,
Author = {Lewis, T and Poitevin, M},
Title = {Disclosure of information in regulatory proceedings},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {50-73},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023382},
Abstract = {This article examines how different rules for presentation
of evidence affect verdicts in regulatory hearings and
examines the welfare and efficiency properties these
procedures exhibit. The hearing is modeled as a game of
imperfect information in which the respondent is privately
informed about the validity of his case. The respondent may
present evidence to support his case. The commission
observes whether the respondent presents evidence and
observes the nature of the evidence presented to update its
beliefs about the validity of the case. Based on these
beliefs and the standard of proof, the commission decides
whether the respondent's application should be accepted or
rejected. The sequential equilibria of this game are
examined for their implications regarding (i) the impact of
information accuracy and disclosure costs on the outcome of
the hearing and the welfare of the respondent, and (ii) how
the burden of proof undertaken by the respondent to prove
his case is affected by disclosure costs and the information
accuracy.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023382},
Key = {fds266969}
}
@article{fds266970,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts: No good
deed goes unpunished?},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {346-358},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555809},
Abstract = {We examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse
selection and moral hazard problems are present. We find
that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that
the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a
lower-powered incentive contract. Penalizing success in this
manner serves to limit the agent's initial incentive to
understate his ability.},
Doi = {10.2307/2555809},
Key = {fds266970}
}
@article{fds266971,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Information management in incentive problems},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {796-821},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-3808},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1982 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {We extend the standard procurement model to examine how an
agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning
information before he chooses an unobservable level of
cost-reducing effort. Concerns about information acquisition
cause important changes in standard incentive contracts.
Reward structures with extreme financial payoffs arise, and
super-high-powered contracts are coupled with contracts that
entail pronounced cost sharing. However, if the principal
can assign the planning and production tasks to two
different agents, then all contracting distortions disappear
and, except for forgone economies of scope, the principal
achieves her most preferred outcome.},
Doi = {10.1086/262094},
Key = {fds266971}
}
@article{fds266968,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are
privately known},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {819-847},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2068 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {I analyze different approaches for protecting the
environment when stakeholders are privately informed about
the costs and benefits of pollution reduction. The presence
of asymmetric information calls for some important
departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable
permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution. For
instance, it may no longer be optimal to equate the social
marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in
determining appropriate abatement levels. I conclude this
review with some suggestions for future research in this
area.},
Doi = {10.2307/2555884},
Key = {fds266968}
}
@article{fds266964,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {65},
Number = {2},
Pages = {327-358},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-0531},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1012},
Abstract = {We examine optimal insurance policies in a setting where
some individuals are perfectly informed about the benefits
they would receive under any proposed plan, and others share
the insurance provider’s imperfect knowledge about likely
benefits. The optimal insurance policy is shown to take on a
particularly simple linear form, providing full insurance
for the smallest and largest wealth realizations, and no
insurance for a range of intermediate wealth realizations.
This basic form of the optimal insurance policy persists in
dynamic settings and those with endogenous information
acquisition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Numbers: D31, D82, H50. © 1995 Academic Press,
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1006/jeth.1995.1012},
Key = {fds266964}
}
@article{fds266965,
Author = {Blair, BF and Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Simple regulatory policies in the presence of demand and
cost uncertainty},
Journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {57-73},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0167-6245},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(94)00030-A},
Abstract = {We analyze the design of regulatory policy in the presence
of demand uncertainty when the regulated firm has superior
knowledge of its cost structure. The presence of demand
uncertainty introduces important new considerations for the
regulator. We show that by limiting the regulated firm's
obligation to serve and by protecting the firm against
stranded investment, the regulator can enhance consumer
welfare relative to the case where the regulator can only
set a single price for the regulated product before demand
is realized. © 1995.},
Doi = {10.1016/0167-6245(94)00030-A},
Key = {fds266965}
}
@article{fds266966,
Author = {Dinopoulos, E and Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Optimal industrial targeting with unknown
learning-by-doing},
Journal = {Journal of International Economics},
Volume = {38},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {275-295},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-1996},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1956 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {We examine a government's optimal targeting policy when it
has limited information about the learning curves of
domestic producers. Popular arguments suggest that in order
to promote learning-by-doing, the government might want to
protect domestic producers from foreign competition by
temporarily closing the domestic market to foreign
producers. We identify a set of conditions under which such
trade intervention is not optimal. Instead, domestic welfare
is better fostered either by no government intervention, or
by providing subsidies to the most capable domestic
producers who are willing to set a particularly low domestic
price for their product. © 1995.},
Doi = {10.1016/0022-1996(94)01349-W},
Key = {fds266966}
}
@article{fds266967,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce
resource rights under limited information},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {57},
Number = {3},
Pages = {431-455},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0047-2727},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)80005-T},
Abstract = {We consider the design of government policy to ration such
scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the
presence of limited information. When government policy is
formulated, some informed agents (e.g. established public
utilities) know how highly they value the resource. Other
uninformed agents (e.g. potential independent power
producers) only learn their valuations at some later date.
The government allows uninformed agents to trade the
resource rights they receive on a competitive market.
Informed agents may or may not have the same privilege. The
optimal initial distribution of resource rights differs
significantly according to whether informed agents can trade
the rights they receive. © 1995.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(95)80005-T},
Key = {fds266967}
}
@article{fds340265,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Optimal capital structure in agency relationships},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {343-361},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555992},
Abstract = {We analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency
relationships. When a risk-averse principal controls the
agent's capital structure, she awards a larger equity stake
to outsiders the smaller the agent's productivity. When she
controls both the timing and the terms of the agent's
financing, the principal shifts to equityholders all risk
associated with stochastic production and with the agent's
unknown productivity. When the principal dictates only the
terms of financing, only the former risk is borne by
equityholders. When the principal is sufficiently averse to
risk, she affords the agent no choice among incentive
schemes.},
Doi = {10.2307/2555992},
Key = {fds340265}
}
@article{fds313472,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Yao, D},
Title = {Some Reflections on Antitrust Treatment of Intellectual
Property},
Journal = {Antitrust Law Journal},
Volume = {63},
Number = {2},
Pages = {603-619},
Publisher = {American Bar Association},
Year = {1995},
ISSN = {0003-6056},
Key = {fds313472}
}
@article{fds313473,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Supplying Information to Facilitate Price
Discrimination},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {38},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {275-295},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1995},
ISSN = {1468-2354},
Key = {fds313473}
}
@article{fds266962,
Author = {Brown, DT and Lewis, TR and Ryngaert, MD},
Title = {The real debate over purchased power},
Journal = {The Electricity Journal},
Volume = {7},
Number = {7},
Pages = {61-73},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1040-6190},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1040-6190(94)90305-0},
Abstract = {Which is riskier - building plants or buying power? Which is
more cost effective? There's no simple answer, but
regulators can help make the playing field level by taking
account of how demand risk is borne in buy and build
settings. The best alternative may be to let utility
affiliates bid on home turf. © 1994.},
Doi = {10.1016/1040-6190(94)90305-0},
Key = {fds266962}
}
@article{fds266963,
Author = {Feenstra, RC and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Trade adjustment assistance and Pareto gains from
trade},
Journal = {Journal of International Economics},
Volume = {36},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {201-222},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-1996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90001-9},
Abstract = {In a model where all factors of production are imperfectly
mobile, we argue that the Dixit-Norman scheme of commodity
taxes may not lead to strict Pareto gains from trade.
Rather, this scheme must be augmented by policies that give
factors an incentive to move between industries: hence, the
role for trade adjustment assistance. By offering an
adjustment subsidy to all individuals wiling to move, and
also using the Dixit-Norman pattern of commodity taxes, the
government can implement Pareto gains from trade under the
condition we identify. © 1994.},
Doi = {10.1016/0022-1996(94)90001-9},
Key = {fds266963}
}
@article{fds340266,
Author = {Blair, BF and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Optimal retail contracts with asymmetric information and
moral hazard},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {284-296},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555831},
Abstract = {Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are
derived when the dealer is privately informed about demand
conditions before contracting with the manufacturer. Demand
is increased by dealer promotion, which is unobservable by
the manufacturer. Consequently, the manufacturer does not
know whether to attribute a low level of sales to a decline
in demand or to a lack of promotion. We show that, in
general, the optimal contract exhibits some form of resale
price maintenance and quantity fixing. The type of resale
price maintenance and quantity fixing depends on how price
and quantity affect the link between sales and
promotion.},
Doi = {10.2307/2555831},
Key = {fds340266}
}
@article{fds313471,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Regulating Power: The Economics of Electricity in the
Information Age - Pechman, C},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {32},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1266-1267},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {0364-281X},
Key = {fds313471}
}
@article{fds266961,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Ignorance in agency problems},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {61},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-183},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-0531},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1064},
Abstract = {We extend the standard agency model of adverse selection to
incorporate the possibility that the agent may be ignorant,
i.e., know no more about a critical parameter than does the
principal. Ignorance introduces a discontinuity, pooling,
and particularly severe output distortions into the optimal
incentive contract. Journal of Economic Literature
Classification Numbers: C79, D82. © 1993 by Academic Press,
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1006/jeth.1993.1064},
Key = {fds266961}
}
@article{fds313537,
Author = {GIAMMARINO, RM and LEWIS, TR and SAPPINGTON, DEM},
Title = {An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation},
Journal = {The Journal of Finance},
Volume = {48},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1523-1542},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-1082},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04766.x},
Abstract = {We examine the optimal design of a risk‐adjusted deposit
insurance scheme when the regulator has less information
than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank's assets
(adverse selection), and when the regulator is unable to
monitor the extent to which bank resources are being
directed away from normal operations toward activities that
lower asset quality (moral hazard). Under a socially optimal
insurance scheme: (1) asset quality is below the
first‐best level, (2) higher‐quality banks have larger
asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements
than lower‐quality banks, and (3) the probability of
failure is equated across banks. 1993 The American Finance
Association},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04766.x},
Key = {fds313537}
}
@article{fds313536,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Choosing Workers' Qualifications: No Experience
Necessary?},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {34},
Number = {3},
Pages = {479-502},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {1468-2354},
Key = {fds313536}
}
@article{fds313535,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by
Public Utilities},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {82},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1321-1340},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313535}
}
@article{fds313532,
Author = {Feenstra, RC and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political
Pressure},
Journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
Volume = {106},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1287-1307},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1991},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0033-5533},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2937965},
Doi = {10.2307/2937965},
Key = {fds313532}
}
@article{fds266960,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {All-or-nothing information control},
Journal = {Economics Letters},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {111-113},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0165-1765},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3},
Abstract = {We examine an extension of the standard agency model in
which the principal can choose the probability (p) with
which the agent receives perfect private state information.
A simple argument reveals that the principal will always set
p at zero or at unity. © 1991.},
Doi = {10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3},
Key = {fds266960}
}
@article{fds313531,
Author = {Feenstra, RC and Lewis, TR},
Title = {DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION},
Journal = {Economics & Politics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {21-39},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0954-1985},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00037.x},
Abstract = {We argue that the incomplete information which the
government has about domestic agents means that tariffs
become an optimal instrument to protect them from import
competition. Using a model where agents have private
information about their endowments, we solve for the optimal
government policy subject to the political constraint of
ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive
compatibility constraint, and the government's budget
constraint. We find that the optimal policy takes the form
of nonlinear tariffs. These tariffs are never complete, in
the sense of bringing prices back to their initial level,
but always allow some individuals to be strictly better off
than at the initial prices. Copyright © 1991, Wiley
Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00037.x},
Key = {fds313531}
}
@article{fds313533,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Technological Change and the Boundaries of the
Firm},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {81},
Number = {4},
Pages = {887-900},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313533}
}
@article{fds313534,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Oversight of Long Term Investment by Short-Lived
Regulators},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {32},
Number = {3},
Pages = {579-600},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {1468-2354},
Key = {fds313534}
}
@article{fds266959,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Sequential regulatory oversight},
Journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {327-348},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1990},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0922-680X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134475},
Abstract = {We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission
controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods.
Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of
contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three
different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal
conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters
specify the extent to which the second-period commission is
bound to promises made by its predecessor. © 1990 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00134475},
Key = {fds266959}
}
@article{fds313530,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Feenstra, R and McMillan, J},
Title = {Designing Policies to Open Trade},
Journal = {Economics & Politics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {223-240},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {1468-0343},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00031.x},
Abstract = {In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S.
import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage
relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss
the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for
the government. We then consider why quota auctions should
be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or
immediately opening trade and compensating people with
income transfers. We argue that the information available to
the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in
understanding these policies. Copyright © 1990, Wiley
Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00031.x},
Key = {fds313530}
}
@article{fds266955,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {An informational effect when regulated firms enter
unregulated markets},
Journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-45},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1989},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0922-680X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00150296},
Abstract = {Our purpose in undertaking this investigation was two-fold.
First, we sought to examine the divergence between
regulatory policy in practice and prescription from economic
theory. Second, we wished to determine whether by
facilitating entry into unregulated market. We found a close
connection between these two apparently disparate issues.
Our conclusion is that a regulator may be able to enhance
the level of expected consumers' surplus generated in a
regulated market by allowing the regulated firm to enter
unregulated markets. We have associated "entry" into
unregulated markets with the possession of "capital" that
constitutes a critical factor of production in the
unregulated market. The key feature of this capital is that
its value is positively correlated with production costs in
the regulated industry. Consequently, if the firm attempts
to exaggerate its costs of producing in the regulated
market, it simultaneously exaggerates the profits it will
earn in the unregulated sector. enabling the regulator to
reduced the allowed compensation in the regulated sector. In
effect, allowing entry into unregulated markets introduces a
counteravailing incentive for the firm which limits its
tendency to exaggerate production costs. This enables the
regulator to better control the profits earned by the
regulated firm. This is the case even when: (i) ratepayers
in the regulated industry provide the initial funding for
the firm's venture into the unregulated market; and (ii) the
capacity afforded the firm cannot be used to produce in the
regulated sector. The presence of countervailing incentives
gives rise to "stickness" in optimal regulated prices. To
limit the incentive to exaggerate low cost realizations,
prices are set in excess of realized marginal cost. To
mitigate the tendency t understate high realizations of c
(and thereby undersate earnings in the unregulated sector),
prices are set below realized marginal cost. For a wide
range of intermediate cost realizations, these
countervailing incentives result in a single regulated price
being optimal. Thus, the optimal policy here is more
congruent with a regulatory policy in a practice; a simple
pricing rule is instituted rather than a complex pricing
formula that affords considerable discretion to the firm. In
a closing, we wish to emphasize that our model is designed
to examine only certain elements of the decision to permit
regulated firms to enter unregulated markets. In practice,
there are many other elements that warrant caregul
consideration. For example, there may be concern that the
regulated firm will have an "unfair" competitive advantage
in unregulated markets. Alternatively, entry into
unregulated markets may complicate cost accounting
procedures and thereby facilitate undesired cross subsidies.
Furthermore, the possibility exists that a regulated firm
might allow the quality of the regulated service to
deteriorate when its attention is focused in other markets.
These issues await additional research. © 1989 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00150296},
Key = {fds266955}
}
@article{fds266956,
Author = {Lewis, T and Nickerson, D},
Title = {Self-insurance against natural disasters},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {209-223},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(89)90010-7},
Abstract = {Expenditures on self-insurance to mitigate the effects of
natural disasters on the value of private assets are
examined in a model where individuals are partially insured
against financial loss by a public relief program and where
private insurance is unavailable. The model predicts that
optimal private expenditures on self-insurance will be
excessive or insufficient according to the nature of the
technology by which individuals protect their assets. The
comparative static effects of variations in the level of
public compensation, individual wealth, and attitudes toward
risk and the degree of environmental uncertainty on
self-insurance expenditures and on the magnitude and
frequency of public compensation are also characterized and
their implications for remedial government policies are
examined. © 1989.},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(89)90010-7},
Key = {fds266956}
}
@article{fds266957,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Countervailing incentives in agency problems},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {49},
Number = {2},
Pages = {294-313},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-0531},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5},
Abstract = {We analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem.
Countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an
incentive to understate his private information for some of
its realizations, and to overstate it for others. When
countervailing incentives arise, pooling generally
characterizes the equilibrium contract. Furthermore,
performance is distorted both above and below efficient
levels. In addition, the agent's rents generally increase
with the realization of his private information over some
ranges, and decrease over other ranges. We demonstate that
the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance
aggregate welfare. © 1989.},
Doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5},
Key = {fds266957}
}
@article{fds266958,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Feenstra, R and Ware, R},
Title = {Eliminating price supports. A political economy
perspective},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {40},
Number = {2},
Pages = {159-185},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0047-2727},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(89)90001-7},
Abstract = {This paper characterizes information and politically
constrained government programs for eliminating price
supports. The issues which we examine in this model include:
(i) To what extent is it possible to reduce the size of
oversubscribed industries in light of the information and
political constraints that exist? Is a complete 'decoupling'
of a worker's compensation from her output possible or
desirable? (ii) Which 'type' of workers (as characterized by
their skill levels and outside employment opportunities)
remain in the industry? (iii) Which type of worker is harmed
by the relocation program? Which coalitions of workers will
oppose the reorganization? © 1989.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(89)90001-7},
Key = {fds266958}
}
@article{fds313527,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {79},
Number = {a},
Pages = {69-84},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313527}
}
@article{fds313529,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D and Perry, M},
Title = {Renegotiation and Specific Performance},
Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {52},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33-48},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {1945-2322},
Key = {fds313529}
}
@article{fds340267,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {405-405},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1989},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555579},
Doi = {10.2307/2555579},
Key = {fds340267}
}
@article{fds313528,
Author = {Giammarino, RM and Lewis, T},
Title = {A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing},
Journal = {Review of Financial Studies},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {265-288},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1988},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0893-9454},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/1.3.265},
Doi = {10.1093/rfs/1.3.265},
Key = {fds313528}
}
@article{fds313525,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Brander, J},
Title = {Bankruptcy Costs and the Theory of Oligopoly},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {221-243},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1988},
ISSN = {1540-5982},
Key = {fds313525}
}
@article{fds313526,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, D},
Title = {Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {78},
Number = {5},
Pages = {986-998},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1988},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313526}
}
@article{fds340268,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DEM},
Title = {Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost
Functions},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {438-438},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1988},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555666},
Doi = {10.2307/2555666},
Key = {fds340268}
}
@article{fds266952,
Author = {Eswaran, M and Lewis, T},
Title = {Collusive behaviour in finite repeated games with
bonding},
Journal = {Economics Letters},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {213-216},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0165-1765},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90025-X},
Abstract = {In finite repeated games, it is not possible to enforce
collusive behaviour using deterrent strategies if the state
game has a unique Nash equilibrium, because of the
'unravelling' of cooperative behaviour in the last period.
This paper demonstrates that under certain conditions, some
cooperation among the players can be maintained if they can
post a bond which they must forfeit if they defect from the
cooperative mode. We show that the incentives to cooperate
increase as the period of interaction grows in that the size
of the bonds required to deter defection become arbitrarily
small as the number of periods in the game increases. ©
1986.},
Doi = {10.1016/0165-1765(86)90025-X},
Key = {fds266952}
}
@article{fds313524,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Brander, J},
Title = {Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability
Effect},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {76},
Number = {5},
Pages = {956-970},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313524}
}
@article{fds313799,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Loury, G},
Title = {On the Profitability of Interruptible Supply},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {76},
Number = {4},
Pages = {827-832},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313799}
}
@article{fds340269,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Reputation and Contractual Performance in Long-Term
Projects},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {141-141},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1986},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555380},
Doi = {10.2307/2555380},
Key = {fds340269}
}
@article{fds340270,
Author = {Lewis, T and Lindsey, R and Ware, R},
Title = {Long-Term Bilateral Monopoly: The Case of an Exhaustible
Resource},
Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {89-89},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1986},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555630},
Doi = {10.2307/2555630},
Key = {fds340270}
}
@article{fds266953,
Author = {Eswaran, M and Lewis, T},
Title = {Exhaustible resources and alternative equilibrium concepts (
Nash).},
Journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {459-473},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/135013},
Abstract = {Identifies instances where the open loop and feedback Nash
equilibria coincide and demonstrate that in other cases the
two equilibria do not differ significantly.
-Authors},
Doi = {10.2307/135013},
Key = {fds266953}
}
@article{fds266954,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {A note on mining with investment in capital.},
Journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {665-667},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/135028},
Abstract = {Identifies the conditions on the extraction technology that
give rise to various sorts of predictions. -from
Author},
Doi = {10.2307/135028},
Key = {fds266954}
}
@article{fds266950,
Author = {Eswaran, M and Lewis, TR},
Title = {Ultimate recovery of an exhaustible resource under different
market structures},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {55-69},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(84)90031-7},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(84)90031-7},
Key = {fds266950}
}
@article{fds313798,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Eswaran, M},
Title = {Appropriability and the Extraction of a Common Property
Resource},
Journal = {Economica},
Volume = {51},
Number = {204},
Pages = {393-400},
Publisher = {Wiley: No OnlineOpen},
Year = {1984},
ISSN = {1468-0335},
Key = {fds313798}
}
@article{fds266951,
Author = {Salant, S and Eswaran, M and Lewis, T},
Title = {The length of optimal extraction programs when depletion
affects extraction costs},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {364-374},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-0531},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90083-2},
Doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(83)90083-2},
Key = {fds266951}
}
@article{fds313795,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Gallini, N and Ware, R},
Title = {Strategic Timing and Pricing of a Substitute in a Cartelized
Resource Market},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {429-446},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {1540-5982},
Key = {fds313795}
}
@article{fds313796,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Eswaran, M},
Title = {On the Non-Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in
Exhaustible Resource Markets},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Volume = {91},
Number = {1},
Pages = {154-167},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {1537-534X},
Key = {fds313796}
}
@article{fds313797,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Preemption, Divestiture, and Forward Contracting in a Market
Dominated by a Single Firm},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {73},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1092-1101},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
Key = {fds313797}
}
@article{fds313793,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Sufficient Conditions for Extracting Least Cost Resources
First},
Journal = {Econometrica},
Volume = {50},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1081-1083},
Publisher = {Econometric Society: Econometrica},
Year = {1982},
ISSN = {1468-0262},
Key = {fds313793}
}
@article{fds313794,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Cartel Deception in Nonrenewable Resource
Markets},
Journal = {Bell Journal of Economics},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {263-271},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds313794}
}
@article{fds266948,
Author = {Lewis, T},
Title = {Energy vs the environment},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-71},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/556 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Optimal development programs that explicitly account for the
environment impacts of extracting energy resources are
analyzed. Possibilities of storing the resources above
ground once it has been extracted are examined When
environmental disruption results from resource extraction,
as in the case of strip mining or drilling for oil, then the
socially optimal rates of resource consumption and
extraction depend on the type and severity of the
environmental impact and on the prospects of storing the
resource above ground. © 1981.},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(81)90057-7},
Key = {fds266948}
}
@article{fds266949,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Markets and environmental management with a storable
pollutant},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-18},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(81)90053-X},
Abstract = {Lee [J. Environ. Econ. Manag., in press] investigates
possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a period of
time and later released into the environment when adverse
effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants
before their release into the environment is a crucial part
of many abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges
will not induce optimal abatement when storage is possible.
This occurs because the firms' response to the dynamic tax
is indeterminant. We suggest alternative controls, whereby
rights to emit pollutants are sold competitively and
demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal
generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In
deriving this result an important difference between markets
and taxes is revealed. With markets there is still
indeterminacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response
of all firms is dictated by market forces that insure
pollution is reduced by some desired amount. ©
1981.},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(81)90053-X},
Key = {fds266949}
}
@article{fds313792,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Exploitation of a Renewable Resource Under
Uncertainty},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {422-439},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1981},
ISSN = {1540-5982},
Key = {fds313792}
}
@article{fds266945,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Schmalensee, R},
Title = {On oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable natural
resources.},
Journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
Volume = {95},
Number = {3},
Pages = {475-491},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1980},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1885089},
Abstract = {Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource
markets is anlayzed under stationary conditions assuming
perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash
equilibria in output paths is established under standard
cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative
dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same
costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either
increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their
reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If
suppliers' costs differ, equilibrium involves inefficient
production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before
low-cost ones.-Authors},
Doi = {10.2307/1885089},
Key = {fds266945}
}
@article{fds266947,
Author = {Eswaran, M and Lewis, TR},
Title = {A note on market structure and the search for exhaustible
resources},
Journal = {Economics Letters},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-80},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1980},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0165-1765},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(80)90060-9},
Doi = {10.1016/0165-1765(80)90060-9},
Key = {fds266947}
}
@article{fds313791,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting},
Journal = {Bell Journal of Economics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {292-301},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds313791}
}
@article{fds266944,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Matthews, SA and Burness, HS},
Title = {Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible
resources: Comment.},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {69},
Number = {1},
Pages = {227-230},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In this note we present realistic, alternative extensions to
the iso-elastic, zero cost analysis which tend to bias
monopolistic extraction rates in the opposite direction,
that is, towards excessive resource use. The first
modification allows for costs that do not vary with the
extraction rate. Occurring in the form of leasing fees,
capital costs, and maintenance fees, these quasi- fixed
costs are incurred only during periods of production and
often constitute a substantial portion of operating
expenses. The second extension involves demand elasticities
varying with consumption instead of time. In particular, we
consider a stationary demand schedule with elasticity
increasing in consumption. We have shown that in 2 special
cases a monopolist depletes a natural resource faster than
is optimal. Since Stiglitz (77C/1118) proves the opposite
result for other special cases, the net effect of all these
presumably realistic considerations is analytically
indeterminate and must be ascertained empirically.-after
Authors},
Key = {fds266944}
}
@article{fds266946,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {The exhaustion and depletion of natural resources.},
Journal = {Econometrica},
Volume = {47},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1569-1571},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914021},
Abstract = {Existing analyses of resource management generally take as
given the possibilities for profitable recovery with
declining stocks as a prerequisite for resource exhaustion.
Presumably, though, one would like to characterize
conditions on the extraction technology which insure the
profitability of resource recovery as the stock becomes
arbitrarily small. Such a characterization is provided in
this note where it is shown that if the resource production
technology is convex, resources recovery is profitable for
any positive stock despite depletion effects. Consequently a
nonreplenishable resource stock will either to totally
exhausted in finite time or will gradually be driven to
zero, given normal convexity assumptions, regardless of
whether the resource is competitively exploited or centrally
managed. Of course the prospects for the exhaustion of
renewable resources are harder to assess.-Author},
Doi = {10.2307/1914021},
Key = {fds266946}
}
@article{fds266943,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sclmalensee, R},
Title = {Non-convexity and Optimal Exhaustion of Renewable
Resources},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {677-691},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1979},
ISSN = {1540-5982},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/134873},
Abstract = {Optimal harvesting strategies are considered for a renewable
resource under stationary conditions. Net benefits are
non-concave in the harvesting rate because of fixed costs.
If harvesting is suspended, a re-entry cost is assumed to be
incurred when it is resumed. It is shown that policies of
five distinct types, which are characterized in detail, may
be optimal. Only 2 of these types have been much studied.
Most notably, a cyclical policy, in which harvesting is
periodically suspended and the resource stock rises and
falls forever, may be optimal. Numerous comparative dynamic
results for the new strategy types are obtained.
-Authors},
Doi = {10.2307/134873},
Key = {fds266943}
}
@article{fds266942,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Attitudes towards risk and the optimal exploitation of an
exhaustible resource},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {111-119},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1977},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(77)90035-3},
Abstract = {The exploitation of a nonrenewable natural resource, such as
petroleum or mineral ores, is analyzed in a stochastic
framework with price uncertainty. The market setting may be
either monopolistic or competitive. We demonstrate that the
rate of extraction varies directly with the resource owner's
willingness to accept risk. Rish-preferring owners use the
resource more rapidly than risk-neutral owners, who in turn
deplete the resource more rapidly than risk-averse owners.
It is also seen that the usual practice of increasing the
discount rate to account for risk induces a more rapid rate
of resource use, when in fact a slower rate of depletion is
desired. © 1977.},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(77)90035-3},
Key = {fds266942}
}
@article{fds266941,
Author = {Lewis, TR},
Title = {Monopoly exploitation of an exhaustible resource},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {198-204},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(76)90019-X},
Abstract = {The popular notion that a monopolist will exhaust a
nonrenewable natural resource at a slower than socially
optimal rate is examined. Contrary to the prevailing belief,
instances do exist for which the monopolist uses the
resource faster than the social maximizer. This is
demonstrated first by finding conditions for which the
expected result-a monopoly rate which is slower than
optimal-will always hold, and second, by showing that for
situations where these conditions are violated the result
may be reversed. © 1976.},
Doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(76)90019-X},
Key = {fds266941}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds357939,
Author = {Lewis, TR and Sappington, DM},
Title = {Procurement and quality monitoring},
Pages = {61-76},
Booktitle = {Incentives in Procurement Contracting},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0813385660},
Abstract = {There are a host of institutional problems that hinder the
government’s procurement of weapons systems. For example,
as Fox (1988) points out, interservice rivalry, the
uncertain funding environment, the short tenure of program
managers, limited continuity in Pentagon management, and
excessive congressional oversight of major weapons
acquisitions are all important obstacles to efficient
procurement policy.},
Key = {fds357939}
}
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