|
Journal Articles
- Ambrus, A, Coalitional rationalizability,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121 no. 3
(August, 2006),
pp. 903-929, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Takahashi, S, Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces,
Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 1
(March, 2008),
pp. 1-27, ISSN 1555-7561 [abs]
- Field, E; Ambrus, A, Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh,
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 116 no. 5
(October, 2008),
pp. 881-891, University of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-3808 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Weinstein, J, Price dispersion and loss leaders,
Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 4
(December, 2008),
pp. 525-537, ISSN 1555-7561 [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Argenziano, R, Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 1 no. 1
(February, 2009),
pp. 17-52, American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7669 [Gateway.cgi], [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A, Theories of coalitional rationality,
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144 no. 2
(March, 2009),
pp. 676-695, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0531 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Field, E; Torero, M, Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 125 no. 3
(August, 2010),
pp. 1349-1397, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Azevedo, E; Kamada, Y, Hierarchical cheap talk,
Accepted by Theoretical Economics, vol. 8 no. 1
(2011),
pp. 233-261, The Econometric Society [pdf], [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Pathak, P, Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95 no. 1-2
(2011),
pp. 500-512, Elsevier BV [pdf], [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Chaney, EJ; Salitskiy, I, Appendix for Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 116
(December, 2011)
- Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 130
(March, 2012),
pp. 29 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Rozen, K, Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid), vol. 125 no. 128
(May, 2012),
pp. 42 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Sandor, L; You, H, Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 122
(October, 2012),
pp. 13 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study,
American Economic Review, vol. 102 no. 7
(December, 2012),
pp. 3317-3332, American Economic Association, ISSN 0002-8282 [Gateway.cgi], [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y; Takagi, Y, Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 94
(2013),
pp. 103-115, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0167-2681 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility",
Econometrica, vol. 81 no. 5
(January, 2013),
pp. 2113-2124, The Econometric Society, ISSN 0012-9682 [Gateway.cgi], [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y; Burns, J, Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 129
(September, 2013),
pp. 59 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Pathak, P, How Individual Preferences Get Aggregated in Groups - An Experimental Study,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 158
(September, 2013),
pp. 37 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Mobius, M; Szeidl, A, Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks,
American Economic Review, vol. 104 no. 1
(January, 2014) [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Lu, SE, Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders,
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 88
(November, 2014),
pp. 174-189, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; En Lu, SE, A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7 no. 1
(January, 2015),
pp. 208-249, American Economic Association [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Ásgeirsdóttir, T; Noor, J; Sandor, L, Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 168
(March, 2015),
pp. 43 pages
- Ambrus, A; Asgeirsdottir, TL; Noor, J; Sándor, L, Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences',
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 169
(March, 2015) [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Chandrasekhar, AG; Elliott, M, Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 179
(March, 2015)
- Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y, On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 185
(March, 2015),
pp. 47 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 183
(August, 2015),
pp. 27 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 193
(September, 2015),
pp. 45 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise',
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 194
(September, 2015),
pp. 16 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Sastro, A, The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior Under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid), vol. 154 no. 199
(December, 2015),
pp. 66 pages, Elsevier BV [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid), vol. 171 no. 200
(December, 2015),
pp. 49 pages, Elsevier BV [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives',
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 201
(December, 2015),
pp. 21 pages [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Calvano, E; Reisinger, M, Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 8 no. 3
(August, 2016),
pp. 189-222, American Economic Association [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Chaney, E; Salitskiy, I, Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information,
Quantitative Economics, vol. 9 no. 1
(March, 2018),
pp. 217-246, The Econometric Society [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Zednik, A, The Effects of a ‘None of the Above’ Ballot Paper Option on Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes,
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 277
(March, 2019)
- Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 178
(October, 2019) [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Field, E; Gonzalez, R, Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease epidemic on the urban landscape,
American Economic Review, vol. 110 no. 2
(January, 2020),
pp. 475-525 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Elliott, M, Investments in social ties, risk sharing, and inequality,
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 88 no. 4
(July, 2021),
pp. 1624-1664, Oxford University Press [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Kolb, A, On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior,
Economic Theory, vol. 72 no. 2
(September, 2021),
pp. 445-472 [doi] [abs]
- Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 13 no. 4
(November, 2021),
pp. 373-419, American Economic Association [abs]
|