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Publications of Attila Ambrus    :recent first  by type listing:

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@article{fds325426,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and En Lu and SE},
   Title = {A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {208-249},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20100029},
   Abstract = {We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for
             coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at
             random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in
             Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating
             sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and
             (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE)
             that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time
             bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as
             the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely
             patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these
             limit payoffs achievable by varying recognition rates is
             exactly the core of the characteristic function.},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.20100029},
   Key = {fds325426}
}

@article{fds320208,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Baranovskyi, V and Kolb, A},
   Title = {A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {193},
   Pages = {45 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a
             coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and
             biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A
             principal with a diffuse prior, and only being able to
             ordinally compare the two proposals, has to choose one of
             them. The selected expert might receive a bonus payment. We
             show that having a second expert benefits the principal,
             even if the two experts have the same biases and the bonus
             of the winner is zero. In contrast with other models of
             expertise, in our setting the principal prefers experts with
             equal rather than opposite biases. Increasing the bonus
             brings experts closer to truthful reporting, but this only
             benefits the principal up to a threshold level, with further
             increases in the bonus strictly decreasing her payoffs. A
             methodological contribution of our paper is characterizing
             restrictions on the set of strategies which allows a formal
             generalization of ex ante expected payoffs to games with
             diffuse prior.},
   Key = {fds320208}
}

@article{fds359729,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Baranovskyi, V and Kolb, A},
   Title = {A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {373-419},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {November},
   Abstract = {We investigate information aggregation and competition in a
             delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to
             perform a task herself and must choose between one of two
             biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal
             equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating
             an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second
             expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more
             biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from
             commitment to an "element of surprise" and prefers experts
             with equal rather than opposite biases.},
   Key = {fds359729}
}

@article{fds237850,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Lu, SE},
   Title = {Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed
             senders},
   Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
   Volume = {88},
   Pages = {174-189},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {0899-8256},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001},
   Abstract = {We show that in multi-sender communication games where
             senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is
             large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily
             close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the
             senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement
             noise, where the senders observe the true state with high
             probability, we show this under mild assumptions, for both
             unbounded and large bounded state spaces. In the case of
             continuous noise, where senders observe a signal distributed
             continuously over a small interval around the true state, we
             establish this for unbounded state spaces. The results imply
             that when there are multiple experts from whom to solicit
             information, if the state space is large, then even when the
             state is observed imperfectly, there are communication
             equilibria that are strictly better for the principal than
             delegating the decision right to one of the
             experts.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001},
   Key = {fds237850}
}

@article{fds325429,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Chaney, EJ and Salitskiy, I},
   Title = {Appendix for Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical
             Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction
             Costs},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working
             Paper},
   Number = {116},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds325429}
}

@article{fds237860,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Argenziano, R},
   Title = {Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {17-52},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {1945-7669},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000284507300002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {This paper investigates pricing decisions and network
             choices in twosided markets with network externalities.
             Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the
             externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of
             coordination failure among consumers generates clear
             qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market
             configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in
             equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network
             provider and in the case of competing providers. These
             equilibria have the property that one network is cheaper and
             larger on one side, while the other network is cheaper and
             larger on the other side. Product differentiation is
             endogenized by consumers' network choices.},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.1.1.17},
   Key = {fds237860}
}

@article{fds237863,
   Author = {Ambrus, A},
   Title = {Coalitional rationalizability},
   Journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
   Volume = {121},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {903-929},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0033-5533},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.3.903},
   Abstract = {This paper investigates how groups or coalitions of players
             can act in their collective interest in noncooperative
             normal form games even if equilibrium play is not assumed.
             The main idea is that each member of a coalition will
             confine play to a subset of their strategies if it is in
             their mutual interest to do so. An iterative procedure of
             restrictions is used to define a noncooperative solution
             concept, the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies.
             The procedure is analogous to iterative deletion of never
             best response strategies, but operates on implicit
             agreements by different coalitions. The solution set is a
             nonempty subset of the rationalizable strategies. © 2006 by
             the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
             Massachusetts Institute of Technology.},
   Doi = {10.1162/qjec.121.3.903},
   Key = {fds237863}
}

@article{fds237851,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Egorov, G},
   Title = {Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility"},
   Journal = {Econometrica},
   Volume = {81},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {2113-2124},
   Publisher = {The Econometric Society},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0012-9682},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000325084100012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {This comment corrects two results in the 2006 Econometrica
             paper by Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (AWA), that features
             a model in which individuals face a trade-off between
             flexibility and commitment. First, in contrast to
             Proposition 1 in AWA, we show that money-burning can be part
             of the ex ante optimal contract when there are two states.
             Second, in contrast to Proposition 2 in AWA, we show that
             money-burning can be imposed at the top (in the highest
             liquidity shock state), even when there is a continuum of
             states. We provide corrected versions of the above results.
             © 2013 The Econometric Society.},
   Doi = {10.3982/ECTA10739},
   Key = {fds237851}
}

@article{fds320220,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Egorov, G},
   Title = {Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal
             Penalties},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {130},
   Pages = {29 pages},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {March},
   Abstract = {Withdrawal penalties are common features of time deposit
             contracts offered by commercial banks, as well as individual
             retirement accounts and employer-sponsored plans. Moreover,
             there is a significant amount of early withdrawals from
             these accounts, despite the associated penalties, and
             empirical evidence shows that liquidity shocks of depositors
             are a major driving force of this. Using the
             consumption-savings model proposed by Amador, Werning and
             Angeletos in their 2006 Econometrica paper (henceforth AWA),
             in which individuals face the trade-off between flexibility
             and commitment, we show that withdrawal penalties can be
             part of the optimal contract, despite involving
             money-burning from an ex ante perspective. For the case of
             two states (which we interpret as “normal times” and a
             “negative liquidity shock”), we provide a full
             characterization of the optimal contract, and show that
             within the parameter region where the first best is
             unattainable, the likelihood that withdrawal penalties are
             part of the optimal contract is decreasing in the
             probability of a negative liquidity shock, increasing in the
             severity of the shock, and it is nonmonotonic in the
             magnitude of present bias. We also show that contracts with
             the same qualitative feature (withdrawal penalties for high
             types) arise in continuous state spaces, too. Our
             conclusions differ from AWA because the analysis in the
             latter implicitly assumes that the optimal contract is
             interior (the amount withdrawn from the savings account is
             strictly positive in each period in every state). We show
             that for any utility function consistent with their
             framework there is an open set of parameter values for which
             the optimal contract is a corner solution, inducing money
             burning in some states.},
   Key = {fds320220}
}

@article{fds320214,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Ásgeirsdóttir, T and Noor, J and Sandor,
             L},
   Title = {Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the
             Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {168},
   Pages = {43 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds320214}
}

@article{fds325428,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Mobius, M and Szeidl, A},
   Title = {Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {104},
   Number = {1},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {We develop a model in which connections between individuals
             serve as social collateral to enforce informal insurance
             payments. We show that: (i) The degree of insurance is
             governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured with
             the per capita number of connections that groups have with
             the rest of the community. "Two-dimensional" networks?like
             real-world networks in Peruvian villages?are sufficiently
             expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. (ii) In second-
             best arrangements, insurance is local: agents fully share
             shocks within, but imperfectly between endogenously emerging
             risk-sharing groups. We also discuss how endogenous social
             collateral affects our results.},
   Key = {fds325428}
}

@article{fds237856,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Pathak, P},
   Title = {Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and
             experiments},
   Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
   Volume = {95},
   Number = {1-2},
   Pages = {500-512},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2011},
   url = {http://public.econ.duke.edu/~aa231/public_good090510_ALL.pdf},
   Abstract = {This paper shows that the presence of different types of
             players - those who only care about their own material
             payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions -
             can explain the robust features of observed contribution
             patterns in public good contribution games, even without the
             presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions
             on reciprocity are sufficient for a unique perfect
             equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under
             these conditions, selfish players have enough future
             benefits to induce subsequent contributions by reciprocal
             players, and this incentive diminishes as the end of the
             game approaches. The model explains the puzzling restart
             effect and is consistent with various other empirical
             findings. We also report the results of a series of
             experiments, using a probabilistic continuation design in
             which after each set of 10-period games, the group is
             restarted with low probability. We find specific support for
             the theory in our data, including that selfish players
             (identified exogenously) stop contributing earlier than
             reciprocal players, as directly implied by the model. ©
             2010 Elsevier B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016},
   Key = {fds237856}
}

@article{fds320205,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Egorov, G},
   Title = {Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Volume = {171},
   Number = {200},
   Pages = {49 pages},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002},
   Abstract = {In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party
             but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may
             be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading
             example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee
             relationship. We study a model of delegation with an
             informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning
             on the agent as a function of the agent’s choice of
             action, and show that money-burning may be part of the
             optimal contract. This result holds even if
             action-contingent monetary transfers are possible, as long
             as transfers from the principal to the agent are bounded
             from below (as in limited liability or minimal wage
             requirements). In fact, the optimal contract can involve a
             combination of both efficient monetary incentives and
             inefficient nonmonetary incentives through money burning.
             Our model delivers some results novel to the delegation
             literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the
             principal is more sensitive to the choice of action than the
             agent. This is consistent with the perception that there is
             more bureaucratization in large organizations. Second,
             money-burning is more likely if the agent’s limited
             liability constraint is tighter relative to his
             participation constraint. This implies that a higher minimum
             wage distorts employment contracts towards using socially
             wasteful nonmonetary incentives, leading to a Pareto
             inferior outcome as the agent is still held down to his
             reservation value through increased money
             burning.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002},
   Key = {fds320205}
}

@article{fds320210,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B},
   Title = {Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and
             Imperfect Observability},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {183},
   Pages = {27 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {August},
   Abstract = {In the context of repeated public good contribution games,
             we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic
             punishment, when members of a group decide by majority
             voting whether to inflict punishment on another member,
             relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic
             punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average
             payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of
             contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment
             and thereby establishing a closer connection between a
             member’s contribution decision and whether subsequently
             being punished by others. We also find that participating in
             a democratic punishment procedure makes even
             non-contributors’ punishment intentions more
             pro-social.},
   Key = {fds320210}
}

@article{fds237859,
   Author = {Field, E and Ambrus, A},
   Title = {Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling
             attainment in Bangladesh},
   Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
   Volume = {116},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {881-891},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0022-3808},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/593333},
   Abstract = {Using data from rural Bangladesh, we explore the hypothesis
             that women attain less schooling as a result of social and
             financial pressure to marry young. We isolate the causal
             effect of marriage timing using age of menarche as an
             instrumental variable. Our results indicate that each
             additional year that marriage is delayed is associated with
             0.22 additional year of schooling and 5.6 percent higher
             literacy. Delayed marriage is also associated with an
             increase in use of preventive health services. In the
             context of competitive marriage markets, we use the above
             results to obtain estimates of the change in equilibrium
             female education that would arise from introducing age of
             consent laws. © 2008 by The University of Chicago. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1086/593333},
   Key = {fds237859}
}

@article{fds318150,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Calvano, E and Reisinger, M},
   Title = {Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of
             Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {189-222},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150019},
   Abstract = {In media markets, consumers spread their attention to
             several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates
             online. The traditional framework for competition among
             media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We
             propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple
             outlets and use it to study the effects on advertising
             levels and the impact of entry and mergers. We identify
             novel forces which reflect outlets' incentives to control
             the composition of their customer base. We link consumer
             preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes.
             The model can explain several empirical regularities that
             are difficult to reconcile with existing
             models.},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.20150019},
   Key = {fds318150}
}

@article{fds320216,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Ishii, Y and Burns, J},
   Title = {Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {129},
   Pages = {59 pages},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if
             bidders can only place bids at random times, then many di
             fferent equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite
             the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria can involve
             gradual bidding, periods of inactivity, and waiting to start
             bidding towards the end of the auction - bidding behaviors
             common on eBay. Bidders in such equilibria implicitly
             collude to keep the increase of the winning price slow over
             the duration of the auction. In a common value environment,
             we characterize a class of equilibria that include the one
             in which bidding at any price is maximally delayed, and all
             bids minimally increment the price. The seller's revenue can
             be a small fraction of what could be obtained at a
             sealed-bid second-price auction, and in the worst
             equilibrium it is decreasing in the value of the object.
             With many bidders, we show that this equilibrium has the
             feature that bidders are passive until near the end of the
             auction, and then they start bidding incrementally.},
   Key = {fds320216}
}

@article{fds237854,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Azevedo, E and Kamada, Y},
   Title = {Hierarchical cheap talk},
   Journal = {Accepted by Theoretical Economics},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {233-261},
   Publisher = {The Econometric Society},
   Year = {2011},
   url = {http://public.econ.duke.edu/~aa231/hierarch_final04.pdf},
   Abstract = {We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to
             each other only through a chain of intermediators, for
             example, because they have to obey institutionalized
             communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the
             communication are strategic and might want to influence the
             action taken by the final receiver. The set of pure strategy
             equilibrium outcomes is simple to characterize, is monotonic
             in each intermediator's bias, and does not depend on the
             order of intermediators; intermediation in these equilibria
             cannot improve information transmission. However, none of
             these conclusions holds for mixed equilibria. We provide a
             partial characterization of mixed equilibria, and offer an
             economically relevant sufficient condition for every
             equilibrium to be outcome-equivalent to a pure equilibrium
             and hence for the simple characterization and comparative
             statics results to hold for the set of all equilibria. ©
             2013 Attila Ambrus, Eduardo M. Azevedo, and Yuichiro
             Kamada.},
   Doi = {10.3982/TE1038},
   Key = {fds237854}
}

@article{fds320215,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B and Pathak, P},
   Title = {How Individual Preferences Get Aggregated in Groups - An
             Experimental Study},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {158},
   Pages = {37 pages},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {This paper experimentally investigates how individual
             preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, get
             aggregated into a group decision in two contexts:
             reciprocating gifts, and choosing between lotteries. In both
             contexts we find that median group members have a
             significant impact on the group decision, but particular
             other members also have some influence. Non-median members
             closer to the median tend to have more influence than other
             members. By investigating the same individual’s influence
             in different groups, we find evidence for relative position
             in the group having a direct effect on influence. We do not
             find evidence that group choice exhibits a shift in a
             particular direction that is independent of member
             preferences and caused by the group decision context itself.
             We also find that group deliberation not only involves
             bargaining and compromise, but it also involves persuasion:
             preferences tend to shift towards the choice of the
             individual’s previous group, especially for those with
             extreme individual preferences.},
   Key = {fds320215}
}

@article{fds237855,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B},
   Title = {Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An
             experimental study},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {102},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {3317-3332},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000312093000007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a
             costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare
             in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games.
             In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity
             of the potential punishment monotonically increases average
             net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring
             environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a
             standard punishment technology in this setting significantly
             decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a
             severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same
             payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of
             increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing.
             Copyright © 2012 by the American Economic
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.102.7.3317},
   Key = {fds237855}
}

@article{fds346383,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B},
   Title = {Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public
             good games with perfect and imperfect observability},
   Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
   Volume = {178},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053},
   Abstract = {In the context of repeated public good contribution games,
             we experimentally compare the institution of democratic
             punishment, where members of a group decide by majority
             voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with
             individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment
             institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more
             cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect
             and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison with
             dictatorial punishment suggests that the effect relative to
             traditional peer-to-peer punishment primarily works by
             curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a
             closer connection between a member's contribution decision
             and whether subsequently being punished by
             others.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053},
   Key = {fds346383}
}

@article{fds357650,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Elliott, M},
   Title = {Investments in social ties, risk sharing, and
             inequality},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
   Volume = {88},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1624-1664},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {July},
   Abstract = {This article investigates stable and efficient networks in
             the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish
             and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We
             find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: the
             most stable efficient networks also generate the most
             inequality. We then suppose that individuals can be split
             into groups, assuming that incomes across groups are less
             correlated than within a group but relationships across
             groups are more costly to form. The tension between
             efficiency and equality extends to these correlated income
             structures. More-central agents have stronger incentives to
             form across-group links, reaffirming the efficiency benefits
             of having highly central agents. Our results are robust to
             many extensions. In general, endogenously formed networks in
             the risk-sharing context tend to exhibit highly asymmetric
             structures, which can lead to stark inequalities in
             consumption levels.},
   Key = {fds357650}
}

@article{fds237852,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Azevedo, EM and Kamada, Y and Takagi,
             Y},
   Title = {Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
   Volume = {94},
   Pages = {103-115},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2013},
   ISSN = {0167-2681},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003},
   Abstract = {This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making,
             in which information must be collected from a strategic
             lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to
             communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and
             determines whether the proposal is processed under open or
             closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be
             optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee
             and, depending on the lobbyist's bias, both open and closed
             rule are used in equilibrium. For small lobbyist bias, it is
             optimal to choose closed rule and a committee whose
             interests are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist's. For
             intermediate lobbyist bias, closed rule remains optimal with
             a committee whose preferences lie between those of the
             legislature and those of the lobbyist. For large lobbyist
             bias, open rule and a committee biased against the lobbyist
             become optimal. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003},
   Key = {fds237852}
}

@article{fds352348,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Field, E and Gonzalez, R},
   Title = {Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease
             epidemic on the urban landscape},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {110},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {475-525},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190759},
   Abstract = {How do geographically concentrated income shocks influence
             the long-run spatial distribution of poverty within a city?
             We examine the impact on housing prices of a cholera
             epidemic in one neighborhood of nineteenth century London.
             Ten years after the epidemic, housing prices are
             significantly lower just inside the catchment area of the
             water pump that transmitted the disease. Moreover,
             differences in housing prices persist over the following 160
             years. We make sense of these patterns by building a model
             of a rental market with frictions in which poor tenants
             exert a negative externality on their neighbors. This
             showcases how a locally concentrated income shock can
             persistently change the tenant composition of a
             block.},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.20190759},
   Key = {fds352348}
}

@article{fds237862,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Takahashi, S},
   Title = {Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state
             spaces},
   Journal = {Theoretical Economics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-27},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {1555-7561},
   Abstract = {This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state
             space might be restricted, either because the policy space
             is restricted or the set of rationalizable policies of the
             receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and
             sufficient condition for the existence of a fully-revealing
             perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any state space. We show
             that if biases are large enough and are not in similar
             directions, where the notion of similarity depends on the
             shape of the state space, then there is no fully-revealing
             perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The results suggest that
             boundedness, as opposed to dimensionality, of the state
             space plays an important role in determining the qualitative
             implications of a cheap talk model. We also investigate
             equilibria that satisfy a robustness property diagonal
             continuity. Copyright © 2008 Attila Ambrus and Satoru
             Takahashi.},
   Key = {fds237862}
}

@article{fds237857,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Field, E and Torero, M},
   Title = {Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence
             of dowry in Bangladesh},
   Journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
   Volume = {125},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {1349-1397},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0033-5533},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1349},
   Abstract = {We explain trends in dowry levels in Bangladesh by drawing
             attention to an institutional feature of marriage contracts
             previously ignored in the literature: mehr or traditional
             Islamic bride-price. We develop a model of marriage
             contracts in which mehr serves as a barrier to husbands
             exiting marriage and a component of dowry as an amount that
             ex ante compensates the groom for the cost of mehr. We
             investigate how mehr and dowry respond to exogenous changes
             in the costs of polygamy and divorce, and show that our
             model gives a different set of predictions than traditional
             models. We show that major changes in dowry levels took
             place precisely after the legal changes, corresponding to
             simultaneous changes in levels of mehr. © 2010 by the
             President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
             Massachusetts Institute of Technology.},
   Doi = {10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1349},
   Key = {fds237857}
}

@article{fds320211,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Ishii, Y},
   Title = {On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {185},
   Pages = {47 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {March},
   Abstract = {This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a
             unique prediction in coordination games, in an
             infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on
             off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive
             necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately
             being absorbed in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of
             the stage game, for every Markov perfect equilibrium. For
             players patient enough, the condition is that the Pareto
             dominant Nash equilibrium is also risk dominant, but for
             lower levels of patience the condition departs from simple
             risk-dominance. For general n-player symmetric games with
             patient players, we show that a necessary and sufficient
             condition for the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium to be the
             unique limit outcome in all symmetric Markov perfect
             equilibrium is a particular generalization of risk-dominance
             for more than two players. We provide extensions to the
             unique selection results to all subgame perfect Nash
             equilibria, and to coordination games in which different
             players prefer different Nash equilibria of the stage
             game.},
   Key = {fds320211}
}

@article{fds326998,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Kolb, A},
   Title = {On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse
             prior},
   Journal = {Economic Theory},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {445-472},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01292-y},
   Abstract = {While the diffuse prior has been widely used in applied
             economic theory for its technical convenience and as a way
             of modeling complete lack of knowledge, it is not formally
             defined, nor are ex ante payoffs in games under this prior.
             In this paper, we provide a formal treatment of the diffuse
             prior which can validate its application in games. We
             consider stationary games, in which players’ signals are
             translation invariant in the true state and players’
             payoffs are translation invariant in actions together with
             the state. We show that strategies which admit well-defined
             expected payoffs under the diffuse prior are essentially
             stationary, being almost translation invariant in signals.
             Our analysis builds on two formal definitions. We define the
             diffuse prior through a limit construction, using sequences
             of well-defined priors that become increasingly dispersed. A
             class of strategy profiles is admissible if for any strategy
             profile, each player’s ex ante payoff along these
             sequences converges to a limit that does not depend on the
             particular sequence. A secondary contribution of the paper
             is an extension of the concept of distributional strategies
             (Milgrom and Weber in Math Oper Res 10:619–632, 1985) to a
             class of multistage games.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s00199-020-01292-y},
   Key = {fds326998}
}

@article{fds325427,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Chaney, E and Salitskiy, I},
   Title = {Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of
             bargaining with asymmetric information},
   Journal = {Quantitative Economics},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {217-246},
   Publisher = {The Econometric Society},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/QE655},
   Abstract = {We investigate the effect of delay on prices in bargaining
             situations using a data set containing thousands of captives
             ransomed from Barbary pirates between 1575 and 1692.
             Plausibly exogenous variation in the delay in ransoming
             provides evidence that negotiating delays decreased the size
             of ransom payments, and that much of the effect stems from
             the signalling value of strategic delay, in accordance with
             theoretical predictions. We also structurally estimate a
             version of the screening type bargaining model, adjusted to
             our context, and find that the model fits both the observed
             prices and acceptance probabilities well.},
   Doi = {10.3982/QE655},
   Key = {fds325427}
}

@article{fds237858,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Weinstein, J},
   Title = {Price dispersion and loss leaders},
   Journal = {Theoretical Economics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {525-537},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {1555-7561},
   Abstract = {Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is
             inconsistent with the standard model of price competition
             among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will
             be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such
             dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a
             firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher
             customer volume for profitable goods. By assuming each
             consumer is forced to buy all desired goods at a single
             firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader
             strategy. We find that such a strategy cannot occur in
             equilibrium if individual demands are inelastic, or if
             demands are diversely distributed. We further show that
             equilibrium loss leaders can occur (and can result in
             positive profits) if there are demand complementarities, but
             only with delicate relationships among the preferences of
             all consumers. Copyright © 2008 Attila Ambrus and Jonathan
             Weinstein.},
   Key = {fds237858}
}

@article{fds320219,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Rozen, K},
   Title = {Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Volume = {125},
   Number = {128},
   Pages = {42 pages},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {May},
   Abstract = {This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making
             models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In
             this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation
             of a collection of utility functions, where the aggregation
             procedure satisfies some simple properties. We propose a
             method for characterizing the extent of irrationality in a
             choice behavior, and use this measure to provide a lower
             bound on the set of choice behaviors that can be
             rationalized with n utility functions. Under an additional
             assumption (scale-invariance), we show that generically at
             most five "reasons" are needed for every
             "mistake."},
   Key = {fds320219}
}

@article{fds325425,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Chandrasekhar, AG and Elliott, M},
   Title = {Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and
             Inequality},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working
             Paper},
   Number = {179},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds325425}
}

@article{fds320213,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Asgeirsdottir, TL and Noor, J and Sándor,
             L},
   Title = {Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment
             on the Influence of Expected Income on Time
             Preferences'},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working
             Paper},
   Number = {169},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {March},
   Abstract = {This Supplementary Appendix contains the English
             translations of the experimental questionnaire, survey
             questions, and instructions that were used in our
             experimental sessions on June 9th and 10th of 2010. For the
             original Icelandic language documents, please contact the
             authors. The paper 'Compensated Discount Functions - An
             Experiment on Integrating Rewards with Expected Income' to
             which this Supplement applies is available at the following
             URL: <a href=http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446602>http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446602</a>},
   Key = {fds320213}
}

@article{fds320209,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Baranovskyi, V and Kolb, A},
   Title = {Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of
             Expertise'},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {194},
   Pages = {16 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {September},
   Abstract = {This supplement provides welfare results not contained in
             the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a
             mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a downward
             equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large bonuses,
             we find a unique candidate for mixed equilibrium and show
             that mixed and upward equilibria cannot co-exist. Also, we
             give an example for equal biases, where this candidate is
             indeed a mixed equilibrium. However, when biases are
             different enough and the bonus is high, a mixed equilibrium
             does not exist. Though a general analytical comparison is
             infeasible, we show that mixed equilibria are inferior to
             upward equilibrium or simple delegation in various special
             cases.},
   Key = {fds320209}
}

@article{fds320206,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Egorov, G},
   Title = {Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary
             Incentives'},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {201},
   Pages = {21 pages},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary
             Incentives."},
   Key = {fds320206}
}

@article{fds320218,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Sandor, L and You, H},
   Title = {Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence
             from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary
             Appendix},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Number = {122},
   Pages = {13 pages},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {October},
   Abstract = {Supplementary Appendix to Testing an Informational Theory of
             Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of
             Representatives.},
   Key = {fds320218}
}

@article{fds320207,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B and Sastro, A},
   Title = {The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior Under Asymmetric
             Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting
             Systems},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid)},
   Volume = {154},
   Number = {199},
   Pages = {66 pages},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.006},
   Abstract = {We experimentally study the impact of adding an explicit nil
             vote option to the ballot in both compulsory and voluntary
             voting settings. We investigate this issue in an
             informational voting setting, in which some voters are
             uninformed and face the swing voter’s curse, implying that
             they can only affect the expected election outcome
             adversely. We generate predictions using a simple model of
             strategic voting in which some voters receive a
             psychological benefit (along the lines of Riker and
             Ordeshook (1968)) from choosing an action that they consider
             a legitimate participation in the election. We test our
             model in a double-blind pen-and-paper laboratory experiment,
             and find that the main comparative predictions of the model
             hold in the data, particularly strongly for compulsory
             voting. In particular, both under compulsory and voluntary
             voting, introducing a nil vote option reduces the number of
             uninformed voters casting a vote for a candidate, increasing
             voters’ expected welfare. Additionally, it eradicates
             strategic invalid votes under compulsory
             voting.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.006},
   Key = {fds320207}
}

@article{fds343589,
   Author = {Ambrus, A and Greiner, B and Zednik, A},
   Title = {The Effects of a ‘None of the Above’ Ballot Paper Option
             on Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes},
   Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working
             Paper},
   Number = {277},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds343589}
}

@article{fds237861,
   Author = {Ambrus, A},
   Title = {Theories of coalitional rationality},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {144},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {676-695},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {0022-0531},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010},
   Abstract = {This paper generalizes the concept of best response to
             coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of
             coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The
             (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator
             from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy
             is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is
             consistent with rationality and common certainty that every
             coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution
             set is provided for operators satisfying four basic
             properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that
             leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent
             to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional
             rationalizability. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010},
   Key = {fds237861}
}


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