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Publications of Rachel Kranton    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
   Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work,
             Wages, and Well-Being},
   Pages = {1-185},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780691152554},
   Abstract = {Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new
             way to understand human behavior, revealing how our
             identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our
             decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future
             Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that
             his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was
             the missing element that would help to explain why
             people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make
             different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year
             collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors
             explain how our conception of who we are and who we want to
             be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor,
             affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and
             save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's
             decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can
             better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or
             don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some
             cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much,
             much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the
             social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics.
             People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden,
             and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how
             they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their
             conception of who they are, and of who they choose to
             be--may be the most important factor affecting their
             economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's
             identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic
   Key = {fds238421}

%% Papers Submitted   
   Author = {Bloch, F and Demange, G and Kranton, R},
   Pages = {421-448},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This article studies the transmission of rumors in social
             networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased
             agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision
             and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent
             learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors,
             who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We
             characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game,
             show that the social network can act as a filter, and that
             biased agents may have an incentive to limit their
   Doi = {10.1111/iere.12275},
   Key = {fds337046}

%% Journal Articles   
   Author = {Lee, VK and Kranton, RE and Conzo, P and Huettel,
   Title = {The hidden cost of humanization: Individuating information
             reduces prosocial behavior toward in-group
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
   Volume = {86},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {October},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This paper reports robust experimental evidence that
             humanization—in the form of individuating information
             about another's personal preferences—leads to decreased
             prosocial behavior toward in-group members. Previous
             research shows that individuating information increases
             prosocial behavior toward dehumanized out-group members. Its
             consequences for in-group members, however, are less well
             understood. Using methods from social psychology and
             behavioral economics, four experiments show that
             individuating information decreases pro-social behavior
             toward in-group members in a variety of settings (charitable
             giving, altruistic punishment, and trust games). Moreover,
             this effect results from decreased reliance on group
             membership labels, and not from other potential explanations
             like the induction of new group identities. Understanding
             these effects sheds light on the motives behind intergroup
             conflict, which may not result from a difference in social
             perception (i.e., humanized in-groups and dehumanized
             out-groups), but rather from biases associated with group
             membership (i.e., in-group favoritism and out-group
             discrimination) that are eliminated by individuating
             information. Together, these results indicate that
             humanization carries a hidden cost for in-group members by
             disrupting group identities that would otherwise make them
             targets of altruistic actions.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2021.102424},
   Key = {fds358746}

   Author = {Khaw, MW and Kranton, R and Huettel, S},
   Title = {Oversampling of minority categories drives misperceptions of
             group compositions.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {214},
   Pages = {104756},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {September},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {The ability to estimate proportions informs our immediate
             impressions of social environments (e.g., of the diversity
             of races or genders within a crowded room). This study
             examines how the distribution of attention during brief
             glances shapes estimates of group gender proportions.
             Performance-wise, subjects exhibit a canonical pattern of
             judgment errors: small proportions are overestimated while
             large values are underestimated. Subjects' eye movements at
             sub-second timescales reveal that these biases follow from a
             tendency to visually oversample members of the gender
             minority. Rates of oversampling dovetail with average levels
             of error magnitudes, response variability, and response
             times. Visual biases are thus associated with the inherent
             difficulty in estimating particular proportions. All results
             are replicated at a within-subjects level with non-human
             ensembles using natural scene stimuli; the observed
             attentional patterns and judgment biases are thus not
             exclusively guided by face-specific visual properties. Our
             results reveal the biased distribution of attention
             underlying typical judgment errors of group
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104756},
   Key = {fds356402}

   Author = {Kranton, R and Pease, M and Sanders, S and Huettel,
   Title = {Deconstructing bias in social preferences reveals groupy and
             not-groupy behavior.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {117},
   Number = {35},
   Pages = {21185-21193},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {September},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Group divisions are a continual feature of human history,
             with biases toward people's own groups shown in both
             experimental and natural settings. Using a within-subject
             design, this paper deconstructs group biases to find
             significant and robust individual differences; some
             individuals consistently respond to group divisions, while
             others do not. We examined individual behavior in two
             treatments in which subjects make pairwise decisions that
             determine own and others' incomes. In a political treatment,
             which divided subjects into groups based on their political
             leanings, political party members showed more in-group bias
             than Independents who professed the same political opinions.
             However, this greater bias was also present in a minimal
             group treatment, showing that stronger group identification
             was not the driver of higher favoritism in the political
             setting. Analyzing individual choices across the experiment,
             we categorize participants as "groupy" or "not groupy," such
             that groupy participants have social preferences that change
             for in-group and out-group recipients, while not-groupy
             participants' preferences do not change across group
             context. Demonstrating further that the group identity of
             the recipient mattered less to their choices, strongly
             not-groupy subjects made allocation decisions faster. We
             conclude that observed in-group biases build on a foundation
             of heterogeneity in individual groupiness.},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1918952117},
   Key = {fds351432}

   Author = {Amasino, DR and Sullivan, NJ and Kranton, RE and Huettel,
   Title = {Amount and time exert independent influences on
             intertemporal choice.},
   Journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {383-392},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Intertemporal choices involve trade-offs between the value
             of rewards and the delay before those rewards are
             experienced. Canonical intertemporal choice models such as
             hyperbolic discounting assume that reward amount and time
             until delivery are integrated within each option prior to
             comparison<sup>1,2</sup>. An alternative view posits that
             intertemporal choice reflects attribute-wise processes in
             which amount and time attributes are compared
             separately<sup>3-6</sup>. Here, we use multi-attribute drift
             diffusion modelling (DDM) to show that attribute-wise
             comparison represents the choice process better than
             option-wise comparison for intertemporal choice in a young
             adult population. We find that, while accumulation rates for
             amount and time information are uncorrelated, the difference
             between those rates predicts individual differences in
             patience. Moreover, patient individuals incorporate amount
             earlier than time into the decision process. Using eye
             tracking, we link these modelling results to attention,
             showing that patience results from a rapid, attribute-wise
             process that prioritizes amount over time information. Thus,
             we find converging evidence that distinct evaluation
             processes for amount and time determine intertemporal
             financial choices. Because intertemporal decisions in the
             lab have been linked to failures of patience ranging from
             insufficient saving to addiction<sup>7-13</sup>,
             understanding individual differences in the choice process
             is important for developing more effective
   Doi = {10.1038/s41562-019-0537-2},
   Key = {fds341870}

   Author = {Kranton, R},
   Title = {The devil is in the details: Implications of Samuel
             bowles’s the moral economy for economics and policy
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {147-160},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {All economists should buy and read The Moral Economy by
             Samuel Bowles. The book challenges basic premises of
             economic theory and questions policies based on monetary
             incentives. Incentives not only crowd out intrinsic
             motivations, they Erode the ethical and moral codes
             necessary for the workings of markets. Bowles boldly
             suggests that successful policies must combine incentives
             and moral messages, exploiting complementarities between the
             two. This essay argues that to achieve this objective,
             economists must study the local institutions and social
             context and engage untraditional data to uncover the
             interplay of incentives and identity.},
   Doi = {10.1257/jel.20171463},
   Key = {fds343586}

   Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Manea, M and Stoddard,
   Title = {Social status in networks},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-30},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {We study social comparisons and status seeking in an
             interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that
             have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new
             measure of interconnectedness- cohesion-captures the
             intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria
             stratify players into social classes, with each class's
             action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition
             algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient)
             equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally cohesive set
             form the highest class. Alternatively, players not belonging
             to sets more cohesive than the set of all nodes constitute
             the lowest class. Intermediate classes are identified by
             iterating a cohesion operator. We also characterize networks
             that accommodate multiple- class equilibria. (JEL D11, D85,
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.20160082},
   Key = {fds325259}

   Author = {Harris, L and Lee, VK and Thompson, EH and Kranton,
   Title = {Exploring the Generalization Process from Past Behavior to
             Predicting Future Behavior},
   Journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {419-436},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0894-3257},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Substantial evidence in social psychology documents that
             traits predict behavior. Research in behavioral economics
             establishes prior behavioral information—the actual
             behavior of another person in the past—influences future
             decision making, suggestive of the role of traits in guiding
             future behavior, but agnostic to the specific psychological
             mechanism. Yet the entire generalization process from past
             behavior to predicting future behavior has not been fully
             explored. Additionally, previous paradigms do not adequately
             dissociate prediction from explanation, and provide
             participants with trait information, or rely on participants
             to generate the appropriate trait. Here, we combine
             literature and experimental approaches in social psychology
             and behavioral economics to explore the generalization
             process from prior behavior that guides future decisions.
             Across three studies utilizing consequential economic game
             paradigms and online questionnaires, an initial group of
             participants (employees) played a time estimation game and a
             charity donations game before a second group of participants
             (employers) viewed the behavior of the first group, then
             decided whether to invest in employees in a trust game and
             rock guessing game. Although participants infer trait warmth
             and competence from the behavioral information in the first
             two games, estimates of normative behavior predicted
             investment decisions on the warmth-relevant games better
             than trait inferences. These results dissociate
             generalizations guided by warmth and competence behavioral
             information, and question the extent to which traits always
             serve as heuristics to predict behavior. Copyright © 2015
             John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1002/bdm.1889},
   Key = {fds238420}

   Author = {Bramoull, Y and Kranton, R and D'Amours, M},
   Title = {Strategic Interaction and Networks},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {104},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {898-930},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {March},
   Abstract = {Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In
             industries, schools, and markets, the entire network
             determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of
             games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a
             single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is
             the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue
             to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the
             network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new
             tools?potential games, optimization, and spectral graph
             theory?to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and
             applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of
             peer effects.},
   Key = {fds325260}

   Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Stoddard, G},
   Title = {Striving for social status},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic
   Pages = {672},
   Publisher = {ACM Press},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {July},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Social comparisons can influence individual decisions.
             People compare their income and their belongings to those of
             people around them. Prominent scholars, such as Frank
             [1985], argue that increasing inequality has led to
             excessive spending, as people try to emulate and compete
             with the rich. This process accelerates as more people are
             exposed to the lives of the rich and what they consume. We
             study social comparisons and striving for status in a
             network context, focusing on how the status considerations
             and network structure influences individual outcomes and
             aggregate consumption of goods. We study this phenomenon in
             a model where agents choose a level of consumption for a
             good with status implications, like cars or designer
             clothing. Agents have a linear value for the good and a
             convex cost of consumption. Additionally, adopting the model
             of Stark andWang [2005], we assume agents suffer a status
             loss as they compare to themselves to those with higher
             consumption in their peer group. Letting e i represent the
             consumption level of agent i, then i suffers a loss equal to
             β x max{e j - e i, 0}/|N i| + 1 for each agent j in N i,
             i's neighborhood in the network. β parameterizes an agent's
             concern for status. Our primary objective is to solve for
             and analyze the Nash equilibria. We find that the
             best-response function is isotone in the lattice structure
             induced by consumption profiles, and so the equilibria of
             our game form a non-empty complete lattice. Furthermore,
             sequential best-response dynamics from either the min or max
             consumption profiles converges in polynomial time to either
             the min-consuming or max-consuming equilibrium. We then
             study how the consumption and welfare of equilibria change
             with respect to status considerations. We find that
             consumption at both the minimum-consuming and
             maximum-consuming equilibria increases with status
             considerations whereas welfare decreases, indicating that
             external organizations like luxury good retailers have
             incentives to perpetuate the perception of their goods as
             status symbols. Welfare, on the other hand, decreases with
             status concerns. Starting from any equilibrium and
             increasing status concerns causes agents to converge to a
             new equilibrium (via best-response dynamics) in which every
             agent has (weakly) lower welfare. This supports the
             intuition that attempts to "keep up with the Joneses" cause
             agents to over-spend. This happens for all agents, even
             those that don't know the Joneses, demonstrating the
             spillover effects of the network. We conclude with a study
             of the network effect on consumption and welfare. We
             characterize the set of equilibria by a notion of network
             connectivity, called cohesion. Using this, we show that
             adding connections can increase or decrease production (and
             welfare) as it alters cohesion. © 2012 Authors.},
   Doi = {10.1145/2229012.2229063},
   Key = {fds238431}

   Author = {Huettel, SA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity economics and the brain: uncovering the mechanisms
             of social conflict.},
   Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.
             Series B, Biological Sciences},
   Volume = {367},
   Number = {1589},
   Pages = {680-691},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {March},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Social contexts can have dramatic effects on decisions. When
             individuals recognize each other as coming from the same
             social group, they can coordinate their actions towards a
             common goal. Conversely, information about group differences
             can lead to conflicts both economic and physical.
             Understanding how social information shapes decision
             processes is now a core goal both of behavioural economics
             and neuroeconomics. Here, we describe the foundations for
             research that combines the theoretical framework from
             identity economics with the experimental methods of
             neuroscience. Research at this intersection would fill
             important gaps in the literature not addressed by current
             approaches in either of these disciplines, nor within social
             neuroscience, psychology or other fields. We set forth a
             simple taxonomy of social contexts based on the information
             content they provide. And, we highlight the key questions
             that would be addressed by a new 'identity neuroeconomics'.
             Such research could serve as an important and novel link
             between the social and natural sciences.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2011.0264},
   Key = {fds238433}

   Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, R},
   Title = {Identity economics},
   Journal = {The Economists' Voice},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {2},
   Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1553-3832},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Why have the relative rates of women smoking grown so much
             in the last 100 years? How can the U.S. military do so well
             with a relatively flat pay scale? Standard economics hasn't
             a clue, but according to Berkeley economist George Akerlof
             and Duke economist Rachel Kranton, the answers lie in a new
             field called identity economics. © Berkeley Electronic
             Press / Project Syndicate.},
   Doi = {10.2202/1553-3832.1762},
   Key = {fds238432}

   Author = {Kranton, R and Swamy, AV},
   Title = {Contracts, hold-up, and exports: Textiles and opium in
             colonial India},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {98},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {967-989},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {Trade and export, it is argued, spur economic growth. This
             paper studies the microeconomics of exporting. We build a
             heuristic model of transactions between exporters and
             producers and relate it to East India Company (EIC)
             operations in colonial Bengal. Our model and the historical
             record stress two difficulties: The exporter and its agents
             might not uphold payment agreements, and producers might not
             honor sales contracts. The model shows when procurement
             succeeds or fails, highlighting the tension between these
             two hold-up problems. We analyze several cases, including
             the EIC's cotton textile venture, the famous Opium Monopoly,
             and present-day contract farming.},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.3.967},
   Key = {fds238435}

   Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity, supervision, and work groups},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {98},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {212-217},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.2.212},
   Key = {fds238430}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
   Title = {Risk-sharing networks},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {3-4 SPEC. ISS.},
   Pages = {275-294},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {0167-2681},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This paper considers the formation of risk-sharing networks.
             Following empirical findings, we build a model where pairs
             form links, but a population cannot coordinate links. As a
             benchmark, individuals commit to share monetary holdings
             equally with linked partners. We find efficient networks can
             (indirectly) connect all individuals and involve full
             insurance. But equilibrium networks connect fewer
             individuals. When breaking links, individuals do not
             consider negative externalities on others in the network.
             Thus identical individuals can end up in different positions
             in a network and have different outcomes. These results may
             help to explain empirical findings that risk-sharing is
             often asymmetric. © 2007.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.004},
   Key = {fds238446}

   Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
   Title = {Public goods in networks},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {135},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {478-494},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {0022-0531},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are
             non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find,
             first, that networks can lead to specialization in public
             good provision. In every social network there is an
             equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others
             free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only
             outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a
             whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked,
             collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases
             access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to
             contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there
             are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006},
   Key = {fds238434}

   Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
   Title = {Risk sharing across communities},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {70-74},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.70},
   Key = {fds238428}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity and the economics of organizations},
   Journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives : a Journal of the
             American Economic Association},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {9-32},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {Fall},
   ISSN = {0895-3309},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/0895330053147930},
   Key = {fds238445}

   Author = {Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Competition and the incentive to produce high
   Journal = {Economica},
   Volume = {70},
   Number = {279},
   Pages = {385-404},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {August},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice
             variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to
             maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic
             interaction among firms and competition for market share is
             not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete
             for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce
             high-quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers
             can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to
             maintain a reputation for high-quality production. In this
             case, economists and policy analysts should pay greater
             attention to the interaction among firms and the
             institutions, such as professional associations, that
             structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms
             have an incentive to produce high-quality
   Doi = {10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00289},
   Key = {fds238438}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity and schooling: Some lessons for the economics of
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
   Volume = {40},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1167-1201},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {January},
   url = { Duke open
   Doi = {10.1257/.40.4.1167},
   Key = {fds238444}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
   Title = {A theory of buyer-seller networks},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {91},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {485-508},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {January},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {This paper introduces a new model of exchange: networks,
             rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. It begins with
             the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller
             must have a relationship, a "link," to exchange goods.
             Networks - buyers, sellers, and the pattern of links
             connecting them - are common exchange environments. This
             paper develops a methodology to study network structures and
             explains why agents may form networks. In a model that
             captures characteristics of a variety of industries, the
             paper shows that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in
             their own self-interests, can form the network structures
             that maximize overall welfare.},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.91.3.485},
   Key = {fds238443}

   Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Economics and identity},
   Journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
   Volume = {115},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {715-753},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0033-5533},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self,
             affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and
             sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In
             the utility function we propose, identity is associated with
             different social categories and how people in these
             categories should behave. We then construct a simple
             game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect
             individual interactions. The paper adapts these models to
             gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of
             poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of
             labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively
             changes conclusions of previous economic
   Doi = {10.1162/003355300554881},
   Key = {fds238427}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
   Title = {Networks versus vertical integration},
   Journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {570-601},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {Fall},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms
             to networks of manufacturers and suppliers. Vertically
             integrated firms make their own specialized inputs. In
             networks, manufacturers procure specialized inputs from
             suppliers that, in turn, sell to several manufacturers. The
             analysis shows that networks can yield greater social
             welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic
             demand shocks. Individual firms may also have the incentive
             to form networks, despite the lack of long-term contracts.
             The analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides
             predictions as to the shape of different
   Doi = {10.2307/2601001},
   Key = {fds238440}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
   Title = {Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {301-331},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1434-4742},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This paper studies competition in a network and how a
             network structure determines agents' individual payoffs. It
             constructs a general model of competition that can serve as
             a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how
             agents' outside options, and hence their shares of surplus,
             derive from "opportunity paths" connecting them to direct
             and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths,
             results show how third parties' links affect different
             agents' bargaining power. Even distant links may have large
             effects on agents' earnings. These payoff results, and the
             identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful
             to further analysis of network structure. © Springer-Verlag
   Doi = {10.1007/PL00013691},
   Key = {fds238442}

   Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Swamy, AV},
   Title = {The hazards of piecemeal reform: British civil courts and
             the credit market in colonial India},
   Journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-24},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {February},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {The colonial experience of developing countries provides
             valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and
             institutional innovations on economic growth. However, there
             has been little effort by economists to study colonial
             policies to gain theoretical insights into the process of
             institutional reform. This paper considers the introduction
             of civil courts in colonial India and its impact on
             agricultural credit markets in the Bombay Deccan. Drawing on
             historical records and a formal analysis of the credit
             market, the paper finds that the reform led to increased
             competition among lenders. Ex ante, we expect that this
             would have raised farmers' welfare. But increased
             competition also reduced lenders' incentives to subsidize
             farmers' investments in times of crisis, leaving them more
             vulnerable in bad times. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00100-X},
   Key = {fds238439}

   Author = {Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {86},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {830-851},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {September},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread
             means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines
             the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the
             interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and
             monetary market exchange. When more people engage in
             reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase,
             reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility.
             Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is
             inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy
             reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The
             results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a
             system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance
             of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets.},
   Key = {fds238437}

   Author = {Kranton, RE},
   Title = {The formation of cooperative relationships},
   Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {214-233},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain
             cooperative relationships when there is always the
             possibility of starting again with a new partner. The
             analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new
             relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple
             strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of
             cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form
             of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship. Two
             newly matched agents may have an incentive to forgo paying
             this bond, given that everyone else in the population
             requires payment of a bond to start a new relationship. This
             incentive disappears, however, if there is enough initial
             uncertainty about a new partner's valuation of future
             utility. Accounts from the sociological and anthropological
             literature indicate that individuals may indeed pay bonds to
             form cooperative relationships.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358},
   Key = {fds238436}

%% Chapters in Books   
   Author = {Kranton, RE and Sanders, SG},
   Title = {Groupy versus non-groupy social preferences: Personality,
             region, and political party},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {65-69},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171096},
   Key = {fds326598}

   Author = {Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Identity economics 2016: Where do social distinctions and
             norms come from?},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {106},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {405-409},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {May},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20161038},
   Key = {fds321817}

   Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
   Title = {Social divisions within schools: How school policies can
             affect students' identities and educational
   Pages = {180-203},
   Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Communities,
             Groups, and Networks},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {September},
   ISBN = {0203799658},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.4324/9780203799659},
   Key = {fds238423}

   Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
   Title = {Social Divisions within Schools: How school policies can
             affect students' identities and educational
   Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Groups,
             Communities and Networks},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Address = {London},
   Editor = {C. Barret},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds142925}

   Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
   Title = {A Model of Poverty and Oppositional Culture},
   Booktitle = {Markets and Governments},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {K. Basu and P. Nayak and R. Ray},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds142926}

%% Working Papers   
   Author = {D. Minehart},
   Title = {Vertical Merger and Specific Investments: A Tale of the
             Second Best},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds142918}

   Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
   Title = {Identity and the Economics of Organizations},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds142919}

%% Other   
   Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
   Title = {Identity and Schooling},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds142937}

   Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
   Title = {Economics and Identity},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds142936}

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