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| Publications of Rachel Kranton :chronological alphabetical combined listing:%% Books @book{fds238421, Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being}, Pages = {1-185}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780691152554}, Abstract = {Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors explain how our conception of who we are and who we want to be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor, affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much, much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics. People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden, and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their conception of who they are, and of who they choose to be--may be the most important factor affecting their economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic well-being.}, Key = {fds238421} } %% Papers Submitted @article{fds337046, Author = {Bloch, F and Demange, G and Kranton, R}, Title = {RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS}, Pages = {421-448}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2018}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12275}, Abstract = {This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.}, Doi = {10.1111/iere.12275}, Key = {fds337046} } %% Journal Articles @article{fds358746, Author = {Lee, VK and Kranton, RE and Conzo, P and Huettel, SA}, Title = {The hidden cost of humanization: Individuating information reduces prosocial behavior toward in-group members}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, Volume = {86}, Year = {2021}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102424}, Abstract = {This paper reports robust experimental evidence that humanization—in the form of individuating information about another's personal preferences—leads to decreased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. Previous research shows that individuating information increases prosocial behavior toward dehumanized out-group members. Its consequences for in-group members, however, are less well understood. Using methods from social psychology and behavioral economics, four experiments show that individuating information decreases pro-social behavior toward in-group members in a variety of settings (charitable giving, altruistic punishment, and trust games). Moreover, this effect results from decreased reliance on group membership labels, and not from other potential explanations like the induction of new group identities. Understanding these effects sheds light on the motives behind intergroup conflict, which may not result from a difference in social perception (i.e., humanized in-groups and dehumanized out-groups), but rather from biases associated with group membership (i.e., in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination) that are eliminated by individuating information. Together, these results indicate that humanization carries a hidden cost for in-group members by disrupting group identities that would otherwise make them targets of altruistic actions.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2021.102424}, Key = {fds358746} } @article{fds356402, Author = {Khaw, MW and Kranton, R and Huettel, S}, Title = {Oversampling of minority categories drives misperceptions of group compositions.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {214}, Pages = {104756}, Year = {2021}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104756}, Abstract = {The ability to estimate proportions informs our immediate impressions of social environments (e.g., of the diversity of races or genders within a crowded room). This study examines how the distribution of attention during brief glances shapes estimates of group gender proportions. Performance-wise, subjects exhibit a canonical pattern of judgment errors: small proportions are overestimated while large values are underestimated. Subjects' eye movements at sub-second timescales reveal that these biases follow from a tendency to visually oversample members of the gender minority. Rates of oversampling dovetail with average levels of error magnitudes, response variability, and response times. Visual biases are thus associated with the inherent difficulty in estimating particular proportions. All results are replicated at a within-subjects level with non-human ensembles using natural scene stimuli; the observed attentional patterns and judgment biases are thus not exclusively guided by face-specific visual properties. Our results reveal the biased distribution of attention underlying typical judgment errors of group proportions.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104756}, Key = {fds356402} } @article{fds363908, Author = {Thomas, D and Lawton, R and Brown, T and Kranton, R}, Title = {Prevalence, severity and distribution of depression and anxiety symptoms using observational data collected before and nine months into the COVID-19 pandemic.}, Journal = {Lancet regional health. Americas}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {100009}, Year = {2021}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2021.100009}, Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by substantial increases in adverse mental health, particularly among the young. However, it remains unclear to what extent increases in population scores on mental health assessments are due to changes in prevalence, rather than severity of symptoms. Further, it is not obvious that widely used assessments of aggregate symptoms retain their typical interpretation during an event that directly disrupts behavior.<h4>Methods</h4>Pre-pandemic data on workers age 18-69y in the 2019 National Health Interview Survey are reweighted to match distributions of demographic characteristics of Duke University employees surveyed nine months into the pandemic. The latter population was at low risk of infection or economic insecurity. Prevalence, severity, and scores for each of nine symptoms are compared overall and by age group.<h4>Outcomes</h4>Elevated psychological distress is primarily driven by increases in prevalence of particular symptoms. Prevalence of trouble concentrating increased six-fold from 9.6% to 72.5%. Other symptoms increased by over one-third; feeling anxious, having little interest, feeling depressed, sleep problems and being irritable, while some symptoms rose only 10% or less. Severity also increased but magnitudes are small relative to prevalence changes. Escalation in prevalence and severity are greatest for the youngest.<h4>Interpretation</h4>Some of the least prevalent symptoms pre-pandemic became the most prevalent during the pandemic, affecting interpretation of indices validated pre-pandemic. Clinical and policy interventions should focus on specific symptoms that increased including trouble concentrating and anxiety.<h4>Funding</h4>Trinity College of Arts & Sciences and Social Science Research Institute at Duke University.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.lana.2021.100009}, Key = {fds363908} } @article{fds351432, Author = {Kranton, R and Pease, M and Sanders, S and Huettel, S}, Title = {Deconstructing bias in social preferences reveals groupy and not-groupy behavior.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {117}, Number = {35}, Pages = {21185-21193}, Year = {2020}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918952117}, Abstract = {Group divisions are a continual feature of human history, with biases toward people's own groups shown in both experimental and natural settings. Using a within-subject design, this paper deconstructs group biases to find significant and robust individual differences; some individuals consistently respond to group divisions, while others do not. We examined individual behavior in two treatments in which subjects make pairwise decisions that determine own and others' incomes. In a political treatment, which divided subjects into groups based on their political leanings, political party members showed more in-group bias than Independents who professed the same political opinions. However, this greater bias was also present in a minimal group treatment, showing that stronger group identification was not the driver of higher favoritism in the political setting. Analyzing individual choices across the experiment, we categorize participants as "groupy" or "not groupy," such that groupy participants have social preferences that change for in-group and out-group recipients, while not-groupy participants' preferences do not change across group context. Demonstrating further that the group identity of the recipient mattered less to their choices, strongly not-groupy subjects made allocation decisions faster. We conclude that observed in-group biases build on a foundation of heterogeneity in individual groupiness.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1918952117}, Key = {fds351432} } @article{fds341870, Author = {Amasino, DR and Sullivan, NJ and Kranton, RE and Huettel, SA}, Title = {Amount and time exert independent influences on intertemporal choice.}, Journal = {Nature human behaviour}, Volume = {3}, Number = {4}, Pages = {383-392}, Year = {2019}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0537-2}, Abstract = {Intertemporal choices involve trade-offs between the value of rewards and the delay before those rewards are experienced. Canonical intertemporal choice models such as hyperbolic discounting assume that reward amount and time until delivery are integrated within each option prior to comparison<sup>1,2</sup>. An alternative view posits that intertemporal choice reflects attribute-wise processes in which amount and time attributes are compared separately<sup>3-6</sup>. Here, we use multi-attribute drift diffusion modelling (DDM) to show that attribute-wise comparison represents the choice process better than option-wise comparison for intertemporal choice in a young adult population. We find that, while accumulation rates for amount and time information are uncorrelated, the difference between those rates predicts individual differences in patience. Moreover, patient individuals incorporate amount earlier than time into the decision process. Using eye tracking, we link these modelling results to attention, showing that patience results from a rapid, attribute-wise process that prioritizes amount over time information. Thus, we find converging evidence that distinct evaluation processes for amount and time determine intertemporal financial choices. Because intertemporal decisions in the lab have been linked to failures of patience ranging from insufficient saving to addiction<sup>7-13</sup>, understanding individual differences in the choice process is important for developing more effective interventions.}, Doi = {10.1038/s41562-019-0537-2}, Key = {fds341870} } @article{fds343586, Author = {Kranton, R}, Title = {The devil is in the details: Implications of Samuel bowles’s the moral economy for economics and policy research}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, Volume = {57}, Number = {1}, Pages = {147-160}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171463}, Abstract = {All economists should buy and read The Moral Economy by Samuel Bowles. The book challenges basic premises of economic theory and questions policies based on monetary incentives. Incentives not only crowd out intrinsic motivations, they Erode the ethical and moral codes necessary for the workings of markets. Bowles boldly suggests that successful policies must combine incentives and moral messages, exploiting complementarities between the two. This essay argues that to achieve this objective, economists must study the local institutions and social context and engage untraditional data to uncover the interplay of incentives and identity.}, Doi = {10.1257/jel.20171463}, Key = {fds343586} } @article{fds325259, Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Manea, M and Stoddard, G}, Title = {Social status in networks}, Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-30}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160082}, Abstract = {We study social comparisons and status seeking in an interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new measure of interconnectedness- cohesion-captures the intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria stratify players into social classes, with each class's action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient) equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally cohesive set form the highest class. Alternatively, players not belonging to sets more cohesive than the set of all nodes constitute the lowest class. Intermediate classes are identified by iterating a cohesion operator. We also characterize networks that accommodate multiple- class equilibria. (JEL D11, D85, Z13).}, Doi = {10.1257/mic.20160082}, Key = {fds325259} } @article{fds238420, Author = {Harris, L and Lee, VK and Thompson, EH and Kranton, R}, Title = {Exploring the Generalization Process from Past Behavior to Predicting Future Behavior}, Journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}, Volume = {29}, Number = {4}, Pages = {419-436}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0894-3257}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1889}, Abstract = {Substantial evidence in social psychology documents that traits predict behavior. Research in behavioral economics establishes prior behavioral information—the actual behavior of another person in the past—influences future decision making, suggestive of the role of traits in guiding future behavior, but agnostic to the specific psychological mechanism. Yet the entire generalization process from past behavior to predicting future behavior has not been fully explored. Additionally, previous paradigms do not adequately dissociate prediction from explanation, and provide participants with trait information, or rely on participants to generate the appropriate trait. Here, we combine literature and experimental approaches in social psychology and behavioral economics to explore the generalization process from prior behavior that guides future decisions. Across three studies utilizing consequential economic game paradigms and online questionnaires, an initial group of participants (employees) played a time estimation game and a charity donations game before a second group of participants (employers) viewed the behavior of the first group, then decided whether to invest in employees in a trust game and rock guessing game. Although participants infer trait warmth and competence from the behavioral information in the first two games, estimates of normative behavior predicted investment decisions on the warmth-relevant games better than trait inferences. These results dissociate generalizations guided by warmth and competence behavioral information, and question the extent to which traits always serve as heuristics to predict behavior. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.}, Doi = {10.1002/bdm.1889}, Key = {fds238420} } @article{fds325260, Author = {Bramoull, Y and Kranton, R and D'Amours, M}, Title = {Strategic Interaction and Networks}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {104}, Number = {3}, Pages = {898-930}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, Abstract = {Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new tools?potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory?to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of peer effects.}, Key = {fds325260} } @article{fds238431, Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Stoddard, G}, Title = {Striving for social status}, Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce}, Pages = {672}, Publisher = {ACM Press}, Year = {2012}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229063}, Abstract = {Social comparisons can influence individual decisions. People compare their income and their belongings to those of people around them. Prominent scholars, such as Frank [1985], argue that increasing inequality has led to excessive spending, as people try to emulate and compete with the rich. This process accelerates as more people are exposed to the lives of the rich and what they consume. We study social comparisons and striving for status in a network context, focusing on how the status considerations and network structure influences individual outcomes and aggregate consumption of goods. We study this phenomenon in a model where agents choose a level of consumption for a good with status implications, like cars or designer clothing. Agents have a linear value for the good and a convex cost of consumption. Additionally, adopting the model of Stark andWang [2005], we assume agents suffer a status loss as they compare to themselves to those with higher consumption in their peer group. Letting e i represent the consumption level of agent i, then i suffers a loss equal to β x max{e j - e i, 0}/|N i| + 1 for each agent j in N i, i's neighborhood in the network. β parameterizes an agent's concern for status. Our primary objective is to solve for and analyze the Nash equilibria. We find that the best-response function is isotone in the lattice structure induced by consumption profiles, and so the equilibria of our game form a non-empty complete lattice. Furthermore, sequential best-response dynamics from either the min or max consumption profiles converges in polynomial time to either the min-consuming or max-consuming equilibrium. We then study how the consumption and welfare of equilibria change with respect to status considerations. We find that consumption at both the minimum-consuming and maximum-consuming equilibria increases with status considerations whereas welfare decreases, indicating that external organizations like luxury good retailers have incentives to perpetuate the perception of their goods as status symbols. Welfare, on the other hand, decreases with status concerns. Starting from any equilibrium and increasing status concerns causes agents to converge to a new equilibrium (via best-response dynamics) in which every agent has (weakly) lower welfare. This supports the intuition that attempts to "keep up with the Joneses" cause agents to over-spend. This happens for all agents, even those that don't know the Joneses, demonstrating the spillover effects of the network. We conclude with a study of the network effect on consumption and welfare. We characterize the set of equilibria by a notion of network connectivity, called cohesion. Using this, we show that adding connections can increase or decrease production (and welfare) as it alters cohesion. © 2012 Authors.}, Doi = {10.1145/2229012.2229063}, Key = {fds238431} } @article{fds238433, Author = {Huettel, SA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity economics and the brain: uncovering the mechanisms of social conflict.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {367}, Number = {1589}, Pages = {680-691}, Year = {2012}, Month = {March}, url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22271784}, Abstract = {Social contexts can have dramatic effects on decisions. When individuals recognize each other as coming from the same social group, they can coordinate their actions towards a common goal. Conversely, information about group differences can lead to conflicts both economic and physical. Understanding how social information shapes decision processes is now a core goal both of behavioural economics and neuroeconomics. Here, we describe the foundations for research that combines the theoretical framework from identity economics with the experimental methods of neuroscience. Research at this intersection would fill important gaps in the literature not addressed by current approaches in either of these disciplines, nor within social neuroscience, psychology or other fields. We set forth a simple taxonomy of social contexts based on the information content they provide. And, we highlight the key questions that would be addressed by a new 'identity neuroeconomics'. Such research could serve as an important and novel link between the social and natural sciences.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2011.0264}, Key = {fds238433} } @article{fds238432, Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, R}, Title = {Identity economics}, Journal = {Economists' Voice}, Volume = {7}, Number = {2}, Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1553-3832}, url = {http://econ.duke.edu/people/kranton/identity_economics}, Abstract = {Why have the relative rates of women smoking grown so much in the last 100 years? How can the U.S. military do so well with a relatively flat pay scale? Standard economics hasn't a clue, but according to Berkeley economist George Akerlof and Duke economist Rachel Kranton, the answers lie in a new field called identity economics. © Berkeley Electronic Press / Project Syndicate.}, Doi = {10.2202/1553-3832.1762}, Key = {fds238432} } @article{fds238435, Author = {Kranton, R and Swamy, AV}, Title = {Contracts, hold-up, and exports: Textiles and opium in colonial India}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {98}, Number = {3}, Pages = {967-989}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2008}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {0002-8282}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1736 Duke open access}, Abstract = {Trade and export, it is argued, spur economic growth. This paper studies the microeconomics of exporting. We build a heuristic model of transactions between exporters and producers and relate it to East India Company (EIC) operations in colonial Bengal. Our model and the historical record stress two difficulties: The exporter and its agents might not uphold payment agreements, and producers might not honor sales contracts. The model shows when procurement succeeds or fails, highlighting the tension between these two hold-up problems. We analyze several cases, including the EIC's cotton textile venture, the famous Opium Monopoly, and present-day contract farming.}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.3.967}, Key = {fds238435} } @article{fds238430, Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity, supervision, and work groups}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {98}, Number = {2}, Pages = {212-217}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2008}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0002-8282}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.212}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.2.212}, Key = {fds238430} } @article{fds238446, Author = {R. Kranton and Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R}, Title = {Risk-sharing networks}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, Volume = {64}, Number = {3-4 SPEC. ISS.}, Pages = {275-294}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {0167-2681}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000251181200002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {This paper considers the formation of risk-sharing networks. Following empirical findings, we build a model where pairs form links, but a population cannot coordinate links. As a benchmark, individuals commit to share monetary holdings equally with linked partners. We find efficient networks can (indirectly) connect all individuals and involve full insurance. But equilibrium networks connect fewer individuals. When breaking links, individuals do not consider negative externalities on others in the network. Thus identical individuals can end up in different positions in a network and have different outcomes. These results may help to explain empirical findings that risk-sharing is often asymmetric. © 2007.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.004}, Key = {fds238446} } @article{fds238434, Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R}, Title = {Public goods in networks}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, Volume = {135}, Number = {1}, Pages = {478-494}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0022-0531}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1943 Duke open access}, Abstract = {This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006}, Key = {fds238434} } @article{fds238428, Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R}, Title = {Risk sharing across communities}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {97}, Number = {2}, Pages = {70-74}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2007}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0002-8282}, url = {http://econ.duke.edu/%7Erek8/bramoullekrantonrisksharingcrosscommjan0207.pdf}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.70}, Key = {fds238428} } @article{fds238445, Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity and the economics of organizations}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, Volume = {19}, Number = {1}, Pages = {9-32}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2005}, Month = {Fall}, ISSN = {0895-3309}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330053147930}, Doi = {10.1257/0895330053147930}, Key = {fds238445} } @article{fds238438, Author = {Kranton, RE}, Title = {Competition and the incentive to produce high quality}, Journal = {Economica}, Volume = {70}, Number = {279}, Pages = {385-404}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2003}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00289}, Abstract = {Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce high-quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to maintain a reputation for high-quality production. In this case, economists and policy analysts should pay greater attention to the interaction among firms and the institutions, such as professional associations, that structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms have an incentive to produce high-quality goods.}, Doi = {10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00289}, Key = {fds238438} } @article{fds238444, Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity and schooling: Some lessons for the economics of education}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, Volume = {40}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1167-1201}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2002}, Month = {January}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1926 Duke open access}, Doi = {10.1257/.40.4.1167}, Key = {fds238444} } @article{fds238443, Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF}, Title = {A theory of buyer-seller networks}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {91}, Number = {3}, Pages = {485-508}, Year = {2001}, Month = {January}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1735 Duke open access}, Abstract = {This paper introduces a new model of exchange: networks, rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. It begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship, a "link," to exchange goods. Networks - buyers, sellers, and the pattern of links connecting them - are common exchange environments. This paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks. In a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries, the paper shows that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in their own self-interests, can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare.}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.91.3.485}, Key = {fds238443} } @article{fds238427, Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Economics and identity}, Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, Volume = {115}, Number = {3}, Pages = {715-753}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0033-5533}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1993 Duke open access}, Abstract = {This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions. The paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis.}, Doi = {10.1162/003355300554881}, Key = {fds238427} } @article{fds238440, Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF}, Title = {Networks versus vertical integration}, Journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, Volume = {31}, Number = {3}, Pages = {570-601}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2000}, Month = {Fall}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2628 Duke open access}, Abstract = {We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppliers. Vertically integrated firms make their own specialized inputs. In networks, manufacturers procure specialized inputs from suppliers that, in turn, sell to several manufacturers. The analysis shows that networks can yield greater social welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks. Individual firms may also have the incentive to form networks, despite the lack of long-term contracts. The analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides predictions as to the shape of different industries.}, Doi = {10.2307/2601001}, Key = {fds238440} } @article{fds238442, Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF}, Title = {Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks}, Journal = {Review of Economic Design}, Volume = {5}, Number = {3}, Pages = {301-331}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1434-4742}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00013691}, Abstract = {This paper studies competition in a network and how a network structure determines agents' individual payoffs. It constructs a general model of competition that can serve as a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how agents' outside options, and hence their shares of surplus, derive from "opportunity paths" connecting them to direct and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths, results show how third parties' links affect different agents' bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents' earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure. © Springer-Verlag 2000.}, Doi = {10.1007/PL00013691}, Key = {fds238442} } @article{fds238439, Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Swamy, AV}, Title = {The hazards of piecemeal reform: British civil courts and the credit market in colonial India}, Journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, Volume = {58}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-24}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {1999}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00100-X}, Abstract = {The colonial experience of developing countries provides valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and institutional innovations on economic growth. However, there has been little effort by economists to study colonial policies to gain theoretical insights into the process of institutional reform. This paper considers the introduction of civil courts in colonial India and its impact on agricultural credit markets in the Bombay Deccan. Drawing on historical records and a formal analysis of the credit market, the paper finds that the reform led to increased competition among lenders. Ex ante, we expect that this would have raised farmers' welfare. But increased competition also reduced lenders' incentives to subsidize farmers' investments in times of crisis, leaving them more vulnerable in bad times. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00100-X}, Key = {fds238439} } @article{fds238437, Author = {Kranton, RE}, Title = {Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {86}, Number = {4}, Pages = {830-851}, Year = {1996}, Month = {September}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1732 Duke open access}, Abstract = {Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and monetary market exchange. When more people engage in reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase, reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility. Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets.}, Key = {fds238437} } @article{fds238436, Author = {Kranton, RE}, Title = {The formation of cooperative relationships}, Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, Volume = {12}, Number = {1}, Pages = {214-233}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358}, Abstract = {This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship. Two newly matched agents may have an incentive to forgo paying this bond, given that everyone else in the population requires payment of a bond to start a new relationship. This incentive disappears, however, if there is enough initial uncertainty about a new partner's valuation of future utility. Accounts from the sociological and anthropological literature indicate that individuals may indeed pay bonds to form cooperative relationships.}, Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358}, Key = {fds238436} } %% Chapters in Books @misc{fds326598, Author = {Kranton, RE and Sanders, SG}, Title = {Groupy versus non-groupy social preferences: Personality, region, and political party}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {107}, Number = {5}, Pages = {65-69}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2017}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171096}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171096}, Key = {fds326598} } @misc{fds321817, Author = {Kranton, RE}, Title = {Identity economics 2016: Where do social distinctions and norms come from?}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {106}, Number = {5}, Pages = {405-409}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2016}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161038}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20161038}, Key = {fds321817} } @misc{fds238423, Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE}, Title = {Social divisions within schools: How school policies can affect students' identities and educational choices}, Pages = {180-203}, Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Communities, Groups, and Networks}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2005}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780203799659}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203799659}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203799659}, Key = {fds238423} } @misc{fds142925, Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof}, Title = {Social Divisions within Schools: How school policies can affect students' identities and educational choices}, Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Groups, Communities and Networks}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Address = {London}, Editor = {C. Barret}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds142925} } @misc{fds142926, Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof}, Title = {A Model of Poverty and Oppositional Culture}, Booktitle = {Markets and Governments}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {K. Basu and P. Nayak and R. Ray}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds142926} } %% Working Papers @article{fds142918, Author = {D. Minehart}, Title = {Vertical Merger and Specific Investments: A Tale of the Second Best}, Year = {2004}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds142918} } @article{fds142919, Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof}, Title = {Identity and the Economics of Organizations}, Year = {2003}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds142919} } %% Other @misc{fds142937, Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof}, Title = {Identity and Schooling}, Year = {2002}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds142937} } @misc{fds142936, Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof}, Title = {Economics and Identity}, Year = {2000}, Month = {August}, Key = {fds142936} } | |
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