Publications of Stephen P. Ryan    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Papers Submitted   
@article{fds26417,
   Author = {Patrick Bajari and Han Hong and Stephen P.
             Ryan},
   Title = {Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete
             Information},
   Journal = {Submitted to Econometrica},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://www.econ.duke.edu/~bajari/game.pdf},
   Abstract = {We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete
             games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss
             (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a
             standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the
             actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute
             all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose
             simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With
             appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates
             enter into payoffs and influence equilibrium selection, the
             model is identified with only weak parametric assumptions.
             Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can
             perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application,
             we study the strategic decision of firms in
             spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the
             Internet.},
   Key = {fds26417}
}


%% Working Papers   
@article{fds26416,
   Author = {Stephen P. Ryan},
   Title = {The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated
             Industry},
   Journal = {Job Market Paper},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://www.duke.edu/~spr6/RYAN2004.pdf},
   Abstract = {The typical cost analysis of environmental regulations
             consists of an engineering estimate of the compliance costs.
             In industries where fixed costs are an important determinant
             of market structure this static analysis ignores the dynamic
             effects of the regulation on market power, as higher costs
             of entry and investment can increase concentration. I
             evaluate the welfare effects of the 1990 Amendments to the
             Clean Air Act on the US Portland cement industry, accounting
             for these effects through a fully dynamic model of oligopoly
             in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Using a
             recently developed two-step estimator, I recover the entire
             cost structure of the industry, including the distribution
             of sunk entry costs and adjustment costs of investment. I
             solve for the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of the
             model and simulate the welfare effects of the Amendments. I
             find static analysis understates costs by an order of
             magnitude, and that the regulations impose a large welfare
             penalty on producers and consumers, primarily through a
             shift in the distribution of the sunk costs of
             entry.},
   Key = {fds26416}
}