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| Philosophy : All Publications (in the database)
List most recent publications in the database. :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% , Ásta
@article{fds373903,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {What are Sex and Gender and what Do We Want them to
Be?},
Journal = {Metaphysics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-44},
Publisher = {Ubiquity Press, Ltd.},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/met.118},
Doi = {10.5334/met.118},
Key = {fds373903}
}
@article{fds365121,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff, Butler, and
Roth},
Journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {310-318},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12744},
Abstract = {The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda
Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu
Roth.},
Doi = {10.1111/ejop.12744},
Key = {fds365121}
}
@article{fds365120,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Can Conferralism Account for Systemic Racism?},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {60},
Number = {S1},
Pages = {21-36},
Year = {2022},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12461},
Abstract = {Conferralism about race is a version of social
constructivism about race, where the agents of construction
seem to be individual agents. However, an important aspect
of racism is systemic or structural, and seemingly not about
the behavior of individual agents. Can conferralism account
for that? In this paper, I begin to address that question by
focusing on recent criticism of conferralism by Linda
Martín Alcoff and Aaron Griffith.},
Doi = {10.1111/sjp.12461},
Key = {fds365120}
}
@book{fds365084,
Author = {Hall, KQ and Ásta},
Title = {The oxford handbook of feminist philosophy},
Pages = {1-589},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190628925},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190628925.001.0001},
Abstract = {This exciting new Handbook offers a comprehensive overview
of the contemporary state of the field. The editors’
introduction and forty-five essays cover feminist critical
engagements with philosophy and adjacent scholarly fields,
as well as feminist approaches to current debates and crises
across the world. Authors cover topics ranging from the ways
in which feminist philosophy attends to other systems of
oppression, and the gendered, racialized, and classed
assumptions embedded in philosophical concepts, to feminist
perspectives on prominent subfields of philosophy. The first
section contains chapters that explore feminist
philosophical engagement with mainstream and marginalized
histories and traditions, while the second section parses
feminist philosophy’s contributions to with numerous
philosophical subfields, for example metaphysics and
bioethics. A third section explores what feminist philosophy
can illuminate about crucial moral and political issues of
identity, gender, the body, autonomy, prisons, among
numerous others. The Handbook concludes with the field’s
engagement with other theories and movements, including
trans studies, queer theory, critical race, theory,
postcolonial theory, and decolonial theory. The volume
provides a rigorous but accessible resource for students and
scholars who are interested in feminist philosophy, and how
feminist philosophers situate their work in relation to the
philosophical mainstream and other disciplines. Above all it
aims to showcase the rich diversity of subject matter,
approach, and method among feminist philosophers.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190628925.001.0001},
Key = {fds365084}
}
@article{fds365086,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Response to Critics},
Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Pages = {273-283},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-2007},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This is a response
to the critical comments by Åsa Burman, Esa Díaz-León,
Aaron Griffith, and Katharine Jenkins.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1515/jso-2020-2007},
Key = {fds365086}
}
@article{fds365085,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Précis: Categories We Live By},
Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Pages = {229-233},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-2008},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The project of
<jats:italic>Categories We Live By</jats:italic> is to offer
a metaphysics of social categories. The strategy is to give
a theory of social properties of individuals. The main
components of the theory are a <jats:italic>conferralist</jats:italic>
framework for properties; an account of social
<jats:italic>meaning</jats:italic>; and an account of social
<jats:italic>construction</jats:italic>; accompanying is
also an account of social <jats:italic>identity</jats:italic>.
This theory can be applies to offer concrete conferralist
proposals of categories such as sex, gender, race,
disability, religion, and LGBTQ categories. This précis
describes the main components (conferralist framework,
social meaning, social construction, social identity)
briefly, but leaves discussions of applications for another
time.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1515/jso-2020-2008},
Key = {fds365085}
}
@article{fds365311,
Author = {Asta},
Title = {Ideological Absorption and Countertechniques},
Journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {3},
Publisher = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i3.1174},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Abstract here.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.26556/jesp.v17i3.1174},
Key = {fds365311}
}
@article{fds365087,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Categorical Injustice},
Journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {50},
Number = {4},
Pages = {392-406},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12318},
Doi = {10.1111/josp.12318},
Key = {fds365087}
}
@book{fds365088,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Categories We Live by The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race,
and Other Social Categories},
Pages = {140 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
ISBN = {9780190256791},
Abstract = {The main idea is that social categories are conferred upon
people. Ásta introduces a 'conferralist' framework
in order to articulate a theory of social meaning, social
construction, and most importantly, of the construction of
sex, gender, ...},
Key = {fds365088}
}
@article{fds365669,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Social Kinds},
Pages = {290-299},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9781138783638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315768571-27},
Abstract = {This chapter introduces the main controversies over social
kinds. Social kinds are objective objects of knowledge, or
as Searle calls it “epistemically objective.” Truths
about social kinds are not subjective in the way in which
whether an apple tastes good or not is subjective and
depends on the particular person taking a bite. Haslanger
explicitly argues for realism about social kinds. Her
critical realism about social kinds has it that social
kinds, while socially constructed, are real types. When a
commitment to philosophical naturalism involves the
metaphysical commitment that only phenomena posited by
theories of natural science are allowed into the ontology,
social kinds pose a problem. John Searle is committed to the
view that what it is for something to be a social kind is
for it to be believed to be and regarded so, e.g. for
something to be money is for it to be regarded as or
believed to be money.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315768571-27},
Key = {fds365669}
}
@article{fds365670,
Author = {Sveinsdóttir, Á},
Title = {The Naturalism Question in Feminism},
Pages = {49-60},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781118657607},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch4},
Abstract = {The subject of this chapter is to what extent a feminist
should embrace naturalist commitments. I characterize
naturalism as involving two commitments: a rejection of
normativity and a commitment to philosophy as a descriptive
discipline consisting of empirical questions to be answered
by empirical methods. I argue that a feminist should not be
a naturalist about normativity, because feminists need to
engage in an inherently normative enquiry. On the other
hand, a naturalist move, wherein one offers a causal
explanation to undercut a normative claim, is an essential
part of a good ideology critique, which is a feminist
staple. As feminists believe that our lived experiences and
social and material conditions are relevant to our
theorizing, empirical questions should play an integral role
in normative enquiry, but since philosophy is not exhausted
by such empirical enquiry, philosophy isn't an empirical
science.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch4},
Key = {fds365670}
}
@article{fds365089,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Social Construction},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {10},
Number = {12},
Pages = {884-892},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12265},
Abstract = {What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of
the various ways in which something could be socially
constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether
social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism
and what, if anything, unifies all social construction
claims.},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12265},
Key = {fds365089}
}
@article{fds365090,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Knowledge of essence: The conferralist story},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {166},
Number = {1},
Pages = {21-32},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0019-0},
Abstract = {Realist essentialists face a prima facie challenge in
accounting for our knowledge of the essences of things, and
in particular, in justifying our engaging in thought
experiments to gain such knowledge. In contrast,
conferralist essentialism has an attractive story to tell
about how we gain knowledge of the essences of things, and
how thought experiments are a justified method for gaining
such knowledge. The conferralist story is told in this
essay. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-012-0019-0},
Key = {fds365090}
}
@article{fds365091,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {The social construction of human kinds},
Journal = {Hypatia},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {716-732},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01317.x},
Abstract = {Social construction theorists face a certain challenge to
the effect that they confuse the epistemic and the
metaphysical: surely our conceptions of something are
influenced by social practices, but that doesn't show that
the nature of the thing in question is so influenced. In
this paper I take up this challenge and offer a general
framework to support the claim that a human kind is socially
constructed, when this is understood as a metaphysical claim
and as a part of a social constructionist debunking project.
I give reasons for thinking that a conferralist framework is
better equipped to capture the social constructionist
intuition than rival accounts of social properties, such as
a constitution account and a response-dependence account,
and that this framework helps to diagnose what is at stake
in the debate between the social constructionists and their
opponents. The conferralist framework offered here should be
welcomed by social constructionists looking for firm
foundations for their claims, and for anyone else interested
in the debate over the social construction of human kinds.
© by Hypatia, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01317.x},
Key = {fds365091}
}
@article{fds365092,
Title = {The Metaphysics of Sex and Gender},
Booktitle = {Feminist Metaphysics Explorations in the Ontology of Sex,
Gender and the Self},
Publisher = {Springer Science & Business Media},
Editor = {Witt, C},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9789048137831},
Abstract = {Feminist Metaphysics is the first collection of articles
addressing metaphysical issues from a feminist
perspective.},
Key = {fds365092}
}
@article{fds365093,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Siding with euthyphro: Response-dependence and conferred
properties},
Journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {108-125},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00303.x},
Abstract = {I argue that a response-dependence account of a concept can
yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological
or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in
the literature on response-dependence. In particular, I show
how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain
property by arguing that the concept of the property is
response-dependent, if certain assumptions are made. © 2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00303.x},
Key = {fds365093}
}
@article{fds365094,
Author = {Sveinsdóttir, A},
Title = {Essentiality conferred},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {140},
Number = {1},
Pages = {135-148},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4},
Abstract = {In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist
account of what makes a property essential to an object and
defend it against likely objections. This account, which I
call a 'conferralist' account, shares some of the attractive
features of other anti-realist accounts, such as
conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their
respective drawbacks. © 2008 Springer Science+Business
Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4},
Key = {fds365094}
}
%% Adler, Matthew D.
@article{fds324453,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {A Better Calculus for Regulators: From Cost-Benefit Analysis
to the Social Welfare Function},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds324453}
}
@article{fds340880,
Author = {Adler, M and Treich, N},
Title = {Utilitarianism, Prioritarianism, and Intergenerational
Equity: A Cake Eating Model},
Journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
Volume = {87},
Pages = {94-102},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2017},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.005},
Doi = {10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.005},
Key = {fds340880}
}
@article{fds340881,
Author = {Adler, MD and Anthoff, D and Bosetti, V and Garner, G and Keller, K and Treich, N},
Title = {Priority for the Worse Off and the Social Cost of
Carbon},
Journal = {CESifo Working Paper Series},
Number = {6032},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds340881}
}
@book{fds310015,
Author = {Adler, M and Fleurbaey, M},
Title = {Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public
Policy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds310015}
}
@misc{fds321471,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis and Social Welfare
Functions},
Journal = {RegBlog},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds321471}
}
@misc{fds317171,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Inequality of What?},
Journal = {OUPblog},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds317171}
}
@article{fds265799,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Aggregating Moral Preferences},
Journal = {Economics & Philosophy},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {283-321},
Year = {2016},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3544},
Key = {fds265799}
}
@article{fds265829,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An
Overview},
Journal = {Review of Environmental Economics & Policy},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {264-285},
Year = {2016},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3110/},
Key = {fds265829}
}
@article{fds321470,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Justice, Claims and Prioritarianism: Room for
Desert?},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds321470}
}
@article{fds315570,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Behavioral Economics, Happiness Surveys, and Public
Policy},
Journal = {Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds315570}
}
@misc{fds315944,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Extended Preferences},
Pages = {476},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Well-Being & Public Policy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds315944}
}
@misc{fds323702,
Author = {Adler, M and Cookson, R and Cotton-Barrett, O and Asaria, M and Ord,
T},
Title = {Years of Good Life Based on Income and Health:
Re-Engineering Cost-Benefit Analysis to Examine Policy
Impact on Wellbeing and Distributive Justice},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds323702}
}
@article{fds265800,
Author = {Adler, M and Trench, N},
Title = {Prioritarianism and Climate Change},
Journal = {Environmental & Resource Economics},
Volume = {62},
Number = {1},
Pages = {279-308},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds265800}
}
@article{fds265801,
Author = {Adler, M and Dolan, P and Kavetsos, G},
Title = {Would You Choose to be Happy? Tradeoffs Between Happiness
and the Other Dimensions of Life in a Large Population
Survey},
Year = {2015},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3507/},
Key = {fds265801}
}
@article{fds265831,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Equity by the Numbers: Measuring Poverty, Inequality, and
Injustice},
Journal = {Alabama Law Review},
Volume = {66},
Number = {3},
Pages = {551-607},
Year = {2015},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3064/},
Key = {fds265831}
}
@misc{fds265805,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Value and Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Pages = {317-337},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds265805}
}
@misc{fds265817,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Welfarism, Equity, and the Choice Between Statistical and
Identified Victims},
Pages = {53-76},
Booktitle = {Identified Versus Statistical Lives: An Interdisciplinary
Perspective},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds265817}
}
@misc{fds315985,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {The Ethical Value of Risk Reduction: Utilitarianism,
Prioritarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Pages = {9-29},
Booktitle = {Ethics & Risk Management},
Publisher = {Information Age Publishing},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds315985}
}
@article{fds265802,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {346},
Pages = {1189-1190},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://www.sciencemag.org/content/346/6214/1189.full},
Key = {fds265802}
}
@article{fds265803,
Author = {Adler, M and Treich, N},
Title = {Consumption, Risk, and Prioritarianism},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3379},
Key = {fds265803}
}
@article{fds265804,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds265804}
}
@article{fds265807,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons: A New
Account},
Journal = {Economics & Philosophy},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {123-162},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3484/},
Key = {fds265807}
}
@article{fds265878,
Author = {Adler, M and Hammitt, J and Treich, N},
Title = {The Social Value of Mortality Risk Reduction: VSL vs. the
Social Welfare Function Approach},
Journal = {Journal of Health Economics},
Volume = {35},
Pages = {82-93},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2539/},
Key = {fds265878}
}
@article{fds319045,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Oeconomia: History, Methodology, Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-85},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds319045}
}
@article{fds265830,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {The Pigou-Dalton Principle and the Structure of Distributive
Justice},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3065/},
Key = {fds265830}
}
@article{fds265879,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What's the
Use?},
Journal = {Duke Law Journal},
Volume = {62},
Pages = {1509-1601},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol62/iss8/2/},
Key = {fds265879}
}
@misc{fds265806,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Happiness, Health and Leisure: Valuing the Nonconsumption
Impacts of Unemployment},
Pages = {150-169},
Booktitle = {Does Regulation Kill Jobs?},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds265806}
}
@misc{fds265818,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social
Sciences},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds265818}
}
@book{fds265828,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost Benefit
Analysis},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717302950},
Key = {fds265828}
}
@article{fds265843,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness},
Journal = {William & Mary Law Review},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {1115-1136},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2857/},
Key = {fds265843}
}
@article{fds316627,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Harsanyi 2.0},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3609/},
Key = {fds316627}
}
@article{fds265816,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {120},
Pages = {831-836},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds265816}
}
@article{fds265875,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Contingent Valuation Studies and Health Policy},
Journal = {Health Economics, Policy & Law},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {123-131},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2618},
Key = {fds265875}
}
@misc{fds265821,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Regulatory Theory},
Pages = {590-606},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds265821}
}
@book{fds310016,
Author = {Adler, M and Himma, K},
Title = {The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds310016}
}
@article{fds265854,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {Regulation & Governance},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {72-83},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds265854}
}
@article{fds265874,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Future Generations: A Prioritarian View},
Journal = {George Washington Law Review},
Volume = {77},
Pages = {1478-1520},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2556/},
Key = {fds265874}
}
@misc{fds265820,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of
Recognition},
Pages = {193},
Booktitle = {The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds265820}
}
@misc{fds265823,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {On (Moral) Philosophy and American Legal
Scholarship},
Pages = {114-121},
Booktitle = {On Philosophy in American Law},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds265823}
}
@misc{fds265824,
Author = {Adler, M and Himma, K},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xiii},
Booktitle = {The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds265824}
}
@misc{fds265826,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship},
Pages = {137},
Booktitle = {Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds265826}
}
@article{fds265837,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Legal Studies},
Volume = {37},
Pages = {S253-S292},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2560/},
Key = {fds265837}
}
@article{fds265846,
Author = {Adler, M and Dolan, P},
Title = {Introducing a 'Different Lives' Approach to the Valuation of
Health and Well-Being},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2558},
Key = {fds265846}
}
@article{fds265873,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Risk Equity: A New Proposal},
Journal = {Harvard Environmental Law Review},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {1-47},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2571/},
Key = {fds265873}
}
@article{fds265844,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Why De Minimis?},
Volume = {2007},
Pages = {7-12},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2559/},
Key = {fds265844}
}
@article{fds265845,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Well-Being, Inequality and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and
its Policy Implications},
Volume = {2007},
Pages = {7-17},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2557/},
Key = {fds265845}
}
@article{fds265849,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons
From Environmental Policy Analysis},
Journal = {Administrative & Regulatory Law News},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {11-14},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2611},
Key = {fds265849}
}
@article{fds265853,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Corrective Justice and Liability for Global
Warming},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {155},
Pages = {1859-1867},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2610},
Key = {fds265853}
}
@article{fds265877,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Economic Growth and the Interests of Future (and Past and
Present) Generations: A Comment on Tyler
Cowen},
Journal = {University of Chicago Law Review},
Volume = {74},
Pages = {41-49},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2612/},
Key = {fds265877}
}
@misc{fds265822,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Society: American and Global
Perspectives},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds265822}
}
@book{fds265827,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://www.worldcat.org/title/new-foundations-of-cost-benefit-analysis/oclc/65187391},
Key = {fds265827}
}
@article{fds265838,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective},
Journal = {Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {1-92},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2575/},
Key = {fds265838}
}
@article{fds265839,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose
Practices Ground U.S. Law?},
Journal = {Northwestern University Law Review},
Volume = {100},
Pages = {719-806},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2576/},
Key = {fds265839}
}
@article{fds265840,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule of Recognition, and the
Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism},
Journal = {Fordham Law Review},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {1671-1696},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2574},
Key = {fds265840}
}
@article{fds265841,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Welfare Polls: A Synthesis},
Journal = {New York University Law Review},
Volume = {81},
Pages = {1875-1970},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2573/},
Key = {fds265841}
}
@article{fds265842,
Author = {Adler, M and Sanchirico, C},
Title = {Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal
Applications},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {155},
Pages = {279-377},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2572/},
Key = {fds265842}
}
@article{fds265852,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations},
Journal = {Legislacao: Cadernos de Ciencia de Legislacao},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {63},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds265852}
}
@article{fds265876,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons
from Environmental Policy Analysis},
Journal = {Duke Law Journal},
Volume = {56},
Pages = {1-50},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol56/iss1/1/},
Key = {fds265876}
}
@misc{fds265819,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Equity Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy},
Booktitle = {On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane
Katrina},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds265819}
}
@article{fds265815,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {115},
Pages = {824-828},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5290&context=faculty_scholarship},
Key = {fds265815}
}
@article{fds265851,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cognitivism, Controversy and Moral Heuristics},
Journal = {Behavioral & Brain Sciences},
Volume = {28},
Pages = {542-543},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds265851}
}
@article{fds265871,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Against 'Individual Risk': A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {153},
Pages = {1122-1250},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2589/},
Key = {fds265871}
}
@article{fds265872,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Justification, Legitimacy, and Administrative
Governance},
Journal = {Issues in Legal Scholarship},
Volume = {2005},
Pages = {1-15},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2588},
Key = {fds265872}
}
@article{fds315986,
Author = {Dowell Earl and H and Epureanu Bogdan and I},
Title = {Nonlinear: Introduction},
Journal = {Nonlinear Dynamics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11071-005-6551-0},
Doi = {10.1007/s11071-005-6551-0},
Key = {fds315986}
}
@article{fds265810,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of
Environmental Law},
Journal = {Environmental Affairs},
Volume = {31},
Pages = {591-605},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds265810}
}
@article{fds265850,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety},
Journal = {Administrative & Regulatory Law News},
Volume = {29},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds265850}
}
@article{fds265870,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety},
Journal = {Chicago-Kent Law Review},
Volume = {79},
Pages = {977-1053},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2591/},
Key = {fds265870}
}
@article{fds265809,
Author = {Adler, M and Finkelstein, C and Huang, P},
Title = {Introduction to Symposium, Preferences and Rational Choice:
New Perspectives and Legal Implications},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Pages = {707-715},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2617/},
Key = {fds265809}
}
@article{fds265866,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {The Puzzle of Ex Ante Efficiency: Does Rational
Approvability have Moral Weight?},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {151},
Pages = {707},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2598/},
Key = {fds265866}
}
@article{fds265867,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation},
Journal = {Minnesota Law Review},
Volume = {87},
Pages = {1293-1445},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2597/},
Key = {fds265867}
}
@article{fds265868,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks},
Journal = {Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {5-28},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2595/},
Key = {fds265868}
}
@article{fds265869,
Author = {Adler, M and Dorf, M},
Title = {Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review},
Journal = {Virginia Law Review},
Volume = {89},
Pages = {1105-1202},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2594/},
Key = {fds265869}
}
@misc{fds265825,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Does the Constitution Require (Basic or Strengthened) Public
Rationality?},
Booktitle = {Linking Law and Political Science},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds265825}
}
@article{fds265814,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Review: An Electronic
Journal},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3608/},
Key = {fds265814}
}
@article{fds265848,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Comment on Johnston},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {1429-1451},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2614},
Key = {fds265848}
}
@article{fds265836,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Expression and Appearance: A Comment on Hellman},
Journal = {Maryland Law Review},
Volume = {60},
Pages = {688-712},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2627},
Key = {fds265836}
}
@article{fds265847,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Risk, Death and Time: A Comment on Judge Williams' Defense
of Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {Administrative Law Review},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {271-287},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2625/},
Key = {fds265847}
}
@book{fds310017,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical
Perspectives},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds310017}
}
@article{fds265808,
Author = {Adler, M and Dorf, M},
Title = {Rights and Rules: An Overview},
Journal = {Legal Theory},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {241-251},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2631},
Key = {fds265808}
}
@article{fds265813,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Philosophy in Review},
Volume = {20},
Pages = {142-145},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2634},
Key = {fds265813}
}
@article{fds265834,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {Introduction, to Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Legal Studies},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {837-842},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2633/},
Key = {fds265834}
}
@article{fds265835,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the
Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors
Anderson and Pildes},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {148},
Pages = {1577-1594},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2626/},
Key = {fds265835}
}
@article{fds265861,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted},
Journal = {Perspectives: Teaching Legal Research and
Writing},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {1105-1147},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2608},
Key = {fds265861}
}
@article{fds265862,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {148},
Pages = {1363-1501},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2603/},
Key = {fds265862}
}
@article{fds265863,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two
Coexist?},
Journal = {Legal Theory},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {337-389},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2604/},
Key = {fds265863}
}
@article{fds265864,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation},
Journal = {Florida State University Law Review},
Volume = {28},
Pages = {241-338},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2599/},
Key = {fds265864}
}
@article{fds265865,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Rights, Rules and the Structure of Constitutional
Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon},
Journal = {Harvard Law Review},
Volume = {113},
Pages = {1371-1420},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2601/},
Key = {fds265865}
}
@article{fds265812,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Philosophy in Review},
Volume = {19},
Pages = {168-171},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2639/},
Key = {fds265812}
}
@article{fds265860,
Author = {Adler, M and Posner, E},
Title = {Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {Yale Law Journal},
Volume = {109},
Pages = {165-247},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2602/},
Key = {fds265860}
}
@article{fds265832,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Law and Incommensurability: Introduction},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {146},
Pages = {1169-1184},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2638},
Key = {fds265832}
}
@article{fds265833,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Can Constitutional Borrowing be Justified? A Comment on
Tushnet},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {350-357},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2632/},
Key = {fds265833}
}
@article{fds265857,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {146},
Pages = {1371-1418},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2607/},
Key = {fds265857}
}
@article{fds265858,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law},
Journal = {Michigan Law Review},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {1-173},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2600/},
Key = {fds265858}
}
@article{fds265859,
Author = {Adler, M and Kreimer, S},
Title = {The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz and
Yeskey},
Journal = {Supreme Court Review},
Volume = {1998},
Pages = {71-143},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2605/},
Key = {fds265859}
}
@article{fds265856,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {145},
Pages = {759-892},
Year = {1997},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2609},
Key = {fds265856}
}
@article{fds265855,
Author = {Adler, M},
Title = {What States Owe Outsiders},
Journal = {Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly},
Volume = {20},
Pages = {391-438},
Year = {1993},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2607/},
Key = {fds265855}
}
%% Ancell, Aaron J
@article{fds326666,
Author = {Ancell, A},
Title = {DEMOCRACY ISN'T THAT SMART (BUT WE CAN MAKE IT SMARTER): ON
LANDEMORE'S DEMOCRATIC REASON},
Journal = {Episteme},
Volume = {14},
Number = {02},
Pages = {161-175},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.67},
Doi = {10.1017/epi.2015.67},
Key = {fds326666}
}
@article{fds318353,
Author = {Ancell, A and Steenbergen, G and Flanagan, O and Martin,
S},
Title = {Empiricism and normative ethics: What do the biology and the
psychology of morality have to do with ethics?},
Journal = {Behaviour},
Volume = {151},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {209-228},
Editor = {de Wall, F. and Churchland, P. and Pievani, T. and Stefano,
P.},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539X-00003142},
Doi = {10.1163/1568539X-00003142},
Key = {fds318353}
}
%% Atkins, Jed W.
@article{fds376120,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {John Rawls’s Theology of Liberal Toleration},
Journal = {American Political Thought},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {56-82},
Year = {2024},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728210},
Abstract = {Scholarship has shown that John Rawls’s theological
education at Princeton shaped his later theory of justice
but has overlooked a similar impact on his account of
toleration, which was also derived from the original
position in ATheory of Justice. Drawing on a variety of
published and unpublished works, I argue that in the account
of toleration in A Theory of Justice the original position
takes the place previously occupied by God in His roles as
“father of all” and “just judge.” Paying attention
to the theological origins of Rawls’s view of toleration
in liberal Protestantism explains why he thought that the
Western concept of the separation of church and state
follows logically from the original position, even though
his insistence on this point subjected his thought to
internal inconsistency and external criticism. Acknowledging
these limitations opens to liberal political theorists an
avenue for increased institutional flexibility that Rawls
prematurely closed.},
Doi = {10.1086/728210},
Key = {fds376120}
}
@article{fds363759,
Author = {Atkins, J},
Title = {Empire, Just Wars, and Cosmopolitanism},
Pages = {231-251},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge},
Editor = {Atkins, J and Benatouil, T},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds363759}
}
@book{fds363760,
Author = {Atkins, JW and Bénatouïl, T},
Title = {The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy},
Pages = {356 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781108404037},
Abstract = {The international, interdisciplinary team of scholars
represented in this volume highlights the historical
significance and contemporary relevance of Cicero's
writings, and suggests pathways for future scholarship on
Cicero's philosophy as ...},
Key = {fds363760}
}
@article{fds363761,
Author = {Atkins, J and Young, C},
Title = {Divided Sovereignty: Polybius and the Compound
Constitution},
Pages = {25-32},
Booktitle = {Reading Texts on Sovereignty},
Publisher = {Bloomsbury},
Editor = {Achilleos, S and Balasoupolis, A},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds363761}
}
@article{fds363762,
Author = {Atkins, J},
Title = {Hope and Empire in Ciceronian Eschatology},
Pages = {267-279},
Booktitle = {Eschatology in Antiquity},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Pollman, K and Van Noorden and H and Marlow, H},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds363762}
}
@article{fds349075,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Leo Strauss's Lucretius and the Art of Writing},
Pages = {29-55},
Booktitle = {Euphrosyne Studies in Ancient Philosophy, History, and
Literature},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG},
Editor = {Burian, P and Strauss Clay and J and Davis, G},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9783110604597},
Key = {fds349075}
}
@article{fds348664,
Author = {Atkins, JW and Murgier, C},
Title = {Espoir et empire dans le songe de Scipion},
Journal = {Cahiers philosophiques},
Volume = {N° 159},
Number = {4},
Pages = {27-41},
Publisher = {CAIRN},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/caph1.159.0027},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Le Songe de Scipion est l’occasion pour Cicéron
de revenir sur cette notion généralement dévalorisée
politiquement qu’est l’espoir, par le biais de la longue
narration d’un rêve, dans lequel Scipion a eu la vision,
non seulement de sa destinée future, mais de l’ensemble
de l’univers, et a été instruit du destin des âmes
humaines après la mort. En réponse aux interrogations du
républicanisme antique sur les limites dans lesquelles une
République peut aspirer à la gloire et à l’expansion
impériale, l’eschatologie développée par Cicéron dans
le Songe de Scipion vient relégitimer l’espoir, en le
réorientant vers cette gloire céleste, et non plus
terrestre, promise après la mort aux hommes politiques
attachés à la vertu. Prêter attention au traitement de
l’espoir dans le De Republica permet à la fois de
ressaisir l’unité que forme le Songe avec le reste de
l’œuvre et d’esquisser l’histoire d’une réflexion
sur la valeur politique de l’espoir.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.3917/caph1.159.0027},
Key = {fds348664}
}
@article{fds348710,
Author = {Atkins, J},
Title = {"How Christianity Changed Singleness"},
Journal = {First Things},
Volume = {299},
Number = {January 2020},
Pages = {44-50},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds348710}
}
@article{fds348462,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Tertullian on 'The Freedom of Religion'},
Journal = {Polis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {145-175},
Publisher = {Brill},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340261},
Abstract = {Tertullian first coined the phrase 'the freedom of
religion'. This article considers what this entails. I argue
that Tertullian's discussion of religious liberty derives
its theoretical significance from his creative repurposing
of the Roman idea of liberty as non-domination. Tertullian
contends that the Roman magistrates' treatment of Christian
citizens and loyal subjects amounts to tyrannical domination
characterized by the absence of the traditional conditions
for non-domination: The rule of law, rule in and responsive
to the interests of the people, and citizens' rights. On his
reworking of these criteria, he argues that citizens and
loyal subjects should have the right to act publicly on the
convictions of their conscience even if these actions
conflict with the state's civil religion. Tertullian shows
that non-domination is a highly flexible idea that does not
necessarily entail the participatory 'free state' of
republicanism. Moreover, by applying the logic of
non-domination to questions surrounding religious liberty,
he opens up an important avenue of investigation largely
ignored in the contemporary republican literature on
non-domination.},
Doi = {10.1163/20512996-12340261},
Key = {fds348462}
}
@article{fds348463,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Book Review: Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian
Tradition of Political Morality, by Gary A.
Remer},
Journal = {Political Theory},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {142-147},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591717743974},
Doi = {10.1177/0090591717743974},
Key = {fds348463}
}
@article{fds346354,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Integrity and Conscience in Medical Ethics: A Ciceronian
Perspective.},
Journal = {Perspectives in biology and medicine},
Volume = {62},
Number = {3},
Pages = {470-488},
Publisher = {Project Muse},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2019.0027},
Abstract = {In his work on medical ethics, Lauris Kaldjian identifies
conscience with integrity. However, there are competing
notions of integrity that may guide the conscience. This
paper addresses debates over conscientious refusals by
considering Cicero's account of integrity, a conception
previously not discussed in the context of this debate.
Cicero offers a framework for understanding integrity and
conscience for the physician that is an alternative to
Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of the completely unified life,
an idea appropriated by Kaldjian in his argument that there
can be no clean distinction between personal, private,
practical reasoning and moral decision-making. Cicero's
account rejects the modern-individualist idea of the
autonomous self living a wholly compartmentalized life. It
agrees with Kaldjian's stress on flexible decision-making,
the internal morality of medicine, the importance of
virtues, and the need to accommodate pluralism. However,
Ciceronian integrity is better suited than the MacIntyreian
account to our present liberal order. It offers a place for
the "moral hero" while recognizing that the vast majority of
moral agents will be "progressors" who lack the consistency
of the moral hero's fully integrated life. The inclusion of
both types of individuals in the medical field may offset
the potentially harmful tendencies to which each is
prone.},
Doi = {10.1353/pbm.2019.0027},
Key = {fds346354}
}
@article{fds340533,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Non-domination and the libera res publica in Cicero's
Republicanism},
Journal = {History of European Ideas},
Volume = {44},
Number = {6},
Pages = {756-773},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2018.1513705},
Abstract = {This paper assesses to what extent the neo-Republican
accounts of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit adequately
capture the nature of political liberty at Rome by focusing
on Cicero's analysis of the libera res publica. Cicero's
analysis in De Republica suggests that the rule of law and a
modest menu of individual citizens’ rights guard against
citizens being controlled by a master's arbitrary will,
thereby ensuring the status of non-domination that
constitutes freedom according to the neo-Republican view. He
also shows the difficulty of anchoring an argument for
citizens’ full political participation in the value of
non-domination. While Cicero believed such full
participation (by elite citizens) was essential for a libera
res publica, he, like other elite Romans, argued for
participation on the basis of liberty conceived as the space
to contend for and enhance one's social status. The
sufficiency of the rule of law and citizens’ rights for
securing a status of non-domination taken together with
their insufficiency for ensuring a libera res publica
suggests that neo-Republican accounts of liberty do not
fully capture the idea as articulated in Cicero's
Republicanism.},
Doi = {10.1080/01916599.2018.1513705},
Key = {fds340533}
}
@book{fds333730,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT},
Pages = {1-240},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107107007},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316227404},
Abstract = {What can the Romans teach us about politics? This thematic
introduction to Roman political thought shows how the Roman
world developed political ideas of lasting significance,
from the consequential constitutional notions of the
separation of powers, political legitimacy, and individual
rights to key concepts in international relations, such as
imperialism, just war theory, and cosmopolitanism. Jed W.
Atkins relates these and many other important ideas to Roman
republicanism, traces their evolution across all major
periods of Roman history, and describes Christianity's
important contributions to their development. Using the
politics and political thought of the United States as a
case study, he argues that the relevance of Roman political
thought for modern liberal democracies lies in the profound
mixture of ideas both familiar and foreign to us that shape
and enliven Roman republicanism. Accessible to students and
non-specialists, this book provides an invaluable guide to
Roman political thought and its enduring
legacies.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316227404},
Key = {fds333730}
}
@article{fds331511,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {"Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of
Political Morality by Gary A. Remer"},
Journal = {Political Theory},
Pages = {1-6},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2017},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds331511}
}
@article{fds328587,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Natural Law and Civil Religion: De legibus, Book
II"},
Volume = {64},
Pages = {167-186},
Booktitle = {Ciceros Staatsphilosophie},
Editor = {Hoeffe, O},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {9783110534771},
Key = {fds328587}
}
@article{fds294089,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Zeno's Republic, plato's Laws, and the early development of
stoic natural law theory},
Journal = {Polis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {166-190},
Publisher = {BRILL},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0142-257X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340042},
Abstract = {Recent scholarship on Stoic political thought has sought to
explain the relationship between Zeno's Republic and the
concept of a natural law regulating a cosmic city of gods
and human beings that is attributed to later Stoics. This
paper provides a reassessment of this relationship by
exploring the underappreciated influence of Plato's Laws on
Zeno's Republic and, through Zeno, on the subsequent Stoic
tradition. Zeno's attempt to remove perceived
inconsistencies in Plato's treatment of 'law' and 'nature'
established a philosophical framework that overturned the
republicanism of Plato and Aristotle; this same framework
established the preconditions for the cosmic city of gods
and human beings regulated by natural law. Thus, the early
Stoic tradition on the topic of natural law is characterized
by continuity rather than by discontinuity.},
Doi = {10.1163/20512996-12340042},
Key = {fds294089}
}
@article{fds294091,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Constitution and Empire in Roman Republican
Thought},
Series = {Museums and World Civilizations},
Booktitle = {Rome},
Publisher = {Peyking University Press},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds294091}
}
@article{fds294090,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Review of Catherine Steel, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Cicero (Cambridge, 2013)},
Publisher = {The Classical Journal},
Year = {2014},
Month = {June},
url = {http://cj.camws.org/sites/default/files/reviews/2014.06.06},
Key = {fds294090}
}
@article{fds294096,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {A revolutionary doctrine? Cicero's natural right teaching in
Mably and Burke},
Journal = {Classical Receptions Journal},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {177-197},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2014},
Month = {Summer},
ISSN = {1759-5134},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/crj/clt031},
Abstract = {Why and how did (and do) political thinkers with radically
different political agendas invest in Cicero's conservative
political philosophy? What is it about Cicero's political
thought that inspires radicals and conservatives alike? This
essay explores these questions through a case study of the
reception of the central Ciceronian political doctrine of
natural right in the revolutionary writings of Gabriel
Bonnot de Mably and Edmund Burke. The former's Des droits et
des devoirs du citoyen was an important revolutionary work
that anticipated key elements of the French Revolution; the
latter's Reflections on the Revolution in France constituted
the major conservative critique of the French Revolution.
Despite their ostensibly different aims, I argue that these
works reveal remarkably similar interpretations of Cicero's
doctrine of natural right: it was flexible enough that a
prudent statesman could adapt it to different circumstances,
but it still contained revolutionary potential. Burke, the
consummate rhetorician, attempted to domesticate Cicero's
teaching by obscuring its revolutionary potential while
utilizing aspects that are friendlier to the established
political order. The case study suggests that the apparent
bivalency of the reception of Cicero's political thought may
result from the amplification of a bivalency within his
thought itself. © 2014 The Author 2014.},
Doi = {10.1093/crj/clt031},
Key = {fds294096}
}
@article{fds294099,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Euripides's orestes and the concept of conscience in Greek
philosophy},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas},
Volume = {75},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-22},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2014.0002},
Doi = {10.1353/jhi.2014.0002},
Key = {fds294099}
}
@article{fds294092,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 BCE)},
Pages = {489-498},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Political Thought},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Gibbons, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds294092}
}
@book{fds294098,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic
and Laws},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://www.cambridge.org/9781107043589},
Abstract = {<a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isb
n/item7282780/Cicero%20on%20Politics%20and%20th
e%20Limits%20of%20Reason/? site_locale=en_US/">See
Publisher’s Description Here</a>},
Key = {fds294098}
}
@article{fds294095,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Cicero's Philosophica (Review of Yelena Baraz, A Written
Republic. Cicero's Philosophical Politics)},
Journal = {CLASSICAL REVIEW},
Volume = {63},
Number = {2},
Pages = {417-419},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0009-840X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=000325538600047&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1017/S0009840X13000504},
Key = {fds294095}
}
@article{fds294093,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Cicero on the Relationship between Plato’s Republic and
Laws},
Series = {BICS Supplement 117},
Pages = {15-34},
Booktitle = {Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Republic},
Editor = {Sheppard, A},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds294093}
}
@article{fds376534,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Cicero on the Relationship between Plato’s Republic and
Laws},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds376534}
}
@article{fds294097,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {Greek and Roman Political Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Oxford Bibliographies in "Classics"},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Dee Clayman},
Year = {2012},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds294097}
}
@article{fds294101,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {The officia of St. Ambrose's de officiis},
Journal = {Journal of Early Christian Studies},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {49-77},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Spring},
ISSN = {1067-6341},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000288926900003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {A reader of Ambrose's De officiis who is well acquainted
with Cicero's homonymous work will be immediately impressed
by the similarities in organization and the structure of
argument. However, he or she will also notice that the
bishop's ethic contains an element of rigor absent from
Cicero's more moderate ethic. By focusing on Ambrose's
creative appropriation of the Ciceronian/ Stoic categories
of duties (officia), I demonstrate how he incorporated this
distinctive element of his ethic into his work while still
employing the same structure, argument, and terminology as
his model. Ambrose uses the first type of officia to
critique Cicero's ethic while he redefines the second type
of officia and subsequently uses it as a vehicle for
expressing the defining characteristics of his own ethic. ©
2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press.},
Doi = {10.1353/earl.2011.0003},
Key = {fds294101}
}
@article{fds294100,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {L'argument du De Re Publica et le Songe de
Scipion},
Journal = {Etudes Philosophiques},
Volume = {99},
Number = {4},
Pages = {455-469},
Publisher = {CAIRN},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/leph.114.0455},
Doi = {10.3917/leph.114.0455},
Key = {fds294100}
}
@misc{fds294094,
Author = {J.W. Atkins and Rousselot, P},
Title = {A Young Researcher Tackles the De Republica},
Journal = {Gazette Tulliana},
Volume = {2},
Number = {Spring},
Pages = {5-7},
Publisher = {Societe internationale des amis de Ciceron
(SIAC)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {Spring},
Abstract = {In this interview with Philippe Rousselot, the President of
the Societe internationale des amis de Ciceron, I discuss my
research on Cicero and Roman philosophy. Translated into
French, Spanish, and Italian.},
Key = {fds294094}
}
%% Bernstein, Sara J.
@article{fds305541,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Causal and Moral Vagueness},
Journal = {Radio},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Special Issue},
Key = {fds305541}
}
@article{fds305543,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Free Will and Mental Causation},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds305543}
}
@article{fds305544,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Moral Overdetermination},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds305544}
}
@article{fds305545,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Actual and Counterfactual Redundancy},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds305545}
}
@article{fds305546,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Nowhere Man: Time travel and Spatial Location},
Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1475-4975},
Key = {fds305546}
}
@article{fds296395,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {The Metaphysics of Omissions},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {1747-9991},
Key = {fds296395}
}
@article{fds296398,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {A Closer Look at Trumping},
Journal = {Acta Analytica},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {1874-6349},
Key = {fds296398}
}
@article{fds305548,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Omission Impossible},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds305548}
}
@article{fds305549,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Overdetermination Underdetermined},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds305549}
}
@article{fds296396,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {What Causally Insensitive Events Tell Us About
Overdetermination},
Journal = {Philosophia},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296396}
}
@article{fds296399,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions},
Journal = {Dialectica},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296399}
}
@article{fds296400,
Author = {Bernstein, SJ},
Title = {Omissions as Possibilities},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296400}
}
@article{fds219814,
Author = {S.J. Bernstein},
Title = {Review of Mental Causation and Ontology},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds219814}
}
@article{fds224938,
Author = {S.J. Bernstein},
Title = {Time Travel and the Movable Present},
Booktitle = {God, Freedom, and Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy of
Peter van Inwagen},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds224938}
}
@article{fds219818,
Author = {S.J. Bernstein},
Title = {Overdetermination Undeterred},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219818}
}
%% Boxall, Susanna F.
@article{fds53636,
Author = {S.F. Boxall},
Title = {Quality of Life andHuman Difference: Genetic Testing, Health
Care, and Disability.},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Year = {2007},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds53636}
}
@article{fds53963,
Author = {Becky White and Susanna Boxall},
Title = {Redefining Disability: Impracticable, Maleficent, Unjust and
Inconsistent},
Journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds53963}
}
@article{fds53638,
Author = {S.F. Boxall},
Title = {Beyond Orthodoxy: A Pluralist Approach to Animal
Liberation},
Journal = {Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-23},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.cala-online.org/Journal/Issue4/Beyond_Orthodoxy.html},
Key = {fds53638}
}
@article{fds53637,
Author = {S.F. Boxall},
Title = {Reinhabiting Reality:Towards a Recovery of
Culture},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds53637}
}
@article{fds53639,
Author = {S.F. Boxall},
Title = {Negri on Negri: Antonio Negri in Conversation with Anne
Dufourmantelle},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Year = {2005},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds53639}
}
@article{fds53640,
Author = {S.F. Boxall},
Title = {Our Present Age: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of
theSuperstructure in Karl Marx’s and Antonio Gramci’s
Philosophies},
Journal = {Philosophy Review of SDSU},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {41-48},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds53640}
}
%% Braddock, Matthew
@article{fds215717,
Author = {Braddock, Matthew},
Title = {Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable
Intuitions},
Journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {44},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-191},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {Dogged resistance to demanding moral views frequently takes
the form of The Demandingness Objection. Premise (1): Moral
view V demands too much of us. Premise (2): If a moral view
demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. Conclusion:
Therefore, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this form
harass major theories in normative ethics as well as
prominent moral views in applied ethics and political
philosophy. The present paper does the following: (i) it
clarifies and distinguishes between various demandingness
objections in the philosophical literature, (ii) identifies
a formidable and interesting form of the demandingness
objection that targets a wide scope of moral views, and
(iii) defuses this objection by developing a local skeptical
argument from unreliability the form of which may,
interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of
philosophy.},
Key = {fds215717}
}
@article{fds204221,
Author = {Braddock, Matthew and Alexander Rosenberg},
Title = {Reconstruction in Moral Philosophy?},
Journal = {Analyse & Kritik},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-80},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {We raise three issues for Philip Kitcher's "Ethical Project"
(2011): First, we argue that the genealogy of morals starts
well before the advent of altruism-failures and the need to
remedy them, which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago.
Second, we challenge the likelihood of long term moral
progress of the sort Kitcher requires to establish
objectivity while circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid
trying to derive normative conclusions from positive
ones--'ought' from 'is'. Third, we sketch ways in which
Kitcher's metaethical opponents could respond to his
arguments against them.},
Key = {fds204221}
}
@article{fds195959,
Author = {Braddock, Matthew},
Title = {Constructivist Experimental Philosophy on Well-Being and
Virtue},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {295-323},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {What is the nature of human well-being? This paper joins the
ancient debate by rejuvenating an ancient claim that is
quite unfashionable among moral philosophers today, namely,
the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is
(non-instrumentally) necessary for human well-being. Call it
the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC). This view can be
revived for contemporary debate by a state-of-the-art
approach that we might call constructivist experimental
philosophy, which takes as its goal the achievement of a
reasonable constructivist account of well-being and takes
the investigation of actual folk intuitions as the central
means to achieving that goal. The paper motivates this
approach and challenges the commonplace philosophical
rejection of AVC by arguing (1) that folk intuitions should
count as evidence in the debate, especially if we aim at a
constructivist account of well-being, (2) that folk
intuitions can be accurately elicited through a thought
experiment (the “Crib Test”), and (3) that there is some
reason (subject to experimental confirmation) for thinking
that folk intuitions, thus elicited, support AVC.
Aristotelian ethics, and indeed the entire virtue ethics
tradition, has come under fire recently by empirically
informed philosophers who question the empirical adequacy of
the postulation of robust character traits, but regardless
of how that debate turns out, other parts of this tradition
might be empirically supported rather than undermined. This
paper sketches a promising, empirically informed way of
supporting Aristotelian views of well-being.},
Key = {fds195959}
}
@article{fds195960,
Author = {Braddock, Matthew},
Title = {Evolutionary Psychology’s Moral Implications},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {531-540},
Year = {2009},
Abstract = {In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s
Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about
certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human
behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat
approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied
with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be
worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it
give us reason to think that we may have to change our
ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral
responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when
it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more
potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects.},
Key = {fds195960}
}
@article{fds195961,
Author = {Braddock, Matthew},
Title = {A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir’s Existential
Ethics},
Journal = {Philosophy Today},
Volume = {51},
Number = {3},
Pages = {303-311},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds195961}
}
%% Brading, Katherine A.
@article{fds376144,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Celebrating Emmy Noether},
Journal = {Physics Today},
Volume = {76},
Number = {8},
Pages = {48-49},
Publisher = {AIP Publishing},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/pt.3.5293},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The Philosophy and Physics of Noether’s Theorems:
A Centenary Volume, James Read and Nicholas J. Teh,
eds.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1063/pt.3.5293},
Key = {fds376144}
}
@article{fds371353,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Du Châtelet and the philosophy of physics},
Pages = {519-532},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138212756},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-45},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-45},
Key = {fds371353}
}
@article{fds357915,
Author = {Brading, K and Stan, M},
Title = {How physics flew the philosophers' nest.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science},
Volume = {88},
Pages = {312-320},
Year = {2021},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.06.010},
Abstract = {We all know that, nowadays, physics and philosophy are
housed in separate departments on university campuses. They
are distinct disciplines with their own journals and
conferences, and in general they are practiced by different
people, using different tools and methods. We also know that
this was not always the case: up until the early 17th
century (at least), physics was a part of philosophy. So
what happened? And what philosophical lessons should we take
away? We argue that the split took place long after Newton's
Principia (rather than before, as many standard accounts
would have it), and offer a new account of the philosophical
reasons that drove the separation. We argue that one
particular problem, dating back to Descartes and persisting
long into the 18th century, played a pivotal role. The
failure to solve it, despite repeated efforts, precipitates
a profound change in the relationship between physics and
philosophy. The culprit is the problem of collisions.
Innocuous though it may seem, this problem becomes the
bellwether of deeper issues concerning the nature and
properties of bodies in general. The failure to successfully
address the problem led to a reconceptualization of the
goals and subject-matter of physics, a change in the
relationship between physics and mechanics, and a shift in
who had authority over the most fundamental issues in
physics.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.06.010},
Key = {fds357915}
}
@article{fds342590,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {A note on rods and clocks in Newton's Principia},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B -
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics},
Volume = {67},
Pages = {160-166},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.07.004},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.07.004},
Key = {fds342590}
}
@article{fds371358,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Matter, Body, Force},
Pages = {54-78},
Booktitle = {EMILIE DU CHATELET AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL
SCIENCE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-138-35165-3},
Key = {fds371358}
}
@article{fds371357,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Method},
Pages = {26-53},
Booktitle = {EMILIE DU CHATELET AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL
SCIENCE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-138-35165-3},
Key = {fds371357}
}
@article{fds371355,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Emilie Du Chatelet and the Foundations of Physical Science
Preface},
Pages = {IX-+},
Booktitle = {EMILIE DU CHATELET AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL
SCIENCE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-138-35165-3},
Key = {fds371355}
}
@article{fds371356,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Bodies in Action},
Pages = {79-101},
Booktitle = {EMILIE DU CHATELET AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL
SCIENCE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-138-35165-3},
Key = {fds371356}
}
@article{fds371354,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Emilie Du Chatelet and the Foundations of Physical Science
Introduction},
Pages = {1-25},
Booktitle = {EMILIE DU CHATELET AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL
SCIENCE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-138-35165-3},
Key = {fds371354}
}
@article{fds371359,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Émilie Du Châtelet and the Problem of Bodies},
Pages = {150-168},
Booktitle = {Early Modern Women on Metaphysics},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107178687},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316827192.009},
Abstract = {The first edition of Du Châtelet’s Institutions de
Physique (hereafter translated as Foundations of Physics)
was published in 1740,1 and was written in France in the
late 1730s, in the wake of Newton’s Principia, at a time
when Cartesian natural philosophy remained popular in France
(the first edition of Newton’s Principia was published in
1687, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy was published in
1644, and Rohault’s textbook of 1671, with multiple
editions thereafter, remained the standard Cartesian
textbook).2, 3.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316827192.009},
Key = {fds371359}
}
@article{fds342589,
Author = {Brading, K and Murgueitio Ramírez and S and Wells,
L},
Title = {One hundred years of general relativity: Albert Einstein:
Relativity: The special and the general theory, 100th
anniversary edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2015, 320 pp, £19.95 HB Andrew Robinson, Einstein. A
Hundred Years of Relativity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2015, 256 pp, £18.95 PB},
Journal = {Metascience},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-9},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-016-0153-y},
Doi = {10.1007/s11016-016-0153-y},
Key = {fds342589}
}
@article{fds359672,
Author = {Brading, K and Crull, E},
Title = {Epistemic structural realism and poincaré’s philosophy of
science},
Journal = {HOPOS},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {108-129},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691138},
Abstract = {Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific
theories have stemmed primarily from John Worrall’s
“Structural Realism” in which he defends a position
(since characterized “epistemic structural realism”)
whose historical roots he attributes to Poincaré. In the
renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon
to find Poincaré’sname associated with various
structuralist positions. However, Poincaré’s
structuralism is deeply entwined with neo-Kantianism and the
roles of convention and objectivity within science. In this
article we explore the nature of these dependencies. What
emerges is not only a clearer picture of Poincaré’s
position regarding structuralism but also two arguments for
versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from
that of Worrall.},
Doi = {10.1086/691138},
Key = {fds359672}
}
@article{fds342591,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Physically locating the present: A case of reading physics
as a contribution to philosophy},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {13-19},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.007},
Abstract = {By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I
argue for the importance of reading history of physics as a
contribution to philosophy, and for the fruitfulness of this
approach to doing integrated history and philosophy of
science. Within philosophy of physics, presentism is widely
regarded as untenable in the light of special relativity. I
argue that reading Newton's Principia as a contribution to
philosophy reveals a law-constitutive approach to the unity
of what there is, from which an alternative approach to
presentism within physics emerges. This view respects the
methodological and epistemological commitments of philosophy
of physics in "taking special relativity seriously", but
proposes an alternative approach to the status of spacetime
(as epistemic) and to the ground of what is real
(law-constitution). While this approach to presentism does
not preserve all of the contemporary presentist desiderata,
it offers the possibility that the spatiotemporal extent of
an existing thing is less than its entire history as
represented in the block universe. I argue that the approach
warrants further philosophical investigation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.007},
Key = {fds342591}
}
@article{fds342592,
Author = {Brading, K and Lanao, X},
Title = {DON ROSS, JAMES LADYMAN, AND HAROLD KINCAID ( eds )
Scientific Metaphysics},
Journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science},
Volume = {65},
Number = {4},
Pages = {899-903},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt061},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt061},
Key = {fds342592}
}
@article{fds342593,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Presentism as an empirical hypothesis},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {80},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1101-1111},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/673897},
Abstract = {Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that
presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by
the development of special relativity. In this article, I
identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists
and advocates of the block universe and then offer an
alternative version of presentism that does not begin from
spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis,
and which has yet to be falsified.While some features of
familiar presentism are lost, a sufficient core remains to
warrant the label (though I fear that labeling it
"presentism" dooms the view). © 2013 by the Philosophy of
Science Association. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/673897},
Key = {fds342593}
}
@article{fds342594,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Three principles of unity in Newton},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {408-415},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.005},
Abstract = {I discuss three principles of unity available in Newton's
physics, appealing to space and time, causal interaction,
and law-constitution respectively. I compare these three
approaches with respect to aggregation (how a collection of
entities can compose a whole) and multiplicity (how the
world as a whole can contain a multiplicity of genuine
unities), outlining the problems faced by the first two
approaches and arguing that the third looks a promising
candidate for further philosophical investigation. © 2012
Elsevier Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.005},
Key = {fds342594}
}
@article{fds342597,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {On composite systems descartes: Newton, and the
law-constitutive approach},
Pages = {130-152},
Booktitle = {Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion Descartes and
Beyond: Descartes and Beyond},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780203833384},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203833384},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203833384},
Key = {fds342597}
}
@article{fds342595,
Author = {Brading, KA and Ryckman, TA},
Title = {Hilbert's axiomatic method and his "foundations of physics":
Reconciling causality with the axiom of general
invariance},
Pages = {175-199},
Booktitle = {Einstein and the Changing Worldviews of Physics},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780817649395},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4940-1_8},
Doi = {10.1007/978-0-8176-4940-1_8},
Key = {fds342595}
}
@article{fds342596,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Newton’s law–constitutive approach to bodies: A response
to Descartes},
Pages = {13-32},
Booktitle = {Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521766180},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511994845.003},
Abstract = {In his Principia Newton offers us a science of bodies in
motion. Such a science has bodies as its subject-matter, but
what are these bodies? If Newton's three laws of motion are
to say anything, then there must be bodies for them to refer
to. I shall label this the ‘problem of bodies’. In this
chapter I outline the ‘problem of bodies’ as Newton
finds it in Descartes's Principles of Philosophy. I claim
that while there is no obvious solution explicit in
Descartes's writings, an implicit solution is strongly
suggested. I argue that Newton was acutely aware of the
problem, and addressed it explicitly by adopting the
strategy implicit in Descartes. My claim is that Newton
offers a law-constitutive solution to the problem of bodies,
according to which the definition of bodies is incomplete
prior to the specification of the laws of nature, and
completed by those laws of nature. Descartes and the problem
of bodies Taken together, Descartes's laws of nature concern
the behaviour of ‘bodies’. Here are the laws as he
stated them in his Principles of Philosophy (Part II,
paragraphs 37, 39, and 40): The first law of nature: that
each thing, as far as is in its power, always remains in the
same state; and that consequently, when it is once moved, it
always continues to move. The second law of nature: that all
movement is, of itself, along straight lines; and
consequently, bodies which are moving in a circle always
tend to move away from the center of the circle which they
are describing. The third law: that a body, on coming in
contact with a stronger one, loses none of its motion; but
that, upon coming in contact with a weaker one, it loses as
much as it transfers to that weaker body. The ‘problem of
bodies’ is this: what are the ‘bodies’ to which these
laws apply? For Descartes, the answer is ‘parts of
matter’. Famously, however, this answer masks a difficulty
that Descartes never satisfactorily resolved, and which
arises as follows.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511994845.003},
Key = {fds342596}
}
@article{fds371360,
Author = {Brading, K and Skiles, A},
Title = {Underdetermination as a Path to Structural
Realism},
Pages = {99-115},
Booktitle = {Structural Realism},
Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {9789400725782},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9_5},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9_5},
Key = {fds371360}
}
@article{fds371361,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and
Modality},
Volume = {281},
Pages = {43-65},
Booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of
Science},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_3},
Abstract = {My goal is to develop a structuralist approach to the
objects of physics that is realist – but there are
obstacles in the way. This paper is about three of them. The
first is familiar, having received a great deal of attention
in the recent literature, and concerns the suggestion by
structural realists French and Ladyman that we should give
up talk of objects. This leaves me in the uncomfortable
position of being pro-structuralist and pro-realist, but
siding with some opponents of structural realism (at least
in its ontic form, about which more below) when it comes to
objects, so I had better have something to say. In fact I do
(see Section 3.4), and I think this obstacle can be moved
out of the way. The other two obstacles I have yet to
overcome, and the purpose of this paper is to explain what
they are, how they arise, and why they are a problem for the
structural realist specifically. The resources open to the
scientific realist in facing these obstacles are not
available to the structural realist, and the reason is the
same in both cases.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_3},
Key = {fds371361}
}
@article{fds371362,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {On composite systems: Descartes, Newton, and the
law-constitutive approach},
Pages = {130-152},
Booktitle = {Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: Descartes and
Beyond},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780415882668},
Key = {fds371362}
}
@article{fds371363,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Autonomous patterns and scientific realism},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {77},
Number = {5},
Pages = {827-839},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656816},
Abstract = {Taking Bogen and Woodward's discussion of data and phenomena
as his starting point, McAllister presents a challenge to
scientific realism. I discuss this challenge and offer a
suggestion for how the scientific realist could respond to
both its epistemic and ontological aspects. In so doing, I
urge that the scientific realist should not reject
ontological pluralism from the start, but should seek to
explore versions of scientific realism that leave open the
possibility of certain kinds of pluralist ontology. I
investigate the available options (in terms of
foundationalism, reductionism, and universalism) and use a
law-constitutive approach to offer a strategy for the
scientific realist who is open-minded about ontological
pluralism. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science
Association. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/656816},
Key = {fds371363}
}
@article{fds371364,
Author = {Brading, KA and Ryckman, TA},
Title = {Hilbert's 'Foundations of Physics': Gravitation and
electromagnetism within the axiomatic method},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B -
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {102-153},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.08.002},
Abstract = {In November and December 1915, Hilbert presented two
communications to the Göttingen Academy of Sciences under
the common title 'The Foundations of Physics'. Versions of
each eventually appeared in the Nachrichten of the Academy.
Hilbert's first communication has received significant
reconsideration in recent years, following the discovery of
printer's proofs of this paper, dated 6 December 1915. The
focus has been primarily on the 'priority dispute' over the
Einstein field equations. Our contention, in contrast, is
that the discovery of the December proofs makes it possible
to see the thematic linkage between the material that
Hilbert cut from the published version of the first
communication and the content of the second, as published in
1917. The latter has been largely either disregarded or
misinterpreted, and our aim is to show that (a) Hilbert's
two communications should be regarded as part of a wider
research program within the overarching framework of 'the
axiomatic method' (as Hilbert expressly stated was the
case), and (b) the second communication is a fine and
coherent piece of work within this framework, whose
principal aim is to address an apparent tension between
general invariance and causality (in the precise sense of
Cauchy determination), pinpointed in Theorem I of the first
communication. This is not the same problem as that found in
Einstein's 'hole argument'-something that, we argue, never
confused Hilbert. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.08.002},
Key = {fds371364}
}
@article{fds371365,
Author = {Brading, K and Castellani, E},
Title = {Symmetries and Invariances in Classical Physics},
Pages = {1331-1367},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Physics},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444515605},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50016-6},
Abstract = {The group theoretical notion of symmetry is the notion of
invariance under a specified group of transformations.
"Invariance" is a mathematical term: something is invariant
when it is left unaltered by a given transformation. This
mathematical notion is used to express the notion of
physical symmetry. The chapter discusses the distinction
between symmetries of objects and of laws, and that between
symmetry principles and symmetry arguments. It includes a
discussion of Curie's principle. The important connection
between symmetries, as studied in physics and the
mathematical techniques of group theory is discussed. A
brief history is given on how group theory was applied first
to geometry and then to physics in the course of the
nineteenth century, preluding to the central importance
acquired by group theoretical techniques in contemporary
physics. The chapter focuses on the roles and meaning of
symmetries in these theories, which leads into the
discussion of Noether's theorems. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50016-6},
Key = {fds371365}
}
@article{fds371366,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {LEO CORRY. David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics
(1898-1918)},
Journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {113-129},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm044},
Doi = {10.1093/philmat/nkm044},
Key = {fds371366}
}
@article{fds371367,
Author = {Brading, K and Landry, E},
Title = {Scientific structuralism: Presentation and
representation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {73},
Number = {5},
Pages = {571-581},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/518327},
Abstract = {This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism.
Central to our investigation is the notion of 'shared
structure'. We begin with a description of mathematical
structuralism and use this to point out analogies and
disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular
focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the
notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world
connection, this use being crucially important to both the
contemporary structural empiricist and realist. We show why
minimal scientific structuralism is, at the very least, a
powerful methodological standpoint. Our investigation also
makes explicit what more must be added to this minimal
structuralist position in order to address the theory-world
connection, namely, an account of representation. Copyright
2006 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/518327},
Key = {fds371367}
}
@article{fds371368,
Author = {Brading, K and Castellani, E},
Title = {Symmetries and invariances in classical physics},
Pages = {1331-1367},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Physics},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780444515605},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50016-6},
Abstract = {The group theoretical notion of symmetry is the notion of
invariance under a specified group of transformations.
“Invariance” is a mathematical term: something is
invariant when it is left unaltered by a given
transformation. This mathematical notion is used to express
the notion of physical symmetry. The chapter discusses the
distinction between symmetries of objects and of laws, and
that between symmetry principles and symmetry arguments. It
includes a discussion of Curie's principle. The important
connection between symmetries, as studied in physics and the
mathematical techniques of group theory is discussed. A
brief history is given on how group theory was applied first
to geometry and then to physics in the course of the
nineteenth century, preluding to the central importance
acquired by group theoretical techniques in contemporary
physics. The chapter focuses on the roles and meaning of
symmetries in these theories, which leads into the
discussion of Noether's theorems.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50016-6},
Key = {fds371368}
}
@article{fds342598,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {A note on general relativity, energy conservation, and
Noether's theorems},
Journal = {Universe of General Relativity},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {125-135},
Publisher = {BIRKHAUSER BOSTON},
Editor = {Kox, AJ and Eisenstaedt, J},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0-8176-4380-X},
Key = {fds342598}
}
@article{fds342599,
Author = {Brading, K and Brown, HR},
Title = {Are gauge symmetry transformations observable?},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {55},
Number = {4},
Pages = {645-665},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.4.645},
Abstract = {In a recent paper in this journal, Kosso ([2000]) discussed
the observational status of continuous symmetries of
physics. While we are in broad agreement with his approach,
we disagree with his analysis. In the discussion of the
status of gauge symmetry, a set of examples offered by't
Hooft ([1980]) has influenced several philosophers,
including Kosso; in all cases the interpretation of the
examples is mistaken. In this paper, we present our
preferred approach to the empirical significance of
symmetries, re-analysing the cases of gauge symmetry and
general covariance. © British Society for the Philosophy of
Science 2004.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/55.4.645},
Key = {fds342599}
}
%% Brandon, Robert N.
@article{fds343339,
Author = {McShea, DW and Wang, SC and Brandon, RN},
Title = {A quantitative formulation of biology's first
law.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {73},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1101-1115},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/evo.13735},
Abstract = {The zero-force evolutionary law (ZFEL) states that in
evolutionary systems, in the absence of forces or
constraints, diversity and complexity tend to increase. The
reason is that diversity and complexity are both variance
measures, and variances tend to increase spontaneously as
random events accumulate. Here, we use random-walk models to
quantify the ZFEL expectation, producing equations that give
the probabilities of diversity or complexity increasing as a
function of time, and that give the expected magnitude of
the increase. We produce two sets of equations, one for the
case in which variation occurs in discrete steps, the other
for the case in which variation is continuous. The equations
provide a way to decompose actual trajectories of diversity
or complexity into two components, the portion due to the
ZFEL and a remainder due to selection and constraint.
Application of the equations is demonstrated using real and
hypothetical data.},
Doi = {10.1111/evo.13735},
Key = {fds343339}
}
@article{fds363728,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Nijhout, HF},
Title = {The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models
of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism
and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism},
Pages = {383-404},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the
view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that
all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the
genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Dawkins 1982;
Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991) defend 278 ROBERT N.
BRANDON AND H. FREDERIK NIJHOUT the weaker view that in many
cases there are multiple, equally adequate accounts of
evolutionary events but that always among the set of equally
adequate representations will be one at the genic level.
There have been many arguments against these views (e.g.,
Wimsatt 1980; Brandon 1982; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Lloyd
1988), but the debate continues to animate contemporary
philosophy of biology (e.g., Lloyd 2005; Waters 2005). A
(perhaps the) reason for this is that the refutations have
primarily relied on philosophically contentious views on
scientific explanation and causation-views their opponents
have not been willing to accept. What both sides in this
debate have accepted is that the genic and higher-level
accounts are empirically equivalent (but see Brandon and
Burian [1984, introduction to part II] and Godfrey-Smith and
Lewontin [1993]). This paper will show that that is not the
case, that the two accounts give dramatically different,
incompatible, predictions in a broad class of cases. The
predictions are factually different and the genic models
consistently get it wrong. Given that virtually all
philosophers and scientists accept the position that
scientific theories should agree with known facts, we will
refute genic selectionism without resort to anything that is
philosophically controversial. 1 1. The Cases. Let us start
with the case that has been most discussed in this
literature, a case of heterozygote superiority. Let us
suppose that there is a single genetic locus with two
alleles, A and a. Thus there are three genotypes, AA, Aa,
and aa.. By definition the heterozygote Aa is superior in
fitness to the two homozygotes. In general the fitness of
the two homozygotes need not be equal, but for simplicity we
will assume that they are since nothing hinges on that
assumption. The standard genotypic model normalizes the
fitness of Aa at 1 and assigns the fitness of 1 - s to the
two homozygotes (where 1 ~ s > 0). Although the value of s =
1 GENIC AND GENOTYPIC MODELS OF SELECTION 279 is a
mathematical, and biological, possibility, for our purposes
we cannot focus on that value since it is what Brandon
(2005) has termed a value of maximal fitness difference.
Fitness values are at the point of maximal fitness
difference when some fitness values equal 1 and some equal 0
and there are no intermediary fitness values. Drift is
impossible at a maximal fitness differential point. Since we
are going to be interested in the interplay of drift and
selection, we will need to give s some intermediary value.
For now let us assume s = 0.5. This model predicts a stable
equilibrium that will be reached in a number of generations
(depending on the initial starting point and population
size). At this equilibrium the frequencies of the two
alleles are both 50'%.},
Key = {fds363728}
}
@article{fds363776,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
Title = {TESTING ADAPTATIONISM: A COMMENT ON ORZACK AND
SOBER},
Pages = {133-146},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {One of the most heated areas of controversy within
contemporary evolutionary biology concerns adaptationism and
the importance of natural selection relative to other
evolutionary factors. Because these debates sometimes seem
to be more ideological than scientific, Orzack and Sober's
(1994) recent suggestion about how to test adaptationism is
likely to be well received. However, as we will show, both
their statement of the hypothesis of adaptationism and their
method of testing it are seriously flawed. We will try to
refine the relevant hypotheses and consider the extent to
which, and the methods by which, they can be tested. In this
way we do take Orzack and Sober's project seriously. But, we
wish to state at the outset that the status of the
"adaptationist program" does not stand or fall on the
outcome of their project or our revision of it here. That
is, even if the hypothesis of adaptationism cannot be stated
in a precise enough manner to be testable, or if it is so
statable but proves to be false, the value of an
adaptational approach to evolutionary biology is not
necessarily diminished (see Mayr 1983 and Williams 1992 for
further discussion). Nonetheless, we think it
uncontroversial that in science a well-posed thesis is
preferable, everything else being equal, to an ill-posed or
untestable one, and our purpose here is to demonstrate that
Orzack and Sober's thesis of what constitutes adaptationism
is ill posed.},
Key = {fds363776}
}
@article{fds363777,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
Title = {THE INDETERMINISTIC CHARACTER OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: NO "NO
HIDDEN VARIABLES PROOF" BUT NO ROOM FOR DETERMINISM
EITHER},
Pages = {213-236},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {ET is also apparently indeterministic; certainly the best
and most influential treatments of the probabilistic nature
of ET have drawn this conclusion (Beatty 1984, Sober 1984,
Richardson and Burian 1992). Moreover, the propensity
interpretation of fitness (Brandon 1978, 1990; Brandon and
Beatty 1984; Burian 1983; Mills and Beatty 1979; Richardson
and Burian 1992), which has been accepted by most
philosophers of biology and many working evolutionary
biologists, presupposes that natural selection is
fundamentally probabilistic. Recently, however, two
philosophers, Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Horan (1994), have
questioned this conclusion. They have argued that the
statistical character of evolutionary theory is best viewed
instrumentally, i.e., that the probabilities involved in
evolutionary theory are epistemic-they reflect our
ignorance-and that if we were smarter and/or if we had
different aims, evolutionary theory could be recast as a
purely deterministic theory. In other words they argue that
the process of evolution is deterministic while, for various
reasons, our best theory of evolution is indeterministic.
This is exactly the sort of position that has been ruled out
in QM by Bell's Theorem (Bell 1964, 1966). We want to show
that it is also ruled out in ET, though in a less decisive
way.},
Key = {fds363777}
}
@article{fds320303,
Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R},
Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in
evolutionary transitions.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and
biomedical sciences},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {24-31},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution'
represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is
warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to
a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a
nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of
evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory
of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of
expected events. We provide a systematic account of
evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity
of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force
Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary
transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely
contingent after all.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
Key = {fds320303}
}
@article{fds320304,
Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L},
Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: A reply
to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {4},
Pages = {577-585},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
Abstract = {Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577-592, 2013) argue
that there is no fact of the matter whether selection
dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of
evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather,
they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual
presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly
complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to
current biological practice. The solution is to recognize
that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process,
and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic
expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no
problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and
empirically-as modern science illustrates-when drift does
occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be
discovered. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
Key = {fds320304}
}
@article{fds244324,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A general case for functional pluralism},
Pages = {97-104},
Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms},
Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
Editor = {Huneman, P},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9789400753037},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued
for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric
Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of
ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
only from the details of biological practice but even from
the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Key = {fds244324}
}
@article{fds359570,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A General Case for Functional Pluralism},
Volume = {363},
Pages = {97-104},
Booktitle = {Synthese Library},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443–469, 1994) argued
for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
argued that they were instead complimentary. Frédéric
Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
stronger using an interesting example—the evolution of
ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
only from the details of biological practice but even from
the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Key = {fds359570}
}
@article{fds244327,
Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {737-744},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {K. Sterelny},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
Keywords = {Zero-force law },
Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
in writing this book was to present a radically different
way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
Key = {fds244327}
}
@article{fds244322,
Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R},
Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group
selection},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-400},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of
individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group
selection. In this paper, we argue that the original
interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We
accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at
minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness
exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations
is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of
individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because
it is individually advantageous. © 2011 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
Key = {fds244322}
}
@article{fds201669,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group
Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy,
(2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201669}
}
@article{fds201670,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,”
in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol.
9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201670}
}
@article{fds201671,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function:
Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)},
Publisher = {Springer},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201671}
}
@article{fds244325,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary
Theory},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {19-35},
Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M},
Year = {2011},
ISBN = {9780262017404},
Key = {fds244325}
}
@article{fds320305,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A non-newtonian newtonian model of evolution: The ZFEL
view},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {77},
Number = {5},
Pages = {702-715},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656901},
Abstract = {Recently philosophers of biology have argued over whether or
not Newtonian mechanics provides a useful analogy for
thinking about evolutionary theory. For philosophers, the
canonical presentation of this analogy is Sober's. Matthen
and Ariew and Walsh, Lewins, and Ariew argue that this
analogy is deeply wrong-headed. Here I argue that the
analogy is indeed useful, however, not in the way it is
usually interpreted. The Newtonian analogy depends on having
the proper analogue of Newton's First Law. That analogue is
what McShea and Brandon call the Zero Force Evolutionary Law
(ZFEL). According to the ZFEL, change, not stasis, is the
default state of evolutionary systems. Copyright 2010 by the
Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/656901},
Key = {fds320305}
}
@book{fds244326,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R},
Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds244326}
}
@article{fds320306,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems},
Pages = {267-281},
Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781402039164},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has
long been associated with the appearance of order in the
biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of
natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear
underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a
product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this
post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of
Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the
ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a
wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to
produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question.
But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from
the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is
needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in
what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language
properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex
dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in
the Netherlands.},
Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
Key = {fds320306}
}
@article{fds244328,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {CII},
Number = {7},
Pages = {319-335},
Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
Year = {2006},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244328}
}
@article{fds52684,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical
Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of
individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group
selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves
via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we
defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual
selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is
individually advantageous, while maintaining that other
forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing
for a pluralistic account of alturism.},
Key = {fds52684}
}
@article{fds244323,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G},
Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical
Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random
Drift},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade
of population genetics—are statistical theories par
excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character
of population-level phenomena? One view is that the
population-level statistics are a product of, are generated
by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the
population. On this conception, population-level phenomena
are explained by individual-level probabilities and their
population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably
goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently ,
is that the population-level statistics are sui generis,
that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic
behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh
et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We
are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will
admit that the population-level theories of evolution are
statistical, so we will call this the emergentist
statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show
that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual
errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology,
concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its
adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory
and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary
biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we
will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI)
succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation
fails.},
Key = {fds244323}
}
@article{fds320307,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to
Millstein},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {153-170},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
Abstract = {Millstein [Bio. Philos. 17 (2002) 33] correctly identies a
serious problem with the view that natural selection and
random drift are not conceptually distinct. She offers a
solution to this problem purely in terms of differences
between the processes of selection and drift. I show that
this solution does not work, that it leaves the vast
majority of real biological cases uncategorized. However, I
do think there is a solution to the problem she raises, and
I offer it here. My solution depends on solving the
biological analogue of the reference class problem in
probability theory and on the reality of individual
fitnesses. © Springer 2005.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
Key = {fds320307}
}
@article{fds320308,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of
Selection},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {167-180},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006682200831},
Abstract = {Richard Lewontin's (1970) early work on the "units" of
selection initiated the conceptual and theoretical
investigations that have led to the hierarchical perspective
on selection that has reached near consensus status today.
This paper explores other aspects of his work, work on what
he termed "continuity" and "quasi-independence", that
connect to contemporary explorations of modularity in
development and evolution. I characterize such modules and
argue that they are the true units of selection in that they
are what evolution by natural selection individuates,
selects among, and transforms.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831},
Key = {fds320308}
}
@article{fds320309,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental
evidence},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392621},
Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the
practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it
as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike,
regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the
experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However,
this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical
Positivist conception of law and its essential role in
scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing
that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology
have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range
of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited
projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of
scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science
Association. All rigts reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/392621},
Key = {fds320309}
}
@article{fds320310,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {531-538},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006576129655},
Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of
screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural
selection raises some interesting issues to which I am
pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some
fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In
particular, he questions whether or not my point that
phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in
cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the
explanation of differential reproductive success should be
in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic
differences. I will respond to this and show why the two
supposed counter-examples to my position
fail.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006576129655},
Key = {fds320310}
}
@article{fds318355,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and
Sober},
Journal = {American Naturalist},
Volume = {148},
Number = {1},
Pages = {189-201},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/285918},
Doi = {10.1086/285918},
Key = {fds318355}
}
@article{fds320311,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No "No
hidden variables proof" but no room for determinism
either},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {3},
Pages = {315-337},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289915},
Abstract = {In this paper we first briefly review Bell's (1964, 1966)
Theorem to see how it invalidates any deterministic "hidden
variable" account of the apparent indeterminacy of quantum
mechanics (QM). Then we show that quantum uncertainty, at
the level of DNA mutations, can "percolate" up to have major
populational effects. Interesting as this point may be it
does not show any autonomous indeterminism of the
evolutionary process. In the next two sections we
investigate drift and natural selection as the locus of
autonomous biological indeterminacy. Here we conclude that
the population-level indeterminacy of natural selection and
drift are ultimately based on the assumption of a
fundamental indeterminacy at the level of the lives and
deaths of individual organisms. The following section
examines this assumption and defends it from the
determinists' attack. Then we show that, even if one rejects
the assumption, there is still an important reason why one
might think evolutionary theory (ET) is autonomously
indeterministic. In the concluding section we contrast the
arguments we have mounted against a deterministic hidden
variable account of ET with the proof of the impossibility
of such an account of QM.},
Doi = {10.1086/289915},
Key = {fds320311}
}
@article{fds320312,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Theory and experiment in evolutionary biology},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {99},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-73},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1994},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064530},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530},
Key = {fds320312}
}
@article{fds320313,
Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to
Ghiselin},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-79},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00144042},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042},
Key = {fds320313}
}
@article{fds320314,
Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species
concept},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {397-414},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1987},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127698},
Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an
important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology,
is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important
subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial
boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion.
Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very
different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with
respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An
often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and
"ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A
phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a
(monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic
sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those
causal processes that are most important in producing and
maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal
processes can include actual interbreeding, selective
constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread
use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two
reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from
ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on
the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor
controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to
interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a
result of a diversity of processes which result in shared
selective environments and common developmental programs.
These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual
organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect
an underlying unity that the biological species concept can
not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698},
Key = {fds320314}
}
@article{fds320315,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N},
Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of
language},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-189},
Year = {1986},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142900},
Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first
section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts,
namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an
evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second
section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In
it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic
plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that
selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a
nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the
inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections
are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we
offer an argument that human natural languages have just the
features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under
the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel
Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900},
Key = {fds320315}
}
@article{fds320316,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Biological teleology: Questions and explanations},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {91-105},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
Abstract = {This paper gives an account of evolutionary explanations in
biology. Briefly, the explanations I am primarily concerned
with are explanations of adaptations. ('Adaptation' is a
technical term and defining it requires a fairly lengthy
digression.) These explanations are contrasted with other
nonteleological evolutionary explanations. The distinction
is made by distinguishing the different kinds of questions
these different explanations serve to answer. The sense in
which explanations of adaptations are teleological is
spelled out. © 1981.},
Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
Key = {fds320316}
}
@article{fds320317,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3},
Pages = {181-206},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1978},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
Key = {fds320317}
}
%% Buchanan, Allen E.
@misc{fds371632,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Evolving Measures of Moral Success},
Pages = {270-294},
Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
Implications},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190096168},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
Key = {fds371632}
}
@misc{fds372449,
Author = {Barrett, J and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Social Experimentation in an Unjust World},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {127-152},
Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume
9},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780198877639},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
Abstract = {There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation
as a means of promoting social progress, including progress
in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in
favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to
resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially
valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We
then identify four challenges: the information problem
(experiments may not yield relevant information), the
selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments
may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information
generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and
the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks).
Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all
four problems, rendering social experimentation a less
reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe
injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is
not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that
we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing
conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be
progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation
a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we
must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its
value.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
Key = {fds372449}
}
@article{fds361221,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {When Knowing What Is Just and Being Committed to Achieving
it Is Not Enough},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {5},
Pages = {725-735},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12536},
Abstract = {In this article, I argue that overly-optimistic beliefs
about how much progress toward justice has been made and
overly-pessimistic beliefs about what progress toward
justice can be made can both help perpetuate injustices.
Further, such beliefs can help perpetuate injustices even if
those who hold them have a firm grasp of the correct
principles of justice, a robust commitment to realize them,
and the political influence to make their commitment
effective. I also argue that when mistaken beliefs about
justice of either sort are embedded in ideologies, they are
an especially serious obstacle to moral progress. Finally, I
conclude that ideologies can help perpetuate injustices even
if they do not ‘mask’ them, if they include either
overly-optimistic or overly-pessimistic beliefs about
progress toward justice.},
Doi = {10.1111/japp.12536},
Key = {fds361221}
}
@article{fds362475,
Author = {Emanuel, EJ and Buchanan, A and Chan, SY and Fabre, C and Halliday, D and Heath, J and Herzog, L and Leland, RJ and McCoy, MS and Norheim, OF and Saenz, C and Schaefer, GO and Tan, K-C and Wellman, CH and Wolff, J and Persad, G},
Title = {What are the obligations of pharmaceutical companies in a
global health emergency?},
Journal = {Lancet (London, England)},
Volume = {398},
Number = {10304},
Pages = {1015-1020},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(21)01378-7},
Doi = {10.1016/s0140-6736(21)01378-7},
Key = {fds362475}
}
@article{fds359813,
Author = {Emanuel, EJ and Buchanan, A and Chan, SY and Fabre, C and Halliday, D and Leland, RJ and Luna, F and Mccoy, MS and Norheim, OF and Schaefer, GO and Tan, KC and Wellman, CH},
Title = {On the Ethics of Vaccine Nationalism: The Case for the Fair
Priority for Residents Framework},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {35},
Number = {4},
Pages = {543-562},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000514},
Abstract = {COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come.
Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated
vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this
vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme
cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we
propose the fair priority for residents (FPR) framework, in
which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for
their residents only to the extent that they are needed to
maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are
implementing reasonable public health interventions.
Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that
experienced during a bad influenza season, which society
considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take
action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no
emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This flu-risk
standard is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic.
Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater
governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for
a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level
of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will
depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This
links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging
from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that
governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their
country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to
noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is
obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks
of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and
reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country:
(1) having developed a vaccine, (2) raising taxes to pay for
vaccine research and purchase, (3) wanting to eliminate
economic and social burdens, and (4) being ineffective in
combating COVID-19 through public health
interventions.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0892679421000514},
Key = {fds359813}
}
@article{fds364051,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {THE PERPETUAL STRUGGLE: HOW THE COEVOLUTION OF HIERARCHY AND
RESISTANCE DRIVES THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY AND
INSTITUTIONS},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {232-260},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052522000139},
Abstract = {Since the earliest human societies, there has been an
ongoing struggle between hierarchy and resistance to
hierarchy, and this struggle is a major driver of the
evolution of moralities and of institutions. Attempts to
initiate or sustain hierarchies are often met with
resistance; hierarchs then adopt new strategies, which in
turn prompt new strategies of resistance; and so on. The key
point is that the struggle is typically conducted using
moral concepts in justifications for or against unequal
power and involves the stimulation of the moral emotions.
Both parties to the struggle treat morality as a valuable
strategic resource; and the dynamic of interaction between
hierarchs and resisters generates changes in that resource.
The hierarch/resister struggle is in part a competition
between moral concepts and justifications, and that
competition drives the emergence of new moral concepts and
justifications, just as competition in other contexts
generates innovations. Among the moral concepts generated by
the struggle are the following: authority, legitimacy,
aristocracy, the divine right of kings, the mandate of
heaven, natural rights, civil and political rights,
constitutionalism, the rule of law, sovereignty, collective
self-determination, exploitation, oppression, and
domination.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052522000139},
Key = {fds364051}
}
@misc{fds365845,
Author = {Powell, R and Mikhalevich, I and Buchanan, A},
Title = {How the Moral Community Evolves},
Pages = {231-249},
Booktitle = {Rethinking Moral Status},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780192894076},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0014},
Abstract = {Moral reasoning is modulated by emotions and other cognitive
biases. How do these covert biasing mechanisms shape
perceptions of more fundamental moral categories, such as
moral standing and moral status (together, “MSS”), out
of which specific moral attitudes and behaviors flow? This
chapter explains the centrality of MSS to human evolution,
and examines several evolved biases that distort MSS
ascription. These include tendencies to deny moral standing,
or to attribute lower moral status, to beings that elicit
feelings of disgust or fear, as well as to those that are
perceived as less similar, less attractive, less
individualized, and less disposed toward reciprocal
cooperation. These adaptive mechanisms may have served human
groups well in the evolutionary past, but in the modern
world they pose an obstacle to moral progress and play a key
role in moral regression. The chapter argues that these
biases have also influenced philosophical and scientific
research on animal minds. The aim is to develop a richer,
biocultural understanding of how conceptions of the moral
community evolve.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0014},
Key = {fds365845}
}
@article{fds355553,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Précis: Our moral fate: Evolution and the escape from
tribalism},
Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {443-447},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2020-0018},
Abstract = {The book uses evolutionary principles to explain tribalism,
a way of thinking and acting that divides the world into Us
versus Them and achieves cooperation within a group at the
expense of erecting insuperable obstacles to cooperation
among groups. Tribalism represents political controversies
as supreme emergencies in which ordinary moral constraints
do not apply and as zero-sum, winner take all contests.
Tribalism not only undermines democracy by ruling out
compromise, bargaining, and respect for the Other; it also
reverses one of the most important milestones of progress in
how we understand morality: the insight that morality is not
a list of commands to be unthinkingly followed, but rather
that morality centrally involves the giving and taking of
reasons among equals. Tribalism rejects this insight by
branding the Other as a being who is incapable of
reasoning.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2020-0018},
Key = {fds355553}
}
@article{fds352466,
Author = {Emanuel, EJ and Persad, G and Kern, A and Buchanan, A and Fabre, C and Halliday, D and Heath, J and Herzog, L and Leland, RJ and Lemango, ET and Luna, F and McCoy, MS and Norheim, OF and Ottersen, T and Schaefer, GO and Tan, K-C and Wellman, CH and Wolff, J and Richardson,
HS},
Title = {An ethical framework for global vaccine allocation.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {369},
Number = {6509},
Pages = {1309-1312},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.abe2803},
Doi = {10.1126/science.abe2803},
Key = {fds352466}
}
@article{fds348062,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Reply to Comments},
Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
Volume = {41},
Number = {2},
Pages = {287-300},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-0018},
Abstract = {Commentators on The Evolution of Moral Progress: A
Biocultural Theory raise a number of metaethical and moral
concerns with our analysis, as well as some complaints
regarding how we have interpreted and made use of the
contemporary evolutionary and social sciences of morality.
Some commentators assert that one must already presuppose a
moral theory before one can even begin to theorize moral
progress; others query whether the shift toward greater
inclusion is really a case of moral progress, or whether our
theory can be properly characterized as 'naturalistic'.
Other commentators worry that we have uncritically accepted
the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, even
though it gives short shrift to the role of women or
presupposes an oversimplified view of the environment in
which the core elements of human moral psychology are
thought to have congealed. Another commentator laments that
we did not make more extensive use of data from the social
sciences. In this reply, we engage with all of these
constructive criticisms and show that although some of them
are well taken, none undermine the core thesis of our
book.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2019-0018},
Key = {fds348062}
}
@article{fds348061,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Précis of the Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural
Theory},
Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
Volume = {41},
Number = {2},
Pages = {183-193},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-0011},
Abstract = {The idea of moral progress played a central role in liberal
political thought from the Enlightenment through the
nineteenth century but is rarely encountered in moral and
political philosophical discourse today. One reason for this
is that traditional liberal theorists of moral progress,
like their conservative detractors, tended to rely on
under-evidenced assumptions about human psychology and
society. For the first time, we are developing robust
scientific knowledge about human nature, especially through
empirical psychological theories of morality and culture
that are informed by evolutionary theory. On the surface,
evolutionary accounts of morality paint a rather pessimistic
picture of human moral nature, suggesting that certain types
of moral progress are unrealistic or inappropriate for
beings like us. Humans are said to be 'hard-wired' for
tribalism. However, such a view overlooks the great
plasticity of human morality as evidenced by our history of
social and political moral achievements. To account for
these changes while giving evolved moral psychology its due,
we develop a dynamic, biocultural theory of moral progress
that highlights the interaction between adaptive components
of moral psychology and the cultural construction of moral
norms and beliefs, and we explore how this interaction can
advance, impede, and reverse moral progress.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2019-0011},
Key = {fds348061}
}
@misc{fds363778,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The reflexive social epistemology of human
rights},
Pages = {284-292},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781315717937},
Key = {fds363778}
}
@misc{fds335555,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Institutional legitimacy},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {53-78},
Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780198813972},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813972.003.0003},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198813972.003.0003},
Key = {fds335555}
}
@misc{fds354169,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {A principled international legal response to demands for
self-determination},
Pages = {139-154},
Booktitle = {Identity, Self-Determination and Secession},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780815389613},
Key = {fds354169}
}
@book{fds337052,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {The evolution of moral progress: A biocultural
theory},
Pages = {1-424},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190868413},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190868413.001.0001},
Abstract = {The idea of moral progress played a central role in liberal
political thought from the Enlightenment through the
nineteenth century but is rarely encountered in moral and
political philosophical discourse today. One reason for this
is that traditional liberal theorists of moral progress,
like their conservative detractors, tended to rely on
underevidenced assumptions about human psychology and
society. For the first time in history, we are developing
robust scientific knowledge about human nature, especially
through empirical psychological theories of morality and
culture that are informed by evolutionary theory. In
addition, the social sciences now provide better information
about which social arrangements are feasible and sustainable
and about how social norms arise, change, and come to shape
moral thought and behavior. Accordingly, it is time to
revisit the question of moral progress. On the surface,
evolutionary accounts of morality paint a pessimistic
picture, suggesting that certain types of moral progress are
unrealistic or inappropriate for beings like us. In brief,
humans are said to be “hard-wired” for rather limited
moral capacities. However, such a view overlooks the great
plasticity of human morality as evidenced by our history of
social and political moral achievements. To account for
these changes while giving evolved moral psychology its due,
we develop a dynamic, biocultural theory of moral progress
that highlights the interaction between adaptive components
of moral psychology and the cultural construction of moral
norms and beliefs; and we explore how this interaction can
advance, impede, and reverse moral progress.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190868413.001.0001},
Key = {fds337052}
}
@book{fds337336,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Institutionalizing the just war},
Pages = {1-324},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190878436},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878436.001.0001},
Abstract = {This book challenges traditional and contemporary just war
theorizing, by taking seriously the role of social practices
and institutions in decisions to go to war. It argues that
which substantive moral principles regarding the initiation
of war are valid can depend upon the institutional processes
within which the decisions are made. Traditional and
mainstream contemporary just war theorists proceed as if
institutions don’t exist or as if existing institutional
resources for influencing decision-making are so negligible
that they may be disregarded. They fail to consider the
possibility that institutional innovations could improve
recourse to war decisions and that the fact that this is so
has important implications for the morality of war-making.
The first six chapters of the book lay out the case for
institutionalizing the just war-for rethinking just war
theory with due regard for the fact that institutional
realities and possibilities shape the morality of war. The
last two chapters advance concrete, feasible proposals for
much-needed institutional innovation.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190878436.001.0001},
Key = {fds337336}
}
@misc{fds366565,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Medical paternalism},
Pages = {183-204},
Booktitle = {Medical Law and Ethics},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9781138730977},
Key = {fds366565}
}
@misc{fds362476,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The controversy over retrospective moral
judgment},
Pages = {117-122},
Booktitle = {Human Experimentation and Research},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781138709607},
Abstract = {The mandate of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments required that the Committee take a
position on the validity of retrospective moral judgments.
However, throughout its period of operation, the Committee
remained divided on the question of whether sound judgments
of individual culpability and wrongdoing should be included
in its Final Report. This essay examines the arguments that
various committee members marshalled to support their
opposing views on retrospective moral judgment and explains
the significance of the controversy.},
Key = {fds362476}
}
@misc{fds366138,
Author = {Buchanan, AE},
Title = {The right to a decent minimum of health care},
Pages = {41-64},
Booktitle = {Health Rights},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780754627944},
Key = {fds366138}
}
@misc{fds368307,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {A critical introduction to rawls' theory of
justice},
Pages = {175-211},
Booktitle = {Distributive Justice},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781315257563},
Key = {fds368307}
}
@article{fds333207,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {De-moralization as emancipation: Liberty, progress, and the
evolution of invalid moral norms},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {108-135},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052517000231},
Abstract = {Liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment understood that
surplus moral constraints, imposed by invalid moral norms,
are a serious limitation on liberty. They also recognized
that overcoming surplus moral constraints - what we call
proper demoralization - is an important dimension of moral
progress. Contemporary philosophical theorists of liberty
have largely neglected the threat that surplus moral
constraints pose to liberty and the importance of proper
de-moralization for human emancipation. This essay examines
the phenomena of surplus moral constraints and proper
de-moralization, utilizing insights from biological and
cultural evolutionary thinking.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052517000231},
Key = {fds333207}
}
@misc{fds349746,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Califano, A and Kahn, J and McPherson, E and Robertson,
J and Brody, B},
Title = {Pharmacogenetics: Ethical issues and policy
options},
Pages = {327-341},
Booktitle = {Genetics and Gene Therapy},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754620556},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315254517-12},
Abstract = {Pharmacogenetics offers the prospect of an era of safer and
more effective drugs, as well as more individualized use of
drug therapies. Before the benefits of pharmacogenetics can
be realized, the ethical issues that arise in research and
clinical application of pharmacogenetic technologies must be
addressed. The ethical issues raised by pharmacogenetics can
be addressed under six headings: (1) regulatory oversight,
(2) confidentiality and privacy, (3) informed consent, (4)
availability of drugs, (5) access, and (6) clinicians’
changing responsibilities in the era of pharmacogenetic
medicine. We analyze each of these categories of ethical
issues and provide policy approaches for addressing
them.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315254517-12},
Key = {fds349746}
}
@misc{fds366566,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {What’s so special about rights?},
Pages = {289-312},
Booktitle = {Theories of Rights},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754624301},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315236308-15},
Abstract = {This chapter examines the assumption that frames the most
important debates in contemporary moral and political
philosophy-the assumption that the concept of a right has
certain unique features which make rights so especially
valuable as to be virtually indispensable elements of any
acceptable social order. There are, it seems, only two
archetypal strategies for challenging the thesis that rights
are uniquely valuable. The first is to argue that rights are
valuable only under certain defective - and temporary-social
conditions. Second explore more promising strategy for
challenging the thesis that rights are so uniquely valuable
as to be indispensable. This second approach frankly
acknowledges that at least some of the types of
interpersonal conflict which rights are invoked to handle
are not eliminable by changing the mode of production or by
any other acceptable and feasible transformation of the
social order.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315236308-15},
Key = {fds366566}
}
@article{fds321574,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Toward a naturalistic theory of moral progress},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {126},
Number = {4},
Pages = {983-1014},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686003},
Abstract = {Early liberal theories about the feasibility of moral
progress were premised on empirically ungrounded assumptions
about human psychology and society. In this article, we
develop a richer naturalistic account of the conditions
under which one important form of moral progress–the
emergence of more “inclusive” moralities– is likely to
arise and be sustained. Drawing upon work in evolutionary
psychology and social moral epistemology, we argue that
“exclusivist” morality is the result of an adaptively
plastic response that is sensitive to cues of out-group
threat that are detected during development. We conclude
with a blueprint for reinforcing and extending inclusivist
progress.},
Doi = {10.1086/686003},
Key = {fds321574}
}
@article{fds331095,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Human Rights: A Plea for Taking the Law and Institutions
Seriously},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {501-510},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679416000472},
Doi = {10.1017/S0892679416000472},
Key = {fds331095}
}
@article{fds321575,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Self-determination, revolution, and intervention},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {126},
Number = {2},
Pages = {447-453},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683639},
Abstract = {What limitations on intervention in support of democratic
revolutions does proper regard for the collective right of
self-determination impose? Some have held that if
intervention in support of democratic revolutions is
justified, it must cease once the authoritarian regime has
been deposed-that any effort by the intervener to use force
to shape the new political order would violate the
people’s right of self-determination. This essay argues
that proper regard for self-determination is compatible with
much more extensive interventions.},
Doi = {10.1086/683639},
Key = {fds321575}
}
@misc{fds337609,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Taking international legality seriously: A Methodology for
human rights},
Pages = {211-229},
Booktitle = {Human Rights: Moral or Political?},
Publisher = {OXFORD},
Editor = {Etinson, A},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {9780198713258},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
Abstract = {The chapter aims to draw philosophical attention to the
neglected enterprise of figuring out whether the existence
of international legal human rights is morally justified.
Philosophers usually focus on whether moral human rights
exist, which is often rather controversial. As is argued
here, however, the existence of a moral right not to be
imprisoned for debt (say) is neither necessary nor
sufficient for an international legal human right not to be
imprisoned for debt to be morally justified. The chapter
proceeds to indicate how rich and complex the issues
involved in morally justifying an international legal human
right really are; and to show how much philosophical
distance there is between such a justification and the
existence of a relevant moral right. Finally, the chapter
draws some lessons from its analysis for the methodological
debate over political approaches to human
rights.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
Key = {fds337609}
}
@misc{fds321576,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Cole, T and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Justice in the Diffusion of Innovation},
Pages = {133-161},
Booktitle = {Political Theory Without Borders: Philosophy, Politics and
Society 9},
Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9781119110088},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119110132.ch7},
Abstract = {This chapter explains why a theory of justice must take the
fact of innovation seriously and focuses on one important
problem of justice in innovation: the fact that when
powerful innovations do not diffuse widely, but are
available only to some, this creates opportunities for
domination and exclusion. It explains a proposal for a new
international institution designed to ameliorate this
problem. The chapter strengthens the case for the proposal
by comparing it both to the status quo and to a prominent
proposal for international institutional change advanced by
Thomas Pogge. It also explains how the proposal could be
integrated into existing international law. The chapter
brings innovation to center stage in thinking about justice,
demonstrates that serious efforts to achieve justice in
innovation requires institutional innovation, and stimulates
deeper consideration of the issues the author addresses by
articulating a concrete institutional proposal.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781119110132.ch7},
Key = {fds321576}
}
@article{fds321577,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {The limits of evolutionary explanations of morality and
their implications for moral progress},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {126},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-67},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682188},
Abstract = {Traditional conservative arguments against the possibility
of moral progress relied on underevidenced assumptions about
the limitations of human nature. Contemporary thinkers have
attempted to fill this empirical gap in the conservative
argument by appealing to evolutionary science. Such
“evoconservative” arguments fail because they overstate
the explanatory reach of evolutionary theory. We maintain
that no adequate evolutionary explanation has been given for
important features of human morality, namely cosmopolitan
and other “inclusivist” moral commitments. We attribute
these evolutionarily anomalous features to a capacity for
open-ended normativity, which presents a serious obstacle to
theorists who wish to draw substantive moral and political
lessons from human evolutionary history.},
Doi = {10.1086/682188},
Key = {fds321577}
}
@misc{fds321578,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Cole, T and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Justice in the Diffusion of Innovation},
Pages = {102-132},
Booktitle = {Global Justice and Bioethics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780195379907},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.003.0005},
Abstract = {This chapter proposes an international regulating body for
the purposes of eliminating the problem of diffusion of
innovation. Patent laws, intellectual property rights,
monopolies, among other things, exacerbate political and
economic inequalities by withholding access of innovations
to those who need it. A major branch of concern is the
distribution of pharmaceuticals. In order to maintain
distributive justice and reduce the global burden of
disease, a Global Institute for Justice in Innovation can be
established to encourage rapid diffusion of innovations and
discourage firms that restrict access to
them.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.003.0005},
Key = {fds321578}
}
@article{fds321579,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Toward a Drone Accountability regime},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {15-37},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000732},
Doi = {10.1017/S0892679414000732},
Key = {fds321579}
}
@article{fds321580,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Toward a drone accountability regime: A rejoinder},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-70},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S089267941400077X},
Doi = {10.1017/S089267941400077X},
Key = {fds321580}
}
@article{fds342818,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Reply to Fenton, Fleck, Powers and Voigt},
Journal = {Jurisprudence},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {151-155},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/20403313.6.1.151},
Doi = {10.5235/20403313.6.1.151},
Key = {fds342818}
}
@book{fds226532,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {Prisoners of Belief},
Booktitle = {THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON FREEDOM},
Editor = {David Schmidtz},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds226532}
}
@book{fds226531,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {A Richer Jus Ad Bellum},
Booktitle = {THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON JUST WAR},
Editor = {Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds226531}
}
@article{fds226530,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan and Gopal Sreenivasan},
Title = {Human Rights: Taking International Legalization
Seriously},
Booktitle = {HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR POLITICAL},
Editor = {Rowan Cruft and Adam Etison},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds226530}
}
@article{fds226529,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane},
Title = {Regulating Lethal Drones},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds226529}
}
@article{fds226528,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {Why International Legal Human Rights?},
Journal = {Foundations of Human Rights},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015},
Editor = {Mathiew Lao and Massimo Renzo},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds226528}
}
@article{fds226533,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for
Intervention},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds226533}
}
@book{fds244332,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Heart of Human Rights},
Pages = {320 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {0199325383},
Abstract = {This book provides a moral assessment of the heart of the
modern human rights enterprise: the system of international
legal human rights.},
Key = {fds244332}
}
@book{fds219863,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {The Heart of Human Rights, OUP, 2013},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
Keywords = {international legal human rights, moral human rights,
institutional legitimacy, sovereignty},
Abstract = {This is the first book-length treatment of a fundamental
topic in Political Philosophy: the justifications for having
an international legal human rights system.},
Key = {fds219863}
}
@article{fds321581,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Kelley, MC},
Title = {Biodefence and the production of knowledge: rethinking the
problem.},
Journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {4},
Pages = {195-204},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100387},
Abstract = {Biodefence, broadly understood as efforts to prevent or
mitigate the damage of a bioterrorist attack, raises a
number of ethical issues, from the allocation of scarce
biomedical research and public health funds, to the use of
coercion in quarantine and other containment measures in the
event of an outbreak. In response to the US bioterrorist
attacks following September 11, significant US policy
decisions were made to spur scientific enquiry in the name
of biodefence. These decisions led to a number of critical
institutional changes within the US federal government
agencies governing scientific research. Subsequent science
policy discussions have focused largely on 'the dual use
problem': how to preserve the openness of scientific
research while preventing research undertaken for the
prevention or mitigation of biological threats from third
parties. We join others in shifting the ethical debate over
biodefence away from a simple framing of the problem as one
of dual use, by demonstrating how a dual use framing
distorts the debate about bioterrorism and truncates
discussion of the moral issues. We offer an alternative
framing rooted in social epistemology and institutional
design theory, arguing that the ethical and policy debates
regarding 'dual use' biomedical research ought to be
reframed as a larger optimisation problem across a plurality
of values including, among others: (1) the production of
scientific knowledge; (2) the protection of human and animal
subjects; (3) the promotion and protection of public health
(national and global); (4) freedom of scientific enquiry;
and (5) the constraint of government power.},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2011-100387},
Key = {fds321581}
}
@article{fds244342,
Author = {BUCHANAN, A},
Title = {The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics
of Intervention},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {41},
Number = {4},
Pages = {291-323},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2013},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/42703863},
Doi = {10.2307/42703863},
Key = {fds244342}
}
@misc{fds321582,
Author = {Hessler, K and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Equality, Democracy, and the Human Right to Health
Care},
Pages = {97-104},
Booktitle = {Medicine and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution of
Health Care},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780199744206},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199744206.003.0009},
Abstract = {This chapter considers whether or not there is a right to
health care by focusing on equality and democracy. It
considers two distinct trends that characterize the human
right to health care. First, public health scholars
increasingly emphasize that health is a complex good,
promoted and protected by circumstances well beyond access
to medical care for individuals or even the provision of
traditional public health services to populations. Second,
work in both public health and in bioethics has increasingly
recognized the importance of political empowerment and
participatory processes to fair and effective health
policies. This chapter articulates an approach to human
rights that supports both trends. It criticizes attempts to
analyze the precise content of the alleged "right to health"
by specifying the levels and kinds of health care to which
individuals are entitled. It argues that a "right to
health," as distinct from a "right to health care," wouldbe
impossibly expensive and ultimately unattainable. It also
reviews a number of accounts of rights to health care and
suggests that all of them are inadequate. Instead, it favors
an approach that considers "rights" to health care not as a
foundation of justice, but as established by the political
process, especially by the procedures of a democratic
state.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199744206.003.0009},
Key = {fds321582}
}
@article{fds321583,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The open-ended normativity of the ethical},
Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
Volume = {2012},
Number = {1},
Pages = {81-94},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2012-0106},
Abstract = {In The Ethical, Project, Kitcher has three main aim: (1) to
provide a naturalistic explanation of the rise of morality
and of its subsequent development, (2) to supply an account
of moral progress that explains progressive developments
that have occurred so far and shows how further progress is
possible, and (3) to propose a further progressive
development-the emergence of a cosmopolitan morality-and
make the case that it is a natural extension of the ethical
project. I argue that Kitcher does not succeed in achieving
any of these aims and that he cannot do so given the meager
resources of his explanatory model. The chief difficulty is
that Kitcher equivocates in his characterization of the
original (and still supposedly primary) function of ethics.
Although he begins by characterizing it as (a) remedying
altruism failures in, order to avoid their social costs, he
sometimes characterizes it instead as (b) remedying altruism
failures simpliciter. Kitcher does not explain how a
practice whose original function was (a) developed into one
whose function is (b). Further, it appears that he cannot do
so without significantly enriching his explanatory model to
include a more robust account of how humans came to have the
capacity to reflect on and revise norms. © Lucius & Lucius,
Stuttgart.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2012-0106},
Key = {fds321583}
}
@article{fds244341,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Still unconvinced, but still tentative: a reply to
DeGrazia},
Journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
Volume = {38},
Number = {3},
Pages = {140-141},
Year = {2012},
ISSN = {0306-6800},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/23215499},
Abstract = {David DeGrazia's article provides a careful and fair
rendition of my position on the possibility of post-persons.
However, I am unconvinced that he has shown that such beings
are possible. My view is based on two assumptions: (1) the
concept of moral status is a threshold concept; and (2) the
most plausible understanding of moral status as a threshold
concept is a Kantian respect-based view, according to which
all and only those beings who have the capacity to be
accountable for reasons have the high status we associate
with persons. I argue that the superior beings DeGrazia
describes would be more morally admirable than us, but would
not have a higher moral status. I also argue that, contrary
to DeGrazia, even the most intelligent of canines do not
have the capacity for accountability for reasons, even in an
attenuated form. I then argue that DeGrazia faces a painful
dilemma: either he must give up the assumption that moral
status (so far as persons are concerned) is a threshold
concept and say that for any two beings with the capacity
for accountability for reasons, the one with the greater
capacity has a higher moral status; or he must retain the
view that moral status is a threshold concept but concede
that he has not account of where the threshold
lies.},
Doi = {10.2307/23215499},
Key = {fds244341}
}
@book{fds244331,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Better than Human: The Promise and Perils of Enhancing
Ourselves},
Pages = {208 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {0199912017},
Abstract = {In Better Than Human, philosopher-bioethicist Allen Buchanan
grapples with the ethical dilemmas of the biomedical
enhancement revolution.},
Key = {fds244331}
}
@article{fds321584,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Cole, T and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Justice in the Diffusion of Innovation},
Journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {306-332},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00348.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00348.x},
Key = {fds321584}
}
@article{fds335556,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Precommitment Regimes for Intervention: Supplementing the
Security Council},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-63},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679410000018},
Doi = {10.1017/S0892679410000018},
Key = {fds335556}
}
@book{fds244398,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Biomedical
Enhancement},
Booktitle = {Oxford University Press},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {978-0-19-958781-0},
Key = {fds244398}
}
@article{fds321586,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Reciprocal legitimation: Reframing the problem of
international legitimacy},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-19},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X09351958},
Abstract = {Theorizing about the legitimacy of international
institutions usually begins with a framing assumption
according to which the legitimacy of the state is understood
solely in terms of the relationship between the state and
its citizens, without reference to the effects of state
power on others. In contrast, this article argues that
whether a state is legitimate vis-a-vis its own citizens
depends upon whether its exercise of power respects the
human rights of people in other states. The other main
conclusions are as follows. First, a state's participation
in international institutions can contribute to its
legitimacy in several ways. Second, when international
institutions contribute to the legitimacy of states, their
doing so can contribute to their own legitimacy. Third, a
theory of international legitimacy ought to recognize
reciprocal legitimation between states and international
institutions. © 2011 The Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X09351958},
Key = {fds321586}
}
@article{fds321587,
Author = {Powell, R and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Breaking evolution's chains: the prospect of deliberate
genetic modification in humans.},
Journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy},
Volume = {36},
Number = {1},
Pages = {6-27},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhq057},
Abstract = {Many philosophers invoke the "wisdom of nature" in arguing
for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of
genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural
selection as akin to a master engineer that creates
functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend
to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II,
we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary
assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA).
By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted
evolution, we show how intentional genetic modification can
overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good.
Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution
that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally
palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian
evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to
ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive
etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first,
it is based on the same "strong adaptationist"
interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA,
and second, the etiological concept of function on which it
relies provides indirect and potentially misleading
information about the likely consequences of genetic
intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on
causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather
than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic
modification, the causal structure of the living world gives
us good moral reason to pursue it.},
Doi = {10.1093/jmp/jhq057},
Key = {fds321587}
}
@book{fds201179,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan},
Title = {Justice and Health Care},
Booktitle = {Justice and Health Care},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-0-19-539406-1},
Key = {fds201179}
}
@book{fds321588,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Moral progress and human rights},
Pages = {399-417},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107003064},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511758553.022},
Abstract = {This chapter makes the case that the concept of human rights
on which the modern international human rights enterprise is
grounded is morally progressive. I first clarify the idea of
moral progress. Next, I focus on what I take to be some of
the most important improvements in thinking about justice
and explain how they are connected to one another. Then, I
show that the modern conception of human rights encompasses
all of these improvements. My account of moral-conceptual
progress will be neutral on the crucial question of causal
relations between changes in normative ideas and interests
or other so-called “material” factors. What I will say
is compatible with both the view that the moral-conceptual
changes I describe played a major causal role in progressive
institutional change (such as the abolition of slavery) and
with the view that they were largely post-hoc responses to
institutional change caused by realignments of interests, as
well as with a range of more nuanced alternative views that
allow complex reciprocal causality between normative beliefs
and interests. It will also be compatible with a sensible
rejection of the facile distinction between normative
beliefs and interests on the basis of which the question of
causality is usually framed.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511758553.022},
Key = {fds321588}
}
@article{fds321585,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Cognitive enhancement and education},
Journal = {Theory and Research in Education},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {145-162},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878511409623},
Abstract = {Cognitive enhancement — augmenting normal cognitive
capacities — is not new. Literacy, numeracy, computers,
and the practices of science are all cognitive enhancements.
Science is now making new cognitive enhancements possible.
Biomedical cognitive enhancements (BCEs) include the
administration of drugs, implants of genetically engineered
or stem-cell grown neural tissue, transcranial magnetic
stimulation, computer/brain interface technologies, and
(perhaps someday) modification of human embryos by genetic
engineering and/or synthetic biology techniques. The same
liberal—democratic values that support education as a
public institutional endeavor also supply reasons for
institutionalizing and publicly supporting BCE. Pursuing the
goals of education may require changing what we have
hitherto regarded as the individual's ‘natural’
potential, even in the case of normal individuals, and this
may require recourse to BCE. The prospect of BCE raises no
novel issues of distributive justice. Like other beneficial
innovations, BCEs have the potential to worsen existing
unjust inequalities, but they also have the potential to
ameliorate them. © 2011, SAGE Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1477878511409623},
Key = {fds321585}
}
@article{fds244343,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Egalitarianism of Human Rights},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {120},
Number = {4},
Pages = {679-710},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/653433},
Doi = {10.1086/653433},
Key = {fds244343}
}
@book{fds244330,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of
Force},
Pages = {352 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {0199741662},
Abstract = {The thirteen essays by Allen Buchanan collected here are
arranged in such a way as to make evident their thematic
interconnections: the important and hitherto unappreciated
relationships among the nature and grounding of human
rights, the ...},
Key = {fds244330}
}
@article{fds340126,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Philosophy and public policy: A role for social moral
epistemology},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {276-290},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00452.x},
Abstract = {Part 1 of this essay argues that one of the most important
contributions of philosophers to sound public policy may be
to combat the influence of bad Philosophy (which includes,
but is not limited to, bad Philosophy produced by accredited
academic philosophers). Part 2 argues that the conventional
conception of Practical Ethics (CPE) that philosophers bring
to issues of public policy is defective because it fails to
take seriously the phenomenon of the subversion of morality,
the role of false factual beliefs in this subversion, and
the vulnerability to the exploitation of our moral powers
that our social-epistemic dependency entails. Given the
serious risks of the subversion of morality through the
propagation of false factual beliefs, CPE’s near exclusive
emphasis on identifying sound moral principles greatly
constrains its potential contribution to the Negative Task
of Practical Ethics, the endeavour to reduce the incidence
of the most grievously wrong behaviour. Practical ethicists
should focus more on the ethics of believing, and develop a
more sophisticated conception of the moral and epistemic
virtues of individuals and of institutions, one that
includes protective meta-virtues, whose function it is to
guard us against the more frequent and predictable
subversions of morality, including those subversions that
are facilitated by the processes of belief-formation that
our social institutions and practices foster.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00452.x},
Key = {fds340126}
}
@article{fds321589,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Human nature and enhancement.},
Journal = {Bioethics},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {141-150},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00633.x},
Abstract = {Appeals to the idea of human nature are frequent in the
voluminous literature on the ethics of enhancing human
beings through biotechnology. Two chief concerns about the
impact of enhancements on human nature have been voiced. The
first is that enhancement may alter or destroy human nature.
The second is that if enhancement alters or destroys human
nature, this will undercut our ability to ascertain the good
because, for us, the good is determined by our nature. The
first concern assumes that altering or destroying human
nature is in itself a bad thing. The second concern assumes
that human nature provides a standard without which we
cannot make coherent, defensible judgments about what is
good. I will argue (1) that there is nothing wrong, per se,
with altering or destroying human nature, because, on a
plausible understanding of what human nature is, it contains
bad as well as good characteristics and there is no reason
to believe that eliminating some of the bad would so imperil
the good as to make the elimination of the bad
impermissible, and (2) that altering or destroying human
nature need not result in the loss of our ability to make
judgments about the good, because we possess a conception of
the good by which we can and do evaluate human nature. I
will argue that appeals to human nature tend to obscure
rather than illuminate the debate over the ethics of
enhancement and can be eliminated in favor of more cogent
considerations.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00633.x},
Key = {fds321589}
}
@misc{fds347025,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Fidelity to constitutional democracy and to the rule of
international law},
Pages = {249-267},
Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of International Law},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415418768},
Key = {fds347025}
}
@misc{fds321590,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Keohane, RO},
Title = {The legitimacy of global governance institutions},
Pages = {29-57},
Booktitle = {Legitimacy, Justice and Public International
Law},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521199490},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511691720.002},
Abstract = {In this introduction, we attempt to elucidate three
theoretical perspectives that are helpful in framing the
contributions to this volume. In the course of this
elucidation we also attempt to indicate some important
problems that the debate currently faces. We do this through
discussions of international legitimacy, international
justice and the relations between ideal and non-ideal
theory. International legitimacy. From normative authority
by consent to instrumental legitimacy. Questions of
legitimacy have long been central to both political
philosophy and political practice. It is not merely vanity
that leads dictators of virtually all stripes to first
decide to hold elections and then announce that they have
won 96 per cent of the vote in them. Saddam Hussein, for
instance, held a referendum in 2002 on whether he should
continue as ruler of Iraq for the next seven years, and
after the election was held it turned out that out of
11,445,638 eligible voters, every single one voted in
favour. The natural question to ask is: why bother? Why
bother to hold sham elections with sham results when you
hold power anyway? There are many possible answers, but two
are especially relevant here. The effect of legitimacy is,
or can be, twofold. First, it makes it easier to exercise
the power one does possess. Second, and as important, it can
often increase the scope of the power one
possesses.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511691720.002},
Key = {fds321590}
}
@book{fds244397,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {978-0-19-539406-1},
Key = {fds244397}
}
@book{fds318356,
Author = {Helfer, L and Henkin, L and Cleveland, S and Neuman, G and Orentlicher,
D},
Title = {Human Rights},
Publisher = {Foundation Press},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds318356}
}
@article{fds244340,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Moral Status and Human Enhancement},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {37},
Number = {4},
Pages = {346-381},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40468461},
Doi = {10.2307/40468461},
Key = {fds244340}
}
@article{fds321591,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Survey article: Constitutional democracy and the rule of
international law: Are they compatible?},
Journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {326-349},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00322.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00322.x},
Key = {fds321591}
}
@article{fds321592,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Enhancement and the ethics of development.},
Journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-34},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.0.0003},
Abstract = {Much of the debate about the ethics of enhancement has
proceeded according to two framing assumptions. The first is
that although enhancement carries large social risks, the
chief benefits of enhancement are to those who are enhanced
(or their parents, in the case of enhancing the traits of
children). The second is that, because we now understand the
wrongs of state-driven eugenics, enhancements, at least in
liberal societies, will be personal goods, chosen or not
chosen in a market for enhancement services. This article
argues that both framing assumptions must be rejected, once
it is understood that some enhancements--especially those
that are most likely to garner resources and become
widespread--will increase human productivity. Once one
appreciates the productivity-increasing potential of
enhancements, one can begin to see that enhancement need not
be primarily a zero sum affair, that the social costs of
forgoing enhancements may be great, and that the state may
well take an interest in facilitating biomedical
enhancements, just as it does in facilitating education and
other productivity-increasing traditional enhancements.
Appreciating the productivity-increasing potential of
enhancements also makes it possible to view the enhancement
debate in a new light, through the lens of the ethics of
development.},
Doi = {10.1353/ken.0.0003},
Key = {fds321592}
}
@article{fds340127,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Human rights and the legitimacy of the international
order},
Journal = {Legal Theory},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {39-70},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325208080038},
Abstract = {The international legal order is beginning to take human
rights seriously, yet sound justifications for claims about
human rights are conspicuously absent. Philosophers have
begun to respond to this “justification deficit” by
developing theories of human rights. Although a
philosophical conception of human rights is needed, it would
not be sufficient. The justification of human rights is a
dynamic process in which a provisional philosophical
conception of human rights both guides and is fleshed out by
public processes of practical reasoning structured by legal
institutions. Whether the “justification deficit” can be
remedied depends not only upon the content of human rights
norms as set out in the major conventions and the arguments
philosophers can marshal to justify them but also upon the
epistemic virtues of the institutions through which the
norms are specified, contested, and revised over time. ©
2008, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1352325208080038},
Key = {fds340127}
}
@misc{fds333208,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession and nationalism},
Pages = {755-766},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781405136532},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405177245.ch46},
Abstract = {The past decade and a half has witnessed a rash of
secessionist movements. Some have succeeded, some have
failed; some have involved large-scale conflict and ethnic
cleansing, some have been remarkably peaceful. These
momentous events call into question not only the legitimacy
of particular states and their boundaries, but also the
nature of sovereignty, the purposes of political association
and the scope of majority rule.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781405177245.ch46},
Key = {fds333208}
}
@misc{fds321593,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Social moral epistemology and the role of
bioethicists},
Pages = {288-296},
Booktitle = {The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral
Landscape},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780801886126},
Abstract = {As a species of practical ethics, bioethics aims not just at
achieving a better understanding of ethical problems, but at
understanding ethical problems in ways that contribute to
morally better actions and policies. Given that the ultimate
aim of bioethics is practical, those who claim the title of
bioethicist ought to think hard about whether the modes of
understanding they characteristically employ are adequate to
the practical task. In this chapter I argue that the
conventional methodologies bioethicists employ are deficient
from the standpoint of the practical aim of bioethics,
because they do not incorporate what I have elsewhere
labeled social moral epistemology. I also want to argue that
social moral epistemology is a valuable tool for
self-examination by bioethicists-and that bioethicists have
a responsibility to apply social moral epistemological
analysis not just to the problems they characteristically
grapple with, but also to themselves. © 2007 by The Johns
Hopkins University Press. All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds321593}
}
@article{fds53283,
Author = {A. Buchanan},
Title = {Democracy and the Commitment to International
Law},
Journal = {University of Georgia Journal of Comparative and
International Law},
Volume = {Spring 2006},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds53283}
}
@article{fds340970,
Author = {Buchanan, A and DeCamp, M},
Title = {Responsibility for global health.},
Journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {95-114},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-005-5755-0},
Abstract = {There are several reasons for the current prominence of
global health issues. Among the most important is the
growing awareness that some risks to health are global in
scope and can only be countered by global cooperation. In
addition, human rights discourse and, more generally, the
articulation of a coherent cosmopolitan ethical perspective
that acknowledges the importance of all persons, regardless
of where they live, provide a normative basis for taking
global health seriously as a moral issue. In this paper we
begin the task of translating the vague commitment to doing
something to improve global health into a coherent set of
more determinate obligations. One chief conclusion of our
inquiry is that the responsibilities of states regarding
global health are both more determinate and more extensive
than is usually assumed. We also argue, however, that
institutional innovation will be needed to achieve a more
comprehensive, fair distribution of concrete
responsibilities regarding global health and to provide
effective mechanisms for holding various state and nonstate
actors accountable for fulfilling them.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11017-005-5755-0},
Key = {fds340970}
}
@article{fds335557,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Keohane, RO},
Title = {The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {20},
Number = {4},
Pages = {405-437},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00043.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00043.x},
Key = {fds335557}
}
@article{fds244468,
Author = {DeCamp, M and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Responsibility for Global Health},
Journal = {Transnational Medicine},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {119-128},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984792.011},
Abstract = {Introduction Growing concern about global health “Global
health” is becoming a fashionable term among scholars,
human rights activists, state officials, leaders of
international and transnational organizations and others.
Until recently, health as a matter of collective concern
largely implied national health. When the health problems of
people in other countries became a public issue, it was
usually within the confines of the notion of disaster
relief, short-term responses to acute health crises caused
by natural disasters or wars. Global health is a relatively
new category of moral concern, empirical investigation and
institutional action. There are several reasons for the
current prominence of global health issues. First, there is
a widening recognition that some major risks to health are
global in three senses: Their adverse impact on health is
potentially worldwide, the conditions for their occurrence
include various transnational dependencies that are lumped
together under the rubric of globalization and an effective
response to them requires cooperation on a global scale.
Examples of global health risks that are global in each of
these three senses include emerging infections, pollution of
the oceans, depletion of the ozone layer, global warming,
nuclear terrorism and bioterrorism. Second, due to the
revolution in information technologies and the emergence of
transnational epistemic communities equipped with powerful
empirical methodologies for measuring and explaining health
and disease, we now know more about the health problems of
people in other countries than ever before.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511984792.011},
Key = {fds244468}
}
@article{fds244470,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Institutionalizing the Just War},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-38},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2006},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557973},
Doi = {10.2307/3557973},
Key = {fds244470}
}
@article{fds244471,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Democracy and the Commitment to International
Law},
Journal = {University of Georgia Journal of Comparative and
International Law},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244471}
}
@article{fds244472,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Institutions, Beliefs and Ethics: Eugenics as a Case
Study},
Journal = {The Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-45},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00250.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00250.x},
Key = {fds244472}
}
@misc{fds244387,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of International Law},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge Encyclopedia},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244387}
}
@misc{fds244388,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Legitimacy of International Law},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of International Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Besson, and Tasioulas},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244388}
}
@misc{fds244389,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Compatibility of Constitutional Democracy and the
Supremacy of International Law},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook on International Law},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Armstrong, J},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244389}
}
@misc{fds244390,
Author = {Buchanan, A and DeCamp, M},
Title = {Pharmacogenomics: Ethical and Regulatory
Issues},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Bioethics},
Editor = {Steinbock, B},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244390}
}
@misc{fds244391,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Taking the Human Out of Human Rights},
Booktitle = {A Realistic Utopia? Critical Essays on Rawl’s Law of
Peoples},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Martin, R and Reidy, D},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244391}
}
@misc{fds244392,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession, Self-Determination, and Identity},
Booktitle = {Identity and Self-Determination},
Publisher = {Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing},
Editor = {Primoratz, I and Pavkovic, A},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244392}
}
@misc{fds244393,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Uncoupling Secession From Nationalism and Itnrastate
Autonoly From Secession},
Booktitle = {Negotiating Self-Determination},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Hannum, H},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244393}
}
@misc{fds244394,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Bioethics and Social Epistemology},
Booktitle = {The Ethics of Bioethics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Eckenweiler, L},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244394}
}
@misc{fds244395,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justifying Preventive War},
Booktitle = {Preemptive War: Military Action and Moral
Justification},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Shue, H and Rodin, DA},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244395}
}
@misc{fds244396,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession and the Problem of Its Legitimacy},
Booktitle = {Separatism (conference volume, Forum on War and Peace,
University of Florence)},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244396}
}
@misc{fds331096,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {In the national interest},
Pages = {110-126},
Booktitle = {The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521609097},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614743.009},
Abstract = {The dominance of a dogma Few deny that the national interest
should play a major role in foreign policy. But often much
stronger assertions about the national interest are made or,
more frequently, uncritically assumed to be true. The
strongest of these, and the one explicitly endorsed by many
state leaders and diplomats, as well as many theorists of
international relations, is that A state’s foreign policy
always ought to be determined exclusively by the national
interest (the Obligatory Exclusivity Thesis). “Foreign
policy” here is understood very broadly, to encompass the
state’s policies of making war and seeking peace, its
posture toward international law, its participation in the
global economy through treaties concerning trade and
communications infrastructures, international financial and
monetary regimes, and the provision of aid to other
countries. Hans Morgenthau, one of the most influential
international relations theorists of the twentieth century,
unambiguously proclaimed the supremacy of the national
interest, asserting that it should be “the one guiding
star, one standard thought, one rule of action” in foreign
policy (Morgenthau, 1952, p. 242). Taken literally,
Morgenthau’s assertion presupposes that every foreign
policy decision affects the national interest one way or the
other. Since this is dubious, and because I am interested in
evaluating the more plausible versions of the idea that the
national interest should reign supreme in foreign policy, I
will understand the Obligatory Exclusivity Thesis as
acknowledging that some decisions may not affect the
national interest one way or another and as permitting other
considerations to guide policy when that is the
case.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511614743.009},
Key = {fds331096}
}
@misc{fds345426,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The international institutional dimension of
secession},
Pages = {225-253},
Booktitle = {Theories of Secession},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {041517192X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203981283-18},
Abstract = {After a long period of neglect, political theorists have
turned their attention to secession. A growing number of
positions on the justification for, and scope of, the right
to secede are being staked out. Yet, so far there has been
no systematic account of the types of normative theories of
secession. Nor has there been a systematic assessment of the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical
options.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203981283-18},
Key = {fds345426}
}
@article{fds244467,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Equality and Human Rights},
Journal = {Philosophy, Politics, and Economics},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-90},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X05049436},
Abstract = {There is a puzzling disconnect between recent philosophical
literature on equality and the modern theory and practice of
human rights. This disconnect is puzzling because the modern
human rights movement is arguably the most salient and
powerful manifestation of the commitment to equality in our
time. One likely source of this disconnect is the tendency
of contributors to the philosophical literature on equality
to focus on justice within the state, considered in
isolation. This article begins the task of connection.
Section II outlines a philosophical conception of human
rights, the Modest Objectivist View, according to which the
list of human rights is grounded in descriptive and
normative egalitarian assumptions about what is required to
help ensure that every individual has the opportunity for a
minimally good or decent human life. Next, I explore the
resources of the Modest Objectivist View for rationally
reconstructing the conventional conception of human rights.
Section III examines challenges to the Modest Objectivist
View’s egalitarian assumptions. Section IV explores the
question of whether the minimal egalitarianism of the Modest
Objectivist View is compatible with the more robust
egalitarianisms advanced in recent philosophical literature.
I conclude that the minimalist egalitarianism of human
rights is compatible with more robust egalitarian
principles, once we understand the distinctive function of
human rights as standards of transnational justice. © 2005,
Sage Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X05049436},
Key = {fds244467}
}
@article{fds244469,
Author = {Keohane, RO and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justifying Preventive Force: A Reply to Lee},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244469}
}
@book{fds244414,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral
Foundations for International Law},
Pages = {1-520},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {0198295359},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198295359.001.0001},
Abstract = {This book articulates a systematic vision of an
international legal system grounded in the commitment to
justice for all persons. It provides a probing exploration
of the moral issues involved in disputes about secession,
ethno-national conflict, 'the right of self-determination of
peoples', human rights, and the legitimacy of the
international legal system itself. The author advances
vigorous criticisms of the central dogmas of international
relations and international law, arguing that the
international legal system should make justice, not simply
peace, among states a primary goal, and rejecting the view
that it is permissible for a state to conduct its foreign
policies exclusively according to what is in the 'national
interest'. He also shows that the only alternatives are not
rigid adherence to existing international law or lawless
chaos in which the world's one superpower pursues its own
interests without constraints. This book not only criticizes
the existing international legal order, but also offers
morally defensible and practicable principles for reforming
it. After a Synopsis and Introduction, which discusses the
idea of a moral theory of international law, the book has
four parts: I: Justice (3 chapters); II: Legitimacy (3
chapters); III: Self-Determination (2 chapters); and IV:
Reform (2 chapters). The book is one of the titles in the
Oxford Political Theory Series.},
Doi = {10.1093/0198295359.001.0001},
Key = {fds244414}
}
@misc{fds331097,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {A critique of justice as reciprocity},
Pages = {99-106},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader},
Publisher = {SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780761941842},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446215272.n12},
Doi = {10.4135/9781446215272.n12},
Key = {fds331097}
}
@article{fds244466,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {95-130},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557947},
Doi = {10.2307/3557947},
Key = {fds244466}
}
@article{fds244465,
Author = {Keohane, RO and Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Preventive use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional
Perspective},
Journal = {Ethics & International Affairs},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-22},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2004.tb00447.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-7093.2004.tb00447.x},
Key = {fds244465}
}
@book{fds321594,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Moore, M},
Title = {States, nations, and borders: The ethics of making
boundaries},
Pages = {1-361},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521819717},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613937},
Abstract = {This volume examines comparatively the views and principles
of seven prominent ethical traditions on the issue of the
making of state and national boundaries. The traditions
represented are Judaism, Christianity, Islam, natural law,
Confucianism, liberalism and international law. Each
contributor is an expert within one of these traditions and
demonstrates how that tradition can handle the five dominant
methods of altering state and national boundaries: conquest,
settlement, purchase, inheritance and secession. Readers
range from upper-level undergraduates to scholars in
philosophy, political science, international relations and
comparative religion.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511613937},
Key = {fds321594}
}
@misc{fds321595,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Reforming the international law of humanitarian
intervention},
Pages = {130-174},
Booktitle = {Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political
Dilemmas},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521821983},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494000.005},
Abstract = {The need for reform: The deficiency of existing law The NATO
intervention in Kosovo (1999) is only the most recent of a
series of illegal interventions for which plausible moral
justifications can be given. Others include India's
intervention in East Pakistan in response to Pakistan's
massive human rights violations there (1971), Vietnam's war
against Pol Pot's genocidal regime in Cambodia (1978), and
Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin's murderous rule in Uganda
(1979). Without commenting on what the dominant motives of
the intervenors were, it is accurate to say that in each
case military action was aimed at preventing or stopping
massive human rights violations. All could qualify as
instances of humanitarian intervention, which may be defined
as follows: humanitarian intervention is the threat or use
of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals
other than its own citizens, without the permission of the
state within whose territory force is applied. In all three
instances in the 1970s the intervention was, according to
the preponderance of international legal opinion, a
violation of international law. None was a case of
self-defense and none enjoyed UN Security Council
authorization. There is, however, an important difference in
the case of the NATO intervention. Unlike the previous
interventions, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the
ensuing debate over its justifiability have focused
attention on the deficiency of existing international law
concerning humanitarian intervention.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511494000.005},
Key = {fds321595}
}
@misc{fds321596,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Moore, M},
Title = {Introduction: The making and unmaking of
boundaries},
Pages = {1-16},
Booktitle = {States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making
Boundaries},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521819717},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613937.001},
Abstract = {This volume is concerned with one of the most pressing
issues facing us today: the making and unmaking of
boundaries. Even in this age of globalization – by which
is usually meant capital mobility, extremely rapid methods
of transportation and communication, the liberalization of
economic markets, the advance of multinational corporations
to many parts of the globe, and increased global economic
trade – boundaries are enormously important. It matters to
people's education, level of health, opportunities and
life-prospects, rights and liberties which states they live
in. People who migrate from one area of jurisdictional
authority to another often taken great risks: Some
prospective migrants die in the attempt. The coercive power
of the state is often employed to prevent the migration of
people across boundaries, and some states expend huge sums
of money on military hardware and large armies and sacrifice
their soldiers' lives, mainly in defense of existing
boundaries. One of the most destabilizing aspects of the
post-Cold War period has been the alteration of boundaries,
which takes place outside the rule of law and often by
force. For nearly fifty years following the end of the
Second World War, there was only one successful case of
secession – Bangladesh, which was created out of a
separatist movement, and in unique circumstances,
particularly since its secession was supported both
militarily and politically by India. Since the end of the
Cold War, a number of new states have been created in the
former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia, Ethiopia,
and Czechoslovakia, and there is little prospect of boundary
stability and peace in the ethnically mixed, recently
independent states of the first three regions, as there are
a number of secessionist groups seeking to further carve
them up.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511613937.001},
Key = {fds321596}
}
@book{fds306203,
Title = {Self-Determination and Secession},
Publisher = {New York University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Macedo, S},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds306203}
}
@book{fds306204,
Title = {The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Moore, M},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds306204}
}
@misc{fds244381,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Introduction, Nomos Volume},
Booktitle = {Self-Determination and Secession},
Publisher = {New York University Press},
Editor = {Macedo, S and Buchanan, A},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244381}
}
@misc{fds244382,
Author = {Hessler, K and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Health Care and Human Rights},
Booktitle = {Justice and Health Care},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Rhodes, R and Battin, P},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244382}
}
@misc{fds244383,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession},
Booktitle = {Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244383}
}
@misc{fds244384,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has
to Say},
Booktitle = {Nations, States, and Borders: The Ethics of Making
Boundaries},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Moore, M},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244384}
}
@misc{fds244385,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Reforming International Law on Humanitarian Intervention:
Some Moral Issues},
Booktitle = {Humanitarian Intervention: Moral, Political and Legal
Dilemmas},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Holzgrefe, J and Keohane, R},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244385}
}
@misc{fds244386,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession, State-Breaking, and Intervention},
Booktitle = {The Ethics of Intervention},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Chaterjee, D and Schied, D},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244386}
}
@article{fds321597,
Author = {Robertson, JA and Brody, B and Buchanan, A and Kahn, J and McPherson,
E},
Title = {Pharmacogenetic challenges for the health care
system.},
Journal = {Health Affairs},
Volume = {21},
Number = {4},
Pages = {155-167},
Year = {2002},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.21.4.155},
Abstract = {Pharmacogenetics--the effect of genotype on drug
response--holds the promise of safer and more effective drug
therapy. Genetic tests would be routinely given to patients
prior to prescription of a drug, with therapeutic decisions
based on the patient's drug-response profile. This paper
examines the operational changes and the ethical, legal, and
policy challenges that pharmacogenetic medicine poses for
key actors in the health care system. Adaptation by drug
companies, regulatory agencies, physicians, patients,
insurers, and public funding agencies will be necessary to
integrate pharmacogenetic medicine into health
care.},
Doi = {10.1377/hlthaff.21.4.155},
Key = {fds321597}
}
@article{fds244462,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Political Legitimacy and Democracy},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {112},
Number = {4},
Pages = {689-719},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/340313},
Doi = {10.1086/340313},
Key = {fds244462}
}
@article{fds244464,
Author = {Buchanan, A and et. al.},
Title = {Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues and Policy
Options},
Journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-15},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2002.0001},
Abstract = {Pharmacogenetics offers the prospect of an era of safer and
more effective drugs, as well as more individualized use of
drug therapies. Before the benefits of pharmacogenetics can
be realized, the ethical issues that arise in research and
clinical application of pharmacogenetic technologies must be
addressed. The ethical issues raised by pharmacogenetics can
be addressed under six headings: (1) regulatory oversight,
(2) confidentiality and privacy, (3) informed consent, (4)
availability of drugs, (5) access, and (6) clinicians'
changing responsibilities in the era of pharmacogenetic
medicine. We analyze each of these categories of ethical
issues and provide policy approaches for addressing
them.},
Doi = {10.1353/ken.2002.0001},
Key = {fds244464}
}
@misc{fds244379,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Golove, D},
Title = {The Philosophy of International law},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Coleman, JL and Shapiro, S},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244379}
}
@misc{fds244380,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Social Moral Epistemology},
Booktitle = {Bioethics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, EF and Fred D Miller and J and Paul, J},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244380}
}
@article{fds244463,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal
International Legal Reform},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {111},
Number = {4},
Pages = {673-705},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233569},
Doi = {10.1086/233569},
Key = {fds244463}
}
@book{fds48864,
Author = {A. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock and Norman Daniels and Daniel
Daniel Wikler},
Title = {From Change to Choice: Genetics & Justice},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds48864}
}
@book{fds244413,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Brock, DW and Daniels, N and Wikler,
DD},
Title = {From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244413}
}
@article{fds244459,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {An Ethical Framework for Stored Biological Samples
Policy},
Journal = {National Bioethics Advisory Commission Report on Stored
Biologival Samples},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244459}
}
@article{fds244460,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian
World},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {110},
Number = {4},
Pages = {697-721},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233370},
Doi = {10.1086/233370},
Key = {fds244460}
}
@article{fds244461,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Act Consequentialism versus the Rule of Law: Reply to
Naticchia},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244461}
}
@misc{fds244376,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Community and Communitarianism},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244376}
}
@misc{fds244377,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Fost, N},
Title = {Hereditary Hemochromatosis: Ethic Issues},
Booktitle = {Hemochromatosis},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Barton, JC and Edwards, C},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244377}
}
@misc{fds244378,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justice, Legitimacy, and Human Rights},
Booktitle = {The Idea of Political Liberalism},
Publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield},
Editor = {Davion, V and Wolf, C},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244378}
}
@article{fds244407,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy and Minority
Rights},
Publisher = {paper commissioned by the Office of the Privy Council,
Government of Canada},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244407}
}
@article{fds244339,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Rule-Governed Institutions versus Act-Consequentialism: A
Rejoinder to Naticchia},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {258-270},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2672859},
Doi = {10.2307/2672859},
Key = {fds244339}
}
@article{fds244456,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {28},
Number = {1},
Pages = {46-78},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672825},
Doi = {10.2307/2672825},
Key = {fds244456}
}
@article{fds244457,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Trust in Managed Care Organizations},
Journal = {Kennedy Institute Journal of Bioethics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {189-212},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2000.0018},
Abstract = {Two basic criticisms of managed care are that it erodes
patient trust in physicians and subjects physicians to
incentives and pressures that compromise the physician's
fiduciary obligation to the patient. In this article, I
first distinguish between status trust and merit trust, and
then argue (1) that the value of status trust in physicians
is probably over-rated and certainly underdocumented; (2)
that erosion of status trust may not be detrimental if
accompanied by an increase in well-founded merit trust; and
(3) that under conditions of managed care the physician's
commitment to traditional medical ethics cannot serve as an
adequate basis for merit trust. Next, drawing on an analogy
between managed care organzations and politics, I argue that
(4) the most appropriate basis for merit trust in managed
care is a conception of organizational legitimacy that
includes procedural justice, empowerment of constructive
criticism within the organization, and organizational
accommodation of the noninstrumental commitment to patient
well-being that is distinctive of medical professionalism. I
then explore the conditions necessary for robust competition
for merit trust among managed care organizations and
indicate the kinds of public policies needed to facilitate
such competition. Finally, I show how the account of
organization-based merit trust can accommodate the special
fiduciary obligation of medical professionals, without
indulging in the delusion that it is the physician's
fiduciary obligation always to provide all care that is
expected to be of any net benefit to the
patient.},
Doi = {10.1353/ken.2000.0018},
Key = {fds244457}
}
@article{fds244458,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention},
Journal = {The Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {71-87},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00066},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-9760.00066},
Key = {fds244458}
}
@misc{fds244373,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Business Ethics and Political Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Dictionary of Business Ethics},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Werhane, P},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244373}
}
@misc{fds244374,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {What’s So Special About Nations?},
Booktitle = {Rethinking Nationalism},
Editor = {Couture, and Nielsen},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244374}
}
@misc{fds244375,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Democracy and Secession},
Booktitle = {National Self-Determination and Secession},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Moore, M},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244375}
}
@article{fds321598,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Managed care: rationing without justice, but not
unjustly.},
Journal = {Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law},
Volume = {23},
Number = {4},
Pages = {617-634},
Year = {1998},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/03616878-23-4-617},
Abstract = {Three ethical criticisms of managed care are often voiced:
(1) by "skimming the cream" of the patient population,
managed care organizations fail to discharge their
obligations to improve access, or at least, to not worsen
it; (2) managed care organizations engage in rationing,
thereby depriving patients of care to which they are
entitled; and (3) by pressuring physicians to ration care,
managed care organizations interfere with physicians'
fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations to provide the
best care for each patient. This article argues that each of
these criticisms is misconceived. The first rests on the
false assumption that the health care system includes a
workable division of responsibility regarding access that
assigns obligations concerning access to managed care
organizations. The second and third criticisms wrongly
assume that we in the United States have taken the first
step toward assuring equitable access to care for all,
articulating a standard for what counts as an "adequate
level of care" to which all are entitled. These three
misguided criticisms obscure the most fundamental ethical
flaw of managed care: the fact that it operates in an
institutional setting within which no connection can be made
between the activity of rationing and the basic requirements
of justice.},
Doi = {10.1215/03616878-23-4-617},
Key = {fds321598}
}
@article{fds321599,
Author = {Burke, W and Thomson, E and Khoury, MJ and McDonnell, SM and Press, N and Adams, PC and Barton, JC and Beutler, E and Brittenham, G and Buchanan,
A and Clayton, EW and Cogswell, ME and Meslin, EM and Motulsky, AG and Powell, LW and Sigal, E and Wilfond, BS and Collins,
FS},
Title = {Hereditary hemochromatosis: gene discovery and its
implications for population-based screening.},
Journal = {Jama},
Volume = {280},
Number = {2},
Pages = {172-178},
Year = {1998},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.280.2.172},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>To evaluate the role of genetic testing in
screening for hereditary hemochromatosis to help guide
clinicians, policymakers, and researchers.<h4>Participants</h4>An
expert panel was convened on March 3, 1997, by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National
Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), with expertise in
epidemiology, genetics, hepatology, iron overload disorders,
molecular biology, public health, and the ethical, legal,
and social implications surrounding the discovery and use of
genetic information.<h4>Evidence</h4>The group reviewed
evidence regarding the clinical presentation, natural
history, and genetics of hemochromatosis, including current
data on the candidate gene for hemochromatosis (HFE) and on
the ethical and health policy implications of genetic
testing for this disorder.<h4>Consensus process</h4>Consensus
was achieved by group discussion confirmed by a voice vote.
A draft of the consensus statement was prepared by a writing
committee and subsequently reviewed and revised by all
members of the expert group over a 1-year
period.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Genetic testing is not
recommended at this time in population-based screening for
hereditary hemochromatosis, due to uncertainties about
prevalence and penetrance of HFE mutations and the optimal
care of asymptomatic people carrying HFE mutations. In
addition, use of a genetic screening test raises concerns
regarding possible stigmatization and discrimination. Tests
for HFE mutations may play a role in confirming the
diagnosis of hereditary hemochromatosis in persons with
elevated serum iron measures, but even this use is limited
by uncertainty about genotype-phenotype correlations. To
address these questions, the expert group accorded high
priority to population-based research to define the
prevalence of HFE mutations, age and sex-related penetrance
of different HFE genotypes, interactions between HFE
genotypes and environmental modifiers, and psychosocial
outcomes of genetic screening for hemochromatosis.},
Doi = {10.1001/jama.280.2.172},
Key = {fds321599}
}
@article{fds244454,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Ethical Responsibilities of Patients and Clinicians
Concerning Genetic Testing},
Journal = {Journal of Health Care Law and Policy},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244454}
}
@article{fds244455,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Rationing Without Justice, But Not Unjustly},
Journal = {Journal of Health Politics, Law & Policy},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244455}
}
@misc{fds244371,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Self-Determinationl Secession, and the Rule of International
Law},
Booktitle = {The Morality of Nationalism},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {McMahon, J and McKim, R},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244371}
}
@misc{fds244372,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Economics and Ethics},
Booktitle = {The Concise Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell’s Publishers},
Editor = {Cooper, CL and Argyris, C},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244372}
}
@article{fds244453,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Distributive Justice in Health Care},
Journal = {Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Year = {1997},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds244453}
}
@article{fds321600,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Philosophic perspectives on access to health care:
distributive justice in health care.},
Journal = {The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine, New
York},
Volume = {64},
Number = {2},
Pages = {90-95},
Year = {1997},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds321600}
}
@article{fds244338,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Theories of Secession},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {31-61},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1997},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2961910},
Doi = {10.2307/2961910},
Key = {fds244338}
}
@article{fds244415,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Separatism, Citizenship, and the State System},
Journal = {Separatism},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds244415}
}
@article{fds48943,
Author = {A. Buchanan},
Title = {Judging the Past},
Journal = {The Hastings Center Report},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds48943}
}
@article{fds244337,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Judging the Past: The Case of the Human Radiation
Experiments},
Journal = {The Hastings Center Report},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {25-30},
Year = {1996},
ISSN = {0093-0334},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3527929},
Doi = {10.2307/3527929},
Key = {fds244337}
}
@article{fds244449,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Perfecting Imperfect Duties: Collective Action to Create
Moral Obligations},
Journal = {Business Ethics Quarterly},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {27-42},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1996},
ISSN = {1052-150X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857239},
Abstract = {Ethical problems in business include not only genuine moral
dilemmas and compliance problems but also problems arising
from the distinctive characteristics of imperfect duties.
Collective action by business to perfect imperfect duties
can yield significant benefits. Such arrrangements can (1)
reduce temptations to moral laxity, (2) achieve greater
efficiency by eliminating redundancies and gaps that plague
uncoordinated individual efforts, (3) reap economies of
scale and achieve success where benefits can be provided
only if a certain threshold of resources can be brought to
bear on a social problem; (4) solve assurance problems where
voluntary compliance by some parties depends upon their
perception that competitors are doing their fair share, and
(5) produce higher levels of contribution than would occur
through independent action in response to imperfect duties,
stimulated by the perception that there is a fair
distribution of burdens of contribution among all parties
involved.},
Doi = {10.2307/3857239},
Key = {fds244449}
}
@article{fds244450,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Toward a Theory of the Ethics of Bureaucratic
Organizations},
Journal = {Business Ethics Quarterly},
Volume = {6},
Number = {4},
Pages = {419-440},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1996},
ISSN = {1052-150X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857497},
Abstract = {This essay articulates a crucial and neglected element of a
general theory of the ethics of bureaucratic organizations,
both private and public. The key to the approach developed
here is the thesis that the distinctive ethical principles
applicable to bureaucratic organizations are responses to
the distinctive agency-risks that arise from the nature of
bureaucratic organizations as complex webs of
principal/agent relationships. It is argued that the most
important and distinctive ethical principles for
bureaucratic organizations express commitments on the part
of bureaucrats that function to reduce the agency risks that
are inherent in such organizations. This approach to the
ethics of bureaucratic organizations is shown to be more
illuminating than those that concentrate exclusively or
primarily on determining the conditions for corporate
responsibility or on the idea that the ethical obligations
distinctive of bureaucracies are role-derived.},
Doi = {10.2307/3857497},
Key = {fds244450}
}
@article{fds244451,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Choosing Who Will be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the
Morality of Inclusion},
Journal = {Social Philosophy & Policy},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {18-46},
Year = {1996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003447},
Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500003447},
Key = {fds244451}
}
@article{fds244452,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Controversy Over Retrospective Moral
Judgment},
Journal = {Kennedy Institute Journal of Ethics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {245-250},
Year = {1996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.1996.0023},
Abstract = {The mandate of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments required that the Committee take a
position on the validity of retrospective moral judgments.
However, throughout its period of operation, the Committee
remained divided on the question of whether sound judgments
of individual culpability and wrongdoing should be included
in its Final Report. This essay examines the arguments that
various committee members marshalled to support their
opposing views on retrospective moral judgment and explains
the significance of the controversy.},
Doi = {10.1353/ken.1996.0023},
Key = {fds244452}
}
@misc{fds244369,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Charity, Justice, and the Idea of Moral Progress},
Booktitle = {Giving: Western Ideas of Philanthropy},
Publisher = {University of Indiana Press},
Editor = {Schneewind, JB},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244369}
}
@misc{fds244370,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Health-Care Delivery and Resource Allocation},
Series = {2nd ed.},
Booktitle = {Medical Ethics},
Publisher = {Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers},
Editor = {Veatch, RM},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244370}
}
@book{fds306205,
Title = {Conflict of Interest in Clinical Practice and
Research},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Spece, R and Schimm, D},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds306205}
}
@article{fds244445,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention},
Journal = {Social Philosophy & Policy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {105-135},
Year = {1995},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004696},
Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500004696},
Key = {fds244445}
}
@article{fds244446,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession, Federalism, and the Morality of
Inclusion},
Journal = {Arizona Law Review},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244446}
}
@article{fds244447,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Federalism and the Sense of Political Unity},
Journal = {IF (Journal of the IBM Foundation of Italty)},
Volume = {II},
Number = {2},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244447}
}
@article{fds244448,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Privitization and Just Healthcare},
Journal = {Bioethics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3/4},
Pages = {220-239},
Year = {1995},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.1995.tb00357.x},
Abstract = {When advocates of insurance-privatization consider whether
private insurance-dominated systems achieve justice at all,
they tend to rely on an incomplete set of criteria for a
just healthcare system. They also mistakenly assume that it
is enough to show that justice is in principle achievable
within a private insurance-dominated system. This essay
offers a more complete set of criteria for a just healthcare
system. It then argues that the motivational assumptions
needed to make insurance-privatization at all plausible (on
grounds of choice, efficiency, and quality of care) are
inconsistent with the motivational assumptions needed to
show that in practice a private insurance-dominated system
will achieve justice. A private insurance-dominated system
can be expected to satisfy the criteria for just healthcare
only if (a) there is extensive and effective regulation to
constrain the normal competitive behavior of private
insurers or if (b) generous public funds are provided to
fill the gaps in access left by the private insurance
market. Yet the assumptions about the motivations and
abilities of the public, regulators, and public officials
needed to satisfy conditions (a) or (b) contradict the
privatization advocate's explanations of how privatization
will maximize efficiency, choice, and quality of
care.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8519.1995.tb00357.x},
Key = {fds244448}
}
@misc{fds244366,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Is There a Medical Profession in the House?},
Booktitle = {Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Practice and
Research},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Spece, R and Schimm, D and Buchanan, A},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244366}
}
@misc{fds244367,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Intending Death: The Structure of the Problem and Proposed
Solutions},
Booktitle = {Intending Death in Medicine},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Beauchamp, TL and Veatch, R},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244367}
}
@misc{fds244368,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Discourse of Fundraising},
Booktitle = {The Ethics of Fundraising for Higher Education},
Publisher = {John Hopkins Press},
Editor = {Elliott, D},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244368}
}
@book{fds306206,
Title = {In Harm’s Way},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Coleman, J},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds306206}
}
@article{fds244444,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Excellent in Business (review-article on Robert
Solomon's Excellence in Business)},
Journal = {The Journal of Business Ethics},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244444}
}
@misc{fds244365,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Liberalism and Group Rights},
Booktitle = {In Harm’s Way},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Coleman, J and Buchanan, A},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244365}
}
@article{fds321601,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Computerised care plans in Tayside.},
Journal = {Nursing Standard},
Volume = {7},
Number = {26},
Pages = {37-39},
Year = {1993},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns.7.26.37.s47},
Abstract = {The development of ward nursing information systems and, in
particular, the advent of computerised nursing care plans,
have caused some controversy and discomfort in professional
circles. This article describes how staff in a large general
hospital in Tayside set about refining their information
technology base, with particular emphasis on the role of the
project nurse who had overall responsibility for the
implementation of the programme. Despite cautionary words
from some commentators, it appears that the computerised
care planning module has been received positively by nursing
staff.},
Doi = {10.7748/ns.7.26.37.s47},
Key = {fds321601}
}
@article{fds244441,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Morality of Inclusion},
Journal = {Social Philosophy & Policy},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {233-257},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1993},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004210},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Today we are witnessing two dramatic processes: the
fragmentation of old states and empires, followed by the
emergence of new states and new forms of political
association; and the construction of new economies out of
the ruins of state socialism. These two processes—the
redrawing of political boundaries and the creation of
economies—are not independent of one another. In some
cases, the desire for a new, more productive economy
supplements other motives for state-breaking and
state-making. In others, even if the fragmentation of
political union results from other factors, such as ethnic
divisions or the resurgence of nationalism against a
weakened imperial center, the fragments may sort themselves
out into new states, federations, or commonwealths,
according to what they believe to be maximally productive
economic units.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500004210},
Key = {fds244441}
}
@article{fds244442,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Role of Collective Land Rights in the Theory and
Practrice of Indigenous Peoples Rights},
Journal = {Transitional Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244442}
}
@article{fds244443,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Terms of Secession},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Canadian Association for the Advancement
of Social Science},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244443}
}
@misc{fds244364,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Nationalism and Secession},
Booktitle = {A Reader in Pooitical Philosophy},
Publisher = {London: Blackwell Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Goodin, R and Petit, P},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244364}
}
@article{fds321602,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The 'longlong' population of Ialibu District, Southern
Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea: contact with health
services and care in the village.},
Journal = {Papua and New Guinea Medical Journal},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {191-193},
Year = {1992},
Month = {September},
Abstract = {The aim of the study was to describe the general behaviour,
living arrangements and level of health services contact of
the mentally ill population of a health district in Papua
New Guinea. The immediate relatives of 31 'longlong' people
living in Ialibu District were interviewed. About half of
the mentally ill subjects were able to cook and look after a
garden. Just over half had engaged in physical violence or
stolen and one-fifth had been physically restrained. Almost
all were living in their own village although not all were
living with their own families. Just over half had had
contact with health services and this contact had usually
been brief and, in the relatives' eyes, unsatisfactory.},
Key = {fds321602}
}
@article{fds244440,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Quebec Secession and Native Territorial Rights},
Journal = {Network on the Constitution},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244440}
}
@misc{fds244358,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Entry on "Distributive Justice},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.},
Editor = {Becker, L and editor-in-chief},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244358}
}
@misc{fds244359,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Public and Private Responsibilities in the U.S. Healthcare
Systems},
Booktitle = {Changing to National Health Care},
Publisher = {University of Utah Press},
Editor = {Hueffner, R and Battin, MP},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244359}
}
@misc{fds244360,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Trends, Problems, and Prospects of Teaching and Research in
Medical Ethics in the U.S.},
Booktitle = {Bioethics Debates in a Changing South Africa},
Publisher = {University of Cape Town},
Editor = {Benatar, SR},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244360}
}
@misc{fds244361,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Is There an International Consensus in Medical
Ethics?},
Booktitle = {Bioethics Debates in a Changing South Africa},
Publisher = {University of Cape Town},
Editor = {Benatar, SR},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244361}
}
@misc{fds244362,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {National Health Systems Versys Mixed Public/Private
Systems},
Booktitle = {Bioethics Debates in a Changing South Africa},
Publisher = {University of Cape Town},
Editor = {Benatar, SR},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244362}
}
@misc{fds244363,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {AIDS and the Morality of Inclusion},
Booktitle = {Bioethics Debates in a Changing South Africa},
Publisher = {University of Cape Town},
Editor = {Benatar, SR},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244363}
}
@book{fds244412,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort
Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec},
Publisher = {Westview Press},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244412}
}
@article{fds244436,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Toward a Theory of Secession},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {101},
Number = {2},
Pages = {322-342},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381866},
Doi = {10.2307/2381866},
Key = {fds244436}
}
@article{fds244437,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Secession and Self-Determination},
Journal = {Journal of International Affairs},
Volume = {45},
Number = {2},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244437}
}
@article{fds244438,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Right of Self-Determination: Analytical and Moral
Foundations},
Journal = {Arizona Journal of International and Comparative
Law},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244438}
}
@article{fds244439,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Individual Rights and Social Change},
Journal = {Philosophical Papers},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {51-75},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1991},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568649109506354},
Doi = {10.1080/05568649109506354},
Key = {fds244439}
}
@misc{fds244357,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Physician’s Knowledge and the Patient’s Best
Interest},
Booktitle = {Ethics, Trust, and Professions},
Publisher = {Georgetown University Press},
Editor = {Pelligrino, E},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244357}
}
@article{fds321603,
Author = {Annas, GJ and Arnold, B and Aroskar, M and Battin, P and Bartels, D and Beauchamp, T and Brock, D and Buchanan, A and Caplan, A and Cohen,
C},
Title = {Bioethicists' statement on the U.S. Supreme Court's Cruzan
decision.},
Journal = {The New England Journal of Medicine},
Volume = {323},
Number = {10},
Pages = {686-687},
Year = {1990},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/nejm199009063231020},
Doi = {10.1056/nejm199009063231020},
Key = {fds321603}
}
@article{fds244435,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered
Justice},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {227-252},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265395},
Doi = {10.2307/2265395},
Key = {fds244435}
}
@misc{fds244355,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Ethical Issues in a Changing Healthcare Environment},
Booktitle = {Health Care Issues and American Economic
Growth},
Publisher = {Jai Press},
Editor = {Libecap, G},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244355}
}
@misc{fds244356,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Allocation and Healthcare Delivery},
Booktitle = {Medical Ethics},
Publisher = {McMillan},
Editor = {Veatch, R},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244356}
}
@book{fds244411,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Brock, DW},
Title = {Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision
Making},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244411}
}
@article{fds244434,
Author = {Buchanan, AE},
Title = {Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {99},
Number = {4},
Pages = {852-882},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381237},
Doi = {10.2307/2381237},
Key = {fds244434}
}
@misc{fds244354,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Rights, Obligations, and the Special Importance of Health
Care},
Booktitle = {The Right to Health Care},
Publisher = {Reidel Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Spicker, S and Englehardt, T},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244354}
}
@article{fds321604,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Principal/agent theory and decision making in health
care.},
Journal = {Bioethics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {317-333},
Year = {1988},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.1988.tb00057.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8519.1988.tb00057.x},
Key = {fds321604}
}
@article{fds321605,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Remaster, R},
Title = {Absconders from a rural health centre in Papua New
Guinea.},
Journal = {Papua and New Guinea Medical Journal},
Volume = {31},
Number = {3},
Pages = {191-193},
Year = {1988},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds321605}
}
@article{fds321606,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Marx as Kierkegaard},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {53},
Number = {1},
Pages = {157-172},
Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00355684},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00355684},
Key = {fds321606}
}
@article{fds244433,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Advance Directives and the Personal Identity
Problem},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {277-302},
Year = {1988},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265401},
Doi = {10.2307/2265401},
Key = {fds244433}
}
@misc{fds244353,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {An Ethical Evaluation of the U.S. Health Care
System},
Booktitle = {Health Care Systems},
Publisher = {Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Editor = {Sass, H-M and Massey, RU},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244353}
}
@article{fds321607,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Maclauren, G},
Title = {Doctors' health centre visits in the Southern Highlands of
Papua New Guinea.},
Journal = {Papua and New Guinea Medical Journal},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {45-48},
Year = {1987},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds321607}
}
@article{fds48990,
Author = {A. Buchanan},
Title = {Marx, Morality, and History},
Journal = {Ethics},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds48990}
}
@article{fds244335,
Author = {Buchanan, AE},
Title = {Marx, Morality, and History: An Assessment of Recent
Analytical Work on Marx},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {98},
Number = {1},
Pages = {104-136},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381296},
Doi = {10.2307/2381296},
Key = {fds244335}
}
@article{fds244405,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Marx on Progress and History},
Journal = {proceedings of the Eleventh Wittgenstein Symposium,
Kirchberg, Austria},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds244405}
}
@article{fds244430,
Author = {Brock, D and Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Profit Motive in Medicine},
Journal = {Medicine and Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {16},
Pages = {1-35},
Year = {1987},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/12.1.1},
Abstract = {The ethical implications of the growth of for-profit health
care institutions are complex. Two major moral criticisms of
for-profit medicine are analyzed. The first claim is that
for-profit health care institutions fail to fulfill their
obligations to do their fair share in providing health care
to the poor and so exacerbate the problem of access to
health care. The second claim is that profit seeking in
medicine will damage the physician-patient relationship,
creating conflicts of interest that will diminish the
quality of care and erode patients' trust in their
physicians and the public's trust in the medical profession.
The authors conclude that while the continued expansion of
for-profit health care may exacerbate in some respects
problems of access, trust and conflicts of interest, it is a
mistake to consider these problems as unique to for-profit
health care; they are problems for not for-profit health
care as well. Though these issues justify continuing moral
concern, they do not at this time provide decisive grounds
for substantially curbing or eliminating for-profit
enterprise in health care.},
Doi = {10.1093/jmp/12.1.1},
Key = {fds244430}
}
@article{fds244431,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Justice and Charity},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {558-575},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381179},
Doi = {10.2307/2381179},
Key = {fds244431}
}
@article{fds244432,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {What's so Special About Rights?},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {61-83},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026505250000090X},
Doi = {10.1017/S026505250000090X},
Key = {fds244432}
}
@article{fds321608,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Mott, A},
Title = {Food incentives to improve clinic attendance.},
Journal = {Lancet (London, England)},
Volume = {2},
Number = {8500},
Pages = {230},
Year = {1986},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(86)92538-9},
Doi = {10.1016/s0140-6736(86)92538-9},
Key = {fds321608}
}
@article{fds244333,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Drane, JF},
Title = {Concepts of Competence: Reinventing the Scale?},
Journal = {The Hastings Center Report},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {44-44},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0093-0334},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3563093},
Doi = {10.2307/3563093},
Key = {fds244333}
}
@article{fds244404,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making for Elderly
Individuals who Are Incompetent or of Questionable
Competence},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244404}
}
@article{fds244429,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Brock, DW},
Title = {Deciding for Others},
Journal = {The Milbank Quarterly},
Volume = {64},
Number = {ArticleType: research-article / Issue Ti},
Pages = {17-94},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0887-378X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3349960},
Abstract = {Decision making for incompetent elderly people is an
increasingly serious issue for American society. The
decision-making processes we choose will reflect choices
among a number of ethical principles-those specifying the
purpose of substituted judgment, those guiding the surrogate
decision maker, and those used in choosing the surrogate-and
depends as well on the way we construe the concept of
decision-making competence.},
Doi = {10.2307/3349960},
Key = {fds244429}
}
@misc{fds244352,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Brock, D},
Title = {Ethical Implications of the Growth of For-Profit Health
Care},
Booktitle = {Profit Enterprise in Health Care},
Publisher = {National Academy Press},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244352}
}
@book{fds244410,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Ethics, Efficiency and the Market},
Publisher = {Rowman & Allenheld (U.S.) and Oxford University Press
(U.K.)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds244410}
}
@book{fds306207,
Title = {Ethics in Emergency Medicine},
Publisher = {Williams and Wilkins Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Buchanan, A and Iserson, KV and Sanders, A and Mathieu,
D},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds306207}
}
@misc{fds244349,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Out Treatment of Incompetents},
Booktitle = {Border Crossings: New Introductory Essays in Biomedical
Ethics},
Publisher = {Temple University Press},
Editor = {Regan, T and Deveer, DV},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244349}
}
@misc{fds244350,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Limitations on the Family’s Authority to Decide for the
Incompetent Patient},
Booktitle = {Ethics Committees},
Editor = {Doudera, E and Cranford, R},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244350}
}
@misc{fds244351,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Competition, Charity, and the Right to Health
Care},
Booktitle = {The Restraint of Liberty},
Publisher = {Bowling Green University Press},
Editor = {Attig, T and Callen, D and Gray, J},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244351}
}
@article{fds244428,
Author = {Buchanan, AE},
Title = {The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {55-78},
Year = {1984},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265199},
Doi = {10.2307/2265199},
Key = {fds244428}
}
@article{fds244427,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Review article on Allen Wood's Marx},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244427}
}
@misc{fds244348,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Limits Of Proxy Decision Making},
Booktitle = {Paternalism},
Publisher = {University of Minnesota Press},
Editor = {Sartorius, R},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244348}
}
@book{fds244408,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of
Liberalism},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield, Philosophy and Society Series (U.S.)
and Methuen Publishers (U.K.)},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244408}
}
@article{fds244425,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Marxian Critique of Justice and Rights},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume: Marx
and Morality},
Volume = {11},
Number = {sup1},
Pages = {269-306},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1982},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1981.10715775},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1981.10715775},
Key = {fds244425}
}
@article{fds244426,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Review article on Kant's theory of Morals by Bruce
Aune},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244426}
}
@misc{fds244346,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Philosophical Foundations of Beneficence},
Booktitle = {Beneficence and Health-Care},
Publisher = {Reidel Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Shelp, E},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244346}
}
@misc{fds244347,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Marxism Conceptual Framework and the Origins of
Totalitarian Socialism},
Booktitle = {Marxism and Democracy},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Paul, J},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244347}
}
@article{fds331098,
Author = {Buchanan, AE},
Title = {The limits of proxy decisionmaking for incompetents.},
Journal = {Ucla Law Review},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {386-408},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds331098}
}
@misc{fds244345,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Deriving Welfare Rights from Libertarian
Rights},
Booktitle = {Income Support: Conceptual and Policy Issues},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Brown, PG and et al, CFP and Public Policy and UOM},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244345}
}
@article{fds244334,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {The Fetishism of Democracy: A Reply to Professor
Gould},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {77},
Number = {11},
Pages = {729-731},
Year = {1980},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025989},
Doi = {10.2307/2025989},
Key = {fds244334}
}
@article{fds244424,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Autonomy, Fairness, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to
Professor Scanlon},
Journal = {University of Pittsburgh Law Review},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244424}
}
@misc{fds244344,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Rawls’s Theory of Justice: A Critical Introduction},
Booktitle = {John Rawls’s Theory of Social Justice},
Publisher = {Ohio University Press},
Editor = {Blocker, G and al, E},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244344}
}
@article{fds331099,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Medical paternalism or legal imperialism: not the only
alternatives for handling Saikewicz-type
cases.},
Journal = {American Journal of Law & Medicine},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Pages = {97-117},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held in
the Saikewicz case that the probate court is the proper
tribunal for making decisions whether to give or withhold
"life-prolonging treatment" for terminally ill incompetent
patients. This ruling provoked debate in the medical and
legal communities. Dr. Arnold Relman, Editor of The New
England Journal of Medicine, argues that Saikewicz
encroaches on existing sound medical practice and requires
decision-making machinery that is impractical and inhumane.
Relman contends that treatment decision for terminally ill
incompetents in Saikewicz-type cases should be made by the
physician in consultation with the patient's family. Law
professor Charles Baron, in contrast, defends Saikewicz's
judicialization approach, arguing that such decision must
bemade in an adversary framework that approximates the ideal
of the rule of law. In the present Article, Professor
Buchanan argues that Relman's criticism of Saikewicz rests
on a defective, medical paternalist view of the
physician-patient relationship, and that Baron's support of
Saikewicz is based on an unjustifiable, legal imperalist
view of decision making for incompetents. In Buchanan's
view, Relman's approach fails to distinguish appropriately
between the making of medical judgments and the making of
moral judgments and wrongly assumes that the patient's
family typically cannot understand the elements of the
decision, while Baron's approach unjustifiably extends the
sphere of the legal process by ignoring the special moral
relationship that usually exists between the family and its
incompetent member. Buchanan proposes an alternative
decision-making approach that he believes incorporates the
merits, while remedying the defects, of both Baron's and
Relman's approaches. The alternative is based on three
propositions. (1) The proper presumption in Saikewicz-type
cases is that the family of an incompetent is to make
decisions concerning treatment. (2) This presumption of the
family's dominant role in decision making is defeasible:
protection of the patient's rights requires that decisions
be made within a framework that allows vigorous discussion
and accoutability through impartial review and that provides
for legal intervention when necessary. (3) The institutional
framework for implementing the features listed in the
preceding proposition will rely heavily upon an ethics
committee that is neither an all-medical prognosis committee
nor an administrative agency of the hospital. Besides
evaluating and responding to the Relman and Baron
approaches, Buchanan examines the contribution to the
Saikewicz debate made by law-and-medicine professor George
Annas. In essence, Buchanan rejects Annas's argument that,
taken together, the Saikewicz opinion and the Quinlan
opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey delineate a
proper division of medical and legal decision-making
responsibility concerning terminally ill incompetents.
Buchanan concludes that, contrary to Annas's view, those two
cases are not reconcilable.},
Key = {fds331099}
}
@article{fds49011,
Author = {A. Buchanan},
Title = {Alienation, Exploitation, and Injustice},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {1979},
Key = {fds49011}
}
@article{fds244336,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Exploitation, Alienation, and Injustice},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {121-139},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1979},
ISSN = {0045-5091},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231084},
Doi = {10.2307/40231084},
Key = {fds244336}
}
@article{fds244423,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-82},
Year = {1979},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264867},
Doi = {10.2307/2264867},
Key = {fds244423}
}
@article{fds244420,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Review article on Onora Nell's Acting on
Principal},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244420}
}
@article{fds244421,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Medical Paternalism},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {370-390},
Year = {1978},
ISSN = {0048-3915},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264963},
Doi = {10.2307/2264963},
Key = {fds244421}
}
@article{fds244422,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Medical Paternalism and Legal Imperialism: Not the Only
Alternatives},
Journal = {American Journal of Law and Medicine},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244422}
}
@article{fds244419,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Categorical Imperatives and Moral Principles},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {249-260},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1977},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319132},
Doi = {10.2307/4319132},
Key = {fds244419}
}
@article{fds244418,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Basic Knowledge},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {101-108},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1976},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106375},
Doi = {10.2307/2106375},
Key = {fds244418}
}
@article{fds244416,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Distributive Justice and Legitimate Expectations},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {28},
Number = {6},
Pages = {419-425},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1975},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318999},
Doi = {10.2307/4318999},
Key = {fds244416}
}
@article{fds244417,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Revisability and Rational Choice},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {395-408},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1975},
ISSN = {0045-5091},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230579},
Doi = {10.2307/40230579},
Key = {fds244417}
}
@article{fds244403,
Author = {Buchanan, A},
Title = {Kant’s Second Analogy},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Congress on
Kant},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244403}
}
@article{fds226536,
Author = {A.E. Buchanan and Russell Powell},
Title = {The Limitations of Evolutionary Explanations of
Morality},
Journal = {ETHICS},
Key = {fds226536}
}
%% Burkhardt, Tim
@article{fds348754,
Author = {Burkhardt, T},
Title = {Epicureanism and the Wrongness of Killing},
Journal = {The Journal of Ethics},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {177-192},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-019-09317-y},
Abstract = {© 2019, Springer Nature B.V. This paper argues that
Epicureanism about death is consistent with grounding the
wrongness of killing in the interests of the victim. Both
defenders and critics of Epicureanism should agree that, if
we knew Epicureanism to be false, then we would have a moral
reason not to kill people. We would have this reason because
we would know that killing people harms them. And even
Epicureans should agree that, given their evidence,
Epicureanism could be false. Given that it could be false,
and given that we would harm people by killing them if it
were, we in fact have a moral reason not to kill them—a
reason which, as this paper will show, is both grounded in
their interests and consistent with the failure of death to
be in any way bad. The latter part of the paper discusses
some advantages that this approach enjoys over two other
attempts to reconcile Epicureanism with the wrongness of
killing, by David Hershenov and Mikel Burley,
respectively.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10892-019-09317-y},
Key = {fds348754}
}
%% Carnes, Thomas
@article{fds373474,
Author = {Carnes, T},
Title = {Keeping the Friend in Epicurean Friendship},
Journal = {Apeiron},
Volume = {54},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-410},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2020-0002},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>There seems to be
universal agreement among Epicurean scholars that friendship
characterized by other-concern is conceptually incompatible
with Epicureanism understood as a directly egoistic theory.
I reject this view. I argue that once we properly understand
the nature of friendship and the Epicurean conception of our
final end, we are in a position to demonstrate
friendship’s compatibility with, and centrality within,
Epicureanism’s direct egoism.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1515/apeiron-2020-0002},
Key = {fds373474}
}
@article{fds373476,
Author = {Carnes, T},
Title = {Forced Separation and the Wrong of Deportation},
Journal = {Social Philosophy Today},
Volume = {36},
Pages = {125-140},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2020},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday2020122875},
Abstract = {<jats:p>This paper argues that liberal states are wrong to
forcibly separate through deportation the unauthorized
immigrant parents of member children and that states must
therefore regularize such unauthorized immigrants. While
most arguments for regularization focus on how deportation
wrongs the unauthorized immigrants themselves, I ground my
argument in how deportation wrongs the state’s members,
namely the unauthorized immigrants’ member children.
Specifically, forced separation through deportation wrongs
affected children by violating a basic right to sustain the
intimate relationships with their parents on which they rely
for their development into fully autonomous
agents.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.5840/socphiltoday2020122875},
Key = {fds373476}
}
@article{fds373475,
Author = {Carnes, TS},
Title = {Unauthorized Immigrants, Reasonable Expectations, and the
Right to Regularization},
Journal = {Social Theory and Practice},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {681-707},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2020},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20201026102},
Abstract = {<jats:p>This article brings an account of reasonable
expectations to bear on the question of when unauthorized
immigrants have a right to be regularized—that is, to be
formally guaranteed freedom from the threat of deportation.
Contrary to the current literature, which implicitly relies
on a flawed understanding of reasonable expectations, this
article argues that only those unauthorized immigrants who
have both been tacitly permitted by the state despite
lacking formal authorization and have remained long enough
to develop deep social roots in the state have a right to
regularization.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.5840/soctheorpract20201026102},
Key = {fds373475}
}
@article{fds373477,
Author = {Carnes, T},
Title = {Historic Injustice, Collective Agency, and Compensatory
Duties},
Journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review},
Volume = {35},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-89},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2019},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20193518},
Abstract = {<jats:p />},
Doi = {10.5840/swphilreview20193518},
Key = {fds373477}
}
%% Conitzer, Vincent
@article{fds376876,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in
Ordinal Games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {38},
Number = {9},
Pages = {9607-9615},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28817},
Abstract = {Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify
utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions
we compute are not robust to errors in this specification.
Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they
require specifying only which outcomes are preferred to
which other ones. Unfortunately, they provide little
guidance for how to play unless there are pure Nash
equilibria; evaluating mixed strategies appears to
fundamentally require cardinal utilities. In this paper, we
observe that we can in fact make good use of mixed
strategies in ordinal games if we consider settings that
allow for folk theorems. These allow us to find equilibria
that are robust, in the sense that they remain equilibria no
matter which cardinal utilities are the correct ones - as
long as they are consistent with the specified ordinal
preferences. We analyze this concept and study the
computational complexity of finding such equilibria in a
range of settings.},
Doi = {10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28817},
Key = {fds376876}
}
@article{fds376877,
Author = {Xu, YE and Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups},
Journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {38},
Number = {9},
Pages = {9952-9959},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28857},
Abstract = {Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important
forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single,
indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially
interested. The two parties typically have different,
privately known valuations for the item, and ideally, they
would like to trade if the buyer values the item more than
the seller. The celebrated impossibility result by Myerson
and Satterthwaite shows that any mechanism for this setting
must violate at least one important desideratum. In this
paper, we investigate a richer paradigm of bilateral trade,
with many self-interested buyers and sellers on both sides
of a single trade who cannot be excluded from the trade. We
show that this allows for more positive results. In fact, we
establish a dichotomy in the possibility of trading
efficiently. If in expectation, the buyers value the item
more, we can achieve efficiency in the limit. If this is not
the case, then efficiency cannot be achieved in general. En
route, we characterize trading mechanisms that encourage
truth-telling, which may be of independent interest. We also
evaluate our trading mechanisms experimentally, and the
experiments align with our theoretical results.},
Doi = {10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28857},
Key = {fds376877}
}
@article{fds375178,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Demski, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality},
Journal = {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science,
EPTCS},
Volume = {379},
Pages = {421-440},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
Abstract = {The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical
omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a
decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant
computations and determine the truth value of all relevant
logical/mathematical claims. This assumption is unrealistic
when, for example, we offer bets on remote digits of π or
when an agent faces a computationally intractable planning
problem. Furthermore, the assumption of logical omniscience
creates contradictions in cases where the environment can
contain descriptions of the agent itself. Importantly,
strategic interactions as studied in game theory are
decision problems in which a rational agent is predicted by
its environment (the other players). In this paper, we
develop a theory of rational decision making that does not
assume logical omniscience. We consider agents who
repeatedly face decision problems (including ones like
betting on digits of π or games against other agents). The
main contribution of this paper is to provide a sensible
theory of rationality for such agents. Roughly, we require
that a boundedly rational inductive agent tests each
efficiently computable hypothesis infinitely often and
follows those hypotheses that keep their promises of high
rewards. We then prove that agents that are rational in this
sense have other desirable properties. For example, they
learn to value random and pseudo-random lotteries at their
expected reward. Finally, we consider strategic interactions
between different agents and prove a folk theorem for what
strategies bounded rational inductive agents can converge
to.},
Doi = {10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
Key = {fds375178}
}
@article{fds375179,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with
Extensive-Form Correlation},
Journal = {EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {1161-1186},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9798400701047},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597665},
Abstract = {We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form
correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our
main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for
computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated
equilibrium (SEFCE), which runs in time polynomial in the
size of the game, as well as the number of bits required to
encode each input number. (2) We give an efficient algorithm
for approximately computing an optimal extensive-form
correlated equilibrium (EFCE) up to machine precision, i.e.,
the algorithm achieves approximation error ϵ in time
polynomial in the size of the game, as well as log(1/ϵ).Our
algorithm for SEFCE is the first polynomial-time algorithm
for equilibrium computation with commitment in such a
general class of stochastic games. Existing algorithms for
SEFCE typically make stronger assumptions such as no chance
moves, and are designed for extensive-form games in the less
succinct tree form. Our algorithm for approximately optimal
EFCE is, to our knowledge, the first algorithm that achieves
3 desiderata simultaneously: approximate optimality,
polylogarithmic dependency on the approximation error and
compatibility with stochastic games in the more succinct
graph form. Existing algorithms achieve at most 2 of these
desiderata, often also relying on additional technical
assumptions.},
Doi = {10.1145/3580507.3597665},
Key = {fds375179}
}
@article{fds375180,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Oesterheld, C},
Title = {Foundations of Cooperative AI},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2023},
Volume = {37},
Pages = {15359-15367},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577358800},
Abstract = {AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with
disastrous consequences. As AI gets to control more of our
world, these interactions will become more common and have
higher stakes. As AI becomes more advanced, these
interactions will become more sophisticated, and game theory
will provide the tools for analyzing these interactions.
However, AI agents are in some ways unlike the agents
traditionally studied in game theory, introducing new
challenges as well as opportunities. We propose a research
agenda to develop the game theory of highly advanced AI
agents, with a focus on achieving cooperation.},
Key = {fds375180}
}
@article{fds375181,
Author = {Jecmen, S and Yoon, M and Conitzer, V and Shah, NB and Fang,
F},
Title = {A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer
Review},
Journal = {ACM Web Conference 2023 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web
Conference, WWW 2023},
Pages = {3816-3826},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781450394161},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583424},
Abstract = {In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to
provide "bids"on each submitted paper that express their
interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment
algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to
compute a high-quality assignment of reviewers to papers.
However, this process has been exploited by malicious
reviewers who strategically bid in order to unethically
manipulate the paper assignment, crucially undermining the
peer review process. For example, these reviewers may aim to
get assigned to a friend's paper as part of a quid-pro-quo
deal. A critical impediment towards creating and evaluating
methods to mitigate this issue is the lack of any
publicly-available data on malicious paper bidding. In this
work, we collect and publicly release a novel dataset to
fill this gap, collected from a mock conference activity
where participants were instructed to bid either honestly or
maliciously. We further provide a descriptive analysis of
the bidding behavior, including our categorization of
different strategies employed by participants. Finally, we
evaluate the ability of each strategy to manipulate the
assignment, and also evaluate the performance of some simple
algorithms meant to detect malicious bidding. The
performance of these detection algorithms can be taken as a
baseline for future research on detecting malicious
bidding.},
Doi = {10.1145/3543507.3583424},
Key = {fds375181}
}
@article{fds375182,
Author = {Tewolde, E and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V and Goldberg,
PW},
Title = {The Computational Complexity of Single-Player
Imperfect-Recall Games},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2023-August},
Pages = {2878-2887},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781956792034},
Abstract = {We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect
recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the
Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural
equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative
solution concepts to ex-ante optimality. One equilibrium
concept uses generalized double halving (GDH) as a belief
system and evidential decision theory (EDT), and another one
uses generalized thirding (GT) as a belief system and causal
decision theory (CDT). Our findings relate those three
solution concepts of a game to solution concepts of a
polynomial maximization problem: global optima, optimal
points with respect to subsets of variables and
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points. Based on these
correspondences, we are able to settle various
complexity-theoretic questions on the computation of such
strategies. For ex-ante optimality and (EDT,GDH)-equilibria,
we obtain NP-hardness and inapproximability, and for
(CDT,GT)-equilibria we obtain CLS-completeness
results.},
Key = {fds375182}
}
@article{fds375183,
Author = {Kovařík, V and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2023-August},
Pages = {2800-2807},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781956792034},
Abstract = {Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from
traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One
such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI
agent (for example because its source code is known), which
allows others to accurately predict the agent's actions.
This could lower the bar for trust and cooperation. In this
paper, we formalize games in which one player can simulate
another at a cost. We first derive some basic properties of
such games and then prove a number of results for them,
including: (1) introducing simulation into generic-payoff
normal-form games makes them easier to solve; (2) if the
only obstacle to cooperation is a lack of trust in the
possibly-simulated agent, simulation enables equilibria that
improve the outcome for both agents; and however (3) there
are settings where introducing simulation results in
strictly worse outcomes for both players.},
Key = {fds375183}
}
@article{fds375184,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Kroer, C and Panigrahi, D and Schrijvers, O and Stier-Moses, NE and Sodomka, E and Wilkens, CA},
Title = {Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction
Markets},
Journal = {Management Science},
Volume = {68},
Number = {12},
Pages = {8515-8535},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4310},
Abstract = {Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level
campaign management tools to help advertisers run their
campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how
each ad is placed and focusing on aggregatemetrics of
interest to advertisers. On such platforms, advertisers
often participate in auctions through a proxy bidder, so the
standard incentive analyses that are common in the
literature do not apply directly. In this paper, we take the
perspective of a budget management system that surfaces
aggregated incentives- instead of individual auctions-and
compare first and second price auctions. We show that theory
offers surprising endorsement for using a first price
auction to sell individual impressions. In particular, first
price auctions guarantee uniqueness of the steadystate
equilibrium of the budget management system, monotonicity,
and other desirable properties, as well as efficient
computation through the solution to the well-studied
Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Contrary to what one can
expect from first price auctions, we show that incentives
issues are not a barrier that undermines the system. Using
realistic instances generated from data collected at
real-world auction platforms, we show that bidders have
small regret with respect to their optimal ex post strategy,
and they do not have a big incentive to misreport when they
can influence equilibria directly by giving inputs
strategically. Finally, budget-constrained bidders, who have
significant prevalence in realworld platforms, tend to have
smaller regrets. Our computations indicate that bidder
budgets, pacingmultipliers, and regrets all have a positive
association in statistical terms.},
Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2022.4310},
Key = {fds375184}
}
@article{fds375185,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game
playing},
Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
Volume = {36},
Number = {2},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09574-6},
Abstract = {A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of
representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each
player trusts their respective representative’s strategic
abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the
original players would simply instruct the representatives
to play the original game as best as they can. In this
paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this
default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that
the original players can coordinate to tell their
representatives to only consider some subset of the
available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes
differently than the original players. Then can the original
players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed
to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for
all the original players? In particular, can they
Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how
the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some
examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the
notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a
notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show
that under some specific assumptions about how the
representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements
is NP-complete.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10458-022-09574-6},
Key = {fds375185}
}
@article{fds375186,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation
Constraints},
Journal = {EC 2022 - Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {1121-1140},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781450391504},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538280},
Abstract = {We consider the problem of planning with participation
constraints introduced in[24]. In this problem, a principal
chooses actions in a Markov decision process, resulting in
separate utilities for the principal and the agent. However,
the agent can and will choose to end the process whenever
his expected onward utility becomes negative. The principal
seeks to compute and commit to a policy that maximizes her
expected utility, under the constraint that the agent should
always want to continue participating. We provide the first
polynomial-time exact algorithm for this problem for
finite-horizon settings, where previously only an additive
ϵ-approximation algorithm was known. Our approach can also
be extended to the (discounted) infinite-horizon case, for
which we give an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in
the size of the input and log(1/ϵ), and returns a policy
that is optimal up to an additive error of
ϵ.},
Doi = {10.1145/3490486.3538280},
Key = {fds375186}
}
@article{fds363356,
Author = {Afnan, M and Afnan, MAM and Liu, Y and Savulescu, J and Mishra, A and Conitzer, V and Rudin, C},
Title = {Data solidarity for machine learning for embryo selection: a
call for the creation of an open access repository of embryo
data.},
Journal = {Reproductive biomedicine online},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {10-13},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2022.03.015},
Abstract = {The last decade has seen an explosion of machine learning
applications in healthcare, with mixed and sometimes harmful
results despite much promise and associated hype. A
significant reason for the reversal in the reported benefit
of these applications is the premature implementation of
machine learning algorithms in clinical practice. This paper
argues the critical need for 'data solidarity' for machine
learning for embryo selection. A recent Lancet and Financial
Times commission defined data solidarity as 'an approach to
the collection, use, and sharing of health data and data for
health that safeguards individual human rights while
building a culture of data justice and equity, and ensuring
that the value of data is harnessed for public good'
(Kickbusch et al., 2021).},
Doi = {10.1016/j.rbmo.2022.03.015},
Key = {fds363356}
}
@article{fds375187,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Panigrahi, D and Zhang, H},
Title = {Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous
Networks},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2022},
Volume = {36},
Pages = {6411-6419},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577358763},
Abstract = {We study the problem of learning influence adoption in
networks. In this problem, a communicable entity (such as an
infectious disease, a computer virus, or a social media
meme) propagates through a network, and the goal is to learn
the state of each individual node by sampling only a small
number of nodes and observing/testing their states. We study
this problem in heterogeneous networks, in which each
individual node has a set of distinct features that
determine how it is affected by the propagating entity. We
give an efficient algorithm with nearly optimal sample
complexity for two variants of this learning problem,
corresponding to symptomatic and asymptomatic spread. In
each case, the optimal sample complexity naturally
generalizes both the complexity of learning how nodes are
affected in isolation, and the complexity of learning
influence adoption in a homogeneous network.},
Key = {fds375187}
}
@article{fds375188,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Planning with Participation Constraints},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2022},
Volume = {36},
Pages = {5260-5267},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577358763},
Abstract = {We pose and study the problem of planning in Markov decision
processes (MDPs), subject to participation constraints as
studied in mechanism design. In this problem, a planner must
work with a self-interested agent on a given MDP. Each
action in the MDP provides an immediate reward to the
planner and a (possibly different) reward to the agent. The
agent has no control in choosing the actions, but has the
option to end the entire process at any time. The goal of
the planner is to find a policy that maximizes her
cumulative reward, taking into consideration the agent's
ability to terminate. We give a fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme for this problem. En route, we present
polynomial-time algorithms for computing (exact) optimal
policies for important special cases of this problem,
including when the time horizon is constant, or when the MDP
exhibits a “definitive decisions” property. We
illustrate our algorithms with two different game-theoretic
applications: the problem of assigning rides in ride-sharing
and the problem of designing screening policies. Our results
imply efficient algorithms for computing (approximately)
optimal policies in both applications.},
Key = {fds375188}
}
@article{fds362917,
Author = {Awad, E and Levine, S and Anderson, M and Anderson, SL and Conitzer, V and Crockett, MJ and Everett, JAC and Evgeniou, T and Gopnik, A and Jamison,
JC and Kim, TW and Liao, SM and Meyer, MN and Mikhail, J and Opoku-Agyemang, K and Borg, JS and Schroeder, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Slavkovik, M and Tenenbaum,
JB},
Title = {Computational ethics.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5},
Pages = {388-405},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Abstract = {Technological advances are enabling roles for machines that
present novel ethical challenges. The study of 'AI ethics'
has emerged to confront these challenges, and connects
perspectives from philosophy, computer science, law, and
economics. Less represented in these interdisciplinary
efforts is the perspective of cognitive science. We propose
a framework - computational ethics - that specifies how the
ethical challenges of AI can be partially addressed by
incorporating the study of human moral decision-making. The
driver of this framework is a computational version of
reflective equilibrium (RE), an approach that seeks
coherence between considered judgments and governing
principles. The framework has two goals: (i) to inform the
engineering of ethical AI systems, and (ii) to characterize
human moral judgment and decision-making in computational
terms. Working jointly towards these two goals will create
the opportunity to integrate diverse research questions,
bring together multiple academic communities, uncover new
interdisciplinary research topics, and shed light on
centuries-old philosophical questions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Key = {fds362917}
}
@article{fds362969,
Author = {Chan, L and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Wilkinson, D and Savulescu, J and Zohny, H and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Which features of patients are morally relevant in
ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.},
Journal = {BMC medical ethics},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>In the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK,
developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of
ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient
understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and
little evidence on which features of a patient the public
believe should and should not be considered in ventilator
triage.<h4>Methods</h4>Two surveys were conducted with
representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525
participants were asked in an open-ended format to provide
features they thought should and should not be considered in
allocating ventilators for COVID-19 patients when not enough
ventilators are available. In the second survey, 505
participants were presented with 30 features identified from
the first study, and were asked if these features should
count in favour of a patient with the feature getting a
ventilator, count against the patient, or neither.
Statistical tests were conducted to determine if a feature
was generally considered by participants as morally relevant
and whether its mean was non-neutral.<h4>Results</h4>In
Survey 1, the features of a patient most frequently cited as
being morally relevant to determining who would receive
access to ventilators were age, general health, prospect of
recovery, having dependents, and the severity of COVID
symptoms. The features most frequently cited as being
morally irrelevant to determining who would receive access
to ventilators are race, gender, economic status, religion,
social status, age, sexual orientation, and career. In
Survey 2, the top three features that participants thought
should count in favour of receiving a ventilator were
pregnancy, having a chance of dying soon, and having waited
for a long time. The top three features that participants
thought should count against a patient receiving a
ventilator were having committed violent crimes in the past,
having unnecessarily engaged in activities with a high risk
of COVID-19 infection, and a low chance of
survival.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The public generally agreed
with existing UK guidelines that allocate ventilators
according to medical benefits and that aim to avoid
discrimination based on demographic features such as race
and gender. However, many participants expressed potentially
non-utilitarian concerns, such as inclining to deprioritise
ventilator allocation to those who had a criminal history or
who contracted the virus by needlessly engaging in high-risk
activities.},
Doi = {10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Key = {fds362969}
}
@article{fds364269,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Kroer, C and Sodomka, E and Stier-Moses,
NE},
Title = {Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction
Markets},
Journal = {Operations Research},
Volume = {70},
Number = {2},
Pages = {963-989},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2167},
Abstract = {Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential
auction markets such as those implemented by internet
companies. To maximize the value provided to auction
participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so
budgets are used for the best opportunities. Motivated by a
mechanism used in practice by several companies, this paper
considers a smoothing procedure that relies on pacing
multipliers: on behalf of each buyer, the auction market
applies a factor between 0 and 1 that uniformly scales the
bids across all auctions. Reinterpreting this process as a
game between buyers, we introduce the notion of pacing
equilibrium, and prove that they are always guaranteed to
exist. We demonstrate through examples that a market can
have multiple pacing equilibria with large variations in
several natural objectives. We show that pacing equilibria
refine another popular solution concept, competitive
equilibria, and show further connections between the two
solution concepts. Although we show that computing either a
social-welfare-maximizing or a revenue-maximizing pacing
equilibrium is NP-hard, we present a mixed-integer program
(MIP) that can be used to find equilibria optimizing several
relevant objectives. We use the MIP to provide evidence
that: (1) equilibrium multiplicity occurs very rarely across
several families of random instances, (2) static MIP
solutions can be used to improve the outcomes achieved by a
dynamic pacing algorithm with instances based on a
real-world auction market, and (3) for the instances we
study, buyers do not have an incentive to misreport bids or
budgets provided there are enough participants in the
market.},
Doi = {10.1287/opre.2021.2167},
Key = {fds364269}
}
@article{fds362137,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Lopomo, G and Stone,
P},
Title = {Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient
Methods for Revenue Maximization},
Journal = {Operations Research},
Volume = {70},
Number = {1},
Pages = {562-584},
Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences (INFORMS)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2092},
Abstract = {Traditionally, the mechanism design literature has been
primarily focused on settings where the bidders' valuations
are independent. However, in settings where valuations are
correlated, much stronger results are possible. For example,
the entire surplus of efficient allocations can be extracted
as revenue. These stronger results are true, in theory,
under generic conditions on parameter values. However, in
practice, they are rarely, if ever, implementable because of
the stringent requirement that the mechanism designer knows
the distribution of the bidders types exactly. In this work,
we provide a computationally efficient and sample efficient
method for designing mechanisms that can robustly handle
imprecise estimates of the distribution over bidder
valuations. This method guarantees that the selected
mechanism will perform at least as well as any ex post
mechanism with high probability. The mechanism also performs
nearly optimally with sufficient information and
correlation. Furthermore, we show that when the distribution
is not known and must be estimated from samples from the
true distribution, a sufficiently high degree of correlation
is essential to implement optimal mechanisms. Finally, we
demonstrate through simulations that this new mechanism
design paradigm generates mechanisms that perform
significantly better than traditional mechanism design
techniques given sufficient samples. Copyright:},
Doi = {10.1287/opre.2020.2092},
Key = {fds362137}
}
@article{fds362192,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Feng, Z and Parkes, DC and Sodomka,
E},
Title = {Welfare-Preserving ε -BIC to BIC Transformation with
Negligible Revenue Loss},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {13112 LNCS},
Pages = {76-94},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783030946753},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_5},
Abstract = {In this paper, we provide a transform from an ε -BIC
mechanism into an exactly BIC mechanism without any loss of
social welfare and with additive and negligible revenue
loss. This is the first ε -BIC to BIC transformation that
preserves welfare and provides negligible revenue loss. The
revenue loss bound is tight given the requirement to
maintain social welfare. Previous ε -BIC to BIC
transformations preserve social welfare but have no revenue
guarantee [4], or suffer welfare loss while incurring a
revenue loss with both a multiplicative and an additive
term, e.g., [9, 14, 28]. The revenue loss achieved by our
transformation is incomparable to these earlier approaches
and can be significantly less. Our approach is different
from the previous replica-surrogate matching methods and we
directly make use of a directed and weighted type graph
(induced by the types’ regret), one for each agent. The
transformation runs a fractional rotation step and a payment
reducing step iteratively to make the mechanism Bayesian
incentive compatible. We also analyze ε -expected ex-post
IC (ε -EEIC) mechanisms [18]. We provide a
welfare-preserving transformation in this setting with the
same revenue loss guarantee for uniform type distributions
and give an impossibility result for non-uniform
distributions. We apply the transform to linear-programming
based and machine-learning based methods of automated
mechanism design.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_5},
Key = {fds362192}
}
@article{fds364270,
Author = {Jecmen, S and Zhang, H and Liu, R and Fang, F and Conitzer, V and Shah,
NB},
Title = {Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing
and Conference Experiment Design},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {1642-1644},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713854333},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21991},
Abstract = {Many scientific conferences employ a two-phase paper review
process, where some papers are assigned additional reviewers
after the initial reviews are submitted. Many conferences
also design and run experiments on their paper review
process, where some papers are assigned reviewers who
provide reviews under an experimental condition. In this
paper, we consider the question: how should reviewers be
divided between phases or conditions in order to maximize
total assignment similarity? We show both empirically (on
real conference data) and theoretically (under certain
natural conditions) that dividing reviewers uniformly at
random is near-optimal. The full paper is available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.06371.},
Doi = {10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21991},
Key = {fds364270}
}
@article{fds375189,
Author = {Emmons, S and Oesterheld, C and Critch, A and Conitzer, V and Russell,
S},
Title = {For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global
Nash Equilibria},
Journal = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
Volume = {162},
Pages = {5924-5943},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally
optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash
equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that
limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show
that any locally optimal symmetric strategy profile is also
a (global) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that this
result is robust to perturbations to the common payoff and
to the local optimum. Applied to machine learning, our
result provides a global guarantee for any gradient method
that finds a local optimum in symmetric strategy space.
While this result indicates stability to unilateral
deviation, we nevertheless identify broad classes of games
where mixed local optima are unstable under joint,
asymmetric deviations. We analyze the prevalence of
instability by running learning algorithms in a suite of
symmetric games, and we conclude by discussing the
applicability of our results to multi-agent RL, cooperative
inverse RL, and decentralized POMDPs.},
Key = {fds375189}
}
@article{fds375190,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Why should we ever automate moral decision
making?},
Journal = {CEUR Workshop Proceedings},
Volume = {3547},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {While people generally trust AI to make decisions in various
aspects of their lives, concerns arise when AI is involved
in decisions with significant moral implications. The
absence of a precise mathematical framework for moral
reasoning intensifies these concerns, as ethics often defies
simplistic mathematical models. Unlike fields such as
logical reasoning, reasoning under uncertainty, and
strategic decisionmaking, which have well-defined
mathematical frameworks, moral reasoning lacks a broadly
accepted framework. This absence raises questions about the
confidence we can place in AI's moral decisionmaking
capabilities. The environments in which AI systems are
typically trained today seem insufficiently rich for such a
system to learn ethics from scratch, and even if we had an
appropriate environment, it is unclear how we might bring
about such learning. An alternative approach involves AI
learning from human moral decisions. This learning process
can involve aggregating curated human judgments or
demonstrations in specific domains, or leveraging a
foundation model fed with a wide range of data. Still,
concerns persist, given the imperfections in human moral
decision making. Given this, why should we ever automate
moral decision making - is it not better to leave all moral
decision making to humans? This paper lays out a number of
reasons why we should expect AI systems to engage in
decisions with a moral component, with brief discussions of
the associated risks.},
Key = {fds375190}
}
@article{fds376623,
Author = {Jecmen, S and Zhang, H and Liu, R and Fang, F and Conitzer, V and Shah,
NB},
Title = {Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing
and Conference Experiment Design},
Journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and
Crowdsourcing},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {102-113},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358787},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21991},
Abstract = {Many scientific conferences employ a two-phase paper review
process, where some papers are assigned additional reviewers
after the initial reviews are submitted. Many conferences
also design and run experiments on their paper review
process, where some papers are assigned reviewers who
provide reviews under an experimental condition. In this
paper, we consider the question: how should reviewers be
divided between phases or conditions in order to maximize
total assignments imilarity? We make several contributions
towards answering this question. First, we prove that when
the set of papers requiring additional review is unknown, a
simplified variant of this problem is NP-hard. Second, we
empirically show that across several datasets pertaining to
real conference data, dividing reviewers between
phases/conditions uniformly atrandom allows an assignment
that is nearly as good as the oracle optimal assignment.
This uniformly random choice is practical for both the
two-phase and conference experiment design settings. Third,
we provide explanations of this phenomenon by providing
theoretical bounds on the sub optimality of this random
strategy under certain natural conditions. From these
easily-interpretable conditions, we provide actionable
insights to conference program chairs about whether a random
reviewer split is suitable for their conference.},
Doi = {10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21991},
Key = {fds376623}
}
@article{fds351475,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {71},
Number = {4},
Pages = {701-716},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa086},
Abstract = {Newcomb s problem has spawned a debate about which variant
of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide
rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument
against what is probably the most popular variant: causal
decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two
scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the
first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT s
recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. The
second scenario extends the first to a diachronic Dutch book
against CDT.},
Doi = {10.1093/pq/pqaa086},
Key = {fds351475}
}
@article{fds358736,
Author = {Afnan, MAM and Rudin, C and Conitzer, V and Savulescu, J and Mishra, A and Liu, Y and Afnan, M},
Title = {Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select
Embryos in in Vitro Fertilization},
Journal = {AIES 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {316-326},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781450384735},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462589},
Abstract = {AI has the potential to revolutionize many areas of
healthcare. Radiology, dermatology, and ophthalmology are
some of the areas most likely to be impacted in the near
future, and they have received significant attention from
the broader research community. But AI techniques are now
also starting to be used in in vitro fertilization (IVF), in
particular for selecting which embryos to transfer to the
woman. The contribution of AI to IVF is potentially
significant, but must be done carefully and transparently,
as the ethical issues are significant, in part because this
field involves creating new people. We first give a brief
introduction to IVF and review the use of AI for embryo
selection. We discuss concerns with the interpretation of
the reported results from scientific and practical
perspectives. We then consider the broader ethical issues
involved. We discuss in detail the problems that result from
the use of black-box methods in this context and advocate
strongly for the use of interpretable models. Importantly,
there have been no published trials of clinical
effectiveness, a problem in both the AI and IVF communities,
and we therefore argue that clinical implementation at this
point would be premature. Finally, we discuss ways for the
broader AI community to become involved to ensure
scientifically sound and ethically responsible development
of AI in IVF.},
Doi = {10.1145/3461702.3462589},
Key = {fds358736}
}
@article{fds355781,
Author = {Kephart, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling
Costs},
Journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3434408},
Abstract = {The revelation principle is a key tool in mechanism design.
It allows the designer to restrict attention to truthful
mechanisms, greatly facilitating analysis. This is also
borne out algorithmically, allowing certain computational
problems in mechanism design to be solved in polynomial
time. Unfortunately, when not every type can misreport every
other type (the partial verification model) or-more
generally-misreporting can be costly, the revelation
principle can fail to hold. This also leads to NP-hardness
results. The primary contribution of this article consists
of characterizations of conditions under which the
revelation principle still holds when reporting can be
costly. (These are generalizations of conditions given
earlier for the partial verification case [11, 21].)
Furthermore, our results extend to cases where, instead of
reporting types directly, agents send signals that do not
directly correspond to types. In this case, we obtain
conditions for when the mechanism designer can restrict
attention to a given (but arbitrary) mapping from types to
signals without loss of generality.},
Doi = {10.1145/3434408},
Key = {fds355781}
}
@article{fds363357,
Author = {McElfresh, DC and Chan, L and Doyle, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V and Borg, JS and Dickerson, JP},
Title = {Indecision Modeling},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {5975-5983},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {AI systems are often used to make or contribute to important
decisions in a growing range of applications, including
criminal justice, hiring, and medicine. Since these
decisions impact human lives, it is important that the AI
systems act in ways which align with human values.
Techniques for preference modeling and social choice help
researchers learn and aggregate peoples’ preferences,
which are used to guide AI behavior; thus, it is imperative
that these learned preferences are accurate. These
techniques often assume that people are willing to express
strict preferences over alternatives; which is not true in
practice. People are often indecisive, and especially so
when their decision has moral implications. The philosophy
and psychology literature shows that indecision is a
measurable and nuanced behavior—and that there are several
different reasons people are indecisive. This complicates
the task of both learning and aggregating preferences, since
most of the relevant literature makes restrictive
assumptions on the meaning of indecision. We begin to close
this gap by formalizing several mathematical indecision
models based on theories from philosophy, psychology, and
economics; these models can be used to describe (indecisive)
agent decisions, both when they are allowed to express
indecision and when they are not. We test these models using
data collected from an online survey where participants
choose how to (hypothetically) allocate organs to patients
waiting for a transplant.},
Key = {fds363357}
}
@article{fds375192,
Author = {Afnan, MAM and Liu, Y and Conitzer, V and Rudin, C and Mishra, A and Savulescu, J and Afnan, M},
Title = {Interpretable, not black-box, artificial intelligence should
be used for embryo selection.},
Journal = {Human reproduction open},
Volume = {2021},
Number = {4},
Pages = {hoab040},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hropen/hoab040},
Abstract = {Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are starting to be
used in IVF, in particular for selecting which embryos to
transfer to the woman. AI has the potential to process
complex data sets, to be better at identifying subtle but
important patterns, and to be more objective than humans
when evaluating embryos. However, a current review of the
literature shows much work is still needed before AI can be
ethically implemented for this purpose. No randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) have been published, and the
efficacy studies which exist demonstrate that algorithms can
broadly differentiate well between 'good-' and 'poor-'
quality embryos but not necessarily between embryos of
similar quality, which is the actual clinical need. Almost
universally, the AI models were opaque ('black-box') in that
at least some part of the process was uninterpretable. This
gives rise to a number of epistemic and ethical concerns,
including problems with trust, the possibility of using
algorithms that generalize poorly to different populations,
adverse economic implications for IVF clinics, potential
misrepresentation of patient values, broader societal
implications, a responsibility gap in the case of poor
selection choices and introduction of a more paternalistic
decision-making process. Use of interpretable models, which
are constrained so that a human can easily understand and
explain them, could overcome these concerns. The
contribution of AI to IVF is potentially significant, but we
recommend that AI models used in this field should be
interpretable, and rigorously evaluated with RCTs before
implementation. We also recommend long-term follow-up of
children born after AI for embryo selection, regulatory
oversight for implementation, and public availability of
data and code to enable research teams to independently
reproduce and validate existing models.},
Doi = {10.1093/hropen/hoab040},
Key = {fds375192}
}
@article{fds358737,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Safe pareto improvements for delegated game
playing},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {971-979},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713832621},
Abstract = {A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of
representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each
player trusts their respective representative’s strategic
abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the
original players would simply instruct the representatives
to play the original game as best as they can. In this
paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this
default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that
the original players can coordinate to tell their
representatives to only consider some subset of the
available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes
differently than the original players. Then can the original
players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed
to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for
all the original players? In particular, can they
Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how
the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some
examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the
notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a
notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show
that under some specific assumptions about how the
representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements
is NP-complete.},
Key = {fds358737}
}
@article{fds363358,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial
Verification},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {6B},
Pages = {5789-5796},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713835974},
Abstract = {We study the problem of automated mechanism design with
partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a
restricted set of types (rather than any other type),
induced by the principal’s limited verification power. We
prove hardness results when the revelation principle does
not necessarily hold, as well as when types have even
minimally different preferences. In light of these hardness
results, we focus on truthful mechanisms in the setting
where all types share the same preference over outcomes,
which is motivated by applications in, e.g., strategic
classification. We present a number of algorithmic and
structural results, including an efficient algorithm for
finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms, which
also implies a faster algorithm for finding optimal
randomized truthful mechanisms via a characterization based
on convexity. We then consider a more general setting, where
the principal’s cost is a function of the combination of
outcomes assigned to each type. In particular, we focus on
the case where the cost function is submodular, and give
generalizations of essentially all our results in the
classical setting where the cost function is additive. Our
results provide a relatively complete picture for automated
mechanism design with partial verification.},
Key = {fds363358}
}
@article{fds363359,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {6B},
Pages = {5805-5812},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713835974},
Abstract = {We study test-based binary classification, where a principal
either accepts or rejects agents based on the outcomes they
get in a set of tests. The principal commits to a policy,
which consists of all sets of outcomes that lead to
acceptance. Each agent is modeled by a distribution over the
space of possible outcomes. When an agent takes a test, he
pays a cost and receives an independent sample from his
distribution as the outcome. Agents can always choose
between taking another test and stopping. They maximize
their expected utility, which is the value of acceptance if
the principal’s policy accepts the set of outcomes they
have and 0 otherwise, minus the total cost of tests taken.
We focus on the case where agents can be either “good”
or “bad” (corresponding to their distribution over test
outcomes), and the principal’s goal is to accept good
agents and reject bad ones. We show, roughly speaking, that
as long as the good and bad agents have different
distributions (which can be arbitrarily close to each
other), the principal can always achieve perfect accuracy,
meaning good agents are accepted with probability 1, and bad
ones are rejected with probability 1. Moreover, there is a
policy achieving perfect accuracy under which the maximum
number of tests any agent needs to take is constant — in
sharp contrast to the case where the principal directly
observes samples from agents’ distributions. The key
technique is to choose the policy so that agents self-select
into taking tests.},
Key = {fds363359}
}
@article{fds363360,
Author = {Krishnaswamy, AK and Li, H and Rein, D and Zhang, H and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {Classification with Strategically Withheld
Data∗},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {6B},
Pages = {5514-5522},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713835974},
Abstract = {Machine learning techniques can be useful in applications
such as credit approval and college admission. However, to
be classified more favorably in such contexts, an agent may
decide to strategically withhold some of her features, such
as bad test scores. This is a missing data problem with a
twist: which data is missing depends on the chosen
classifier, because the specific classifier is what may
create the incentive to withhold certain feature values. We
address the problem of training classifiers that are robust
to this behavior. We design three classification methods:
MINCUT, HILL-CLIMBING (HC) and Incentive-Compatible Logistic
Regression (IC-LR). We show that MINCUT is optimal when the
true distribution of data is fully known. However, it can
produce complex decision boundaries, and hence be prone to
overfitting in some cases. Based on a characterization of
truthful classifiers (i.e., those that give no incentive to
strategically hide features), we devise a simpler
alternative called HC which consists of a hierarchical
ensemble of out-of-the-box classifiers, trained using a
specialized hill-climbing procedure which we show to be
convergent. For several reasons, MINCUT and HC are not
effective in utilizing a large number of complementarily
informative features. To this end, we present IC-LR, a
modification of Logistic Regression that removes the
incentive to strategically drop features. We also show that
our algorithms perform well in experiments on real-world
data sets, and present insights into their relative
performance in different settings.},
Key = {fds363360}
}
@article{fds363361,
Author = {Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Incentive-Aware PAC Learning},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {6B},
Pages = {5797-5804},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713835974},
Abstract = {We study PAC learning in the presence of strategic
manipulation, where data points may modify their features in
certain predefined ways in order to receive a better
outcome. We show that the vanilla ERM principle fails to
achieve any nontrivial guarantee in this context. Instead,
we propose an incentive-aware version of the ERM principle
which has asymptotically optimal sample complexity. We then
focus our attention on incentive-compatible classifiers,
which provably prevent any kind of strategic manipulation.
We give a sample complexity bound that is, curiously,
independent of the hypothesis class, for the ERM principle
restricted to incentive-compatible classifiers. This
suggests that incentive compatibility alone can act as an
effective means of regularization. We further show that it
is without loss of generality to consider only
incentive-compatible classifiers when opportunities for
strategic manipulation satisfy a transitivity condition. As
a consequence, in such cases, our hypothesis-class-independent
sample complexity bound applies even without incentive
compatibility. Our results set the foundations of
incentive-aware PAC learning.},
Key = {fds363361}
}
@article{fds363877,
Author = {Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design},
Journal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {27785-27797},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713845393},
Abstract = {We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured
dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts
with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic
agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the
principal and the agent can have arbitrary and potentially
different valuations for the actions taken, possibly also
depending on the actual state of the world. Moreover, at any
time, the state of the world may evolve arbitrarily
depending on the action taken by the principal. The goal is
to compute an optimal mechanism which maximizes the
principal's utility in the face of the self-interested
strategic agent. We give an efficient algorithm for
computing optimal mechanisms, with or without payments,
under different individual-rationality constraints, when the
time horizon is constant. Our algorithm is based on a
sophisticated linear program formulation, which can be
customized in various ways to accommodate richer
constraints. For environments with large time horizons, we
show that the principal's optimal utility is hard to
approximate within a certain constant factor, complementing
our algorithmic result. These results paint a relatively
complete picture for automated dynamic mechanism design in
unstructured environments. We further consider a special
case of the problem where the agent is myopic, and give a
refined efficient algorithm whose time complexity scales
linearly in the time horizon. In the full version of the
paper, we show that memoryless mechanisms, which are without
loss of generality optimal in Markov decision processes
without strategic behavior, do not provide a good solution
for our problem, in terms of both optimality and
computational tractability. Moreover, we present
experimental results where our algorithms are applied to
synthetic dynamic environments with different
characteristics, which not only serve as a proof of concept
for our algorithms, but also exhibit intriguing phenomena in
dynamic mechanism design.},
Key = {fds363877}
}
@article{fds325596,
Author = {Kolb, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and
warning},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {189},
Number = {16},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105094},
Abstract = {We analyze cheap talk warnings about a strategic adversary,
with applications to cybersecurity and national security.
Each period an expert receives a noisy private signal about
whether an attack by the adversary is feasible. The expert
wants to warn a decision maker while also maintaining
credibility for future warnings, but unlike in a standard
cheap talk game, the adversary can undermine the expert's
credibility by delaying attack. While such delays increase
“warning fatigue,” they also make the expert less
tempted to exaggerate so as to avoid too many false alarms.
We show that the net effect of a strategic adversary can be
better incentive alignment between the expert and decision
maker that benefits them both. Moreover, we show that
sometimes the expert and decision maker benefit from the
expert's ability to exaggerate, as this can induce more
defensive action and more strategic delay.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2020.105094},
Key = {fds325596}
}
@article{fds351430,
Author = {Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite
Matching},
Journal = {EC 2020 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {879-910},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781450379755},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399470},
Abstract = {We consider a combinatorial variant of the classical ski
rental problem - - which we call combinatorial ski rental -
- where multiple resources are available to purchase and to
rent, and are demanded online. Moreover, the costs of
purchasing and renting are potentially combinatorial. The
dual problem of combinatorial ski rental, which we call
combinatorial online bipartite matching, generalizes the
classical online bipartite matching problem into a form
where constraints, induced by both offline and online
vertices, can be combinatorial. We give a 2-competitive
(resp. e / (e - 1)-competitive) deterministic (resp.
randomized) algorithm for combinatorial ski rental, and an e
/ (e - 1)-competitive algorithm for combinatorial online
bipartite matching. All these ratios are optimal given
simple lower bounds inherited from the respective
well-studied special cases. We also prove
information-theoretic impossibility of constant-factor
algorithms when any part of our assumptions is considerably
relaxed.},
Doi = {10.1145/3391403.3399470},
Key = {fds351430}
}
@article{fds349164,
Author = {Freedman, R and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {283},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Abstract = {The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a
classical problem in economics and computer science. In
kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living
kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and
donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc
weights decided on by committee and then fed into an
allocation algorithm that determines who gets what—and who
does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end
methodology for estimating weights of individual participant
profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human
subjects a list of patient attributes they consider
acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g.,
medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on).
Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient
profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their
responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney
exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the
impact of the weights in simulations and find that the
precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter
little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply.
However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there
is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients
being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Key = {fds349164}
}
@article{fds348892,
Author = {Chan, L and Doyle, K and McElfresh, DC and Conitzer, V and Dickerson,
JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Artificial artificial intelligence: Measuring influence of
AI 'Assessments' on moral decision-making},
Journal = {AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI,
Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {214-220},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Abstract = {Given AI's growing role in modeling and improving
decision-making, how and when to present users with feedback
is an urgent topic to address. We empirically examined the
effect of feedback from false AI on moral decision-making
about donor kidney allocation. We found some evidence that
judgments about whether a patient should receive a kidney
can be influenced by feedback about participants' own
decision-making perceived to be given by AI, even if the
feedback is entirely random.We also discovered different
effects between assessments presented as being from human
experts and assessments presented as being from
AI.},
Doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Key = {fds348892}
}
@article{fds348964,
Author = {Skorburg, JA and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {AI Methods in Bioethics.},
Journal = {AJOB empirical bioethics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-39},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Doi = {10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Key = {fds348964}
}
@article{fds354268,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert
Problems},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {12495 LNCS},
Pages = {430-443},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783030649456},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_30},
Abstract = {We consider a principal-expert problem in which a principal
contracts one or more experts to acquire and report
decision-relevant information. The principal never finds out
what information is available to which expert, at what costs
that information is available, or what costs the experts
actually end up paying. This makes it challenging for the
principal to compensate the experts in a way that
incentivizes acquisition of relevant information without
overpaying. We determine the payment scheme that minimizes
the principal’s worst-case regret relative to the
first-best solution. In particular, we show that under two
different assumptions about the experts’ available
information, the optimal payment scheme is a set of linear
contracts.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_30},
Key = {fds354268}
}
@article{fds354269,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Deng, Y and Dughmi, S},
Title = {Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with
Application to Security Games},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {12495 LNCS},
Pages = {444-458},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783030649456},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31},
Abstract = {We study infinitely-repeated two-player zero-sum games with
one-sided private information and a persistent state. Here,
only one of the two players learns the state of the repeated
game. We consider two models: either the state is chosen by
nature, or by one of the players. For the former, the
equilibrium of the repeated game is known to be equivalent
to that of a one-shot public signaling game, and we make
this equivalence algorithmic. For the latter, we show
equivalence to one-shot team max-min games, and also provide
an algorithmic reduction. We apply this framework to
repeated zero-sum security games with private information on
the side of the defender and provide an almost complete
characterization of their computational complexity.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31},
Key = {fds354269}
}
@article{fds356399,
Author = {Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Learning the valuations of a k-demand agent},
Journal = {37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML
2020},
Volume = {PartF168147-15},
Pages = {11000-11009},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713821120},
Abstract = {We study problems where a learner aims to learn the
valuations of an agent by observing which goods he buys
under varying price vectors. More specifically, we consider
the case of a k-demand agent, whose valuation over the goods
is additive when receiving up to k goods, but who has no
interest in receiving more than k goods. We settle the query
complexity for the active-learning (preference elicitation)
version, where the learner chooses the prices to post, by
giving a biased binary search algorithm, generalizing the
classical binary search procedure. We complement our query
complexity upper bounds by lower bounds that match up to
lower-order terms. We also study the passive-learning
version in which the learner does not control the prices,
and instead they are sampled from some distribution. We show
that in the PAC model for passive learning, any empirical
risk minimizer has a sample complexity that is optimal up to
a factor of eO(k).},
Key = {fds356399}
}
@article{fds356400,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Panigrahi, D and Zhang, H},
Title = {Learning opinions in social networks},
Journal = {37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML
2020},
Volume = {PartF168147-3},
Pages = {2100-2110},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781713821120},
Abstract = {We study the problem of learning opinions in social
networks. The learner observes the states of some sample
nodes from a social network, and tries to infer the states
of other nodes, based on the structure of the network. We
show that sample-efficient learning is impossible when the
network exhibits strong noise, and give a polynomial-time
algorithm for the problem with nearly optimal sample
complexity when the network is sufficiently
stable.},
Key = {fds356400}
}
@article{fds357491,
Author = {Jecmen, S and Zhang, H and Liu, R and Shah, NB and Conitzer, V and Fang,
F},
Title = {Mitigating manipulation in peer review via randomized
reviewer assignments},
Journal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems},
Volume = {2020-December},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We consider three important challenges in conference peer
review: (i) reviewers maliciously attempting to get assigned
to certain papers to provide positive reviews, possibly as
part of quid-pro-quo arrangements with the authors; (ii)
“torpedo reviewing,” where reviewers deliberately
attempt to get assigned to certain papers that they dislike
in order to reject them; (iii) reviewer de-anonymization on
release of the similarities and the reviewer-assignment
code. On the conceptual front, we identify connections
between these three problems and present a framework that
brings all these challenges under a common umbrella. We then
present a (randomized) algorithm for reviewer assignment
that can optimally solve the reviewer-assignment problem
under any given constraints on the probability of assignment
for any reviewer-paper pair. We further consider the problem
of restricting the joint probability that certain suspect
pairs of reviewers are assigned to certain papers, and show
that this problem is NP-hard for arbitrary constraints on
these joint probabilities but efficiently solvable for a
practical special case. Finally, we experimentally evaluate
our algorithms on datasets from past conferences, where we
observe that they can limit the chance that any malicious
reviewer gets assigned to their desired paper to 50% while
producing assignments with over 90% of the total optimal
similarity.},
Key = {fds357491}
}
@article{fds348969,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Kroer, C and Panigrahi, D and Schrijvers, O and Sodomka,
E and Stier-Moses, NE and Wilkens, C},
Title = {Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction
Markets},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation},
Publisher = {ACM},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781450367929},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329600},
Doi = {10.1145/3328526.3329600},
Key = {fds348969}
}
@article{fds333306,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {A Puzzle about Further Facts},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {84},
Number = {3},
Pages = {727-739},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6},
Abstract = {In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related
questions about the existence of “further facts”—facts
that are contingent relative to the physical structure of
the universe. These include further facts about qualia,
personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a
sequence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging
from one in which the protagonist can clearly conclude such
further facts exist to one that describes our own condition.
This raises the question of where along the sequence (if at
all) the protagonist stops being able to soundly conclude
that further facts exist.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6},
Key = {fds333306}
}
@article{fds345864,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Hadfield, G and Vallor, S},
Title = {AIES 2019 program chairs' welcome},
Journal = {AIES 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {III-IV},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450363242},
Key = {fds345864}
}
@article{fds346381,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable
strategies},
Journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {783-792},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0945},
Abstract = {While the computational complexity of many game-theoretic
solution concepts, notably Nash equilibrium, has now been
settled, the question of determining the exact complexity of
computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted
solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this
paper, I settle this question by proving that deciding the
existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is ΣP2
complete.},
Doi = {10.1287/moor.2018.0945},
Key = {fds346381}
}
@article{fds348965,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Designing preferences, beliefs, and identities for
artificial intelligence},
Journal = {33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019,
31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on
Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI
2019},
Pages = {9755-9759},
Publisher = {ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358091},
Abstract = {Research in artificial intelligence, as well as in economics
and other related fields, generally proceeds from the
premise that each agent has a well-defined identity,
well-defined preferences over outcomes, and well-defined
beliefs about the world. However, as we design AI systems,
we in fact need to specify where the boundaries between one
agent and another in the system lie, what objective
functions these agents aim to maximize, and to some extent
even what belief formation processes they use. The premise
of this paper is that as AI is being broadly deployed in the
world, we need well-founded theories of, and methodologies
and algorithms for, how to design preferences, identities,
and beliefs. This paper lays out an approach to address
these problems from a rigorous foundation in decision
theory, game theory, social choice theory, and the
algorithmic and computational aspects of these
fields.},
Key = {fds348965}
}
@article{fds348966,
Author = {Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A PAC framework for aggregating agents' judgments},
Journal = {33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019,
31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on
Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI
2019},
Pages = {2237-2244},
Publisher = {ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358091},
Abstract = {Specifying the objective function that an AI system should
pursue can be challenging. Especially when the decisions to
be made by the system have a moral component, input from
multiple stakeholders is often required. We consider
approaches that query them about their judgments in
individual examples, and then aggregate these judgments into
a general policy. We propose a formal learning-theoretic
framework for this setting. We then give general results on
how to translate classical results from PAC learning into
results in our framework. Subsequently, we show that in some
settings, better results can be obtained by working directly
in our framework. Finally, we discuss how our model can be
extended in a variety of ways for future
research.},
Key = {fds348966}
}
@article{fds348967,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A better algorithm for societal tradeoffs},
Journal = {33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019,
31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on
Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI
2019},
Pages = {2229-2236},
Publisher = {ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358091},
Abstract = {In the societal tradeoffs problem, each agent perceives
certain quantitative tradeoffs between pairs of activities,
and the goal is to aggregate these tradeoffs across agents.
This is a problem in social choice; specifically, it is a
type of quantitative judgment aggregation problem. A natural
rule for this problem was axiomatized by Conitzer et al.
[AAAI 2016]; they also provided several algorithms for
computing the outcomes of this rule. In this paper, we
present a significantly improved algorithm and evaluate it
experimentally. Our algorithm is based on a tight connection
to minimum-cost flow that we exhibit. We also show that our
algorithm cannot be improved without breakthroughs on
min-cost flow.},
Key = {fds348967}
}
@article{fds348968,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Shah, N and Vaughan,
JW},
Title = {Group fairness for the allocation of indivisible
goods},
Journal = {33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019,
31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on
Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI
2019},
Pages = {1853-1860},
Publisher = {ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358091},
Abstract = {We consider the problem of fairly dividing a collection of
indivisible goods among a set of players. Much of the
existing literature on fair division focuses on notions of
individual fairness. For instance, envy-freeness requires
that no player prefer the set of goods allocated to another
player to her own allocation. We observe that an algorithm
satisfying such individual fairness notions can still treat
groups of players unfairly, with one group desiring the
goods allocated to another. Our main contribution is a
notion of group fairness, which implies most existing
notions of individual fairness. Group fairness (like
individual fairness) cannot be satisfied exactly with
indivisible goods. Thus, we introduce two “up to one
good” style relaxations. We show that, somewhat
surprisingly, certain local optima of the Nash welfare
function satisfy both relaxations and can be computed in
pseudo-polynomial time by local search. Our experiments
reveal faster computation and stronger fairness guarantees
in practice.},
Key = {fds348968}
}
@article{fds350368,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Distinguishing distributions when samples are strategically
transformed},
Journal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems},
Volume = {32},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Often, a principal must make a decision based on data
provided by an agent. Moreover, typically, that agent has an
interest in the decision that is not perfectly aligned with
that of the principal. Thus, the agent may have an incentive
to select from or modify the samples he obtains before
sending them to the principal. In other settings, the
principal may not even be able to observe samples directly;
instead, she must rely on signals that the agent is able to
send based on the samples that he obtains, and he will
choose these signals strategically. In this paper, we give
necessary and sufficient conditions for when the principal
can distinguish between agents of “good” and “bad”
types, when the type affects the distribution of samples
that the agent has access to. We also study the
computational complexity of checking these conditions.
Finally, we study how many samples are needed.},
Key = {fds350368}
}
@article{fds375310,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {When samples are strategically selected},
Journal = {36th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML
2019},
Volume = {2019-June},
Pages = {12733-12743},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781510886988},
Abstract = {In standard classification problems, the assumption is that
the entity making the decision (the principal) has access to
all the samples. However, in many contexts, she either docs
not have direct access to the samples, or can inspect only a
limited set of samples and does not know which are the most
relevant ones. In such cases, she must rely on another party
(the agent) to either provide the samples or point out the
most relevant ones. If the agent has a different objective,
then the principal cannot trust the submitted samples to be
representative. She must set a policy for how she makes
decisions, keeping in mind the agent's incentives. In this
paper, we introduce a theoretical framework for this problem
and provide key structural and computational
results.},
Key = {fds375310}
}
@article{fds341328,
Author = {Kramer, MF and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?},
Journal = {AIES 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {204-209},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Abstract = {AI systems are now or will soon be sophisticated enough to
make consequential decisions. Although this technology has
flourished, we also need public appraisals of AI systems
playing these more important roles. This article reports
surveys of preferences for and against AI systems making
decisions in various domains as well as experiments that
intervene on these preferences. We find that these
preferences are contingent on subjects' previous exposure to
computer systems making these kinds of decisions, and some
interventions designed to mimic previous exposure
successfully encourage subjects to be more hospitable to
computer systems making these weighty decisions.},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Key = {fds341328}
}
@article{fds348970,
Author = {Freedman, R and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human
Values},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society},
Publisher = {ACM},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Key = {fds348970}
}
@article{fds335334,
Author = {Ueda, S and Iwasaki, A and Conitzer, V and Ohta, N and Sakurai, Y and Yokoo, M},
Title = {Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with
compact representations},
Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {503-533},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-018-9386-z},
Abstract = {This paper presents a new way of formalizing the coalition
structure generation problem (CSG) so that we can apply
constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective
coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and
multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of
agents into coalitions to maximize social surplus.
Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box
function called a characteristic function, which takes a
coalition as input and returns the value of the coalition.
As a result, applying constraint optimization techniques to
this problem has been infeasible. However, characteristic
functions that appear in practice often can be represented
concisely by a set of rules, rather than treating the
function as a black box. Then we can solve the CSG problem
more efficiently by directly applying constraint
optimization techniques to this compact representation. We
present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing
recently developed compact representation schemes for
characteristic functions. We first characterize the
complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In
this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of
rules than by the number of agents. As an initial step
toward developing efficient constraint optimization
algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we also develop
mixed integer programming formulations and show that an
off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably
well.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10458-018-9386-z},
Key = {fds335334}
}
@article{fds337141,
Author = {Freeman, R and Zahedi, SM and Conitzer, V and Lee,
BC},
Title = {Dynamic Proportional Sharing},
Journal = {Performance Evaluation Review},
Volume = {46},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33-35},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781450358460},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219617.3219631},
Abstract = {Sharing computational resources amortizes cost and improves
utilization and efficiency. When agents pool their
resources, each becomes entitled to a portion of the shared
pool. Static allocations in each round can guarantee
entitlements and are strategy-proof, but efficiency suffers
because allocations do not reflect variations in agents'
demands for resources across rounds. Dynamic allocation
mechanisms assign resources to agents across multiple rounds
while guaranteeing agents their entitlements. Designing
dynamic mechanisms is challenging, however, when agents are
strategic and can benefit by misreporting their demands for
resources. In this paper, we show that dynamic allocation
mechanisms based on max-min fail to guarantee entitlements,
strategy-proofness or both. We propose the flexible lending
(FL) mechanism and show that it satisfies strategy-proofness
and guarantees at least half of the utility from static
allocations while providing an asymptotic efficiency
guarantee. Our simulations with real and synthetic data show
that the performance of the flexible lending mechanism is
comparable to that of state-of-the-art mechanisms, providing
agents with at least 0.98x, and on average 15x, of their
utility from static allocations. Finally, we propose the T
-period mechanism and prove that it satisfies
strategy-proofness and guarantees entitlements for T łe
2.},
Doi = {10.1145/3219617.3219631},
Key = {fds337141}
}
@article{fds332974,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness
criteria they should satisfy},
Journal = {Communications of the ACM},
Volume = {61},
Number = {2},
Pages = {92},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3166066},
Doi = {10.1145/3166066},
Key = {fds332974}
}
@article{fds339563,
Author = {De Weerdt and M and Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Van Der Linden,
K},
Title = {Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart
grid},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2018-July},
Pages = {4736-4742},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780999241127},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/658},
Abstract = {The problem of optimally scheduling the charging demand of
electric vehicles within the constraints of the electricity
infrastructure is called the charge scheduling problem. The
models of the charging speed, horizon, and charging demand
determine the computational complexity of the charge
scheduling problem. We show that for about 20 variants the
problem is either in P or weakly NP-hard and dynamic
programs exist to compute optimal solutions. About 10 other
variants of the problem are strongly NP-hard, presenting a
potentially significant obstacle to their use in practical
situations of scale. An experimental study establishes up to
what parameter values the dynamic programs can determine
optimal solutions in a couple of minutes.},
Doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2018/658},
Key = {fds339563}
}
@article{fds341330,
Author = {Deng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Disarmament games with resources},
Journal = {32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2018},
Pages = {981-988},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358008},
Abstract = {A paper by Deng and Conitzer in AAAI'17 introduces
disarmament games, in which players alternatingly commit not
to play certain pure strategies. However, in practice
disarmament usually does not consist in removing a strategy,
but rather in removing a resource (and doing so rules out
all the strategies in which that resource is used
simultaneously). In this paper, we introduce a model of
disarmament games in which resources, rather than
strategies, are removed. We prove NP-completeness of several
formulations of the problem of achieving desirable outcomes
via disarmament. We then study the case where resources can
be fractionally removed, and prove a result analogous to the
folk theorem that all desirable outcomes can be achieved. We
show that we can approximately achieve any desirable outcome
in a polynomial number of rounds, though determining whether
a given outcome can be obtained in a given number of rounds
remains NP-complete.},
Key = {fds341330}
}
@article{fds341329,
Author = {Freedman, R and Dickerson, JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2018},
Pages = {1636-1643},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358008},
Abstract = {The efficient allocation of limited resources is a classical
problem in economics and computer science. In kidney
exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney
donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors
in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights
decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation
algorithm that determines who get what-and who does not. In
this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for
estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a
kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list
of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the
purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical
characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask
subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and
estimate weights in a principled way from their responses.
We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market
clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the
weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical
values of the weights we computed matter little, other than
the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared
to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant
effect, with certain classes of patients being
(de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Key = {fds341329}
}
@article{fds339285,
Author = {De Weerdt and MM and Conitzer, V and Albert, M and Van Der Linden,
K},
Title = {Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart
grid},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {1924-1926},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781510868083},
Abstract = {The problem of optimally scheduling the charging demand of
electric vehicles within the constraints of the electricity
infrastructure is called the charge scheduling problem. The
models of the charging speed, horizon, and charging demand
determine the computational complexity of the charge
scheduling problem. For about 20 variants the problem is
either in P or weakly NP-hard and dynamic programs exist to
compute optimal solutions. About 10 other variants of the
problem are strongly NP-hard, presenting a potentially
significant obstacle to their use in practical situations of
scale.},
Key = {fds339285}
}
@article{fds345390,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2018},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds345390}
}
@article{fds328054,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Shah, N},
Title = {Fair public decision making},
Journal = {EC 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {629-646},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781450345279},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085125},
Abstract = {We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating
indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision
making, in which a decision must be made on several social
issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic se.ing, a
decision can provide positive utility to multiple players.
We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality
(which is not guaranteeable) to our more general se.ing, and
introduce three novel relaxations - proportionality up to
one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional
share -That are also interesting in the classic goods
allocation se.ing. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare
solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness
properties in the classic se.ing, satisfies or approximates
all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide
polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding
allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without
insisting on Pareto optimality.},
Doi = {10.1145/3033274.3085125},
Key = {fds328054}
}
@article{fds335335,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Mcafee, P},
Title = {Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM
TEAC and into the Future},
Journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Editor = {Conitzer, V and McAfee, P},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3079047},
Doi = {10.1145/3079047},
Key = {fds335335}
}
@article{fds236185,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Game-theoretic question selection for tests},
Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
Volume = {59},
Pages = {437-462},
Publisher = {AI Access Foundation},
Editor = {Rossi, F},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-633-2},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2013.html},
Abstract = {Conventionally, the questions on a test are assumed to be
kept secret from test takers until the test. However, for
tests that are taken on a large scale, particularly
asynchronously, this is very hard to achieve. For example,
TOEFL iBT and driver's license test questions are easily
found online. This also appears likely to become an issue
for Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs, as offered for
example by Coursera, Udacity, and edX). Specifically, the
test result may not reflect the true ability of a test taker
if questions are leaked beforehand. In this paper, we take
the loss of confidentiality as a fact. Even so, not all hope
is lost as the test taker can memorize only a limited set of
questions' answers, and the tester can randomize which
questions to let appear on the test. We model this as a
Stackelberg game, where the tester commits to a mixed
strategy and the follower responds. Informally, the goal of
the tester is to best reveal the true ability of a test
taker, while the test taker tries to maximize the test
result (pass probability or score). We provide an
exponential-size linear program formulation that computes
the optimal test strategy, prove several NP-hardness results
on computing optimal test strategies in general, and give
efficient algorithms for special cases (scored tests and
single-question tests). Experiments are also provided for
those proposed algorithms to show their scalability and the
increase of the tester's utility relative to that of the
uniform-at-random strategy. The increase is quite
significant when questions have some correlation-for
example, when a test taker who can solve a harder question
can always solve easier questions.},
Doi = {10.1613/jair.5413},
Key = {fds236185}
}
@article{fds323443,
Author = {Aziz, H and Brill, M and Conitzer, V and Elkind, E and Freeman, R and Walsh, T},
Title = {Justified representation in approval-based committee
voting},
Journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
Volume = {48},
Number = {2},
Pages = {461-485},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3},
Abstract = {We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the
setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates,
and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of
winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this
setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This
axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters
exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at
least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in
the winning committee. We show that for every list of
ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides
JR. However, it turns out that several prominent
approval-based voting rules may fail to output such a
committee. In particular, while Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV) always outputs a committee that provides JR ,
Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (SeqPAV), which is a
tractable approximation to PAV , does not have this
property. We then introduce a stronger version of the JR
axiom, which we call extended justified representation
(EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR , while other rules
we consider do not; indeed, EJR can be used to characterize
PAV within the class of weighted PAV rules. We also consider
several other questions related to JR and EJR , including
the relationship between JR /EJR and core stability, and the
complexity of the associated computational
problems.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3},
Key = {fds323443}
}
@article{fds329334,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schaich Borg and J and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {4831-4835},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds329334}
}
@article{fds329335,
Author = {Deng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Disarmament games},
Journal = {31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2017},
Pages = {473-479},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Much recent work in the AI community concerns algorithms for
computing optimal mixed strategies to commit to, as well as
the deployment of such algorithms in real security
applications. Another possibility is to commit not to play
certain actions. If only one player makes such a commitment,
then this is generally less powerful than completely
committing to a single mixed strategy. However, if players
can alternatingly commit not to play certain actions and
thereby iteratively reduce their strategy spaces, then
desirable outcomes can be obtained that would not have been
possible with just a single player committing to a mixed
strategy. We refer to such a setting as a disarmament game.
In this paper, we study disarmament for two-player
normal-form games. We show that deciding whether an outcome
can be obtained with disarmament is NP-complete (even for a
fixed number of rounds), if only pure strategies can be
removed. On the other hand, for the case where mixed
strategies can be removed, we provide a folk theorem that
shows that all desirable utility profiles can be obtained,
and give an efficient algorithm for (approximately)
obtaining them.},
Key = {fds329335}
}
@article{fds329336,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Stone, P},
Title = {Automated design of robust mechanisms},
Journal = {31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2017},
Pages = {298-304},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We introduce a new class of mechanisms, robust mechanisms,
that is an intermediary between ex-post mechanisms and
Bayesian mechanisms. This new class of mechanisms allows the
mechanism designer to incorporate imprecise estimates of the
distribution over bidder valuations in a way that provides
strong guarantees that the mechanism will perform at least
as well as ex-post mechanisms, while in many cases
performing better. We further extend this class to
mechanisms that are with high probability incentive
compatible and individually rational, e-robust mechanisms.
Using techniques from automated mechanism design and robust
optimization, we provide an algorithm polynomial in the
number of bidder types to design robust and e-robust
mechanisms. We show experimentally that this new class of
mechanisms can significantly outperform traditional
mechanism design techniques when the mechanism designer has
an estimate of the distribution and the bidder's valuation
is correlated with an externally verifiable
signal.},
Key = {fds329336}
}
@article{fds329581,
Author = {Freeman, R and Zahedi, SM and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic
settings},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {4580-4587},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780999241103},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/639},
Abstract = {We study a dynamic social choice problem in which an
alternative is chosen at each round according to the
reported valuations of a set of agents. In the interests of
obtaining a solution that is both efficient and fair, we aim
to maximize the long-term Nash welfare, which is the product
of all agents' utilities. We present and analyze two greedy
algorithms for this problem, including the classic
Proportional Fair (PF) algorithm. We analyze several
versions of the algorithms and how they relate, and provide
an axiomatization of PF. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms
on data gathered from a computer systems
application.},
Doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2017/639},
Key = {fds329581}
}
@article{fds335336,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report},
Volume = {WS-17-01 - WS-17-15},
Pages = {105-109},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357865},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds335336}
}
@article{fds335337,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Stone, P},
Title = {Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can
we learn optimal mechanisms?},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {69-77},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781510855076},
Abstract = {Due to Cremer and McLean (1985), it is well known that in a
setting where bidders' values are correlated, an auction
designer can extract the full social surplus as revenue.
However, this result strongly relies on the assumption of a
common prior distribution between the mechanism designer and
the bidders. A natural question to ask is, can a mechanism
designer distinguish between a set of possible
distributions, or failing that, use a finite number of
samples from the true distribution to learn enough about the
distribution to recover the Cremer and Mclean result? We
show that if a bidder's distribution is one of a countably
infinite sequence of potential distributions that converges
to an independent private values distribution, then there is
no mechanism that can guarantee revenue more than c greater
than the optimal mechanism over the independent private
value mechanism, even with sampling from the true
distribution. We also show that any mechanism over this
infinite sequence can guarantee at most a (|6| + l)/(2 + c)
approximation, where [6| is the number of bidder types, to
the revenue achievable by a mechanism where the designer
knows the bidder's distribution. Finally, as a positive
result, we show that for any distribution where full surplus
extraction as revenue is possible, a mechanism exists that
guarantees revenue arbitrarily close to full surplus for
sufficiently close distributions. Intuitively, our results
suggest that a high degree of correlation will be essential
in the effective application of correlated mechanism design
techniques to settings with uncertain distributions.},
Key = {fds335337}
}
@article{fds335338,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Easley, D},
Title = {Introduction to the special issue on EC'14},
Journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
Volume = {4},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1-1},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Editor = {Conitzer, V and Easley, D},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2953046},
Doi = {10.1145/2953046},
Key = {fds335338}
}
@article{fds318115,
Author = {Kephart, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting
costs},
Journal = {EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {85-102},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781450339360},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940795},
Abstract = {The revelation principle is a key tool in mechanism design.
It allows the designer to restrict attention to the class of
truthful mechanisms, greatly facilitating analysis. This is
also borne out in an algorithmic sense, allowing certain
computational problems in mechanism design to be solved in
polynomial time. Unfortunately, when not every type can
misreport every other type (the partial verification model),
or-more generally-misreporting can be costly, the revelation
principle can fail to hold. This also leads to NP-hardness
results. The primary contribution of this paper consists of
characterizations of conditions under which the revelation
principle still holds when misreporting can be costly.
(These are generalizations of conditions given earlier for
the partial verification case [Green and Laffont 1986; Yu
2011].) We also study associated computational
problems.},
Doi = {10.1145/2940716.2940795},
Key = {fds318115}
}
@article{fds318116,
Author = {Bergemann, D and Chen, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {EC 2016 foreword},
Journal = {EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {iii-iv},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781450339360},
Key = {fds318116}
}
@article{fds343205,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {abs/1605.06048},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {In this article, I discuss how the AI community views
concerns about the emergence of superintelligent AI and
related philosophical issues.},
Key = {fds343205}
}
@article{fds290776,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {On Stackelberg mixed strategies},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {193},
Number = {3},
Pages = {689-703},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0039-7857},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0927-6},
Abstract = {It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game
theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to
a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make
sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the
original representation of the game), or should we entirely
subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on
the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature
takes different approaches in different cases. In this
article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg
mixed strategies. I argue that, even though a Stackelberg
mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there
remains significant value in studying it separately. The
analysis of this special case may have implications for
other solution concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0927-6},
Key = {fds290776}
}
@article{fds316128,
Author = {Jakobsen, SK and Sørensen, TB and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Timeability of extensive-form games},
Journal = {ITCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science},
Pages = {191-199},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840737},
Abstract = {Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation
scheme for games with a temporal component. But do all
extensive-form games correspond to protocols that we can
implement in the real world? We often rule out games with
imperfect recall, which prescribe that an agent forget
something that she knew before. In this paper, we show that
even some games with perfect recall can be problematic to
implement. Specifically, we show that if the agents have a
sense of time passing (say, access to a clock), then some
extensive-form games can no longer be implemented; no matter
how we attempt to time the game, some information will leak
to the agents that they are not supposed to have. We say
such a game is not exactly timeable. We provide
easy-To-check necessary and sufficient conditions for a game
to be exactly timeable. Most of the technical depth of the
paper concerns how to approximately time games, which we
show can always be done, though it may require large amounts
of time. Specifically, we show that some games require time
proportional to the power tower of height proportional to
the number of players, which in practice would make them
untimeable. We hope to convince the reader that timeability
should be a standard assumption, just as perfect recall is
today. Besides the conceptual contribution to game theory,
we show that timeability has implications for onion routing
protocols.},
Doi = {10.1145/2840728.2840737},
Key = {fds316128}
}
@article{fds321516,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V and Korzhyk, D},
Title = {Catcher-evader games},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2016-January},
Pages = {329-337},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have
recently been applied to a number of security domains.
However, many of the techniques developed for compact
representations of security games do not extend to Bayesian
security games, which allow us to model uncertainty about
the attacker's type. In this paper, we introduce a general
framework of catcher-evader games that can capture Bayesian
security games as well as other game families of interest.
We show that computing Stackelberg strategies is NP-hard,
but give an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium that
performs well in experiments. We also prove that the Nash
equilibria of these games satisfy the interchangeability
property, so that equilibrium selection is not an
issue.},
Key = {fds321516}
}
@article{fds325219,
Author = {Xu, H and Freeman, R and Conitzer, V and Dughmi, S and Tambe,
M},
Title = {Signaling in Bayesian stackelberg games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Pages = {150-158},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450342391},
Abstract = {Algorithms for solving Stackelberg games are used in an
ever-growing variety of real-world domains. Previous work
has extended this framework to allow the leader to commit
not only to a distribution over actions, but also to a
scheme for stochastically signaling information about these
actions to the follower. This can result in higher utility
for the leader. In this paper, we extend this methodology to
Bayesian games, in which either the leader or the follower
has payoff-relevant private information or both. This leads
to novel variants of the model, for example by imposing an
incentive compatibility constraint for each type to listen
to the signal intended for it. We show that, in contrast to
previous hardness results for the case without signaling [5,
16], we can solve unrestricted games in time polynomial in
their natural representation. For security games, we obtain
hardness results as well as efficient algorithms, depending
on the settings. We show the benefits of our approach in
experimental evaluations of our algorithms.},
Key = {fds325219}
}
@article{fds325220,
Author = {Brill, M and Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Shah,
N},
Title = {False-name-proof recommendations in social
networks},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Pages = {332-340},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450342391},
Abstract = {We study the problem of finding a recommendation for an
uninformed user in a social network by weighting and
aggregating the opinions offered by the informed users in
the network. In social networks, an informed user may try to
manipulate the recommendation by performing a false-name
manipulation, wherein the user submits multiple opinions
through fake accounts. To that end, we impose a no harm
axiom: false-name manipulations by a user should not reduce
the weight of other users in the network. We show that this
axiom has deep connections to false-name-proofness. While it
is impossible to design a mechanism that is best for every
network subject to this axiom, we propose an intuitive
mechanism LEGIT+, and show that it is uniquely optimized for
small networks. Using real-world datasets, we show that our
mechanism performs very well compared to two baseline
mechanisms in a number of metrics, even on large
networks.},
Key = {fds325220}
}
@article{fds325221,
Author = {Moon, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Pages = {1413-1414},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450342391},
Abstract = {In multiagent systems, often agents need to be assigned to
different roles. Multiple aspects should be taken into
account for this, such as agents' skills and constraints
posed by existing assignments. In this paper, we focus on
another aspect: when the agents are self-interested, careful
role assignment is necessary to make cooperative behavior an
equilibrium of the repeated game. We formalize this problem
and provide an easy-to-check necessary and sufficient
condition for a given role assignment to induce cooperation.
However, we show that finding whether such a role assignment
exists is in general NP-hard. Nevertheless, we give two
algorithms for solving the problem. The first is based on a
mixed-integer linear program formulation. The second is
based on a dynamic program, and runs in pseudopolynomial
time if the number of agents is constant. Minor
modifications of these algorithms also allow for
determination of the minimal subsidy necessary to induce
cooperation. In our experiments, the IP performs much, much
faster.},
Key = {fds325221}
}
@article{fds323444,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing equilibria with partial commitment},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {10123 LNCS},
Pages = {1-14},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783662541098},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1},
Abstract = {In security games, the solution concept commonly used is
that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to
commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that
the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender’s actions
and learn her distribution over actions, before acting
himself. If the actions were not observable, Nash (or
perhaps correlated) equilibrium would arguably be a more
natural solution concept. But what if some, but not all,
aspects of the defender’s actions are observable? In this
paper, we introduce solution concepts corresponding to this
case, both with and without correlation. We study their
basic properties, whether these solutions can be efficiently
computed, and the impact of additional observability on the
utility obtained.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1},
Key = {fds323444}
}
@article{fds323445,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Lopomo, G},
Title = {Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of
ex-post incentive compatibility},
Journal = {30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2016},
Pages = {376-382},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357605},
Abstract = {In a landmark paper in the mechanism design literature,
Cremer and McLean (1985) (CM for short) show that when a
bidder's valuation is correlated with an external signal, a
monopolistic seller is able to extract the full social
surplus as revenue. In the original paper and subsequent
literature, the focus has been on ex-post incentive
compatible (or IC) mechanisms, where truth telling is an
ex-post Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we explore the
implications of Bayesian versus ex-post IC in a correlated
valuation setting. We generalize the full extraction result
to settings that do not satisfy the assumptions of CM. In
particular, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for
full extraction that strictly relax the original conditions
given in CM. These more general conditions characterize the
situations under which requiring expost IC leads to a
decrease in expected revenue relative to Bayesian IC. We
also demonstrate that the expected revenue from the optimal
ex-post IC mechanism guarantees at most a (|Θ| + 1)/4
approximation to that of a Bayesian IC mechanism, where |Θ|
is the number of bidder types. Finally, using techniques
from automated mechanism design, we show that, for randomly
generated distributions, the average expected revenue
achieved by Bayesian IC mechanisms is significantly larger
than that for ex-post IC mechanisms.},
Key = {fds323445}
}
@article{fds323446,
Author = {Brill, M and Freeman, R and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and
bipartisan setwinners)},
Journal = {30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2016},
Pages = {418-424},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357605},
Abstract = {In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but
limited control over the game being played. In this paper,
we formalize this by considering incompletely specified
games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be
chosen from a specified set. We show that it is NP-hard for
the designer to make this choices optimally, even in
zero-sum games. In fact, it is already intractable to decide
whether a given action is (potentially or necessarily)
played in equilibrium. We also consider incompletely
specified symmetric games in which all completions are
required to be symmetric. Here, hardness holds even in weak
tournament games (symmetric zero-sum games whose entries are
all -1, 0, or 1) and in tournament games (symmetric zero-sum
games whose non-diagonal entries are all -1 or 1). The
latter result settles the complexity of the possible and
necessary winner problems for a social-choice-Theoretic
solution concept known as the bipartisan set. We finally
give a mixed-integer linear programming formulation for weak
tournament games and evaluate it experimentally.},
Key = {fds323446}
}
@article{fds323447,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Brill, M and Li, Y},
Title = {Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs},
Journal = {30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2016},
Pages = {460-467},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357605},
Abstract = {We study the societal tradeoffs problem, where a set of
voters each submit their ideal tradeoff value between each
pair of activities (e.g., "using a gallon of gasoline is as
bad as creating 2 bags of landfill trash"), and these are
then aggregated into the societal tradeoff vector using a
rule.We introduce the family of distance-based rules and
show that these can be justified as maximum likelihood
estimators of the truth. Within this family, we single out
the logarithmic distance-based rule as especially appealing
based on a social-choice-Theoretic axiomatization. We give
an efficient algorithm for executing this rule as well as an
approximate hill climbing algorithm, and evaluate these
experimentally.},
Key = {fds323447}
}
@article{fds321517,
Author = {Moon, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2016-January},
Pages = {416-423},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In multiagent systems, often agents need to be assigned to
different roles. Multiple aspects should be taken into
account for this, such as agents' skills and constraints
posed by existing assignments. In this paper, we focus on
another aspect: when the agents are self-interested, careful
role assignment is necessary to make cooperative behavior an
equilibrium of the repeated game. We formalize this problem
and provide an easy-to-check necessary and sufficient
condition for a given role assignment to induce cooperation.
However, we show that finding whether such a role assignment
exists is in general NP-hard. Nevertheless, we give two
algorithms for solving the problem. The first is based on a
mixed-integer linear program formulation. The second is
based on a dynamic program, and runs in pseudopolynomial
time if the number of agents is constant. Minor
modifications of these algorithms also allow for
determination of the minimal subsidy necessary to induce
cooperation. In our experiments, the IP performs much, much
faster.},
Key = {fds321517}
}
@article{fds321518,
Author = {Andersen, G and Conitzer, V},
Title = {ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice
simultaneously},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2016-January},
Pages = {3662-3669},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In highly anonymous environments such as the Internet, many
applications suffer from the fact that a single user can
pose as multiple users. Indeed, presumably many potential
applications do not even get off the ground as a result.
Consider the example of an online vote. Requiring voters to
provide identifying information, to the extent that this is
even feasible, can significantly deter participation. On the
other hand, not doing so makes it possible for a single
individual to vote more than once, so that the result may
become almost meaningless. (A quick web search will reveal
many examples of Internet polls with bizarre outcomes.)
CAPTCHAs may prevent running a program that votes many
times, but they do nothing to prevent a single user from
voting many times by hand. In this paper, we propose
ATUCAPTS (Automated Tests That a User Cannot Pass Twice
Simultaneously) as a solution. ATUCAPTS are automatically
generated tests such that it is (1) easy for a user to pass
one instance, but (2) extremely difficult for a user to pass
two instances at the same time. Thus, if it is feasible to
require all users to take such a test at the same time, we
can verify that no user holds more than one account. We
propose a specific class of ATUCAPTS and present the results
of a human subjects study to validate that they satisfy the
two properties above. We also introduce several theoretical
models of how well an attacker might perform and show that
these models still allow for good performance on both (1)
and (2) with reasonable test lengths.},
Key = {fds321518}
}
@article{fds325600,
Author = {Brill, M and Freeman, R and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and
bipartisan set winners)},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Pages = {369-375},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Schuurmans, D and Wellman, MP},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-760-5},
Abstract = {Copyright © 2016, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but
limited control over the game being played. In this paper,
we formalize this by considering incompletely specified
games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be
chosen from a specified set. We show that it is NP-hard for
the designer to make this choices optimally, even in
zero-sum games. In fact, it is already intractable to decide
whether a given action is (potentially or necessarily)
played in equilibrium. We also consider incompletely
specified symmetric games in which all completions are
required to be symmetric. Here, hardness holds even in weak
tournament games (symmetric zero-sum games whose entries are
all −1, 0, or 1) and in tournament games (symmetric
zero-sum games whose non-diagonal entries are all −1 or
1). The latter result settles the complexity of the possible
and necessary winner problems for a social-choice-theoretic
solution concept known as the bipartisan set. We finally
give a mixed-integer linear programming formulation for weak
tournament games and evaluate it experimentally.},
Key = {fds325600}
}
@article{fds345391,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Brill, M and Li, Y},
Title = {Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Copyright © 2016, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
We study the societal tradeoffs problem, where a set of
voters each submit their ideal tradeoff value between each
pair of activities (e.g., “using a gallon of gasoline is
as bad as creating 2 bags of landfill trash”), and these
are then aggregated into the societal tradeoff vector using
a rule. We introduce the family of distance-based rules and
show that these can be justified as maximum likelihood
estimators of the truth. Within this family, we single out
the logarithmic distance-based rule as especially appealing
based on a social-choice-theoretic axiomatization. We give
an efficient algorithm for executing this rule as well as an
approximate hill climbing algorithm, and evaluate these
experimentally.},
Key = {fds345391}
}
@article{fds345392,
Author = {Brill, M and Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Shah,
N},
Title = {False-name-proof recommendations in social
networks},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {© 2016 University of Virginia. All rights reserved. We
study the problem of finding a recommendation for an
uninformed user in a social network by weighting and
aggregating the opinions offered by the informed users in
the network. In social networks, an informed user may try to
manipulate the recommendation by performing a false-name
manipulation, wherein the user submits multiple opinions
through fake accounts. To that end, we impose a no harm
axiom: false-name manipulations by a user should not reduce
the weight of other users in the network. We show that this
axiom has deep connections to false-name-proofness. While it
is impossible to design a mechanism that is best for every
network subject to this axiom, we propose an intuitive
mechanism LEGIT+, and show that it is uniquely optimized for
small networks. Using real-world datasets, we show that our
mechanism performs very well compared to two baseline
mechanisms in a number of metrics, even on large
networks.},
Key = {fds345392}
}
@article{fds349501,
Author = {Brill, M and Freeman, R and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and
bipartisan set winners)},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but
limited control over the game being played. In this paper,
we formalize this by considering incompletely specified
games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be
chosen from a specified set. We show that it is NP-hard for
the designer to make this choices optimally, even in
zero-sum games. In fact, it is already intractable to decide
whether a given action is (potentially or necessarily)
played in equilibrium. We also consider incompletely
specified symmetric games in which all completions are
required to be symmetric. Here, hardness holds even in weak
tournament games (symmetric zero-sum games whose entries are
all −1, 0, or 1) and in tournament games (symmetric
zero-sum games whose non-diagonal entries are all −1 or
1). The latter result settles the complexity of the possible
and necessary winner problems for a social-choice-theoretic
solution concept known as the bipartisan set. We finally
give a mixed-integer linear programming formulation for weak
tournament games and evaluate it experimentally.},
Key = {fds349501}
}
@article{fds349502,
Author = {Brill, M and Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Shah,
N},
Title = {False-name-proof recommendations in social
networks},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We study the problem of finding a recommendation for an
uninformed user in a social network by weighting and
aggregating the opinions offered by the informed users in
the network. In social networks, an informed user may try to
manipulate the recommendation by performing a false-name
manipulation, wherein the user submits multiple opinions
through fake accounts. To that end, we impose a no harm
axiom: false-name manipulations by a user should not reduce
the weight of other users in the network. We show that this
axiom has deep connections to false-name-proofness. While it
is impossible to design a mechanism that is best for every
network subject to this axiom, we propose an intuitive
mechanism LEGIT+, and show that it is uniquely optimized for
small networks. Using real-world datasets, we show that our
mechanism performs very well compared to two baseline
mechanisms in a number of metrics, even on large
networks.},
Key = {fds349502}
}
@article{fds349503,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Freeman, R and Brill, M and Li, Y},
Title = {Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2016},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We study the societal tradeoffs problem, where a set of
voters each submit their ideal tradeoff value between each
pair of activities (e.g., “using a gallon of gasoline is
as bad as creating 2 bags of landfill trash”), and these
are then aggregated into the societal tradeoff vector using
a rule. We introduce the family of distance-based rules and
show that these can be justified as maximum likelihood
estimators of the truth. Within this family, we single out
the logarithmic distance-based rule as especially appealing
based on a social-choice-theoretic axiomatization. We give
an efficient algorithm for executing this rule as well as an
approximate hill climbing algorithm, and evaluate these
experimentally.},
Key = {fds349503}
}
@article{fds325597,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Lopomo, G},
Title = {Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of
Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility.},
Journal = {AAAI},
Pages = {383-389},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Schuurmans, D and Wellman, MP},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-760-5},
Key = {fds325597}
}
@article{fds325599,
Author = {Jakobsen, SK and Sørensen, TB and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Timeability of Extensive-Form Games.},
Journal = {ITCS},
Pages = {191-199},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Sudan, M},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-4057-1},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840737},
Doi = {10.1145/2840728.2840737},
Key = {fds325599}
}
@article{fds325601,
Author = {Moon, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended
Abstract).},
Journal = {AAMAS},
Pages = {1413-1414},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Jonker, CM and Marsella, S and Thangarajah, J and Tuyls,
K},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-4239-1},
Key = {fds325601}
}
@article{fds236154,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Can rational choice guide us to correct de se
beliefs?},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {192},
Number = {12},
Pages = {4107-4119},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0039-7857},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0737-x},
Abstract = {Significant controversy remains about what constitute
correct self-locating beliefs in scenarios such as the
Sleeping Beauty problem, with proponents on both the
“halfer” and “thirder” sides. To attempt to settle
the issue, one natural approach consists in creating
decision variants of the problem, determining what actions
the various candidate beliefs prescribe, and assessing
whether these actions are reasonable when we step back.
Dutch book arguments are a special case of this approach,
but other Sleeping Beauty games have also been constructed
to make similar points. Building on a recent article (Shaw,
Synthese 190(3):491–508, 2013), I show that in general we
should be wary of such arguments, because unintuitive
actions may result for reasons that are unrelated to the
beliefs. On the other hand, I show that, when we restrict
our attention to additive games, then a thirder will
necessarily maximize her ex ante expected payout, but a
halfer in some cases will not (assuming causal decision
theory). I conclude that this does not necessarily settle
the issue and speculate about what might.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0737-x},
Key = {fds236154}
}
@article{fds236155,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential
decision theorists},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {192},
Number = {9},
Pages = {2887-2899},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0039-7857},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0691-7},
Abstract = {In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been
argued that so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book
arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I
introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty
problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall
prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The
argument crucially requires that an action can provide
evidence for what the agent would do not only at other
decision points where she has exactly the same information,
but also at decision points where she has different but
“symmetric” information.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0691-7},
Key = {fds236155}
}
@article{fds236157,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {A devastating example for the Halfer Rule},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {172},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1985-1992},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0384-y},
Abstract = {How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se
evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers
into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some
disagreement among halfers about how their position should
generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not
always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule,
under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based
on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief
article, I provide a simple example for which the Halfer
Rule prescribes credences that, I argue, cannot be
reasonably held by anyone. In particular, these credences
constitute an egregious violation of the Reflection
Principle. I then discuss the consequences for halfing in
general.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-014-0384-y},
Key = {fds236157}
}
@article{fds313252,
Author = {Aziz, H and Brill, M and Conitzer, V and Elkind, E and Freeman, R and Walsh, T},
Title = {Justified representation in approval-based committee
voting},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {784-790},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the
setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates,
and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of
winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this
setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This
axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters
exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at
least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in
the winning committee. We show that for every list of
ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides
JR. We then check if this axiom is fulfilled by well-known
approval-based voting rules. We show that the answer is
negative for most of the rules we consider, with notable
exceptions of PAV (Proportional Approval Voting), an extreme
version of RAV (Reweighted Approval Voting), and, for a
restricted preference domain, MA V (Minimax Approval
Voting). We then introduce a stronger version of the JR
axiom, which we call extended justified representation
(EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules do
not. We also consider several other questions related to JR,
and EJR, including the relationship between JR./EJR and
unanimity, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic
problems.},
Key = {fds313252}
}
@article{fds313250,
Author = {Brill, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Strategic voting and strategic candidacy},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {819-826},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577357001},
Abstract = {Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of
candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic
assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates,
whereas voters vote truthfully. In this paper, we extend the
analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of
the voters. (We also study cases where only candidates or
only voters are strategic.) We consider two settings in
which strategic voting is well-defined and has a natural
interpretation: majority-consistent voting with
single-peaked preferences and voting by successive
elimination. In the former setting, we analyze the type of
strategic behavior required in order to guarantee desirable
voting outcomes. In the latter setting, we determine the
complexity of computing the set of potential outcomes if
both candidates and voters act strategically.},
Key = {fds313250}
}
@article{fds313251,
Author = {Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Lopomo, G},
Title = {Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated
mechanism design},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {763-769},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577357001},
Abstract = {In a classic result in the mechanism design literature,
Cremer and McLean (1985) show that if buyers' valuations are
sufficiently correlated, a mechanism exists that allows the
seller to extract the full surplus from efficient allocation
as revenue. This result is commonly seen as "too good to be
true" (in practice), casting doubt on its modeling
assumptions. In this paper, we use an automated mechanism
design approach to assess how sensitive the Cremer-McLean
result is to relaxing its main technical assumption. That
assumption implies that each valuation that a bidder can
have results in a unique conditional distribution over the
external signal(s). We relax this, allowing multiple
valuations to be consistent with the same distribution over
the external signal(s). Using similar insights to
Cremer-McLean, we provide a highly efficient algorithm for
computing the optimal revenue in this more general case.
Using this algorithm, we observe that indeed, as the number
of valuations consistent with a distribution grows, the
optimal revenue quickly drops to that of a reserve-price
mechanism. Thus, automated mechanism design allows us to
gain insight into the precise sense in which Cremer-McLean
is "too good to be true.".},
Key = {fds313251}
}
@article{fds313253,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability
under noise},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {979-985},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577357001},
Abstract = {In cooperative game theory, it is typically assumed that the
value of each coalition is known. We depart from this,
assuming that v(S) is only a noisy estimate of the true
value V(S), which is not yet known. In this context, we
investigate which solution concepts maximize the probability
of ex-post stability (after the true values are revealed).
We show how various conditions on the noise characterize the
least core and the nucleolus as optimal. Modifying some
aspects of these conditions to (arguably) make them more
realistic, we obtain characterizations of new solution
concepts as being optimal, including the partial nucleolus,
the multiplicative least core, and the multiplicative
nucleolus.},
Key = {fds313253}
}
@article{fds290774,
Author = {Kephart, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Complexity of mechanism design with signaling
costs},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {357-365},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450337694},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {In mechanism design, it is generally assumed that an agent
can submit any report at zero cost (with the occasional
further restriction that certain types can not submit
certain reports). More generally, however, an agent of type
θ may be able to report θ', but only at a cost c(θ,θ').
This cost may reflect the effort the agent would have to
expend to be indistinguishable from an agent that truthfully
reports θ'. Even more generally, the possible reports (or
signals) may not directly correspond to types. In this
paper, we consider the complexity of determining whether
particular social choice functions can be implemented in
this context.},
Key = {fds290774}
}
@article{fds290775,
Author = {Freeman, R and Brill, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {General tiebreaking schemes for computational social
choice},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {1401-1409},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450337717},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {In (computational) social choice, how ties are broken can
affect the axiomatic and computational properties of a
voting rule. In this paper, we first consider settings where
we may have multiple winners. We formalize the notion of
parallel universes tiebreaking with respect to a particular
tree that represents the computation of the winners, and
show that the specific tree used does not matter if certain
conditions hold. We then move on to settings where a single
winner must be returned, generally by randomized
tiebreaking, and examine some drawbacks of existing
approaches. We propose a new class of tiebreaking schemes
based on randomly perturbing the vote profile. Finally, we
show that one member of this class uniquely satisfies a
number of desirable properties.},
Key = {fds290775}
}
@article{fds313248,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Brill, M and Freeman, R},
Title = {Crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1213-1217},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781450337700},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {It would be desirable if, as a society, we could reduce the
amount of landfill trash we create, the amount of carbon
dioxide we emit, the amount of forest we clear, etc. Since
we cannot (or are in any case not willing to) simultaneously
pursue all these objectives to their maximum extent, we must
prioritize among them. Currently, this is done mostly in an
ad-hoc manner, with people, companies, local governments,
and other entities deciding on an individual basis which of
these objectives to pursue, and to what extent. A more
systematic approach would be to set, at a global level,
exact numerical tradeoffs: using one gallon of gasoline is
as bad as creating x bags of landfill trash. Having such
tradeoffs available would greatly facilitate decision
making, and reduce inefficiencies resulting from
inconsistent decisions across agents. But how could we
arrive at a reasonable value for x? In this paper, we argue
that many techniques developed in the multiagent systems
community, particularly those under economic paradigms, can
be brought to bear on this question. We lay out our vision
and discuss its relation to computational social choice,
mechanism design, prediction markets, and related
topics.},
Key = {fds313248}
}
@article{fds313249,
Author = {Moon, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Maximal cooperation in repeated games on social
networks},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2015-January},
Pages = {216-223},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357384},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {Standard results on and algorithms for repeated games assume
that defections are instantly observable. In reality, it may
take some time for the knowledge that a defection has
occurred to propagate through the social network. How does
this affect the structure of equilibria and algorithms for
computing them? In this paper, we consider games with
cooperation and defection. We prove that there exists a
unique maximal set of forever cooperating agents in
equilibrium and give an efficient algorithm for computing
it. We then evaluate this algorithm on random graphs and
find experimentally that there appears to be a phase
transition between cooperation everywhere and defection
everywhere, based on the value of cooperation and the
discount factor. Finally, we provide a condition for when
the equilibrium found is credible, in the sense that agents
are in fact motivated to punish deviating agents. We find
that this condition always holds in our experiments,
provided the graphs are sufficiently large.},
Key = {fds313249}
}
@article{fds325602,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Easley, D},
Title = {Notes from the EC'14 program chairs},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-4},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2014},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2692375.2692377},
Abstract = {<jats:p>This short document describes the process used to
create the EC'14 program, as well some comments on our
experience. This year the conference, which had been called
the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, was renamed the
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation to better
reflect the actual makeup of the papers to be presented at
the conference. The acronym EC was retained and EC'14 is the
fifteenth iteration of the conference.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1145/2692375.2692377},
Key = {fds325602}
}
@article{fds325632,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of Mechanism Design},
Volume = {cs.GT/0205075},
Pages = {103-110},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Darwiche, A and Friedman, N},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {1-55860-897-4},
Abstract = {The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central
problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that
the agents may report their preferences insincerely.
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the
game so that the agents are motivated to report their
preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is
chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is
automatically created for the preference aggregation setting
at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is
that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be
solved anew each time. Focusing on settings where side
payments are not possible, we show that the mechanism design
problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms. This
holds both for dominant-strategy implementation and for
Bayes-Nash implementation. We then show that if we allow
randomized mechanisms, the mechanism design problem becomes
tractable. In other words, the coordinator can tackle the
computational complexity introduced by its uncertainty about
the agents preferences BY making the agents face additional
uncertainty.This comes at no loss, AND IN SOME cases at a
gain, IN the(social) objective.},
Key = {fds325632}
}
@article{fds236162,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in
multi-unit auctions},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {216},
Pages = {287-308},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0004-3702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006},
Abstract = {For the problem of allocating one or more items among a
group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG
mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value
flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG
payments, which reduces the agents' utilities. In many
settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the
agents' utilities (taking payments into account). For this
purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been
proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG
payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains
strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property.
Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution
mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of
the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for
the agents, even though the items are allocated efficiently.
In this paper, we study strategy-proof allocation mechanisms
that do not always allocate the items efficiently. It turns
out that by allocating inefficiently, more payment can
sometimes be redistributed, so that the net effect is an
increase in the sum of the agents' utilities. Our objective
is to design mechanisms that are competitive against the
first-best mechanism in terms of the agents' total utility.
We first study multi-unit auctions with unit demand. We
characterize the family of linear allocation mechanisms. We
propose an optimization technique for simultaneously finding
a linear allocation mechanism and a payment redistribution
rule, which together are optimal. With the help of this
technique, we also analytically characterize several
competitive mechanisms, which are based on burning units and
partitioning the agents into groups. Finally, we extend the
definition of linear allocation mechanisms and the
optimization technique to general multi-unit auctions. ©
2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006},
Key = {fds236162}
}
@article{fds236163,
Author = {Letchford, J and Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V},
Title = {On the value of commitment},
Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
Volume = {28},
Number = {6},
Pages = {986-1016},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1387-2532},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9},
Abstract = {In game theory, it is well known that being able to commit
to a strategy before other players move can be beneficial.
In this paper, we analyze how much benefit a player can
derive from commitment in various types of games, in a
quantitative sense that is similar to concepts such as the
value of mediation and the price of anarchy. Specifically,
we introduce and study the value of pure commitment (the
benefit of committing to a pure strategy), the value of
mixed commitment (the benefit of committing to a mixed
strategy), and the mixed versus pure commitment ratio (how
much can be gained by committing to a mixed strategy rather
than a pure one). In addition to theoretical results about
how large these values are in the extreme case in various
classes of games, we also give average-case results based on
randomly drawn normal-form games. © 2013 The
Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9},
Key = {fds236163}
}
@article{fds236164,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {False-name-proof voting with costs over two
alternatives},
Journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {599-618},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0020-7276},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3},
Abstract = {In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can
participate in a mechanism multiple times under different
identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever
benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately,
the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered
by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how
some of these negative results can be circumvented by making
the realistic assumption that obtaining additional
identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider
arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the
context of a voting model with two alternatives. © 2014
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3},
Key = {fds236164}
}
@article{fds236165,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Easley, D and Babaioff, M},
Title = {EC'14 foreword},
Journal = {EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {iii-iv},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds236165}
}
@article{fds236166,
Author = {De Weerdt and MM and Harrenstein, P and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of
ties},
Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {405-420},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0899-8256},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001},
Abstract = {A contract auction establishes a contract between a center
and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many
terms, preferences over contracts typically display
indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects
the best contract for the winner that is at least as good
for the center as any of the contracts offered by the
non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a
contract with higher utility for the center at an
arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the
only mechanism that is individually rational,
strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto
efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a
variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is
strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However,
there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also
selects Pareto efficient outcomes. © 2013 Elsevier
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001},
Key = {fds236166}
}
@article{fds236156,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in
multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games},
Journal = {13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {581-588},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781634391313},
Abstract = {MC-nets constitute a natural compact representation scheme
for cooperative games in multiagent systems. In this paper,
we study the complexity of several natural computational
problems that concern solution concepts such as the core,
the least core and the nucleolus. We characterize the
complexity of these problems for a variety of subclasses of
MC-nets, also considering constraints on the game such as
superadditivity (where appropriate). Many of our hardness
results are derived from a hardness result that we establish
for a class of multi-issue cooperative games (SILT games);
we suspect that this hardness result can also be used to
prove hardness for other representation schemes.},
Key = {fds236156}
}
@article{fds236158,
Author = {Freeman, R and Brill, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {On the axiomatic characterization of runoff voting
rules},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {675-681},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577356776},
Abstract = {Runoff voting rules such as single transferable vote (STV)
and Baldwin's rule are of particular interest in
computational social choice due to their recursive nature
and hardness of manipulation, as well as in (human) practice
because they are relatively easy to understand. However,
they are not known for their compliance with desirable
axiomatic properties, which we attempt to rectify here. We
characterize runoff rules that are based on scoring rules
using two axioms: a weakening of local independence of
irrelevant alternatives and a variant of
population-consistency. We then show, as our main technical
result, that STV is the only runoff scoring rule satisfying
an independence-of-clones property. Furthermore, we provide
axiomatizations of Baldwin's rule and Coombs'
rule.},
Key = {fds236158}
}
@article{fds236159,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Vidali, A},
Title = {Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution
time},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {623-629},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577356776},
Abstract = {We study the problem where a task (or multiple unrelated
tasks) must be executed, there are multiple machines/agents
that can potentially perform the task, and our objective is
to minimize the expected sum of the agents' processing
times. Each agent does not know exactly how long it will
take him to finish the task; he only knows the distribution
from which this lime is drawn. These times are independent
across agents and the distributions fulfill the monotone
hazard rate condition. Agents are selfish and will lie about
their distributions if this increases their expected
utility.},
Key = {fds236159}
}
@article{fds236160,
Author = {Sørensen, TB and Dalis, M and Letchford, J and Korzhyk, D and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {Beat the cheater: Computing game-theoretic strategies for
when to kick a gambler out of a casino},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {798-804},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577356776},
Abstract = {Gambles in casinos are usually set up so that the casino
makes a profit in expectation-as long as gamblers play
honestly. However, some gamblers are able to cheat, reducing
the casino's profit. How should the casino address this? A
common strategy is to selectively kick gamblers out,
possibly even without being sure that they were cheating. In
this paper, we address the following question: Based solely
on a gambler's track record, when is it optimal for the
casino to kick the gambler out? Because cheaters will adapt
to the casino's policy, this is a game-theoretic question.
Specifically, we model the problem as a Bayesian game in
which the casino is a Stackelberg leader that can commit to
a (possibly randomized) policy for when to kick gamblers
out, and we provide efficient algorithms for computing the
optimal policy. Besides being potentially useful to casinos,
we imagine that similar techniques could be useful for
addressing related problems-for example, illegal trades in
financial markets.},
Key = {fds236160}
}
@article{fds236161,
Author = {Xu, H and Fang, F and Jiang, AX and Conitzer, V and Dughmi, S and Tambe,
M},
Title = {Solving zero-sum security games in discretized
spatio-temporal domains},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1500-1506},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577356783},
Abstract = {Among the many deployment areas of Stackelberg Security
games, a major area involves games played out in space and
time, which includes applications in muitipte mobile
defender resources protecting multiple mobile targets.
Previous algorithms for such spatio-temporal security games
fail to scale-up and little is known of the computational
complexity properties of these problems. This paper provides
a novel oracle-based algorithmic framework for a systematic
study of different problem variants of computing optimal
(minimax) strategies in spatio-temporal security games. Our
framework enables efficient computation of a minimax
strategy when the problem admits a polynomial-time oracle.
Furthermore, for the cases in which efficient oracles are
difficult to find, we propose approximations or prove
hardness results.},
Key = {fds236161}
}
@article{fds325609,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social
networks},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2014},
Pages = {1482-1487},
Publisher = {IEEE},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736702},
Abstract = {© 2014 University of Illinois at Chicago. All rights
reserved. One view of voting is that voters have inherently
different preferences – de gustibus non est disputandum
– and that voting is merely a method for reaching a
reasonable compromise solution. An alternative view is that
some of the alternatives really are better in an objective
sense, and by voting over the alternatives we hope to be
more likely to reach the correct outcome. In this latter
view, we can see the votes as noisy estimates of the truth.
Specifying a probabilistic noise model gives us a natural
“optimal” voting rule for determining the outcome based
on the votes, namely, the function that takes the votes as
input and produces the outcome that maximizes the likelihood
of these votes as output. We will first review some of the
work on the maximum likelihood approach to voting. Most of
this work supposes that, conditional on the correct outcome,
votes are independent. In reality, however, voters are
clearly influenced by the opinions of those close to them.
How should we model the effects of the social network, and
what does this imply for the maximum likelihood approach? We
will first review an earlier result (Conitzer 2012) that
states that, under certain assumptions, the social network
structure should not affect the voting rule. We then
consider a new model under which this is not true, and prove
that computing the probability of the votes given the
correct outcome is #P-hard under this model. On the other
hand, if the goal is to simultaneously also give a point
estimate of the hidden variables in the model, then the
optimization problem can be solved in polynomial
time.},
Doi = {10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736702},
Key = {fds325609}
}
@article{fds236177,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {False-name-proof voting with costs over two
alternatives},
Journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-20},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
ISSN = {0020-7276},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3},
Doi = {10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3},
Key = {fds236177}
}
@article{fds325603,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial
Orders.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/1401.3876},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds325603}
}
@article{fds325604,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of Mechanism Design.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/1408.1486},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds325604}
}
@article{fds325605,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison
Queries.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/1401.3449},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds325605}
}
@article{fds325607,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Yin, Z and Kiekintveld, C and Conitzer, V and Tambe,
M},
Title = {Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended
Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and
Uniqueness.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/1401.3888},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds325607}
}
@article{fds325606,
Title = {ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14,
Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014},
Journal = {EC},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Babaioff, M and Conitzer, V and Easley, DA},
Year = {2014},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-2565-3},
Key = {fds325606}
}
@article{fds236175,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Game-theoretic question selection for tests},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {254-262},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {Conventionally, the questions on a test are assumed to be
kept secret from test takers until the test. However, for
tests that are taken on a large scale, particularly
asynchronously, this is very hard to achieve. For example,
example TOEFL iBT and driver's license test questions are
easily found online. This also appears likely to become an
issue for Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). In this
paper, we take the loss of confidentiality as a fact. Even
so, not all hope is lost as the test taker can memorize only
a limited set of questions' answers, and the tester can
randomize which questions appear on the test. We model this
as a Stackelberg game, where the tester commits to a mixed
strategy and the follower responds. We provide an
exponential-size linear program formulation, prove several
NP-hardness results, and give efficient algorithms for
special cases.},
Key = {fds236175}
}
@article{fds236176,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable
strategies},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {8289 LNCS},
Pages = {96-108},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_9},
Abstract = {While the computational complexity of many game-theoretic
solution concepts, notably Nash equilibrium, has now been
settled, the question of determining the exact complexity of
computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted
solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this
paper, I settle this question by proving that deciding the
existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is -complete.
© 2013 Springer-Verlag.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_9},
Key = {fds236176}
}
@article{fds236183,
Author = {Andersen, G and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Fast equilibrium computation for infinitely repeated
games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2013},
Pages = {53-59},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {desJardins, M and Littman, ML},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781577356158},
url = {http://www.aaai.org/Library/AAAI/aaai13contents.php},
Abstract = {It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated
two-player game (with limit average payoffs) can be computed
in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk
theorem, we compute minimax strategies for both players to
calculate the punishment values, and subsequently find a
mixture over outcomes that exceeds these punishment values.
However, for very large games, even computing minimax
strategies can be prohibitive. In this paper, we propose an
algorithmic framework for computing equilibria of repeated
games that does not require linear programming and that does
not necessarily need to inspect all payoffs of the game.
This algorithm necessarily sometimes fails to compute an
equilibrium, but we mathematically demonstrate that most of
the time it succeeds quickly on uniformly random games, and
experimentally demonstrate this for other classes of games.
This also holds for games with more than two players, for
which no efficient general algorithms are known. Copyright
© 2013, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236183}
}
@article{fds236184,
Author = {Letchford, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Solving security games on graphs via marginal
probabilities},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2013},
Pages = {591-597},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {desJardins, M and Littman, ML},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781577356158},
url = {http://www.aaai.org/Library/AAAI/aaai13contents.php},
Abstract = {Security games involving the allocation of multiple security
resources to defend multiple targets generally have an
exponential number of pure strategies for the defender. One
method that has been successful in addressing this
computational issue is to instead directly compute the
marginal probabilities with which the individual resources
are assigned (first pursued by Kiekintveld et al. (2009)).
However, in sufficiently general settings, there exist games
where these marginal solutions are not implementable, that
is, they do not correspond to any mixed strategy of the
defender. In this paper, we examine security games where the
defender tries to monitor the vertices of a graph, and we
show how the type of graph, the type of schedules, and the
type of defender resources affect the applicability of this
approach. In some settings, we show the approach is
applicable and give a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing an optimal defender strategy; in other settings,
we give counterexample games that demonstrate that the
approach does not work, and prove NP-hardness results for
computing an optimal defender strategy. Copyright © 2013,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236184}
}
@article{fds236174,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social
networks},
Journal = {2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013},
Pages = {1482-1487},
Publisher = {IEEE},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736702},
Abstract = {One view of voting is that voters have inherently different
preferences - de gustibus non est disputandum - and that
voting is merely a method for reaching a reasonable
compromise solution. An alternative view is that some of the
alternatives really are better in an objective sense, and by
voting over the alternatives we hope to be more likely to
reach the correct outcome. In this latter view, we can see
the votes as noisy estimates of the truth. Specifying a
probabilistic noise model gives us a natural 'optimal'
voting rule for determining the outcome based on the votes,
namely, the function that takes the votes as input and
produces the outcome that maximizes the likelihood of these
votes as output. We will first review some of the work on
the maximum likelihood approach to voting. Most of this work
supposes that, conditional on the correct outcome, votes are
independent. In reality, however, voters are clearly
influenced by the opinions of those close to them. How
should we model the effects of the social network, and what
does this imply for the maximum likelihood approach' We will
first review an earlier result [1] that states that, under
certain assumptions, the social network structure should not
affect the voting rule. We then consider a new model under
which this is not true, and prove that computing the
probability of the votes given the correct outcome is
#P-hard under this model. On the other hand, if the goal is
to simultaneously also give a point estimate of the hidden
variables in the model, then the optimization problem can be
solved in polynomial time. © 2013 IEEE.},
Doi = {10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736702},
Key = {fds236174}
}
@article{fds303204,
Author = {Guo, M and Markakis, E and Apt, KR and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Undominated groves mechanisms},
Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {129-163},
Publisher = {AI Access Foundation},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.1809v2},
Abstract = {The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the
well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke
mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof
mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are
generally not budget balanced. That is, under such
mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of
the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for
the agents. We consider the following problem: within the
family of Groves mechanisms, we want to identify mechanisms
that give the agents the highest utilities, under the
constraint that these mechanisms must never incur deficits.
We adopt a prior-free approach. We introduce two general
measures for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. We
say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M individually
dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M′ if for
every type profile, every agent's utility under M is no less
than that under M′, and this holds with strict inequality
for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a
non-deficit Groves mechanism M collectively dominates
another non-deficit Groves mechanism M′ if for every type
profile, the agents' total utility under M is no less than
that under M′, and this holds with strict inequality for
at least one type profile. The above definitions induce two
partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We study
the maximal elements corresponding to these two partial
orders, which we call the individually undominated
mechanisms and the collectively undominated mechanisms,
respectively. © 2013 AI Access Foundation. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1613/jair.3810},
Key = {fds303204}
}
@article{fds325608,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Mcafee, RP},
Title = {The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An
introduction},
Journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-3},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2399187.2399188},
Doi = {10.1145/2399187.2399188},
Key = {fds325608}
}
@article{fds236180,
Author = {Todo, T and Conitzer, V},
Title = {False-name-proof matching},
Journal = {12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {311-318},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Gini, ML and Shehory, O and Ito, T and Jonker, CM},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-1993-5},
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2484920},
Abstract = {Matching a set of agents to a set of objects has many real
applications. One well-studied framework is that of
priority-based matching, in which each object is assumed to
have a priority order over the agents. The Deferred
Acceptance (DA) and Top-Trading-Cycle (TTC) mechanisms are
the best-known strategy-proof mechanisms. However, in highly
anonymous environments, the set of agents is not known a
priori, and it is more natural for objects to instead have
priorities over characteristics (e.g., the student's GPA or
home address). In this paper, we extend the model so that
each agent reports not only its preferences over objects,
but also its characteristic. We derive results for various
notions of strategy-proofness and false-name-proofness,
corresponding to whether agents can only report weaker
characteristics or also incomparable or stronger ones, and
whether agents can only claim objects allocated to their
true accounts or also those allocated to their fake
accounts. Among other results, we show that DA and TTC
satisfy a weak version of false-name-proofness. Furthermore,
DA also satisfies a strong version of false-name-proofness,
while TTC fails to satisfy it without an acyclicity
assumption on priorities. Copyright © 2013, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236180}
}
@article{fds236181,
Author = {Li, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Optimal Internet auctions with costly communication},
Journal = {12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {683-690},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Gini, ML and Shehory, O and Ito, T and Jonker, CM},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-1993-5},
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2484920},
Abstract = {Iterative auctions can reach an outcome before all bidders
have revealed all their preference information. This can
decrease costs associated with communication, deliberation,
and loss of privacy. We propose an explicit cost model that
is inspired by single-item Internet auctions, such as those
taking place on auction sites (eBay) or via informal
communication (craigslist, mailing lists). A nonzero bid
comes at a cost to both the seller and the bidder, and the
seller can send broadcast queries at a cost. Under this
model, we study auctions that maximize the seller's profit
(revenue minus seller cost). We consider multi-round Vickrey
auctions (MVAs), in which the seller runs multiple Vickrey
auctions, with decreasing reserve prices. We prove that
restricting attention to this class is without loss of
optimality, show how to compute an optimal MVA, and compare
experimentally to some other natural MVAs. Among our
findings are that (1) the expected total cost is bounded by
a constant for arbitrarily many bidders, and (2) the optimal
MVA and profit remain the same as long as the total bid cost
is fixed, regardless of which portion of it belongs to the
seller and which to the buyer. Copyright © 2013,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236181}
}
@article{fds236182,
Author = {Jain, M and Conitzer, V and Tambe, M},
Title = {Security scheduling for real-world networks},
Journal = {12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {215-222},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Gini, ML and Shehory, O and Ito, T and Jonker, CM},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-1993-5},
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2484920},
Abstract = {Network based security games, where a defender strategically
places security measures on the edges of a graph to protect
against an adversary, who chooses a path through a graph is
an important research problem with potential for real-world
impact. For example, police forces face the problem of
placing checkpoints on roads to inspect vehicular traffic in
their day-to-day operations, a security measure the Mumbai
police have performed since the terrorist attacks in 2008.
Algorithms for solving such network-based security problems
have been proposed in the literature, but none of them scale
up to solving problems of the size of real-world networks.
In this paper, we present SNARES, a novel algorithm that
computes optimal solutions for both the defender and the
attacker in such network security problems. Based on a
double-oracle framework, SNARES makes novel use of two
approaches: warm starts and greedy responses. It makes the
following contributions: (1) It defines and uses
mincut-fanout, a novel method for efficient warm-starting of
the computation; (2) It exploits the sub-modularity property
of the defender optimization in a greedy heuristic, which is
used to generate "better-responses"; SNARES also uses a
better-response computation for the attacker. Furthermore,
we evaluate the performance of SNARES in real-world networks
illustrating a significant advance: whereas state-of-the-art
algorithms could handle just the southern tip of Mumbai,
SNARES can compute optimal strategy for the entire urban
road network of Mumbai. Copyright © 2013, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236182}
}
@article{fds236178,
Author = {Letchford, J and Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V},
Title = {On the value of commitment},
Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
Volume = {28},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1-31},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2013},
ISSN = {1387-2532},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9},
Doi = {10.1007/s10458-013-9246-9},
Key = {fds236178}
}
@article{fds236179,
Author = {de Weerdt, MM and Harrenstein, P and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of
ties},
Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {405-420},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2013},
ISSN = {0899-8256},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001},
Abstract = {A contract auction establishes a contract between a center
and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many
terms, preferences over contracts typically display
indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects
the best contract for the winner that is at least as good
for the center as any of the contracts offered by the
non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a
contract with higher utility for the center at an
arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the
only mechanism that is individually rational,
strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto
efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a
variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is
strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However,
there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also
selects Pareto efficient outcomes. © 2013 Elsevier
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001},
Key = {fds236179}
}
@article{fds236298,
Author = {Bhattacharya, S and Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents
in a social network},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {7695 LNCS},
Pages = {482-488},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_36},
Abstract = {Firms have ever-increasing amounts of information about
possible customers available to them; furthermore, they are
increasingly able to push offers to them rather than having
to passively wait for a consumer to initiate contact. This
opens up enormous new opportunities for intelligent
marketing. In this paper, we consider the limit case in
which the firm can predict consumers' preferences and
relationships to each other perfectly, and has perfect
control over when it makes offers to consumers. We focus on
how to optimally introduce a new product into a social
network of agents, when that product has significant
externalities. We propose a general model to capture this
problem, and prove that there is no polynomial-time
approximation unless P=NP. However, in the special case
where agents' relationships are symmetric and externalities
are positive, we show that the problem can be solved in
polynomial time. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_36},
Key = {fds236298}
}
@article{fds325610,
Author = {Letchford, J and MacDermed, L and Conitzer, V and Parr, R and Isbell,
CL},
Title = {Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic
games},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {11},
Number = {2},
Pages = {36-40},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2509002.2509011},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Significant recent progress has been made in both
the computation of optimal strategies to commit to
(Stackelberg strategies), and the computation of correlated
equilibria of stochastic games. In this letter we discuss
some recent results in the intersection of these two areas.
We investigate how valuable commitment can be in stochastic
games and give a brief summary of complexity results about
computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic
games.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1145/2509002.2509011},
Key = {fds325610}
}
@article{fds236200,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Xia, L},
Title = {Approximating common voting rules by sequential voting in
multi-issue domains},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2012},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.cs.uic.edu/bin/view/Isaim2012/AcceptedPapers},
Abstract = {When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, one
solution is to vote on the issues sequentially. In this
paper, we investigate how well the winner under the
sequential voting process approximates the winners under
some common voting rules. Some common voting rules,
including Borda, k-approval, Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and
Dodgson, admit natural scoring functions that can serve as a
basis for approximation results. We focus on multi-issue
domains where each issue is binary and the agents'
preferences are O-legal, separable, represented by LP-trees,
or lexicographic. Our results show significant improvements
in the approximation ratios when the preferences are
represented by LP-trees, compared to the approximation
ratios when the preferences are O-legal. However, assuming
that the preferences are separable (respectively,
lexicographic) does not significantly improve the
approximation ratios compared to the case where the
preferences are O-legal (respectively, are represented by
LP-trees). Copyright© 2011, Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236200}
}
@article{fds236304,
Author = {Waggoner, B and Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in
elections},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1485-1491},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a
strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating
multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where
the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name
manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such
as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of
such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a
high probability of obtaining the "correct" outcome, and
second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness
of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two
alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a
number of identities from a distribution that may be
influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method.
We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of
these distributions. Then, given the results of an election
in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we
propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the
outcome. Copyright © 2012, Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236304}
}
@article{fds236305,
Author = {Letchford, J and MacDermed, L and Conitzer, V and Parr, R and Isbell,
CL},
Title = {Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic
games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1380-1386},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Significant progress has been made recently in the following
two lines of research in the intersection of AI and game
theory: (1) the computation of optimal strategies to commit
to (Stackelberg strategies), and (2) the computation of
correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this paper, we
unite these two lines of research by studying the
computation of Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.
We provide theoretical results on the value of being able to
commit and the value of being able to correlate, as well as
complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in
stochastic games. We then modify the QPACE algorithm
(MacDermed et al. 2011) to compute Stackelberg strategies,
and provide experimental results. Copyright © 2012,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236305}
}
@article{fds236306,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to
security},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {2106-2112},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {The multiagent systems community has adopted game theory as
a framework for the design of systems of multiple
self-interested agents. For this to be effective, efficient
algorithms must be designed to compute the solutions that
game theory prescribes. In this paper, I summarize some of
the state of the art on this topic, focusing particularly on
how this line of work has contributed to several highly
visible deployed security applications, developed at the
University of Southern California. Copyright © 2012,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236306}
}
@article{fds236307,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer
science and economics},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {2357-2362},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {In recent years, major research advances have taken place in
the intersection of computer science and economics, but this
material has so far been taught primarily at the graduate
level. This paper describes a novel semester-long
undergraduate-level course in the intersection of computer
science and economics at Duke University, titled "CPS 173:
Computational Microeconomics." Copyright © 2012,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236307}
}
@article{fds343206,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal},
Volume = {abs/1208.6501},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
Abstract = {We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation
in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple
false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments
have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name
identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to
pay). While these withdrawn identities will not obtain the
items they won, their initial presence may have been
beneficial to the agent's other identities. We define a
mechanism to be false-name-proof with withdrawal (FNPW) if
the aforementioned manipulation is never beneficial. FNPW is
a stronger condition than false-name-proofness
(FNP).},
Key = {fds343206}
}
@article{fds236300,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Should social network structure be taken into account in
elections?},
Journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
Volume = {64},
Number = {1},
Pages = {100-102},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0165-4896},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.006},
Abstract = {If the social network structure among the voters in an
election is known, how should this be taken into account by
the voting rule? In this brief article, I argue, via the
maximum likelihood approach to voting, that it is optimal to
ignore the social network structure altogether-one person,
one vote. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.006},
Key = {fds236300}
}
@article{fds236301,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Taylor, CR and Wagman, L},
Title = {Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with
repeat purchases},
Journal = {Marketing Science},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-292},
Publisher = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences (INFORMS)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0732-2399},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1110.0691},
Abstract = {When a firm can recognize its previous customers, it may use
information about their past purchases to price
discriminate. We study a model with a monopolist and a
continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers have
the ability to maintain their anonymity and avoid being
identified as past customers, possibly at a cost. When
consumers can freely maintain their anonymity, they all
individually choose to do so, which results in the highest
profit for the monopolist. Increasing the cost of anonymity
can benefit consumers but only up to a point, after which
the effect is reversed. We show that if the monopolist or an
independent third party controls the cost of anonymity, it
often works to the detriment of consumers. © 2012
INFORMS.},
Doi = {10.1287/mksc.1110.0691},
Key = {fds236301}
}
@article{fds236299,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition},
Journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {91-129},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0020-7276},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0275-9},
Abstract = {We study the following game: each agent i chooses a lottery
over nonnegative numbers whose expectation is equal to his
budget b i. The agent with the highest realized outcome wins
(and agents only care about winning). This game is motivated
by various real-world settings where agents each choose a
gamble and the primary goal is to come out ahead. Such
settings include patent races, stock market competitions,
and R&D tournaments. We show that there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium when budgets are equal. We proceed to
study and solve extensions, including settings where agents
choose their budgets (at a cost) and where budgets are
private information. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00182-011-0275-9},
Key = {fds236299}
}
@article{fds236297,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive
representation of settings with externalities},
Journal = {Journal of Computer and System Sciences},
Volume = {78},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-14},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-0000},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009},
Abstract = {When a decision must be made based on the preferences of
multiple agents, and the space of possible outcomes is
combinatorial in nature, it becomes necessary to think about
how preferences should be represented, and how this affects
the complexity of finding an optimal (or at least a good)
outcome. We study settings with externalities, where each
agent controls one or more variables, and how these
variables are set affects not only the agent herself, but
also potentially the other agents. For example, one agent
may decide to reduce her pollution, which will come at a
cost to herself, but will result in a benefit for all other
agents. We formalize how to represent such domains and show
that in a number of key special cases, it is NP-complete to
determine whether there exists a nontrivial feasible
solution (and therefore the maximum social welfare is
completely inapproximable). However, for one important
special case, we give an algorithm that converges to the
solution with the maximal concession by each agent (in a
linear number of rounds for utility functions that
additively decompose into piecewise constant functions).
Maximizing social welfare, however, remains NP-hard even in
this setting. We also demonstrate a special case that can be
solved in polynomial time using linear programming. © 2011
Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009},
Key = {fds236297}
}
@article{fds236192,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Xia, L},
Title = {Paradoxes of multiple elections: An approximation
approach},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning},
Pages = {179-187},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Brewka, G and Eiter, T and McIlraith, SA},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577355601},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/kr/kr2012.html},
Abstract = {When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues,
applying common voting rules becomes computationally hard
due to the exponentially large number of alternatives. One
computationally efficient solution is to vote on the issues
sequentially. In this paper, we investigate how well the
winner under the sequential voting process approximates the
winners under some common voting rules that admit natural
scoring functions that can serve as a basis for
approximation results. We focus on multi-issue domains where
each issue is binary and the agents' preferences are
O-legal, separable, represented by LP-trees, or
lexicographic. We show some generalized paradoxes of
multiple elections: Sequential voting does not approximate
many common voting rules well even when the preferences are
O-legal or separable. However, these paradoxes are much
alleviated or even completely avoided when the preferences
are lexicographic or represented by LP-trees. Our results
thus draw a border for conditions under which sequential
voting rules, which have extremely low computational and
communicational cost, are good approximations of some common
voting rules w.r.t. their corresponding scoring functions.
Copyright © 2012, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236192}
}
@article{fds375193,
Author = {Letchford, J and MacDermed, L and Conitzer, V and Parr, R and Isbell,
CL},
Title = {Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic
Games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2012},
Pages = {1380-1386},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Significant progress has been made recently in the following
two lines of research in the intersection of AI and game
theory: (1) the computation of optimal strategies to commit
to (Stackelberg strategies), and (2) the computation of
correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this paper, we
unite these two lines of research by studying the
computation of Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.
We provide theoretical results on the value of being able to
commit and the value of being able to correlate, as well as
complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in
stochastic games. We then modify the QPACE algorithm
(MacDermed et al. 2011) to compute Stackelberg strategies,
and provide experimental results.},
Key = {fds375193}
}
@article{fds375194,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to
Security},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2012},
Pages = {2106-2112},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The multiagent systems community has adopted game theory as
a framework for the design of systems of multiple
self-interested agents. For this to be effective, efficient
algorithms must be designed to compute the solutions that
game theory prescribes. In this paper, I summarize some of
the state of the art on this topic, focusing particularly on
how this line of work has contributed to several highly
visible deployed security applications, developed at the
University of Southern California.},
Key = {fds375194}
}
@article{fds375195,
Author = {Waggoner, B and Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in
Elections},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2012},
Pages = {1485-1491},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a
strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating
multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where
the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name
manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such
as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of
such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a
high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and
second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness
of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two
alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a
number of identities from a distribution that may be
influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method.
We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of
these distributions. Then, given the results of an election
in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we
propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the
outcome.},
Key = {fds375195}
}
@article{fds236294,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Discussion of "a conditional game for comparing
approximations"},
Journal = {Journal of Machine Learning Research},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {72-73},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1532-4435},
Abstract = {This brief paper discusses the paper by Eaton mentioned in
the title [1]. Copyright 2011 by the authors.},
Key = {fds236294}
}
@article{fds236194,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V and Parr, R},
Title = {Security games with multiple attacker resources},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {273-279},
Publisher = {IJCAI/AAAI},
Editor = {Walsh, T},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781577355120},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2011.html},
Abstract = {Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used
in several real-world security applications. This work has
generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender
commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player
normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to
compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been
shown that in many security games, Stackelberg strategies
are also Nash strategies for the defender. However, the work
on security games so far assumes that the attacker attacks
only a single target. In this paper, we generalize to the
case where the attacker attacks multiple targets
simultaneously. Here, Stackelberg and Nash strategies for
the defender can be truly different. We provide a
polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium.
The algorithm gradually increases the number of defender
resources and maintains an equilibrium throughout this
process. Moreover, we prove that Nash equilibria in security
games with multiple attackers satisfy the interchange
property, which resolves the problem of equilibrium
selection in such games. On the other hand, we show that
Stackelberg strategies are actually NP-hard to compute in
this context. Finally, we provide experimental
results.},
Doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-056},
Key = {fds236194}
}
@article{fds236195,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Lang, J and Xia, L},
Title = {Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue
domains},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {158-163},
Publisher = {IJCAI/AAAI},
Editor = {Walsh, T},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781577355120},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2011.html},
Abstract = {We consider a framework for preference aggregation on
multiple binary issues, where agents' preferences are
represented by (possibly cyclic) CP-nets. We focus on the
majority aggregation of the individual CP-nets, which is the
CP-net where the direction of each edge of the hypercube is
decided according to the majority rule. First we focus on
hypercube Condorcet winners (HCWs); in particular, we show
that, assuming a uniform distribution for the CP-nets, the
probability that there exists at least one HCWis at least 1
- 1/e, and the expected number of HCWs is 1. Our
experimental results confirm these results. We also show
experimental results under the Impartial Culture assumption.
We then generalize a few tournament solutions to select
winners from (weighted) majoritarian CP-nets, namely
Copeland, maximin, and Kemeny. For each of these, we address
some social choice theoretic and computational
issues.},
Doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-038},
Key = {fds236195}
}
@article{fds236199,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial
orders},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {446-451},
Publisher = {IJCAI/AAAI},
Editor = {Walsh, T},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781577355120},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2011.html},
Abstract = {In many of the possible applications as well as the
theoretical models of computational social choice, the
agents' preferences are represented as partial orders. In
this paper, we extend the maximum likelihood approach for
defining "optimal" voting rules to this setting. We consider
distributions in which the pairwise comparisons/incomparabilities
between alternatives are drawn i.i.d. We call such models
pairwise-independent models and show that they correspond to
a class of voting rules that we call pairwise scoring rules.
This generalizes rules such as Kemeny and Borda. Moreover,
we show that Borda is the only pairwise scoring rule that
satisfies neutrality, when the outcome space is the set of
all alternatives. We then study which voting rules defined
for linear orders can be extended to partial orders via our
MLE model. We show that any weakly neutral outcome scoring
rule (including any ranking/candidate scoring rule) based on
the weighted majority graph can be represented as the MLE of
a weakly neutral pairwise-independent model. Therefore, all
such rules admit natural extensions to profiles of partial
orders. Finally, we propose a specific MLE model πk for
generating a set of k winning alternatives, and study the
computational complexity of winner determination for the MLE
of πk.},
Doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-082},
Key = {fds236199}
}
@article{fds236288,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Walsh, T and Xia, L},
Title = {Dominating manipulations in voting with partial
information},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {638-643},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only
has partial information about the votes of the
non-manipulators. Such partial information is described by
an information set, which is the set of profiles of the
non-manipulators that are indistinguishable to the
manipulator. Given such an information set, a dominating
manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can
cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and
sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the
manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full
information, computing whether or not there exists a
dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules
(by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no
information, there is no dominating manipulation for many
common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is
represented by partial orders and only a small portion of
the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating
manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our
results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic
behavior by limiting information about the votes of other
voters. Copyright © 2011, Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236288}
}
@article{fds236290,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Korzhyk, D},
Title = {Commitment to correlated strategies},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {632-637},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {The standard approach to computing an optimal mixed strategy
to commit to is based on solving a set of linear programs,
one for each of the follower's pure strategies. We show that
these linear programs can be naturally merged into a single
linear program; that this linear program can be interpreted
as a formulation for the optimal correlated strategy to
commit to, giving an easy proof of a result by von Stengel
and Zamir that the leader's utility is at least the utility
she gets in any correlated equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game; and that this linear program can be
extended to compute optimal correlated strategies to commit
to in games of three or more players. (Unlike in two-player
games, in games of three or more players, the notions of
optimal mixed and correlated strategies to commit to are
truly distinct.) We give examples, and provide experimental
results that indicate that for 50 x 50 games, this approach
is usually significantly faster than the multiple-LPs
approach. Copyright © 2011, Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236290}
}
@article{fds325423,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V and Taylor, CR},
Title = {Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with
Repeat Purchases},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds325423}
}
@article{fds375196,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Korzhyk, D},
Title = {Commitment to Correlated Strategies},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2011},
Pages = {632-637},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781577355083},
Abstract = {The standard approach to computing an optimal mixed strategy
to commit to is based on solving a set of linear programs,
one for each of the follower's pure strategies. We show that
these linear programs can be naturally merged into a single
linear program; that this linear program can be interpreted
as a formulation for the optimal correlated strategy to
commit to, giving an easy proof of a result by von Stengel
and Zamir that the leader's utility is at least the utility
she gets in any correlated equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game; and that this linear program can be
extended to compute optimal correlated strategies to commit
to in games of three or more players. (Unlike in two-player
games, in games of three or more players, the notions of
optimal mixed and correlated strategies to commit to are
truly distinct.) We give examples, and provide experimental
results that indicate that for 50 × 50 games, this approach
is usually significantly faster than the multiple-LPs
approach.},
Key = {fds375196}
}
@article{fds375197,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Walsh, T and Xia, L},
Title = {Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial
Information},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2011},
Pages = {638-643},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781577355083},
Abstract = {We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only
has partial information about the votes of the
non-manipulators. Such partial information is described by
an information set, which is the set of profiles of the
non-manipulators that are indistinguishable to the
manipulator. Given such an information set, a dominating
manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can
cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and
sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the
manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full
information, computing whether or not there exists a
dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules
(by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no
information, there is no dominating manipulation for many
common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is
represented by partial orders and only a small portion of
the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating
manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our
results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic
behavior by limiting information about the votes of other
voters.},
Key = {fds375197}
}
@article{fds236286,
Author = {Naoki, O and Vincent, C and Ryo, I and Yuko, S and Atsushi, I and Makoto,
Y},
Title = {Coalition structure generation utilizing compact
characteristic function representations},
Journal = {Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {451-460},
Publisher = {Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1346-0714},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1527/tjsai.26.451},
Abstract = {This paper presents a new way of formalizing the Coalition
Structure Generation problem (CSG), so that we can apply
constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective
coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and
multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of
agents into coalitions so that social surplus is maximized.
Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box
function called a characteristic function, which takes a
coalition as an input and returns the value of the
coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization
techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However,
characteristic functions that appear in practice often can
be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than a
single black-box function. Then, we can solve the CSG
problem more efficiently by applying constraint optimization
techniques to the compact representation directly. We
present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing
recently developed compact representation schemes for
characteristic functions. We first characterize the
complexity of the CSG under these representation schemes. In
this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of
rules rather than by the number of agents. Furthermore, as
an initial step towards developing efficient constraint
optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we
develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that
an off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably
well, i.e., it can solve instances with a few hundred
agents, while the state-of-the-art algorithm (which does not
make use of compact representations) can solve instances
with up to 27 agents.},
Doi = {10.1527/tjsai.26.451},
Key = {fds236286}
}
@article{fds236293,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Expressive markets for donating to charities},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {175},
Number = {7-8},
Pages = {1251-1271},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0004-3702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007},
Abstract = {When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is
possible to use the contemplated donation as a bargaining
chip to induce other parties interested in the charity to
donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of
matching offers, where one party promises to pay a certain
amount if others pay a certain amount. However, in their
current form, matching offers allow for only limited
negotiation. For one, it is not immediately clear how
multiple parties can make matching offers at the same time
without creating circular dependencies. Also, it is not
immediately clear how to make a donation conditional on
other donations to multiple charities when the donor has
different levels of appreciation for the different
charities. In both these cases, the limited expressiveness
of matching offers causes economic loss: it may happen that
an arrangement that all parties (donors as well as
charities) would have preferred cannot be expressed in terms
of matching offers and will therefore not occur. In this
paper, we introduce a bidding language for expressing very
general types of matching offers over multiple charities. We
formulate the corresponding clearing problem (deciding how
much each bidder pays, and how much each charity receives),
and show that it cannot be approximated to any ratio in
polynomial time unless P = NP, even in very restricted
settings. We give a mixed integer program formulation of the
clearing problem, and show that for concave bids, the
program reduces to a linear program. We then show that the
clearing problem for a subclass of concave bids is at least
as hard as the decision variant of linear programming. We
also consider the case where each charity has a target
amount, and bidders willingness-to-pay functions are
concave. Here, we show that the optimal surplus can be
approximated to a ratio m, the number of charities, in
polynomial time (and no significantly better approximation
is possible in polynomial time unless P = NP); no
polynomial-time approximation ratio is possible for
maximizing the total donated, unless P = NP. Subsequently,
we show that the clearing problem is much easier when bids
are quasilinear-for maximizing surplus, the problem
decomposes across charities, and for maximizing the total
donated, a greedy approach is optimal if the bids are
concave (although this latter problem is weakly NP-hard when
the bids are not concave). For the quasilinear setting, we
study the mechanism design question. We show that an ex-post
efficient mechanism is impossible even with only one charity
and a very restricted class of bids. We also show that there
can be benefits to linking the charities from a mechanism
design standpoint. Finally, we discuss an experiment in
which we used this methodology to collect money for victims
of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. © 2010 Published by
Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007},
Key = {fds236293}
}
@article{fds236295,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Determining possible and necessary winners under common
voting rules given partial orders},
Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {25-67},
Publisher = {AI Access Foundation},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1076-9757},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.3186},
Abstract = {Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their
preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is
impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the
alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit
partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile
of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two
important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c
to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the
possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively.
Each of these two problems is further divided into two
sub-problems: determining whether c is a unique winner (that
is, c is the only winner), or determining whether c is a
co-winner (that is, c is in the set of winners). We consider
the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded
and the votes are unweighted. We completely characterize the
complexity of possible/necessary winner problems for the
following common voting rules: a class of positional scoring
rules (including Borda), Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, ranked
pairs, voting trees, and plurality with runoff. © 2011 AI
Access Foundation. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1613/jair.3186},
Key = {fds236295}
}
@article{fds236296,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Yin, Z and Kiekintveld, C and Conitzer, V and Tambe,
M},
Title = {Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended
investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and
uniqueness},
Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {297-327},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1076-9757},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.3269},
Abstract = {There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic
approaches to security, with much of the recent research
focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game
model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program
deployed at LAX Airport and the IRIS program in use by the
US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption
for using Stackelberg games is that security forces
(leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy;
while their adversaries (followers) choose their best
response after surveillance of this randomized strategy.
Yet, in many situations, a leader may face uncertainty about
the follower's surveillance capability. Previous work fails
to address how a leader should compute her strategy given
such uncertainty. We provide five contributions in the
context of a general class of security games. First, we show
that the Nash equilibria in security games are
interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection
problem. Second, under a natural restriction on security
games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium
strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class
of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third,
when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets,
many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, we show
experimentally that in most (but not all) games where the
restriction does not hold, the Stackelberg strategy is still
a Nash equilibrium strategy, but this is no longer true when
the attacker can attack multiple targets. Finally, as a
possible direction for future research, we propose an
extensive-form game model that makes the defender's
uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe
explicit. © 2011 AI Access Foundation. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1613/jair.3269},
Key = {fds236296}
}
@article{fds236172,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V and Parr, R},
Title = {Solving stackelberg games with uncertain
observability},
Journal = {10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {953-960},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Recent applications of game theory in security domains use
algorithms to solve a Stackelberg model, in which one player
(the leader) first commits to a mixed strategy and then the
other player (the follower) observes that strategy and
best-responds to it. However, in real-world applications, it
is hard to determine whether the follower is actually able
to observe the leader's mixed strategy before acting. In
this paper, we model the uncertainty about whether the
follower is able to observe the leader's strategy as part of
the game (as proposed in the extended version of Yin et al.
[17]). We describe an iterative algorithm for solving these
games. This algorithm alternates between calling a Nash
equilibrium solver and a Stackelberg solver as subroutines.
We prove that the algorithm finds a solution in a finite
number of steps and show empirically that it runs fast on
games of reasonable size. We also discuss other properties
of this methodology based on the experiments. Copyright ©
2011, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236172}
}
@article{fds236173,
Author = {Jain, M and Korzhyk, D and Vaněk, O and Conitzer, V and Pěchouček, M and Tambe, M},
Title = {A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on
graphs},
Journal = {10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {305-312},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In response to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Mumbai police
have started to schedule a limited number of inspection
checkpoints on the road network throughout the city.
Algorithms for similar security-related scheduling problems
have been proposed in recent literature, but security
scheduling in networked domains when targets have varying
importance remains an open problem at large. In this paper,
we cast the network security problem as an attacker-
defender zero-sum game. The strategy spaces for both players
are exponentially large, so this requires the development of
novel, scalable techniques. We first show that existing
algorithms for approximate solutions can be arbitrarily bad
in general settings. We present Rugged (Randomization in
Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and
Defender), the first scalable optimal solution technique for
such network security games. Our technique is based on a
double oracle approach and thus does not require the
enumeration of the entire strategy space for either of the
players. It scales up to realistic problem sizes, as is
shown by our evaluation of maps of southern Mumbai obtained
from GIS data. Categories and Subject Descriptors 1.2.11
[Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial
Intelligence General Terms Algorithms, Security,
Performance. Copyright © 2011, International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.},
Key = {fds236173}
}
@article{fds236285,
Author = {Farfel, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Aggregating value ranges: Preference elicitation and
truthfulness},
Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-150},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1387-2532},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-009-9118-5},
Abstract = {We study the case where agents have preferences over ranges
(intervals) of values, and we wish to elicit and aggregate
these preferences. For example, consider a set of
climatologist agents who are asked for their predictions for
the increase in temperature between 2009 and 2100. Each
climatologist submits a range, and from these ranges we must
construct an aggregate range. What rule should we use for
constructing the aggregate range? One issue in such settings
is that an agent (climatologist) may misreport her range to
make the aggregate range coincide more closely with her own
(true) most-preferred range. We extend the theory of
single-peaked preferences from points to ranges to obtain a
rule (the median-of-ranges rule) that is strategy-proof
under a condition on preferences. We then introduce and
analyze a natural class of algorithms for approximately
eliciting a median range from multiple agents. We also show
sufficient conditions under which such an approximate
elicitation algorithm still incentivizes agents to answer
truthfully. Finally, we consider the possibility that ranges
can be refined when the topic is more completely specified
(for example, the increase in temperature on the North Pole
given the failure of future climate pacts). We give a
framework and algorithms for selectively specifying the
topic further based on queries to agents. © 2009 The
Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1007/s10458-009-9118-5},
Key = {fds236285}
}
@article{fds236287,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V and Lang, J},
Title = {Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and
multiple-election paradoxes},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {179-188},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993602},
Abstract = {In many settings, a group of voters must come to a joint
decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done
by voting on the issues in sequence. We model sequential
voting in multi-issue domains as a complete-information
extensive-form game, in which the voters are perfectly
rational and their preferences are common knowledge. In each
step, the voters simultaneously vote on one issue, and the
order of the issues is given exogenously before the process.
We call this model strategic sequential voting. We focus on
domains characterized by multiple binary issues, so that
strategic sequential voting leads to a unique outcome under
a natural solution concept. We show that under some
conditions on the preferences, this leads to the same
outcome as truthful sequential voting, but in general it can
result in very different outcomes. In particular, sometimes
the order of the issues has a strong influence on the
winner. We also analyze the communication complexity of the
corresponding social choice rule. Most significantly, we
illustrate several multiple-election paradoxes in strategic
sequential voting: there exists a profile for which the
winner under strategic sequential voting is ranked nearly at
the bottom in all voters' true preferences, and the winner
is Pareto-dominated by almost every other alternative. We
show that changing the order of the issues cannot completely
prevent such paradoxes. We also study the possibility of
avoiding the paradoxes for strategic sequential voting by
imposing some constraints on the profile, such as
separability, lexicographicity or O-legality. © 2011
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1993574.1993602},
Key = {fds236287}
}
@article{fds236289,
Author = {Zuckerman, M and Faliszewski, P and Conitzer, V and Rosenschein,
JS},
Title = {An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating
elections},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {7090 LNCS},
Pages = {363-374},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_31},
Abstract = {Social choice theory and cooperative (coalitional) game
theory have become important foundations for the design and
analysis of multiagent systems. In this paper, we use
cooperative game theory tools in order to explore the
coalition formation process in the coalitional manipulation
problem. Unlike earlier work on a cooperative-game-theoretic
approach to the manipulation problem [2], we consider a
model where utilities are not transferable. We investigate
the issue of stability in coalitional manipulation voting
games; we define two notions of the core in these domains,
the α-core and the β-core. For each type of core, we
investigate how hard it is to determine whether a given
candidate is in the core. We prove that for both types of
core, this determination is at least as hard as the
coalitional manipulation problem. On the other hand, we show
that for some voting rules, the α- and the β-core problems
are no harder than the coalitional manipulation problem. We
also show that some prominent voting rules, when applied to
the truthful preferences of voters, may produce an outcome
not in the core, even when the core is not empty. © 2011
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_31},
Key = {fds236289}
}
@article{fds236291,
Author = {Guo, M and Naroditskiy, V and Conitzer, V and Greenwald, A and Jennings,
NR},
Title = {Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms:
Public goods and beyond},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {7090 LNCS},
Pages = {158-169},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14},
Abstract = {Many scenarios where participants hold private information
require payments to encourage truthful revelation. Some of
these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would
absorb the budget surplus or cover the deficit. Faltings [7]
proposed the idea of excluding one agent uniformly at random
and making him the residual claimant. Based on this idea, we
propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive
optimal ones within each class: Faltings' mechanism is
optimal in one of the classes. We then move on to general
mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the
social welfare achieved by Faltings' mechanism. Finally, we
analyze a modification of the mechanism where budget balance
is achieved without designating any agent as the residual
claimant. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14},
Key = {fds236291}
}
@article{fds325612,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {AI and Economic Theory},
Journal = {IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {7-7},
Publisher = {IEEE COMPUTER SOC},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds325612}
}
@article{fds236292,
Author = {Bhattacharya, S and Conitzer, V and Munagala, K},
Title = {Approximation algorithm for security games with costly
resources},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {7090 LNCS},
Pages = {13-24},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783642255090},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_2},
Abstract = {In recent years, algorithms for computing game-theoretic
solutions have been developed for real-world security
domains. These games are between a defender, who must
allocate her resources to defend potential targets, and an
attacker, who chooses a target to attack. Existing work has
assumed the set of defender's resources to be fixed. This
assumption precludes the effective use of approximation
algorithms, since a slight change in the defender's
allocation strategy can result in a massive change in her
utility. In contrast, we consider a model where resources
are obtained at a cost, initiating the study of the
following optimization problem: Minimize the total cost of
the purchased resources, given that every target has to be
defended with at least a certain probability. We give an
efficient logarithmic approximation algorithm for this
problem. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_2},
Key = {fds236292}
}
@article{fds325611,
Author = {Jain, M and Korzhyk, D and Vanek, O and Conitzer, V and Pechoucek, M and Tambe, M},
Title = {A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on
graphs.},
Journal = {AAMAS},
Pages = {327-334},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Sonenberg, L and Stone, P and Tumer, K and Yolum,
P},
Year = {2011},
ISBN = {978-0-9826571-5-7},
Key = {fds325611}
}
@article{fds236280,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with
restricted preferences},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {6484 LNCS},
Pages = {402-414},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_33},
Abstract = {In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules
when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure,
and the voters' preferences are represented by acyclic
CP-nets that follow a common order over issues. Our main
result is a simple full characterization of strategy-proof
voting rules satisfying non-imposition for a very natural
restriction on preferences in multi-issue domains: we show
that if the preference domain is lexicographic, then a
voting rule satisfying non-imposition is strategy-proof if
and only if it can be decomposed into multiple
strategy-proof local rules, one for each issue and each
setting of the issues preceding it. We also obtain the
following variant of Gibbard-Satterthwaite: when there are
at least two issues and each of the issues can take at least
two values, then there is no non-dictatorial strategy-proof
voting rule that satisfies non-imposition, even when the
domain of voters' preferences is restricted to linear orders
that are consistent with acyclic CP-nets following a common
order over issues. This impossibility result follows from
either one of two more general new impossibility results we
obtained, which are not included in this paper due to the
space constraint. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_33},
Key = {fds236280}
}
@article{fds236279,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Immorlica, N and Letchford, J and Munagala, K and Wagman, L},
Title = {False-name-proofness in social networks},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {6484 LNCS},
Pages = {209-221},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9783642175718},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_17},
Abstract = {In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making
a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties
(agents), while taking into account that agents may behave
strategically. An emerging phenomenon is to run such
mechanisms on a social network; for example, Facebook
recently allowed its users to vote on its future terms of
use. One significant complication for such mechanisms is
that it may be possible for a user to participate multiple
times by creating multiple identities. Prior work has
investigated the design of false-name-proof mechanisms,
which guarantee that there is no incentive to use additional
identifiers. Arguably, this work has produced mostly
negative results. In this paper, we show that it is in fact
possible to create good mechanisms that are robust to
false-name-manipulation, by taking the social network
structure into account. The basic idea is to exclude agents
that are separated from trusted nodes by small vertex cuts.
We provide key results on the correctness, optimality, and
computational tractability of this approach. © 2010
Springer-Verlag.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_17},
Key = {fds236279}
}
@article{fds236272,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V and Procaccia, AD},
Title = {A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {275-284},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807386},
Abstract = {The coalitional manipulation problem is one of the central
problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we
focus on solving the problem under the important family of
positional scoring rules, in an approximate sense that was
advocated by Zuckerman et al. [SODA 2008, AIJ 2009]. Our
main result is a polynomial-time algorithm with (roughly
speaking) the following theoretical guarantee: given a
manipulable instance with m alternatives, the algorithm
finds a successful manipulation with at most m - 2
additional manipulators. Our technique is based on a
reduction to the scheduling problem known as Q|pmtn|Cmax,
along with a novel rounding procedure. We demonstrate that
our analysis is tight by establishing a new type of
integrality gap. We also resolve a known open question in
computational social choice by showing that the coalitional
manipulation problem remains (strongly) NP-complete for
positional scoring rules even when votes are unweighted.
Finally, we discuss the implications of our results with
respect to the question: "Is there a prominent voting rule
that is usually hard to manipulate?" Copyright 2010
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1807342.1807386},
Key = {fds236272}
}
@article{fds236273,
Author = {Letchford, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form
games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {83-92},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807354},
Abstract = {Computing optimal strategies to commit to in general
normal-form or Bayesian games is a topic that has recently
been gaining attention, in part due to the application of
such algorithms in various security and law enforcement
scenarios. In this paper, we extend this line of work to the
more general case of commitment in extensive-form games. We
show that in some cases, the optimal strategy can be
computed in polynomial time; in others, computing it is
NP-hard. © 2010 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1807342.1807354},
Key = {fds236273}
}
@article{fds375198,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V and Parr, R},
Title = {Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in
Security Resource Allocation Games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2010},
Pages = {805-810},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781577354642},
Abstract = {Recently, algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions
have been deployed in real-world security applications, such
as the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los
Angeles International Airport. These algorithms assume that
the defender (security personnel) can commit to a mixed
strategy, a so-called Stackelberg model. As pointed out by
Kiekintveld et al. (2009), in these applications, generally,
multiple resources need to be assigned to multiple targets,
resulting in an exponential number of pure strategies for
the defender. In this paper, we study how to compute optimal
Stackelberg strategies in such games, showing that this can
be done in polynomial time in some cases, and is NP-hard in
others.},
Key = {fds375198}
}
@article{fds375199,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and
Paradoxes},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2010},
Pages = {921-926},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781577354642},
Abstract = {We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each
voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the
preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic.
This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect
information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We
first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding
the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting
game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient
if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We
show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the
time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results
are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of
Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and
any voting rule that satisfies non-imposition and with a low
domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n
voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked
somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every
voter's preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but
one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that
many common voting rules have a very low (= 1) domination
index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For
the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger
paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm,
we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome
of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters
vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules.
Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on
average, more voters prefer the backward-induction
outcome.},
Key = {fds375199}
}
@article{fds375200,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General
Approach and Case Studies},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2010},
Pages = {1676-1679},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781577354642},
Abstract = {In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based
on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie
about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In
mechanism design, the goal is to design procedures
(mechanisms) for making the decision that work in spite of
such strategic behavior, usually by making untruthful
behavior suboptimal. In automated mechanism design, the idea
is to computationally search through the space of feasible
mechanisms, rather than to design them analytically by hand.
Unfortunately, the most straightforward approach to
automated mechanism design does not scale to large
instances, because it requires searching over a very large
space of possible functions. In this paper, we describe an
approach to automated mechanism design that is
computationally feasible. Instead of optimizing over all
feasible mechanisms, we carefully choose a parameterized
subfamily of mechanisms. Then we optimize over mechanisms
within this family, and analyze whether and to what extent
the resulting mechanism is suboptimal outside the subfamily.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach with two case
studies.},
Key = {fds375200}
}
@article{fds375201,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2010},
Pages = {915-920},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781577354642},
Abstract = {In computational social choice, one important problem is to
take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters),
and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs
to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the
summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the
subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives
wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation
complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize
the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by
Chevaleyre et al. [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types
of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre
et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on
the size of the complement (the voters outside the
subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the
complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The
third depends on both. We first investigate the relations
among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we
give upper and lower bounds on all three types of
compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules.
We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m/2), Borda, and
Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically
tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when
l > m/2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent
rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs
(including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet
consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise
elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds
for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a
multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate
and its complement are both larger than m1+є for some є >
0.},
Key = {fds375201}
}
@article{fds325613,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1980534.1980543},
Abstract = {<jats:p> Solutions should be sent to the editor at
conitzer@cs.duke.edu with subject header <jats:bold>SIGecom
Exchanges Puzzle</jats:bold> . The author(s) of the most
elegant solution (as judged by the editor) will be allowed
to publish his or her or their proof in the next issue of
the Exchanges (ties broken towards earlier submissions). To
make the solution accessible to a wide audience, try to
minimize technical jargon in the proof. Until the winner is
chosen, the editor will not give any feedback on submitted
solutions and ignore any requests for hints,
<jats:italic>etc</jats:italic> . </jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1145/1980534.1980543},
Key = {fds325613}
}
@article{fds236281,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {174},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {363-381},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0004-3702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.12.003},
Abstract = {Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the
allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents
are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations
for the resources if they perceive this to be in their
interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the items
efficiently, is strategy-proof (agents have no incentive to
lie), and never runs a deficit. Nevertheless, the agents may
have to make large payments to a party outside the system of
agents, leading to decreased utility for the agents. Recent
work has investigated the possibility of redistributing some
of the payments back to the agents, without violating the
other desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Previous
research on redistribution mechanisms has resulted in a
worst-case optimal redistribution mechanism, that is, a
mechanism that maximizes the fraction of VCG payments
redistributed in the worst case. In contrast, in this paper,
we assume that a prior distribution over the agents'
valuations is available, and our goal is to maximize the
expected total redistribution. In the first part of this
paper, we study multi-unit auctions with unit demand. We
analytically solve for a mechanism that is optimal among
linear redistribution mechanisms. We also propose
discretized redistribution mechanisms. We show how to
automatically solve for the optimal discretized
redistribution mechanism for a given discretization step
size, and show that the resulting mechanisms converge to
optimality as the step size goes to zero. We present
experimental results showing that for auctions with many
bidders, the optimal linear redistribution mechanism
redistributes almost everything, whereas for auctions with
few bidders, we can solve for the optimal discretized
redistribution mechanism with a very small step size. In the
second part of this paper, we study multi-unit auctions with
nonincreasing marginal values. We extend the notion of
linear redistribution mechanisms, previously defined only in
the unit demand setting, to this more general setting. We
introduce a linear program for finding the optimal linear
redistribution mechanism. This linear program is unwieldy,
so we also introduce one simplified linear program that
produces relatively good linear redistribution mechanisms.
We conjecture an analytical solution for the simplified
linear program. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2009.12.003},
Key = {fds236281}
}
@article{fds236284,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial
auctions and voting},
Journal = {Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {58},
Number = {3},
Pages = {239-259},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1012-2443},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y},
Abstract = {In a combinatorial auction, a set of items is for sale, and
agents can bid on subsets of these items. In a voting
setting, the agents decide among a set of alternatives by
having each agent rank all the alternatives. Many of the key
research issues in these two domains are similar. The aim of
this paper is to give a convenient side-by-side comparison
that will clarify the relation between the domains, and
serve as a guide to future research. © 2010 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y},
Key = {fds236284}
}
@article{fds236282,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple
agents},
Journal = {Communications of the ACM},
Volume = {53},
Number = {3},
Pages = {84-94},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0001-0782},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1666420.1666442},
Abstract = {Computer scientists have made great strides in how
decision-making mechanisms are used. © 2010
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1666420.1666442},
Key = {fds236282}
}
@article{fds236274,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Using a memory test to limit a user to one
account},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing},
Volume = {44 LNBIP},
Pages = {60-72},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1865-1348},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_5},
Abstract = {In many Web-based applications, there are incentives for a
user to sign up for more than one account, under false
names. By doing so, the user can send spam e-mail from an
account (which will eventually cause the account to be shut
down); distort online ratings by rating multiple times (in
particular, she can inflate her own reputation ratings);
indefinitely continue using a product with a free trial
period; place shill bids on items that she is selling on an
auction site; engage in false-name bidding in combinatorial
auctions; etc. All of these behaviors are highly undesirable
from the perspective of system performance. While CAPTCHAs
can prevent a bot from automatically signing up for many
accounts, they do not prevent a human from signing up for
multiple accounts. It may appear that the only way to
prevent the latter is to require the user to provide
information that identifies her in the real world (such as a
credit card or telephone number), but users are reluctant to
give out such information. In this paper, we propose an
alternative approach. We investigate whether it is possible
to design an automated test that is easy to pass once, but
difficult to pass a second time. Specifically, we design a
memory test. In our test, items are randomly associated with
colors ("Cars are green."). The user first observes all of
these associations, and is then asked to recall the colors
of the items ("Cars are...?"). The items are the same across
iterations of the test, but the colors are randomly redrawn
each time ("Cars are blue."). Therefore, a user who has
taken the test before will occasionally accidentally respond
with the association from the previous time that she took
the test ("Cars are...? Green!"). If there is significant
correlation between the user's answers and the correct
answers from a previous iteration of the test, then the
system can decide that the user is probably the same, and
refuse to grant another account. We present and analyze the
results of a small study with human subjects. We also give a
game-theoretic analysis. In the appendix, we propose an
alternative test and present the results of a small study
with human subjects for that test (however, the results for
that test are quite negative). © 2010 Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_5},
Key = {fds236274}
}
@article{fds236275,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Compilation complexity of common voting rules},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {915-920},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In computational social choice, one important problem is to
take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters),
and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs
to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the
summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the
subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives
wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation
complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize
the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by
Chevaleyre et al. [1JCA1-09]. We study three different types
of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre
et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on
the size of the complement (the voters outside the
subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the
complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The
third depends on both. We first investigate the relations
among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we
give upper and lower bounds on all three types of
compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules.
We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m/2), Borda, and
Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically
tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when
l > m/2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent
rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs
(including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet
consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise
elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds
for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a
multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate
and its complement are both larger than m 1+ε for some ε >
0. Copyright © 2010, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236275}
}
@article{fds236276,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and
paradoxes},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {921-926},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each
voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the
preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic.
This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect
information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We
first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding
the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting
game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient
if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We
show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the
time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results
are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of
Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and
any voting rule that satisfies non-imposition and with a low
domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n
voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked
somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every
voter's preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but
one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that
many common voting rules have a very low (- 1) domination
index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For
the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger
paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm,
we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome
of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters
vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules.
Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on
average, more voters prefer the backward-induction outcome.
Copyright © 2010, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236276}
}
@article{fds236277,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General
approach and case studies},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {1676-1679},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based
on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie
about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In
mechanism design, the goal is to design procedures
(mechanisms) for making the decision that work in spite of
such strategic behavior, usually by making untruthful
behavior suboptimal. In automated mechanism design, the idea
is to computationally search through the space of feasible
mechanisms, rather than to design them analytically by hand.
Unfortunately, the most straightforward approach to
automated mechanism de sign does not scale to large
instances, because it requires searching over a very large
space of possible functions. In this paper, we describe an
approach to automated mechanism design that is
computationally feasible. Instead of optimizing over all
feasible mechanisms, we carefully choose a parameterized
subfamily of mechanisms. Then we optimize over mechanisms
within this family, and analyze whether and to what extent
the resulting mechanism is suboptimal outside the subfamily.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach with two case
studies. Copyright © 2010, Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236277}
}
@article{fds236278,
Author = {Korzhyk, D and Conitzer, V and Parr, R},
Title = {Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in
security resource allocation games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {805-810},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Recently, algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions
have been deployed in real-world security applications, such
as the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los
Angeles International Airport. These algorithms assume that
the defender (security personnel) can commit to a mixed
strategy, a so-called Stackelberg model. As pointed out by
Kiek-intveld et al. (2009), in these applications,
generally, multiple resources need to be assigned to
multiple targets, resulting in an exponential number of pure
strategies for the defender. In this paper, we study how to
compute optimal Stackelberg strategies in such games,
showing that this can be done in polynomial time in some
cases, and is NP-hard in others. Copyright © 2010,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236278}
}
@article{fds236283,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Yokoo, M},
Title = {Using mechanism design to prevent false-name
manipulations},
Journal = {AI Magazine},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {65-77},
Publisher = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0738-4602},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315},
Abstract = {Mechanism design, which is based on game theory, concerns
the study of how to design mechanisms that result in good
outcomes even when the agents act strategically. The issue
of false-name manipulation can be addressed using techniques
from mechanism design. The difficulty of designing a good
false-name-proof voting rule should be apparent. One may
conjecture that votes are necessarily entirely meaningless
in this context, and that one might as well choose the
winning alternative randomly without regard to the votes. A
nontrivial false-name-proof mechanism called the Minimal
Bundle (MB) mechanism can be thought of as an improved
version of the Set mechanism. An auction mechanism consists
of an allocation rule and a payment rule. The assumption
that a manipulator can obtain an unlimited number of
identifiers at no cost is not realistic. A simple way of
addressing the issue of false-name manipulation is to verify
that all the identifiers correspond to real agents in the
real world.},
Doi = {10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315},
Key = {fds236283}
}
@article{fds236186,
Author = {Iwasaki, A and Conitzer, V and Omori, Y and Sakurai, Y and Todo, T and Guo,
M and Yokoo, M},
Title = {Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof
combinatorial auction mechanisms},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {633-640},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Hoek, WVD and Kaminka, GA and Lespérance, Y and Luck, M and Sen,
S},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781617387715},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/atal/aamas2010.html},
Abstract = {This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of
false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.
False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by
assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under
fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It
has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof
mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient
allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible,
we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves
the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed.
To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case
analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the
Pareto efficient surplus that, we obtain and try to maximize
this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of
false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the
first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of
false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the worst-case
efficiency ratio of any false-name-proof mechanism that
satisfies some apparently minor assumptions is at most 2/(m
+1) for auctions with m different goods. We also observe
that the worst-case efficiency ratio of existing
false-name-proof mechanisms is generally 1/m or 0. Finally,
we propose a novel mechanism, called the adaptive reserve
price mechanism that is falso-nanic-proof when all bidders
are single-minded. The worst-case efficiency ratio is 2/(m +
1), i.e., optimal. Copyright © 2010, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1145/1838206.1838289},
Key = {fds236186}
}
@article{fds236187,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V and Lang, J},
Title = {Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using
maximum likelihood estimators},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {399-406},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Hoek, WVD and Kaminka, GA and Lespérance, Y and Luck, M and Sen,
S},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781617387715},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/atal/aamas2010.html},
Abstract = {In this paper, we study a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) approach to voting when the set of alternatives has a
multi-issue structure, and the voters' preferences are
represented by CP-nets. We first consider general
multi-issue domains, and study whether and how
issue-by-issue voting rules and sequential voting rules can
be represented by MLEs. We first show that issue-by-issue
voting rules in which each local rule is itself an MLE
(resp. a candidate scoring rule) can be represented by MLEs
with a weak (resp. strong) decomposability property. Then,
we prove two theorems that state that if the noise model
satisfies a very weak decomposability property, then no
sequential voting rule that satisfies unanimity can be
represented by an MLE, unless the number of voters is
bounded. We then consider multi-issue domains in which each
issue is binary; for these, we propose a general family of
distance-based noise models, of which give an axiomatic
characterization. We then propose a more specific family of
natural distance-based noise models that are parameterized
by a threshold. We identify the complexity of winner
determination for the corresponding MLE voting rule in the
two most important subcases of this framework. Copyright ©
2010, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1145/1838206.1838262},
Key = {fds236187}
}
@article{fds236188,
Author = {Yin, Z and Korzhyk, D and Kiekintveld, C and Conitzer, V and Tambe,
M},
Title = {Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability,
equivalence, and uniqueness},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1139-1146},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Hoek, WVD and Kaminka, GA and Lespérance, Y and Luck, M and Sen,
S},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781617387715},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/atal/aamas2010.html},
Abstract = {There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic
approaches to security, with much of the recent research
focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game
model; for example, these games are at the heart of major
applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security
at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by
the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational
assumption for using Stackelberg games is that security
forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized
strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their
best response after surveillance of this randomized
strategy. Yet, in many situations, the followers may act
without observation of the leader's strategy, essentially
converting the game into a simultaneous-move game model.
Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute
her strategy given this fundamental uncertainty about the
type of game faced. Focusing on the complex games that are
directly inspired by real-world security applications, the
paper provides four contributions in the context of a
general class of security games. First, exploiting the
structure of these security games, the paper shows that the
Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus
alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second,
resolving the leader's dilemma, it shows that under a
natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg
strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and
furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of real-world
security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when
faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many
of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, our experimental
results emphasize positive properties of games that do not
fit our restrictions. Our contributions have major
implications for the real-world applications. Copyright ©
2010, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1145/1838206.1838360},
Key = {fds236188}
}
@article{fds236191,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two
agents without payments or priors},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {881-888},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Hoek, WVD and Kaminka, GA and Lespérance, Y and Luck, M and Sen,
S},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781617387715},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/atal/aamas2010.html},
Abstract = {We investigate the problem of allocating items (private
goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both
prior-free and payment-free. Specificall, we focus on
allocating multiple heterogeneous items between two agents
with additive valuation functions. Our objective is to
design strategy-proof mechanisms that are competitive
against the most efficien (first-best allocation. We
introduce the family of linear increasing-price (LIP)
mechanisms. The LIP mechanisms are strategy-proof,
prior-free, and payment-free, and they are exactly the
increasing-price mechanisms satisfying a strong
responsiveness property. We show how to solve for
competitive mechanisms within the LIP family. For the case
of two items, we fin a LIP mechanism whose competitive ratio
is near optimal (the achieved competitive ratio is 0.828,
while any strategy-proof mechanism is at most
0.841-competitive). As the number of items goes to infinit,
we prove a negative result that any increasing-price
mechanism (linear or nonlinear) has a maximal competitive
ratio of 0.5. Our results imply that in some cases, it is
possible to design good allocation mechanisms without
payments and without priors. Copyright © 2010,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1145/1838206.1838324},
Key = {fds236191}
}
@article{fds236271,
Author = {Bhattacharya, S and Conitzer, V and Munagala, K and Xia,
L},
Title = {Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit
auctions},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms},
Pages = {554-572},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780898717013},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075.47},
Abstract = {In this paper, we consider the problem of designing
incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous)
units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and
private budget constraints. When only the valuations are
private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al [8] show
that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique
incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality.
They further show that this auction is not truthful with
private budgets, so that there is no deterministic
Pareto-optimal auction with private budgets. Our main
contribution is to show the following Budget Monotonicity
property of this auction: When there is only one infinitely
divisible good, a bidder cannot improve her utility by
reporting a budget smaller than the truth. This implies that
the adaptive clinching auction is incentive compatible when
over-reporting the budget is not possible (for instance,
when funds must be shown upfront). We can also make
reporting larger budgets suboptimal with a small randomized
modification to the auction. In either case, this makes the
modified auction Pareto-optimal with private budgets. We
also show that the Budget Monotonicity property does not
hold for auctioning indivisible units of the good, showing a
sharp contrast between the divisible and indivisible cases.
The Budget Monotonicity property also implies other improved
results in this context. For revenue maximization, the same
auction improves the best-known competitive ratio due to
Abrams [1] by a factor of 4, and asymptotically approaches
the performance of the optimal single-price auction.
Finally, we consider the problem of revenue maximization (or
social welfare) in a Bayesian setting. We allow the bidders
have public size constraints (on the amount of good they are
willing to buy) in addition to private budget constraints.
We show a simple poly-time computable 5.83-approximation to
the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, that is
implementable in dominant strategies. Our technique again
crucially needs the ability to prevent bidders from
over-reporting budgets via randomization. We show the
approximation result via designing a rounding scheme for an
LP relaxation of the problem, which may be of independent
interest. Copyright © by SIAM.},
Doi = {10.1137/1.9781611973075.47},
Key = {fds236271}
}
@article{fds375202,
Author = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, JF and Zwicker, WS},
Title = {Computational Foundations of Social Choice - Dagstuhl
Seminar -},
Journal = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
Volume = {10101},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This seminar addressed some of the key issues in
computational social choice, a novel interdisciplinary eld
of study at the interface of social choice theory and
computer science. Computational social choice is concerned
with the application of computational techniques to the
study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting rules and
fair division protocols, as well as with the integration of
social choice paradigms into computing. The seminar brought
together many of the most active researchers in the eld and
focussed the research community currently forming around
these important and exciting topics.},
Key = {fds375202}
}
@article{fds325616,
Title = {Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. -
12.03.2010},
Journal = {Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
Volume = {10101},
Publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
Germany},
Editor = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, J-F and Zwicker, WS},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds325616}
}
@article{fds325617,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal.},
Journal = {AAMAS},
Pages = {1475-1476},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Hoek, WVD and Kaminka, GA and Lespérance, Y and Luck, M and Sen,
S},
Year = {2010},
ISBN = {978-0-9826571-1-9},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1838206.1838439},
Doi = {10.1145/1838206.1838439},
Key = {fds325617}
}
@article{fds325618,
Author = {Bhattacharya, S and Conitzer, V and Munagala, K and Xia,
L},
Title = {Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit
Auctions.},
Journal = {SODA},
Pages = {554-572},
Publisher = {SIAM},
Editor = {Charikar, M},
Year = {2010},
ISBN = {978-0-89871-701-3},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075.47},
Doi = {10.1137/1.9781611973075.47},
Key = {fds325618}
}
@article{fds325614,
Author = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, J-F and Zwicker, WS},
Title = {10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of
Social Choice.},
Journal = {Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
Volume = {10101},
Publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
Germany},
Editor = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, J-F and Zwicker, WS},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds325614}
}
@article{fds325615,
Author = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, J-F and Zwicker, WS},
Title = {10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of
Social Choice.},
Journal = {Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
Volume = {10101},
Publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
Germany},
Editor = {Brandt, F and Conitzer, V and Hemaspaandra, LA and Laslier, J-F and Zwicker, WS},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds325615}
}
@article{fds236257,
Author = {Letchford, J and Conitzer, V and Munagala, K},
Title = {Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit
to},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5814 LNCS},
Pages = {250-262},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9783642046445},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23},
Abstract = {Computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in general
two-player Bayesian games (not to be confused with
Stackelberg strategies in routing games) is a topic that has
recently been gaining attention, due to their application in
various security and law enforcement scenarios. Earlier
results consider the computation of optimal Stackelberg
strategies, given that all the payoffs and the prior
distribution over types are known. We extend these results
in two different ways. First, we consider learning optimal
Stackelberg strategies. Our results here are mostly
positive. Second, we consider computing approximately
optimal Stackelberg strategies. Our results here are mostly
negative. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23},
Key = {fds236257}
}
@article{fds236258,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V and Reeves, DM},
Title = {Competitive repeated allocation without payments},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5929 LNCS},
Pages = {244-255},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_23},
Abstract = {We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly
among multiple competing agents, in an environment where
monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash)
incentive compatible mechanisms that do not rely on
payments, with the goal of maximizing expected social
welfare. We first focus on the case of two agents. We
introduce an artificial payment system, which enables us to
construct repeated allocation mechanisms without payments
based on one-shot allocation mechanisms with payments. Under
certain restrictions on the discount factor, we propose
several repeated allocation mechanisms based on artificial
payments. For the simple model in which the agents'
valuations are either high or low, the mechanism we propose
is 0.94-competitive against the optimal allocation mechanism
with payments. For the general case of any prior
distribution, the mechanism we propose is 0.85-competitive.
We generalize the mechanism to cases of three or more
agents. For any number of agents, the mechanism we obtain is
at least 0.75-competitive. The obtained competitive ratios
imply that for repeated allocation, artificial payments may
be used to replace real monetary payments, without incurring
too much loss in social welfare. © 2009 Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_23},
Key = {fds236258}
}
@article{fds236259,
Author = {Ohta, N and Sato, Y and Iwasaki, A and Yokoo, M and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally
efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open
anonymous environment},
Journal = {Computer Software},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {181-196},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0289-6540},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is an important capability for automated
negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for
coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be
answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be
distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of
solution concepts for this. However, recent research has
revealed that these traditional solution concepts are
vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous
environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous
work has developed a solution concept called the
anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such
manipulations. That work also developed a method for
compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However,
the required computational and representational costs are
still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept
which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show
that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by
certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is
uniquely determined. The computational and representational
costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically
smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution
concepts.},
Key = {fds236259}
}
@article{fds236260,
Author = {Shi, P and Conitzer, V and Guo, M},
Title = {Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable
actions},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5929 LNCS},
Pages = {89-100},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_10},
Abstract = {A potential downside of prediction markets is that they may
incentivize agents to take undesirable actions in the real
world. For example, a prediction market for whether a
terrorist attack will happen may incentivize terrorism, and
an in-house prediction market for whether a product will be
successfully released may incentivize sabotage. In this
paper, we study principal-aligned prediction
mechanisms-mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable
actions. We characterize all principal-aligned proper
scoring rules, and we show an "overpayment" result, which
roughly states that with n agents, any prediction mechanism
that is principal-aligned will, in the worst case, require
the principal to pay Θ(n) times as much as a mechanism that
is not. We extend our model to allow uncertainties about the
principal's utility and restrictions on agents' actions,
showing a richer characterization and a similar
"overpayment" result. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_10},
Key = {fds236260}
}
@article{fds236261,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Approximation guarantees for fictitious play},
Journal = {2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009},
Pages = {636-643},
Publisher = {IEEE},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394918},
Abstract = {Fictitious play is a simple, well-known, and often-used
algorithm for playing (and, especially, learning to play)
games. However, in general it does not converge to
equilibrium; even when it does, we may not be able to run it
to convergence. Still, we may obtain an approximate
equilibrium. In this paper, we study the approximation
properties that fictitious play obtains when it is run for a
limited number of rounds. We show that if both players
randomize uniformly over their actions in the first r rounds
of fictitious play, then the result is an ∈-equilibrium,
where ∈ = (r + 1)/(2r). (Since we are examining only a
constant number of pure strategies, we know that ∈ < 1/2
is impossible, due to a result of Feder et al.) We show that
this bound is tight in the worst case; however, with an
experiment on random games, we illustrate that fictitious
play usually obtains a much better approximation. We then
consider the possibility that the players fail to choose the
same r. We show how to obtain the optimal approximation
guarantee when both the opponent's r and the game are
adversarially chosen (but there is an upper bound R on the
opponent's r), using a linear program formulation. We show
that if the action played in the ith round of fictitious
play is chosen with probability proportional to: 1 for i = 1
and 1/(i-1) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ R+1, this gives an
approximation guarantee of 1-1/(2+lnR). We also obtain a
lower bound of 1 - 4/ ln R. This provides an actionable
prescription for how long to run fictitious play. ©2009
IEEE.},
Doi = {10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394918},
Key = {fds236261}
}
@article{fds236262,
Author = {Harrenstein, BP and De Weerdt and MM and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {A qualitative Vickrey auction},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {197-206},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566403},
Abstract = {Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that
their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows
for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. These results, however, are
limited to settings where there is some commonly desired
commodity or numeraire - money, shells, beads, etcetera -
which is commensurable with utility. We propose a
generalization of the Vickrey auction that does not assume
that the agents' preferences are quasilinear, but
nevertheless retains some of the Vickrey auction's desirable
properties. In this auction, a bid can be any alternative,
rather than just a monetary offer. As a consequence, the
auction is also applicable to situations where there is a
fixed budget, or no numeraire is available at all (or it is
undesirable to use payments for other reasons) - such as,
for example, in the allocation of the task of contributing a
module to an open-source project. We show that in two
general settings, this qualitative Vickrey auction has a
dominant-strategy equilibrium, invariably yields a weakly
Pareto efficient outcome in this equilibrium, and is
individually rational. In the first setting, the center has
a linear preference order over a finite set of alternatives,
and in the second setting, the bidders' preferences can be
represented by continuous utility functions over a closed
metric space of alternatives and the center's utility is
equipeaked. The traditional Vickrey auction turns out to be
a special case of the qualitative Vickrey auction in this
second setting. Copyright 2009 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1566374.1566403},
Key = {fds236262}
}
@article{fds325619,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-1},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1980522.1980532},
Abstract = {<jats:p> Solutions should be sent to the editor at
conitzer@cs.duke.edu with subject header <jats:bold>SIGecom
Exchanges Puzzle</jats:bold> . The author(s) of the most
elegant solution (as judged by the editor) will be allowed
to publish his or her or their proof in the next issue of
the Exchanges (ties broken towards earlier submissions). To
make the solution accessible to a wide audience, try to
minimize technical jargon in the proof. The editor will not
give any feedback on submitted solutions and ignore any
requests for hints, <jats:italic>etc</jats:italic> .
</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1145/1980522.1980532},
Key = {fds325619}
}
@article{fds313247,
Author = {Farfel, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction
market},
Journal = {Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences,
Social-Informatics and Telecommunications
Engineering},
Volume = {14 LNICST},
Pages = {61-73},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9783642038204},
ISSN = {1867-8211},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_10},
Abstract = {We present Turing Trade, a web-based game that is a hybrid
of a Turing test and a prediction market. In this game,
there is a mystery conversation partner, the "target," who
is trying to appear human, but may in reality be either a
human or a bot. There are multiple judges (or "bettors"),
who interrogate the target in order to assess whether it is
a human or a bot. Throughout the interrogation, each bettor
bets on the nature of the target by buying or selling human
(or bot) securities, which pay out if the target is a human
(bot). The resulting market price represents the bettors'
aggregate belief that the target is a human. This game
offers multiple advantages over standard variants of the
Turing test. Most significantly, our game gathers much more
fine-grained data, since we obtain not only the judges'
final assessment of the target's humanity, but rather the
entire progression of their aggregate belief over time. This
gives us the precise moments in conversations where the
target's response caused a significant shift in the
aggregate belief, indicating that the response was decidedly
human or unhuman. An additional benefit is that (we believe)
the game is more enjoyable to participants than a standard
Turing test. This is important because otherwise, we will
fail to collect significant amounts of data. In this paper,
we describe in detail how Turing Trade works, exhibit some
example logs, and analyze how well Turing Trade functions as
a prediction market by studying the calibration and
sharpness of its forecasts (from real user data). © 2009
ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and
Telecommunications Engineering.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_10},
Key = {fds313247}
}
@article{fds236256,
Author = {Ohta, N and Conitzer, V and Ichimura, R and Sakurai, Y and Iwasaki, A and Yokoo, M},
Title = {Coalition structure generation utilizing compact
characteristic function representations},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5732 LNCS},
Pages = {623-638},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04244-7_49},
Abstract = {This paper presents a new way of formalizing the Coalition
Structure Generation problem (CSG), so that we can apply
constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective
coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and
multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of
agents into coalitions so that social surplus is maximized.
Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box
function called a characteristic function, which takes a
coalition as an input and returns the value of the
coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization
techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However,
characteristic functions that appear in practice often can
be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than a
single black-box function. Then, we can solve the CSG
problem more efficiently by applying constraint optimization
techniques to the compact representation directly. We
present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing
recently developed compact representation schemes for
characteristic functions. We first characterize the
complexity of the CSG under these representation schemes. In
this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of
rules rather than by the number of agents. Furthermore, as
an initial step towards developing efficient constraint
optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we
develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that
an off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably
well, i.e., it can solve instances with a few hundred
agents, while the state-of-the-art algorithm (which does not
make use of compact representations) can solve instances
with up to 27 agents. © 2009 Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-04244-7_49},
Key = {fds236256}
}
@article{fds236270,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in
multi-unit auctions},
Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-98},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0899-8256},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007},
Abstract = {For allocation problems with one or more items, the
well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (aka Clarke
mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction) is efficient,
strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a
deficit. However, it is not (strongly) budget balanced:
generally, the agents' payments will sum to more than 0. We
study mechanisms that redistribute some of the VCG payments
back to the agents, while maintaining the desirable
properties of the VCG mechanism. Our objective is to come as
close to budget balance as possible in the worst case. For
auctions with multiple indistinguishable units in which
marginal values are nonincreasing, we derive a mechanism
that is optimal in this sense. We also derive an optimal
mechanism for the case where we drop the non-deficit
requirement. Finally, we show that if marginal values are
not required to be nonincreasing, then the original VCG
mechanism is worst-case optimal. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007},
Key = {fds236270}
}
@article{fds325372,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Taylor, CR and Wagman, L},
Title = {Who Benefits from Online Privacy?},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds325372}
}
@article{fds325620,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-1},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1598780.1598792},
Doi = {10.1145/1598780.1598792},
Key = {fds325620}
}
@article{fds236171,
Author = {Farfel, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A multiagent turing test based on a prediction
market},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1435-1436},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Key = {fds236171}
}
@article{fds236255,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison
queries},
Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
Volume = {35},
Pages = {161-191},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1076-9757},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2606},
Abstract = {Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences
of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible
alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of
thealternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is
produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is
impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete
preferences.Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least the
relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited.This is done by
asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of simple
queries about their preferences, such as comparison queries,
which ask an agent to compare two of the alternatives. Prior
work on preference elicitation in voting has focused on the
case of unrestricted preferences. It has been shown that in
this setting, it is sometimes necessary to ask each agent
(almost) as many queries as would be required to determine
an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives. In contrast, in
this paper, we focus on single-peaked preferences.We show
that such preferences can be elicited using only a linear
number of comparison queries, if either the order with
respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known, or
at least one other agent's complete preferences are known.
We show that using a sublinear number of queries does not
suffice. We also consider the case of cardinally
single-peaked preferences. For this case, we show that if
the alternatives' cardinal positions are known, then an
agent's preferences can be elicited using only a logarithmic
number of queries; however, we also show that if the
cardinal positions are not known, then a sublinear number of
queries does not suffice. We present experimental results
for all elicitation algorithms. We also consider the problem
of only eliciting enough information to determine the
aggregate ranking, and show that even for this more modest
objective, a sublinear number of queries per agent does not
suffice for known ordinal or unknown cardinal positions.
Finally, we discuss whether and how these techniques can be
applied when preferences are almost single-peaked. ©2009 AI
Access Foundation.},
Doi = {10.1613/jair.2606},
Key = {fds236255}
}
@article{fds236263,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Lang, J and Xia, L},
Title = {How hard is it to control sequential elections via the
agenda?},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {103-108},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {Voting on multiple related issues is an important and
difficult problem. The key difficulty is that the number of
alternatives is exponential in the number of issues, and
hence it is infeasible for the agents to rank all the
alternatives. A simple approach is to vote on the issues one
at a time, in sequence; however, a drawback is that the
outcome may depend on the order in which the issues are
voted upon and decided, which gives the chairperson some
control over the outcome of the election because she can
strategically determine the order. While this is undeniably
a negative feature of sequential voting, in this paper we
temper this judgment by showing that the chairperson's
control problem is, in most cases, computationally
hard.},
Key = {fds236263}
}
@article{fds236264,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Rognlie, M and Xia, L},
Title = {Preference functions that score rankings and maximum
likelihood estimation},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {109-115},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {In social choice, a preference function (PF) takes a set of
votes (linear orders over a set of alternatives) as input,
and produces one or more rankings (also linear orders over
the alternatives) as output. Such functions have many
applications, for example, aggregating the preferences of
multiple agents, or merging rankings (of, say, webpages)
into a single ranking. The key issue is choosing a PF to
use. One natural and previously studied approach is to
assume that there is an unobserved "correct" ranking, and
the votes are noisy estimates of this. Then, we can use the
PF that always chooses the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
of the correct ranking. In this paper, we define simple
ranking scoring functions (SRSFs) and show that the class of
neutral SRSFs is exactly the class of neutral PFs that are
MLEs for some noise model. We also define composite ranking
scoring functions (CRSFs) and show a condition under which
these coincide with SRSFs. We study key properties such as
consistency and continuity, and consider some example PFs.
In particular, we study Single Transferable Vote (STV), a
commonly used PF, showing that it is a CRSF but not an SRSF,
thereby clarifying the extent to which it is an MLE
function. This also gives a new perspective on how ties
should be broken under STV. We leave some open
questions.},
Key = {fds236264}
}
@article{fds236265,
Author = {Halvorson, E and Conitzer, V and Parr, R},
Title = {Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {159-166},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {We study a multi-step hider-seeker game where the hider is
moving on a graph and, in each step, the seeker is able to
search c subsets of the graph nodes. We model this game as a
zero-sum Bayesian game, which can be solved in weakly
polynomial time in the players' action spaces. The seeker's
action space is exponential in c, and both players' action
spaces are exponential in the game horizon. To manage this
intractability, we use a column/constraint generation
approach for both players. This approach requires an oracle
to determine best responses for each player. However, we
show that computing a best response for the seeker is
NP-hard, even for a single-step game when c is part of the
input, and that computing a best response is NP-hard for
both players for the multi-step game, even if c = 1. An
integer programming formulation of the best response for the
hider is practical for moderate horizons, but computing an
exact seeker best response is impractical due to the
exponential dependence on both c and the horizon. We
therefore develop an approximate best response oracle with
bounded suboptimality for the seeker. We prove performance
bounds on the strategy that results when column/constraint
generation with approximate best responses converges, and we
measure the performance of our algorithm in simulations. In
our experimental results, column/constraint generation
converges to near-minimax strategies for both players fairly
quickly.},
Key = {fds236265}
}
@article{fds236266,
Author = {Xia, L and Zuckerman, M and Procaccia, AD and Conitzer, V and Rosenschein, JS},
Title = {Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some
common voting rules},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {348-353},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {Understanding the computational complexity of manipulation
in elections is arguably the most central agenda in
Computational Social Choice. One of the influential
variations of the the problem involves a coalition of
manipulators trying to make a favorite candidate win the
election. Although the complexity of the problem is
well-studied under the assumption that the voters are
weighted, there were very few successful attempts to abandon
this strong assumption. In this paper, we study the
complexity of the unweighted coalitional manipulation
problem (UCM) under several prominent voting rules. Our main
result is that UCM is NP-complete under the maximin rule;
this resolves an enigmatic open question. We then show that
UCM is NP-complete under the ranked pairs rule, even with
respect to a single manipulator. Furthermore, we provide an
extreme hardness-of-approximation result for an optimization
version of UCM under ranked pairs. Finally, we show that UCM
under the Bucklin rule is in P.},
Key = {fds236266}
}
@article{fds236267,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game
theory},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2009},
Pages = {101-108},
Publisher = {AUAI Press},
Editor = {Bilmes, JA and Ng, AY},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from
multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities
for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes
agents to reveal their information truthfully; such
incentive compatibility considerations are commonly studied
in mechanism design. While this relation between prediction
markets and mechanism design is well understood at a high
level, the models used in prediction markets tend to be
somewhat different from those used in mechanism design. This
paper considers a model for prediction markets that fits
more straightforwardly into the mechanism design framework.
We consider a number of mechanisms within this model, all
based on proper scoring rules. We discuss basic properties
of these mechanisms, such as incentive compatibility. We
also draw connections between some of these mechanisms and
cooperative game theory. Finally, we speculate how one might
build a practical prediction market based on some of these
ideas.},
Key = {fds236267}
}
@article{fds236268,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring
rules},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {336-341},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1045-0823},
Abstract = {An important problem in computational social choice concerns
whether it is possible to prevent manipulation of voting
rules by making it computationally intractable. To answer
this, a key question is how frequently voting rules are
manipulable. We [Xia and Conitzer, 2008] recently defined
the class of generalized scoring rules (GSRs) and
characterized the frequency of manipulability for such
rules. We showed, by examples, that most common rules seem
to fall into this class. However, no natural axiomatic
characterization of the class was given, leaving the
possibility that there are natural rules to which these
results do not apply. In this paper, we characterize the
class of GSRs based on two natural properties: it is equal
to the class of rules that are anonymous and finitely
locally consistent. Generalized scoring rules also have
other uses in computational social choice. For these uses,
the order of the GSR (the dimension of its score vector) is
important. Our characterization result implies that the
order of a GSR is related to the minimum number of locally
consistent components of the rule. We proceed to bound the
minimum number of locally consistent components for some
common rules.},
Key = {fds236268}
}
@article{fds236269,
Author = {Anand, SS and Bunescu, R and Carvcdho, V and Chomicki, J and Conitzer,
V and Cox, MT and Dignum, V and Dodds, Z and Dredze, M and Furcy, D and Gabrilovich, E and Göker, MH and Guesgen, H and Hirsh, H and Jannach,
D and Junker, U and Ketter, W and Kobsa, A and Koenig, S and Lau, T and Lewis,
L and Matson, E and Metzler, T and Mihalcea, R and Mobasher, B and Pineau,
J and Poupart, P and Raja, A and Ruml, W and Sadeh, N and Shani, G and Shapiro, D and Smith, T and Taylor, ME and Wagstaff, K and Walsh, W and Zhou, R},
Title = {AAAI 2008 workshop reports},
Journal = {AI Magazine},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {108-118},
Publisher = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0738-4602},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2196},
Abstract = {AAAI was pleased to present the AAAI-08 Workshop Program,
held Sunday and Monday, July 13-14, in Chicago, Illinois,
USA. The program included the following 15 workshops:
Advancements in POMDP Solvers; AI Education Workshop
Colloquium; Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and
Norms in Agent Systems, Enhanced Messaging; Human
Implications of Human-Robot Interaction; Intelligent
Techniques for Web Personalization and Recommender Systems;
Metareasoning: Thinking about Thinking; Multidisciplinary
Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling; Search in
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics; Spatial and Temporal
Reasoning; Trading Agent Design and Analysis; Transfer
Learning for Complex Tasks; What Went Wrong and Why: Lessons
from AI Research and Applications; and Wikipedia and
Artificial Intelligence: An Evolving Synergy. Copyright ©
2009, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2196},
Key = {fds236269}
}
@article{fds325375,
Author = {Sosa, JA and Romero, P},
Title = {Editorial Introductions},
Journal = {Current Opinion in Oncology},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1345037.1345038},
Doi = {10.1145/1345037.1345038},
Key = {fds325375}
}
@article{fds325621,
Author = {Farfel, J and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction
market.},
Journal = {AAMAS (2)},
Pages = {1407-1408},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Sierra, C and Castelfranchi, C and Decker, KS and Sichman,
JS},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {978-0-9817381-7-8},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1558109.1558318},
Doi = {10.1145/1558109.1558318},
Key = {fds325621}
}
@article{fds340691,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game
Theory.},
Journal = {UAI},
Pages = {101-108},
Publisher = {AUAI Press},
Editor = {Bilmes, JA and Ng, AY},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds340691}
}
@article{fds236243,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly
voting},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {190-195},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {One way for agents to reach a joint decision is to vote over
the alternatives. In open, anonymous settings such as the
Internet, an agent can vote more than once without being
detected. A voting rule is false-name-proof if no agent ever
benefits from casting additional votes. Previous work has
shown that all false-name-proof voting rules are
unresponsive to agents' preferences. However, that work
implicitly assumes that casting additional votes is
costless. In this paper, we consider what happens if there
is a cost to casting additional votes. We characterize the
optimal (most responsive) false-name-proof-with-costs voting
rule for 2 alternatives. In sharp contrast to the costless
setting, we prove that as the voting population grows
larger, the probability that this rule selects the majority
winner converges to 1. We also characterize the optimal
group false-name-proof rule for 2 alternatives, which is
robust to coalitions of agents sharing the costs of
additional votes. Unfortunately, the probability that this
rule chooses the majority winner as the voting population
grows larger is relatively low. We derive an analogous rule
in a setting with 3 alternatives, and provide bounding
results and computational approaches for settings with 4 or
more alternatives. Copyright © 2008, Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All
rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236243}
}
@article{fds236241,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Determining possible and necessary winners under common
voting rules given partial orders},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {196-201},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to
give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some
cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order
over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let
agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a profile
of partial orders and a candidate c, two important questions
arise: first, is c guaranteed to win, and second, is it
still possible for c to win? These are the necessary winner
and possible winner problems, respectively. We consider the
setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and
the votes are unweighted. We prove that for Copeland,
maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the possible winner
problem is NP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition
on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be
NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition). We also prove
that for Copeland and ranked pairs, the necessary winner
problem is co NP-complete. All the hardness results hold
even when the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is
no more than a constant. We also present polynomial-time
algorithms for the necessary winner problem for scoring
rules, maximin, and Bucklin. Copyright © 2008, Association
for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236241}
}
@article{fds236242,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V and Lang, J},
Title = {Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential
dependencies},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {202-207},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on
multiple attributes at the same time, so that there are
exponentially many alternatives; In this case, it is
unrealistic to ask agents to communicate a full ranking of
all the alternatives. To address this, earlier work has
proposed decomposing such voting processes by using local
voting rules on the individual attributes. Unfortunately,
the existing methods work only with rather severe domain
restrictions, as they require the voters' preferences to
extend acyclic CP-nets compatible with a common order on the
attributes. We first show that this requirement is very
restrictive, by proving that the number of linear orders
extending an acyclic CP-net is exponentially smaller than
the number of all linear orders. Then, we introduce a very
general methodology that allows us to aggregate preferences
when voters express CP-nets that can be cyclic. There does
not need to be any common structure among the submitted
CP-nets. Our methodology generalizes the earlier, more
restrictive methodology. We study whether properties of the
local rules transfer to the global rule, and vice versa. We
also address how to compute the winning alternatives.
Copyright © 2008, Association for the Advancement of
Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236242}
}
@article{fds236244,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial
auctions and voting},
Journal = {10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2008},
Pages = {10P},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {In a combinatorial auction, a set of resources is for sale,
and agents can bid on subsets of these resources. In a
voting setting, the agents decide among a set of
alternatives by having each agent rank all the alternatives.
Many of the key research issues in these two domains are
similar. The aim of this paper is to give a convenient
side-by-side comparison that will clarify the relation
between the domains, and serve as a guide to future
research. © 2007, authors listed above. All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236244}
}
@article{fds236245,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional
manipulability},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {109-118},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386811},
Abstract = {We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized
scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a
vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is
based only on the sum of these vectors - more specifically,
only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's
components. This class is extremely general: we do not know
of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized
scoring rule. We then study the coalitional manipulation
problem for generalized scoring rules. We prove that under
certain natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators
is O(np) (for any p < 1/2), then the probability that a
random profile is manipulable is O(np-1/2), where n is the
number of voters. We also prove that under another set of
natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is Ω(np)
(for any p > 1/2) and o(n), then the probability that a
random profile is manipulable (to any possible winner under
the voting rule) is 1 - O(e -Ω(n2p-1)). We also show that
common voting rules satisfy these conditions (for the
uniform distribution). These results generalize earlier
results by Procaccia and Rosenschein as well as even earlier
results on the probability of an election being tied.
Copyright 2008 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1386790.1386811},
Key = {fds236245}
}
@article{fds236246,
Author = {Xia, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently
manipulable},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {99-108},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386810},
Abstract = {The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in
unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is
manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this
theorem was proved by Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, and Noam
Nisan: when the number of alternatives is three, for any
neutral voting rule that is far from any dictatorship, there
exists a voter such that a random manipulation - -that is,
the true preferences and the strategic vote are all drawn
i.i.d., uniformly at random - -will succeed with a
probability of Ω(1/n), where n is the number of voters.
However, it seems that the techniques used to prove this
theorem can not be fully extended to more than three
alternatives. In this paper, we give a more limited result
that does apply to four or more alternatives. We give a
sufficient condition for a voting rule to be randomly
manipulable with a probability of Ω(1/n) for at least one
voter, when the number of alternatives is held fixed.
Specifically, our theorem states that if a voting rule r
satisfies 1. homogeneity, 2. anonymity, 3. non-imposition,
4. a canceling-out condition, and 5. there exists a stable
profile that is still stable after one given alternative is
uniformly moved to different positions; then there exists a
voter such that a random manipulation for that voter will
succeed with a probability of Ω(1/n). We show that many
common voting rules satisfy these conditions, for example
any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, maximin, and
ranked pairs. Copyright 2008 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1386790.1386810},
Key = {fds236246}
}
@article{fds236247,
Author = {Apt, K and Conitzer, V and Guo, M and Markakis, E},
Title = {Welfare undominated groves mechanisms},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5385 LNCS},
Pages = {426-437},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Editor = {Papadimitriou, CH and Zhang, S},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {978-3-540-92184-4},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48},
Abstract = {A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the
outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that
maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without
introducing incentives for agents to misreport their
preferences. The class of Groves mechanisms achieves this;
however, these mechanisms require the agents to make
payments, thereby reducing the agents' total welfare. In
this paper we introduce a measure for comparing two
mechanisms with respect to the final welfare they generate.
This measure induces a partial order on mechanisms and we
study the question of finding minimal elements with respect
to this partial order. In particular, we say a non-deficit
Groves mechanism is welfare undominated if there exists no
other non-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller
or equal sum of payments. We focus on two domains: (i)
auctions with multiple identical units and unit-demand
bidders, and (ii) mechanisms for public project problems. In
the first domain we analytically characterize all welfare
undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and have
linear payment functions, by showing that the family of
optimal-in-expectation linear redistribution mechanisms,
which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo
mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of welfare
undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear
in the setting we study. In the second domain we show that
the classic VCG (Clarke) mechanism is welfare undominated
for the class of public project problems with equal
participation costs, but is not undominated for a more
general class. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48},
Key = {fds236247}
}
@article{fds236248,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Anonymity-proof voting rules},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5385 LNCS},
Pages = {295-306},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_36},
Abstract = {A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of
total orders (aka. votes) over a fixed set of alternatives
to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A
voting rule f is false-name-proof if no voter ever benefits
from casting more than one vote. It is anonymity-proof if it
satisfies voluntary participation and it is
false-name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof
neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rules of the
following form. With some probability k f ∈ ∈[0,1], the
rule chooses an alternative uniformly at random. With
probability 1∈-∈k f, the rule first draws a pair of
alternatives uniformly at random. If every vote prefers the
same alternative between the two (and there is at least one
vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise,
the rule flips a fair coin to decide between the two
alternatives. We also show how the characterization changes
if group strategy-proofness is added as a requirement. ©
2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_36},
Key = {fds236248}
}
@article{fds236249,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in
multi-unit auctions with unit demand},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {210-219},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386825},
Abstract = {For the problem of allocating one or more items among a
group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG
mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value
flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG
payments, which reduces the agents' utilities. In many
settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the
agents' utilities (taking payments into account). For this
purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been
proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG
payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains
strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property.
Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution
mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of
the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for
the agents, even though the items are allocated efficiently.
In this paper, we study strategy-proof allocation mechanisms
that do not always allocate the items efficiently. It turns
out that by allocating inefficiently, more payment can
sometimes be redistributed, so that the net effect is an
increase in the sum of the agents' utilities. Our objective
is to design mechanisms that are competitive with the
omnipotent perfect allocation in terms of the agents' total
utility. We define linear allocation mechanisms. We propose
an optimization model for simultaneously finding an
allocation mechanism and a payment redistribution rule which
together are optimal, given that the allocation mechanism is
required to be either one of, or a mixture of, a finite set
of specified linear allocation mechanisms. Finally, we
propose several specific (linear) mechanisms that are based
on burning items, excluding agents, and (most generally)
partitioning the items and agents into groups. We show or
conjecture that these mechanisms are optimal among various
classes of mechanisms. Copyright 2008 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1386790.1386825},
Key = {fds236249}
}
@article{fds236250,
Author = {Chomicki, J and Conitzer, V and Junkar, U and Pern,
P},
Title = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report: Preface},
Journal = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report},
Volume = {WS-08-09},
Pages = {vii},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds236250}
}
@article{fds236251,
Author = {Letchford, J and Conitzer, V and Jain, K},
Title = {An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player
perfect-information games},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {5385 LNCS},
Pages = {696-707},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_75},
Abstract = {The standard solution concept for perfect-information
extensive form games is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
However, humans do not always play according to a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, especially in games where it is
possible for all the players to obtain much higher payoffs
if they place some trust in each other (and this trust is
not violated). In this paper, we introduce a new solution
concept for two-player perfect-information games that
attempts to model this type of trusting behavior (together
with the "ethical" behavior of not violating that trust).
The concept takes subgame perfect equilibrium as a starting
point, but then repeatedly resolves the game based on the
players being able to trust each other. We give two distinct
algorithmic definitions of the concept and show that they
are equivalent. Finally, we give a fast implementation of
one of the algorithms for solving the game, and show that it
runs in time O(nlogn∈+∈nhlog(n/h)). © 2008 Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_75},
Key = {fds236251}
}
@article{fds236252,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Metareasoning as a formal computational problem},
Journal = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report},
Volume = {WS-08-07},
Pages = {29-33},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Metareasoning research often lays out high-level principles,
which are then applied in the context of larger systems.
While this approach has proven quite successful, it
sometimes obscures how metareasoning can be seen as a crisp
computational problem in its own right. This alternative
view allows us to apply tools from the theory of algorithms
and computational complexity to metareasoning. In this
paper, we consider some known results on how variants of the
metareasoning problem can be precisely formalized as
computational problems, and shown to be computationally hard
to solve to optimality. We discuss a variety of techniques
for addressing these hardness results. Copyright © 2008,
Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence.},
Key = {fds236252}
}
@article{fds325622,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-1},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1486877.1486889},
Doi = {10.1145/1486877.1486889},
Key = {fds325622}
}
@article{fds236254,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {New complexity results about Nash equilibria},
Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
Volume = {63},
Number = {2},
Pages = {621-641},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0899-8256},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015},
Abstract = {We provide a single reduction that demonstrates that in
normal-form games: (1) it is NP-complete to determine
whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties
exist (these results are similar to those obtained by Gilboa
and Zemel [Gilboa, I., Zemel, E., 1989. Nash and correlated
equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games Econ.
Behav. 1, 80-93]), (2) more significantly, the problems of
maximizing certain properties of a Nash equilibrium are
inapproximable (unless P = NP), and (3) it is # P-hard to
count the Nash equilibria. We also show that determining
whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists in a
Bayesian game is NP-complete, and that determining whether a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a Markov
(stochastic) game is PSPACE-hard even if the game is
unobserved (and that this remains NP-hard if the game has
finite length). All of our hardness results hold even if
there are only two players and the game is symmetric. ©
2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015},
Key = {fds236254}
}
@article{fds325623,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1399589.1399602},
Doi = {10.1145/1399589.1399602},
Key = {fds325623}
}
@article{fds236253,
Author = {Apaydin, MS and Conitzer, V and Donald, BR},
Title = {Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native
structural ensembles.},
Journal = {Journal of biomolecular NMR},
Volume = {40},
Number = {4},
Pages = {263-276},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0925-2738},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18365752},
Abstract = {An important step in NMR protein structure determination is
the assignment of resonances and NOEs to corresponding
nuclei. Structure-based assignment (SBA) uses a model
structure ("template") for the target protein to expedite
this process. Nuclear vector replacement (NVR) is an SBA
framework that combines multiple sources of NMR data
(chemical shifts, RDCs, sparse NOEs, amide exchange rates,
TOCSY) and has high accuracy when the template is close to
the target protein's structure (less than 2 A backbone
RMSD). However, a close template may not always be
available. We extend the circle of convergence of NVR for
distant templates by using an ensemble of structures. This
ensemble corresponds to the low-frequency perturbations of
the given template and is obtained using normal mode
analysis (NMA). Our algorithm assigns resonances and sparse
NOEs using each of the structures in the ensemble
separately, and aggregates the results using a voting scheme
based on maximum bipartite matching. Experimental results on
human ubiquitin, using four distant template structures show
an increase in the assignment accuracy. Our algorithm also
improves the robustness of NVR with respect to structural
noise. We provide a confidence measure for each assignment
using the percentage of the structures that agree on that
assignment. We use this measure to assign a subset of the
peaks with even higher accuracy. We further validate our
algorithm on data for two additional proteins with NVR. We
then show the general applicability of our approach by
applying our NMA ensemble-based voting scheme to another SBA
tool, MARS. For three test proteins with corresponding
templates, including the 370-residue maltose binding
protein, we increase the number of reliable assignments made
by MARS. Finally, we show that our voting scheme is sound
and optimal, by proving that it is a maximum likelihood
estimator of the correct assignments.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10858-008-9230-x},
Key = {fds236253}
}
@article{fds236167,
Author = {Ohta, N and Conitzer, V and Satoh, Y and Iwasaki, A and Yokoo,
M},
Title = {Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for
coalitional games in open environments},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {909-916},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is an important capability for automated
negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for
coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be
answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be
distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of
solution concepts for this. However, recent research has
revealed that these traditional solution concepts are
vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous
environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous
work has developed a solution concept called the
anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such
manipulations. That work also developed a method for
compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However,
the required computational and representational costs are
still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept
which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show
that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by
certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is
uniquely determined. The computational and representational
costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically
smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution
concepts. Copyright © 2008, International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaarnas.org).
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236167}
}
@article{fds236168,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Strategie betting for competitive agents},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {829-836},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {In many multiagent settings, each agent's goal is to come
out ahead of the other agents on some metric, such as the
currency obtained by the agent. In such settings, it is not
appropriate for an agent to try to maximize its expected
score on the metric; rather, the agent should maximize its
expected probability of winning. In principle, given this
objective, the game can be solved using game-theoretic
techniques. However, most games of interest are far too
large and complex to solve exactly. To get some intuition as
to what an optimal strategy in such games should look like,
we introduce a simplified game that captures some of their
key aspects, and solve it (and several variants) exactly.
Specifically, the basic game that we study is the following:
each agent i chooses a lottery over nonnegative numbers
whose expectation is equal to its budget bi. The agent with
the highest realized outcome wins (and agents only care
about winning). We show that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium when budgets are equal. We proceed to study and
solve extensions, including settings where agents must
obtain a minimum outcome to win; where agents choose their
budgets (at a cost); and where budgets are private
information. Copyright © 2008, International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236168}
}
@article{fds236169,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1029-1036},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the
allocation of multiple resources to multiple agents. If
agents are self-interested, they will lie about their
valuations for the resources if they perceive this to be in
their interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the
items efficiently, is incentive compatible (agents have no
incentive to lie), and never runs a deficit. Nevertheless,
the agents may have to make large payments to a party
outside the system of agents, leading to decreased utility
for the agents. Recent work has investigated the possibility
of redistributing some of the payments back to the agents,
without violating the other desirable properties of the VCG
mechanism. We study multi-unit auctions with unit demand,
for which previously a mechanism has been found that
maximizes the worst-case redistribution percentage. In
contrast, we assume that a prior distribution over the
agents' valuations is available, and try to maximize the
expected total redistribution. We analytically solve for a
mechanism that is optimal among linear redistribution
mechanisms. The optimal linear mechanism is asymptotically
optimal. We also propose discretization redistribution
mechanisms. We show how to automatically solve for the
optimal discretization redistribution mechanism for a given
discretization step size, and show that the resulting
mechanisms converge to optimality as the step size goes to
zero. We also present experimental results showing that for
auctions with many bidders, the optimal linear
redistribution mechanism redistributes almost everything,
whereas for auctions with few bidders, we can solve for the
optimal discretization redistribution mechanism with a very
small step size. Copyright © 2008, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236169}
}
@article{fds236170,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1021-1028},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1548-8403},
Abstract = {Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as
resource allocation problems. For such problems, the
well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is
efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and
does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not
(strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents' payments
will sum to more than 0. Very recently, several mechanisms
have been proposed that redistribute a significant
percentage of the VCG payments back to the agents while
maintaining the other properties. This increases the agents'
utilities. One redistribution mechanism dominates another if
it always redistributes at least as much to each agent (and
sometimes more). In this paper, we provide a
characterization of undominated redistribution mechanisms.
We also propose several techniques that take a dominated
redistribution mechanism as input, and produce as output
another redistribution mechanism that dominates the
original. One technique immediately produces an undominated
redistribution mechanism that is not necessarily anonymous.
Another technique preserves anonymity, and repeated
application results in an undominated redistribution
mechanism in the limit. We show experimentally that these
techniques improve the known redistribution mechanisms.
Copyright © 2008. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds236170}
}
@article{fds341040,
Author = {Apt, KR and Conitzer, V and Guo, M and Markakis, E},
Title = {Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.},
Journal = {WINE},
Volume = {5385},
Pages = {426-437},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Papadimitriou, CH and Zhang, S},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {978-3-540-92184-4},
Key = {fds341040}
}
@article{fds325624,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.},
Journal = {AAMAS (2)},
Pages = {1047-1054},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Padgham, L and Parkes, DC and Müller, JP and Parsons,
S},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {978-0-9817381-1-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1402298.1402367},
Doi = {10.1145/1402298.1402367},
Key = {fds325624}
}
@article{fds325625,
Author = {Wagman, L and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Strategic betting for competitive agents.},
Journal = {AAMAS (2)},
Pages = {847-854},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Padgham, L and Parkes, DC and Müller, JP and Parsons,
S},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {978-0-9817381-1-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1402298.1402342},
Doi = {10.1145/1402298.1402342},
Key = {fds325625}
}
@article{fds325626,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.},
Journal = {AAMAS (2)},
Pages = {1039-1046},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Padgham, L and Parkes, DC and Müller, JP and Parsons,
S},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {978-0-9817381-1-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1402298.1402366},
Doi = {10.1145/1402298.1402366},
Key = {fds325626}
}
@article{fds325627,
Author = {Ohta, N and Conitzer, V and Satoh, Y and Iwasaki, A and Yokoo,
M},
Title = {Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for
coalitional games in open environments.},
Journal = {AAMAS (2)},
Pages = {927-934},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Padgham, L and Parkes, DC and Müller, JP and Parsons,
S},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {978-0-9817381-1-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1402298.1402352},
Doi = {10.1145/1402298.1402352},
Key = {fds325627}
}
@article{fds236237,
Author = {Guo, M and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG
payments},
Journal = {EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on
Electronic Commerce},
Pages = {30-39},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250915},
Abstract = {For allocation problems with one or more items, the
wellknown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is
efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does
not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not
(strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents' payments
will sum to more than 0. If there is an auctioneer who is
selling the items, this may be desirable, because the
surplus payment corresponds to revenue for the auctioneer.
However, if the items do not have an owner and the agents
are merely interested in allocating the items efficiently
among themselves, any surplus payment is undesirable,
because it will have to flow out of the system of agents. In
2006, Cavallo [3] proposed a mechanism that redistributes
some of the VCG payment back to the agents, while
maintaining efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, and the non-deflcit property. In this paper, we
extend this result in a restricted setting. We study
allocation settings where there are multiple
indistinguishable units of a single good, and agents have
unit demand. (For this specific setting, Cavallo's mechanism
coincides with a mechanism proposed by Bailey in 1997 [2].)
Here we propose a family of mechanisms that redistribute
some of the VCG payment back to the agents. All mechanisms
in the family are efficient, strategyproof, individually
rational, and never incur a deficit. The family includes the
Bailey-Cavallo mechanism as a special case. We then provide
an optimization model for finding the optimal mechanism|that
is, the mechanism that maximizes redistribution in the worst
case|inside the family, and show how to cast this model as a
linear program. We give both numerical and analytical
solutions of this linear program, and the (unique) resulting
mechanism shows significant improvement over the
Bailey-Cavallo mechanism (in the worst case). Finally, we
prove that the obtained mechanism is optimal among all
anonymous deterministic mechanisms that satisfy the above
properties. Copyright 2007 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1250910.1250915},
Key = {fds236237}
}
@article{fds236238,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison
queries},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous
Agents},
Pages = {420-427},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329204},
Abstract = {Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences
of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible
alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the
alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is
produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is
impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete
preferences. Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least
the relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited. This is
done by asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of
simple queries about their preferences, such as comparison
queries, which ask an agent to compare two of the
alternatives. Prior work on preference elicitation in voting
has focused on the case of unrestricted preferences. It has
been shown that in this setting, it is sometimes necessary
to ask each agent (almost) as many queries as would be
required to determine an arbitrary ranking of the
alternatives. By contrast, in this paper, we focus on
single-peaked preferences. We show that such preferences can
be elicited using only a linear number of comparison
queries, if either the order with respect to which
preferences are single-peaked is known, or at least one
other agent's complete preferences are known. We also show
that using a sublinear number of queries will not suffice.
Finally, we present experimental results. © 2007
IFAAMAS.},
Doi = {10.1145/1329125.1329204},
Key = {fds236238}
}
@article{fds325628,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Editor's puzzle},
Journal = {ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-70},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1345037.1345055},
Doi = {10.1145/1345037.1345055},
Key = {fds325628}
}
@article{fds236193,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Incremental mechanism design},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {1251-1256},
Editor = {Veloso, MM},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2007.html},
Abstract = {Mechanism design has traditionally focused almost
exclusively on the design of truthful mechanisms. There are
several drawbacks to this: 1. in certain settings (e.g.
voting settings), no desirable strategy-proof mechanisms
exist; 2. truthful mechanisms are unable to take advantage
of the fact that computationally bounded agents may not be
able to find the best manipulation, and 3. when designing
mechanisms automatically, this approach leads to constrained
optimization problems for which current techniques do not
scale to very large instances. In this paper, we suggest an
entirely different approach: we start with a naïve
(manipulable) mechanism, and incrementally make it more
strategy-proof over a sequence of iterations. We give
examples of mechanisms that (variants of) our approach
generate, including the VCG mechanism in general settings
with payments, and the plurality-with-runoff voting rule. We
also provide several basic algorithms for automatically
executing our approach in general settings. Finally, we
discuss how computationally hard it is for agents to find
any remaining beneficial manipulation.},
Key = {fds236193}
}
@article{fds236196,
Author = {Sandholm, T and Conitzer, V and Boutilier, C},
Title = {Automated design of multistage mechanisms},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {1500-1506},
Editor = {Veloso, MM},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2007.html},
Abstract = {Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation
protocols that work well in the face of self-interested
agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for
automatically designing multistage mechanisms. These can
reduce elicitation burden by only querying agents for
information that is relevant given their answers to previous
queries. We first show how to turn a given (e.g.,
automatically designed using constrained optimization
techniques) single-stagemechanism into the most efficient
corresponding multistage mechanism given a specified
elicitation tree. We then present greedy and dynamic
programming (DP) algorithms that determine the elicitation
tree (optimal in the DP case). Next, we show how the query
savings inherent in the multistage model can be used to
design the underlying single-stage mechanism to maximally
take advantage of this approach. Finally, we present
negative results on the design of multistage mechanisms that
do not correspond to dominant-strategy single-stage
mechanisms: an optimal multistage mechanism in general has
to randomize over queries to hide information from the
agents.},
Key = {fds236196}
}
@article{fds236198,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Limited verification of identities to induce
false-name-proofness},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2007},
Volume = {07271},
Pages = {102-111},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Editor = {Cramton, P and Müller, R and Tardos, É and Tennenholtz,
M},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/tark/tark2007.html},
Abstract = {In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet,
mechanism design is complicated by the fact that a single
agent can participate in the mechanism under multiple
identifiers. One way to address this is to design
false-name-proof mechanisms, which choose the outcome in
such a way that agents have no incentive to use more than
one identifier. Unfortunately, there are inherent
limitations on what can be achieved with false-name-proof
mechanisms, and at least in some cases, these limitations
are crippling. An alternative approach is to verify the
identities of all agents. This imposes significant overhead
and removes any benefits from anonymity. In this paper, we
propose a middle ground. Based on the reported preferences,
we check, for various subsets of the reports, whether the
reports in the subset were all submitted by different
agents. If they were not, then we discard some of them. We
characterize when such a limited verification protocol
induces false-name-proofness for a mechanism, that is, when
the combination of the mechanism and the verification
protocol gives the agents no incentive to use multiple
identifiers. This characterization leads to various
optimization problems for minimizing verification effort. We
study how to solve these problems. Throughout, we use
combinatorial auctions (using the Clarke mechanism) and
majority voting as examples.},
Doi = {10.1145/1324249.1324265},
Key = {fds236198}
}
@article{fds236239,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T and Lang, J},
Title = {When are elections with few candidates hard to
manipulate},
Journal = {Journal of the ACM},
Volume = {54},
Number = {3},
Pages = {14-es},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0004-5411},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1236457.1236461},
Abstract = {In multiagent settings where the agents have different
preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue.
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but
seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols
are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by
using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation
is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is
reasonable to measure this hardness by computational
complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area,
but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates
is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the
number of candidates is small, because manipulation
algorithms that are exponential only in the number of
candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We
give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been
shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates
the core of this article, which derives hardness results for
realistic elections where the number of candidates is a
small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The
main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional
manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler
manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few
candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making
a given candidate win) and destructive manipulation (making
a given candidate not win). We characterize the exact number
of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the
plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality
with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols. We
also show that hardness of manipulation in this setting
implies hardness of manipulation by an individual in
unweighted settings when there is uncertainty about the
others' votes (but not vice-versa). To our knowledge, these
are the first results on the hardness of manipulation when
there is uncertainty about the others' votes. © 2007
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1236457.1236461},
Key = {fds236239}
}
@article{fds236240,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that
converges in self-play and learns a best response against
stationary opponents},
Journal = {Machine Learning},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {23-43},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0885-6125},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10994-006-0143-1},
Abstract = {Two minimal requirements for a satisfactory multiagent
learning algorithm are that it 1. learns to play optimally
against stationary opponents and 2. converges to a Nash
equilibrium in self-play. The previous algorithm that has
come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been proven to have these two
properties in 2-player 2-action (repeated) games-assuming
that the opponent's mixed strategy is observable. Another
algorithm, ReDVaLeR (which was introduced after the
algorithm described in this paper), achieves the two
properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and
players, but still requires that the opponents' mixed
strategies are observable. In this paper we present AWESOME,
the first algorithm that is guaranteed to have the two
properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and
players. It is still the only algorithm that does so while
only relying on observing the other players' actual actions
(not their mixed strategies). It also learns to play
optimally against opponents that eventually become
stationary. The basic idea behind AWESOME (Adapt When
Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium) is
to try to adapt to the others' strategies when they appear
stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed
equilibrium strategy. We provide experimental results that
suggest that AWESOME converges fast in practice. The
techniques used to prove the properties of AWESOME are
fundamentally different from those used for previous
algorithms, and may help in analyzing future multiagent
learning algorithms as well. © Springer Science + Business
Media, LLC 2007.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10994-006-0143-1},
Key = {fds236240}
}
@article{fds341041,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Limited Verification of Identities to Induce
False-Name-Proofness},
Journal = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
Volume = {7271},
Publisher = {Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer
Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
Editor = {Cramton, P and Müller, R and Tardos, É and Tennenholtz,
M},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet,
mechanism design is complicated by the fact that a single
agent can participate in the mechanism under multiple
identifiers. One way to address this is to design
false-name-proof mechanisms, which choose the outcome in
such a way that agents have no incentive to use more than
one identifier. Unfortunately, there are inherent
limitations on what can be achieved with false-name-proof
mechanisms, and at least in some cases, these limitations
are crippling. An alternative approach is to verify the
identities of all agents. This imposes significant overhead
and removes any benefits from anonymity. In this paper, we
propose a middle ground. Based on the reported preferences,
we check, for various subsets of the reports, whether the
reports in the subset were all submitted by different
agents. If they were not, then we discard some of them. We
characterize when such a limited verification protocol
induces false-name-proofness for a mechanism, that is, when
the combination of the mechanism and the verification
protocol gives the agents no incentive to use multiple
identifiers. This characterization leads to various
optimization problems for minimizing verification effort. We
study how to solve these problems. Throughout, we use
combinatorial auctions (using the Clarke mechanism) and
majority voting as examples.},
Key = {fds341041}
}
@article{fds325629,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules},
Journal = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
Volume = {7271},
Publisher = {Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer
Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
Editor = {Cramton, P and Müller, R and Tardos, É and Tennenholtz,
M},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of
total orders of (aka. votes over) a fixed set of
alternatives to a probability distribution over these
alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all
alternatives symmetrically. It satisfies participation if no
voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is
false-name-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting
additional (potentially different) votes. It is
anonymity-proof if it satisfies participation and it is
false-name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof
neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rules of the
following form. With some probability kf ∈ [0, 1], the
rule chooses an alternative at random. With probability 1
− kf, the rule first draws a pair of alternatives at
random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between
the two (and there is at least one vote), then the rule
chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a fair
coin to decide between the two alternatives.},
Key = {fds325629}
}
@article{fds325630,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser
Distinguished Dissertation Award.},
Journal = {AAMAS},
Pages = {253-253},
Publisher = {IFAAMAS},
Editor = {Durfee, EH and Yokoo, M and Huhns, MN and Shehory,
O},
Year = {2007},
ISBN = {978-81-904262-7-5},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329431},
Doi = {10.1145/1329125.1329431},
Key = {fds325630}
}
@article{fds236233,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and
exchanges},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous
Agents},
Volume = {2006},
Pages = {521-528},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160729},
Abstract = {The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating
bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid
truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG
mechanism: the problem of revenue guarantees, and that of
collusion. The existence of these problems even in one-item
settings is well-known; in this paper, we lay out their full
extent in multi-item settings. We study four settings:
combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal,
combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal,
combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free
disposal, and combinatorial exchanges. In each setting, we
give an example of how additional bidders (colluders) can
make the outcome much worse (less revenue or higher cost)
under the VCG mechanism (but not under a first price
mechanism); derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
such an effective collusion to be possible under the VCG
mechanism; and (when nontrivial) study the computational
complexity of deciding whether these conditions hold.
Copyright 2006 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1160633.1160729},
Key = {fds236233}
}
@article{fds236234,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Garera, N},
Title = {Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and
selling goods online)},
Journal = {ACM International Conference Proceeding Series},
Volume = {148},
Pages = {209-216},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1143844.1143871},
Abstract = {In a principal-agent problem, a principal seeks to motivate
an agent to take a certain action beneficial to the
principal, while spending as little as possible on the
reward. This is complicated by the fact that the principal
does not know the agent's utility function (or type). We
study the online setting where at each round, the principal
encounters a new agent, and the principal sets the rewards
anew. At the end of each round, the principal only finds out
the action that the agent took, but not his type. The
principal must learn how to set the rewards optimally. We
show that this setting generalizes the setting of selling a
digital good online. We study and experimentally compare
three main approaches to this problem. First, we show how to
apply a standard bandit algorithm to this setting. Second,
for the case where the distribution of agent types is fixed
(but unknown to the principal), we introduce a new gradient
ascent algorithm. Third, for the case where the distribution
of agents' types is fixed, and the principal has a prior
belief (distribution) over a limited class of type
distributions, we study a Bayesian approach.},
Doi = {10.1145/1143844.1143871},
Key = {fds236234}
}
@article{fds236235,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a nash
equilibrium},
Journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous
Agents},
Volume = {2006},
Pages = {537-544},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160731},
Abstract = {We present a technique for reducing a normal-form (aka.
(bi)matrix) game, O, to a smaller normal-form game, R, for
the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by
computing a Nash equilibrium for a subcomponent, G, of O for
which a certain condition holds. We also show that such a
subcomponent G on which to apply the technique can be found
in polynomial time (if it exists), by showing that the
condition that G needs to satisfy can be modeled as a Horn
satisfiability problem. We show that the technique does not
extend to computing Pareto-optimal or welfare-maximizing
equilibria. We present a class of games, which we call
ALAGIU (Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility) games, for
which recursive application of (special cases of) the
technique is sufficient for finding a Nash equilibrium in
linear time. Finally, we discuss using the technique to
compute approximate Nash equilibria. Copyright 2006
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1160633.1160731},
Key = {fds236235}
}
@article{fds236229,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computing slater rankings using similarities among
candidates},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {613-619},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Voting (or rank aggregation) is a general method for
aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One
important voting rule is the Slater rule. It selects a
ranking of the alternatives (or candidates) to minimize the
number of pairs of candidates such that the ranking
disagrees with the pairwise majority vote on these two
candidates. The use of the Slater rule has been hindered by
a lack of techniques to compute Slater rankings. In this
paper, we show how we can decompose the Slater problem into
smaller subproblems if there is a set of similar candidates.
We show that this technique suffices to compute a Slater
ranking in linear time if the pairwise majority graph is
hierarchically structured. For the general case, we also
give an efficient algorithm for finding a set of similar
candidates. We provide experimental results that show that
this technique significantly (sometimes drastically) speeds
up search algorithms. Finally, we also use the technique of
similar sets to show that computing an optimal Slater
ranking is NP-hard, even in the absence of pairwise ties.
Copyright © 2006, American Association for Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236229}
}
@article{fds236230,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to
manipulate},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {627-634},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents is a
key problem for multiagent systems, and one general method
for doing so is to vote over the alternatives (candidates).
Unfortunately, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that
when there are three or more candidates, all reasonable
voting rules are manipulable (in the sense that there exist
situations in which a voter would benefit from reporting its
preferences insincerely). To circumvent this impossibility
result, recent research has investigated whether it is
possible to make finding a beneficial manipulation
computationally hard. This approach has had some limited
success, exhibiting rules under which the problem of finding
a beneficial manipulation is NP-hard, #P-hard, or even
PSPACE-hard. Thus, under these rules, it is unlikely that a
computationally efficient algorithm can be constructed that
always finds a beneficial manipulation (when it exists).
However, this still does not preclude the existence of an
efficient algorithm that often finds a successful
manipulation (when it exists). There have been attempts to
design a rule under which finding a beneficial manipulation
is usually hard, but they have failed. To explain this
failure, in this paper, we show that it is in fact
impossible to design such a rule, if the rule is also
required to satisfy another property: a large fraction of
the manipulable instances are both weakly monotone, and
allow the manipulators to make either of exactly two
candidates win. We argue why one should expect voting rules
to have this property, and show experimentally that common
voting rules clearly satisfy it. We also discuss approaches
for potentially circumventing this impossibility result.
Copyright © 2006, American Association for Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236230}
}
@article{fds236231,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Davenport, A and Kalagitanam, J},
Title = {Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {620-626},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Voting (or rank aggregation) is a general method for
aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One voting
rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which
minimizes the number of cases where the final ranking
disagrees with a vote on the order of two alternatives.
Unfortunately, Kemeny rankings are NP-hard to compute.
Recent work on computing Kemeny rankings has focused on
producing good bounds to use in search-based methods. In
this paper, we extend on this work by providing various
improved bounding techniques. Some of these are based on
cycles in the pairwise majority graph, others are based on
linear programs. We completely characterize the relative
strength of all of these bounds and provide some
experimental results. Copyright © 2006, American
Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All
rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236231}
}
@article{fds236232,
Author = {Ohta, N and Iwasaki, A and Yokoo, M and Maruono, K and Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in
open anonymous environments},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {697-702},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is an important capability of automated
negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for
coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be
answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be
distributed. Recent research has revealed that traditional
solution concepts, such as the Shapley value, core, least
core, and nucleolus, are vulnerable to various manipulations
in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These
manipulations include submitting false names, collusion, and
hiding some skills. To address this, a solution concept
called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against
such manipulations, was developed. However, the
representation size of the outcome function in the
anonymity-proof core (and similar concepts) requires space
exponential in the number of agents/skills. This paper
proposes a compact representation of the outcome function,
given that the characteristic function is represented using
a recently introduced compact language that explicitly
specifies only coalitions that introduce synergy. This
compact representation scheme can successfully express the
outcome function in the anonymity-proof core. Furthermore,
this paper develops a new solution concept, the
anonymity-proof nucleolus, that is also expressible in this
compact representation. We show that the anonymity-proof
nucleolus always exists, is unique, and is in the
anonymity-proof core (if the latter is nonempty), and
assigns the same value to symmetric skills. Copyright ©
2006, American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236232}
}
@article{fds236227,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Garera, N},
Title = {Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and
selling goods online)},
Journal = {ICML 2006 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference
on Machine Learning},
Volume = {2006},
Pages = {209-216},
Year = {2006},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {In a principal-agent problem, a principal seeks to motivate
an agent to take a certain action beneficial to the
principal, while spending as little as possible on the
reward. This is complicated by the fact that the principal
does not know the agent's utility function (or type). We
study the online setting where at each round, the principal
encounters a new agent, and the principal sets the rewards
anew. At the end of each round, the principal only finds out
the action that the agent took, but not his type. The
principal must learn how to set the rewards optimally. We
show that this setting generalizes the setting of selling a
digital good online. We study and experimentally compare
three main approaches to this problem. First, we show how to
apply a standard bandit algorithm to this setting. Second,
for the case where the distribution of agent types is fixed
(but unknown to the principal), we introduce a new gradient
ascent algorithm. Third, for the case where the distribution
of agents' types is fixed, and the principal has a prior
belief (distribution) over a limited class of type
distributions, we study a Bayesian approach.},
Key = {fds236227}
}
@article{fds236236,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on
synergies among coalitions},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {170},
Number = {6-7},
Pages = {607-619},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0004-3702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2006.01.005},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents, and other
multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes
accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can
accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to
abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of
the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of
agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition.
This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative
game theory: the set of solutions that satisfy it is known
as the core. The computational questions around the core
have received less attention. When it comes to coalition
formation among software agents (that represent real-world
parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In
this paper we define a concise, natural, general
representation for games in characteristic form that relies
on superadditivity. In our representation, individual
agents' values are given as well as values for those
coalitions that introduce synergies. We show that this
representation allows for efficient checking of whether a
given outcome is in the core. We then show that determining
whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete both with and
without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes
the problem hard in both cases is determining the
collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible
for the grand coalition); we do so by showing that if these
are given, the problem becomes solvable in time polynomial
in the size of the representation in both cases. However, we
then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the problem,
where utility transfer is possible only within the grand
coalition, the problem remains NP-complete even when the
collaborative possibilities are given. Finally, we show that
for convex characteristic functions, a solution in the core
can be computed efficiently (in O(nl2) time, where n is the
number of agents and l is the number of synergies), even
when the collaborative possibilities are not given in
advance. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2006.01.005},
Key = {fds236236}
}
@article{fds236225,
Author = {Yokoo, M and Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T and Ohta, N and Iwasaki,
A},
Title = {A new solution concept for coalitional games in open
anonymous environments},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {4012 LNAI},
Pages = {53-64},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation
among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be
stable, a key question that must be answered is how the
gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various
solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least
core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we
demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various
kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such
as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting
false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as
one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we
introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof
core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that
the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple
axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing
these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least
anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.},
Doi = {10.1007/11780496_6},
Key = {fds236225}
}
@article{fds236228,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Computing the optimal strategy to commit
to},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {2006},
Pages = {82-90},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134717},
Abstract = {In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed
under the assumption that the players choose their
strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always
realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to
a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such
models are synonymously referred to as leadership,
commitment, or Stackelberg models, and optimal play in such
models is often significantly different from optimal play in
the model where strategies are selected simultaneously. The
recent surge in interest in computing game-theoretic
solutions has so far ignored leadership models (with the
exception of the interest in mechanism design, where the
designer is implicitly in a leadership position). In this
paper, we study how to compute optimal strategies to commit
to under both commitment to pure strategies and commitment
to mixed strategies, in both normal-form and Bayesian games.
We give both positive results (efficient algorithms) and
negative results (NP-hardness results). Copyright 2006
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1134707.1134717},
Key = {fds236228}
}
@article{fds236216,
Author = {Yokoot, M and Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T and Ohta, N and Iwasaki,
A},
Title = {Coalitional games in open anonymous environments},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {509-514},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation
among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be
stable, a key question that must be answered is how the
gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various
solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least
core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we
demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various
kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such
as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting
false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as
one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we
introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof
core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that
the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple
axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing
these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least
anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
We also show that computational hardness of manipulation may
provide an alternative barrier to manipulation. Copyright ©
2005, American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236216}
}
@article{fds236217,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T and Santi, P},
Title = {Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent
valuations},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {248-254},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {We analyze the computational and communication complexity of
combinatorial auctions from a new perspective: the degree of
interdependency between the items for sale in the bidders'
preferences. Denoting by G k the class of valuations
displaying up to k-wise dependencies, we consider the
hierarchy G 1 ⊂ G 2 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ G m, where m is the number
of items for sale. We show that the minimum non-trivial
degree of interdependency (2-wise dependency) is sufficient
to render NP-hard the problem of computing the optimal
allocation (but we also exhibit a restricted class of such
valuations for which computing the optimal allocation is
easy). On the other hand, bidders' preferences can be
communicated efficiently (i.e., exchanging a polynomial
amount of information) as long as the interdependencies
between items are limited to sets of cardinality up to k,
where k is an arbitrary constant. The amount of
communication required to transmit the bidders' preferences
becomes super-polynomial (under the assumption that only
value queries are allowed) when interdependencies occur
between sets of cardinality g(m), where g(m) is an arbitrary
function such that g(m) → ∞ as m → ∞. We also
consider approximate elicitation, in which the auctioneer
learns, asking polynomially many value queries, an
approximation of the bidders' actual preferences. Copyright
© 2005, American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236217}
}
@article{fds236218,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {Computational aspects of mechanism design},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {1642-1643},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds236218}
}
@article{fds236219,
Author = {Sandholm, T and Gilpin, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash
equilibria},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {495-501},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {We present, to our knowledge, the first mixed integer
program (MIP) formulations for finding Nash equilibria in
games (specifically, two-player normal form games). We study
different design dimensions of search algorithms that are
based on those formulations. Our MIP Nash algorithm
outperforms Lemke-Howson but not Porter-Nudelman-Shoham
(PNS) on GAMUT data. We argue why experiments should also be
conducted on games with equilibria with medium-sized
supports only, and present a methodology for generating such
games. On such games MIP Nash drastically outperforms PNS
but not Lemke-Howson. Certain MIP Nash formulations also
yield anytime algorithms for ε-equilibrium, with provable
bounds. Another advantage of MIP Nash is that it can be used
to find an optimal equilibrium (according to various
objectives). The prior algorithms can be extended to that
setting, but they are orders of magnitude slower. Copyright
© 2005, American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236219}
}
@article{fds236220,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and
computational methods for applying it},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {483-488},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {We define a generalized strategy eliminability criterion for
bimatrix games that considers whether a given strategy is
eliminable relative to given dominator & eliminee subsets of
the players' strategies. We show that this definition spans
a spectrum of eliminability criteria from strict dominance
(when the sets are as small as possible) to Nash equilibrium
(when the sets are as large as possible). We show that
checking whether a strategy is eliminable according to this
criterion is coNP-complete (both when all the sets are as
large as possible and when the dominator sets each have size
1). We then give an alternative definition of the
eliminability criterion and show that it is equivalent using
the Minimax Theorem. We show how this alternative definition
can be translated into a mixed integer program of polynomial
size with a number of (binary) integer variables equal to
the sum of the sizes of the eliminee sets, implying that
checking whether a strategy is eliminable according to the
criterion can be done in polynomial time, given that the
eliminee sets are small. Finally, we study using the
criterion for iterated elimination of strategies. Copyright
© 2005, American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236220}
}
@article{fds236221,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of (iterated) dominance},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {88-97},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064019},
Abstract = {We study various computational aspects of solving games
using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both
strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that
checking whether a given strategy is dominated by some mixed
strategy can be done in polynomial time using a single
linear program solve. We then move on to iterated dominance.
We show that determining whether there is some path that
eliminates a given strategy is NP-complete with iterated
weak dominance. This allows us to also show that determining
whether there is a path that leads to a unique solution is
NP-complete. Both of these results hold both with and
without dominance by mixed strategies. (A weaker version of
the second result (only without dominance by mixed
strategies) was already known [7].) Iterated strict
dominance, on the other hand, is path-independent (both with
and without dominance by mixed strategies) and can therefore
be done in polynomial time. We then study what happens when
the dominating strategy is allowed to place positive
probability on only a few pure strategies. First, we show
that finding the dominating strategy with minimum support
size is NP-complete (both for strict and weak dominance).
Then, we show that iterated strict dominance becomes
path-dependent when there is a limit on the support size of
the dominating strategies, and that deciding whether a given
strategy can be eliminated by iterated strict dominance
under this restriction is NP-complete (even when the limit
on the support size is 3). Finally, we study Bayesian games.
We show that, unlike in normal form games, deciding whether
a given pure strategy is dominated by another pure strategy
in a Bayesian game is NP-complete (both with strict and weak
dominance); however, deciding whether a strategy is
dominated by some mixed strategy can still be done in
polynomial time with a single linear program solve (both
with strict and weak dominance). Finally, we show that
iterated dominance using pure strategies can require an
exponential number of iterations in a Bayesian game (both
with strict and weak dominance). Copyright 2005
ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1064009.1064019},
Key = {fds236221}
}
@article{fds236222,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {255-260},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {In recent years, certain formalizations of combinatorial
negotiation settings, most notably combinatorial auctions,
have become an important research topic in the AI community.
A pervasive assumption has been that of no externalities:
the agents deciding on a variable (such as whether a trade
takes place between them) are the only ones affected by how
this variable is set. To date, there has been no widely
studied formalization of combinatorial negotiation settings
with externalities. In this paper, we introduce such a
formalization. We show that in a number of key special
cases, it is NP-complete to find a feasible nontrivial
solution (and therefore the maximum social welfare is
completely inapproximable). However, for one important
special case, we give an algorithm which converges to the
solution with the maximal concession by each agent (in a
linear number of rounds for utility functions that decompose
into piecewise constant functions). Maximizing social
welfare, however, remains NP-complete even in this setting.
We also demonstrate a special case which can be solved in
polynomial time by linear programming. Copyright © 2005,
American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds236222}
}
@article{fds236223,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Communication complexity of common voting
rules},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {78-87},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064018},
Abstract = {We determine the communication complexity of the common
voting rules. The rules (sorted by their communication
complexity from low to high) are plurality, plurality with
runoff, single transferable vote (STV), Condorcet, approval,
Bucklin, cup, maximin, Borda, Copeland, and ranked pairs.
For each rule, we first give a deterministic communication
protocol and an upper bound on the number of bits
communicated in it; then, we give a lower bound on (even the
nondeterministic) communication requirements of the voting
rule. The bounds match for all voting rules except STV and
maximin. Copyright 2005 ACM.},
Doi = {10.1145/1064009.1064018},
Key = {fds236223}
}
@article{fds236224,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and
exchanges with VCG payments},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics)},
Volume = {3435 LNAI},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
Abstract = {In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for
sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of
these items rather than just on the individual items. A key
problem in this and similar settings is that of strategic
bidding, where bidders misreport their true preferences in
order to effect a better outcome for themselves. The VCG
payment scheme is the canonical method for motivating the
bidders to bid truthfully. We study two related problems
concerning the VCG payment scheme: the problem of revenue
guarantees, and that of collusion. The existence of such
problems is known by many; in this paper, we lay out their
full extent. We study four settings: combinatorial forward
auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions
with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse)
auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial exchanges.
In each setting, we give an example of how additional
bidders (colluders) can make the outcome much worse (less
revenue or higher cost) under the VCG payment scheme (but
not under a first price scheme); derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for such an effective collusion to be
possible under the VCG payment scheme; and (when nontrivial)
study the computational complexity of deciding whether these
conditions hold. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
2005.},
Key = {fds236224}
}
@article{fds236190,
Author = {Yokoo, M and Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T and Ohta, N and Iwasaki,
A},
Title = {Coalitional games in open anonymous environments},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {1668-1669},
Publisher = {Professional Book Center},
Editor = {Kaelbling, LP and Saffiotti, A},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {0938075934},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2005.html},
Key = {fds236190}
}
@article{fds236226,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Common voting rules as maximum likelihood
estimators},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2005},
Pages = {145-152},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A
voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a
ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either
just the winning alternative or a ranking of the
alternatives. One potential view of voting is the following.
There exists a "correct" outcome (winner/ranking), and each
voter's vote corresponds to a noisy perception of this
correct outcome. If we are given the noise model, then for
any vector of votes, we can compute the maximum likelihood
estimate of the correct outcome. This maximum likelihood
estimate constitutes a voting rule. In this paper, we ask
the following question: For which common voting rules does
there exist a noise model such that the rule is the maximum
likelihood estimate for that noise model? We require that
the votes are drawn independently given the correct outcome
(we show that without this restriction, all voting rules
have the property). We study the question both for the case
where outcomes are winners and for the case where outcomes
are rankings. In either case, only some of the common voting
rules have the property. Moreover, the sets of rules that
satisfy the property are incomparable between the two cases
(satisfying the property in the one case does not imply
satisfying it in the other case).},
Key = {fds236226}
}
@article{fds236215,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Computing shapley values, manipulating value division
schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue
domains},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {219-225},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for
coalition formation to be successful, a key question that
must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be
distributed. Various solution concepts have been proposed,
but the computational questions around these solution
concepts have received little attention. We study a concise
representation of characteristic functions which allows for
the agents to be concerned with a number of independent
issues that each coalition of agents can address. For
example, there may be a set of tasks that the
capacity-unconstrained agents could undertake, where
accomplishing a task generates a certain amount of value
(possibly depending on how well the task is accomplished).
Given this representation, we show how to quickly compute
the Shapley value-a seminal value division scheme that
distributes the gains from cooperation fairly in a certain
sense. We then show that in (distributed)
marginal-contribution based value division schemes, which
are known to be vulnerable to manipulation of the order in
which the agents are added to the coalition, this
manipulation is NP-complete. Thus, computational complexity
serves as a barrier to manipulating the joining order.
Finally, we show that given a value division, determining
whether some subcoalition has an incentive to break away (in
which case we say the division is not in the core) is
NP-complete. So, computational complexity serves to increase
the stability of the coalition.},
Key = {fds236215}
}
@article{fds236213,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Derryberry, J and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Combinatorial auctions with structured item
graphs},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {212-218},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for
allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner
determination is NP-complete unless there is special
structure. We study the setting where there is a graph (with
some desired property), with the items as vertices, and
every bid bids on a connected set of items. Two
computational problems arise: 1) clearing the auction when
given the item graph, and 2) constructing an item graph (if
one exists) with the desired property. 1 was previously
solved for the case of a tree or a cycle, and 2 for the case
of a line graph or a cycle. We generalize the first result
by showing that given an item graph with bounded treewidth,
the clearing problem can be solved in polynomial time (and
every CA instance has some treewidth; the complexity is
exponential in only that parameter). We then give an
algorithm for constructing an item tree (treewidth 1) if
such a tree exists, thus closing a recognized open problem.
We show why this algorithm does not work for treewidth
greater than 1, but leave open whether item graphs of (say)
treewidth 2 can be constructed in polynomial time. We show
that finding the item graph with the fewest edges is
NP-complete (even when a graph of treewidth 2 exists).
Finally, we study how the results change if a bid is allowed
to have more than one connected component. Even for line
graphs, we show that clearing is hard even with 2
components, and constructing the line graph is hard even
with 5.},
Key = {fds236213}
}
@article{fds236214,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in
games},
Journal = {Proceedings, Twenty-First International Conference on
Machine Learning, ICML 2004},
Pages = {185-192},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {A fast-growing body of research in the AI and machine
learning communities addresses learning in games, where
there are multiple learners with different interests. This
research adds to more established research on learning in
games conducted in economics. In part because of a clash of
fields, there are widely varying requirements on learning
algorithms in this domain. The goal of this paper is to
demonstrate how communication complexity can be used as a
lower bound on the required learning time or cost. Because
this lower bound does not assume any requirements on the
learning algorithm, it is universal, applying under any set
of requirements on the learning algorithm. We characterize
exactly the communication complexity of various solution
concepts from game theory, namely Nash equilibrium, iterated
dominant strategies (both strict and weak), and backwards
induction. This gives the tighest lower bounds on learning
in games that can be obtained with this method.},
Key = {fds236214}
}
@article{fds236211,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic
mechanisms without payments},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
2004},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {128-135},
Year = {2004},
Month = {September},
Abstract = {Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the
game so that a desirable outcome is reached even though the
agents in the game behave selfishly. This is a difficult
problem because the designer is uncertain about the agents'
preferences and the agents may lie about their preferences.
Traditionally, the focus in mechanism design has been on
designing mechanisms that are appropriate for a range of
settings. While this approach has produced a number of
famous mechanisms, much of the space of possible settings is
still left uncovered. In contrast, in automated mechanism
design (AMD), a mechanism is computed on the fly for the
setting at hand - a universally applicable approach. In this
paper we present (to our knowledge) the first algorithm
designed specifically for AMD. It is designed for the
special case where there is only one type-reporting agent,
the mechanism must be deterministic, and payments are not
possible. The algorithm relies on an association of a
particular (easy to compute) mechanism to each subset of
outcomes, and a proof that one such mechanism is an optimal
one-which allows us to reduce the search space to one of
size 2|O| We propose an admissible heuristic to use in
searching over this space, and show how it can be updated
efficiently from node to node. We show how to apply branch
and bound DPS as well as IDA* to this search space, and show
that this approach outperforms CPLEX8.0, a general-purpose
solver, solidly on unstructured instances, both with and
without an IR constraint. However, on our third type of
instance, a bartering problem, CPLEX almost achieves the
performance of our algorithm by exploiting the structure
inherent in the domain.},
Key = {fds236211}
}
@article{fds236206,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Computational criticisms of the revelation
principle},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {262-263},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988824},
Abstract = {Computational criticisms of the revelation principle were
presented. The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in
mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention,
without loss in the designer's objective, to mechanisms in
which the agents report their types completely. It is shown
that reasonable constraints on computation and communication
can invalidate the revelation principle.},
Doi = {10.1145/988772.988824},
Key = {fds236206}
}
@article{fds236208,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Expressive negotiation over donations to
charities},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {51-60},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988781},
Abstract = {When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is
possible to use the contemplated donation as negotiating
material to induce other parties interested in the charity
to donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of
matching offers, where one party promises to pay a certain
amount if others pay a certain amount. However, in their
current form, matching offers allow for only limited
negotiation. For one, it is not immediately clear how
multiple parties can make matching offers at the same time
without creating circular dependencies. Also, it is not
immediately clear how to make a donation conditional on
other donations to multiple charities, when the donator has
different levels of appreciation for the different
charities. In both these cases, the limited expressiveness
of matching offers causes economic loss: it may happen that
an arrangement that would have made all parties (donators as
well as charities) better off cannot be expressed in terms
of matching offers and will therefore not occur. In this
paper, we introduce a bidding language for expressing very
general types of matching offers over multiple charities. We
formulate the corresponding clearing problem (deciding how
much each bidder pays, and how much each charity receives),
and show that it is NP-complete to approximate to any ratio
even in very restricted settings. We give a mixed-integer
program formulation of the clearing problem, and show that
for concave bids, the program reduces to a linear program.
We then show that the clearing problem for a subclass of
concave bids is at least as hard as the decision variant of
linear programming. Subsequently, we show that the clearing
problem is much easier when bids are quasilinear-for
surplus, the problem decomposes across charities, and for
payment maximization, a greedy approach is optimal if the
bids are concave (although this latter problem is weakly
NP-complete when the bids are not concave). For the
quasilinear setting, we study the mechanism design question.
We show that an ex-post efficient mechanism is impossible
even with only one charity and a very restricted class of
bids. We also show that there may be benefits to linking the
charities from a mechanism design standpoint.},
Doi = {10.1145/988772.988781},
Key = {fds236208}
}
@article{fds236209,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications
for optimal combinatorial auctions},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {132-141},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988793},
Abstract = {Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the
preferences reported by a group of agents. The key
difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences
insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to
themselves. Mechanism design is the art of designing the
rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report
their preferences truthfully, and a desirable outcome is
chosen. In a recently proposed approach - called automated
mechanism design - a mechanism is computed for the
preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several
advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design
optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time.
Unlike the earlier work on automated mechanism design that
studied a benevolent designer, in this paper we study
automated mechanism design problems where the designer is
self-interested. In this case, the center cares only about
which outcome is chosen and what payments are made to it.
The reason that the agents' preferences are relevant is that
the center is constrained to making each agent at least as
well off as the agent would have been had it not
participated in the mechanism. In this setting, we show that
designing optimal deterministic mechanisms is NP-complete in
two important special cases: when the center is interested
only in the payments made to it, and when payments are not
possible and the center is interested only in the outcome
chosen. We then show how allowing for randomization in the
mechanism makes problems in this setting computationally
easy. Finally, we show that the payment-maximizing AMD
problem is closely related to an interesting variant of the
optimal (revenue-maximizing) combinatorial auction design
problem, where the bidders have "best-only" preferences. We
show that here, too, designing an optimal deterministic
auction is NP-complete, but designing an optimal randomized
auction is easy.},
Doi = {10.1145/988772.988793},
Key = {fds236209}
}
@article{fds236210,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and
exchanges with VCG payments},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {266-267},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988826},
Abstract = {Various aspects of combinatorial auction were discussed.
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions
were also described. In a combinatorial auction, there are
multiple items for sale and bidders are allowed to place a
bid on a bundle of these items. The VCG mechanism is the
canonical payment scheme for motivating the bidders to bid
truthfully in combinatorial auctions.},
Doi = {10.1145/988772.988826},
Key = {fds236210}
}
@article{fds236212,
Author = {Santi, P and Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Towards a characterization of polynomial preference
elicitation with value queries in combinatorial
auctions},
Journal = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science)},
Volume = {3120},
Pages = {1-16},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0302-9743},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27819-1_1},
Abstract = {Communication complexity has recently been recognized as a
major obstacle in the implementation of combinatorial
auctions. In this paper, we consider a setting in which the
auctioneer (elicitor), instead of passively waiting for the
bids presented by the bidders, elicits the bidders'
preferences (or valuations) by asking value queries. It is
known that in the more general case (no restrictions on the
bidders' preferences) this approach requires the exchange of
an exponential amount of information. However, in practical
economic scenarios we might expect that bidders' valuations
are somewhat structured. In this paper, we consider several
such scenarios, and we show that polynomial elicitation in
these cases is often sufficient. We also prove that the
family of "easy to elicit" classes of valuations is closed
under union. This suggests that efficient preference
elicitation is possible in a scenario in which the elicitor,
contrary to what it is commonly assumed in the literature on
preference elicitation, does not exactly know the class to
which the function to elicit belongs. Finally, we discuss
what renders a certain class of valuations "easy to elicit
with value queries".},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-27819-1_1},
Key = {fds236212}
}
@article{fds236202,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from
the single-agent setting},
Journal = {ACM International Conference Proceeding Series},
Volume = {50},
Pages = {17-24},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/948005.948008},
Abstract = {The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central
problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that
the agents may report their preferences insincerely.
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the
game so that the agents are motivated to report their
preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is
chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is
automatically created for the preference aggregation setting
at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is
that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be
solved anew each time. Hence the computational complexity of
mechanism design becomes a key issue. In this paper we
analyze the single-agent mechanism design problem, whose
simplicity allows for elegant and generally applicable
results.We show that designing an optimal deterministic
mechanism that does not use payments is NP-complete even if
there is only one agent whose type is private information -
-even when the designer's objective is social welfare. We
show how this hardness result extends to settings with
multiple agents with private information. We then show that
if the mechanism is allowed to use randomization, the design
problem is solvable by linear programming (even for general
objectives) and hence in P. This generalizes to any fixed
number of agents. We then study settings where side payments
are possible and the agents' preferences are quasilinear. We
show that if the designer's objective is social welfare, an
optimal deterministic mechanism is easy to construct; in
fact, this mechanism is also ex post optimal. We then show
that designing an optimal deterministic mechanism with side
payments is NP-complete for general objectives, and this
hardness extends to settings with multiple agents. Finally,
we show that an optimal randomized mechanism can be designed
in polynomial time using linear programming even for general
objective functions. This again generalizes to any fixed
number of agents.},
Doi = {10.1145/948005.948008},
Key = {fds236202}
}
@article{fds236203,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the
core},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {613-618},
Publisher = {ACM},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {1-58113-679-X},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/sigecom/sigecom2003.html},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents, and other
multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes
accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can
do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents
to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some
of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of
agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition.
This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative
game theory. However, the computational questions around
this constraint have received less attention. When it comes
to coalition formation among software agents (that represent
real-world parties), these questions become increasingly
explicit. In this paper we define a concise general
representation for games in characteristic form that relies
on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient
checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then
show that determining whether the core is nonempty is
NP-complete both with and without transferable utility. We
demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases
is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that
if these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both
cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid
version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible
only within the grand coalition, the problem remains NP
complete even when the collaborative possibilities are
given.},
Doi = {10.1145/779928.779973},
Key = {fds236203}
}
@article{fds236204,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In
Zero-Sum Games},
Journal = {Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine
Learning},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {91-98},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Fawcett, T and Mishra, N},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {1-57735-189-4},
Abstract = {We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated
zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the
losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number of
rounds). The game is adversarially chosen from some family
that the learner knows. The opponent knows the game and the
learner's learning strategy. The learner tries to either not
accrue losses, or to quickly learn about the game so as to
avoid future losses (this is consistent with the Win or
Learn Fast (WoLF) principle; BL stands for "bounded loss").
Our framework allows for both probabilistic and approximate
learning. The resultant notion of BL-WoLF-learnability can
be applied to any class of games, and allows us to measure
the inherent disadvantage to a player that does not know
which game in the class it is in. We present guaranteed
BL-WoLF-learnability results for families of games with
deterministic payoffs and families of games with stochastic
payoffs. We demonstrate that these families are guaranteed
approximately BL-WoLF-learnable with lower cost. We then
demonstrate families of games (both stochastic and
deterministic) that are not guaranteed BL-WoLF-learnable. We
show that those families, nevertheless, are
BL-WoLF-learnable. To prove these results, we use a key
lemma which we derive.},
Key = {fds236204}
}
@article{fds236205,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that
Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against
Stationary Opponents},
Journal = {Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine
Learning},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {83-90},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Fawcett, T and Mishra, N},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {1-57735-189-4},
Abstract = {A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a
minimum, learn to play optimally against stationary
opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play.
The algorithm that has come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been
proven to have these two properties in 2-player 2-action
repeated games - assuming that the opponent's (mixed)
strategy is observable. In this paper we present AWESOME,
the first algorithm that is guaranteed to have these two
properties in all repeated (finite) games. It requires only
that the other players' actual actions (not their
strategies) can be observed at each step. It also learns to
play optimally against opponents that eventually become
stationary. The basic idea behind AWESOME (Adapt When
Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium) is
to try to adapt to the others' strategies when they appear
stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed
equilibrium strategy. The techniques used to prove the
properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those
used for previous algorithms, and may help in analyzing
other multiagent learning algorithms also.},
Key = {fds236205}
}
@article{fds236207,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from
the Single-Agent Setting},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {17-24},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/948005.948008},
Abstract = {The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central
problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that
the agents may report their preferences insincerely.
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the
game so that the agents are motivated to report their
preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is
chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is
automatically created for the preference aggregation setting
at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is
that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be
solved anew each time. Hence the computational complexity of
mechanism design becomes a key issue. In this paper we
analyze the single-agent mechanism design problem, whose
simplicity allows for elegant and generally applicable
results. We show that designing an optimal deterministic
mechanism that does not use payments is script N sign
℘-complete even if there is only one agent whose type is
private information - even when the designer's objective is
social welfare. We show how this hardness result extends to
settings with multiple agents with private information. We
then show that if the mechanism is allowed to use
randomization, the design problem is solvable by linear
programming (even for general objectives) and hence in ℘.
This generalizes to any fixed number of agents. We then
study settings where side payments are possible and the
agents' preferences are quasilinear. We show that if the
designer's objective is social welfare, an optimal
deterministic mechanism is easy to construct; in fact, this
mechanism is also ex post optimal. We then show that
designing an optimal deterministic mechanism with side
payments is script N sign ℘-complete for general
objectives, and this hardness extends to settings with
multiple agents. Finally, we show that an optimal randomized
mechanism can be designed in polynomial time using linear
programming even for general objective functions. This again
generalizes to any fixed number of agents.},
Doi = {10.1145/948005.948008},
Key = {fds236207}
}
@article{fds303205,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation
hard},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {781-788},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Gottlob, G and Walsh, T},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0307018v1},
Abstract = {Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in
multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all
(nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could
try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where
determining a beneficial manipulation is hard
computationally. A number of recent papers study the
complexity of manipulating existing protocols. This paper is
the first work to take the next step of designing new
protocols that are especially hard to manipulate. Rather
than designing these new protocols from scratch, we instead
show how to tweak existing protocols to make manipulation
hard, while leaving much of the original nature of the
protocol intact. The tweak studied consists of adding one
elimination preround to the election. Surprisingly, this
extremely simple and universal tweak makes typical protocols
hard to manipulate! The protocols become NP-hard, #P-hard,
or PSPACE-hard to manipulate, depending on whether the
schedule of the preround is determined before the votes are
collected, after the votes are collected, or the scheduling
and the vote collecting are interleaved, respectively. We
prove general sufficient conditions on the protocols for
this tweak to introduce the hardness, and show that the most
common voting protocols satisfy those conditions. These are
the first results in voting settings where manipulation is
in a higher complexity class than NP (presuming PSPACE ≠
NP).},
Key = {fds303205}
}
@article{fds303206,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning
problems},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {1099-1106},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Gottlob, G and Walsh, T},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0307017v1},
Abstract = {In most real-world settings, due to limited time or other
resources, an agent cannot perform all potentially useful
deliberation and information gathering actions. This leads
to the metareasoning problem of selecting such actions.
Decision-theoretic methods for metareasoning have been
studied in AI, but there are few theoretical results on the
complexity of metareasoning. We derive hardness results for
three settings which most real metareasoning systems would
have to encompass as special cases. In the first, the agent
has to decide how to allocate its deliberation time across
anytime algorithms running on different problem instances.
We show this to be ATP-complete. In the second, the agent
has to (dynamically) allocate its deliberation or
information gathering resources across multiple actions that
it has to choose among. We show this to be AfP-hard even
when evaluating each individual action is extremely simple.
In the third, the agent has to (dynamically) choose a
limited number of deliberation or information gathering
actions to disambiguate the state of the world. We show that
this is AfP-hard under a natural restriction, and
PSPACE-hard in general.},
Key = {fds303206}
}
@article{fds303207,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity results about Nash equilibria},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {cs.GT/0205074},
Pages = {765-771},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0205074v1},
Abstract = {Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework
for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the
toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will
have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single
reduction that 1) demonstrates NP-hardness of determining
whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties
exist, and 2) demonstrates the #P-hardness of counting Nash
equilibria (or connected sets of Nash equilibria). We also
show that 3) determining whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash
equilibrium exists is NP-hard, and that 4) determining
whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a
stochastic (Markov) game is PSP ACE-hard even if the game is
invisible (this remains NP-hard if the game is finite). All
of our hardness results hold even if there are only two
players and the game is symmetric.},
Key = {fds303207}
}
@article{fds236201,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Automated mechanism design for a self-interested
designer},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {232-233},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/779950.779974},
Abstract = {Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the
preferences reported by a group of agents. The key
difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences
insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to
themselves. Mechanism design is the art of designing the
rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report
their preferences truthfully, and a desirable outcome is
chosen. We recently proposed an approach-called automated
mechanism design-where a mechanism is computed for the
preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several
advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design
optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time.
Unlike the earlier work on automated mechanism design that
studied a benevolent designer, in this paper we study
automated mechanism design problems where the designer is
self-interested. In this case, the center cares only about
which outcome is chosen and what payments are made to it.
The reason that the agents' preferences are relevant is that
the center is constrained to making each agent at least as
well off as the agent would have been had it not
participated in the mechanism. In this setting, we show that
designing optimal deterministic mechanisms is NP-complete in
two important special cases: when the center is interested
only in the payments made to it, and when payments are not
possible and the center is interested only in the outcome
chosen. We then show how allowing for randomization in the
mechanism makes problems in this setting computationally
easy.},
Doi = {10.1145/779950.779974},
Key = {fds236201}
}
@article{fds376366,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the
core},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {230-231},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/779950.779973},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents, and other
electronic commerce applications. A coalition of agents can
sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents
cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However,
motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires
careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in
the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off
and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied
extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the
computational questions around this constraint have received
less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among
software agents (that represent real-world parties), these
questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we
define a concise general representation for games in
characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show
that it allows for efficient checking of whether a given
outcome is in the core. We then show that determining
whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete both with and
without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes
the problem hard in both cases is determining the
collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible
for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are
given, the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However,
we then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the
problem, where utility transfer is possible only within the
grand coalition, the problem remains NP-complete even when
the collaborative possibilities are given.},
Doi = {10.1145/779950.779973},
Key = {fds376366}
}
@article{fds236197,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the
core},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {613-618},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Gottlob, G and Walsh, T},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {1-58113-679-X},
url = {http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/publishers/mkp.html},
Abstract = {Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents, and other
multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes
accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can
do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents
to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some
of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of
agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition.
This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative
game theory. However, the computational questions around
this constraint have received less attention. When it comes
to coalition formation among software agents (that represent
real-world parties), these questions become increasingly
explicit. In this paper we define a concise general
representation for games in characteristic form that relies
on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient
checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then
show that determining whether the core is nonempty is
NP-complete both with and without transferable utility. We
demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases
is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that
if these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both
cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid
version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible
only within the grand coalition, the problem remains NP
complete even when the collaborative possibilities are
given.},
Doi = {10.1145/779950.779973},
Key = {fds236197}
}
@article{fds335342,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that
Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against
Stationary Opponents.},
Journal = {ICML},
Pages = {83-90},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Fawcett, T and Mishra, N},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {1-57735-189-4},
Key = {fds335342}
}
@article{fds335344,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation
Hard.},
Journal = {IJCAI},
Pages = {781-788},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Gottlob, G and Walsh, T},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds335344}
}
@article{fds335343,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning
Problems.},
Journal = {IJCAI},
Pages = {1099-1106},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Editor = {Gottlob, G and Walsh, T},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds335343}
}
@article{fds325631,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Lang, J and Sandholm, T},
Title = {How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to
manipulate?},
Journal = {TARK},
Pages = {201-214},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Halpern, JY and Tennenholtz, M},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {1-58113-731-1},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/846241.846268},
Abstract = {In multiagent settings where the agents have different
preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue.
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but
seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols
are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by
using voting protocols where determining a beneficial
manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of
manipulating realistic elections where the number of
candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4], but
the emphasis was on the question of whether or not a
protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number
of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the
question: How many candidates are needed to make elections
hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when
comparing the relative manipulability of different voting
protocols. In this paper we answer that question for the
voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda,
STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We
also answer that question for two voting protocols for which
no results on the complexity of manipulation have been
derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. It turns out
that the voting protocols under study become hard to
manipulate at 3 candidates, 4 candidates, 7 candidates, or
never.},
Doi = {10.1145/846241.846268},
Key = {fds325631}
}
@article{fds340692,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In
Zero-Sum Games.},
Journal = {ICML},
Pages = {91-98},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Fawcett, T and Mishra, N},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {1-57735-189-4},
Key = {fds340692}
}
@article{fds236302,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {392-397},
Publisher = {AAAI Press / The MIT Press},
Editor = {Dechter, R and Kearns, MJ and Sutton, RS},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has
received significant attention in single-agent settings. It
is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has
received little attention here so far. In this setting, the
agents may have different preferences that often must be
aggregated using voting. This leads to interesting issues
because what, if any, information should be elicited from an
agent depends on what other agents have revealed about their
preferences so far. In this paper we study effective
elicitation, and its impediments, for the most common voting
protocols. It turns out that in the Single Transferable Vote
protocol, even knowing when to terminate elicitation is N
P-complete, while this is easy for all the other protocols
under study. Even for these protocols, determining how to
elicit effectively is N P-complete, even with perfect
suspicions about how the agents will vote. The exception is
the Plurality protocol where such effective elicitation is
easy. We also show that elicitation introduces additional
opportunities for strategic manipulation by the voters. We
demonstrate how to curtail the space of elicitation schemes
so that no such additional strategic issues
arise.},
Key = {fds236302}
}
@article{fds236303,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of manipulating elections with few
candidates},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {314-319},
Publisher = {AAAI Press / The MIT Press},
Editor = {Dechter, R and Kearns, MJ and Sutton, RS},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {In multiagent settings where the agents have different
preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue.
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but
seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols
are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by
using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation
is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is
reasonable to measure this hardness by computational
complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area,
but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates
is unbounded. We derive hardness results for the more common
setting where the number of candidates is small but the
number of voters can be large. We show that with complete
information about the others' votes, individual manipulation
is easy, and coalitional manipulation is easy with
unweighted voters. However, constructive coalitional
manipulation with weighted voters is intractable for all of
the voting protocols under study, except in the Cup
protocol. Destructive manipulation tends to be easier,
except in the Single Transferable Vote protocol. Randomizing
over instantiations of the protocols (such as schedules of a
Cup) can be used to make manipulation hard. Finally, we show
that under weak assumptions, if weighted coalitional
manipulation with complete information about the others'
votes is hard in some voting protocol, then individual and
unweighted manipulation is hard when there is uncertainty
about the others' votes.},
Key = {fds236303}
}
@article{fds362594,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of Mechanism Design},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI-02), Edmonton, Canada,
2002},
Year = {2002},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central
problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that
the agents may report their preferences insincerely.
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the
game so that the agents are motivated to report their
preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is
chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is
automatically created for the preference aggregation setting
at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is
that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be
solved anew each time. Focusing on settings where side
payments are not possible, we show that the mechanism design
problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms. This
holds both for dominant-strategy implementation and for
Bayes-Nash implementation. We then show that if we allow
randomized mechanisms, the mechanism design problem becomes
tractable. In other words, the coordinator can tackle the
computational complexity introduced by its uncertainty about
the agents' preferences by making the agents face additional
uncertainty. This comes at no loss, and in some cases at a
gain, in the (social) objective.},
Key = {fds362594}
}
@article{fds335346,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {cs.GT/0205074},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds335346}
}
@article{fds335345,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.},
Journal = {AAAI/IAAI},
Pages = {392-397},
Publisher = {AAAI Press / The MIT Press},
Editor = {Dechter, R and Kearns, MJ and Sutton, RS},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds335345}
}
@article{fds340693,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sandholm, T},
Title = {Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few
Candidates.},
Journal = {AAAI/IAAI},
Pages = {314-319},
Publisher = {AAAI Press / The MIT Press},
Editor = {Dechter, R and Kearns, MJ and Sutton, RS},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds340693}
}
@article{fds325373,
Author = {Hough, JF},
Title = {Editor's Introduction},
Journal = {Journal of Soviet Nationalities},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-13},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(90)90044-T},
Doi = {10.1016/0304-4076(90)90044-T},
Key = {fds325373}
}
@article{fds325883,
Author = {Campbell, JY and Melino, A},
Title = {Editors' introduction},
Journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-5},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(90)90091-7},
Doi = {10.1016/0304-4076(90)90091-7},
Key = {fds325883}
}
%% Conrad, Robert F.
@article{fds320460,
Author = {Conrad, RF and Hool, B and Nekipelov, D},
Title = {The Role of Royalties in Resource Extraction
Contracts},
Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working
Paper},
Number = {195},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
Abstract = {The manner in which governments charge mineral resource
producers has been the subject of considerable debate. In
particular, there is a continuing debate about whether
royalties should be reduced or eliminated, the preferred
alternative then being some variant of an income-based
charge such as a resource rent tax, a policy adopted in
Norway, the United Kingdom and Australia. The argument for
avoiding royalties is based on analyses demonstrating that
royalties and other quantity-based charges distort
production decisions and lead to outcomes such as
high-grading and premature mine closure. We argue that it is
inappropriate to infer that royalties are inefficient from
the perspective of the resource owner (typically a
government on behalf of society). Rather, the royalty serves
a key pricing purpose and should be interpreted as the
capital loss on the resource owner's balance sheet from
extracting marginal reserves. We demonstrate this result
under various conditions of uncertainty and informational
asymmetry, using an incentive-based framework which enables
us to highlight the separation of asset ownership from asset
use. The principal-agent framework is consistent with the
contracting problem encountered by governments who as
resource owners contract with private sector firms for
extraction rights.},
Key = {fds320460}
}
%% De Brigard, Felipe
@article{fds376061,
Author = {Niemi, L and Washington, N and Workman, C and Arcila-Valenzuela, M and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge:
An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.},
Journal = {Acta psychologica},
Volume = {244},
Pages = {104157},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Abstract = {According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice,
baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with
marginalized social identities is a central driver of
prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may
sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic
stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In
this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of
epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional
responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized
social group membership predicts these responses. We
conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total
N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual
knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings
about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback
(invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming
remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social
evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all
three studies, on average, affective responses to
discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting
feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback.
Participants who shared their knowledge reported more
negative affect after discrediting feedback than
participants who shared their feelings. There were
consistent individual differences, including a
twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after
receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men
compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's
race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their
affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback,
suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed
to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic
injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of
knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Key = {fds376061}
}
@article{fds376898,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation
During Retrospective Causal Judgment.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e13426},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13426},
Abstract = {How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just
consider what actually happened, or do they also consider
what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye
tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how
people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused
the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual
ball-shooting game and then-while looking at a blank
screen-mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b)
what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what
caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that
participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with
the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally
simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur,
participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of
counterfactual possibilities. These results favor
counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how
eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning
and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective
causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.13426},
Key = {fds376898}
}
@article{fds373975,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and Murray, S and Brockmole, JR and De
Brigard, F and Nuthmann, A},
Title = {A computational modeling approach to investigating mind
wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene
viewing.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {242},
Pages = {105624},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Abstract = {Research on gaze control has long shown that increased
visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are
associated with longer fixation durations. More recently,
though, longer durations have also been linked to mind
wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention
marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward
better understanding the relationship between fixation
durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran
simulations using an established random-walk model for
saccade timing and programming and assessed which model
parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations
associated with mind wandering compared to attentive
viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best
described as an increase in the variability of the
fixation-generating process, leading to more
variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past
research showed that increased processing demands increased
the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The
findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing
demands modulate fixation durations through different
mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing
demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation
durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by
which these changes were generated.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Key = {fds373975}
}
@article{fds373542,
Author = {Miceli, K and Morales-Torres, R and Khoudary, A and Faul, L and Parikh,
N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in
episodic counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Hippocampus},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-6},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23583},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining
alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous
research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates
with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine
possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to
critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has
explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the
perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However,
the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by
perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study,
we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging
datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility
modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results
indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates
hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is
confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus.
Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is
positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior
hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT
plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty
alone can account for these results, and instead suggest
possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus
during the construction of plausible and implausible
ECT.},
Doi = {10.1002/hipo.23583},
Key = {fds373542}
}
@article{fds374206,
Author = {Morales-Torres, R and De Brigard and F},
Title = {On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà
vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {e370},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Abstract = {Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and
involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar
retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify
three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to
happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic
cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How
déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Key = {fds374206}
}
@article{fds369853,
Author = {Murray, S and Bermúdez, JP and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Moralization and self-control strategy selection.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1586-1595},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Abstract = {To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment,
people use self-control. The process model of self-control
outlines different strategies for managing the onset and
experience of temptation. However, little is known about the
decision-making factors underlying strategy selection.
Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the
moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise
attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2,
people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly
more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to
immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived
temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that
as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral
valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be
significantly more effective relative to attentional
distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly
mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These
results indicate that moralization informs decision-making
processes related to self-control strategy
selection.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Key = {fds369853}
}
@article{fds371448,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.},
Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677},
Abstract = {The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100
years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an
unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's
seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized
cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet
the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper,
I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this
theoretical term as well as an argument to question its
scientific status by comparing it to other cases of
theoretical terms that have either survived scientific
change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such
as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory"
is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus,
recommend its demotion from our scientific
vocabulary.},
Doi = {10.1111/tops.12677},
Key = {fds371448}
}
@article{fds369341,
Author = {Boone, T and Van Rooy and N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Not Every Thing Must Go.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {376-379},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Abstract = {In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard
approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is
seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with
causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he
advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic
brain networks are associated, not with traditional
psychological categories, but with behavioral functions
characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number
of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately
believe that although much revision to cognitive
neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical
proposals may be counterproductive.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Key = {fds369341}
}
@article{fds365621,
Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Irving, Z and Nadelhoffer, T and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent
wrongdoing.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {152},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-138},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001262},
Abstract = {Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to
what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act
negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not
desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do
people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose
that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based
on perceived <i>mental</i> <i>control</i>, or the degree to
which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over
time. To acquire information about others' mental control,
people self-project their own perceived mental control to
anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and
concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four
experiments (<i>N</i> = 841), we tested whether perceptions
of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame
for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with
which people can counterfactually imagine an individual
being non-negligent mediated the relationship between
judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated
that perceived mental control has a strong effect on
judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that
first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately
correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for
negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical
memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of
forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal
episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent
wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for
whom past episodes of negligence were not salient.
Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal
judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments
of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role
for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of
responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0001262},
Key = {fds365621}
}
@article{fds372917,
Author = {Uddin, LQ and Betzel, RF and Cohen, JR and Damoiseaux, JS and De
Brigard, F and Eickhoff, SB and Fornito, A and Gratton, C and Gordon,
EM and Laird, AR and Larson-Prior, L and McIntosh, AR and Nickerson, LD and Pessoa, L and Pinho, AL and Poldrack, RA and Razi, A and Sadaghiani, S and Shine, JM and Yendiki, A and Yeo, BTT and Spreng,
RN},
Title = {Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale
brain network nomenclature.},
Journal = {Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.)},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {864-905},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Abstract = {Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by
standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the
level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning
to confront the challenges associated with developing a
taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The
Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was
formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping
(OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide
recommendations on points of consensus, identify open
questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the
service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of
network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a
survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain
network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g.,
default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and
a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We
summarize survey results and provide initial considerations
and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective
piece includes a selective review of challenges to this
enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and
hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks;
(3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4)
consideration of network affiliations of subcortical
structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information.
We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive
and network neuroscience communities to adopt.},
Doi = {10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Key = {fds372917}
}
@article{fds368517,
Author = {Krasich, K and Simmons, C and O'Neill, K and Giattino, CM and De
Brigard, F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mudrik, L and Woldorff,
MG},
Title = {Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked
recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual
perception.},
Journal = {Sci Rep},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22126},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Abstract = {We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory
activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact
to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants
tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually
masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed
that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with
greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that
resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously
argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious
perception. This effect, however, was not associated with
better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was
elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated
with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then
associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was
worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the
stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase
and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest
that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables
temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates
conscious perception in OSM.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Key = {fds368517}
}
@article{fds363449,
Author = {Setton, R and Mwilambwe-Tshilobo, L and Girn, M and Lockrow, AW and Baracchini, G and Hughes, C and Lowe, AJ and Cassidy, BN and Li, J and Luh,
W-M and Bzdok, D and Leahy, RM and Ge, T and Margulies, DS and Misic, B and Bernhardt, BC and Stevens, WD and De Brigard and F and Kundu, P and Turner,
GR and Spreng, RN},
Title = {Age differences in the functional architecture of the human
brain.},
Journal = {Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {114-134},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhac056},
Abstract = {The intrinsic functional organization of the brain changes
into older adulthood. Age differences are observed at
multiple spatial scales, from global reductions in
modularity and segregation of distributed brain systems, to
network-specific patterns of dedifferentiation. Whether
dedifferentiation reflects an inevitable, global shift in
brain function with age, circumscribed, experience-dependent
changes, or both, is uncertain. We employed a multimethod
strategy to interrogate dedifferentiation at multiple
spatial scales. Multi-echo (ME) resting-state fMRI was
collected in younger (n = 181) and older (n = 120)
healthy adults. Cortical parcellation sensitive to
individual variation was implemented for precision
functional mapping of each participant while preserving
group-level parcel and network labels. ME-fMRI processing
and gradient mapping identified global and macroscale
network differences. Multivariate functional connectivity
methods tested for microscale, edge-level differences. Older
adults had lower BOLD signal dimensionality, consistent with
global network dedifferentiation. Gradients were largely
age-invariant. Edge-level analyses revealed discrete,
network-specific dedifferentiation patterns in older adults.
Visual and somatosensory regions were more integrated within
the functional connectome; default and frontoparietal
control network regions showed greater connectivity; and the
dorsal attention network was more integrated with
heteromodal regions. These findings highlight the importance
of multiscale, multimethod approaches to characterize the
architecture of functional brain aging.},
Doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhac056},
Key = {fds363449}
}
@article{fds367649,
Author = {Khoudary, A and O'Neill, K and Faul, L and Murray, S and Smallman, R and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Neural differences between internal and external episodic
counterfactual thoughts.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {377},
Number = {1866},
Pages = {20210337},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0337},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) consist of imagining
alternative outcomes to past experiences. A common sub-class
of eCFT-<i>upward</i> eCFT-involves imagining how past
negative experiences could have been <i>better</i>, either
because one could have done something differently (internal)
or because something about the circumstances could have been
different (external). Although previous neuroimaging
research has shown that the brain's default mode network
(DMN) supports upward eCFT, it is unclear how it is
differentially recruited during internal versus external
upward eCFT. We collected functional magnetic resonance
imaging data while participants remembered negative
autobiographical memories, generated either internal or
external upward eCFT for the memory, and then rated the
plausibility, perceived control and difficulty of eCFT
generation. Both internal and external eCFT engaged midline
regions of cingulate cortex, a central node of the DMN. Most
activity differentiating eCFT, however, occurred outside the
DMN. External eCFT engaged cuneus, angular gyrus and
precuneus, whereas internal eCFT engaged posterior cingulate
and precentral gyrus. Angular gyrus and precuneus were
additionally sensitive to perceived plausibility of external
eCFT, while postcentral gyrus and insula activity scaled
with perceived plausibility of internal eCFT. These results
highlight the key brain regions that might be involved in
cases of maladaptive mental simulations. This article is
part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities:
mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0337},
Key = {fds367649}
}
@article{fds368059,
Author = {Khoudary, A and Hanna, E and O'Neill, K and Iyengar, V and Clifford, S and Cabeza, R and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations
Theory.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {491-507},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Abstract = {Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind
contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally
specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social
world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and
Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive
architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during
moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we
use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC)
analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of
foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's
cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A
mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables
that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation
violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty,
Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and
suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than
other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses
confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm
from moral foundation violations, and distinguished
individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority
is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations
were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas
moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage
the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence
for neural modularity and motivate further research on the
novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Key = {fds368059}
}
@article{fds363780,
Author = {Faul, L and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The moderating effects of nostalgia on mood and optimism
during the COVID-19 pandemic.},
Journal = {Memory (Hove, England)},
Volume = {30},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1103-1117},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2022.2082481},
Abstract = {The initial waves of the coronavirus pandemic amplified
feelings of depression, psychological fatigue and pessimism
for the future. Past research suggests that nostalgia helps
to repair negative moods by boosting current and
future-oriented positive affect, thereby strengthening
psychological resilience. Accordingly, the present study
investigated whether nostalgia moderated the relationship
between pandemic experience and individual differences in
mood and optimism. Across two studies we assessed
psychosocial self-report data from a total of 293 online
participants (22-72 years old; mean age 38; 109 females, 184
males) during the first two waves of the pandemic.
Participants completed comprehensive questionnaires that
probed state and trait characteristics related to mood and
memory, such as the Profile of Mood States, Nostalgia
Inventory and State Optimism Measure. Our findings indicate
that during the initial wave of coronavirus cases, higher
levels of nostalgia buffered against deteriorating mood
states associated with concern over the pandemic. Nostalgia
also boosted optimism for participants experiencing negative
mood, and optimism predicted subjective mood improvement one
week later. This shielding effect of nostalgia on optimism
was replicated during the second wave of coronavirus cases.
The present findings support the role of nostalgia in
promoting emotional homeostasis and resilience during
periods of psychological distress.},
Doi = {10.1080/09658211.2022.2082481},
Key = {fds363780}
}
@article{fds362040,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Bello, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Confidence and gradation in causal judgment.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {223},
Pages = {105036},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105036},
Abstract = {When comparing the roles of the lightning strike and the dry
climate in causing the forest fire, one might think that the
lightning strike is more of a cause than the dry climate, or
one might think that the lightning strike completely caused
the fire while the dry conditions did not cause it at all.
Psychologists and philosophers have long debated whether
such causal judgments are graded; that is, whether people
treat some causes as stronger than others. To address this
debate, we first reanalyzed data from four recent studies.
We found that causal judgments were actually multimodal:
although most causal judgments made on a continuous scale
were categorical, there was also some gradation. We then
tested two competing explanations for this gradation: the
confidence explanation, which states that people make graded
causal judgments because they have varying degrees of belief
in causal relations, and the strength explanation, which
states that people make graded causal judgments because they
believe that causation itself is graded. Experiment 1 tested
the confidence explanation and showed that gradation in
causal judgments was indeed moderated by confidence: people
tended to make graded causal judgments when they were
unconfident, but they tended to make more categorical causal
judgments when they were confident. Experiment 2 tested the
causal strength explanation and showed that although
confidence still explained variation in causal judgments, it
did not explain away the effects of normality, causal
structure, or the number of candidate causes. Overall, we
found that causal judgments were multimodal and that people
make graded judgments both when they think a cause is weak
and when they are uncertain about its causal
role.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105036},
Key = {fds362040}
}
@article{fds358346,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Liu, A and Yin, S and Brady, T and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Effects of category learning strategies on recognition
memory.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {512-526},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-021-01207-9},
Abstract = {Extant research has shown that previously acquired
categorical knowledge affects recognition memory, and that
differences in category learning strategies impact
classification accuracy. However, it is unknown whether
different learning strategies also have downstream effects
on subsequent recognition memory. The present study
investigates the effect of two unidimensional rule-based
category learning strategies - learning (a) with or without
explicit instruction, and (b) with or without supervision -
on subsequent recognition memory. Our findings suggest that
acquiring categorical knowledge increased both hits
(Experiments 1 and 2) and false-alarms (Experiment 1) for
category-congruent items regardless of the particular
strategy employed in initially learning these categories.
There were, however, small processing speed advantages
during recognition memory for both explicit instruction and
supervised practice relative to neither (Experiment 2). We
discuss these findings in the context of how prior knowledge
influences recognition memory, and in relation to similar
findings showing schematic effects on episodic
memory.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-021-01207-9},
Key = {fds358346}
}
@article{fds362477,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Umanath, S and Irish, M},
Title = {Rethinking the distinction between episodic and semantic
memory: Insights from the past, present, and
future.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {459-463},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-022-01299-x},
Abstract = {On the 50th anniversary of Tulving's introduction of the
celebrated distinction between episodic and semantic memory,
it seems more than fitting to revisit his proposal in light
of recent conceptual and methodological advances in the
field. This Special Issue of Memory & Cognition brings
together researchers doing cutting-edge work at the
intersection between episodic and semantic memory to
showcase studies directly probing this psychological
distinction, as well as articles that seek to provide
conceptual and theoretical accounts to understand their
interaction. The 14 articles presented here highlight the
need to critically examine the way in which we conceptualize
not only the relationship between episodic and semantic
memory, but also the interplay between declarative and
non-declarative memory, and the myriad implications of such
conceptual changes. In many ways, we suggest this Special
Issue might serve as a call to action for our field,
inspiring future work to challenge pre-existing conceptions
and stimulate new directions in this fast-moving
field.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-022-01299-x},
Key = {fds362477}
}
@article{fds372918,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = { Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian
Dorsch},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {81},
Number = {4},
Pages = {827-831},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab001},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anab001},
Key = {fds372918}
}
@article{fds358756,
Author = {Lipkus, IM and Mays, D and Sheeran, P and Pan, W and Cameron, LD and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Effects of mental simulation of future waterpipe tobacco
smoking on attitudes, perceived harms and intended use among
young adults.},
Journal = {Journal of behavioral medicine},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {76-89},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10865-021-00245-7},
Abstract = {The desire to engage in waterpipe tobacco smoking (WTS) may
occur when smokers and nonsmokers conjure positive mental
simulations of WTS. However, effects of these simulations on
desire to smoke waterpipe tobacco and potential mediators
are unexplored. This research addressed these effects among
young adult waterpipe tobacco smokers and nonsmokers. Two
online studies were conducted with adults ages 18-30. In
Study 1, 200 smokers, 190 susceptible nonsmokers, and 182
nonsusceptible nonsmokers were randomized to mentally
simulate or not WTS in the future. In Study 2, 234 smokers
and 241 susceptible nonsmokers were randomized to four arms:
no simulation or simulations that varied valence of
experience (positive, negative or no valence provided). Main
outcomes were immediate desire to smoke waterpipe tobacco,
cognitive and affective attitudes, and perceived harms. In
Study 1, mental simulations increased the desire to smoke
waterpipe tobacco among smokers. In Study 2, asking
participants to simulate WTS positively or with no valence
instruction increased desire to smoke relative to negative
valence instruction or no simulation. Negative simulations
reduced perceived probability of smoking within a month
compared to positive simulations. Effects on desire to
engage in WTS were mediated by cognitive and affective
attitudes among susceptible nonsmokers and by cognitive
attitudes among smokers. These findings suggest that
exploring when and how often mental simulations about WTS
are evoked and their potency for promoting prevention and
cessation of WTS merit further attention.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10865-021-00245-7},
Key = {fds358756}
}
@article{fds367259,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Robins, S},
Title = {Memory},
Pages = {325-343},
Booktitle = {Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical
Introduction},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138392342},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-24},
Abstract = {The idea that there are different kinds of memory is old.
Aristotle, for instance, famously distinguished between
memory and reminiscence, the former roughly corresponding to
the retention of temporally based information from past
events, and the latter to the act of retrieving previously
stored information. Cognitive psychologists and
neuroscientists also agree that remembering is a diachronic
process, but they tend to think that it involves three
stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval. Declarative or
explicit memory is often divided into two subclasses as
well, thanks to Tulving's influential distinction between
episodic memory and semantic memory. The shifting of
memories from one system to another is thought to aid in
overall memory storage by preventing the hippocampus from
becoming too overloaded with memories. The precise timescale
for systems consolidation is a matter of some debate; it is
thought to occur anywhere from a few weeks or months to
possibly even years or decades after the initial
encoding.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003241898-24},
Key = {fds367259}
}
@article{fds376732,
Author = {Stanley, ML and De Brigard and FD},
Title = {The Importance of Morality for One’s Self-Concept Predicts
Perceptions of Personal Change after Remembering
Wrongdoings},
Pages = {143-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the
Self},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350246898},
Key = {fds376732}
}
@article{fds369061,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Measuring and Modeling Confidence in Human Causal
Judgment},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Cognitive Diversity, CogSci
2022},
Pages = {446-452},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The human capacity for causal judgment has long been thought
to depend on an ability to consider counterfactual
alternatives: the lightning strike caused the forest fire
because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have
ensued. To accommodate psychological effects on causal
judgment, a range of recent accounts of causal judgment have
proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual
alternatives from which they compute a graded index of
causal strength. While such models have had success in
describing the influence of probability on causal judgments,
among other effects, we show that these models make further
untested predictions: probability should also influence
people's metacognitive confidence in their causal judgments.
In a large (N=3020) sample of participants in a causal
judgment task, we found evidence that normality indeed
influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and
that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual
sampling model. We take this result as supporting evidence
for existing Bayesian accounts of causal
judgment.},
Key = {fds369061}
}
@article{fds369062,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Eye-tracking mental simulation during retrospective causal
reasoning},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Cognitive Diversity, CogSci
2022},
Pages = {1004-1010},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {There are conflicting theories about how people reason
through cause and effect. A key distinction between two
prominent accounts pertains to whether, in judging an
event's causal relevance, people preferentially consider
what actually happened (as predicted by process theories) or
whether they also consider what could have happened under
different conditions (as predicted by counterfactual
theories). Toward adjudicating between these theories, the
current work used eye tracking and Gaussian Process modeling
to investigate how people form causal judgments
retrospectively and in the absence of ongoing visual input.
Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game: after
choosing to move left or right, they encoded a video of the
actual outcome and then were prompted to mentally simulate
either (a) what actually happened, (b) what could have
happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen while
looking at a blank screen. During causal judgment, we found
evidence that participants visually mentally simulated
counterfactual possibilities: they moved their eyes in
similar patterns as when they imagined a counterfactual
alternative. Altogether, these results favor counterfactual
theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how visual mental
simulation can support this reasoning, and provide a novel
methodological approach for using eye movements to
investigate causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking
more broadly.},
Key = {fds369062}
}
@article{fds363370,
Author = {Ayala, OD and Banta, D and Hovhannisyan, M and Duarte, L and Lozano, A and García, JR and Montañés, P and Davis, SW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Episodic Past, Future, and counterfactual thinking in
Relapsing-Remitting Multiple sclerosis.},
Journal = {Neuroimage Clin},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {103033},
Year = {2022},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2022.103033},
Abstract = {Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a progressive disease
characterized by widespread white matter lesions in the
brain and spinal cord. In addition to well-characterized
motor deficits, MS results in cognitive impairments in
several domains, notably in episodic autobiographical
memory. Recent studies have also revealed that patients with
MS exhibit deficits in episodic future thinking, i.e., our
capacity to imagine possible events that may occur in our
personal future. Both episodic memory and episodic future
thinking have been shown to share cognitive and neural
mechanisms with a related kind of hypothetical simulation
known as episodic counterfactual thinking: our capacity to
imagine alternative ways in which past personal events could
have occurred but did not. However, the extent to which
episodic counterfactual thinking is affected in MS is still
unknown. The current study sought to explore this issue by
comparing performance in mental simulation tasks involving
either past, future or counterfactual thoughts in
relapsing-remitting MS. Diffusion weighted imaging (DWI)
measures were also extracted to determine whether changes in
structural pathways connecting the brain's default mode
network (DMN) would be associated with group differences in
task performance. Relative to controls, patients showed
marked reductions in the number of internal details across
all mental simulations, but no differences in the number of
external and semantic-based details. It was also found that,
relative to controls, patients with relapsing-remitting MS
reported reduced composition ratings for episodic
simulations depicting counterfactual events, but not so for
actual past or possible future episodes. Additionally, three
DWI measures of white matter integrity-fractional
anisotropy, radial diffusivity and streamline counts-showed
reliable differences between patients with
relapsing-remitting MS and matched healthy controls.
Importantly, DWI measures associated with reduced white
matter integrity in three association tracts on the DMN-the
right superior longitudinal fasciculus, the left hippocampal
portion of the cingulum and the left inferior longitudinal
fasciculus-predicted reductions in the number of internal
details during episodic counterfactual simulations. Taken
together, these results help to illuminate impairments in
episodic simulation in relapsing-remitting MS and show, for
the first time, a differential association between white
matter integrity and deficits in episodic counterfactual
thinking in individuals with relapsing-remitting
MS.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.nicl.2022.103033},
Key = {fds363370}
}
@article{fds372919,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neuroscience and Philosophy Introduction},
Pages = {1-13},
Booktitle = {NEUROSCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY},
Year = {2022},
ISBN = {978-0-262-04543-8},
Key = {fds372919}
}
@article{fds359026,
Author = {Gessell, B and Geib, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Multivariate pattern analysis and the search for neural
representations},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {199},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {12869-12889},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03358-3},
Abstract = {Multivariate pattern analysis, or MVPA, has become one of
the most popular analytic methods in cognitive neuroscience.
Since its inception, MVPA has been heralded as offering much
more than regular univariate analyses, for—we are
told—it not only can tell us which brain regions are
engaged while processing particular stimuli, but also which
patterns of neural activity represent the categories the
stimuli are selected from. We disagree, and in the current
paper we offer four conceptual challenges to the use of MVPA
to make claims about neural representation. Our view is that
the use of MVPA to make claims about neural representation
is problematic.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03358-3},
Key = {fds359026}
}
@article{fds361803,
Author = {Huang, S and Faul, L and Sevinc, G and Mwilambwe-Tshilobo, L and Setton,
R and Lockrow, AW and Ebner, NC and Turner, GR and Spreng, RN and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Age differences in intuitive moral decision-making:
Associations with inter-network neural connectivity.},
Journal = {Psychology and aging},
Volume = {36},
Number = {8},
Pages = {902-916},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pag0000633},
Abstract = {Positions of power involving moral decision-making are often
held by older adults (OAs). However, little is known about
age differences in moral decision-making and the intrinsic
organization of the aging brain. In this study, younger
adults (YAs; <i>n</i> = 117, <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 22.11)
and OAs (<i>n</i> = 82, <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 67.54) made
decisions in hypothetical moral dilemmas and completed
resting-state multi-echo functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) scans. Relative to YAs, OAs were more likely
to endorse deontological decisions (i.e., decisions based on
adherence to a moral principle or duty), but only when the
choice was immediately compelling or <i>intuitive</i>. By
contrast, there was no difference between YAs and OAs in
utilitarian decisions (i.e., decisions aimed at maximizing
collective well-being) when the utilitarian choice was
intuitive. Enhanced connections between the posterior medial
core of the default network (pmDN) and the dorsal attention
network, and overall reduced segregation of pmDN from the
rest of the brain, were associated with this increased
deontological-intuitive moral decision-making style in OAs.
The present study contributes to our understanding of age
differences in decision-making styles by taking into account
the intuitiveness of the moral choice, and it offers further
insights as to how age differences in intrinsic brain
connectivity relate to these distinct moral decision-making
styles in YAs and OAs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021
APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/pag0000633},
Key = {fds361803}
}
@article{fds356451,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Niemi, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Making moral principles suit yourself.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1735-1741},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Abstract = {Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer
general moral principles for people to follow. These moral
principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid,
offering reliable guides for moral judgment and
decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found
consistent evidence that agreement with general moral
principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed
in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of
moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with
those very principles-relative to participants who recalled
events in which other people violated the principles. This
shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people's
willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but
not the transgressions of others. These results have
important implications for understanding the roles memory
and personal identity in moral judgment. People's commitment
to moral principles may be maintained when they recall
others' past violations, but their commitment may wane when
they recall their own violations.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Key = {fds356451}
}
@article{fds357557,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Cabeza, R and Smallman, R and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings
Foster Moral Learning and Improvement.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {45},
Number = {6},
Pages = {e13007},
Year = {2021},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13007},
Abstract = {In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering,
reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral
transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to
form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported
having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly
their more severe transgressions, and they reported having
frequently thought about morally better ways in which they
could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward
counterfactuals; Studies 1-3). The more that participants
reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in
which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions
were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3).
Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found
that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after
committing a moral transgression strengthened reported
intentions for moral improvement-relative to resimulating
the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in
which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss
the implications of these results for competing theoretical
views on the relationship between memory and morality and
for functional theories of counterfactual
thinking.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.13007},
Key = {fds357557}
}
@article{fds355019,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Henne, P and Stanley, ML},
Title = {Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects
judgments of counterfactual plausibility.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {209},
Pages = {104574},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104574},
Abstract = {People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or
mental simulations about alternative ways the world could
have been. But the perceived plausibility of those
counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article
interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of
counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental
simulations, and it explores the role of perceived
similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We
report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly
supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived
plausibility of a counterfactual event is predicted by the
perceived similarity between the possible world in which the
imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world.
Second, when people attend to differences between imagined
possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the
imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world
and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less
plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical
between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they
think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the
actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such
worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light
of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of
counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104574},
Key = {fds355019}
}
@article{fds372920,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Bello, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Confidence and Gradation in Causal Judgment},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/m5w9c},
Abstract = {<p>When comparing the roles of the lightning strike and the
dry climate in causing the forest fire, one might think that
the lightning strike is more of a cause than the dry
climate, or one might think that the lightning strike
completely caused the fire while the dry conditions did not
cause it at all. Psychologists and philosophers have long
debated whether such causal judgments are graded; that is,
whether people treat some causes as stronger than others. To
address this debate, we first reanalyzed data from four
recent studies. We found that causal judgments were actually
multimodal: although most causal judgments made on a
continuous scale were categorical, there was also some
gradation. We then tested two competing explanations for
this gradation: the confidence explanation, which states
that people make graded causal judgments because they have
varying degrees of belief in causal relations, and the
strength explanation, which states that people make graded
causal judgments because they believe that causation itself
is graded. Experiment 1 tested the confidence explanation
and showed that gradation in causal judgments was indeed
moderated by confidence: people tended to make graded causal
judgments when they were unconfident, but they tended to
make more categorical causal judgments when they were
confident. Experiment 2 tested the causal strength
explanation and showed that although confidence still
explained variation in causal judgments, it did not explain
away the effects of normality, causal structure, or the
number of candidate causes. Overall, we found that causal
judgments were multimodal and that people make graded
judgments both when they think a cause is weak and when they
are uncertain about its causal role.</p>},
Doi = {10.31219/osf.io/m5w9c},
Key = {fds372920}
}
@article{fds355198,
Author = {Henne, P and O'Neill, K and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e12931},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12931},
Abstract = {People more frequently select norm-violating factors,
relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some
outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has
been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms.
We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this
effect for prospective causal judgments-that is, judgments
about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments
show that people more frequently select norm-violating
factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of
some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection
effects are not primarily explained by the perception of
agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation
to recent efforts to model causal judgment.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12931},
Key = {fds355198}
}
@article{fds361804,
Author = {Parikh, N and De Brigard and F and LaBar, KS},
Title = {The Efficacy of Downward Counterfactual Thinking for
Regulating Emotional Memories in Anxious
Individuals.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {712066},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.712066},
Abstract = {Aversive autobiographical memories sometimes prompt
maladaptive emotional responses and contribute to affective
dysfunction in anxiety and depression. One way to regulate
the impact of such memories is to create a downward
counterfactual thought-a mental simulation of how the event
could have been worse-to put what occurred in a more
positive light. Despite its intuitive appeal, counterfactual
thinking has not been systematically studied for its
regulatory efficacy. In the current study, we compared the
regulatory impact of downward counterfactual thinking,
temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal in 54 adult
participants representing a spectrum of trait anxiety.
Participants recalled regretful experiences and rated them
on valence, arousal, regret, and episodic detail. Two to six
days later, they created a downward counterfactual of the
remembered event, thought of how they might feel about it 10
years from now, or simply rehearsed it. A day later,
participants re-rated the phenomenological characteristics
of the events. Across all participants, downward
counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory
rehearsal were equally effective at reducing negative affect
associated with a memory. However, in individuals with
higher trait anxiety, downward counterfactual thinking was
more effective than rehearsal for reducing regret, and it
was as effective as distancing in reducing arousal. We
discuss these results in light of the functional theory of
counterfactual thinking and suggest that they motivate
further investigation into downward counterfactual thinking
as a means to intentionally regulate emotional memories in
affective disorders.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2021.712066},
Key = {fds361804}
}
@article{fds361924,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Stanley, ML},
Title = {Moral Memories and Identity Protection},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {240-246},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004817},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004817},
Key = {fds361924}
}
@article{fds356452,
Author = {Gessell, B and Stanley, M and Geib, B and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Prediction and Topological Models in Neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {35-55},
Booktitle = {Studies in Brain and Mind},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_3},
Abstract = {In the last two decades, philosophy of neuroscience has
predominantly focused on explanation. Indeed, it has been
argued that mechanistic models are the standards of
explanatory success in neuroscience over, among other
things, topological models. However, explanatory power is
only one virtue of a scientific model. Another is its
predictive power. Unfortunately, the notion of prediction
has received comparatively little attention in the
philosophy of neuroscience, in part because predictions seem
disconnected from interventions. In contrast, we argue that
topological predictions can and do guide interventions in
science, both inside and outside of neuroscience.
Topological models allow researchers to predict many
phenomena, including diseases, treatment outcomes, aging,
and cognition, among others. Moreover, we argue that these
predictions also offer strategies for useful interventions.
Topology-based predictions play this role regardless of
whether they do or can receive a mechanistic interpretation.
We conclude by making a case for philosophers to focus on
prediction in neuroscience in addition to explanation
alone.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_3},
Key = {fds356452}
}
@article{fds372921,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Modeling Confidence in Causal Judgments},
Year = {2021},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf},
Abstract = {<p>The human capacity for causal judgment has long been
thought to depend on an ability to consider counterfactual
alternatives: the lightning strike caused the forest fire
because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have
ensued. To accommodate psychological effects on causal
judgment, a range of recent accounts of causal judgment have
proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual
alternatives from which they compute a graded index of
causal strength. While such models have had success in
describing the influence of probability on causal judgments,
among other effects, we show that these models make further
untested predictions: probability should also influence
people's metacognitive confidence in their causal judgments.
In a large (N=3020) sample of participants in a causal
judgment task, we found evidence that normality indeed
influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and
that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual
sampling model. We take this result as supporting evidence
for existing Bayesian accounts of causal
judgment.</p>},
Doi = {10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf},
Key = {fds372921}
}
@article{fds351193,
Author = {Parikh, N and LaBar, KS and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Phenomenology of counterfactual thinking is dampened in
anxious individuals.},
Journal = {Cognition & emotion},
Volume = {34},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1737-1745},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2020.1802230},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT), or simulating alternative
versions of occurred events, is a common psychological
strategy people use to process events in their lives.
However, CFT is also a core component of ruminative thinking
that contributes to psychopathology. Though prior studies
have tried to distinguish adaptive from maladaptive CFT, our
study provides a novel demonstration that identifies
phenomenological differences across CFT in participants with
varying levels of trait anxiety. Participants
(<i>N </i>= 96) identified negative, regretful memories
from the past 5 years and created a better counterfactual
alternative (upward CFT), a worse counterfactual alternative
(downward CFT), or simply recalled each memory. Participants
with high levels of trait anxiety used more negative
language when describing their mental simulations, reported
lower ratings of composition during upward CFT, and reported
more difficulty in imagining the emotion they would have
felt had negative events turned out to be better.
Additionally, participants with high anxiety thought that
upward CFT was less likely to occur relative to individuals
with low anxiety. These results help to clarify how mental
simulations of aversive life events are altered in anxiety
and serve as a stepping stone to future research uncovering
the mechanisms of ruminative thought patterns.},
Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2020.1802230},
Key = {fds351193}
}
@article{fds341028,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Yang, BW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and
Polarization},
Journal = {Political Behavior},
Volume = {42},
Number = {3},
Pages = {891-913},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
Abstract = {People seem more divided than ever before over social and
political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and
unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms
driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a
limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and
has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and
arguments in belief formation prior to experimental
sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3001),
we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we
investigate the causes and consequences of resistance to
belief change for five diverse and less contentious
socio-political issues. After participants chose initially
to support or oppose a given socio-political position, they
were provided with reasons favoring their chosen position
(affirming reasons), reasons favoring the other, unchosen
position (conflicting reasons), or all reasons for both
positions (reasons for both sides). Our results indicate
that participants are more likely to stick with their
initial decisions than to change them no matter which
reasons are considered, and that this resistance to belief
change is likely due to a motivated, biased evaluation of
the reasons to support their initial beliefs (prior-belief
bias). More specifically, they rated affirming reasons more
favorably than conflicting reasons—even after accounting
for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the novelty of
the reasons presented, and the reported strategy used to
make the initial decision. In many cases, participants who
did not change their positions tended to become more
confident in the superiority of their positions after
considering many reasons for both sides.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
Key = {fds341028}
}
@article{fds349388,
Author = {Faul, L and St Jacques and PL and DeRosa, JT and Parikh, N and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Differential contribution of anterior and posterior midline
regions during mental simulation of counterfactual and
perspective shifts in autobiographical memories.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {215},
Pages = {116843},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116843},
Abstract = {Retrieving autobiographical memories induces a natural
tendency to mentally simulate alternate versions of past
events, either by reconstructing the perceptual details of
the originally experienced perspective or the conceptual
information of what actually occurred. Here we examined
whether the episodic system recruited during imaginative
experiences functionally dissociates depending on the nature
of this reconstruction. Using fMRI, we evaluated
differential patterns of neural activity and hippocampal
connectivity when twenty-nine participants naturally
recalled past negative events, shifted visual perspective,
or imagined better or worse outcomes than what actually
occurred. We found that counterfactual thoughts were
distinguished by neural recruitment in dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, whereas shifts in visual perspective were
uniquely supported by the precuneus. Additionally,
connectivity with the anterior hippocampus changed depending
upon the mental simulation that was performed - with
enhanced hippocampal connectivity with medial prefrontal
cortex for counterfactual simulations and precuneus for
shifted visual perspectives. Together, our findings provide
a novel assessment of differences between these common
methods of mental simulation and a more detailed account for
the neural network underlying episodic retrieval and
reconstruction.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116843},
Key = {fds349388}
}
@article{fds342766,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Langella, S and Stanley, ML and Castel, AD and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Age-related differences in recognition in associative
memory.},
Journal = {Neuropsychology, development, and cognition. Section B,
Aging, neuropsychology and cognition},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {289-301},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
Abstract = {Aging is often accompanied by associative memory changes,
although their precise nature remains unclear. This study
examines how recognition of item position in the context of
associative memory differs between younger and older adults.
Participants studied word pairs (A-B, C-D) and were later
tested with intact (A-B), reversed (D-C), recombined (A-D),
and recombined and reversed (B-C) pairs. When participants
were instructed to respond "Old" to both intact and reversed
pairs, and "New" to recombined, and recombined and reversed
pairs, older adults showed worse recognition for recombined
and reversed pairs relative to younger adults (Experiment
1). This finding also emerged when flexible retrieval
demands were increased by asking participants to respond
"Old" <i>only</i> to intact pairs (Experiment 2). These
results suggest that as conditions for flexible retrieval
become more demanding, older adults may show worse
recognition in associative memory tasks relative to younger
adults.},
Doi = {10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
Key = {fds342766}
}
@article{fds348484,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Bedrov, A and Cabeza, R and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {The centrality of remembered moral and immoral actions in
constructing personal identity.},
Journal = {Memory (Hove, England)},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {278-284},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2019.1708952},
Abstract = {There is a widespread belief that morally good traits and
qualities are particularly central to psychological
constructions of personal identity. People have a strong
tendency to believe that they truly are morally good. We
suggest that autobiographical memories of past events
involving moral actions may inform how we come to believe
that we are morally good. In two studies, we investigated
the role of remembered past events involving moral and
immoral actions in constructing perceived personal identity.
For morally right actions only, we found that remembered
actions judged to be more morally right relative to less
morally right were more central to personal identity (Study
1). We then found that remembered morally right actions were
more central to personal identity than remembered morally
wrong actions (Study 2). We discuss these findings in
relation to recent research on morality and personal
identity.},
Doi = {10.1080/09658211.2019.1708952},
Key = {fds348484}
}
@article{fds366567,
Author = {Huang, S and Stanley, ML and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The phenomenology of remembering our moral
transgressions.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {48},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-286},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-01009-0},
Abstract = {People tend to believe that they truly are morally good, and
yet they commit moral transgressions with surprising
frequency in their everyday lives. To explain this
phenomenon, some theorists have suggested that people
remember their moral transgressions with fewer details,
lower vivacity, and less clarity, relative to their morally
good deeds and other kinds of past events. These
phenomenological differences are thought to help alleviate
psychological discomfort and to help people maintain a
morally good self-concept. Given these motivations to
alleviate discomfort and to maintain a morally good
self-concept, we might expect our more egregious moral
transgressions, relative to our more minor transgressions,
to be remembered less frequently, with fewer details, with
lower vivacity, and with a reduced sense of reliving. More
severe moral transgressions might also be less central to
constructions of personal identity. In contrast to these
expectations, our results suggest that participants' more
severe moral transgressions are actually remembered more
frequently, more vividly, and with more detail. More severe
moral transgressions also tend to be more central to
personal identity. We discuss the implications of these
results for the motivation to maintain a morally good
self-concept and for the functions of autobiographical
memory.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-019-01009-0},
Key = {fds366567}
}
@article{fds349624,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B and Yang, BW and Stewart, G and Marsh,
EJ},
Title = {Remembering possible times: Memory for details of past,
future, and counterfactual simulations.},
Journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory Research, and
Practice},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {331-339},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000220},
Abstract = {People’s capacity to mentally simulate future events
(episodic future thinking) as well as what could have
occurred in the past but did not (episodic counterfactual
thinking) critically depends on their capacity to retrieve
episodic memories. All 3 mental simulations are likely
adaptive in that they involve rehearsing possible scenarios
with the goal of improving future performance. However, the
extent to which these mental simulations are useful at a
later time depends on how well they are later remembered.
Unfortunately, little is known about how such simulations
are remembered. In the current study, we explored this issue
by asking participants to retrieve episodic memories and
generate future and counterfactual simulations in response
to 4 cues: particular places, people, objects, and times. A
day later participants received 3 of the 4 cues and were
asked to recall the remaining 1. Our results indicate that
people and locations are equally well remembered, regardless
of the temporal orientation of the mental simulation. In
contrast, objects in future simulations are recalled less
frequently than are those in memories. Time was poorly
remembered across conditions but especially when remembering
a future or a counterfactual simulation. In light of these
results, we discuss how temporal information may be
incorporated into our hypothetical episodic simulations.
(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights
reserved)},
Doi = {10.1037/cns0000220},
Key = {fds349624}
}
@article{fds354585,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Do we need another kind of memory?},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {27},
Number = {11-12},
Pages = {134-144},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds354585}
}
@article{fds372922,
Author = {Henne, P and O'Neill, K and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/2nwb4},
Abstract = {<p>People more frequently select norm-violating factors,
relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some
outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has
been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms.
We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this
effect for prospective causal judgments—i.e., judgments
about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments
show that people more frequently select norm-violating
factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of
some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection
effects are not primarily explained by the perception of
agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation
to recent efforts to model causal judgment.</p>},
Doi = {10.31219/osf.io/2nwb4},
Key = {fds372922}
}
@article{fds347639,
Author = {De Brigard and F and O'Neill, K},
Title = {Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal
cognition.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {e247},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19000645},
Abstract = {Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a two-system account of
temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic
proposals where cognitive systems are putatively
independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a
minimum, involve (1) a difference in the nature of the
representations upon which each system operates, and (2) a
difference in the computations they carry out. In this
comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's
proposal does not meet the minimal requirements (1) and
(2).},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19000645},
Key = {fds347639}
}
@article{fds343341,
Author = {Henne, P and Niemi, L and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F and Knobe,
J},
Title = {A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal
judgment.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {190},
Pages = {157-164},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Abstract = {People's causal judgments are susceptible to the action
effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than
inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the
counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more
causal than inactions because they are more inclined to
consider the counterfactual alternatives to actions than to
consider counterfactual alternatives to inactions.
Experiment 1a conceptually replicates the original action
effect for causal judgments. Experiment 1b confirms a novel
prediction of the new explanation, the reverse action
effect, in which people judge inactions to be more causal
than actions in overdetermination cases. Experiment 2
directly compares the two effects in joint-causation and
overdetermination scenarios and conceptually replicates them
with new scenarios. Taken together, these studies provide
support for the new counterfactual explanation for the
action effect in causal judgment.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Key = {fds343341}
}
@article{fds343711,
Author = {Stanley, ML and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Moral Memories and the Belief in the Good
Self},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {387-391},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419847990},
Abstract = {Most people believe they are morally good, and this belief
plays an integral role in constructions of personal
identity. Yet people commit moral transgressions with
surprising frequency in everyday life. In this article, we
characterize two mechanisms involving autobiographical
memory that are utilized to foster a belief in a morally
good self in the present—despite frequent and repeated
immoral behavior. First, there is a tendency for people to
willfully and actively forget details about their own moral
transgressions but not about their own morally praiseworthy
deeds. Second, when past moral transgressions are not
forgotten, people strategically compare their more recent
unethical behaviors with their more distant unethical
behaviors to foster a perception of personal moral
improvement over time. This, in turn, helps to portray the
current self favorably. These two complementary mechanisms
help to explain pervasive inconsistencies between people’s
personal beliefs about their own moral goodness and the
frequency with which they behave immorally.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721419847990},
Key = {fds343711}
}
@article{fds335559,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E and St Jacques and PL and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel
about what was.},
Journal = {Cognition & emotion},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {646-659},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical
memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of
episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon
reactivation, memories become labile and prone to
modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of
mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for
editing processes to modify the content of the original
memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results
of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating
negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining
a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT)
alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to
attentively retrieving the memory without mental
modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our
results suggest that attentive remembering was the best
strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with
negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect
associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating
positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT
modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original
memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a
downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases
the perceived detail of the original memory over
time.},
Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
Key = {fds335559}
}
@article{fds332864,
Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {176},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1177-1201},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Abstract = {In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we
judge that people are responsible for the consequences of
their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies
to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences
of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to
hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The
level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates
judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that
the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action
does not. We argue that this result has important
implications for a long-running debate about the nature of
responsible agency.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Key = {fds332864}
}
@article{fds341029,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the
self.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {47},
Number = {3},
Pages = {441-454},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
Abstract = {Having positive moral traits is central to one's sense of
self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a
positive view of the self in the present. But it remains
unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of
the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and
reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal
past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the
current self in complementary ways. More specifically,
across four studies we investigated the extent to which
people believe they have changed over time after
recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the
personal past. Our results indicate that recollecting past
immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of
dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over time than
recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for
diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty,
helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and
loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting
for objective, calendar time. Further supporting a
motivational explanation, these effects held when people
recollected their own past actions but not when they
recollected the actions of other people.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
Key = {fds341029}
}
@article{fds341881,
Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
Furniture},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-139},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some
skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the
principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not
simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments
for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to
support the claim that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Key = {fds341881}
}
@article{fds341030,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N},
Title = {Episodic Counterfactual Thinking},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {28},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-66},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806512},
Abstract = {Our tendency to engage in episodic counterfactual
thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways in which past
personal events could have occurred but did not—is
ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive and social
psychologists, this autobiographically based variety of
counterfactual thought has been connected only recently to
research on the cognitive and neuroscientific basis of
episodic memory and mental simulation. In the current
article, we offer an empirical characterization of episodic
counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with related
varieties of mental simulation along three dimensions:
temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and modal
profile (i.e., perceived possibility or impossibility). In
so doing, we offer a practical strategy to navigate the
nascent literature on episodic counterfactual thinking
within the context of other mental simulations, and we argue
that the evidence surveyed strongly indicates that although
connected along the aforementioned dimensions, episodic
counterfactual thinking is a psychological process different
from episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and semantic
counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721418806512},
Key = {fds341030}
}
@article{fds341027,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Network modularity as a foundation for neural
reuse},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {86},
Number = {1},
Pages = {23-46},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701037},
Abstract = {The neural reuse framework developed primarily by Michael
Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in
multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions
flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations
to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the
evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of
supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We
map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on
recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that
methods employed in network neuroscience provide the means
to fully engage in a research program operating under the
principles of neural reuse.},
Doi = {10.1086/701037},
Key = {fds341027}
}
@article{fds345881,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {719-758},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280},
Abstract = {A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between
knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist”
view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often
invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction
between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the
so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two
decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged
by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly,
defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to
the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in
particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this
strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer
scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and
neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist
approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is
likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good
news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that
theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view
either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is
couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in
psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either
be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to
experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280},
Key = {fds345881}
}
@article{fds345882,
Author = {Pavese, C and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Editor’s introduction},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {585-587},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607964},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1607964},
Key = {fds345882}
}
@article{fds367332,
Author = {Henne, P and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms and the meaning of omissive enabling
conditions},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {1901-1907},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {People often reason about omissions. One line of research
shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of
omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for
instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but
didn't cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows
that people rely on the normative status of omissive events
in inferring their causal role: if the outcome came about
because the omission violated some norm, reasoners are more
likely to select that omission as a cause. We designed a
novel paradigm that tests how norms interact with the
semantics of omissive enabling conditions. The paradigm
concerns the circuitry of a mechanical device that plays
music. Two experiments used the paradigm to stipulate norms
and present a distinct set of possibilities to participants.
Participants chose which causal verb best described the
operations of the machine. The studies revealed that
participants' responses are best predicted by their tendency
to consider the semantics of omissive relations. In
contrast, norms had little to no effect in participants'
responses. We conclude by marshaling the evidence and
considering what role norms may play in people's
understanding of omissions.},
Key = {fds367332}
}
@article{fds367333,
Author = {Yin, S and O'Neill, K and Brady, TF and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {The Effect for Category Learning on Recognition Memory: A
Signal Detection Theory Analysis},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {3165-3171},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {Previous studies have shown that category learning affects
subsequent recognition memory. However, questions remain as
to how category learning affects discriminability during
recognition. In this three-stage study, we employed sets of
simulated flowers with category- and non-category-inclusion
features appearing with equal probabilities. In the learning
stage, participants were asked to categorize flowers by
identifying the category-inclusion feature. Next, in the
studying stage, participants memorized a new set of flowers,
a third of which belonged to the learned category. Finally,
in the testing stage, participants received a recognition
test with old and new flowers, some from the learned
category, some from a not-learned category, some from both
categories, and some from neither category. We applied
hierarchical Bayesian signal detection theory models to
recognition performance and found that prior category
learning affected both discriminability as well as criterion
bias. That is, people that learned the category well,
exhibited improved discriminability and a shifted bias
toward flowers from the learned relative to the not learned
category.},
Key = {fds367333}
}
@article{fds335558,
Author = {Parikh, N and Ruzic, L and Stewart, GW and Spreng, RN and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {What if? Neural activity underlying semantic and episodic
counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {178},
Pages = {332-345},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is the process of mentally
simulating alternative versions of known facts. In the past
decade, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to uncover the
neural underpinnings of CFT, particularly episodic CFT
(eCFT), which activates regions in the default network (DN)
also activated by episodic memory (eM) recall. However, the
engagement of DN regions is different for distinct kinds of
eCFT. More plausible counterfactuals and counterfactuals
about oneself show stronger activity in DN regions compared
to implausible and other- or object-focused counterfactuals.
The current study sought to identify a source for this
difference in DN activity. Specifically, self-focused
counterfactuals may also be more plausible, suggesting that
DN core regions are sensitive to the plausibility of a
simulation. On the other hand, plausible and self-focused
counterfactuals may involve more episodic information than
implausible and other-focused counterfactuals, which would
imply DN sensitivity to episodic information. In the current
study, we compared episodic and semantic counterfactuals
generated to be plausible or implausible against episodic
and semantic memory reactivation using fMRI. Taking
multivariate and univariate approaches, we found that the DN
is engaged more during episodic simulations, including eM
and all eCFT, than during semantic simulations. Semantic
simulations engaged more inferior temporal and lateral
occipital regions. The only region that showed strong
plausibility effects was the hippocampus, which was
significantly engaged for implausible CFT but not for
plausible CFT, suggestive of binding more disparate
information. Consequences of these findings for the
cognitive neuroscience of mental simulation are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
Key = {fds335558}
}
@article{fds336415,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Yang, BW and De Brigard and F},
Title = {No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A
failed replication and extension.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {46},
Number = {5},
Pages = {787-795},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
Abstract = {In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
argue in the current study, their claim that people develop
"unethical amnesia" confuses two distinct and dissociable
memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of
remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
= 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
(2016), while including several additional variables meant
to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
(N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
memory for moral and immoral actions are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
Key = {fds336415}
}
@article{fds329104,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
in revising moral decisions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {147},
Number = {7},
Pages = {962-987},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
(affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
options. Although participants were more likely to change
their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
participants were significantly more likely not to change
their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
Key = {fds329104}
}
@article{fds335560,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
Title = {Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our
Judgments of Responsibility (Review of Philosophy and
Psychology, (2013), 4, 2, (259-269), 10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8)},
Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {447},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
Abstract = {On pages 263, 265, and 266, incorrect degrees of freedom and
t values were reported. The statistical conclusions are not
affected by these reporting errors, but the corrected values
are shown below.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
Key = {fds335560}
}
@article{fds335561,
Author = {De Freitas and J and Sarkissian, H and Newman, GE and Grossmann, I and De
Brigard, F and Luco, A and Knobe, J},
Title = {Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and
Three Interdependent Cultures.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {42 Suppl 1},
Pages = {134-160},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12505},
Abstract = {People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an
essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the
true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to
believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep
inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good
ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with
optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does
it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people
understand the self? To address this question, we tested the
good true self theory against two potential boundary
conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about
the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual
differences in misanthropy-the tendency to view humans
negatively-predict beliefs about the good true self in an
American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in
a good true self, even among individuals who have an
explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true
self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing
samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set
of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and
Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and
magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we
tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across
groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy,
suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the
true self as morally good.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12505},
Key = {fds335561}
}
@article{fds372923,
Author = {Stanley, M and Yang, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {No Evidence for Unethical Amnesia for Imagined Actions: A
Failed Replication and Extension},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kn8ce},
Abstract = {<p>In a recent paper, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
argue in the current paper, their claim that people develop
“unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and
dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology
of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
= 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
(2016), while including several additional variables meant
to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
(N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
memory for moral and immoral actions are
discussed.</p>},
Doi = {10.31234/osf.io/kn8ce},
Key = {fds372923}
}
@article{fds337053,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory and the intentional stance},
Pages = {62-91},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780199367511},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
Abstract = {Despite Dennett's vast scholarship, he seemed to only have
directly addressed the topic of memory in a relatively
unknown coauthored article published in a somewhat obscure
volume. The current chapter attempts to reconstruct the
ideas from this old article, and argues that it offers a
viable and coherent view of episodic memory with substantial
empirical support. Specifically, the chapter uncovers three
empirically supported theses. A functional thesis, according
to which our memory system not only processes information
about past events but also uses this information to
construct useful anticipations of possible future events. A
computational thesis, according to which statistical
regularities, along with individual limitations and goals,
probabilistically constrain the search space examined during
memory retrieval. And a metaphysical thesis, according to
which memories do not exist as subpersonal-level brain
structures encoding particular intentional contents but
rather as personal-level psychological phenomena only
accessible from the intentional stance.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
Key = {fds337053}
}
@article{fds335563,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B},
Title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {e8},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
Abstract = {Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal
are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude
that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to
some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories.
Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate
critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that
their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more
parsimonious evolutionary accounts.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
Key = {fds335563}
}
@article{fds340469,
Author = {Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The discontinuity of levels in cognitive
science},
Journal = {Teorema},
Volume = {37},
Number = {3},
Pages = {151-165},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We begin by characterizing Dennett’s “homuncular
functionalist” view of the mind, as described in his early
work. We then contrast that view with the one outlined in
From Bacteria to Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes
in Dennett’s view have produced tension in the way he
conceives of functional decompositions. Functional
decompositions based on the intentional stance are supposed
to reach a bottom, “dumb” level which can be explained
mechanically; however, since Dennett now believes that
neurons may need to be described intentionally, it is not
clear whether our explanations of cognitive functions can
ever align with our explanations of neuronal and network
behaviors. We explore the consequences of this tension for
Dennett’s view, and for cognitive neuroscience in
general.},
Key = {fds340469}
}
@article{fds335562,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing},
Pages = {200-220},
Booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138065604},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591},
Abstract = {When people jointly reminisce, they often talk about past
objects, which may or may no longer exist. How can two or
more people jointly refer to an object that is long gone-or
at least, that is not present in their surrounding? In this
chapter, I offer a three-part answer to this question.
First, I suggest that our capacity to remember intentional
objects during memory retrieval depends on our capacity to
direct our attention inwardly toward the relevant component
of a memorial content-a mental act I call mental ostension.
Second, I argue that, for us to refer to remembered
intentional objects, we must possess the ability to refer to
them indirectly or “deferredly” by way of mentally
ostending toward a present mental content; in short, we must
be capable of deferred mental ostension. Finally, I claim
that to jointly reminisce, we must have the capacity to
guide someone else’s attention inwardly toward the
relevant aspect of the mental content we want them to focus
on so that they become aware of the past object we are
deferredly ostending; that is, we need concerted deferred
mental ostension.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315159591},
Key = {fds335562}
}
@article{fds329948,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Neural activity associated with repetitive simulation of
episodic counterfactual thoughts.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {106},
Pages = {123-132},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
Abstract = {When people revisit past autobiographical events they often
imagine alternative ways in which such events could have
occurred. Often these episodic counterfactual thoughts
(eCFT) are momentary and fleeting, but sometimes they are
simulated frequently and repeatedly. However, little is
known about the neural differences between frequently versus
infrequently repeated eCFT. The current study explores this
issue. In a three-session study, participants were asked to
simulate alternative ways positive, negative, and neutral
autobiographical memories could have occurred. Half of these
eCFT were repeatedly re-simulated while the other half were
not. Immediately after, participants were asked to simulate
all these eCFT again while undergoing fMRI. A partial least
squares analysis on the resultant fMRI data revealed that
eCFT that were not frequently repeated preferentially
engaged brain regions including middle (BA 21) and superior
temporal gyri (BA 38/39), middle (BA 11) and superior
frontal gyri (BA 9), and hippocampus. By contrast,
frequently repeated eCFT preferentially engaged regions
including medial frontal gyri (BA 10), anterior cingulate
cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). Direct
contrasts for each type of eCFT were also conducted. The
results of these analyses suggest differential contributions
of regions traditionally associated with eCFT, such as BA
10, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus, as a
function of kind of eCFT and frequency of repetition.
Consequences for future research on eCFT and rumination are
considered.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
Key = {fds329948}
}
@article{fds329949,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory and imagination},
Pages = {127-140},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138909366},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315687315},
Key = {fds329949}
}
@article{fds326194,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {146},
Number = {6},
Pages = {884-895},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
people judge those actions that happened further in the past
to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
believed that they were very different people than they are
now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
Key = {fds326194}
}
@article{fds327002,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Cognitive systems and the changing brain},
Journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {224-241},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
Abstract = {The notion of cognitive system is widely used in
explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an
agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional
decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting
point. The extended cognition movement challenged that
approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of
cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa.
2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.]
suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a
cognitive system is we may need to solve “the demarcation
challenge”: the problem of identifying a reliable way to
determine which mechanisms that are causally responsible for
the production of a certain cognitive process constitute a
cognitive system responsible for such process and which ones
do not. Recently, [Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive Systems and
the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] offered
a solution based on the idea that the mechanisms that
constitute a cognitive system are integrated in a particular
sense. In this paper I critically review Rupert’s solution
and argue against it. Additionally, I argue that a
successful account of cognitive system must accommodate the
fact that the neural mechanisms causally responsible for the
production of a cognitive process are diachronically dynamic
and yet functionally stable. At the end, I offer a
suggestion as to how to accommodate this diachronic
dynamicity without losing functional stability. I conclude
by drawing some implications for the discussion on cognitive
ontologies.},
Doi = {10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
Key = {fds327002}
}
@article{fds342710,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Stewart, GW and Brigard, FD},
Title = {Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative
Similarity.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {41 Suppl 5},
Pages = {1216-1228},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12451},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking involves imagining hypothetical
alternatives to reality. Philosopher David Lewis (1973,
1979) argued that people estimate the subjective
plausibility that a counterfactual event might have occurred
by comparing an imagined possible world in which the
counterfactual statement is true against the current, actual
world in which the counterfactual statement is false.
Accordingly, counterfactuals considered to be true in
possible worlds comparatively more similar to ours are
judged as more plausible than counterfactuals deemed true in
possible worlds comparatively less similar. Although Lewis
did not originally develop his notion of comparative
similarity to be investigated as a psychological construct,
this study builds upon his idea to empirically investigate
comparative similarity as a possible psychological strategy
for evaluating the perceived plausibility of counterfactual
events. More specifically, we evaluate judgments of
comparative similarity between episodic memories and
episodic counterfactual events as a factor influencing
people's judgments of plausibility in counterfactual
simulations, and we also compare it against other factors
thought to influence judgments of counterfactual
plausibility, such as ease of simulation and prior
simulation. Our results suggest that the greater the
perceived similarity between the original memory and the
episodic counterfactual event, the greater the perceived
plausibility that the counterfactual event might have
occurred. While similarity between actual and counterfactual
events, ease of imagining, and prior simulation of the
counterfactual event were all significantly related to
counterfactual plausibility, comparative similarity best
captured the variance in ratings of counterfactual
plausibility. Implications for existing theories on the
determinants of counterfactual plausibility are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12451},
Key = {fds342710}
}
@article{fds327003,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Rodriguez, DC and Montañés,
P},
Title = {Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and
counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study
of a Colombian sample.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {258-267},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
Abstract = {Although extant evidence suggests that many neural and
cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic past, future, and
counterfactual thinking overlap, recent results have
uncovered differences among these three processes. However,
the extent to which there may be age-related differences in
the phenomenological characteristics associated with
episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking remains
unclear. This study used adapted versions of the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
Interview in younger and older adults to investigate the
subjective experience of episodic past, future and
counterfactual thinking. The results suggest that, across
all conditions, younger adults generated more internal
details than older adults. However, older adults generated
more external details for episodic future and counterfactual
thinking than younger adults. Additionally, younger and
older adults generated more internal details, and gave
higher sensory and contextual ratings, for memories rather
than future and counterfactual thoughts. Methodological and
theoretical consequences for extant theories of mental
simulation are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
Key = {fds327003}
}
@article{fds318357,
Author = {Henne, P and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering
Plants},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {95},
Number = {2},
Pages = {270-283},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Abstract = {People generally accept that there is causation by
omission—that the omission of some events cause some
related events. But this acceptance elicits the selection
problem, or the difficulty of explaining the selection of a
particular omissive cause or class of causes from the causal
conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories
of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we
argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the
selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide
novel experimental evidence for it.},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Key = {fds318357}
}
@article{fds323231,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and
counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {48},
Pages = {283-291},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts-imagined alternative ways
in which personal past events might have occurred-are
frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here,
participants recollected positive and negative
autobiographical memories and then generated better and
worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories.
Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity
during the simulated remembered/imagined event is
significantly higher than but typically positively related
to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the
event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual
events heightened the emotional intensity felt while
simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the
emotional intensity accompanying the experience of
remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity
during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the
emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than
the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated
from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward
counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are
discussed in relation to clinical work and functional
theories of counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
Key = {fds323231}
}
@article{fds323662,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, TF and Ruzic, L and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning
paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {105-120},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
Abstract = {Previous research has shown that prior knowledge structures
or schemas affect recognition memory. However, since the
acquisition of schemas occurs over prolonged periods of
time, few paradigms allow the direct manipulation of schema
acquisition to study their effect on memory performance.
Recently, a number of parallelisms in recognition memory
between studies involving schemas and studies involving
category learning have been identified. The current paper
capitalizes on these findings and offers a novel
experimental paradigm that allows manipulation of category
learning between individuals to study the effects of schema
acquisition on recognition. First, participants learn to
categorize computer-generated items whose category-inclusion
criteria differ between participants. Next, participants
study items that belong to either the learned category, the
non-learned category, both, or neither. Finally,
participants receive a recognition test that includes old
and new items, either from the learned, the non-learned, or
neither category. Using variations on this paradigm, four
experiments were conducted. The results from the first three
studies suggest that learning a category increases hit rates
for old category-consistent items and false alarm rates for
new category-consistent lures. Absent the category learning,
no such effects are evident, even when participants are
exposed to the same learning trials as those who learned the
categories. The results from the fourth experiment suggest
that, at least for false alarm rates, the effects of
category learning are not solely attributable to frequency
of occurrence of category-consistent items during learning.
Implications for recognition memory as well as advantages of
the proposed paradigm are discussed.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
Key = {fds323662}
}
@article{fds359515,
Author = {Brigard, FD},
Title = {The problem of consciousness for philosophy of mind and of
psychiatry},
Journal = {Ideas y Valores},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {15-45},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65652},
Abstract = {Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose symptoms
include disorders or impairments of consciousness.
Unfortunately, the meaning of the term consciousness is not
altogether clear. This article presents a systematic review
of various meanings attributed to this term, as well as of
diverse associated philosophical problems. Likewise, it
reconstructs some philosophical and scientific theories of
consciousness, identifying their advantages and
disadvantages. Finally, it offers some suggestions for the
use of the term consciousness in psychiatry.},
Doi = {10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65652},
Key = {fds359515}
}
@article{fds331533,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Responsibility and the relevance of alternative future
possibilities},
Journal = {Teoria},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {25-35},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In the past decade, philosophical and psychological research
on people's beliefs about free will and responsibility has
skyrocketed. For the most part, these vignette-based studies
have exclusively focused on participants' judgments of the
causal history of the events leading up to an agent's action
and considerations about what the agent could have done
differently in the past. However, recent evidence suggests
that, when judging whether or not an individual is
responsible for a certain action - even in concrete,
emotionally laden and fully deterministic scenarios -
considerations about alternative future possibilities may
become relevant. This paper reviews this evidence and
suggests a way of interpreting the nature of these effects
as well as some consequences for experimental philosophy and
psychology of free will and responsibility going
forward.},
Key = {fds331533}
}
@article{fds320134,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Stewart, GW and Lockrow, AW and O'Brien, MM and Spreng, RN},
Title = {Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,
future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and
older adults.},
Journal = {Quarterly journal of experimental psychology
(2006)},
Volume = {69},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2358-2375},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
Abstract = {Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the
neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory,
episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual
thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological
characteristics associated with these mental simulations
change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The
current study employs adapted versions of the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics
associated with both positive and negative episodic past,
future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older
adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived
likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The
results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults
generate more external details and report higher ratings of
vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults.
Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details
across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely
future events as more likely than did older adults.
Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher
ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors
during episodic memories relative to future and
counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings
of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely
counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and
future simulations. Implications for the psychology of
mental simulation and ageing are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
Key = {fds320134}
}
@article{fds325468,
Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
'Can'},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {283-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
Key = {fds325468}
}
@article{fds318358,
Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
"ought" implies "can".},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {20-25},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
empirical work has studied the relationships among these
concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
which states that if someone ought to do something, then
they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
"ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
of obligation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Key = {fds318358}
}
@article{fds347942,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Brigard, FD},
Title = {Modularity in network neuroscience and neural
reuse.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {39},
Pages = {e133},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x15001673},
Abstract = {Neural reuse allegedly stands in stark contrast against a
modular view of the brain. However, the development of
unique modularity algorithms in network science has provided
the means to identify functionally cooperating, specialized
subsystems in a way that remains consistent with the neural
reuse view and offers a set of rigorous tools to fully
engage in Anderson's (2014) research program.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x15001673},
Key = {fds347942}
}
@article{fds341031,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Consciousness and moral responsibility},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {75},
Number = {4},
Pages = {661-667},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv012},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anv012},
Key = {fds341031}
}
@article{fds320135,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Nathan Spreng and R and Mitchell, JP and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Neural activity associated with self, other, and
object-based counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {109},
Pages = {12-26},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
Abstract = {Previous research has shown that autobiographical episodic
counterfactual thinking-i.e., mental simulations about
alternative ways in which one's life experiences could have
occurred-engages the brain's default network (DN). However,
it remains unknown whether or not the DN is also engaged
during impersonal counterfactual thoughts, specifically
those involving other people or objects. The current study
compares brain activity during counterfactual simulations
involving the self, others and objects. In addition,
counterfactual thoughts involving others were manipulated in
terms of similarity and familiarity with the simulated
characters. The results indicate greater involvement of DN
during person-based (i.e., self and other) as opposed to
object-based counterfactual simulations. However, the
involvement of different regions of the DN during
other-based counterfactual simulations was modulated by how
close and/or similar the simulated character was perceived
to be by the participant. Simulations involving unfamiliar
characters preferentially recruited dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex. Simulations involving unfamiliar similar characters,
characters with whom participants identified personality
traits, recruited lateral temporal gyrus. Finally, our
results also revealed differential coupling of right
hippocampus with lateral prefrontal and temporal cortex
during counterfactual simulations involving familiar similar
others, but with left transverse temporal gyrus and medial
frontal and inferior temporal gyri during counterfactual
simulations involving either oneself or unfamiliar
dissimilar others. These results suggest that different
brain mechanisms are involved in the simulation of personal
and impersonal counterfactual thoughts, and that the extent
to which regions associated with autobiographical memory are
recruited during the simulation of counterfactuals involving
others depends on the perceived similarity and familiarity
with the simulated individuals.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
Key = {fds320135}
}
@article{fds347943,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Book review: Involuntary autobiographical memories: An
introduction to the unbidden past},
Journal = {Memory Studies},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {255-257},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750698014534786},
Doi = {10.1177/1750698014534786},
Key = {fds347943}
}
@article{fds305551,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Eliminando el fantasma de la máquina. Del alma al software
1},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {175-192},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds305551}
}
@article{fds305552,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {El advenimiento de la metáfora mente-computador. Del alma
al software 3},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {64-85},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds305552}
}
@article{fds305553,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Capas limítrofes y dominios de evidencia en ciencia
cognitiva},
Journal = {Universitas Philosophica},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {53-77},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0120-5323},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2006_UnivPhil.pdf},
Key = {fds305553}
}
@article{fds305555,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {17},
Number = {9/10},
Pages = {189-201},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305555}
}
@article{fds305557,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of “Attention is Cognitive Unison”. Christopher
Mole. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1/2},
Pages = {239-247},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305557}
}
@article{fds305558,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {In defense of the self-stultification objection},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5/6},
Pages = {120-130},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305558}
}
@article{fds305556,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memoria, neurociencia y educación},
Pages = {179-194},
Booktitle = {La pizarra de Babel: Puentes entre neurociencia, psicologia
y educación},
Publisher = {Libros del Zorzal},
Editor = {Lipina, S and Sigman, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds305556}
}
@misc{fds305550,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Finding Memory: Interview with Daniel L.
Schacter},
Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {2605-1610},
Publisher = {Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {2011-2777},
Key = {fds305550}
}
@article{fds287445,
Author = {Schacter, DL and Benoit, RG and De Brigard and F and Szpunar,
KK},
Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
thinking: intersections between memory and
decisions.},
Journal = {Neurobiology of learning and memory},
Volume = {117},
Pages = {14-21},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1074-7427},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
Abstract = {This article considers two recent lines of research
concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated
events that can provide insight into the relationship
between memory and decision making. One line of research
concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating
episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the
other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which
involves simulating episodes that could have happened in
one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies
that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic
future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We
argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of
episodic simulation engage a common core network including
medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also
supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging
studies have documented neural differences between episodic
future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking,
including differences in hippocampal responses. We next
consider behavioral studies that have delineated both
similarities and differences between the two kinds of
episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic
future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by
similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with
episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly
imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting
effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during
episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual
thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional
consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for
decisions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
Key = {fds287445}
}
@article{fds318359,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E},
Title = {Clinical applications of counterfactual thinking during
memory reactivation.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {38},
Pages = {e5},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
Abstract = {The Integrative Memory Model offers a strong foundation upon
which to build successful strategies for clinical
intervention. The next challenge is to figure out which
cognitive strategies are more likely to bring about
successful and beneficial modifications of reactivated
memories during therapy. In this commentary we suggest that
exercising emotional regulation during episodic
counterfactual thinking is likely to be a successful
therapeutic strategy to bring about beneficial memory
modifications.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
Key = {fds318359}
}
@book{fds320136,
Author = {Muñoz-Suárez, C and de Brigard, F and Daniel,
D},
Title = {Content and consciousness revisited},
Pages = {1-220},
Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783319173733},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
Abstract = {What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental
and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing
mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior?
Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner
evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between
personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain?
Answers to these and other questions were developed in
Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness
(1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework
for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive
science and philosophy of mind. Content and Consciousness
Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals
introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its
fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking
into account the findings and progress which have taken
place during more than four decades. This book includes
original and critical contributions about the relations
between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal
level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality,
rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of
scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces
an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive
science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and
cognitive psychiatry.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
Key = {fds320136}
}
@article{fds320137,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {In defence of the self-stultification objection},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {120-130},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by
physical events while not causing any physical effects
whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable
argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if
epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of
our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S.
Robinson has called into question the soundness of this
objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of
his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the
opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to show that
epiphenomenalism is no less stultifying than its contenders,
such as dualism, functionalism, or identity theory. In the
current paper I attempt to shift the burden of proof back to
Robinson, and thus to defend the self-stultification
objection, by offering two counterarguments against one of
Robinson's objections to one of the key premises of the
self-stultification objection.},
Key = {fds320137}
}
@article{fds287446,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The nature of memory traces},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {9},
Number = {6},
Pages = {402-414},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12133},
Abstract = {Memory trace was originally a philosophical term used to
explain the phenomenon of remembering. Once debated by
Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more
recently to have become the exclusive province of cognitive
psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern
appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking
carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the
contrary, scientific research on the nature of memory traces
can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With
that general aim in mind, the present paper has three
specific goals. First, it attempts to chart the most
relevant philosophical views on the nature of memory traces
from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it
reviews critical findings in the psychology and the
neuroscience of memory traces. Finally, it explains how such
results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical
positions on the nature of memory traces. This paper also
touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research
that theories of memory traces need to accommodate in order
to succeed. © 2014 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2014
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12133},
Key = {fds287446}
}
@article{fds287451,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of
episodic hypothetical thinking},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {191},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155-185},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2013_Synthese.pdf},
Abstract = {Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in
our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the
function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering
is typically thought to happen because our memory system
malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of
misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In
particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of
misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's
malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger
cognitive system that performs a different function, and for
which remembering is just one operation. Building upon
extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a
picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system
that supports not only thinking of what was the case and
what potentially could be the case, but also what could have
been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a
particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the
flexible recombination of different components of encoded
traces into representations of possible past events that
might or might not have occurred, in the service of
constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for
diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan 1.2. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7},
Key = {fds287451}
}
@article{fds287444,
Author = {Banerjee, S and Cox, J and De Brigard and F and et. al.},
Title = {The significance of cognitive neuroscience: Findings,
applications and challenges},
Pages = {1071-1078},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neuroscience V},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Address = {Cambridge, MA},
Editor = {Mangum, R and Gazzaniga, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287444}
}
@misc{fds287428,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The New Paideia},
Journal = {3:AM Magazine},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287428}
}
@misc{fds287429,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The Anatomy of Amnesia},
Journal = {Scientific American Mind},
Pages = {33-37},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287429}
}
@article{fds287448,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Addis, DR and Ford, JH and Schacter, DL and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Remembering what could have happened: neural correlates of
episodic counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {51},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2401-2414},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the
past and to imagine what might happen in the future largely
depend on the same core brain network that includes the
middle temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial
cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal
cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. However, the extent
to which regions of this core brain network are also
responsible for our capacity to think about what could have
happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic
counterfactual thinking), is still unknown. The present
study examined this issue. Using a variation of the
experimental recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser,
& Schacter, 2009. Neuropsychologia. 47: 2222-2238),
participants were asked both to remember personal past
events and to envision alternative outcomes to such events
while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Three sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in
order to investigate two related issues. First, a
mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS)
analysis identified a pattern of brain activity across
regions of the core network that was common to episodic
memory and episodic counterfactual thinking. Second, a
non-rotated PLS analysis identified two different patterns
of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic
counterfactual thoughts, with the former showing significant
overlap with the set of regions engaged during episodic
recollection. Finally, a parametric modulation was conducted
to explore the differential engagement of brain regions
during counterfactual thinking, revealing that areas such as
the parahippocampal gyrus and the right hippocampus were
modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual
simulations. These results suggest that episodic
counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the core
brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of
our counterfactual thoughts modulates the engagement of
different areas within this set of regions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
Key = {fds287448}
}
@article{fds287450,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Coming to grips with the past: effect of repeated simulation
on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual
thoughts.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {24},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1329-1334},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612468163},
Abstract = {When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage
in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of
alternative ways in which personal past events could have
occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental
paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on
the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral
episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to
remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical
memories. One week later, they self-generated upward,
downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those
memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those
counterfactuals either once or four times. The results
indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and
neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their
perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease,
detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding
suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual
thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations.
Possible implications of this finding for pathological and
nonpathological anxiety are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797612468163},
Key = {fds287450}
}
@article{fds287449,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
Title = {The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of
Responsibility},
Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {259-269},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description
of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is
couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or
emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward
compatibilism than when those descriptions use
non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or
emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has
been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are
processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the
second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system.
The current paper reports the results of three studies
exploring whether or not considerations about possible
future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a
present time affect people's judgments of responsibility.
The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system
does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility
unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic,
reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded
deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that
considerations about possible future consequences for
innocent third parties that may follow as a result of
holding an agent responsible affect people's judgment as to
whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did.
Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant
evidence on the so-called "Side-effect effect", as they
suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side
effects influence people's judgment of responsibility. The
impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology
is discussed. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
Key = {fds287449}
}
@article{fds320138,
Author = {Acevedo-Triana, C and Fernando Cardenas and P and de Brigard,
F},
Title = {Finding memory: Interview with Daniel L.
Schacter},
Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1605-1610},
Publisher = {Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
Abstract = {The present interview offers an annotated dialogue with Dr.
Daniel L. Schacter, in which we had the chance to learn
about his findings, his current studies, in their
implications for memory and cognition. Dr. Schacter is
currently William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Psychology at
Harvard University. With more than 40 years of professional
experience in research on cognition, Dr. Schacter has
published over 400 articles, many in top scientific
journals, and some have been cited thousands of times. For
his multiple theoretical and empirical contributions to the
field of psychology, Dr. Schacter recently received the
American Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished
Scientific Contributions.},
Doi = {10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
Key = {fds320138}
}
@article{fds347944,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical
Psychology},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {239-247},
Publisher = {IMPRINT ACADEMIC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds347944}
}
@article{fds221957,
Author = {(5) Schacter, D.L. and Benoit, R. and De Brigard and F. and Szpunar,
K.K},
Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
thinking: Intersections between memory and
decisions.},
Journal = {Neurobiology of Learning and Memory},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds221957}
}
@article{fds287447,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of “Involuntary Autobiographical Memories”.
Dorthe Berntsen. (Cambridge University Press.
2009)},
Journal = {Memory Studies},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287447}
}
@article{fds287440,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Kaufer, D},
Title = {Neuroanatomy of Memory},
Booktitle = {Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Editor = {Arcinegas, DB and Anderson, CA and Filley, CM},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287440}
}
@article{fds287442,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {What was I thinking? Dennett’s Content and Consciousness
and the reality of propositional attitudes},
Booktitle = {Content and Consciousness Revisited},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Muñoz-Suárez, CM and De Brigard and F},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287442}
}
@article{fds287443,
Author = {St Jacques and P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Neural correlates of autobiographical memory: Methodological
Considerations.},
Booktitle = {The Handbook on the Cognitive Neuroscience of
Memory.},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Durte, A and Barense, M and Addis, D},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287443}
}
@article{fds287438,
Author = {Giovanello, KS and De Brigard and F and Hennessey Ford and J and Kaufer,
DI and Burke, JR and Browndyke, JN and Welsh-Bohmer,
KA},
Title = {Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging changes
during relational retrieval in normal aging and amnestic
mild cognitive impairment.},
Journal = {J Int Neuropsychol Soc},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {886-897},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1355-6177},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355617712000689},
Abstract = {The earliest cognitive deficits observed in amnestic mild
cognitive impairment (aMCI) appear to center on memory tasks
that require relational memory (RM), the ability to link or
integrate unrelated pieces of information. RM impairments in
aMCI likely reflect neural changes in the medial temporal
lobe (MTL) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). We tested
the hypothesis that individuals with aMCI, as compared to
cognitively normal (CN) controls, would recruit neural
regions outside of the MTL and PPC to support relational
memory. To this end, we directly compared the neural
underpinnings of successful relational retrieval in aMCI and
CN groups, using event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), holding constant the stimuli and encoding
task. The fMRI data showed that the CN, compared to the
aMCI, group activated left precuneus, left angular gyrus,
right posterior cingulate, and right parahippocampal cortex
during relational retrieval, while the aMCI group, relative
to the CN group, activated superior temporal gyrus and
supramarginal gyrus for this comparison. Such findings
indicate an early shift in the functional neural
architecture of relational retrieval in aMCI, and may prove
useful in future studies aimed at capitalizing on
functionally intact neural regions as targets for treatment
and slowing of the disease course. (JINS, 2012, 18,
1-12).},
Doi = {10.1017/S1355617712000689},
Key = {fds287438}
}
@article{fds287439,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of
episodic past, future, and counterfactual
thinking.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {21},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1085-1096},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1053-8100},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
Abstract = {Recent findings suggest that our capacity to imagine the
future depends on our capacity to remember the past.
However, the extent to which episodic memory is involved in
our capacity to think about what could have happened in our
past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic counterfactual
thinking), remains largely unexplored. The current
experiments investigate the phenomenological characteristics
and the influence of outcome valence on the experience of
past, future and counterfactual thoughts. Participants were
asked to mentally simulate past, future, and counterfactual
events with positive or negative outcomes. Features of their
subjective experiences during each type of simulation were
measured using questionnaires and autobiographical
interviews. The results suggest that clarity and vividness
were higher for past than future and counterfactual
simulations. Additionally, emotional intensity was lower for
counterfactual simulations than past and future simulations.
Finally, outcome valence influenced participants' judgment
of probability for future and counterfactual
simulations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
Key = {fds287439}
}
@article{fds287436,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The role of attention in conscious recollection.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {29},
Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
Abstract = {Most research on the relationship between attention and
consciousness has been limited to perception. However,
perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of
which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious
states that has not received proper treatment within this
discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews
compelling evidence indicating that attention may be
necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious
recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of
conscious perception, the kind of attention required during
recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention.
As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as
suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but
probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The
paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions
among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the
difference between internal and external attention. Next,
evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and
neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is
required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents
is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention
during recollection is what makes us conscious of the
contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support
of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested
that internal attention is probably not sufficient for
conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues
for future research are also mentioned.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
Key = {fds287436}
}
@article{fds287437,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Predictive memory and the surprising gap.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {420},
Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
Key = {fds287437}
}
@article{fds320139,
Author = {de Brigard, F},
Title = {Consciousness, attention and commonsense},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {17},
Number = {9-10},
Pages = {189-201},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour
of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology,
while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention
isn't necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an
argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an
argument against the claim that, according to our
commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for
attention. However, I don't claim it follows from this
argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz.
that consciousness isn't necessary for attention. Instead, I
want to motivate the claim that there isn't such a thing as
the view of commonsense psychology about the relation
between attention and consciousness. I argue that people's
use of these terms - and, presumably, of their corresponding
concepts - seems to be context dependent. I conclude with a
discussion of the possible implications of this claim for
the empirical study of attention and consciousness. ©
Imprint Academic 2010.},
Key = {fds320139}
}
@article{fds287435,
Author = {Sarkissian, H and Chatterjee, A and De brigard, F and Knobe, J and Nichols, S and Sirker, S},
Title = {Is belief in free will a cultural universal?},
Journal = {Mind and Language},
Volume = {25},
Number = {3},
Pages = {346-358},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
Abstract = {Recent experimental research has revealed surprising
patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral
responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is
that it has been conducted exclusively on people from
Western cultures. The present paper extends previous
research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining
intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in
subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and
Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of
cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the
majority of participants said that (a) our universe is
indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not
compatible with determinism. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
Key = {fds287435}
}
@article{fds305554,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {If you like it, does it matter if it’s
real?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-57},
Publisher = {Taylor & Francis (Routledge)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {1465-394X},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2010_PhilPsych.pdf},
Abstract = {Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's
experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like
his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual
reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable
experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as
sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable
experiences, people care about "living in contact with
reality." Such claim, however, assumes that people's
reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due
to the fact that they value reality over virtual
experiences-an assumption that has seldom (if ever) been
questioned. This paper challenges that very assumption. I
report some experimental evidence suggesting that the
intuition elicited by the thoughtexperiment may be
explainable by the fact that people are averse to abandon
the life they have been experiencing so far, regardless of
whether such life is virtual or real. I use then an
explanatory model, derived from what behavioral economists
and psychologists call the status quo bias, to make sense of
these results. Finally, I argue that since this explanation
also accounts for people's reaction toward Nozick's
thought-experiment, it would be wrong to take such intuition
as evidence that people value being in touch with reality.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515080903532290},
Key = {fds305554}
}
@article{fds287434,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Prinz, J},
Title = {Attention and consciousness.},
Journal = {Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive
science},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-59},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1939-5078},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.27},
Abstract = {For the past three decades there has been a substantial
amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that
attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual
representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be
something that it is like to experience a representational
perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently
questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In
this paper we survey some of the most important recent
findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first
is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those
seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second
is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging
dissociations between consciousness and attention is not
decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the
debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out
both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues
here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing
investigation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For
further resources related to this article, please visit the
WIREs website.},
Doi = {10.1002/wcs.27},
Key = {fds287434}
}
@article{fds287433,
Author = {de Brigard, F and Mandelbaum, E and Ripley, D},
Title = {Responsibility and the brain sciences},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {511-524},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {1386-2820},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
Abstract = {Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the
neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we
will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This
intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience
gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions,
people will cease to view others as morally responsible for
their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our
legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against
such intuitions. Particularly, our studies of folk
intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are
described in neurological terms, they are not found to be
any more exculpatory than when described in psychological
terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even
for actions that are fully neurologically caused. ©
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
Key = {fds287433}
}
@article{fds287431,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of The Origins of Meaning: Language in the Light of
Evolution},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {529-533},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080903157924},
Doi = {10.1080/09515080903157924},
Key = {fds287431}
}
@article{fds287432,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Comentario crítico a “Las dificultades del compatibilismo
de Dennett”de José Antonio Guerrero del
Amo},
Journal = {Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía},
Volume = {58},
Number = {141},
Pages = {262-268},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287432}
}
@misc{fds287427,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Estados Unidos: Entre ilusiones y prejuicios},
Journal = {Revista Javeriana},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds287427}
}
@article{fds287430,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {En busca de la mente cerebral. Del alma al software
2},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {373-390},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds287430}
}
@book{fds287441,
Author = {Montañés, P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Neuropsicologia clinica y cognoscitiva},
Pages = {267 pages},
Publisher = {Univ. Nacional de Colombia},
Year = {2001},
ISBN = {9789588063041},
url = {http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/1511/},
Key = {fds287441}
}
%% Eva, Benjamin E.
@article{fds374145,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {3},
Pages = {613-637},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
that there exist situations in which rational agents
inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
class of normative theories than has been previously
recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
saddled with the inevitability of rational
opinion loss.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
Key = {fds374145}
}
@article{fds365000,
Author = {Eva, B},
Title = {Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking},
Journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
Volume = {50},
Number = {2},
Pages = {239-266},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papa.12211},
Doi = {10.1111/papa.12211},
Key = {fds365000}
}
@article{fds365001,
Author = {Eva, B and Hartmann, S},
Title = {The logic of partial supposition},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {81},
Number = {2},
Pages = {215-224},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa060},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>According to
orthodoxy, there are two basic moods of supposition:
indicative and subjunctive. The most popular formalizations
of the corresponding norms of suppositional judgement are
given by Bayesian conditionalization and Lewisian imaging,
respectively. It is well known that Bayesian
conditionalization can be generalized (via Jeffrey
conditionalization) to provide a model for the norms of
partial indicative supposition. This raises the question of
whether imaging can likewise be generalized to model the
norms of ‘partial subjunctive supposition’. The present
article casts doubt on whether the most natural
generalizations of imaging are able to provide a plausible
account of the norms of partial subjunctive
supposition .</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anaa060},
Key = {fds365001}
}
@article{fds362298,
Author = {DÖRING, A and EVA, B and OZAWA, M},
Title = {A BRIDGE BETWEEN Q-WORLDS},
Journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {447-486},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2021},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020319000492},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Quantum set theory
(QST) and topos quantum theory (TQT) are two long running
projects in the mathematical foundations of quantum
mechanics (QM) that share a great deal of conceptual and
technical affinity. Most pertinently, both approaches
attempt to resolve some of the conceptual difficulties
surrounding QM by reformulating parts of the theory inside
of nonclassical mathematical universes, albeit with very
different internal logics. We call such mathematical
universes, together with those mathematical and logical
structures within them that are pertinent to the physical
interpretation, ‘Q-worlds’. Here, we provide a unifying
framework that allows us to (i) better understand the
relationship between different Q-worlds, and (ii) define a
general method for transferring concepts and results between
TQT and QST, thereby significantly increasing the expressive
power of both approaches. Along the way, we develop a novel
connection to paraconsistent logic and introduce a new class
of structures that have significant implications for recent
work on paraconsistent set theory.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/s1755020319000492},
Key = {fds362298}
}
@article{fds365002,
Author = {Eva, B},
Title = {The Logic of Conditional Belief},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {70},
Number = {281},
Pages = {759-779},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa008},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The logic of
indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and
intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two
influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief
and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly
sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a
particular conception of the logic of indicative
conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates,
contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is
a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the
indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the
Ramseyan indicative conditional.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1093/pq/pqaa008},
Key = {fds365002}
}
@article{fds365003,
Author = {Eva, B and Hartmann, S},
Title = {On the Origins of Old Evidence},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {98},
Number = {3},
Pages = {481-494},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1658210},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2019.1658210},
Key = {fds365003}
}
@article{fds365504,
Author = {Eva, B},
Title = {Principles of Indifference},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {116},
Number = {7},
Pages = {390-411},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2019},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116724},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The principle of indifference (PI) states that in
the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will
distribute their credence equally among all the possible
outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive
plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is
widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. In this
article, I present a novel rehabilitation of PI in terms of
the epistemology of comparative confidence judgments. In
particular, I consider two natural comparative
reformulations of PI and argue that while one of them
prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic
states, the other (which is only available when we drop the
standard but controversial “Opinionation” assumption
from the comparative confidence framework) provides a
consistent formulation of PI that overcomes the most salient
limitations of existing formulations.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil2019116724},
Key = {fds365504}
}
@article{fds365505,
Author = {Eva, B and Hartmann, S},
Title = {Bayesian argumentation and the value of logical
validity.},
Journal = {Psychological Review},
Volume = {125},
Number = {5},
Pages = {806-821},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000114},
Doi = {10.1037/rev0000114},
Key = {fds365505}
}
%% Farahany, Nita A.
@misc{fds376318,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Congress Is Right to Want to Curtail Tiktok’s Power and
Influence},
Journal = {The Guardian},
Year = {2024},
Key = {fds376318}
}
@article{fds375515,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Neurotech at Work},
Booktitle = {The Year in Tech, 2024: The Insights You Need From Harvard
Business Review},
Publisher = {Harvard Business Review Press},
Year = {2024},
Key = {fds375515}
}
@book{fds365011,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {The Battle for Your Brain: Defending the Right to Think
Freely in the Age of Neurotechnology},
Publisher = {St. Martin's Press},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds365011}
}
@misc{fds369820,
Author = {Farahany, NA and Corbyn, Z},
Title = {We Need a New Human Right to Cognitive Liberty},
Journal = {The Guardian},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds369820}
}
@misc{fds368813,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {A Round-Up of 2022 Neurotechnology Advances},
Journal = {Volokh Conspiracy},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds368813}
}
@misc{fds369927,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Provide a Résumé, Cover Letter and Access to Your Brain?
The Creepy Race to Read Workers’ Minds},
Journal = {Los Angeles Times},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds369927}
}
@misc{fds370153,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {TikTok Is Part of China’s Cognitive Warfare
Campaign},
Journal = {Guardian},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds370153}
}
@misc{fds370151,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {This Is the Battle for Your Brain at Work},
Journal = {Fast Company},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds370151}
}
@misc{fds371554,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {'Cognitive Liberty' Is the Human Right We Need to Talk
About},
Journal = {Time},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds371554}
}
@misc{fds373700,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Human Values in a Digital Age},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {382},
Number = {6670},
Pages = {523},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds373700}
}
@article{fds369011,
Author = {Farahany, NA and Benatar, M and Wuu, J and Andersen, PM and Bucelli, RC and Andrews, JA and Otto, M},
Title = {Design of a Randomized, Placebo-Controlled, Phase 3 Trial of
Tofersen Initiated in Clinically Presymptomatic SOD1 Variant
Carriers: the ATLAS Study},
Journal = {Neurotherapeutics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1248-1258},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds369011}
}
@misc{fds363696,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {We Parents of Unvaccinated Children Need More
Guidance},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds363696}
}
@book{fds361281,
Author = {Farahany, N and Cohen, I and Greely, H and Shachar,
C},
Title = {Consumer Genetic Technologies : Ethical and Legal
Considerations},
Volume = {184},
Pages = {1962-1963},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds361281}
}
@article{fds361279,
Author = {Farahany, N and Ramos, K},
Title = {Neuroethics: Fostering Collaborations to Enable
Neuroscientific Discovery},
Journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {148-154},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds361279}
}
@article{fds361280,
Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H},
Title = {Advancing the Ethical Dialogue About Monkey/Human Chimeric
Embryos},
Journal = {Cell},
Volume = {184},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1962-1963},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds361280}
}
@article{fds355867,
Author = {Farahany, N and Robinson, G},
Title = {The Rise and Fall of the ‘’Warrior Gene’’
Defense},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {371},
Number = {6536},
Pages = {1320},
Year = {2021},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.abh4479},
Doi = {10.1126/science.abh4479},
Key = {fds355867}
}
@misc{fds359369,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {The Extent of Employee Surveillance Is Greater Than You
Know},
Journal = {Duke Magazine},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds359369}
}
@misc{fds355535,
Author = {Farahany, N and Robinson, G},
Title = {Criminal Defendants Still Cite a ‘Gene for Violence.’ It
Doesn’t Exist},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds355535}
}
@article{fds369012,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Neurolaw: A Conversation With Nita Farahany},
Booktitle = {Conversations About Law},
Publisher = {Open Agenda Publishing},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds369012}
}
@article{fds354045,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Proof of Vaccination Will Be Very Valuable — and Easy to
Abuse},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds354045}
}
@article{fds361282,
Author = {Farahany, N and Kennedy, R and Garrett, B},
Title = {Genetic Evidence, MAOA, and State v. Yepez},
Journal = {New Mexico Law Review},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {469-487},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds361282}
}
@article{fds341805,
Author = {Farahany, N and Chodavadia, S and Katsanis, S},
Title = {Ethical Guidelines for DNA Testing in Migrant Family
Reunification},
Journal = {American Journal of Bioethics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {4-7},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds341805}
}
@article{fds319416,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {The Cost of Changing Our Minds},
Journal = {Emory Law Journal},
Volume = {69},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-110},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds319416}
}
@article{fds352924,
Author = {Farahany, N and Ramos, K and Grady, C and Greely,
H},
Title = {The NIH BRAIN Initiative: Integrating Neuroethics and
Neuroscience},
Journal = {Neuron},
Volume = {101},
Number = {3},
Pages = {394-398},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds352924}
}
@article{fds341286,
Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H},
Title = {Neuroscience and the Criminal Justice System},
Journal = {Annual Review of Criminology},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {451-471},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds341286}
}
@misc{fds342432,
Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H and Giattino, C},
Title = {Part-revived Pig Brains Raise Slew of Ethical
Quandaries},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {568},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds342432}
}
@article{fds352925,
Author = {Farahany, N and Giattino, C and Kwong, L and Rafetto,
C},
Title = {The Seductive Allure of Artificial Intelligence-Powered
Neurotechnology},
Pages = {397-402},
Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society},
Publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds352925}
}
@article{fds340884,
Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H},
Title = {The Ethics of Experimenting With Human Brain
Tissue},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {556},
Number = {7702},
Pages = {429-432},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-04813-x},
Doi = {10.1038/d41586-018-04813-x},
Key = {fds340884}
}
@article{fds340883,
Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H and Grady, C and Ramos,
K},
Title = {Neuroethics Guiding Principles for the NIH BRAIN
Initiative},
Journal = {Journal of Neuroscience},
Volume = {38},
Number = {50},
Pages = {10586-10588},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.2077-18.2018},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.2077-18.2018},
Key = {fds340883}
}
@article{fds336005,
Author = {Farahany, N and Oertelt, N and Arabian, A and Payne, S and Brugger, E and Chorost, M},
Title = {Human by Design: An Ethical Framework for Human
Augmentation},
Journal = {IEEE Technology and Society Magazine},
Volume = {36},
Number = {1},
Pages = {32-36},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds336005}
}
@article{fds312125,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An
Empirical Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Law & the Biosciences},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {485-509},
Year = {2016},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3578},
Key = {fds312125}
}
@misc{fds303051,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {3 Reasons Brain Science is Terrific and Terrifying},
Journal = {World Economic Forum},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds303051}
}
@misc{fds319414,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Can You Legally Consent to a Head Transplant?},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds319414}
}
@article{fds268327,
Author = {Farahany, N and Zacharias, R},
Title = {The Legal Circle of Life},
Pages = {229-245},
Booktitle = {Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of
Severe Brain Damage},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds268327}
}
@article{fds268341,
Author = {Farahany, N and Green, R},
Title = {Regulation: The FDA is Overcautious on Consumer
Genetics},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {505},
Pages = {286-287},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds268341}
}
@misc{fds268323,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {New Year's Resolutions, Conservatism & Porn},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds268323}
}
@misc{fds319417,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Colleges Should Allow Students to Take Smart
Drugs},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds319417}
}
@misc{fds319418,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Jurors Award $2.25M in "Devious Defecator"
Case},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds319418}
}
@misc{fds319419,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Test for "Devious Defecator" was Unlawful, Judge
Rules},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds319419}
}
@misc{fds319420,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Zapping the Brain},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds319420}
}
@article{fds268324,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Inability to Consent Does Not Diminish the Desirability of
Stroke Thrombolysis},
Journal = {Annals of Neurology},
Volume = {76},
Number = {2},
Pages = {296-304},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds268324}
}
@article{fds268325,
Author = {Farahany, N and Erlich, Y and Williams, J and Glazer, D and Yocum, K and Olson, M and Narayanan, A and Stein, L and Witkowski, J and Kain,
R},
Title = {Redefining Genomic Privacy: Trust and Empowerment},
Journal = {PLOS Biology},
Volume = {12},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1-5},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3499/},
Key = {fds268325}
}
@article{fds268329,
Author = {Farahany, N and Chiong, W and Kim, A and Huang, I and Josephson,
S},
Title = {Testing the Presumption of Consent to Emergency Treatment
for Acute Ischemic Stroke},
Journal = {Journal of the American Medical Association},
Volume = {311},
Number = {16},
Pages = {1689-1691},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds268329}
}
@article{fds268334,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {The Costs of Changing Our Minds},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3596},
Key = {fds268334}
}
@misc{fds319421,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {On 'Being a Dirty Old Man' and a Federal
Judge},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds319421}
}
@misc{fds319422,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Reining in FDA Regulation of Mobile Health
Apps},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds319422}
}
@misc{fds319423,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {FDA Considers Controversial Fertility Procedure. What's at
Stake?},
Journal = {Washington Post},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds319423}
}
@article{fds268326,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Introduction},
Booktitle = {The Island of Dr. Moreau},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds268326}
}
@article{fds268333,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {On Cognitive Liberty},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds268333}
}
@article{fds268335,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Empirical Use of Behavioral Genetics and Neuroscience in
Criminal Law, 2004-2010},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds268335}
}
@article{fds268336,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {A Neurological Foundation for Freedom},
Journal = {Stanford Technology Law Review},
Volume = {2012},
Pages = {4},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2650/},
Key = {fds268336}
}
@article{fds268343,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Incriminating Thoughts},
Journal = {Stanford Law Review},
Volume = {64},
Pages = {351-408},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2651/},
Key = {fds268343}
}
@article{fds268344,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Searching Secrets},
Journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
Volume = {160},
Pages = {1239-1308},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2654/},
Key = {fds268344}
}
@article{fds268330,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Law and Behavioral Morality},
Booktitle = {Evolution and Morality (NOMOS LII)},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds268330}
}
@book{fds310028,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal
Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds310028}
}
@article{fds268332,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {ix-xviii},
Booktitle = {The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal
Law},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds268332}
}
@article{fds268340,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Cruel and Unequal Punishment},
Journal = {Washington University Law Review},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {859-915},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2653/},
Key = {fds268340}
}
@article{fds268331,
Author = {Farahany, N and Coleman Jr. and J},
Title = {Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility},
Pages = {183-240},
Booktitle = {The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal
Law},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds268331}
}
@article{fds268345,
Author = {Farahany, N and Bernet, W and Vnencak-Jones, C and Montgomery,
S},
Title = {Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony Regarding MAOA and
SLC6A4 Genotyping in Murder Trials},
Journal = {Journal of Forensic Sciences},
Volume = {52},
Pages = {1362-1371},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2655/},
Key = {fds268345}
}
@article{fds268337,
Author = {Farahany, N},
Title = {Foreword: The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Criminal
Law},
Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {69},
Pages = {1-6},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol69/iss1/2/},
Key = {fds268337}
}
@article{fds268339,
Author = {Farahany, N and Bernet, W},
Title = {Behavioural Genetics in Criminal Cases: Past, Present and
Future},
Journal = {Genomics, Society & Policy},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {72-79},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2656/},
Key = {fds268339}
}
@article{fds268342,
Author = {Coleman, J and Farahany, N},
Title = {Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal from the
Crime},
Journal = {Law & Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {69},
Pages = {115-164},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol69/iss1/7/},
Key = {fds268342}
}
%% Ferejohn, Michael T.
@article{fds226006,
Author = {M.T. Ferejohn},
Title = {Definition in Ancient Logic},
Booktitle = {Ancient Logic},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {L. Castagnoli},
Year = {2014},
ISBN = {TBD},
Key = {fds226006}
}
@book{fds220177,
Author = {M.T. Ferejohn},
Title = {Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in
Socratic and Aristotelian Thought (new title)},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {978-0-19-969530-0},
Key = {fds220177}
}
@book{fds296415,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in
Socratic and Aristotelian Thought},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {978-0-19-969530-0},
Key = {fds296415}
}
@article{fds296407,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {The Diagnostic Function of Socratic Definitions},
Booktitle = {Socrates, Plato, Aristotle" Essays in Honour of G.
Santas},
Editor = {Anagnostopoulos, G},
Year = {2010},
ISBN = {978-9400737303},
Key = {fds296407}
}
@article{fds327004,
Author = {Ferejohn, M},
Title = {Empiricism and the First Principles of Aristotelian
Science},
Pages = {66-80},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Aristotle},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9781405122238},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444305661.ch5},
Doi = {10.1002/9781444305661.ch5},
Key = {fds327004}
}
@article{fds296406,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Empiricism and First Principles in Aristotle},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Aristotle},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Anagnostopoulos, G},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {9781405122238},
Key = {fds296406}
}
@article{fds327597,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Knowledge, Recollection, and the Forms in Republic
VII},
Pages = {214-233},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781405115636},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776414.ch11},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470776414.ch11},
Key = {fds327597}
}
@article{fds327005,
Author = {Ferejohn, M},
Title = {Knowledge and the Forms in Plato},
Pages = {146-161},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Plato},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Year = {2007},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9781405115216},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470996256.ch11},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470996256.ch11},
Key = {fds327005}
}
@article{fds296405,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Knowledge and the Forms},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Plato},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Benson, H},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds296405}
}
@article{fds296404,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Knowledge and Recollection in the Middle Books of the
Republic},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Santas, GX},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296404}
}
@article{fds296416,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Logical and Physical Inquiries in Aristotle's
Metaphysics},
Journal = {The Modern Schoolman},
Volume = {LXXX},
Number = {4},
Pages = {325-350},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman200380420},
Doi = {10.5840/schoolman200380420},
Key = {fds296416}
}
@article{fds296413,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford
1998)},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {111},
Number = {2},
Year = {2002},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296413}
}
@article{fds17820,
Author = {M.T. Ferejohn},
Title = {Perception and Dialectic in De Anima B5},
Booktitle = {From Puzzles to Principles: Essays on Aristotle’s
Dialectic},
Publisher = {Lexington Books},
Editor = {May Sim},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds17820}
}
@article{fds71083,
Author = {M.T. Ferejohn},
Title = {Perception and Dialectic in De Anima B5},
Booktitle = {From Puzzles to Principles: Essays on Aristotle’s
Dialectic},
Editor = {May Sim},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds71083}
}
@article{fds296403,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Perception and Dialectic in De Anima B5},
Booktitle = {From Puzzles to Principles: Essays on Aristotle’s
Dialectic},
Editor = {Sim, M},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296403}
}
@article{fds296412,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Of G. Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s
Theory of Forms (Oxford 1993)},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296412}
}
@article{fds296417,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Matter Definition, and Generation in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy},
Volume = {10},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296417}
}
@article{fds296418,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {The Immediate Premises of Aristotelian Demonstration},
Journal = {Ancient Philosophy},
Volume = {XIV},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296418}
}
@article{fds296411,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Of R. McKirahan, Principle and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory
of Demonstrative Science (Princeton 1992)},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296411}
}
@article{fds296402,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {The Definition of Generated Composites in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics},
Booktitle = {Unity and Identity: The Principles of Aristotelian
Substance},
Publisher = {Oxford},
Editor = {Charles, D and Gill, ML and Scaltsas, T},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296402}
}
@article{fds342194,
Author = {Posy, CJ and Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Editors' introduction},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {96},
Number = {3},
Pages = {333-334},
Year = {1993},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064005},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064005},
Key = {fds342194}
}
@book{fds71071,
Author = {M.T. Ferejohn},
Title = {The Origins of Aristotelian Science. Yale University Press,
1991.},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds71071}
}
@book{fds296414,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {The Origins of Aristotelian Science},
Publisher = {Yale University Press},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296414}
}
@article{fds296419,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic
Fragmentation},
Journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
Volume = {71},
Number = {3},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {0003-9101},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph.1989.71.3.257},
Doi = {10.1515/agph.1989.71.3.257},
Key = {fds296419}
}
@article{fds296420,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Meno's Paradox and De Re Knowledge in Aristotle's Theory of
Demonstration},
Journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly},
Year = {1988},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296420}
}
@article{fds296410,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Of B. Aune, Metaphysics: The Elements},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds296410}
}
@article{fds296409,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Of S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency},
Journal = {Review of Metaphysics},
Year = {1984},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296409}
}
@article{fds296408,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Of S. Waterlow, Passage and Possibility},
Journal = {Canadian Philosophical Reviews},
Year = {1984},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds296408}
}
@article{fds296422,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Socratic Virtue as the Parts of Itself},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {377-388},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1984},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107690},
Doi = {10.2307/2107690},
Key = {fds296422}
}
@article{fds296421,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue
Paradox},
Journal = {Phronesis},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {105-122},
Publisher = {Brill},
Year = {1984},
ISSN = {0031-8868},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852884x00102},
Doi = {10.1163/156852884x00102},
Key = {fds296421}
}
@article{fds296423,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Definition and the Two Stages of Aristotelian
Demonstration},
Journal = {Review of Metaphysics},
Volume = {36},
Number = {2},
Pages = {373-395},
Year = {1982},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296423}
}
@article{fds296424,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {The Unity of Virtue and the Object of Socratic
Inquiry},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-21},
Year = {1982},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds296424}
}
@article{fds296425,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Aristotle on Necessary Truth and Logical
Priority},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {18},
Number = {4},
Pages = {285-293},
Year = {1981},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds296425}
}
@article{fds296426,
Author = {Ferejohn, MT},
Title = {Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of
Science},
Journal = {Phronesis},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {117-128},
Publisher = {Brill},
Year = {1980},
ISSN = {0031-8868},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852880x00070},
Doi = {10.1163/156852880x00070},
Key = {fds296426}
}
%% Finestone, Kobi
@article{fds361763,
Author = {Finestone, K and Kingston, E},
Title = {Crisis Prices: The Ethics of Market Controls during a Global
Pandemic},
Journal = {Business Ethics Quarterly},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {12-40},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2021.15},
Abstract = {<jats:p>SARS-CoV-2 has unleashed an unprecedented global
crisis that has caused the demand for essential goods, such
as medical and sanitation products, to soar while
simultaneously disrupting the very supply chains that allow
individuals and institutions to obtain those essential
goods. This has resulted in stark price increases and
accusations of price gouging. We survey the existing
philosophical literature that examines price gouging and
identify the key arguments for regulators permitting such
behavior and for regulators restricting such behavior. We
demonstrate how the existing accounts are designed for
localized <jats:italic>emergencies</jats:italic> rather than
global persistent <jats:italic>crises</jats:italic> such as
the coronavirus pandemic. In light of this, we highlight an
understudied justification for price gouging that is much
more salient during global crises: incentivizing increased
production of essential goods. Furthermore, we pinpoint
three conditions that help determine whether authorities
should restrict price gouging during the coronavirus
pandemic and similar global crises.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/beq.2021.15},
Key = {fds361763}
}
@article{fds362200,
Author = {Finestone, K},
Title = {Darwinian rational expectations},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {113-123},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2022.2035796},
Abstract = {The rational expectations hypothesis holds that agents
should be modeled as not making systematic forecasting
errors and has become a central model-building principle of
modern economics. The hypothesis is often justified on the
grounds that it coheres with the general methodological
principle of economic rationality. In this article, I
propose a novel Darwinian market justification for rational
expectations which does not require either structural
knowledge or statistical learning, as is commonly required
in the economic literature. Rather, this Darwinian market
account reconceives rationality as a market level phenomenon
instead of as an individualistic property.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2022.2035796},
Key = {fds362200}
}
%% Fjeld, Jon
@article{fds357041,
Author = {Fjeld, J and Jensen, K and Byers, T and Dunham, L},
Title = {Entrepreneurs and the Truth},
Journal = {Harvard Business Review},
Publisher = {Harvard Business School Publishing},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds357041}
}
@article{fds362007,
Author = {Cummings, JN and Cohen, W and Fjeld, J and Mealey,
C},
Title = {Coherence between Firm Innovation Strategy and Structuring
Innovation Projects: A Framework},
Journal = {Academy of Management Proceedings},
Volume = {2019},
Number = {1},
Pages = {17817-17817},
Publisher = {Academy of Management},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2019.17817abstract},
Doi = {10.5465/ambpp.2019.17817abstract},
Key = {fds362007}
}
@article{fds336006,
Author = {Fjeld, J},
Title = {How to Test Your Assumptions},
Journal = {MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW},
Volume = {59},
Number = {2},
Pages = {89-90},
Publisher = {SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW ASSOC, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL
MANAGEMENT},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds336006}
}
@article{fds326236,
Author = {Cohen, WM and Fjeld, J},
Title = {The three legs of a stool: Comment on Richard Nelson, “The
sciences are different and the differences
matter”},
Journal = {Research Policy},
Volume = {45},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1708-1712},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.06.002},
Abstract = {In our response to Nelson's important argument regarding the
fit of research methods with the subject matter of various
natural and social sciences, we highlight the
complementarities offered by combining qualitative analysis
with modeling and statistical analysis, focusing on
economics. The argument is illustrated using a discussion of
two studies on the economics of innovation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2016.06.002},
Key = {fds326236}
}
%% Flanagan, Owen
@article{fds287515,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the Mozi
1},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {473-491},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03503008},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03503008},
Key = {fds287515}
}
@article{fds355606,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {Han fei zi’s philosophical psychology: Human nature,
scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian consensus},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {293-316},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03802010},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03802010},
Key = {fds355606}
}
@article{fds357871,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The disunity of addictive cravings},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {243-246},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0030},
Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2020.0030},
Key = {fds357871}
}
@article{fds366398,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Cross-cultural philosophy and well-being},
Pages = {227-247},
Booktitle = {Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy: Owen
Flanagan and Beyond},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9780367350246},
Key = {fds366398}
}
@article{fds346700,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Is Oneness an Over-belief?},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {99},
Number = {2},
Pages = {508-513},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12631},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12631},
Key = {fds346700}
}
@article{fds363772,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity and addiction},
Pages = {77-89},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of
Addiction},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781138909281},
Key = {fds363772}
}
@article{fds335564,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Zhao, W},
Title = {The self and its good vary cross-culturally: A dozen
self-variations and Chinese familial selves},
Pages = {287-301},
Booktitle = {Self, Culture and Consciousness: Interdisciplinary
Convergences on Knowing and Being},
Publisher = {Springer Singapore},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9789811057762},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
Doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
Key = {fds335564}
}
@book{fds335566,
Author = {Caruso, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age
of neuroscience},
Pages = {1-374},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
Abstract = {Existentialism is a concern about the foundation of meaning,
morals, and purpose. Existentialisms arise when some
foundation for these elements of being is under assault. In
the past, first-wave existentialism concerned the
increasingly apparent inability of religion and religious
tradition to provide such a foundation, as typified in the
writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche.
Second-wave existentialism, personified philosophically by
Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, developed in response to the
inability of an overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of
reason and the common good to provide such a foundation.
There is a third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism,
developing in response to advances in the neurosciences that
threaten the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self.
With the increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of
neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world
to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces
foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores
the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and
some responses to it. It brings together some of the
world℉s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive
scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our
neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind
sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion,
autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral
responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment,
meaning in life, and purpose.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
Key = {fds335566}
}
@article{fds335565,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, G},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Third-wave existentialism},
Pages = {1-22},
Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
of Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
Abstract = {Neuroexistentialism is a recent expression of existential
anxiety over the nature of persons. Unlike previous
existentialisms, neuroexistentialism is not caused by a
problem with ecclesiastical authority, as was the
existentialism represented by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and
Nietzsche, nor by the shock of coming face to face with the
moral horror of nation state actors and their citizens, as
in the mid-century existentialism of Sartre and Camus.
Rather, neuroexistentialism is caused by the rise of the
scientific authority of the human sciences and a resultant
clash between the scientific and the humanistic image of
persons. Flanagan and Caruso explain what
neuroexistentialism is and how it is related to two earlier
existentialisms and they spell out how neuroexistentialism
makes particularly vivid the clash between the humanistic
and the scientific image of persons. They conclude by
providing a brief summary of the chapters to
follow.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
Key = {fds335565}
}
@article{fds339638,
Author = {Tononi, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness},
Journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {332-348},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
Abstract = {This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist
about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is
consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If
so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like
in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its
explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory
acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan
and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during
an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of
consciousness.},
Doi = {10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
Key = {fds339638}
}
@article{fds366917,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, GD},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism},
Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine},
Number = {83},
Pages = {68-72},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm201883105},
Doi = {10.5840/tpm201883105},
Key = {fds366917}
}
@article{fds366918,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Philosophy of Multicultures},
Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine},
Number = {82},
Pages = {99-104},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188283},
Doi = {10.5840/tpm20188283},
Key = {fds366918}
}
@article{fds329381,
Author = {Gyal, P and Flanagan, O},
Title = {The role of pain in buddhism: The conquest of
suffering},
Pages = {288-296},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138823181},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315742205},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315742205},
Key = {fds329381}
}
@article{fds327006,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Addiction Doesn’t Exist, But it is Bad for
You},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {91-98},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
Abstract = {There is a debate about the nature of addiction, whether it
is a result of brain damage, brain dysfunction, or normal
brain changes that result from habit acquisition, and about
whether it is a disease. I argue that the debate about
whether addiction is a disease is much ado about nothing,
since all parties agree it is “unquestionably
destructive.” Furthermore, the term ‘addiction’ has
disappeared from recent DSM’s in favor of a spectrum of
‘abuse’ disorders. This may be a good thing indicating
more nuance in typing the heterogeneous phenomena we used to
call ‘addiction’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
Key = {fds327006}
}
@book{fds341012,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Foreword: Cross-cultural philosophy and the moral
project},
Pages = {xi-xvii},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190499778},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001},
Key = {fds341012}
}
@article{fds352990,
Author = {Tekin, Ş and Flanagan, O and Graham, G},
Title = {Against the Drug Cure Model: Addiction, Identity, and
Pharmaceuticals},
Volume = {122},
Pages = {221-236},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Medicine},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13},
Abstract = {Recent advances in brain imaging methods as well as
increased sophistication in neuroscientific modeling of the
brain’s reward systems have facilitated the study of
neural mechanisms associated with addiction such as
processes associated with motivation, decision-making,
pleasure seeking, and inhibitory control. These scientific
activities have increased optimism that the neurological
underpinnings of addiction will be delineated, and that
pharmaceuticals that target and change these mechanisms will
by themselves facilitate early intervention and even full
recovery. In this paper, we argue that it is misguided to
construe addiction as just or primarily a brain chemistry
problem, which can be adequately treated by pharmaceutical
interventions alone.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13},
Key = {fds352990}
}
@article{fds366919,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H},
Title = {The Character of Consciousness},
Pages = {17-30},
Booktitle = {UNDERSTANDING JAMES, UNDERSTANDING MODERNISM},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-5013-0274-9},
Key = {fds366919}
}
@article{fds366920,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Graham, G},
Title = {Truth and Sanity: Positive Illusions, Spiritual Delusions,
and Metaphysical Hallucinations},
Pages = {293-313},
Booktitle = {EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY: RESPONSES TO THE
CRISIS IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds366920}
}
@article{fds328339,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Negative dialectics in comparative philosophy: The case of
Buddhist free will quietism},
Pages = {59-71},
Booktitle = {Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless
Agency?},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781138950344},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315668765},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315668765},
Key = {fds328339}
}
@article{fds318361,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Does yoga induce metaphysical hallucinations?
Interdisciplinarity at the edge: Comments on Evan Thompson's
waking, dreaming, being},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {66},
Number = {3},
Pages = {952-958},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
Doi = {10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
Key = {fds318361}
}
@article{fds318360,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Pages = {16-33},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism},
Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781118657607},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Abstract = {In this chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics
should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet
naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two
fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism
allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics
is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to
pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics
both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why
nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical
naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes
the essence of Duke naturalism.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Key = {fds318360}
}
@article{fds327181,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H},
Title = {William James and the problem of consciousness},
Pages = {152-161},
Booktitle = {Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What would they
have said about our Mind-Body Problem?},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138934412},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315678023},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315678023},
Key = {fds327181}
}
@article{fds361192,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K},
Title = {Justice, care, and gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan debate
revisited},
Pages = {69-84},
Booktitle = {An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary
Perspectives},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781134712465},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203760192-13},
Abstract = {In 1958, G. E. M. Anscombe wrote, “It is not profitable
for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be
laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy
of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking”
(186). Anscombe hinted (and she and many others pursued the
hint) that the Aristotelian tradition was the best place to
look for a richer and less shadowy conception of moral
agency than either utilitarianism or Kantianism had
provided.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203760192-13},
Key = {fds361192}
}
@article{fds366137,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S},
Title = {Confucian Moral Sources},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA},
Pages = {205-227},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds366137}
}
@article{fds318363,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Buddhism and the scientific image: Reply to
critics},
Journal = {Zygon(R)},
Volume = {49},
Number = {1},
Pages = {242-258},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12080},
Abstract = {I provide a précis of The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism
Naturalized, and then respond to three critics, Christian
Coseru, Charles Goodman, and Bronwyn Finnigan. © 2014 by
the Joint Publication Board of Zygon.},
Doi = {10.1111/zygo.12080},
Key = {fds318363}
}
@book{fds222040,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {MORAL SPROUTS AND NATURAL TELEOLOGIES 21st CENTURY MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY MEETS CLASSICAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY},
Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds222040}
}
@book{fds287538,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleology: 21st century Moral
Psychology Meets Classical Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {The 78th Aquinas Lecture},
Key = {fds287538}
}
@book{fds306209,
Title = {Virtue Epistemology Naturalized},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Fairweather, A and Flanagan, O},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds306209}
}
@article{fds287492,
Author = {Crome, I and Wu, L-T and Rao, RT and Crome, P},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xxiv-xxv},
Booktitle = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287492}
}
@article{fds287493,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {*It Takes a Metaphysics, Raising Virtuous
Buddhists*},
Booktitle = {*Cultivating Virtue*},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Snow, N},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Abstract: Buddhism is an extremely demanding ethic, possibly
as demanding as act-utilitarianism. It endorses virtuous
dispositions, compassion and loving-kindness, to alleviate
the suffering of all sentient beings and to bring well-being
in its stead. How does Buddhism inculcate these virtues, if
it does? Besides the usual direct instruction, cajoling,
carrots and sticks familiar across ethical traditions,
Buddhists work to inculcate these virtues by teaching
children a metaphysic that involves recognition of one’s
ephemerality and one’s dependency on and
interconnectedness with all other beings.},
Key = {fds287493}
}
@article{fds287495,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {Han Fei Zi’s Philosophical Psychology: Human Nature,
Scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian Consensus},
Booktitle = {The State of Nature in Comparative Political Thought:
Western and Non-Western Perspectives},
Publisher = {Lexington Books},
Editor = {Carlson, JD and Fox, RA},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287495}
}
@article{fds287496,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Phenomenal Authority: The Epistemic Authority of Alcoholics
Anonymous},
Booktitle = {The Nature of Addiction},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Levy, N},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {To understand a complicated psycho-bio-social phenomenon(a)
such as addiction to alcohol one wants ideally a
phenomenology, a behavioral and cognitive psychology, a
physiology, and a neurobiology – all embedded in a
sociology. One wants to know what it is like to be alcoholic
– if, that is, there is any commonality to the experiences
of alcoholics (Flanagan 2011). One wants to know about such
things as whether and if so what kind of loss of control
alcoholics experience in relation to alcohol (as well as,
any and all affective and cognitive deficits). One wants to
know what the brain is doing and how it contributes to the
production of the characteristic phenomenology(ies) and
control (and other cognitive and affective) problems. One
wants to know what effect heavy drinking has on vulnerable
organ systems, e.g., the brain, the heart, and the liver.
And, of course, all along the way, one should want to know
how the sociomoral-cultural-political ecology normalizes,
romanticizes, pathologizes, etc. alcoholism and its
relations, heavy drinking, recklessness-under-the-influence,
etc. Some scientists and philosophers worry that the program
of A.A. biases our understanding of the phenomenology,
psychology, physiology, and neurobiology of addiction and
prevents a unified, or at least a consilient, account of the
nature, causes, and treatment of alcoholism from emerging. I
have experience in the rooms of A.A., as well as in seminar
and conference rooms with experts on addiction. From this
perspective, I assess this claim that A.A. is part of the
problem, not of the solution, and suggest some ways to
increase mutual understanding between the various modes of
understanding alcoholism, which if abided would yield
sensitive and sensible interaction among the practical
program of A.A. and the sciences of addiction. One
consequence is that A.A. would need to acknowledge that as a
therapeutic social institution it is a repository of some
practical knowledge about what works to help some people
recovery and stay abstinent, but has no expertise on
alcoholism or even on “how it works” if, that is, it
does work.},
Key = {fds287496}
}
@article{fds287527,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {PERFORMING ONESELF},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Creativity},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Samuels, E and Kaufmann, SB},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287527}
}
@article{fds287540,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The shame of addiction.},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychiatry},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {120},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {8 OCTOBER 2013},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24115936},
Abstract = {Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin
normative failures. A failure of normal rational effective
agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and
shame at both this failure, and the failure to live up to
the standards for a good life that the addict himself
acknowledges and aspires to. Feeling shame for addiction is
not a mistake. It is part of the shape of addiction, part of
the normal phenomenology of addiction, and often a source of
motivation for the addict to heal. Like other recent
attempts in the addiction literature to return normative
concepts such as "choice" and "responsibility" to their
rightful place in understanding and treating addiction, the
twin normative failure model is fully compatible with
investigation of genetic and neuroscientific causes of
addiction. Furthermore, the model does not re-moralize
addiction. There can be shame without blame.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00120},
Key = {fds287540}
}
@book{fds222041,
Author = {Abrol Fairweather and O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Fairweather and Flanagan},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds222041}
}
@article{fds287488,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The View From the East Pole: Buddhist and Confucian
Tolerance},
Booktitle = {Religion and Tolerance},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clarke, S and Powell, R},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {In this chapter I ask the question: Why are Buddhists and
Confucians more tolerant, less conflict prone, less
war-like, etc. than Abrahamic peoples IF THEY ARE?1 A proper
analysis that positioned us to adequately answer this
question would require defining the different
concepts—“tolerance,” “conflict-prone,”
“war-like”—producing evidence that it is true that
there exist significant differences between adherents of
these different traditions, and then using something like
Mill’s methods to rule out political, economic, or
material culture explanations of the differences, thereby
making the reli- gious differences the most plausible
candidate for the difference-maker.2 Here I do something
less than what is needed. I operate on the assump- tion that
it is true that Buddhists and Confucians are more tolerant,
less conflict-prone, etc. than Abrahamic people, all else
equal.3 Then I formulate a hypothesis for why the
difference-maker may have to do with God, or better, with
beliefs about God’s nature and modus operandi. I say
“may” because I am not convinced that my hypothesis is
true. The hypothesis is not that Buddhism and Confucianism
are more rational, less superstitious than the Abrahamic
religions. It is that Buddhism and Confucianism have
theologies that differ from the Abrahamic ones in ways that
make a difference. The core idea is that the belief in the
Abrahamic God (Yahweh, God, Allah) engenders or supports
attitudes and actions that demand epistemic and normative
conformity across peoples with different customs, habits,
and beliefs. Buddhist and Confucian theologies differ from
each other in important ways, but share the following two
features (Flanagan 2008; Flanagan 2011):},
Key = {fds287488}
}
@article{fds287489,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Social Epistemological Normalization of Contestable
Narratives:* Stories of Just Deserts},
Pages = {358-375},
Booktitle = {What Happened In and To Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth
Century},
Publisher = {notre dame university press},
Editor = {Rourke, FO},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287489}
}
@article{fds287490,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S},
Title = {Confucian Moral Sources},
Booktitle = {The Philosophical Challenge from China},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Burya, B},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287490}
}
@article{fds287491,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
G},
Title = {Empiricism and Normative Ethics What do the biology and the
psychology of morality have to do with ethics?},
Booktitle = {Evolved Morality: The Biology & Philosophy of Human
Conscience},
Publisher = {Brill},
Editor = {Waal, FD and al, PSCE},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287491}
}
@article{fds287520,
Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Lane, T},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive
Illusions},
Journal = {SYNTHESE Philosophy Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {SPRINGER},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287520}
}
@article{fds287526,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Buddhism and The Scientific Image},
Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287526}
}
@article{fds318364,
Author = {Flanagan, B and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Anguished Art: Coming Through the Dark to the Light the Hard
Way},
Pages = {75-83},
Booktitle = {Blues-Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling
Low},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780470656808},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
Key = {fds318364}
}
@book{fds306210,
Author = {Fireman, GD and McVay, TE and Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
Brain},
Pages = {1-264},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780195140057},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
Abstract = {The evocation of narrative as a way to understand the
content of consciousness, including memory, autobiography,
self, and imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary
work among psychologists, philosophers, and literary
critics. Even neuroscientists have taken an interest in the
stories people create to understand themselves, their past,
and the world around them. The research presented in this
volume should appeal to researchers enmeshed in these
problems, as well as the general reader with an interest in
the philosophical problem of what consciousness is and how
it functions in the everyday world.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
Key = {fds306210}
}
@article{fds318365,
Author = {Einstein, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Sexual Identities and Narratives of Self},
Pages = {209-231},
Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
Brain},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780195140057},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
Abstract = {Certain philosophical ideas about identity, what makes one
human, and other such dimensions may be associated with
conceptions that concern how scientific knowledge about
sense of self may be reinforced by processes that occur
within the body and the brain. John Locke's cognitivist view
asserts that among all other organisms, and although these
organisms may possess organic integrity and biological
continuity, only human beings are bestowed with a semantic
and autobiographical memory. While Locke's view concentrates
on how personal identity should entail cognitive memory,
this chapter looks into alternative views wherein the self
also involves certain conative factors. This chapter looks
into the notion of sexual self and how the body and brain
may also determine the self.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
Key = {fds318365}
}
@book{fds318366,
Author = {Fairweather, A},
Title = {Naturalizing epistemic virtue},
Pages = {1-272},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107028579},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
Abstract = {An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the
discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other
intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology
is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the
first collection of essays to explore whether virtue
epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical
definition meaning 'methodologically continuous with
science'. The essays examine the empirical research in
psychology on cognitive abilities and personal dispositions,
meta-epistemic semantic accounts of virtue theoretic norms,
the role of emotion in knowledge, 'ought-implies can'
constraints, empirically and metaphysically grounded
accounts of 'proper functioning', and even applied virtue
epistemology in relation to education. Naturalizing
Epistemic Virtue addresses many core issues in contemporary
epistemology, presents new opportunities for work on
epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive
character, and will be of great interest to those studying
virtue ethics and epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
Key = {fds318366}
}
@article{fds287539,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Phenomenal and historical selves},
Journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
Volume = {84},
Pages = {217-240},
Editor = {Katja Crone and Kristina Musholt and Anna Strasser},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0165-9227},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789401207904_011},
Abstract = {There are two ways a person can experience or, what is dif
erent, can think about herself: f rst, as a subject of
experience who feels a certain characteristic way,
the-way-it-feels-to-be-oneself; and, second, as the person
who is the subject of a particular autobiography, as the
actor who is the protagonist in the history of this
organism. The f rst is the phenomenal self; the second is
the historical self. Marking the distinction has
implications for philosophical psychology, for views about
what a self is, how many selves a person has, the varieties
of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and for normative
views about how a self is supposed to relate to its own past
and future.},
Doi = {10.1163/9789401207904_011},
Key = {fds287539}
}
@article{fds318367,
Author = {Fairweather, A},
Title = {Introduction: Naturalized virtue epistemology},
Pages = {1-14},
Booktitle = {Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107028579},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
Abstract = {This volume aims to launch a powerful and largely unexplored
position in epistemology: naturalized virtue epistemology.
Most debates in virtue epistemology have been decidedly
axiological and aim to clarify the goals, values, and ends
constitutive of epistemic evaluation. Value-driven inquiry
has now become quite complex in the large literature on the
value problem (and the related Meno problem), which examines
whether the value of knowledge can be reduced to the value
of any proper subset of its parts (Zagzebski 1996; Kvanvig
2003; Pritchard 2007). Normative epistemic inquiry has also
been useful in meeting more traditional problems in
epistemology, such as Gettier problems (Turri 2011) and
problems of epistemic luck more generally, as well as the
structure of knowledge (as etiological rather than
foundational or coherentist), and Chisholm’s “problem of
the criterion” (Riggs 2007). Virtue epistemology has
opened many new areas of inquiry in contemporary
epistemology including: epistemic agency (Greco 1999;
Zagzebski 2001; Sosa 2007), the role of motivations and
emotions in epistemology (Fairweather 2001; Hookway 2003),
the nature of abilities (Millar 2008; Greco 2010; Pritchard
2012), skills (Greco 1993; Bloomfield 2000), and competences
(Sosa 2007), the value of understanding (Kvanvig 2003; Grimm
2006; Riggs 2009), wisdom (Ryan 1999; Zagzebski 2013),
curiosity (Whitcomb 2010; Inan 2012) and even education
policy and practice (Baehr 2011). The virtue turn in
epistemology that started with the early work of Sosa (1991)
and Zagzebski (1996) has now produced a large and mature
literature in normative epistemology. While the growth and
impact of virtue epistemology has been impressive and
important, it has come with insufficient attention to the
empirical grounding of these normative theories, and thus
runs the risk of endorsing free-floating epistemic norms cut
loose from the real-world phenomenon they must evaluate. To
this end, virtue epistemologists should heed the exhortation
given by Anscombe in “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) to
constrain normative theorizing in ethics with an empirically
adequate moral psychology, and might even do so
optimistically since Anscombe (and Foot, later Geach, and
still later MacIntyre) was led to endorse virtue theory
precisely because it appeared more psychologically plausible
than deontology or consequentialism. The same cautionary
(and perhaps optimistic) point holds for epistemic
psychology and normative epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
Key = {fds318367}
}
@article{fds212062,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {Kristján Kristjánsson The Self and Its Emotions Kristján
Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions, Cambridge
University Press, 2010, 288pp., ISBN 9780521114783.},
Journal = {NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35356-the-self-and-its-emotions/},
Key = {fds212062}
}
@article{fds212082,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr. and Stephen Martin},
Title = {Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology},
Journal = {Human.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies
21},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963) Wilfrid
Sellars raises a problem for the very possibility of
normative epistemology. How can the scientific image, which
celebrates the causal relation among often imperceptible
physical states, make room for justificatory relations among
introspectible propositional attitudes? We sketch a
naturalistic model of reason and of epistemic decisions that
parallels a compatibilist solution to the problem of freedom
of action. Not only doesn’t science lead to rejection of
our account of normative reasoning, science depends on,
sophisticates, and explains how normative reasoning is
possible.},
Key = {fds212082}
}
@article{fds287519,
Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
G},
Title = {What do the Psychology and Biology of Morality have to do
with Ethics?: Ethics as Human Ecology},
Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
B},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds287519}
}
@book{fds183894,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (paper
2013)},
Publisher = {MIT PRESS},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds183894}
}
@article{fds318370,
Author = {Paulson, S and Flanagan, O and Bloom, P and Baumeister,
R},
Title = {Quid pro quo: the ecology of the self.},
Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
Volume = {1234},
Pages = {29-43},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
Abstract = {Moderated by Steve Paulson, producer and interviewer for
public radio's To the Best of Our Knowledge, philosopher and
neurobiologist Owen Flanagan (Duke University), and
psychologists Paul Bloom (Yale University) and Roy
Baumeister (Florida State University) examine current
biological, psychological, and anthropological research on
the complex interaction between the self and others, and
consider the roots of empathy and morality. The following is
an edited transcript of the discussion that occurred
February 23, 2011, 7:00-8:15 PM, at the New York Academy of
Sciences in New York City.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
Key = {fds318370}
}
@book{fds287537,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds287537}
}
@article{fds287541,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {HAN FEI ZI'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN NATURE,
SCARCITY, AND THE NEO-DARWINIAN CONSENSUS},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {293-316},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0301-8121},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
Key = {fds287541}
}
@article{fds201209,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {SISSELA BOK Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain
Science},
Journal = {Notre Dame Review of Books},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds201209}
}
@article{fds287453,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Wittgenstein's Ethical Nonnaturalism: An Interpretation of
Tractatus 6.41-47 and the 'Lecture on Ethics'},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {48},
Number = {2},
Pages = {185-198},
Publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0003-0481},
Key = {fds287453}
}
@article{fds318369,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroscience: Knowing and feeling},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {469},
Number = {7329},
Pages = {160-161},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/469160a},
Doi = {10.1038/469160a},
Key = {fds318369}
}
@article{fds287485,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Performing Oneself},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Creativity},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Paul, E and Kaufmann, SB},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {Abstract: I explore the ancient idea that life is some kind
of dramatic or artistic performance. How seriously and
literally ought we to take this idea that life is like a
dramatic performance, even that it is one? There are
metaphysical and logical questions about whether and how
self-creation and self-constitution are possible; and there
are normative questions about which norms sensibly govern
self-constituting performances. Here I discuss the normative
questions associated with the ideas that life is a
performance and that the self is something that both emerges
in and is constituted by the performance. Three contemporary
psychopoetic conceptions of persons – “day-by-day
persons,” “ironic persons,” and “strong poetic
persons” are examined in order to discuss whether there
are legitimate normative constraints on “performing
oneself,” and, if so, what these might
be.},
Key = {fds287485}
}
@article{fds287486,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {My Non-Narrative, Non-Forensic Dasein: The First and Second
Self},
Pages = {214-240},
Booktitle = {Self and Consciousness},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Liu, JL and Perry, J},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds287486}
}
@article{fds287546,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {I, hypocrite},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {208},
Number = {2791},
Pages = {44-44},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0262-4079},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=000287908900039&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(10)63116-8},
Key = {fds287546}
}
@article{fds287518,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism, with David Barack},
Journal = {EURAMERICA},
Volume = {40},
Number = {3},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {EURAMERICA vol. 40, no. 3},
Key = {fds287518}
}
@article{fds167619,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {1. “What does the Modularity of Ethics have to do with
Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few” with
Robert A. Williams, TopiCS (Topics in Cognitive
Science).},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds167619}
}
@article{fds287549,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Williams, RA},
Title = {What does the modularity of morals have to do with ethics?
Four moral sprouts plus or minus a few.},
Journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {430-453},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1756-8757},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000283869500012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to
suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was
worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a
serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence
is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily
ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular
sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes
out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We
discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient
version, "Mencian Moral Modularity," which claims four
innate modules, and "Social Intuitionist Modularity," which
claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral
modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules
are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or
emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true
has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The
discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with
normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of
the "is-ought" problem. We explain in a new way what this
problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not
involve the logic of "ought," but rather the plasticity of
human nature and the realistic options to "grow" and "do"
human nature in multifarious legitimate ways.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01076.x},
Key = {fds287549}
}
@article{fds287484,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {What is it Like to be an Addict?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Responsibility},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Graham, G and Poland, G},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds287484}
}
@article{fds287544,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Can do attitudes: Some positive illusions are not
misbeliefs},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {32},
Number = {6},
Pages = {519-520},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0140-525X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000274676100012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a
plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily selected
for misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class
of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that
some of its members are best understood as positive
attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at all. ©
2010 Cambridge University Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09991439},
Key = {fds287544}
}
@article{fds287522,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Literate Ape},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
Key = {fds287522}
}
@article{fds167613,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {The Ego Tunnel http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds167613}
}
@article{fds287524,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Ego Tunnel},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
Key = {fds287524}
}
@article{fds287542,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {One Enchanted Being: Neuroexistentialism &
Meaning},
Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-49},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1467-9744},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
Key = {fds287542}
}
@article{fds287523,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Your mind is more than your brain},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {201},
Number = {2691},
Pages = {42-43},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.800-review-where-in-the-world-is-the-mind.html},
Abstract = {Two new books argue that the mind extends beyond the brain
into the world around us. © 2009 Reed Business Information
Ltd, England.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(09)60167-6},
Key = {fds287523}
}
@article{fds318371,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
smile},
Pages = {413-434},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521884754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
Abstract = {A major task for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts
between our ordinary way of understanding persons and the
world - what Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' -
and scientific accounts of persons and the world - the
'scientific image'. Sometimes, of course, it is possible to
blend the two images so as to produce a genuinely
stereoscopic or synthetic picture. But this is not always
possible. In the case of Darwin's theory of natural
selection, we seem to have a scientific theory that cannot
be comfortably assimilated into the extant manifest image by
adding, in Sellars' phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to
that image. As traditionally understood, we humans are made
in God's image and sit beneath God and the angels and above
the animals on the 'Great Chain of Being'. There is a
tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure
matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings
who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm
and the material realm (us). We humans know the material
realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial
realm - theological and moral truths in particular - through
illumination, grace or other non-empirical and nonrational
or arational means. God sets out the moral law, and if we
obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we will gain
eternal salvation.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
Key = {fds318371}
}
@article{fds167618,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {“The Literate Ape,” New Scientist November 23, 2009
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds167618}
}
@article{fds167617,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {“The Left Brain Conspiracy,” New Scientist, December 9,
2009 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20427381.600},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds167617}
}
@article{fds287479,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These
Years},
Pages = {52-78},
Booktitle = {Moral Personality, Identity and Character: Explorations in
Moral Psychology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Narvaez, D and Lapsley, DK},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287479}
}
@article{fds287480,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {“Buddhist Persons & Eudaimonia Buddha”},
Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Philosophical Psychology},
Editor = {Symons, J},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287480}
}
@article{fds287481,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Five Questions},
Booktitle = {Mind & Consciousness},
Publisher = {VIP Press},
Editor = {Grim, P},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287481}
}
@article{fds287483,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuro-Eudaimonics, or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the
Seat of Happiness},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Editor = {Bickle, J},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287483}
}
@article{fds287517,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Structures of Meaningful Life Stories},
Journal = {Argentinian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287517}
}
@article{fds318372,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the
Mozi},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {473-491},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
Key = {fds318372}
}
@article{fds287516,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Neural Pathway to the White House},
Journal = {The New Scientist},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19826586.300-review-ithe-political-mindi-by-george-lakoff.html?full=true},
Key = {fds287516}
}
@article{fds322469,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Review: The Political Mind by George Lakoff},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {198},
Number = {2658},
Pages = {48-49},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
Abstract = {If winning elections is a matter of manipulating brains,
that must make George Bush and his team experts in
neuroscience - but Owen Flanagan isn't convinced. © 2008
Reed Business Information Ltd, England.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
Key = {fds322469}
}
@article{fds318377,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness},
Pages = {176-185},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch9},
Abstract = {What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness
play in the explanation of cognition? Can consciousness be
studied empirically? These are the questions. Here are the
answers},
Doi = {10.1002/9781405164535.ch9},
Key = {fds318377}
}
@article{fds287452,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Where is the Happiness},
Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds287452}
}
@book{fds141485,
Author = {O. Flanagan},
Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
World},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds141485}
}
@book{fds287536,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
World},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds287536}
}
@article{fds287477,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {"What is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer,
Railton, and Ruse"},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {45-52},
Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds287477}
}
@article{fds287478,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds287478}
}
@article{fds45628,
Author = {O. Flanagan},
Title = {“The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness”
in},
Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age:
Routledge: Cruzon, London, In Press: Editors, D. K.
Nauriyal, Michael Drummond, Y. B. Lal: Forward: His
Holiness, XIV Dalai Lama},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds45628}
}
@article{fds287475,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Varieties of Naturalism},
Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Religion and Science},
Publisher = {OUP},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds287475}
}
@article{fds287476,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and
Happiness},
Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern
Age},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Nauriyal, DK and Drummond, YB},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds287476}
}
@article{fds287514,
Author = {Greene, M and Schill, K and Takahashi, S and Bateman-House, A and Beauchamp, T and Bok, H and Cheney, D and Coyle, J and Deacon, T and Dennett, D and Donovan, P and Flanagan, O and Goldman, S and Greely, H and Martin, L and Miller, E and Mueller, D and Siegel, A and Solter, D and Gearhart, J and McKhann, G and Faden, R},
Title = {Ethics: Moral issues of human-non-human primate neural
grafting.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {309},
Number = {5733},
Pages = {385-386},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1112207},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1112207},
Key = {fds287514}
}
@article{fds318373,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The colour of happiness},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {178},
Number = {2396},
Pages = {44},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds318373}
}
@article{fds318374,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
smile},
Pages = {377-398},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521771978},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
Abstract = {Darwinism And The Manifest Image Of Humankind: A major task
for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts between our
ordinary way of understanding persons and the world - what
Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' - and scientific
accounts of persons and the world - the 'scientific image'.
Sometimes, of course, it is possible to blend the two images
so as to produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic
picture. But this is not always possible. In the case of
Darwin's theory of natural selection, we seem to have a
scientific theory that cannot be comfortably assimilated
into the extant manifest image by adding, in Sellars'
phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to that image. As
traditionally understood, we humans are made in God’s
image and sit beneath God and the angels and above the
animals on the ‘Great Chain of Being’. There is a
tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure
matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings
who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm
and the material realm (us). We humans know the material
realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial
realm – theological and moral truths in particular –
through illumination, grace or other non-empirical and
nonrational or arational means. God sets out the moral law,
and if we obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we
will gain eternal salvation. Nothing in this metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics seems to square with the theory of
natural selection. On this theory, no divine, intelligent
designer is needed to explain the existence of humans or any
other type of organic life. Moreover, as animals, descended
from other animals, we humans possess no mysterious
epistemic powers to detect what is true or what is good. The
idea that morality has a divine origin and justification
loses its force. The prospects for personal immortality seem
nil. The manifest image of humankind thus takes a major hit
at the hands of Darwin2019s theory, and it is not clear how
to maintain sensibly the central components of that
image.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
Key = {fds318374}
}
@book{fds18414,
Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
Brain. Eds. Gary Fireman, Ted McVay, and Owen
Flanagan},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Gary Fireman and Ted McVay and Owen Flanagan},
Year = {2003},
Abstract = {Interdisciplinary book (edited collection) on
role/construction of self-narratives in cog. sci,
neuroscience, psychology and literature. A contribution to
topic of personal identity and role of narrative in
self-construction.},
Key = {fds18414}
}
@book{fds287533,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to
Reconcile Them},
Publisher = {Basic Books},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287533}
}
@book{fds287535,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Almas Que Suenan},
Publisher = {Oceano},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Spanish translation of DREAMING SOULS.},
Key = {fds287535}
}
@article{fds287473,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Emotional Expressions: Why Moralists Scowl, Frown, and
Smile},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Radick, G and Hodges, J},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287473}
}
@article{fds287474,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Neurobiology of Sexual Self-Consciousness: Mind and the
Interplay of Brain and Body},
Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
Brain.},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fireman, G and McVay, T and Flanagan, O},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Spring},
Abstract = {Chapter on Narrative Self-Construction by individuals
w/non-standard sexual identities.},
Key = {fds287474}
}
@article{fds287513,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Emotional Expressions},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Radick, and Hodge},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287513}
}
@article{fds318375,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and
consciousness and experience},
Journal = {Minds and Machines},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {113-126},
Year = {2001},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011276727406},
Abstract = {The books 'consciouness' and 'consciouness and experience,'
written by Lycan, were reviewed. According to the reviwers,
the author has given some powerful ideas about how
functionalism would work, and a whole armory of useful
tools. These two books are an indispensable part of any
study of consciousness. They are ideal for graduate
seminars, and accessible to interested readers who may
already have waded through any of various recent
philosophical works about consciousness.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1011276727406},
Key = {fds318375}
}
@article{fds287472,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Natural Questions to Natural Answers},
Volume = {5},
Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections,
Conjectures},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds287472}
}
@article{fds303570,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Is Consciousness an Adaptation?},
Booktitle = {Evolving Consciousness},
Publisher = {Johns Benjamin, Amsterdam},
Editor = {Mulhauser, G},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds303570}
}
@article{fds318376,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Dreaming is not an adaptation},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {23},
Number = {6},
Pages = {936-939},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
Abstract = {The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper
evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being
different. To establish that some trait of character is an
adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story
about the fitness enhancing function it served when it
evolved and possibly a story of how the maintenance of this
function is fitness enhancing now. My aim is to evaluate the
proposals put forward in these papers. My conclusion is that
although sleep is almost certainly an adaptation, dreaming
is not.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
Key = {fds318376}
}
@book{fds287532,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Dreaming Souls},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds287532}
}
@article{fds287547,
Author = {Hardcastle, VG and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative
Disorders},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {82},
Number = {4},
Pages = {645-657},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0026-9662},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084733100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/27903660},
Key = {fds287547}
}
@article{fds318362,
Author = {Patton, LL and Griffiths, PJ},
Title = {Foreward},
Pages = {ix-xi},
Booktitle = {David Peter Lawrence - Rediscovering God with Transcendental
Argument: A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri
Éaiva Philosophy},
Publisher = {Albany: State University of New York Press},
Year = {1999},
ISBN = {9781138888272},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315713571},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315713571},
Key = {fds318362}
}
@book{fds306211,
Title = {The Nature of Consciousness},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Block, N and Guzeldere, G and Flanagan, O},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds306211}
}
@article{fds287467,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Confidence: Three Cheers for Naturalistic
Ethics},
Booktitle = {In The Face of Facts: Moral Inquiry in American
Scholarship},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Westbrook, and Bethe-Elstain, and Fox},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287467}
}
@article{fds287468,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Guzeldere, G},
Title = {Consciousness: A Philosophical Tour},
Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Rolls, E},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287468}
}
@article{fds287469,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {How to Study Consciousness Empirically: The Case of
Dreams},
Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Rolls, E},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287469}
}
@article{fds287470,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness as a Pragmatist Views It},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to William James},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Putnam, RA},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287470}
}
@article{fds287471,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Dryden, D},
Title = {Consciousness and the Mind},
Booktitle = {Invitation to Cognitive Science},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sternberg, S},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287471}
}
@book{fds287531,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Self Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of
Life},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287531}
}
@article{fds287464,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethics Naturalized: Ethics and Human Ecology},
Booktitle = {Mind and Morals},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {May, and Clark, and Friedman},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287464}
}
@article{fds287465,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Network},
Booktitle = {The Churchlands and Their Critics},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Editor = {McCauley, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287465}
}
@article{fds287509,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Polger, T},
Title = {Zombies and the Function of Consciousness},
Journal = {The Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287509}
}
@article{fds303569,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Prospects For A Unified Theory of Consciousness or, What
Dreams are Made Of},
Booktitle = {Scientific Approaches to the Question of Consciousness: 25th
Carnegie Symposium on Cognition},
Publisher = {Erlbaum},
Editor = {Cohen, J and Schooler, J},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds303569}
}
@article{fds287552,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness and the natural method.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {33},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1103-1115},
Year = {1995},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0028-3932},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7501132},
Abstract = {'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous
array of mental state types. The types share the property of
'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being
something that it is like for the subject to be in one of
these states.' I propose that we can only build a theory of
consciousness by deploying 'the natural method' of
coordinating all relevant informational resources at once,
especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience
and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the
natural method in action in mental domains where an
adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i)
visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I
will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no
adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever
interest the particular cases have, the examination will
show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role
conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built
domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there
will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary
history of different domains and competences.},
Doi = {10.1016/0028-3932(95)00051-4},
Key = {fds287552}
}
@article{fds156818,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {"Consciousness"},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ted Honderich},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds156818}
}
@article{fds287458,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and
Self-Reclamation},
Pages = {135-162},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Psychopathology},
Publisher = {MIT},
Editor = {Graham, G and Stephens, L},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287458}
}
@article{fds287459,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Behaviorism},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287459}
}
@article{fds287460,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {D. C. Dennett},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287460}
}
@article{fds287461,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Stream of Consciousness},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287461}
}
@article{fds287462,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {History of the Philosophy of Mind},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287462}
}
@article{fds287463,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287463}
}
@article{fds287508,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Moment of Truth on the Dublin Bridge},
Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
Volume = {94},
Number = {2},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287508}
}
@article{fds287543,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {92},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-27},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Hameroff, SR and Kaszniak, AW and Scott, AC},
Year = {1995},
ISBN = {0-262-08249-7},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995PY90800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2940806},
Key = {fds287543}
}
@article{fds318379,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {THE MOMENT OF TRUTH ON DUBLIN BRIDGE, A RESPONSE TO
PICKERING,ANDREW},
Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
Volume = {94},
Number = {2},
Pages = {467-474},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds318379}
}
@article{fds318378,
Author = {Jr, OF},
Title = {"Stream of Consciousness"},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds318378}
}
@article{fds318381,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Malaise of Modernity.Charles Taylor},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {104},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-194},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1993},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293596},
Doi = {10.1086/293596},
Key = {fds318381}
}
@article{fds287457,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Situations and Dispositions},
Pages = {681-695},
Booktitle = {Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge: MIT Press},
Editor = {Goldman, AI},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds287457}
}
@article{fds318380,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {VALIDATION IN THE CLINICAL THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - A
STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS -
GRUNBAUM,A},
Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement},
Number = {4726},
Pages = {3-4},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds318380}
}
@book{fds287530,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness Reconsidered},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds287530}
}
@article{fds287456,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Other Minds, Obligation, and Honesty},
Booktitle = {Social and Cognitive Factors in Preschoolers’
Deception},
Publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum},
Editor = {Ceci, S and DeSimone, M and Putnick, ME},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds287456}
}
@article{fds287507,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity, Gender, and Strong Evaluation},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {198-198},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1991},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215579},
Doi = {10.2307/2215579},
Key = {fds287507}
}
@article{fds318382,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The modularity of consciousness},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {446-447},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
Key = {fds318382}
}
@book{fds287529,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological
Realism},
Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds287529}
}
@article{fds287506,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Virtue and Ignorance},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {87},
Number = {8},
Pages = {420-420},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1990},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026736},
Doi = {10.2307/2026736},
Key = {fds287506}
}
@book{fds306212,
Title = {Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral
Psychology},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds306212}
}
@article{fds303568,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation},
Pages = {37-65},
Booktitle = {Identity, Character, and Morality},
Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds303568}
}
@article{fds287504,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Pragmatism, Ethics, and Correspondence Truth: Response to
Gibson and Quine},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {98},
Number = {3},
Pages = {541-549},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380967},
Doi = {10.1086/292971},
Key = {fds287504}
}
@article{fds287548,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K},
Title = {Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate
Revisited},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {622-637},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292870},
Doi = {10.1086/292870},
Key = {fds287548}
}
@article{fds318383,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Materialism and immaterialism: A reply to
Robinson},
Journal = {Contemporary Psychology: a Journal of Reviews},
Volume = {31},
Number = {9},
Pages = {722-722},
Publisher = {Portico},
Year = {1986},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/025101},
Doi = {10.1037/025101},
Key = {fds318383}
}
@article{fds318384,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Psychoanalysis as a social activity},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {238-239},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
Key = {fds318384}
}
@article{fds287503,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Psychoanalysis and Social Practice: A Comment on
Grünbaum},
Journal = {The Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Number = {Fall},
Year = {1986},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds287503}
}
@article{fds287550,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-60},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026466},
Doi = {10.2307/2026466},
Key = {fds287550}
}
@article{fds318385,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {CONSCIOUSNESS, NATURALISM, AND NAGEL},
Journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {373-390},
Publisher = {INST MIND BEHAVIOR INC},
Year = {1985},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds318385}
}
@book{fds287528,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Science of the Mind},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds287528}
}
@article{fds287502,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Adler, J},
Title = {Impartiality and Particularity},
Journal = {Social Research},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {576-596},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {0037-783X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970910},
Doi = {10.2307/40970910},
Key = {fds287502}
}
@article{fds287501,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Quinean Ethics},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {93},
Number = {1},
Pages = {56-74},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380762},
Doi = {10.1086/292405},
Key = {fds287501}
}
@article{fds287498,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on
the Moral Psychology Debate},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {92},
Number = {3},
Pages = {499-512},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380735},
Doi = {10.1086/292358},
Key = {fds287498}
}
@article{fds287499,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {92},
Number = {3},
Pages = {529-532},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380737},
Doi = {10.1086/292360},
Key = {fds287499}
}
@article{fds287500,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Moral Structures?},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {255-270},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1982},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200302},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318201200302},
Key = {fds287500}
}
@article{fds318386,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Psychology, progress and the problem of reflexivity: a study
in the epistemological foundations of psychology.},
Journal = {Journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {375-386},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
Doi = {10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
Key = {fds318386}
}
@article{fds287454,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Skinnerian Metaphysics and the Problem of
Operationism},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-13},
Year = {1980},
ISSN = {0090-4155},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758948},
Doi = {10.2307/27758948},
Key = {fds287454}
}
@article{fds318387,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ and McCreadie-Albright, T},
Title = {Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {425-430},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1974},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00368508},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00368508},
Key = {fds318387}
}
%% Gillespie, Michael A.
@article{fds363706,
Author = {Gillespie, M},
Title = {“The Knots of Experience,”},
Booktitle = {Experience – Implikationen für Mensch, Gesellschaft und
Politik. Festschrift für Wolfgang Leidhold,},
Publisher = {:Königshausen & Neumann,},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds363706}
}
@article{fds296879,
Author = {Folch, C},
Title = {Debt},
Pages = {128-156},
Booktitle = {HYDROPOLITICS: THE ITAIPU DAM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE
ENGINEERING OF MODERN SOUTH AMERICA},
Publisher = {Indiana University Press},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-0-69-118659-7},
Key = {fds296879}
}
@article{fds336482,
Author = {Allen Gillespie and M},
Title = {On Debt and Redemption: Friedrich Nietzsche's Doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence},
Journal = {Journal of Religious Ethics},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {267-287},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jore.12218},
Abstract = {In this essay, I argue that the notion of monetary debt does
not displace but merely conceals our deeper, ontological
debt to the sources of our being and way of life. I suggest
that first Christianity and then modern science attempted to
find a means of redemption that could free us from debt, but
that both were unable to reconcile the ideas of freedom and
indebtedness. I then examine the way in which Friedrich
Nietzsche tried to resolve the apparent contradiction of our
debt to the past and our freedom to shape the future by
developing a new form of redemption rooted in his doctrine
of the eternal recurrence.},
Doi = {10.1111/jore.12218},
Key = {fds336482}
}
@article{fds367555,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Radical Hopes: Apocalyptic Longing in Nineteenth-Century
Philosophy},
Journal = {APOCALYPTIC COMPLEX},
Pages = {181-201},
Year = {2018},
Key = {fds367555}
}
@article{fds367543,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Beyond the Island of Truth: Hegel and the Shipwreck of
Science},
Pages = {171-182},
Booktitle = {MASTERY OF NATURE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS},
Year = {2018},
ISBN = {978-0-8122-4993-4},
Key = {fds367543}
}
@book{fds367544,
Author = {Gillespie, M},
Title = {Nietzsche's Final Teaching},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds367544}
}
@article{fds367557,
Author = {Perkins, LR and Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Dangerous Divide: Between Weak Thought and Practical
Politics},
Pages = {137-149},
Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
Year = {2017},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59021-9_19},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-59021-9_19},
Key = {fds367557}
}
@article{fds305572,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nihilism After Nietzsche},
Journal = {Bollettino Filosofico},
Number = {Nihilism and Modernity. Rethinking Moder},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305572}
}
@article{fds305574,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Problems of Modernity and the Possibilities of Human
Thriving},
Journal = {Perspectives Libres},
Volume = {12},
Number = {Sept},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305574}
}
@article{fds305573,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Socinianism and the Political Theology of
Liberalism},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Political Theology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kessler, M and Casey, S},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305573}
}
@article{fds305576,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Harpham, J},
Title = {Life and Thought: The Structure of Montaigne's Essays and
the Idea of the Self},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305576}
}
@article{fds305575,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche's Final Teaching},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305575}
}
@article{fds305577,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Hermeneutic Communism},
Publisher = {Continuum Press},
Editor = {Mazzini, S},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305577}
}
@article{fds305578,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Beyond Secularism: The Inevitable Entanglement of Religion
and Political Life},
Publisher = {Boston University},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds305578}
}
@misc{fds296834,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Degradation},
Publisher = {The Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds296834}
}
@misc{fds296838,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Anti-Trinitarian Origins of Liberalism},
Booktitle = {Boston University Series on Religion and
Politics},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296838}
}
@article{fds296833,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Question for Fuller},
Journal = {First Things},
Number = {April},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296833}
}
@article{fds296875,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {In the Shadow of Modernity},
Volume = {Orientale Lumen IV},
Address = {Melbourne, Australia},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296875}
}
@article{fds376594,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Anti-Trinitarian Origins of Liberalism},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds376594}
}
@article{fds296839,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Machiavelli’s Modernity and the Christian
Tradition},
Booktitle = {The Modern Turn},
Publisher = {Catholic University Press},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296839}
}
@book{fds296886,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Theological Origins of Modernity, Turkish
edition},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296886}
}
@article{fds296876,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Jean Elshtain: In Memorium},
Journal = {Review of Politics},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296876}
}
@article{fds376630,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Radical Philosophy and Political Theology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds376630}
}
@article{fds296840,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Radical Philosophy and Political Theology},
Booktitle = {Religion and Modern European Thought,},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ward, G and Pattison, G and Adams, N},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296840}
}
@article{fds296841,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Doing Nothing or Nothing Doing},
Pages = {51-61},
Booktitle = {Nihilism and Contemporary Politics},
Publisher = {Van Leer Institute},
Address = {Jerusalem},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296841}
}
@article{fds296842,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Perkins, L},
Title = {The Dangerous Divide : Between Weak Thought and Practical
Politics,"},
Booktitle = {On Vattimo and Zabala’s Hermeneutic Communism On Vattimo
and Zabala’s Hermeneutic Communism},
Publisher = {Continuum Press},
Editor = {Mazzini, S},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296842}
}
@article{fds296877,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Too Many Wins for North Carolina to Reject Medicaid
Expansion},
Journal = {Raleigh News and Observer, February 19, 2013.},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296877}
}
@book{fds182633,
Author = {M.A. Gillespie},
Title = {The Theological Origins of Modernity (2008; paper 2009;
Chinese ed. 2012, Turkish ed. 2013)},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press, Human Science and Technology
Press},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds182633}
}
@book{fds296885,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Theological Origins of Modernity, Chinese edition with a
new Preface},
Publisher = {Human Science adn Technology Press},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296885}
}
@article{fds296867,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: Murder, Madness, and Suicide.
Nihilism and the Doctrine of the Eternal
Recurrence},
Booktitle = {Nietzsche and Dostoevsky},
Publisher = {Continuum Press},
Editor = {Metzger, J},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296867}
}
@article{fds296868,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Martin Heidegger},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Political Thought},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296868}
}
@article{fds296869,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Radical Hopes: Apocalyptic Longings in Nineteenth Century
Philosophy},
Booktitle = {The Apocalyptic Complex – Origins, Histories,
Permanence},
Publisher = {CEU Press},
Editor = {Al-Bagdadi, N and Riedl, M and Marno, D},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296869}
}
@article{fds296878,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Calanan, K},
Title = {Toward Noon: Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche,},
Publisher = {Camden House},
Address = {Melton England},
Editor = {Bishop, P},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296878}
}
@article{fds367559,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Michael Gillespie: Life and Thought},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds367559}
}
@article{fds367560,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Calanan, K},
Title = {Toward Noon: Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche},
Publisher = {Camden House},
Editor = {Bishop, P},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds367560}
}
@article{fds367558,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The History of Democracy},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds367558}
}
@article{fds370495,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Callanan, KF},
Title = {On the Genealogy of Morals},
Pages = {255-277},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and
Works},
Publisher = {Boydell & Brewer},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {9781571133274},
Key = {fds370495}
}
@article{fds376420,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Martin Heidegger},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds376420}
}
@article{fds376421,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: Murder, Madness, and Suicide.
Nihilism and the Doctrine of the Eternal
Recurrence},
Publisher = {Continuum Press},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds376421}
}
@article{fds296873,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Just One of Those We Lost},
Journal = {Raleigh News and Observer},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds296873}
}
@article{fds305579,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Tragedy of the Goods and the Pursuit of
Happiness},
Pages = {177 pages},
Booktitle = {In Search of Goodness},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, RW},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780226306834},
Abstract = {The eight essays in this volume challenge the dichotomies
that usually govern how goodness has been discussed in the
past: altruism versus egoism; reason versus emotion; or
moral choice versus moral character.},
Key = {fds305579}
}
@article{fds296902,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {'March Madness'},
Journal = {The Point},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296902}
}
@article{fds296865,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Tragedy of the Goods and the Pursuit of
Happiness},
Booktitle = {The Idea of the Good},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Address = {Chicago, IL},
Editor = {Grant, R},
Year = {2011},
ISBN = {0226306836},
Abstract = {The eight essays in this volume challenge the dichotomies
that usually govern how goodness has been discussed in the
past: altruism versus egoism; reason versus emotion; or
moral choice versus moral character.},
Key = {fds296865}
}
@article{fds296866,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nihilism},
Booktitle = {, Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy},
Publisher = {: Edinburgh University Press},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296866}
}
@article{fds296874,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Budget Pain Must Fall on All},
Journal = {Raleigh News and Observer, op ed},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296874}
}
@article{fds376422,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nihilism},
Publisher = {: Edinburgh University Press},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds376422}
}
@article{fds296903,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Perkins, L},
Title = {Political Anti-Theology: Mark Lilla’s The Stillborn
God},
Journal = {Critical Review},
Year = {2010},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds296903}
}
@misc{fds182628,
Author = {M.A. Gillespie},
Title = {Interview},
Journal = {Tehran Times},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds182628}
}
@misc{fds296871,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Response to Robert Pippin},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://onthehuman.org/2010/04/participants_and_spectators/},
Key = {fds296871}
}
@misc{fds296872,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Science and the Humanities},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://onthehuman.org/2010/01/science-and-the-humanities},
Key = {fds296872}
}
@article{fds296825,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Winners All in NCAA Basketball Championship
Game},
Journal = {The Herald Sun},
Number = {April},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds296825}
}
@article{fds296864,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Tragedy of the Goods and the Pursuit of
Happiness},
Booktitle = {In Purusit of Goodness},
Editor = {Grant, R},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds296864}
}
@misc{fds296870,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {“Backgammon Anyone?” A response to Alexander
Rosenberg’s “The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to
Reality},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalist%E2%80%99s-guide-to-reality/comment-page-1/#comment-500},
Key = {fds296870}
}
@article{fds296826,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {A Place to Learn and Reflect: Course to Explore Ideals of
Ethical Life},
Journal = {Greensboro News-Record},
Number = {June 14},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296826}
}
@article{fds296835,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Toward a New Aristocracy: Nietzsche Contra Plato on the Role
a Warrior Elite},
Booktitle = {Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Philosophy of the
Future},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Editor = {Metzger, J},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296835}
}
@article{fds296863,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Hegel},
Booktitle = {The International Encyclopedia of Political
Science,},
Editor = {al, GKE},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296863}
}
@book{fds296836,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Theological Origins of Modernity},
Pages = {866 pages},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296836}
}
@book{fds296884,
Author = {Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Gillespie},
Title = {Homo Politicus, Homo Economicus},
Editor = {Gillespie, MA and Brennan, G},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296884}
}
@article{fds296827,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {On Gold Medals and Team Sports},
Journal = {The Durham Herald Sun},
Number = {Aug 29},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296827}
}
@article{fds296859,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Plato and Nietzsche on Warriors},
Booktitle = {Nietzche’s Nihilistic Anti-egalitarianism},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Address = {London/New York},
Editor = {Metzger, J},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296859}
}
@article{fds296860,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche},
Booktitle = {The International Encyclopedia of Political
Science},
Publisher = {CQ Press},
Address = {Washington, DC},
Editor = {al, GKE},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296860}
}
@article{fds296861,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Players and Spectators: Sports and Ethical Training in the
American University},
Booktitle = {Debating Moral Education},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Address = {Durham, North Carolina},
Editor = {Kiss, E and Euben, P},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296861}
}
@article{fds305580,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Afterword},
Pages = {247-251},
Booktitle = {Homo Politicus, Homo Economicus},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {0203870867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203870860},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203870860},
Key = {fds305580}
}
@article{fds376423,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche},
Publisher = {CQ Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds376423}
}
@article{fds376424,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Players and Spectators: Sports and Ethical Training in the
American University},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds376424}
}
@article{fds376425,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Plato and Nietzsche on Warriors},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds376425}
}
@article{fds296890,
Author = {McCubbins, M and Brody, D},
Title = {Afterword},
Volume = {137},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {523-524},
Booktitle = {Homo Politicus, Homo Economicus},
Publisher = {Stanford University Press},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260378900009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9323-9},
Key = {fds296890}
}
@article{fds296858,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Sovereign Selves and Sovereign States: Political Theory for
a New Millenium},
Booktitle = {Freedom and the Human PErson},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press},
Editor = {Velkley, R},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds296858}
}
@article{fds376595,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Sovereign Selves and Sovereign States: Political Theory for
a New Millenium},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds376595}
}
@article{fds296828,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Column Was Malicious Nonsense},
Journal = {Durham Herald Sun},
Number = {Feb 19},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296828}
}
@article{fds296855,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Where Did All the Evils Go},
Booktitle = {Moral Judgment and the Problem of Evil},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, R},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296855}
}
@article{fds296856,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Search for Immediacy and the Problem of the Political in
Existentialism and Phenomenology,},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Phenomenology},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {Dreyfus, H and Wrathall, M},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296856}
}
@article{fds296857,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Distorting Mirrors: Reflecting on Europe and
America,},
Booktitle = {Europe and America in Translation},
Publisher = {Winter Verlag},
Editor = {Waldschmidt-Nelson, B and Hunemorder, M and Zwingenberger,
M},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296857}
}
@article{fds367563,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Sovereign Selves and Sovereign States: Political Theory for
a New Millenium},
Booktitle = {Freedom and the Human Person},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press},
Editor = {Velkley, R},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds367563}
}
@article{fds367562,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Sovereign Selves and Sovereign States: Political Theory for
a New Millenium},
Booktitle = {Freedom and the Human Person},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press},
Editor = {Velkley, R},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds367562}
}
@article{fds376426,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Where Did All the Evils Go},
Booktitle = {Moral Judgment and the Problem of Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds376426}
}
@article{fds376427,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Distorting Mirrors: Reflecting on Europe and
America,},
Publisher = {Winter Verlag},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds376427}
}
@article{fds296905,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {'Slouching Toward Bethlehem to Be Born', On the Nature and
Meaning of Nietzsche's Superman},
Journal = {Journal of Nietzsche Studies},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {50-70},
Publisher = {Pennsylvania State University Press},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nie.2005.0011},
Doi = {10.1353/nie.2005.0011},
Key = {fds296905}
}
@article{fds376428,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {'Slouching Toward Bethlehem to Be Born': On the Nature and
Meaning of Nietzsche's Superman},
Journal = {The Journal of Nietzsche Studies},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {49-69},
Publisher = {Pennsylvania State University Press},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nie.2005.0011},
Doi = {10.1353/nie.2005.0011},
Key = {fds376428}
}
@article{fds296854,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Forward},
Booktitle = {The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
(Stanley Rosen)},
Publisher = {New Haven: Yale University Press},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds296854}
}
@article{fds367564,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Forward, Stanley Rosen},
Booktitle = {The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra},
Publisher = {New Haven: Yale University Press},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds367564}
}
@article{fds296853,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche, Friedrich},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Protestantism},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Hillerbrand, H},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds296853}
}
@article{fds376429,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche, Friedrich},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds376429}
}
@article{fds296829,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Raise the Cigarette Tax},
Journal = {Durham Herald Sun},
Number = {June 8},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296829}
}
@article{fds296852,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {American Public Philosophy After the Cold
War},
Booktitle = {Public Philosophy and Political Science: Crisis and
Reflection},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Lexington Books},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296852}
}
@article{fds376430,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {American Public Philosophy After the Cold
War},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Lexington Books},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds376430}
}
@article{fds296916,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Philosophy and Rhetoric in Kant's Third Antinomy},
Journal = {Political Science Reviewer},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {7-33},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296916}
}
@article{fds296830,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {County Failing to Control Vicious Packs of
Dogs},
Journal = {Durham Herald Sun},
Number = {June 6},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296830}
}
@article{fds296914,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {The Theological Origins of Modernity},
Journal = {Critical Review},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-30},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0891-3811},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000085218600001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Most critiques of modernity rest on an inadequate
understanding of its complexity. Modernity should be seen in
terms of the question that guides modern thought. This is
the question of divine omnipotence that arises out of the
nominalist destruction of Scholasticism. Humanism,
Reformation Christianity, empiricsim, and rationalism are
different responses to this question. © 1999 Critical
Review Foundation.},
Doi = {10.1080/08913819908443520},
Key = {fds296914}
}
@article{fds296850,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Descartes and the Question of Toleration},
Booktitle = {Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of
Toleration},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Editor = {Levine, A},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296850}
}
@article{fds296851,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Liberal Education and the Idea of the West},
Booktitle = {The West and the Liberal Arts},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Editor = {Hancock, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296851}
}
@article{fds376431,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Liberal Education and the Idea of the West},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds376431}
}
@article{fds376631,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Descartes and the Question of Toleration},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds376631}
}
@article{fds296906,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche and the Premodernist Critique of
Postmodernity},
Journal = {Critical Review},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {537-554},
Year = {1997},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {0891-3811},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000075687500005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds296906}
}
@book{fds296883,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nihilism Before Nietzsche},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds296883}
}
@article{fds296831,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Do Subsidies Keep Health Plan Afloat?},
Journal = {Duke Dialogue},
Number = {Dec 2},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296831}
}
@article{fds296832,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Scholarly Issues Guided Lomparis Decision},
Journal = {Durham Herald Sun},
Number = {Feb 22},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296832}
}
@article{fds296849,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Political Parties and the American Founding},
Pages = {17-43},
Booktitle = {American Political Parties and Constitutional
Politics},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Editor = {Shramm, P and Wilson, B},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296849}
}
@article{fds376432,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Political Parties and the American Founding},
Pages = {17-43},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds376432}
}
@article{fds296889,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Books in Review},
Journal = {Political Theory},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {173-176},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1992},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0090-5917},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1992HC26200013&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1177/0090591792020001014},
Key = {fds296889}
}
@article{fds296909,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Liberal Democracy and Liberal Education},
Journal = {Academic Question},
Volume = {3},
Number = {4},
Pages = {65-68},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0895-4852},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02682904},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02682904},
Key = {fds296909}
}
@article{fds296848,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {George Grant and the Tradition of Political
Philosophy},
Booktitle = {By Loving our Own: George Grant and the Legacy of the Lament
for a Nation},
Publisher = {Ottawa: Carleton University Press},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296848}
}
@article{fds376596,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {George Grant and the Tradition of Political
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Ottawa: Carleton University Press},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds376596}
}
@book{fds296882,
Title = {Ratifying the Constitution},
Publisher = {University Press of Kansas},
Editor = {Gillespie, M and Lienesch, M},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296882}
}
@article{fds296898,
Author = {GILLESPIE, MA},
Title = {TEMPORALITY AND HISTORY IN THE THOUGHT OF
HEIDEGGER,MARTIN},
Journal = {REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE},
Volume = {43},
Number = {168},
Pages = {33-51},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {0048-8143},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1989U601300002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds296898}
}
@article{fds296910,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {History and Temporality in the Thought of
Heidegger},
Journal = {Revue Internationale de Phiosophie},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {33-51},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296910}
}
@article{fds296847,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Masschusetts: Creating Consensus},
Booktitle = {Ratifying the Constitution},
Publisher = {Lawrence: University Press of Kansas},
Editor = {Gillespie, MA and Lienesch, M},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296847}
}
@article{fds376433,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Masschusetts: Creating Consensus},
Publisher = {Lawrence: University Press of Kansas},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds376433}
}
@book{fds296881,
Title = {Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy,
Aesthetics, and Politics},
Pages = {240-240},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Gillespie, MA and Strong, TB},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296881}
}
@article{fds296844,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche’s Musical Politics},
Pages = {117-149},
Booktitle = {Nietzsche’s New Seas},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Gillespie, MA and Strong, TB},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296844}
}
@article{fds296845,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Lienesch, M},
Title = {Religion and the Resurgence of Conservatism},
Booktitle = {The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American
Democracies},
Publisher = {Durham: Duke University Press},
Editor = {Cooper, B and Mishler, W and Kornberg, A},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296845}
}
@article{fds296846,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Death and Desire: War and Bourgoisification in the Thought
of Hegel},
Booktitle = {Understanding the Political Spirit},
Publisher = {New Haven: Yale University Press},
Editor = {Zuckert, C},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296846}
}
@article{fds376434,
Author = {Gillespie, MA and Lienesch, M},
Title = {Religion and the Resurgence of Conservatism},
Publisher = {Durham: Duke University Press},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds376434}
}
@article{fds376435,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Nietzsche's Musical Politics},
Pages = {117-149},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds376435}
}
@article{fds376436,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Death and Desire: War and Bourgoisification in the Thought
of Hegel},
Publisher = {New Haven: Yale University Press},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds376436}
}
@article{fds296843,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Martin Heidegger},
Booktitle = {The History of Political Philosophy},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Strauss, L and Cropsey, J},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds296843}
}
@article{fds376632,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Martin Heidegger},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds376632}
}
@article{fds296896,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Hegel's Liberalism - Michael H. Mitias: Moral Foundation of
the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1984. Pp. 197. $23.00,
paper.)},
Journal = {The Review of Politics},
Volume = {47},
Number = {3},
Pages = {468-469},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0034-6705},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1985ARW6200022&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1017/s0034670500037086},
Key = {fds296896}
}
@article{fds296912,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Montaigne's Humanistic Liberalism},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {40-59},
Year = {1985},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1985AEY4800007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2131069},
Key = {fds296912}
}
@book{fds296880,
Author = {Gillespie, MA},
Title = {Hegel, Heidegger, and Ground of History},
Publisher = {Chicago, University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296880}
}
@article{fds296894,
Author = {GILLESPIE, MA},
Title = {HEIDEGGER 'BEING AND TIME' AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHY - BLITZ,M},
Journal = {INTERPRETATION-A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {399-400},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {0020-9635},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1983SU33900006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds296894}
}
%% Golding, Martin P.
@article{fds52081,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Faux Pas},
Journal = {13 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik},
Volume = {103-22},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds52081}
}
@book{fds45500,
Author = {M.P. Golding and William Edmundson},
Title = {Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishing},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds45500}
}
@article{fds172729,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Forthcoming Publication: Chapter on "Responsibility"},
Booktitle = {Blackwell Guide to Legal Philosophy},
Editor = {M. P. Golding and William Edmundson of the Georgia State Law
School},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds172729}
}
@article{fds15914,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Forthcoming chapter on "Responsibility"},
Booktitle = {Blackwell Guide to Legal Philosophy},
Editor = {William Edmundson of the Georgia State Law
School},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds15914}
}
@article{fds15603,
Author = {M. P. Golding},
Title = {The Legal Analog of the Principle of Bivalence},
Journal = {Ratio Juris},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {450-468},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds15603}
}
@misc{fds15607,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {"Towards a Theory of Human Rights" in The Monist, 52 (1968),
512-49},
Journal = {Reprinted in C. Wellman (ed.), Rights and
Duties},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {512-549},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds15607}
}
@misc{fds15936,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {"The Primacy of Welfare Rights," Social Philosophy and
Policy, 1 (1984), 119-136},
Journal = {Reprinted in C. Wellman (ed.), Rights and
Duties},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {199-136},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds15936}
}
@article{fds15938,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {The Cultural Defense},
Journal = {Ratio Juris},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {146-158},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds15938}
}
@article{fds15940,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {G. Christie's, "The Notion of an Ideal Audience in Legal
Argument"},
Journal = {Duke Law Forum},
Year = {2001},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds15940}
}
@book{fds15939,
Title = {*Legal Reasoning},
Publisher = {Broadview Press, Ontario},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds15939}
}
@book{fds15995,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Free Speech on Campus},
Publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds15995}
}
@article{fds15941,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Parts of books, "Philosophy of Law" reprinted},
Booktitle = {Intro. to the Study of Law, 2nd ed..},
Publisher = {Anderson Publishing Company},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds15941}
}
@article{fds15942,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Parts of book "Legal Reasoning" and article "Principled
Decision-Making and the Supreme Court" reprinted},
Booktitle = {Constitutional Theory , 2nd ed.},
Publisher = {Lexus Publishing},
Editor = {Gerhardt},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds15942}
}
@misc{fds15990,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court
*reprinted},
Booktitle = {Moral Theory and Legal Reasoning},
Editor = {S. Brewer},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds15990}
}
@article{fds15989,
Author = {M.P. Golding},
Title = {My Philosophy of Law},
Booktitle = {The Law in Philosophical Perspectives: My Philosophy of
Law},
Publisher = {Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Editor = {L. J. Wintgens},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds15989}
}
%% Grant, Ruth W.
@article{fds372670,
Author = {Grant, RW and Katzenstein, S and Kennedy, C},
Title = {How Could They Let This Happen? Cover Ups, Complicity, and
the Problem of Accountability},
Journal = {Res Publica},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
Abstract = {Sexual abuse by clergymen, poisoned water, police
brutality—these cases each involve two wrongs: the abuse
itself and the attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Our
focus is this second wrong—the cover up. Cover ups are
accountability failures, and they share common strategies
for thwarting accountability whatever the abuse and whatever
the institution. We find that cover ups often succeed even
when accountability mechanisms are in place. Hence, improved
institutions will not be sufficient to prevent
accountability failures. Accountability mechanisms are tools
that people must be willing to use in good faith. They fail
when people are complicit. What explains complicity? We
identify certain human proclivities and features of modern
organizations that lead people to become complicit in the
wrongdoing of others. If we focus exclusively on the design
of institutions, we will fail to constrain the perpetrators
of wrongdoing. Understanding complicity is key to
understanding accountability failures.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
Key = {fds372670}
}
@article{fds355667,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Reflections on a Career},
Journal = {Perspectives on Political Science},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {154-157},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2021.1897333},
Doi = {10.1080/10457097.2021.1897333},
Key = {fds355667}
}
@article{fds341049,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Incentives and praise compared: the ethics of
motivation},
Journal = {International Review of Economics},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {17-28},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12232-018-0293-z},
Doi = {10.1007/s12232-018-0293-z},
Key = {fds341049}
}
@article{fds369114,
Author = {Grant, RW and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics},
Pages = {467-481},
Booktitle = {Global Governance},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781315254234},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315254234-31},
Abstract = {The interdependence of states, globaliza tion of business,
expansion of the scope and authority of multilateral
organizations, and rapid increases in the num ber of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have heightened
concerns about the way power is used and abused on the world
stage. Controversy about globalization pivots around the
twin issues of accountability and democracy. A crucial
feature of representative democracy is that those wbo govern
are held accountable to tbe governed. If governance above
the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a
democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate accoun tability
need to be institutionalized. Yet these mechanisms cannot
simply replicate, on a larger sca le, the familiar
procedures and practices of democratic states.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315254234-31},
Key = {fds369114}
}
@article{fds320143,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Homo politicus: Reflections on the passions and the
interests},
Journal = {Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology},
Volume = {34B},
Pages = {123-137},
Publisher = {Emerald Group Publishing Limited},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0743-41542016000034B009},
Abstract = {In The Passions and the Interests, Hirschman explored a
movement in 18th century thought whose aim was to shape
human motivations by establishing the prominence of
interests, particularly material interests, in order to
diminish the negative effects of the passions in political
life. If the pursuit of gain could replace the pursuit of
glory, for example, commercial transactions might replace
bloody wars as a means of resolving conflict. Hirschman
finds this claim overly optimistic. And, in his view, in
making their case, these thinkers oversimplified and
impoverished our understanding of human psychology by
reducing all motivation to interest - a problem that
persists in contemporary social science. After exploring
Hirschman's account of 18th century thinkers, this paper
attempts a discussion of a richer psychology identifying the
variety of passions that motivate action toward different
political goals; viz. status, justice, solidarity, and
security. These political passions - including ambition,
compassion, righteous indignation, loyalty, and fear - can
have positive as well as negative political
consequences.},
Doi = {10.1108/S0743-41542016000034B009},
Key = {fds320143}
}
@article{fds331124,
Author = {Grant, RW and Hertzberg, BR},
Title = {Locke on Education},
Pages = {448-465},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Locke},
Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9781405178150},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118328705.ch23},
Abstract = {John Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education began as a
series of letters to his friend, Sir Edward Clarke. Written
during the same period he was writing the final draft of An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Thoughts was first
published in 1693. Locke was as concerned with cultivating
the minds of adults as he was with childhood education. Of
the Conduct of the Understanding addresses this concern.
Locke's thoughts on education are part of his comprehensive
epistemological, moral, and political reflections. For this
reason, this chapter begins by considering the Thoughts and
the Conduct in turn for what they reveal of Locke's
educational principles and recommended practices. Then, it
turns to address the ways in which these writings on
education can deepen our understanding of unresolved
theoretical problems in Locke's thought, of key concepts
such as freedom and reasonableness, and of the degree of
coherence of his philosophy altogether.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118328705.ch23},
Key = {fds331124}
}
@article{fds249775,
Author = {Grant, RW and Hertzberg, B},
Title = {Education},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {544 pages},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Locke},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Stuart, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9781405178150},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131724909342067},
Abstract = {This collection of 29 original essays examines the diverse
scope of John Locke's contributions as a celebrated
philosopher, empiricist, and father of modern political
theory.},
Doi = {10.1080/00131724909342067},
Key = {fds249775}
}
@article{fds249772,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Rethinking the Ethics of Incentives},
Journal = {Journal of the International Network of Economic
Methods},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {354-372},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2015.1071506},
Abstract = {Incentives are typically conceived as a form of trade, and
so voluntariness appears to be the only ethical concern. As
a consequence, incentives are often considered ethically
superior to regulations because they are voluntary rather
than coercive. But incentives can also be viewed as one way
to get others to do what they otherwise would not; that is,
as a form of power. When incentives are viewed in this
light, many ethical questions arise in addition to
voluntariness: What are the responsibilities of the powerful
in using incentives? Can incentives be manipulative or
exploitative, even if people are free to refuse them? Like
all other forms of power, incentives can be abused. This
paper develops criteria for distinguishing their legitimate
from their illegitimate uses, viz. legitimacy of purpose,
voluntariness, and effect on character. The criteria are
then applied to three cases: plea bargaining, recruiting
medical research subjects, and motivating children to learn.
Thinking of incentives in terms of power relations, rather
than as a form of trade, yields a strikingly different
account of the ethical issues involved in their
use.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2015.1071506},
Key = {fds249772}
}
@article{fds249789,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {John Locke on Custom's Power and Reason's
Authority},
Journal = {Review of Politics},
Volume = {74},
Number = {4},
Pages = {607-629},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034670512000770},
Abstract = {Locke stresses the power of custom in shaping opinion and
behavior, though this aspect of his thought has been
underappreciated. Recognizing its importance raises critical
issues, particularly the relation between custom and reason
and the role of authoritative custom in supporting political
and social power. Locke explains in detail the various
psychological and sociological mechanisms by which the power
of custom is manifested; but he nonetheless consistently and
emphatically rejects its authority. Instead, Locke is a
champion of the authority of reason. Because custom is
powerful, but reason is authoritative, Locke attempts to
enlist the power of custom in the service of reason and of
reasonable politics, and because custom is powerful and its
impact unavoidable, individual intellectual independence
cannot mean being without cultural prejudices. At best, it
means the ability to gain some critical distance from them.
These observations place Locke's relation to the
Enlightenment in a new perspective. © 2012 University of
Notre Dame.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0034670512000770},
Key = {fds249789}
}
@book{fds208419,
Author = {R.W. Grant},
Title = {Strings Attached: Untangling t he Ethics of
Incentives},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press and Russell Sage
Foundation},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds208419}
}
@book{fds249787,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Strings attached: Untangling the ethics of
incentives},
Pages = {1-202},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9780691151601},
Abstract = {Incentives can be found everywhere--in schools, businesses,
factories, and government--influencing people's choices
about almost everything, from financial decisions and
tobacco use to exercise and child rearing. So long as people
have a choice, incentives seem innocuous. ButStrings
Attacheddemonstrates that when incentives are viewed as a
kind of power rather than as a form of exchange, many
ethical questions arise: How do incentives affect character
and institutional culture? Can incentives be manipulative or
exploitative, even if people are free to refuse them? What
are the responsibilities of the powerful in using
incentives? Ruth Grant shows that, like all other forms of
power, incentives can be subject to abuse, and she
identifies their legitimate and illegitimate uses. Grant
offers a history of the growth of incentives in early
twentieth-century America, identifies standards for judging
incentives, and examines incentives in four areas--plea
bargaining, recruiting medical research subjects,
International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and motivating
students. In every case, the analysis of incentives in terms
of power yields strikingly different and more complex
judgments than an analysis that views incentives as trades,
in which the desired behavior is freely exchanged for the
incentives offered. Challenging the role and function of
incentives in a democracy,Strings Attachedquestions whether
the penchant for constant incentivizing undermines active,
autonomous citizenship. Readers of this book are sure to
view the ethics of incentives in a new light. © 2011 by
Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press. All
Rights Reserved.},
Key = {fds249787}
}
@book{fds376563,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Strings attached: Untangling the ethics of
incentives},
Pages = {1-202},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9780691161020},
Abstract = {Incentives can be found everywhere--in schools, businesses,
factories, and government--influencing people's choices
about almost everything, from financial decisions and
tobacco use to exercise and child rearing. So long as people
have a choice, incentives seem innocuous. But Strings
Attached demonstrates that when incentives are viewed as a
kind of power rather than as a form of exchange, many
ethical questions arise: How do incentives affect character
and institutional culture? Can incentives be manipulative or
exploitative, even if people are free to refuse them? What
are the responsibilities of the powerful in using
incentives? Ruth Grant shows that, like all other forms of
power, incentives can be subject to abuse, and she
identifies their legitimate and illegitimate uses. Grant
offers a history of the growth of incentives in early
twentieth-century America, identifies standards for judging
incentives, and examines incentives in four areas--plea
bargaining, recruiting medical research subjects,
International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and motivating
students. In every case, the analysis of incentives in terms
of power yields strikingly different and more complex
judgments than an analysis that views incentives as trades,
in which the desired behavior is freely exchanged for the
incentives offered. Challenging the role and function of
incentives in a democracy, Strings Attached questions
whether the penchant for constant incentivizing undermines
active, autonomous citizenship. Readers of this book are
sure to view the ethics of incentives in a new
light.},
Key = {fds376563}
}
@article{fds249776,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Generous to a Fault: Altruism and Psychic
Health},
Pages = {177 pages},
Booktitle = {In Search of Goodness},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, RW},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780226306834},
Abstract = {The eight essays in this volume challenge the dichotomies
that usually govern how goodness has been discussed in the
past: altruism versus egoism; reason versus emotion; or
moral choice versus moral character.},
Key = {fds249776}
}
@book{fds309861,
Title = {In Search of Goodness},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, RW},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds309861}
}
@article{fds249792,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Passions and interests revisited: The psychological
foundations of economics and politics},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {137},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {451-461},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260378900003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Homo Politicus, Homo Oeconomicus. Can these two abstract
human types meaningfully be distinguished? Is there a
characteristic set of motivations that drive human beings in
so far as they are political actors and a different set that
drive their economic lives? What are the psychological
foundations of economics and politics? The answers to these
questions have significant implications both for the study
and the practice of economics and politics. If homo
politicus is essentially identical to homo oeconomicus, it
is safe to generalize from the study of economic behavior to
political phenomena. If not, such a procedure will distort
our understanding of politics. Similarly, if we design
political institutions and public policies assuming that
people will behave as they do when they confront economic
choices, we may find our intentions thwarted if we have
neglected the distinctive motivations characteristic of
political action. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media,
LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9325-7},
Key = {fds249792}
}
@article{fds249791,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Ethics and incentives: A political approach},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {100},
Number = {1},
Pages = {29-39},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2006},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0003-0554},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000235829400004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Understood within an economic framework as a form of trade,
incentives appear inherently ethical; understood as a form
of power, incentives seem ethically suspect. Incentives,
along with coercion and persuasion, are among the ways in
which some people get others to do what they want them to
do. This paper analyzes incentives as a form of power in
order to develop criteria for distinguishing legitimate from
illegitimate uses of them. Whereas an economic approach
focuses on voluntariness as the sole criterion in judging
incentives, this political approach yields three standards:
purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the
parties involved. The paper explores issues that arise in
applying these standards. Framing the problem of incentives
as a problem of power reveals the ethical issues with
greater depth and complexity than placing incentives in an
economic frame of reference.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055406061983},
Key = {fds249791}
}
@article{fds303775,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Ethics and Incentives: A Political Approach},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2006},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {1537-5943},
Key = {fds303775}
}
@misc{fds48289,
Title = {Naming Evil, Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Ruth W. Grant and a forward by Alasdair
MacIntyre},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds48289}
}
@book{fds50296,
Author = {Ruth W. Grant},
Title = {Naming Evil, Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds50296}
}
@book{fds311757,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Naming Evil, Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds311757}
}
@article{fds249781,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Is Humanistic Education Humanizing?},
Series = {Peter Euben and Elizabeth Kiss, eds.},
Booktitle = {Debating Moral Education},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds249781}
}
@article{fds249782,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {The Rousseauan Revolution and the Problem of
Evil},
Series = {Ruth W. Grant ed.},
Booktitle = {Naming Evil, Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds249782}
}
@article{fds249790,
Author = {Grant, RW and Keohane, RO},
Title = {Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {99},
Number = {1},
Pages = {29-43},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0003-0554},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000227684400003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Debates about globalization have centered on calls to
improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world
politics. How should we think about global accountability in
the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to
account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly
about these questions requires recognizing a distinction,
evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state
level, between "participation" and "delegation" models of
accountability. The distinction helps to explain why
accountability is so problematic at the global level and to
clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements
in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven
types of accountability mechanisms and consider their
applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations,
multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks.
By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to
identify opportunities for improving protections against
abuses of power at the global level.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055405051476},
Key = {fds249790}
}
@article{fds249780,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Ethics and Politics: Institutional Solutions and Their
Limits},
Volume = {2},
Booktitle = {Faces of Man: the Dr. Eric Williams Memorial Lectures
1993-2004},
Publisher = {Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds249780}
}
@article{fds249799,
Author = {Grant, RW and Sugarman, J},
Title = {Ethics in human subjects research: do incentives
matter?},
Journal = {The Journal of medicine and philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {6},
Pages = {717-738},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0360-5310},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15590518},
Abstract = {There is considerable confusion regarding the ethical
appropriateness of using incentives in research with human
subjects. Previous work on determining whether incentives
are unethical considers them as a form of undue influence or
coercive offer. We understand the ethical issue of undue
influence as an issue, not of coercion, but of corruption of
judgment. By doing so we find that, for the most part, the
use of incentives to recruit and retain research subjects is
innocuous. But there are some instances where it is not.
Specifically, incentives become problematic when conjoined
with the following factors, singly or in combination with
one another: where the subject is in a dependency
relationship with the researcher, where the risks are
particularly high, where the research is degrading, where
the participant will only consent if the incentive is
relatively large because the participant's aversion to the
study is strong, and where the aversion is a principled one.
The factors we have identified and the kinds of judgments
they require differ substantially from those considered
crucial in most previous discussions of the ethics of
employing incentives in research with human
subjects.},
Doi = {10.1080/03605310490883046},
Key = {fds249799}
}
@article{fds249779,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Political theory, political science, and
politics},
Pages = {174-192},
Booktitle = {What is Political Theory},
Publisher = {SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780761942610},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446215425.n9},
Doi = {10.4135/9781446215425.n9},
Key = {fds249779}
}
@article{fds303774,
Author = {Grant, RW and Sugarman, J},
Title = {Ethics in Human Subjects Research: Do Incentives
Matter?},
Journal = {The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: a forum for
bioethics and philosophy of medicine},
Volume = {29},
Number = {6},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2004},
ISSN = {1744-5019},
Key = {fds303774}
}
@book{fds320144,
Author = {Locke, J and Shapiro, I and Dunn, J and Grant, R},
Title = {Two treatises of government and a letter concerning
toleration},
Pages = {1-359},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780300100174},
Abstract = {Among the most influential writings in the history of
Western political thought, John Locke's Two Treatises of
Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration remain vital
to political debates today, more than three centuries after
they were written. The complete texts appear in this volume,
accompanied by interpretive essays by three prominent Locke
scholars. Ian Shapiro's introduction places Locke's
political writings in historical and biographical context.
John Dunn explores both the intellectual context in which
Locke wrote the 'Two Treatises of Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration' and the major interpretive
controversies surrounding their meaning. Ruth Grant offers a
discussion of Locke's views on women and the family, and
Shapiro contributes an essay on the democratic elements of
Locke's political theory. Taken together, the texts and
essays in this volume offer invaluable insights into the
history of ideas and the enduring influence of Locke's
political thought. © 2003 by Yale University. All rights
reserved.},
Key = {fds320144}
}
@article{fds249778,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {John Locke on Women and the Family},
Booktitle = {John Locke, Two Treaties of Government and Letter Concerning
Toleration},
Publisher = {Yale University Press},
Editor = {Shapiro, I},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds249778}
}
@article{fds249798,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Political theory, political science, and
politics},
Journal = {Political Theory},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {577-595},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0090-5917},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000176785000007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1177/0090591702030004007},
Key = {fds249798}
}
@article{fds249801,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {The ethics of incentives: Historical origins and
contemporary understandings},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {111-139},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0266-2671},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000175194800010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267102001104},
Key = {fds249801}
}
@article{fds309863,
Title = {Rousseau and the Ancients},
Booktitle = {North American Society for the Study of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau},
Editor = {Grant, RW and Stewart, P},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds309863}
}
@article{fds372614,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Response to NASSP book award panel},
Journal = {CULTURAL INTEGRITY AND WORLD COMMUNITY},
Volume = {22},
Number = {15},
Pages = {445-452},
Publisher = {EDWIN MELLEN PRESS},
Editor = {Hughes, C and Hudson, Y},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0-7734-7670-9},
Key = {fds372614}
}
@article{fds8294,
Title = {Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Editor = {Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams},
Year = {1999},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds8294}
}
@article{fds249784,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Review of Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience (Ian Shapiro
and Robert Adams, eds.)},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Year = {1999},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds249784}
}
@article{fds372615,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Integrity and Conscience: Nomos XL. Edited by Ian Shapiro
and Robert Adams. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
340p. $50.00.},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {93},
Number = {3},
Pages = {708-708},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1999},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585597},
Doi = {10.2307/2585597},
Key = {fds372615}
}
@book{fds249786,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau and the
Ethics of Politics},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds249786}
}
@article{fds249796,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {The ethics of talk: Classroom conversation and democratic
politics},
Journal = {TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {470-482},
Publisher = {TEACHERS COLL OF COLUMBIA UNIV},
Year = {1996},
Month = {Spring},
ISSN = {0161-4681},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UF73100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds249796}
}
@article{fds249797,
Author = {Grant, RW and Orr, M},
Title = {Language, Race and Politics: From “Black” to
“African-American”},
Journal = {Politics & Society},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {137-152},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0032-3292},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UQ54100003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1177/0032329296024002004},
Key = {fds249797}
}
@book{fds309864,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education and of the
Conduct of the Understanding},
Publisher = {Hackett Publishing},
Editor = {Grant, RW and Tarcov, N},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds309864}
}
@article{fds249795,
Author = {GRANT, RW},
Title = {Integrity and Politics},
Journal = {Political Theory},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {414-443},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1994},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0090-5917},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591794022003003},
Doi = {10.1177/0090591794022003003},
Key = {fds249795}
}
@article{fds249794,
Author = {Aldrich, JH and Grant, RW},
Title = {The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the First
Parties},
Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
Volume = {55},
Number = {2},
Pages = {295-326},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1993},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2132267},
Doi = {10.2307/2132267},
Key = {fds249794}
}
@article{fds249800,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of
Powers},
Journal = {Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Year = {1991},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds249800}
}
@article{fds18913,
Author = {Michael Walzer},
Title = {Interpretation and Social Criticism},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Year = {1988},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds18913}
}
@article{fds249788,
Author = {Grant, RW and Kautz, S},
Title = {Review of Interpretation and Social Criticism by Michael
Walzer},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {259-262},
Year = {1988},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=A1988M945100026&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2131060},
Key = {fds249788}
}
@article{fds249793,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean
Individualism},
Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {42-63},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131040},
Doi = {10.2307/2131040},
Key = {fds249793}
}
@article{fds38446,
Author = {Book Note: David Wootton},
Title = {Divine Right and Democracy},
Journal = {Ethics},
Year = {1987},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds38446}
}
@book{fds249785,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {John Locke’s Liberalism},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds249785}
}
@article{fds249783,
Author = {Grant, RW},
Title = {Notes on Divine Right and Democracy by David
Wooton},
Journal = {Ethics},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds249783}
}
@article{fds331125,
Author = {Grant, R},
Title = {Advice to dissertation writers},
Journal = {PS: Political Science & Politics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {64-65},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096500017194},
Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500017194},
Key = {fds331125}
}
@article{fds249777,
Author = {Grant, RW and Grant, S},
Title = {The Madisonian Presidency},
Booktitle = {The Presidency in the Constitutional Order},
Publisher = {Louisiana State University Press},
Editor = {Bessette, J and Tulis, J},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds249777}
}
%% Güzeldere, Güven
@book{fds18266,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {Mechanical Minds: Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence
from},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds18266}
}
@book{fds18267,
Author = {Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere},
Title = {Sensing, Perceiving, Introspecting: Cognitive Architecture
and Phenomenal Consciousness},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds18267}
}
@book{fds18392,
Author = {Güven Güzeldere and Yoshi Nakamura},
Title = {The Puzzle of Pain: Philosophical and Scientific
Readings.},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds18392}
}
@article{fds53468,
Author = {O, Flanagan and J. Evans and G. Guzeldere},
Title = {Neuroethics: The Ethics of Neuroscience or the Neuroscience
of Ethics?},
Journal = {Neurology},
Editor = {Patricia S. Churchland},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds53468}
}
@book{fds18393,
Author = {Gürol Irzik and Güven Güzeldere},
Title = {Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Science},
Publisher = {D. Reidel Pub.},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds18393}
}
@book{fds18394,
Author = {Stefano Franchi and Güven Güzeldere},
Title = {Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds: Artificial
Intelligence from Automata to Cyborgs},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds18394}
}
@article{fds14206,
Author = {Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere},
Title = {Cognitive Architecture, Concepts and Introspection: An
Information-},
Journal = {Nous},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds14206}
}
@book{fds18398,
Author = {Sibel Irzik and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {Relocating the Faultlines},
Journal = {Special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds18398}
}
@article{fds14207,
Author = {G. Guzeldere and K. Pelphrey and P. Mack and A. Song and G.
McCarthy},
Title = {"Face Evoke Spatially Differentiated Patterns of BOLD
Activation and Deactivation in Ventral Extrastriate
Cortex"},
Journal = {Neuroreport},
Volume = {14},
Number = {7},
Year = {2003},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds14207}
}
@book{fds14205,
Title = {Contents of Consciousness},
Booktitle = {Consciousness and Cognition},
Editor = {Ron Mangun and Güven Güzeldere},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14205}
}
@article{fds14208,
Author = {G. Guzeldere},
Title = {Zombies},
Booktitle = {MacMillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science},
Publisher = {Nature Publishing Company},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14208}
}
@article{fds14212,
Author = {G. Guzeldere},
Title = {"Consciousness Resurrected: The Status of the Mind-Body
Problem Today"},
Journal = {Philosophy Now},
Volume = {36},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14212}
}
@book{fds18397,
Author = {Ron Mangun and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {Contents of Consciousness: Attention, Perception, and
Phenomenology},
Journal = {Special issue of Consciousness and Cognition},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds18397}
}
@book{fds18399,
Author = {Ron Mangun and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {Proceedings of the 5th Annual Meeting of the Association for
the Scientific Study of Consciousness},
Journal = {Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on
Consciousness},
Volume = {8},
Year = {2002},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds18399}
}
@article{fds14209,
Author = {G. Guzeldere and Murat Aydede},
Title = {"Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of
Pain"},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {69},
Year = {2002},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds14209}
}
@article{fds14210,
Author = {G. Guzeldere and E. Nahmias and R. Deaner},
Title = {"Darwin's Continuum: Building Blocks of Deception"},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Animal},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {C. Allen and M. Bekoff and G. Burghardt},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds14210}
}
@article{fds18403,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and M. Aydede},
Title = {"Consciousness, Conceivability Arguments, and
Perspectivalism: The Dialectics of the Debate."},
Journal = {Communication and Cognition},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1-2},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds18403}
}
@article{fds18405,
Author = {Scott Huettel and G. Güzeldere and Gregory
McCarthy},
Title = {"Dissociating th eMechanisms of Visual Attention in Change
Detection Using Functional MRI},
Journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
Volume = {13},
Number = {7},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds18405}
}
@article{fds18406,
Author = {M. Aydede and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: Some
Foundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence"},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {12},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18406}
}
@article{fds18407,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and Valerie Hardcastle and Owen
Flanagan},
Title = {"The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons from
Blindsight"},
Booktitle = {The New Cognitive Neurosciences},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Editor = {M. Gazzaniga},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds18407}
}
@book{fds18400,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and ed.},
Title = {Yapay Zeka ("Artificial Intelligence")},
Journal = {Special edition of Cogito},
Publisher = {Yapi Kredi Publications (Istanbul)},
Year = {1998},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds18400}
}
@article{fds18410,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and M. Aydede},
Title = {"On the relation between phenomenal and representational
properties." (commentary on Ned Block)},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Year = {1997},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds18410}
}
@book{fds18395,
Author = {Ned Block and Owen Flanagan and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical
Debates},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds18395}
}
@article{fds18408,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field
Guide"},
Booktitle = {The Nature of Consciousness},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds18408}
}
@article{fds18411,
Author = {Owen Flanagan and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Consciousness: A Philosophical Tour"},
Booktitle = {Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {M. Ito and Y. Miyashita and E. Rolls},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds18411}
}
@article{fds18409,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Is Consciousness the Perception of What Passes in One's Own
Mind?"},
Booktitle = {Conscious Experience},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Editor = {Thomas Metzinger},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds18409}
}
@article{fds18471,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Consciousness and the Introspective Link
Hypothesis"},
Booktitle = {Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Editor = {S. Hameroff and A. Kaszniak and A. C. Scott},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds18471}
}
@book{fds18401,
Author = {Stefano Franchi and G. Güzeldere},
Title = {Constructions of the Mind: Artificial Intelligence and the
Humanities},
Journal = {Special issue of the Stanford Humanities
Review},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18401}
}
@book{fds18402,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and Stefano Franchi},
Title = {"Bridging the Gap": Where Cognitive Scienceets Literary
Criticism},
Journal = {Special supplement of the Stanford Humanities
Review},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18402}
}
@article{fds18472,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Varieties of Zombiehood"},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18472}
}
@article{fds18473,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Problems of Consciousness: A Perspective on Contemporary
Issues, Current Debates"},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18473}
}
@article{fds18474,
Author = {G. Güzeldere},
Title = {"Consciousness: What It Is, HOw to Study It, What to Learn
from Its History"},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18474}
}
@article{fds18475,
Author = {G. Güzeldere and Stefano Franchi},
Title = {"Mindless Mechanisms, Mindful Constructions"},
Journal = {Stanford Humanities Review},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds18475}
}
%% Hawkins, Jennifer
@article{fds371502,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Affect, Values and Problems Assessing Decision-Making
Capacity.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Pages = {1-12},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
Abstract = {The dominant approach to assessing decision-making capacity
in medicine focuses on determining the extent to which
individuals possess certain core cognitive abilities.
Critics have argued that this model delivers the wrong
verdict in certain cases where patient values that are the
product of mental disorder or disordered affective states
undermine decision-making without undermining cognition. I
argue for a re-conceptualization of what it is to possess
the capacity to make medical treatment decisions. It is, I
argue, <i>the ability to track one's own personal interests
at least as well as most people can</i>. Using this idea, I
demonstrate that it is possible to craft a solution for the
problem cases-one that neither alters existing criteria in
dangerous ways (e.g. does not open the door to various kinds
of abuse) nor violates the spirit of widely accepted ethical
constraints on decision-making assessment.},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
Key = {fds371502}
}
@article{fds361359,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Theory Without Theories: Well-Being, Ethics, and
Medicine.},
Journal = {The Journal of medicine and philosophy},
Volume = {46},
Number = {6},
Pages = {656-683},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhab028},
Abstract = {Medical ethics would be better if people were taught to
think more clearly about well-being or (what I take to be
the same thing) the concept of what is good for a person.
Yet for a variety of reasons, bioethicists have generally
paid little attention to this concept. Here, I argue, first,
that focusing on general theories of welfare is not useful
for practical medical ethics. I argue, second, for what I
call the "theory-without-theories approach" to welfare in
practical contexts. The first element of this approach is a
focus on examining important and relatively uncontroversial
constituents of welfare as opposed to general theories. The
second key element is a framework for thinking about choice
in relation to welfare, a framework I refer to as "the mild
objectivity framework." I conclude with illustrations of the
way in which the "theory without theories approach" can
improve thinking in medicine.},
Doi = {10.1093/jmp/jhab028},
Key = {fds361359}
}
@article{fds363183,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Why even a liberal can justify limited paternalistic
intervention in anorexia nervosa},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155-158},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2021.0024},
Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2021.0024},
Key = {fds363183}
}
@article{fds363184,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Further Reflections: Surrogate Decisionmaking When
Significant Mental Capacities are Retained.},
Journal = {Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the
international journal of healthcare ethics
committees},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-198},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180120000699},
Abstract = {Mackenzie Graham has made an important contribution to the
literature on decisionmaking for patients with disorders of
consciousness. He argues, and I agree, that decisions for
unresponsive patients who are known to retain some degree of
covert awareness ought to focus on current interests, since
such patients likely retain the kinds of mental capacities
that in ordinary life command our current respect and
attention. If he is right, then it is not appropriate to
make decisions for such patients by appealing to the values
they had in the past, either the values expressed in an
advance directive or the values recalled by a surrogate.
There are two things I wish to add to the discussion. My
first point is somewhat critical, for although I agree with
his general conclusion about how, ideally, such decisions
should be approached, I remain skeptical about whether his
conclusion offers decisionmakers real practical help. The
problem with these cases is that the evidence we have about
the nature of the patient's current interests is minimal or
nonexistent. However-and this is important-Graham's
conclusion will be extremely relevant if in the future, our
ability to communicate with such patients improves, as I
hope it will. This leads to my second point. Graham's
conclusion illustrates a more general problem with our
standard framework for decisionmaking for previously
competent patients, a problem that has not been adequately
recognized. So, in what follows, I explain the problem I see
and offer some brief thoughts about solutions.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0963180120000699},
Key = {fds363184}
}
@article{fds347026,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Diversity of meaning and the value of a concept: Comments on
anna Alexandrova's a philosophy for the science of
well-being},
Journal = {Res Philosophica},
Volume = {96},
Number = {4},
Pages = {529-535},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1802},
Doi = {10.11612/resphil.1802},
Key = {fds347026}
}
@article{fds332347,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Barnes, Elizabeth. The Minority Body: A Theory of
Disability. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp.
160. $45.00 (cloth).},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {128},
Number = {2},
Pages = {462-467},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694278},
Doi = {10.1086/694278},
Key = {fds332347}
}
@article{fds335567,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Artistic creativity and suffering},
Pages = {152-169},
Booktitle = {Creativity and Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138827677},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351199797},
Abstract = {Can negative psychological experiences be good for a person?
If so, what could possibly be good about them? And when and
under what circumstances might they be good? In what
follows, my aim is to begin a philosophical exploration of
these issues by focusing on a particular case-the
relationship between negative affective experience and
artistic creativity.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781351199797},
Key = {fds335567}
}
@article{fds244473,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Decision-Making Capacity and Value},
Pages = {204-213},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Moseley, D and Gala, G},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds244473}
}
@article{fds244474,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {The Experience Machine and the Experience
Requirement},
Pages = {355-365},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of
Well-Being},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Fletcher, G},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {9781317402640},
Key = {fds244474}
}
@article{fds303571,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {What’s Good for Them? Best Interests and Severe Disorders
of Consciousness},
Pages = {180-206},
Booktitle = {Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics and Law of
Severe Brain Damage},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds303571}
}
@article{fds330526,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Treatment},
Pages = {204-213},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Moseley, D and Gala, G},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780415708166},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315688725},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315688725},
Key = {fds330526}
}
@article{fds244486,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Well-Being: What Matters Beyond the Mental?},
Journal = {Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {210-235},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2015},
url = {https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/84733336/09_Hawkins_Chapter-9PROOFS.pdf},
Key = {fds244486}
}
@article{fds244487,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Well-Being, Time, and Dementia},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {124},
Number = {3},
Pages = {507-542},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2014},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/675365},
Abstract = {Philosophers concerned with what would be good for a person
sometimes consider a person's past desires. Indeed, some
theorists have argued by appeal to past desires that it is
in the best interests of certain dementia patients to die. I
reject this conclusion. I consider three different ways one
might appeal to a person's past desires in arguing for
conclusions about the good of such patients, finding flaws
with each. Of the views I reject, the most interesting one
is the view that prudential value is, at least partly,
concerned with the shape of a life as a whole. © 2014 by
The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/675365},
Key = {fds244487}
}
@book{fds244475,
Title = {Exploitation and Developing Countries: The Ethics of
Clinical Research},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
Editor = {Hawkins, J and Emanuel, EJ},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244475}
}
%% Hazelwood, Caleb
@article{fds373380,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {An Emerging Dilemma for Reciprocal Causation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {1-43},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.124},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Among advocates
and critics of the “extended evolutionary synthesis”
(EES), “reciprocal causation” refers to the view that
adaptive evolution is a bidirectional phenomenon, whereby
organisms and environments impinge on each other through
processes of niche construction and natural selection. I
argue that reciprocal causation is incompatible with the
view that natural selection is a metaphysically emergent
causal process. The emergent character of selection places
reciprocal causation on the horns of dilemma, and neither
horn can rescue it. I conclude that proponents of the EES
must abandon the claim that the process of natural selection
features in cycles of reciprocal causation.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.124},
Key = {fds373380}
}
@article{fds372667,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Newton's “law-first” epistemology and “matter-first”
metaphysics},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {101},
Pages = {40-47},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
Key = {fds372667}
}
@article{fds370035,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Review of Charles H. Pence’sThe Causal Structure of
Natural Selection- Charles H. Pence, The Causal
Structure of Natural Selection. Elements in the Philosophy
of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2021), 75
pp. $22.00 (paperback).},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {90},
Number = {3},
Pages = {750-753},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.53},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.53},
Key = {fds370035}
}
@article{fds369252,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Reciprocal causation and biological practice},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {1},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
Abstract = {Arguments for an extended evolutionary synthesis often
center on the concept of “reciprocal causation.”
Proponents argue that reciprocal causation is superior to
standard models of evolutionary causation for at least two
reasons. First, it leads to better scientific models with
more predictive power. Second, it more accurately represents
the causal structure of the biological world. Simply put,
proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis argue that
reciprocal causation is empirically and explanatorily apt
relative to competing causal frameworks. In this paper, I
present quantitative survey data from faculty members in
biology departments at universities across the United States
to evaluate this claim. The survey data indicate that a
majority of the participants do not agree (i.e., most either
disagree or neither agree nor disagree) that the concept of
reciprocal causation confers a larger advantage on research
practices. However, a majority of the participants agree
that the causal framework of the extended evolutionary
synthesis more accurately represents the structure of the
biological world. These results demonstrate that the
explanatory merits of a conceptual framework and its
practical utility can come apart in interesting and
informative ways.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
Key = {fds369252}
}
@article{fds369232,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Bruce S. Grant, Observing Evolution: Peppered Moths and the
Discovery of Parallel Melanism. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2021.},
Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
Volume = {44},
Number = {4},
Pages = {52},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40656-022-00543-6},
Doi = {10.1007/s40656-022-00543-6},
Key = {fds369232}
}
@article{fds359231,
Author = {D'Aguillo, M and Hazelwood, C and Quarles, B and Donohue,
K},
Title = {Genetic Consequences of Biologically Altered
Environments.},
Journal = {The Journal of heredity},
Volume = {113},
Number = {1},
Pages = {26-36},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhered/esab047},
Abstract = {Evolvable traits of organisms can alter the environment
those organisms experience. While it is well appreciated
that those modified environments can influence natural
selection to which organisms are exposed, they can also
influence the expression of genetic variances and
covariances of traits under selection. When genetic variance
and covariance change in response to changes in the
evolving, modified environment, rates and outcomes of
evolution also change. Here we discuss the basic mechanisms
whereby organisms modify their environments, review how
those modified environments have been shown to alter genetic
variance and covariance, and discuss potential evolutionary
consequences of such dynamics. With these dynamics,
responses to selection can be more rapid and sustained,
leading to more extreme phenotypes, or they can be slower
and truncated, leading to more conserved phenotypes.
Patterns of correlated selection can also change, leading to
greater or less evolutionary independence of traits, or even
causing convergence or divergence of traits, even when
selection on them is consistent across environments.
Developing evolutionary models that incorporate changes in
genetic variances and covariances when environments
themselves evolve requires developing methods to predict how
genetic parameters respond to environments-frequently
multifactorial environments. It also requires a
population-level analysis of how traits of collections of
individuals modify environments for themselves and/or others
in a population, possibly in spatially explicit ways.
Despite the challenges of elucidating the mechanisms and
nuances of these processes, even qualitative predictions of
how environment-modifying traits alter evolutionary
potential are likely to improve projections of evolutionary
outcomes.},
Doi = {10.1093/jhered/esab047},
Key = {fds359231}
}
@article{fds369253,
Author = {Nijhout, HF and Kudla, A and Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Genetic assimilation and accommodation: Models and
mechanisms},
Journal = {Current Topics in Developmental Biology},
Volume = {141},
Pages = {337-369},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.ctdb.2020.11.006},
Doi = {10.1016/bs.ctdb.2020.11.006},
Key = {fds369253}
}
@article{fds355918,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of
Art},
Journal = {The British Journal of Aesthetics},
Volume = {61},
Number = {2},
Pages = {213-227},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayaa039},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In this paper, I
argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not
undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a
disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of
art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science,
likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’,
to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about
art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps
incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I
consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural
definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The
motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of
practice, because the term is of apparent value to
practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept
reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to
understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their
pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I
attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science
about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we
ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a
concept.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1093/aesthj/ayaa039},
Key = {fds355918}
}
@article{fds355278,
Author = {Nijhout, HF and Kudla, AM and Hazelwood, CC},
Title = {Genetic assimilation and accommodation: Models and
mechanisms.},
Volume = {141},
Pages = {337-369},
Booktitle = {Current Topics in Developmental Biology},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.ctdb.2020.11.006},
Abstract = {Genetic assimilation and genetic accommodation are
mechanisms by which novel phenotypes are produced and become
established in a population. Novel characters may be fixed
and canalized so they are insensitive to environmental
variation, or can be plastic and adaptively responsive to
environmental variation. In this review we explore the
various theories that have been proposed to explain the
developmental origin and evolution of novel phenotypes and
the mechanisms by which canalization and phenotypic
plasticity evolve. These theories and models range from
conceptual to mathematical and have taken different views of
how genes and environment contribute to the development and
evolution of the properties of phenotypes. We will argue
that a deeper and more nuanced understanding of genetic
accommodation requires a recognition that phenotypes are not
static entities but are dynamic system properties with no
fixed deterministic relationship between genotype and
phenotype. We suggest a mechanistic systems-view of
development that allows one to incorporate both genes and
environment in a common model, and that enables both
quantitative analysis and visualization of the evolution of
canalization and phenotypic plasticity.},
Doi = {10.1016/bs.ctdb.2020.11.006},
Key = {fds355278}
}
@article{fds355919,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {The species category as a scientific kind},
Journal = {Synthese},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2018},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02025-4},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02025-4},
Key = {fds355919}
}
%% Henne, Paul
@article{fds343595,
Author = {Henne, P and Niemi, L and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F and Knobe,
J},
Title = {A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal
judgment.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {190},
Pages = {157-164},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Abstract = {People's causal judgments are susceptible to the action
effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than
inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the
counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more
causal than inactions because they are more inclined to
consider the counterfactual alternatives to actions than to
consider counterfactual alternatives to inactions.
Experiment 1a conceptually replicates the original action
effect for causal judgments. Experiment 1b confirms a novel
prediction of the new explanation, the reverse action
effect, in which people judge inactions to be more causal
than actions in overdetermination cases. Experiment 2
directly compares the two effects in joint-causation and
overdetermination scenarios and conceptually replicates them
with new scenarios. Taken together, these studies provide
support for the new counterfactual explanation for the
action effect in causal judgment.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Key = {fds343595}
}
@article{fds337722,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
in revising moral decisions.},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
Volume = {147},
Number = {7},
Pages = {962-987},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
(affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
options. Although participants were more likely to change
their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
participants were significantly more likely not to change
their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
Key = {fds337722}
}
@misc{fds337721,
Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
Pages = {54-67},
Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
of Neuroscience},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. In Chapter 4, the authors
explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The
authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments
for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that
neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgments,
focusing the majority of their attention on one argument in
particular-the idea that neuroscience and psychology might
undermine moral knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs
result from unreliable processes. They argue that the
background arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail
to adequately support it. They conclude that the overall
issue of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled,
but, they contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
together.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Key = {fds337721}
}
@article{fds337723,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
Volume = {146},
Number = {6},
Pages = {884-895},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
people judge those actions that happened further in the past
to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
believed that they were very different people than they are
now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
Key = {fds337723}
}
@article{fds318389,
Author = {Henne, P and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering
Plants},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {95},
Number = {2},
Pages = {270-283},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Abstract = {© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy. People
generally accept that there is causation by omission—that
the omission of some events cause some related events. But
this acceptance elicits the selection problem, or the
difficulty of explaining the selection of a particular
omissive cause or class of causes from the causal
conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories
of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we
argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the
selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide
novel experimental evidence for it.},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Key = {fds318389}
}
@article{fds318390,
Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
"ought" implies "can".},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {20-25},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
empirical work has studied the relationships among these
concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
which states that if someone ought to do something, then
they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
"ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
of obligation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Key = {fds318390}
}
@article{fds318388,
Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
'Can'},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {283-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
Key = {fds318388}
}
%% Hoover, Kevin D.
@article{fds373365,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Svorenčík, A},
Title = {Who Runs the AEA?},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {61},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1127-1171},
Year = {2023},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221667},
Abstract = {The leadership structure of the American Economic
Association is documented using a biographical database
covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices
from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional
affiliations by education and employment. The structure is
strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the
leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger
over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored:
that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or
that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network
effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing
concentration are also investigated.},
Doi = {10.1257/jel.20221667},
Key = {fds373365}
}
@article{fds360551,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The struggle for the soul of macroeconomics},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {30},
Number = {2},
Pages = {80-89},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
Abstract = {Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was
failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the
dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling
for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics
exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking,
and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE
framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even
claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent
macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an
old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and
empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement
without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles
Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The
earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the
recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission
position, some DSGE modelers would essentially
straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic
science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet
critical framework.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
Key = {fds360551}
}
@article{fds370306,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Models, truth, and analytic inference in
economics},
Pages = {119-144},
Year = {2022},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003266051-11},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003266051-11},
Key = {fds370306}
}
@article{fds355665,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Erratum to: Hoover, k.d. 2020. the discovery of long-run
causal order: A preliminary investigation. econometrics 8:
31},
Journal = {Econometrics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/econometrics9010007},
Abstract = {The author would like to make the following correction to
the article by Hoover (2020): The symbol “↦”, first
defined as “is weakly exogenous for” in the first line
of the third paragraph of Section 4.3, was inadvertently and
systematically converted in production to the symbol
“α”. Every instance in which symbol “α” is used to
denote weak exogeneity should be changed to “↦”. The
Editorial Office would like to apologize for any
inconvenience caused to the readers by this change. The
change does not affect the scientific results. The
manuscript will be updated and the original will remain
online on the article webpage.},
Doi = {10.3390/econometrics9010007},
Key = {fds355665}
}
@article{fds351431,
Author = {Wible, JR and Hoover, KD},
Title = {The economics of trade liberalization: Charles S. Peirce and
the Spanish Treaty of 1884},
Journal = {European Journal of the History of Economic
Thought},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {229-248},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2020.1805483},
Abstract = {In the 1870 s and 1880 s, the scientist, logician, and
pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce possessed an
advanced knowledge of mathematical economics, having
mastered and criticised Cournot as early as 1871. In 1884 he
engaged in a multi-round debate with the editors of The
Nation over the economics of trade liberalisation in the
case of a proposed trade treaty with Spain concerning import
tariffs on Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar. While the
mathematical underpinings of Peirce’s intervention in the
debate are not explicit, they are evident in light of
Peirce’s unpublished writing on Cournot. The debate is
reconstructed and related carefully both to Peirce’s
understanding of mathematical economics and to his
philosophy of science. Peirce’s intervention is one of the
earliest intricate applications of mathematical economics to
public policy.},
Doi = {10.1080/09672567.2020.1805483},
Key = {fds351431}
}
@article{fds352545,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The discovery of long-run causal order: A preliminary
investigation},
Journal = {Econometrics},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-24},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/econometrics8030031},
Abstract = {The relation between causal structure and cointegration and
long-run weak exogeneity is explored using some ideas drawn
from the literature on graphical causal modeling. It is
assumed that the fundamental source of trending behavior is
transmitted from exogenous (and typically latent) trending
variables to a set of causally ordered variables that would
not themselves display nonstationary behavior if the
nonstationary exogenous causes were absent. The possibility
of inferring the long-run causal structure among a set of
time-series variables from an exhaustive examination of weak
exogeneity in irreducibly cointegrated subsets of variables
is explored and illustrated.},
Doi = {10.3390/econometrics8030031},
Key = {fds352545}
}
@article{fds356401,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Wible, JR},
Title = {Ricardian inference: Charles S. Peirce, economics, and
scientific method},
Journal = {Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society},
Volume = {56},
Number = {4},
Pages = {521-557},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.4.02},
Abstract = {Standard histories of economics usually treat the
“marginal revolution” of the mid- 19th century as both
supplanting the “classical” economics of Smith and
Ricardo and as advancing the idea of economics as a
mathematical science. The marginalists -especially Jevons
and Walras-viewed Cournot’s (1838) book on mathematical
economics as a seminal work on which they could build.
Surprisingly, the scientist, philosopher, and logician
Charles S. Peirce discovered Cournot before the marginalist
economists and possessed a deeper appreciation of his
mathematical approach. While Peirce’s contributions to
economics are limited, the influence of economics on his
philosophy is subtle and not well understood. In a number of
fragments, Peirce, who, despite Ricardo’s lack of
mathematical form, nonetheless regarded him as a
paradigmatic mathematical economist, refers to “Ricardian
inference” as a fundamental contribution to scientific
method. Two options, perhaps complementary, are explored as
to exactly what Peirce meant by “Ricardian inference.”
On the one hand, he associates Ricardo with the
“primipostnumeral syllogism,” which is a sort of
generalization to uncountably infinite sets of what Peirce
calls Fermatian inference (often referred to as mathematical
induction). On the other hand, he holds up Ricardo as an
exemplar of the “analytical method,” which is Peirce’s
name for a hybrid form connecting analogy, abduction, and
induction. On either account, economics plays a larger and
more fundamental role in Peirce’s philosophy of science
than is generally understood. In the Harvard Lectures the
two threads are linked together in Peirce’s use of an
economic example to exemplify pragmatism.},
Doi = {10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.4.02},
Key = {fds356401}
}
@article{fds366754,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The life you do not save: Reflections on the causal element
in the notion of a decision’s consequences},
Journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics},
Volume = {176},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-174},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0019},
Doi = {10.1628/jite-2020-0019},
Key = {fds366754}
}
@article{fds344661,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Editor’s note},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {51},
Number = {3},
Pages = {389},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7694871},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-7694871},
Key = {fds344661}
}
@misc{fds344811,
Author = {Goodwin, C and Weintraub, ER and Hoover, KD and Caldwell,
B},
Title = {John maynard keynes of bloomsbury: Four short
talks},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds344811}
}
@article{fds342813,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Keynes and economics},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {51},
Number = {1},
Pages = {83-88},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7289276},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-7289276},
Key = {fds342813}
}
@article{fds342814,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Craufurd goodwin: Economist as collector},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {51},
Number = {1},
Pages = {187-191},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7289420},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-7289420},
Key = {fds342814}
}
@article{fds333200,
Author = {Hoover, K},
Title = {Scots are more studious},
Journal = {Economist (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {414},
Number = {9074},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds333200}
}
@article{fds343702,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {A countercultural methodology: Caldwell’s beyond
positivism at thirty-five},
Volume = {36A},
Pages = {9-17},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0743-41542018000036A002},
Abstract = {Caldwell’s Beyond Positivism was a key publication that
helped precipitate the consolidation of the methodology of
economics into a distinct subfield within economics.
Reconsidering it after 35 years, it is striking for its
antina-turalism (i.e., its lack of deference to the actual
practices of economics) or, perhaps, for its meta-naturalism
(displayed in its excessive deference to the philosophy of
science) and for its defense of pluralism. It offers
pluralism as an unsuccessful defense against dogmatism.
Against Caldwell’s pluralism, dogmatism is better opposed
by a commitment of fallibilism and scientific humility.
Caldwell’s defense of Austrian methodology is taken as a
case study to illustrate and investigate his key themes and
the issues that they raise.},
Doi = {10.1108/S0743-41542018000036A002},
Key = {fds343702}
}
@article{fds321958,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The Crisis in economic theory: A review essay},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {54},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1350-1361},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151338},
Abstract = {The Great Recession and the financial crisis of 2007-09
prompted calls for fundamental reforms of economic theory.
The role of theory in economics and in recent economic
events is considered in light of two recent books: the
sociologist Richard Swedberg's The Art of Social Theory and
the economist André Orléan's The Empire of Value: A New
Foundation for Economics.},
Doi = {10.1257/jel.20151338},
Key = {fds321958}
}
@article{fds285653,
Author = {Halsmayer, V and Hoover, KD},
Title = {Solow's Harrod: Transforming macroeconomic dynamics into a
model of long-run growth},
Journal = {European Journal of the History of Economic
Thought},
Volume = {23},
Number = {4},
Pages = {561-596},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0967-2567},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2014.1001763},
Abstract = {Abstract: Modern growth theory derives mostly from Solow's
“A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”
(1956). Solow's own interpretation locates its origins in
his view that Harrod's growth model implied a tendency
toward progressive collapse of the economy. He formulates
his view in terms of Harrod's invoking a fixed-coefficients
production function. We challenge Solow's reading of
Harrod's “Essay in Dynamic Theory,” arguing that
Harrod's object in providing a “dynamic” theory had
little to do with the problem of long-run growth as Solow
understood it, but instead addressed medium-run
fluctuations, the “inherent instability” of economies.
Solow's interpretation of Harrod was grounded in a
particular culture of understanding embedded in the practice
of formal modelling that emerged in economics in the
post-Second World War period. Solow's interpretation, which
ultimately dominated the profession's view of Harrod, is a
case study in the difficulties in communicating across
distinct interpretive communities and of the potential for
losing content and insights in the process. Harrod's objects
– particularly, of trying to account for a tendency of the
economy toward chronic recessions – were lost to the
mainstream literature.},
Doi = {10.1080/09672567.2014.1001763},
Key = {fds285653}
}
@article{fds320587,
Author = {Wible, JR and Hoover, KD},
Title = {Mathematical Economics Comes to America: Charles S. Peirce's
Engagement with Cournot's Recherches Sur Les Principes
Mathematiques De La Théorie Des Richesses},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Economic Thought},
Volume = {37},
Number = {04},
Pages = {511-536},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1053837215000450},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Although Cournot’s mathematical economics was
generally neglected until the mid-1870s, he was taken up and
carefully studied by the Scientific Club of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, even before his “discovery” by Walras and
Jevons. The episode is reconstructed from fragmentary
manuscripts of the pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce,
a sophisticated mathematician. Peirce provides a subtle
interpretation and anticipates Bertrand’s
criticisms.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S1053837215000450},
Key = {fds320587}
}
@article{fds320588,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The Ontological Status of Shocks and Trends in
Macroeconomics},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {192},
Number = {11},
Pages = {3509-3532},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0503-5},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0503-5},
Key = {fds320588}
}
@article{fds321959,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Thomas Mayer: (born 18 January 1927, Vienna Austria; died 29
January 2015, Berkeley, California, USA)},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {526-527},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2015.1112623},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2015.1112623},
Key = {fds321959}
}
@article{fds285654,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Reductionism in economics: Intentionality and eschatological
justification in the microfoundations of
macroeconomics},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {82},
Number = {4},
Pages = {689-711},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682917},
Abstract = {Macroeconomists overwhelmingly believe that macroeconomics
requires microfoundations, typically understood as a strong
eliminativist reductionism. Microfoundations aims to recover
intentionality. In the face of technical and data
constraints macroeconomists typically employ a
representative-agent model, in which a single agent solves
the microeconomic optimization problem for the whole
economy, and take it to be microfoundationally adequate. The
characteristic argument for the representative-agent model
holds that the possibility of the sequential elaboration of
the model to cover any number of individual agents justifies
treating the policy conclusions of the single-agent model as
practically relevant. This eschatological justification is
examined and rejected.},
Doi = {10.1086/682917},
Key = {fds285654}
}
@article{fds325927,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {A Review of James Forder's Macroeconomics and the Phillips
Curve Myth},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Abstract = {A review of James Forder’s important history of the
Phillips Curve.},
Key = {fds325927}
}
@article{fds285662,
Author = {Hoover, K and Juselius, K},
Title = {TRYGVE HAAVELMO'S EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY and SCENARIO
ANALYSIS in A COINTEGRATED VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION},
Journal = {Econometric Theory},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {249-274},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0266-4666},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266466614000292},
Abstract = {The paper provides a careful, analytical account of Trygve
Haavelmo's use of the analogy between controlled experiments
common in the natural sciences and econometric techniques.
The experimental analogy forms the linchpin of the
methodology for passive observation that he develops in his
famous monograph, The Probability Approach in Econometrics
(1944). Contrary to some recent interpretations of
Haavelmo's method, the experimental analogy does not commit
Haavelmo to a strong apriorism in which econometrics can
only test and reject theoretical hypotheses, rather it
supports the acquisition of knowledge through a two-way
exchange between theory and empirical evidence. Once the
details of the analogy are systematically understood, the
experimental analogy can be used to shed light on
theory-consistent cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR)
scenario analyses. A CVAR scenario analysis can be
interpreted as a clear example of Haavelmo's 'experimental'
approach; and, in turn, it can be shown to extend and
develop Haavelmo's methodology and to address issues that
Haavelmo regarded as unresolved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266466614000292},
Key = {fds285662}
}
@misc{fds333582,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Macroeconomics, History of From 1933 to Present},
Pages = {400-405},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences: Second Edition},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780080970868},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71066-X},
Abstract = {The history of modern macroeconomics begins when much older
economic questions were reclassified by Ragnar Frisch under
the headings 'microeconomics' and 'macroeconomics.' The
history of macroeconomics related here is importantly a
history of the relationships of macroeconomics to
microeconomics, and econometrics. The emphasis is on the
development of macroeconomics as an interplay among economic
theory, empirical investigation, and public
policy.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71066-X},
Key = {fds333582}
}
@article{fds285664,
Author = {Demiralp, S and Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Still puzzling: Evaluating the price puzzle in an
empirically identified structural vector
autoregression},
Journal = {Empirical Economics},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {701-731},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0377-7332},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00181-013-0694-5},
Abstract = {The price puzzle, an increase in the price level associated
with a contractionary monetary shock, is investigated in a
rich, 12-variable SVAR in which various factors that have
been mooted as solutions are considered jointly. SVARs for
the pre-1980 and post-1990 periods are identified
empirically using a graph-theoretic causal search algorithm
combined with formal tests of the implied overidentifying
restrictions. In this SVAR, the pre-1980 price puzzle
depends on the characterization of monetary policy, and the
post-1990 price puzzle is statistically insignificant.
Commonly suggested theoretical resolutions to the price
puzzle are shown to have causal implications inconsistent
with the data. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00181-013-0694-5},
Key = {fds285664}
}
@article{fds285657,
Author = {Boianovsky, M and Hoover, KD},
Title = {In the Kingdom of Solovia: The Rise of Growth Economics at
MIT, 1956-1970},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {46},
Number = {Supplement 1},
Pages = {198-228},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0018-2702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2716172},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-2716172},
Key = {fds285657}
}
@article{fds285663,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {On the reception of haavelmo's econometric
thought},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Economic Thought},
Volume = {36},
Number = {1},
Pages = {45-65},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1053-8372},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1053837214000029},
Abstract = {The significance of Haavelmo's The Probability Approach in
Econometrics (1944), the foundational document of modern
econometrics, has been interpreted in widely different ways.
Some regard it as a blueprint for a provocative (but
ultimately unsuccessful) program dominated by the need for a
priori theoretical identification of econometric models.
Others focus more on statistical adequacy than on
theoretical identification. They see its deepest insights as
unduly neglected. The present article uses bibliometric
techniques and a close reading of econometrics articles and
textbooks to trace the way in which the economics profession
received, interpreted, and transmitted Haavelmo's ideas. A
key irony is that the first group calls for a reform of
econometric thinking that goes several steps beyond
Haavelmo's initial vision; the second group argues that
essentially what the first group advocates was already in
Haavelmo's Probability Approach from the beginning. © 2014
The History of Economics Society.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1053837214000029},
Key = {fds285663}
}
@article{fds285667,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Stevens, JP},
Title = {The 'slave bonus'},
Journal = {New York Review of Books},
Volume = {60},
Number = {16},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0028-7504},
Key = {fds285667}
}
@article{fds285668,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {John Paul Stevens replies},
Journal = {New York Review of Books},
Volume = {60},
Number = {16},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0028-7504},
Key = {fds285668}
}
@article{fds219757,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {The Role of Hypothesis Testing in the Molding of Econometric
Models},
Journal = {Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
Abstract = {This paper addresses the role of tests of statistical
hypotheses (specification tests) in selection of a
statistically admissible model in which to evaluate economic
hypotheses. The issue is formulated in the context of recent
philosophical accounts on the nature of models and related
to some results in the literature on specification
search.},
Key = {fds219757}
}
@article{fds285671,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Young, W},
Title = {Rational expectations: Retrospect and prospect},
Journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics},
Volume = {17},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1169-1192},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1365-1005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1365100511000812},
Abstract = {The transcript of a panel discussion marking the 50th
anniversary of John Muth's Rational Expectations and the
Theory of Price Movements (Econometrica 1961). The panel
consisted of Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen,
Robert Shiller, and Neil Wallace. The discussion was
moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young. The panel
touched on a wide variety of issues related to the
rational-expectations hypothesis, including its history,
starting with Muth's work at Carnegie Tech; its
methodological role; applications to policy; its
relationship to behavioral economics; its role in the recent
financial crisis; and its likely future. The panel
discussion was held in a session sponsored by the History of
Economics Society at the Allied Social Sciences Association
(ASSA) meetings in the Capitol 1 Room of the Hyatt Regency
Hotel in Denver, Colorado. © 2012 Cambridge University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1365100511000812},
Key = {fds285671}
}
@misc{fds362081,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Pragmatism, perspectivai realism, and econometrics},
Pages = {223-240},
Booktitle = {Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in
Economics},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9780415686549},
Key = {fds362081}
}
@book{fds371695,
Author = {Hartley, JE and Hoover, KD and Salyer, KD},
Title = {Real business cycles: A Reader},
Pages = {1-669},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781134694792},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203070710},
Abstract = {Real Business Cycle theory combines the remains of
monetarism with the new classical macroeconomics, and has
become one of the dominant approaches within contemporary
macroeconomics today. This volume presents: * the
authoritative anthology in RBC. The work contains the major
articles introducing and extending the theory as well as
critical literature * an extensive introduction which
contains an expository summary and critical evaluation of
RBC theory * comprehensive coverage and balance between
seminal papers and extensions; proponents and critics; and
theory and empirics. Macroeconomics is a compulsory element
in most economics courses, and this book will be an
essential guide to one of its major theories.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203070710},
Key = {fds371695}
}
@misc{fds285659,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Pragmatism, perspectival realism, and econometrics},
Pages = {221-240},
Booktitle = {Economics for Real: Uskali Maki and the Place of Truth in
Economics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Aki Lehtinen and Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri
Ylikoski},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780203148402},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203148402},
Abstract = {Econometricians tend to hold simultaneously two views in
tension with each other: an apparent anti-realism, which
holds that all models are false and at best useful
constructs or approximations to true models, and an apparent
realism, on which models are to be judged by their success
at capturing an independent reality. This tension is
resolved starting from Ronald Giere’s perspectival
realism. Perspectival realism can itself be seen as a
species of pragmatism, as that term is understood by its
originator, Charles S. Peirce.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203148402},
Key = {fds285659}
}
@misc{fds354538,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Identity, Structure, and Causal Representation in Scientific
Models},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {35-57},
Booktitle = {History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life
Sciences},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Hsiang-Ke Chao and Szu-Ting Chen and Roberta
Millstein},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2454-9_3},
Abstract = {Recent debates over the nature of causation, casual
inference, and the uses of causal models in counterfactual
analysis, involving inter alia Nancy Cartwright (Hunting
Causes and Using Them), James Woodward (Making Things
Happen), and Judea Pearl (Causation), hinge on how causality
is represented in models. Economists’ indigenous approach
to causal representation goes back to the work of Herbert
Simon with the Cowles Commission in the early 1950s. The
paper explicates a scheme for the representation of causal
structure, inspired by Simon, and shows how this
representation sheds light on some important debates in the
philosophy of causation. This structural account is compared
to Woodward’s manipulability account. It is used to
evaluate the recent debates – particularly, with respect
to the nature of causal structure, the identity of causes,
causal independence, and modularity. Special attention is
given to modeling issues that arise in empirical
economics.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-2454-9_3},
Key = {fds354538}
}
@misc{fds368102,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {FACTS AND ARTIFACTS: CALIBRATION AND THE EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF REAL-BUSINESS-CYCLE MODELS},
Pages = {272-291},
Booktitle = {Real business cycles: A Reader},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781134694792},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203070710-23},
Abstract = {THE RELATIONSHIP between theory and data has been, from the
beginning, a central concern of the new-classical
macroeconomics. This much is evident in the title of Robert
E. Lucas’s and Thomas J. Sargent’s landmark edited
volume, Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice
(1981). With the advent of real-business-cycle models, many
new classical economists have turned to calibration methods.
The new classical macroeconomics is now divided between
calibrators and estimators. But the debate is not a
parochial one, raising, as it does, issues about the
relationships of models to reality and the nature of
econometrics that should be important to every school of
macroeconomic thought, indeed to all applied economics. The
stake in this debate is the future direction of quantitative
macroeconomics. It is, therefore, critical to understand the
root issues.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203070710-23},
Key = {fds368102}
}
@article{fds285703,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Causal structure and hierarchies of models.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and
biomedical sciences},
Volume = {43},
Number = {4},
Pages = {778-786},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1369-8486},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22727127},
Abstract = {Economics prefers complete explanations: general over
partial equilibrium, microfoundational over aggregate.
Similarly, probabilistic accounts of causation frequently
prefer greater detail to less as in typical resolutions of
Simpson's paradox. Strategies of causal refinement equally
aim to distinguish direct from indirect causes. Yet, there
are countervailing practices in economics.
Representative-agent models aim to capture economic
motivation but not to reduce the level of aggregation. Small
structural vector-autoregression and dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium models are practically preferred to
larger ones. The distinction between exogenous and
endogenous variables suggests partitioning the world into
distinct subsystems. The tension in these practices is
addressed within a structural account of causation inspired
by the work of Herbert Simon's, which defines cause with
reference to complete systems adapted to deal with
incomplete systems and piecemeal evidence. The focus is on
understanding the constraints that a structural account of
causation places on the freedom to model complex or
lower-order systems as simpler or higher-order systems and
on to what degree piecemeal evidence can be incorporated
into a structural account.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2012.05.007},
Key = {fds285703}
}
@article{fds285706,
Author = {Duarte, PG and Hoover, KD},
Title = {Observing Shocks},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {44},
Number = {suppl_1},
Pages = {226-249},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0018-2702},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000313155900011&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Macroeconomists have observed business cycle
fluctuations over time by constructing and manipulating
models in which shocks have increasingly played a greater
role. Shock is a term of art that pervades modern economics
appearing in nearly one-quarter of all journal articles in
economics and in nearly half in macroeconomics.
Surprisingly, its rise as an essential element in the
vocabulary of economists can be dated only to the early
1970s. We trace the history of shocks in macroeconomics from
Ragnar Frisch and Eugen Slutsky in the 1920s and 1930s
through real business cycle and DSGE models and to the use
of shocks as generators of impulse-response functions, which
are in turn used as data in matching estimators. The history
is organized around the observability of shocks. As well as
documenting a critical conceptual development in economics,
the history of shocks shows that James Bogen and James
Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena must be
substantially relativized if it is to be at all
plausible.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-1631851},
Key = {fds285706}
}
@article{fds320590,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Juselius, K},
Title = {Experiments, Passive Observation and Scenario Analysis:
Trygve Haavelmo and the Cointegrated Vector
Autoregression},
Journal = {Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion
Paper},
Number = {12},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {The paper provides a careful, analytical account of Trygve
Haavelmo's unsystematic, but important, use of the analogy
between controlled experiments common in the natural
sciences and econometric techniques. The experimental
analogy forms the linchpin of the methodology for passive
observation that he develops in his famous monograph, The
Probability Approach in Econometrics (1944). We show how,
once the details of the analogy are systematically
understood, the experimental analogy can be used to shed
light on theory-consistent cointegrated vector
autoregression (CVAR) scenario analysis. CVAR scenario
analysis can be seen as a clear example of Haavelmo's
'experimental' approach; and, in turn, it can be shown to
extend and develop Haavelmo's methodology and to address
issues that Haavelmo regarded as unresolved.},
Key = {fds320590}
}
@article{fds325928,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Man and Machine in Macroeconomics},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds325928}
}
@article{fds320591,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Against Psychosis: A Review of Roman Frydman and Michael D.
Goldberg’s Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings,
Risk, and the Role of the State},
Journal = {CHOPE Working Paper},
Number = {2012},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {A review essay of Roman Frydman & Michael D. Goldberg’s
Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the
Role of the State.},
Key = {fds320591}
}
@article{fds320592,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The Role of Hypothesis Testing in the Molding of Econometric
Models},
Journal = {CHOPE Working Paper},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2012},
Pages = {43-43},
Publisher = {Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v6i2.133},
Abstract = {The paper is a keynote lecture from the Tilburg-Madrid
Conference on Hypothesis Tests: Foundations and Applications
at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)
Madrid, Spain, 15-16 December 2011. It addresses the role of
tests of statistical hypotheses (specification tests) in
selection of a statistically admissible model in which to
evaluate economic hypotheses. The issue is formulated in the
context of recent philosophical accounts on the nature of
models and related to some results in the literature on
specification search.},
Doi = {10.23941/ejpe.v6i2.133},
Key = {fds320592}
}
@book{fds211896,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {Applied Intermediate Macroeconomics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {An intermediate macroeconomics textbook that stresses using
real-world data and elementary statistics to understand the
economy.},
Key = {fds211896}
}
@article{fds285669,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Microfoundational programs},
Pages = {19-61},
Booktitle = {Microfoundations Reconsidered: The Relationship of Micro and
Macroeconomics in Historical Perspective.},
Publisher = {Elgar},
Editor = {Pedro Garcia Duarte and Gilberto Lima Tadeu},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781781004104.00008},
Abstract = {The substantial questions of macroeconomics itself are very
old, going back to the origins of economics itself. But
professional self-consciousness of the distinction between
macroeconomics and microeconomics dates only to the 1930s.
The distinction was drawn quite independently of Keynes, yet
Keynes’s General Theory led to its widespread adoption.
The question of the relationship of microeconomics to
macroeconomics encapsulated in the question of whether
macroeconomics requires microfoundations was not raised for
the first time in the 1960s or ‘70s, as is sometimes
thought, but goes back to the very foundations of
macroeconomics. There are in fact at least three
microfoundational programs: a Marshallian program with its
roots directly in Keynes’s own theorizing in the General
Theory; a fixed-price general-equilibrium theory, which
includes some work of Patinkin, Clower, and Barro and
Grossman; and the more recent representative-agent
microfoundations, starting with Lucas and the new classicals
in the early 1970s. This paper will document the development
of each of these microfoundational programs and their
interrelationship, especially in relationship to the
programs of general-equilibrium theory and econometrics,
whose modern incarnations both date from exactly the same
period in the 1930s.},
Doi = {10.4337/9781781004104.00008},
Key = {fds285669}
}
@article{fds285670,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Economic Theory and Causal Inference},
Pages = {89-113},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50004-X},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50004-X},
Key = {fds285670}
}
@misc{fds211920,
Author = {K.D. Hoover and Selva Demiralp and Stephen Perez},
Title = {“Empirical Identification of the Vector Autoregression:
The Causes and Effects of U.S. M2”},
Pages = {37-58},
Booktitle = {The Methodology and Practice of Econometrics: A Festschrift
in Honour of David F. Hendry},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Jennifer Castle and Neil Shephard},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds211920}
}
@misc{fds211902,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {"Identity, Structure, and Causal Representation in
Scientific Models"},
Booktitle = {Towards the Methodological Turn in the Philosophy of
Science: Mechanism and Causality in Biology and
Economics.},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Hsiang-Ke Chao and Szu-Ting Chen and Roberta
Millstein},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Recent debates over the nature causation, casual inference,
and the uses of causal models in counterfactual analysis,
involving inter alia Nancy Cartwright (Hunting Causes and
Using Them), James Woodward (Making Things Happen) and Judea
Pearl (Causation) hinge on how causality is represented in
models. Economists’ indigenous approach to causal
representation goes back to the work of Herbert Simon with
the Cowles Commission in the early 1950s. The paper
explicates a scheme for the representation of causal
structure, inspired by Simon and shows how this
representation sheds light on some important debates in the
philosophy of causation. This structural account is compared
to Woodward’s manipulability account. It is used to
evaluate the recent debates – particularly, with respect
to the nature of causal structure, the identity of causes,
causal independence, and modularity. Special attention is
given to modeling issues that arise in empirical
economics.},
Key = {fds211902}
}
@misc{fds285660,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Counterfactuals and causal structure},
Pages = {338-360},
Booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Phyllis McKay Illari and Federica Russo and Jon
Williamson},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780199574131},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0016},
Abstract = {The structural account of causation derives inter alia from
Herbert Simon's work on causal order and was developed in
Hoover's Causality in Macroeconomics and earlier articles.
The structural account easily connects to, enriches, and
illuminates graphical or Bayes net approaches to causal
representation and is able to handle modular, nonmodular,
linear, and nonlinear causal systems. The representation is
used to illuminate the mutual relationship between causal
structure and counterfactuals, particularly addressing the
role of counterfactuals in Woodward's manipulationist
account of causation and Cartwright's attack on 'impostor
counterfactuals'.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0016},
Key = {fds285660}
}
@article{fds285693,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Craufurd goodwin and history of political economy: A double
anniversary},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {43},
Number = {2},
Pages = {247-255},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0018-2702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-1257379},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-1257379},
Key = {fds285693}
}
@misc{fds211911,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {The Uses of Economics: Past and Future , special issue of
History of Political Economy.},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Editor = {K.D. Hoover},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {A special issue of the journal History of Political Economy
arising from the conference celebrating the joint 40th
anniversary of the journal and of the editorship of its
founding editor, Craufurd Goodwin.},
Key = {fds211911}
}
@article{fds285694,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Introduction: Methodological implications of the financial
crisis},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {397-398},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2010.525037},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2010.525037},
Key = {fds285694}
}
@article{fds285700,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of
Macroeconomics},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {73},
Number = {3},
Pages = {329-347},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0165-0106},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2043 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {The dominant view among macroeconomists is that
macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics, both in the sense
that all macroeconomic phenomena arise out of microeconomic
phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic theory-to the
extent that it is correct-can be derived from microeconomic
theory. More than that, the dominant view believes that
macroeconomics should in practice use the reduced
microeconomic theory: this is the program of
microfoundations for macroeconomics to which the vast
majority of macroeconomists adhere. The "microfoundational"
models that they actually employ are, however, characterized
by another feature: they are highly idealized, even when
they are applied as direct characterizations of actual data,
which itself consists of macroeconomic aggregates. This
paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism
and idealization in the microfoundational program and the
role of idealization in empirical modeling. © 2010 The
Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-010-9235-1},
Key = {fds285700}
}
@article{fds285691,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Minisymposium on the history of econometrics:
Introduction},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {42},
Number = {1},
Pages = {19-20},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0018-2702},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2009-061},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-2009-061},
Key = {fds285691}
}
@article{fds200400,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {“Economic Theory and Causal Inference”},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics; one volume of the
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science},
Editor = {Uskali Mäki (volume editor) and Dov Gabbay and Paul Thagard and John Woods (general},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds200400}
}
@article{fds285695,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {“Minisymposium: Methodological Implications of the
Financial Crisis: Introduction”},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {Editor's introduction to the minisymposium.},
Key = {fds285695}
}
@article{fds285699,
Author = {Boianovsky, M and Hoover, KD},
Title = {The neoclassical growth model and twentieth-century
economics},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {41},
Number = {SUPPL.1},
Pages = {1-23},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0018-2702},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000280833000001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-2009-013},
Key = {fds285699}
}
@misc{fds285658,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195189254},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195189254.003.0014},
Abstract = {The typical concerns of macroeconomics-such as national
output, employment and unemployment, inflation, interest
rates, and the balance of payments-are among the oldest in
economics, having been dominant among the problems addressed
by both the mercantilists and classical economists, such as
David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, as well as even
earlier writers. These concerns co-existed with ones that
are now regarded as characteristically microeconomic, such
as the theory of prices exemplified in the labor theory of
value of the classical economists or the theory of marginal
utility of the early neoclassical economists. Questions
about the relationship between these two groups of concerns
could hardly be articulated until a categorical distinction
between macroeconomics and microeconomics had been drawn.
This article asks whether there is a successful ontology of
macroeconomics. It also discusses the implications that this
ontology has for practical macroeconomics.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195189254.003.0014},
Key = {fds285658}
}
@misc{fds285661,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Demiralp, S and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Empirical Identification of the Vector Autoregression: The
Causes and Effects of US M2},
Pages = {37-58},
Booktitle = {The Methodology and Practice of Econometrics: A Festschrift
in Honour of David F. Hendry},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780199237197},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237197.003.0002},
Abstract = {The M2 monetary aggregate is monitored by the Federal
Reserve, using a broad brush theoretical analysis and an
informal empirical analysis. This chapter illustrates
empirical identification of an eleven-variable system, in
which M2 and the factors that the Fed regards as causes and
effects are captured in a vector autoregression. Taking
account of cointegration, the methodology combines recent
developments in graph-theoretical causal search algorithms
with a general-to-specific search algorithm to identify a
fully specified structural vector autoregression (SVAR). The
SVAR is used to examine the causes and effects of M2 in a
variety of ways. The chapter concludes that while the Fed
has rightly identified a number of special factors that
influence M2 and while M2 detectably affects other important
variables, there is 1) little support for the core
quantity-theoretic approach to M2 used by the Fed; and 2) M2
is a trivial linkage in the transmission mechanism from
monetary policy to real output and inflation.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237197.003.0002},
Key = {fds285661}
}
@article{fds285692,
Author = {Hoover, K},
Title = {Economic reasoning},
Journal = {Economist},
Volume = {392},
Number = {8643},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0013-0613},
Key = {fds285692}
}
@misc{fds285655,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Milton Friedman’s stance: The methodology of causal
realism},
Pages = {303-320},
Booktitle = {The Methodology of Positive Economics: Reflections on the
Milton Friedman Legacy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Uskali Mäki},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521867016},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511581427.014},
Abstract = {The God of Abraham; the methodology of Marshall The
philosopher Bas Van Fraassen opens his Terry Lectures
(published as The Empirical Stance) with an anecdote:
“When Pascal died, a scrap of paper was found in the
lining of his coat. On it was written ‘The God of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, not the God of the philosophers’” (Van
Fraassen 2002, 1). Pascal's God talks and wrestles with men;
Descartes's God is a creature of metaphysics. Analogously,
with respect to the “Methodology of positive economics”
(F53) there are two Friedmans. Most of the gallons of ink
spilled in interpreting Friedman's essay have treated it as
a philosophical work. This is true, for example, for those
who have interpreted it as an exemplar of instrumentalism,
Popperian falsificationism, conventionalism, positivism, and
so forth. And it is even true for those critics, such as
Samuelson (1963), whose credentials as an economist are
otherwise secure. Mayer (1993a, 1995, 2003) and Hands (2003)
remind us that Friedman was philosophically unsophisticated,
and in the essay Friedman tried a fall with other
economists, not with philosophers. The origin of the essay
was the quotidian practice of economics, not abstract
epistemology. To know the Friedman of the economists, I
propose to read the essay in light of Friedman (and
Schwartz's) A Monetary History of the United States,
1867–1960 (1963a) and “Money and business cycles”
(1963b), perhaps his most characteristic economic
investigations. My point is not that there is a particular
philosophers' position that can be contrasted with a
particular economists' (or even Friedman's)
position.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511581427.014},
Key = {fds285655}
}
@book{fds211919,
Title = {Robert Solow and the Development of Growth
Economics},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Editor = {K.D. Hoover and Mauro Boianovsky},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds211919}
}
@misc{fds211917,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {“Probability and Structure in Econometric
Models”},
Pages = {497-513.},
Booktitle = {The Proceedings of the 13th International Congress of Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science.},
Publisher = {King's College Publications},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds211917}
}
@article{fds285702,
Author = {Demiralp, S and Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {A bootstrap method for identifying and evaluating a
structural vector autoregression},
Journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
Volume = {70},
Number = {4},
Pages = {509-533},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0305-9049},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2047 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Graph-theoretic methods of causal search based on the ideas
of Pearl (2000), Spirtes et al. (2000), and others have been
applied by a number of researchers to economic data,
particularly by Swanson and Granger (1997) to the problem of
finding a data-based contemporaneous causal order for the
structural vector autoregression, rather than, as is
typically done, assuming a weakly justified Choleski order.
Demiralp and Hoover (2003) provided Monte Carlo evidence
that such methods were effective, provided that signal
strengths were sufficiently high. Unfortunately, in
applications to actual data, such Monte Carlo simulations
are of limited value, as the causal structure of the true
data-generating process is necessarily unknown. In this
paper, we present a bootstrap procedure that can be applied
to actual data (i.e. without knowledge of the true causal
structure). We show with an applied example and a simulation
study that the procedure is an effective tool for assessing
our confidence in causal orders identified by
graph-theoretic search algorithms. © 2008. Blackwell
Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University
of Oxford.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00496.x},
Key = {fds285702}
}
@article{fds285701,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The vanity of the economist: A comment on Peart and Levy's
the "Vanity of the Philosopher"},
Journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
Volume = {67},
Number = {3},
Pages = {445-453},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0002-9246},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2039 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {In the Vanity of the Philosopher, Sandra Peart and David
Levy reconsider "postclassical" economics from the vantage
point of Adam Smith's "analytical" egalitarianism.
Analytical egalitarianism is assumed, not proved; and Peart
and Levy's criticisms of many 19th- and early 20th-century
economists, as well as eugenics in general, depend on
equivocating between analytical and substantive
egalitarianism. They fail to provide a non-question-begging
critique of eugenics. © 2008 American Journal of Economics
and Sociology, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.2008.00581.x},
Key = {fds285701}
}
@article{fds325929,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Was Harrod Right?},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds325929}
}
@article{fds285698,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Johansen, S and Juselius, K},
Title = {Allowing the data to speak freely: The macroeconometrics of
the cointegrated vector autoregression},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {98},
Number = {2},
Pages = {251-255},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2056 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {An explication of the key ideas behind the Cointegrated
Vector Autoregression Approach. The CVAR approach is related
to Haavelmo’s famous “Probability Approach in
Econometrics” (1944). It insists on careful stochastic
specification as a necessary groundwork for econometric
inference and the testing of economic theories. In
time-series data, the probability approach requires careful
specification of the integration and cointegration
properties of variables in systems of equations. The
relationship between the CVAR approach and wider
methodological issues and between it and related approaches
(e.g., the LSE approach) are explored. The
specific-to-general strategy of widening the scope of
econometric models to identify stochastic trends and
cointegrating relations and to nest theoretical economic
models is illustrated with the example of purchasing-power
parity.},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.2.251},
Key = {fds285698}
}
@article{fds285696,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Siegler, MV},
Title = {The rhetoric of 'Signifying nothing': A rejoinder to Ziliak
and McCloskey},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {57-68},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780801913546},
Doi = {10.1080/13501780801913546},
Key = {fds285696}
}
@article{fds285697,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Siegler, MV},
Title = {Sound and fury: McCloskey and significance testing in
economics},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-37},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2045 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {For more than 20 years, Deidre McCloskey has campaigned to
convince the economics profession that it is hopelessly
confused about statistical significance. She argues that
many practices associated with significance testing are bad
science and that most economists routinely employ these bad
practices: 'Though to a child they look like science, with
all that really hard math, no science is being done in these
and 96 percent of the best empirical economics ' (McCloskey
1999). McCloskey's charges are analyzed and rejected. That
statistical significance is not economic significance is a
jejune and uncontroversial claim, and there is no convincing
evidence that economists systematically mistake the two.
Other elements of McCloskey's analysis of statistical
significance are shown to be ill-founded, and her criticisms
of practices of economists are found to be based in
inaccurate readings and tendentious interpretations of those
economists' work. Properly used, significance tests are a
valuable tool for assessing signal strength, for assisting
in model specification, and for determining causal
structure.},
Doi = {10.1080/13501780801913298},
Key = {fds285697}
}
@misc{fds211930,
Author = {K.D. Hoover},
Title = {“Causality in Economics and Econometrics”},
Series = {2nd edition},
Booktitle = {The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics},
Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
Editor = {Steven Durlauf},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds211930}
}
@article{fds285665,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {A History of Postwar Monetary Economics and
Macroeconomics},
Pages = {411-427},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470999059.ch26},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470999059.ch26},
Key = {fds285665}
}
@article{fds285650,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Does macroeconomics need microfoundations?},
Pages = {315-333},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819025.022},
Abstract = {As I observed in the first lecture, I chose Pissarides’s
model as a paradigm of the modern macroeconomic model for a
variety of reasons: the clarity of its goals and exposition;
the manner in which it attempted to relate its theoretical
construction to empirical facts (at least in principle);
and, by no means the least important reason, because it was
the model that Nancy Cartwright held up as an example of a
nomological machine in economics. A number of fellow
economists, however, question whether Pissarides’s model
really is a macroeconomic model. Because it appears to model
the decision problem of the individual worker and the
individual firm, some economists regard it as a
microeconomic model. But this is all the better for my
purposes because there is a persistent refrain in recent
macroeconomics that the only acceptable macroeconomic models
are those that have adequate microfoundations. The idea of
microfoundations did not originate with the new classical
macroeconomics, but the manner in which the new classical
macroeconomics has dominated the agenda of macroeconomics
over the past quarter century has firmly cemented it in the
minds of virtually all economists. Lucas puts it clearly
when he longs for an economics that does not need the
prefixes “micro” or “macro” – sound economics is
held to be microeconomics, and any macroeconomics that is
not just a shorthand for the manner in which microeconomics
is applied to certain problems is held to be bad
economics.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511819025.022},
Key = {fds285650}
}
@misc{fds285651,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Econometrics as observation: The lucas critique and the
nature of econometric inference},
Pages = {297-314},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521883504},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819025.021},
Abstract = {Kevin Hoover (1955–) received a D.Phil. in economics from
Oxford University after an undergraduate major in
philosophy, and his work reflects this dual competence. He
has contributed both to contemporary economics (especially
macroeconomics) and to economic methodology, serving for a
decade as the editor of The Journal of Economic Methodology.
After more than two decades at the University of California,
Davis, Hoover is now a professor of economics and a
professor of philosophy at Duke University. The Lucas
Critique: Perhaps the principal challenge to the use of
econometric models in economic analysis is the policy
non-invariance argument, popularly known as the ‘Lucas
critique’. Robert Lucas (1976) attacks the use of
econometric models as bases for the evaluation of policy on
the grounds that the estimated equations of such models are
unlikely to remain invariant to the very changes in policy
that the economist seeks to evaluate. The argument is
originally cast as an implication of rational expectations.
Among the constraints people face are the policy rules of
the government. If people are rational, then, when these
rules change, and if the change is correctly perceived, they
take proper account of the change in adjusting their
behavior. The rational expectations hypothesis implies that
changes in policy will in fact be correctly perceived up to
a serially uncorrelated error.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511819025.021},
Key = {fds285651}
}
@article{fds285689,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {A Neowicksellian in a new classical world: The methodology
of Michael Woodford's Interest and Prices},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Economic Thought},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {143-149},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2006},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1053-8372},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10427710600676322},
Doi = {10.1080/10427710600676322},
Key = {fds285689}
}
@article{fds285690,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Fragility and robustness in econometrics: Introduction to
the symposium},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {159-160},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2006},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780600733335},
Doi = {10.1080/13501780600733335},
Key = {fds285690}
}
@article{fds285649,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Doctor keynes: Economic theory in a diagnostic
science},
Pages = {78-97},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521840902.005},
Abstract = {THEORY AND PRACTICE For the greater part of his professional
life, John Maynard Keynes was known as a practical man: the
author of topical tracts on current economic questions, an
adviser to, and an emissary from, the British Treasury, a
successful player of financial markets for himself and
King's College Cambridge, a member of corporate boards and a
portfolio manager for two insurance companies. He was, in
this sense, a part-time academic. And although he had long
been known to be a first-rate economist, it was only after
the publication of the General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money in 1936 that he was able to secure his
reputation as a first-rate economic theorist. Yet, of the
ten volumes of books published in his lifetime, three (the
General Theory and the two volumes of the Treatise on Money,
volume I subtitled The Pure Theory of Money and volume II
The Applied Theory of Money) feature 'theory' in their
title. And if we note that three of the remaining volumes
are clearly non-economic and two are as much political as
economic, the proportion of his economic books
self-consciously styled as theoretical rises to
three-fifths. Even one of the remaining volumes, A Tract on
Monetary Reform, contains a clearly theoretical core. If
Keynes was indeed a theorist, what kind of a theorist was
he?},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL0521840902.005},
Key = {fds285649}
}
@misc{fds285656,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The past as the Future: The Marshallian approach to post
Walrasian econometrics},
Pages = {239-257},
Booktitle = {Post Walrasian Macroeconomics: Beyond the Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium Model},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521865487},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617751.014},
Abstract = {The popular image of the scientific revolution usually pits
young revolutionaries against old conservatives. Freeman
Dyson (2004, p. 16) observes that, in particle physics in
the mid twentieth century, something had to change. But in
the revolution of quantum electrodynamics, Einstein, Dirac,
Heisenberg, Born, and Schödinger were old revolutionaries,
while the winners, Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga, were
young conservatives. Post Walrasian economics is not a
doctrine, but a slogan announcing that something has to
change. Most of the self-conscious efforts to forge a Post
Walrasian economics are due to old radicals. Here I want to
explore the space of the young conservative: the future is
past, particularly in the methodology of Alfred Marshall’s
essay, ‘The Present Position of Economics’ (1885). The
radical approach identifies the problem as Walrasian theory
and seeks to replace it with something better and altogether
different. The conservative approach says that theory is not
the problem. The problem is rather to establish an empirical
discipline that connects theory to the world. Marshall’s
methodology places the relationship between theory and
empirical tools on center stage. In North America, if not in
Europe, the dominant tools of macro econometrics are the
vector auto regression (VAR) and calibration techniques.
These techniques reached their current status as the result
of two nearly simultaneous reactions to the Cowles
Commission program, which dominated macro econometrics
during the two decades 1950-70. These are the famous Lucas
critique, and the practically influential, if less storied,
Sims critique.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511617751.014},
Key = {fds285656}
}
@misc{fds347022,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Is there a place for rational expectations in keynes’s
general theory?},
Pages = {219-237},
Booktitle = {A 'Second Edition' of the General Theory},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415406994},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203980316-28},
Abstract = {Keynes distinguishes between long-term and short-term
expectations (G. T.: 46-7). The distinction mirrors
Marshall's distinction between the long run, in which
factors of production are all variable, and the short run,
in which the firm's capital equipment is fixed. Keynes
argues that an entrepreneur consults his long-term
expectations in determining the amount of his investment in
plant and machinery, and consults his short-term
expectations in determining the scale of his current
output.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203980316-28},
Key = {fds347022}
}
@article{fds285687,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Automatic inference of the contemporaneous causal order of a
system of equations},
Journal = {Econometric Theory},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-77},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0266-4666},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2009 Duke open
access},
Doi = {10.1017/S026646660505005X},
Key = {fds285687}
}
@article{fds285685,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Lost causes},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Economic Thought},
Volume = {26},
Number = {2},
Pages = {149-164},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2004},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1053-8372},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1042771042000219000},
Doi = {10.1080/1042771042000219000},
Key = {fds285685}
}
@article{fds285686,
Author = {De Vroey and M and Hoover, KD},
Title = {Introduction: Seven decades of the IS-LM
model},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {36},
Number = {SUPPL.},
Pages = {1-11},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-suppl_1-1},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-36-suppl_1-1},
Key = {fds285686}
}
@article{fds285688,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Truth and robustness in cross-country growth
regressions},
Journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
Volume = {66},
Number = {5},
Pages = {765-798},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2079 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {We re-examine studies of cross-country growth regressions by
Levine and Renelt (American Economic Review, Vol. 82, 1992,
pp. 942-963) and Sala-i-Martin (American Economic Review,
Vol. 87, 1997a, pp. 178-183; Economics Department, Columbia,
University, 1997b). In a realistic Monte Carlo experiment,
their variants of Edward Leamer's extreme-bounds analysis
are compared with a cross-sectional version of the
general-to-specific search methodology associated with the
LSE approach to econometrics. Levine and Renelt's method has
low size and low power, while Sala-i-Martin's method has
high size and high power. The general-to-specific
methodology is shown to have a near nominal size and high
power. Sala-i-Martin's method and the general-to-specific
method are then applied to the actual data from
Sala-i-Martin's original study.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0084.2004.101_1.x},
Key = {fds285688}
}
@article{fds285682,
Author = {Demiralp, S and Hoover, KD},
Title = {Searching for the Causal Structure of a Vector
Autoregression},
Journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
Volume = {65},
Number = {SUPPL.},
Pages = {745-767},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.0305-9049.2003.00087.x},
Abstract = {We provide an accessible introduction to graph-theoretic
methods for causal analysis. Building on the work of Swanson
and Granger (Journal of the American Statistical
Association, Vol. 92, pp. 357-367, 1997), and generalizing
to a larger class of models, we show how to apply
graph-theoretic methods to selecting the causal order for a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR). We evaluate the PC
(causal search) algorithm in a Monte Carlo study. The PC
algorithm uses tests of conditional independence to select
among the possible causal orders - or at least to reduce the
admissible causal orders to a narrow equivalence class. Our
findings suggest that graph-theoretic methods may prove to
be a useful tool in the analysis of SVARs.},
Doi = {10.1046/j.0305-9049.2003.00087.x},
Key = {fds285682}
}
@article{fds285683,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Some causal lessons from macroeconomics},
Journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
Volume = {112},
Number = {1},
Pages = {121-125},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1904 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Some of the well-posed causal aspects from macroeconomics
were discussed. The causal lessons were supported by the
vector-autoregression (VAR) framework of macroeconomics
which was analogous to the panel-data approach. The analysis
of causality in a VAR framework carried important lessons
for the panel-studies. The results show that the direct and
indirect linkages among the health indicators and the
counterfactual simulations were sensitive to the omission of
a contemporaneous link from wealth to health.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0304-4076(02)00154-9},
Key = {fds285683}
}
@article{fds285684,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Nonstationary time series, cointegration, and the principle
of the common cause},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {54},
Number = {4},
Pages = {527-551},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.4.527},
Abstract = {Elliot Sober ([2001]) forcefully restates his well-known
counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common
cause: bread prices in Britain and sea levels in Venice both
rise over time and are, therefore, correlated; yet they are
ex hypothesi not causally connected, which violates the
principle of the common cause. The counterexample employs
nonstationary data - i.e., data with time-dependent
population moments. Common measures of statistical
association do not generally reflect probabilistic
dependence among nonstationary data. I demonstrate the
inadequacy of the counterexample and of some previous
responses to it, as well as illustrating more appropriate
measures of probabilistic dependence in the nonstationary
case.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/54.4.527},
Key = {fds285684}
}
@article{fds285680,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Dowell, ME},
Title = {Measuring causes: Episodes in the quantitative assessment of
the value of money},
Journal = {History of Political Economy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {SUPPL.},
Pages = {159-161},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2563 Duke open
access},
Doi = {10.1215/00182702-33-suppl_1-137},
Key = {fds285680}
}
@article{fds343584,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {167},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780110047264},
Doi = {10.1080/13501780110047264},
Key = {fds343584}
}
@article{fds285681,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Siegler, MV},
Title = {Taxing and spending in the long view: The causal structure
of US fiscal policy, 1791-1913},
Journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {745-773},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0030-7653},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/52.4.745},
Abstract = {Causal relations between US federal taxation and expenditure
are analyzed using an approach based on the invariance of
econometric relationships in the face of structural
interventions. Institutional evidence for interventions or
changes of regime and econometric tests for structural
breaks are used to investigate the relative stability of
conditional and marginal probability distributions for each
variable. The patterns of stability are the products of the
underlying causal order. Consistent with earlier work on the
post World War II period, we find that dominant causal
direction (with only a short-lived reversal) runs from taxes
to spending in the period before World War
I.},
Doi = {10.1093/oep/52.4.745},
Key = {fds285681}
}
@article{fds343585,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Three attitudes towards data mining},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {195-210},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780050045083},
Abstract = {'Data mining' refers to a broad class of activities that
have in common, a search over different ways to process or
package data statistically or econometrically with the
purpose of making the final presentation meet certain design
criteria. We characterize three attitudes toward data
mining: first, that it is to be avoided and, if it is
engaged in, that statistical inferences must be adjusted to
account for it; second, that it is inevitable and that the
only results of any interest are those that transcend the
variety of alternative data mined specifications (a view
associated with Leamer's extreme-bounds analysis); and
third, that it is essential and that the only hope we have
of using econometrics to uncover true economic relationships
is to be found in the intelligent mining of data. The first
approach confuses considerations of sampling distribution
and considerations of epistemic warrant and, reaches an
unnecessarily hostile attitude toward data mining. The
second approach relies on a notion of robustness that has
little relationship to truth: there is no good reason to
expect a true specification to be robust alternative
specifications. Robustness is not, in general, a carrier of
epistemic warrant. The third approach is operationalized in
the general-to-specific search methodology of the LSE school
of econometrics. Its success demonstrates that intelligent
data mining is an important element in empirical
investigation in economics. © 2000, Taylor & Francis Group,
LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/13501780050045083},
Key = {fds343585}
}
@article{fds285678,
Author = {Hartley, JE and Hoover, KD and Salyer, KD},
Title = {The limits of business cycle research: Assessing the real
business cycle model},
Journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {34-54},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0266-903X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/13.3.34},
Abstract = {The real business cycle model dominates business cycle
research in the new classical tradition. Typically, real
business cycle modellers both offer the bold conjecture that
business cycles are equilibrium phenomena driven by
technology shocks and also novel strategies for assessing
the success of the model. This article critically examines
the real business model and the assessment strategy, surveys
the literature supporting and opposing the model, and
evaluates the evidence on the empirical success of the
model. It argues that, on the preponderance of the evidence,
the real business cycle model is refuted.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxrep/13.3.34},
Key = {fds285678}
}
@article{fds285679,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Facts and artifacts: Calibration and the empirical
assessment of real-business-cycle models},
Journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {24-44},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0030-7653},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042160},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042160},
Key = {fds285679}
}
@article{fds285676,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Post hoc ergo propter once more an evaluation of 'does
monetary policy matter?' in the spirit of James
Tobin},
Journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {47-74},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0304-3932},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1981 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Christina and David Romer's paper 'Does Monetary Policy
Matter?' advocates the so-called 'narrative' approach to
causal inference. We demonstrate that this method will not
sustain causal inference. First, it is impossible to
distinguish monetary shocks from oil shocks as causes of
recessions. Second, a world in which the Fed only announces
intentions to act cannot be distinguished from one in which
it in fact acts. Third, the techniques of dynamic simulation
used in the Romers' study are inappropriate and
quantitatively misleading. And, finally, their approach
provides no basis for establishing causal asymmetry. ©
1994.},
Doi = {10.1016/0304-3932(94)01149-4},
Key = {fds285676}
}
@article{fds285677,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Perez, SJ},
Title = {Money may matter, but how could you know?},
Journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {89-99},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0304-3932},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(94)01151-6},
Abstract = {Christina and David Romers' reply to our article 'Post Hoc
Ergo Propter Hoc Once More' misses the point. Our argument
was never that monetary policy did not matter, but that
their methods could not provide useful evidence that it did.
Yet, they offer additional evidence of the same type with
respect to the efficacy of monetary shocks without
effectively replying to the criticisms of their methods. We
show point by point that such responses as they give leave
our original conclusion intact: their narrative/statistical
approach is a complicated version of the fallacy post hoc
ergo propter hoc; and, as such, will not sustain inferences
with respect to the direction and strength of the causes of
output fluctuations. © 1994.},
Doi = {10.1016/0304-3932(94)01151-6},
Key = {fds285677}
}
@article{fds321960,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Econometrics as observation: The Lucas critique and the
nature of econometric inference},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {65-80},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501789400000006},
Doi = {10.1080/13501789400000006},
Key = {fds321960}
}
@article{fds341488,
Author = {Hoover, K},
Title = {Comment},
Journal = {Social Epistemology},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {257-260},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729308578704},
Doi = {10.1080/02691729308578704},
Key = {fds341488}
}
@article{fds285675,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The causal direction between money and prices. An
alternative approach},
Journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {381-423},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0304-3932},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1974 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Causality is viewed as a matter of control. Controllability
is captured in Simon's analysis of causality as an
asymmetrical relation of recursion between variables in the
unobservable data-generating process. Tests of the stability
of marginal and conditional distributions for these
variables can provide evidence of causal ordering. The
causal direction between prices and money in the United
States 1950-1985 is assessed. The balance of evidence
supports the view that money does not cause prices, and that
prices do cause money. © 1991.},
Doi = {10.1016/0304-3932(91)90015-G},
Key = {fds285675}
}
@article{fds321961,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The logic of causal inference: Econometrics and the
Conditional Analysis of Causation},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-234},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026626710000122X},
Abstract = {This article is extracted from my earlier paper, “The
Logic of Causal Inference: With anApplication to Money and
Prices” (Working Papers in the Research Program in
AppliedMacroeconomics and Macro Policy, No. 55, Institute of
Governmental Affairs, Universityof California, Davis). I am
grateful to Peter Oppenheimer, Peter Sinclair, Charles
Goodhart, Steven Sheffrin, Thomas Mayer, Edward Learner,
Thomas Cooley, Stephen LeRoy, LeonWegge, David Hendry, Nancy
Wulwick, Diran Bodenhorn, Clive Granger, Paul Holland,
Daniel Hausman (co-editor), and three anonymous referees, as
well as the participants inseminars at the University of
California, Berkeley (Fall 1986), the University of
California, Davis (Fall 1988), and the University of
California, Irvine (Spring 1989), for comments onthis
article in its various previous incarnations. © 1990,
Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S026626710000122X},
Key = {fds321961}
}
@article{fds285673,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {Money, prices and finance in the new monetary
economics},
Journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1},
Pages = {150-167},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0030-7653},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041842},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041842},
Key = {fds285673}
}
@article{fds321962,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {ON THE PITFALLS OF UNTESTED COMMON‐FACTOR RESTRICTIONS:
THE CASE OF THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS},
Journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
Volume = {50},
Number = {2},
Pages = {125-138},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1988.mp50002002.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0084.1988.mp50002002.x},
Key = {fds321962}
}
@article{fds285674,
Author = {Bisignano, J and Hoover, K},
Title = {Some suggested improvements to a simple portfolio balance
model of exchange rate determination with special reference
to the U. S. dollar/Canadian dollar rate},
Journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv},
Volume = {118},
Number = {1},
Pages = {19-38},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1982},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0043-2636},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02706077},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02706077},
Key = {fds285674}
}
%% Janiak, Andrew
@article{fds371295,
Author = {Gessell, B and Janiak, A},
Title = {Physics and optics: Agnesi, Bassi, Du Châtelet},
Pages = {174-186},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138212756},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-17},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-17},
Key = {fds371295}
}
@article{fds374560,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {A Tale of Two Forces: Metaphysics and its Avoidance in
Newton’s Principia},
Volume = {343},
Pages = {223-242},
Booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of
Science},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
Abstract = {Isaac Newton did more than any other early modern figure to
revolutionize natural philosophy, but he was often wary of
other aspects of philosophy. He had an especially vexed
relationship with metaphysics. As recent scholarship has
highlighted, he often denounced metaphysical discussions,
especially those in the Scholastic tradition (Levitin 2016).
He insisted that he himself was not engaging with the aspect
of philosophy that played such a prominent role in the work
of his predecessors, especially Descartes, and his critics,
especially Leibniz. However, in the Principia and the
Opticks, along with correspondence and unpublished
manuscripts, Newton expressed views about the gravity of
bodies and the power of substances that place his thought
squarely within the metaphysical tradition he sought to
avoid. Alas, his famous reluctance to engage in disputes
left even Newton’s supporters confused about his
metaphysical ideas.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
Key = {fds374560}
}
@article{fds363035,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Émilie Du Châtelet’s Break from the French
Newtonians},
Journal = {Revue D'Histoire Des Sciences},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {265-296},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rhs.742.0265},
Abstract = {In Madame Du Châtelet's milieu, many philosophers argued
that Newton's physics allowed one to ignore metaphysics, or
perhaps required a modest supplement from elements of
Locke's metaphysics. In her Institutions physiques, Du
Châtelet takes a radically different approach. She contends
that Newton's science of gravity requires a foray into
metaphysics, especially concerning the essence of matter.
Using her version of the principle of sufficient reason, she
also argues that Locke's metaphysics is not an appropriate
supplement to the new science of gravity. I conclude that
her approach is distinctive for the early
Enlightenment.},
Doi = {10.3917/rhs.742.0265},
Key = {fds363035}
}
@article{fds363729,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Émilie Du Châtelet: Physics, Metaphysics and the Case of
Gravity},
Pages = {49-71},
Booktitle = {Early Modern Women on Metaphysics},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107178687},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316827192.004},
Abstract = {When Émilie Du Châtelet published her magnum opus,
Institutions de physique, in 1740, it was quickly met with
excited reactions from mathematicians and philosophers
throughout the Continent.1 Within a few short years, it was
read and discussed by philosophers like Kant and Wolff and
by mathematicians like the Bernoullis, Euler and
D’Alembert.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316827192.004},
Key = {fds363729}
}
@article{fds366192,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {NATURAL PHILOSOPHY},
Pages = {385-409},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century
Philosophy},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415775670},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315771960-14},
Abstract = {During the seventeenth century, there was something
approaching consensus about the methodological parameters of
natural philosophy. Throughout the century, a debate raged
about whether the natural philosopher could legitimately
employ geometric and arithmetic methods to model and
understand phenomena. It is probably safe to say that by the
middle of the century, Rene Descartes had set the agenda of
natural philosophy for philosophers throughout Europe. There
can be no doubt that Newton made astonishing progress in
using mathematical, especially geometric, methods in
answering questions about the motions of bodies and the
forces that cause them in Principia mathematica. The
Cartesian conception of space, time, and motion, it is fair
to say, set the stage for nearly all later discussions of
the topics within natural philosophy in the seventeenth
century. Descartes’s and Newton’s discussions of God
within natural philosophy can make it tempting to conclude
that they are parroting well-worn theological
points.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315771960-14},
Key = {fds366192}
}
@article{fds311979,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Space and motion in nature and Scripture: Galileo,
Descartes, Newton.},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {89-99},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0039-3681},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.02.004},
Abstract = {In the Scholium to the Definitions in Principia mathematica,
Newton departs from his main task of discussing space, time
and motion by suddenly mentioning the proper method for
interpreting Scripture. This is surprising, and it has long
been ignored by scholars. In this paper, I argue that the
Scripture passage in the Scholium is actually far from
incidental: it reflects Newton's substantive concern, one
evident in correspondence and manuscripts from the 1680s,
that any general understanding of space, time and motion
must enable readers to recognize the veracity of Biblical
claims about natural phenomena, including the motion of the
earth. This substantive concern sheds new light on an aspect
of Newton's project in the Scholium. It also underscores
Newton's originality in dealing with the famous problem of
reconciling theological and philosophical conceptions of
nature in the seventeenth century.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.02.004},
Key = {fds311979}
}
@book{fds303572,
Title = {Space: history of a concept},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Editor = {Janiak, A},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds303572}
}
@article{fds244491,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Mathematics and infinity in Descartes and
Newton},
Pages = {209-230},
Booktitle = {Mathematizing Space: the objects of geometry from Antiquity
to the Early Modern Age},
Publisher = {Birkhauser},
Editor = {De Risi and V},
Year = {2015},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12102-4_9},
Abstract = {The concept of the infinite has often been regarded as
inherently problematic in mathematics and in philosophy. The
idea that the universe itself might be infinite has been the
subject of intense debate not only on mathematical and
philosophical grounds, but for theological and political
reasons as well. When Copernicus and his followers
challenged the old Aristotelian and Ptolemaic conceptions of
the world’s finiteness, if not its boundedness, the idea
of an infinite, if not merely unbounded, world seemed more
attractive. Indeed, the infinity of space has been called
the “fundamental principle of the new ontology” (Koyré
in From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957, p. 126).
Influential scholarship in the first half of the twentieth
century helped to solidify the idea that it was specifically
in the seventeenth century that astronomers and natural
philosophers fully embraced the infinity of the universe. As
Kuhn writes in his Copernican Revolution (1957, p. 289):
“From Bruno ’s death in 1600 to the publication of
Descartes ’s Principles of Philosophy in 1644, no
Copernican of any prominence appears to have espoused the
infinite universe, at least in public. After Descartes,
however, no Copernican seems to have opposed the
conception.” That same year saw the publication of
Alexandre Koyré ’s sweeping volume about the scientific
revolution, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.
The decision to describe and conceive of the world as
infinite might be seen as a crucial, if not decisive, aspect
of the overthrow of Scholasticism. As Kuhn and Koyré knew,
one finds a particularly invigorating expression of this
historical-philosophical interpretation in an earlier
article by Marjorie Nicholson (Studies in Philology
25:356–374, 1929, p. 370).},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-12102-4_9},
Key = {fds244491}
}
@article{fds244496,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton’s Philosophy},
Series = {SECOND EDITION},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {S},
Editor = {Zalta, E},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds244496}
}
@book{fds306213,
Author = {A. Janiak},
Title = {Newton: Philosophical Writings},
Series = {SECOND EDITION},
Pages = {199 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Janiak, A},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds306213}
}
@article{fds244504,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Three concepts of causation in Newton},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {396-407},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0039-3681},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.009},
Abstract = {In this paper, I argue that recent debates about Newton's
attitude toward action at a distance have been hampered by a
lack of conceptual clarity. To clarify the metaphysical
background of the debates, I distinguish three kinds of
causes within Newton's work: mechanical, dynamical, and
substantial causes. This threefold distinction enables us to
recognize that although Newton clearly regards gravity as an
impressed force that operates across vast distances, he
denies that this commitment requires him to think that some
substance acts at a distance on another substance.
(Dynamical causation is distinct from substantial
causation.) Newton's denial of substantial action at a
distance may strike his interpreters as questionable, so I
provide an argument to show that it is in fact acceptable.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.009},
Key = {fds244504}
}
@article{fds244505,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy in Descartes and
Newton},
Journal = {Foundations of Science},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {403-417},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {1233-1821},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9277-0},
Abstract = {This paper compares Newton's and Descartes's conceptions of
the complex relationship between physics and metaphysics. ©
2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10699-011-9277-0},
Key = {fds244505}
}
@article{fds244493,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Isaac Newton},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth
Century},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244493}
}
@article{fds244502,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton and descartes: Theology and natural
philosophy},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {414-435},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000308296900005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Scholars have long recognized that Newton regarded Descartes
as his principal philosophical interlocutor when composing
the first edition of Philosophiae Naturalis Principia
Mathematica in 1687. The arguments in the Scholium on space
and time, for instance, can profitably be interpreted as
focusing on the conception of space and motion in part two
of Descartes's Principles of Philosophy (1644). What is less
well known, however, is that this Cartesian conception,
along with Descartes's attempt to avoid Galileo's fate in
1633, serves as an essential background to understanding
Newton's own (poorly understood) view of the theological
implications of his theory of space and motion. In
particular, after withdrawing Le Monde from publication in
1633 because of its Copernican leanings, Descartes later
introduced what some regard as a "fudge factor" into the
theory of motion in the Principles: from an ordinary
perspective the earth does move; but from a philosophical
one, it does not. This background indicates the novelty and
originality of Newton's own attempt to explicate how
scriptural passages concerning the motions of the heavenly
bodies can be reconciled with the philosophical views he
developed during the 1680s. New evidence from archival
sources and correspondence supports this argument, shedding
light on the Scholium and on Newton's conception of
philosophy's relation to theology. © 2012 The University of
Memphis.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00130.x},
Key = {fds244502}
}
@book{fds306214,
Author = {Janiak, A and Schliesser, E},
Title = {Interpreting Newton: Critical essays},
Pages = {i-iv},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521766180},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511994845},
Abstract = {This collection of specially-commissioned essays by leading
scholars presents new research on Isaac Newton and his main
philosophical interlocutors and critics. The essays analyze
Newton's relation to his contemporaries, especially Barrow,
Descartes, Leibniz and Locke, and discuss the ways in which
a broad range of figures, including Hume, Maclaurin,
Maupertuis, and Kant, reacted to his thought. The wide range
of topics discussed includes the laws of nature, the notion
of force, the relation of mathematics to nature, Newton's
argument for universal gravitation, his attitude toward
philosophical empiricism, his use of “fluxions,” his
approach toward measurement problems, and his concept of
absolute motion, together with new interpretations of
Newton's matter theory. The volume concludes with an
extended essay that analyzes the changes in physics wrought
by Newton's Principia. A substantial introduction and
bibliography provide essential reference
guides.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511994845},
Key = {fds306214}
}
@book{fds311980,
Author = {Janiak, A and Schliesser, E},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {1-10},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521766180},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511994845.001},
Abstract = {It may be anachronistic to say that Isaac Newton and his
Principia decisively changed physics and philosophy, because
separate fields of physics and philosophy did not yet exist.
But the notion of decisive change captures something
significant about the continuing relevance of studying
Newton. What has been aptly termed “Newton's new way of
inquiry” (Harper and Smith 1995) was baffling for even his
most sophisticated contemporaries, and it took Europe's
brightest astronomers and mathematically inclined natural
philosophers almost a century in order to evaluate and
assimilate the Principia. But for reasons that need not
detain us here, few of these figures (e.g., Clairaut, Euler,
Laplace), who were fully immersed in Newton's work, really
offered a definitive account of the methodology of the
Principia. Of course, many scholars from Newton's day onward
have offered interpretations of Newton's explicit
methodological claims, but surprisingly few have combined
this approach with detailed knowledge of Newton's technical
practice. As is well known, by the time physics became
enshrined as the leading part of the disciplinary structure
of science, its attitude toward its own history did not
encourage close scrutiny of past practices. In this volume,
the three chapters on methodology by George Smith, William
Harper, and Ori Belkind all capture important aspects of
Newton's new way of inquiry. Newton also changed philosophy
in two important ways. First, the body of work eventually
known as “Newtonian mechanics” became a privileged form
of knowledge that had to be dealt with somehow within
metaphysics and epistemology. Second, it initiated a slow
process in which philosophy defined itself in terms that
often contrasted with – or were modeled on – Newtonian
success. But as a consequence, in philosophy's evolving
self-conception Newton stopped being central to the history
of philosophy. Somewhat surprisingly, philosophical interest
in Newton revived at the beginning of the twentieth century,
precisely when his physical theory was called into question
by Einstein's revolutionary work. Most of the papers in this
volume engage with Newton's place within the history of
philosophy. Before we turn to a detailed description of the
chapters collected here, we offer a brief introduction to
the scholarship that in many ways forms the shared
background of recent philosophically motivated work on Isaac
Newton.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511994845.001},
Key = {fds311980}
}
@article{fds244501,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {The Kantian Spirit: how to resist realism in the philosophy
of science (Review Essay)},
Journal = {Metascience},
Volume = {20},
Pages = {153-157},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244501}
}
@article{fds244500,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Substance and Action in Descartes and Newton},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {93},
Number = {4},
Pages = {657-677},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Editor = {Sugden, SJB},
Year = {2010},
ISSN = {0026-9662},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist201093437},
Doi = {10.5840/monist201093437},
Key = {fds244500}
}
@article{fds244492,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton’s Forces in Kant’s Critique},
Booktitle = {Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of
History and Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {Open Court Press},
Editor = {Dickson, M and Domski, M},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244492}
}
@article{fds244499,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Review of Garber and Longuenesse, Kant and the early Moderns
(Princeton Press)},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244499}
}
@article{fds244495,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Kant’s Views on Space and Time},
Series = {Spring 2009 edition},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Zalta, E},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244495}
}
@article{fds367065,
Title = {Matter and mechanism: contesting the mechanical philosophy,
II},
Pages = {87-129},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.006},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.006},
Key = {fds367065}
}
@article{fds367066,
Title = {Physics and metaphysics: three interpretations},
Pages = {11-49},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.004},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.004},
Key = {fds367066}
}
@article{fds367067,
Title = {Space in physics and metaphysics: contra
Descartes},
Pages = {130-162},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.007},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.007},
Key = {fds367067}
}
@article{fds367068,
Title = {God and natural philosophy},
Pages = {163-178},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.008},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.008},
Key = {fds367068}
}
@article{fds367069,
Title = {Preface},
Pages = {vii-x},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.001},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.001},
Key = {fds367069}
}
@article{fds367070,
Title = {Do forces exist? contesting the mechanical philosophy,
I},
Pages = {50-86},
Booktitle = {Newton as Philosopher},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511481512.005},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511481512.005},
Key = {fds367070}
}
@book{fds244503,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton as philosopher},
Pages = {1-196},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521862868},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511481512},
Abstract = {Newton's philosophical views are unique and uniquely
difficult to categorise. in the course of a long career from
the early 1670s until his death in 1727, he articulated
profound responses to Cartesian natural philosophy and to
the prevailing mechanical philosophy of his day. Newton as
Philosopher presents Newton as an original and sophisticated
contributor to natural philosophy, one who engaged with the
principal ideas of his most important predecessor, René
Descartes, and of his most influential critic, G. W.
Leibniz. Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, Newton was systematic
and philosophical without presenting a philosophical system,
but over the course of his life, he developed a novel
picture of nature, our place within it, and its relation to
the creator. This rich treatment of his philosophical ideas,
the first in English for thirty years, will be of wide
interest to historians of philosophy, science, and
ideas.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511481512},
Key = {fds244503}
}
@article{fds367071,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton as philosopher, the very idea},
Pages = {1-10},
Booktitle = {NEWTON AS PHILOSOPHER},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds367071}
}
@article{fds244506,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Newton and the reality of force},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-147},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0022-5053},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000243762200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1353/hph.2007.0010},
Key = {fds244506}
}
@article{fds311982,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Science and religion (Steven Weinberg's review of Richard
Dawkins's The 'God Delusion')},
Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement},
Number = {5418},
Pages = {17-17},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0307-661X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000244376500018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311982}
}
@article{fds244498,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Review of Thomas Holden, The Architecture of
Matter},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {115},
Number = {460},
Pages = {1130-1133},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2006},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0026-4423},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000241277400017&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1130},
Key = {fds244498}
}
@article{fds244494,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Kant as Philosopher of Science},
Journal = {Perspectives on Science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {337-361},
Publisher = {MIT Press - Journals},
Year = {2004},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1063-6145},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1063614042795453},
Abstract = {Michael Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences (1992)
refocused scholarly attention on Kant's status as a
philosopher of the sciences, especially (but not
exclusively) of the broadly Newtonian science of the
eighteenth century. The last few years have seen a plethora
of articles and monographs concerned with characterizing
that status. This recent scholarship illuminates Kant's
views on a diverse group of topics: science and its relation
to metaphysics; dynamics and the theory of matter; causation
and Hume's critique of it; and, the limits of mechanism and
of mechanical intelligibility. I argue that recent
interpretations of Kant's views on these topics should
influence our understanding of his principal metaphysical
and epistemological arguments and positions. © 2004 by The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.},
Doi = {10.1162/1063614042795453},
Key = {fds244494}
}
@article{fds311981,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Kant, Herder and the birth of anthropology},
Journal = {History of Political Thought},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {163-164},
Year = {2004},
ISSN = {0143-781X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000189176700012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311981}
}
@article{fds244497,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology (U Chicago
Press)},
Journal = {History of Political Thought},
Volume = {25},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244497}
}
@article{fds311983,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Kant's conception of moral character: The 'critical' link of
morality, anthropology and reflective judgment},
Journal = {History of Political Thought},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {545-546},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {0143-781X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000178002300008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311983}
}
@article{fds331597,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {Space, atoms and mathematical divisibility in
Newton},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {203-230},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0039-3681(00)00003-0},
Doi = {10.1016/S0039-3681(00)00003-0},
Key = {fds331597}
}
%% Jhun, Jennifer S.
@article{fds369225,
Author = {Jhun, JS},
Title = {Book Review},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {95},
Pages = {226-227},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.06.005},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.06.005},
Key = {fds369225}
}
@article{fds369342,
Author = {Jhun, J},
Title = {Economics, Equilibrium Methods, and Multi-Scale
Modeling},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {86},
Number = {2},
Pages = {457-472},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00113-6},
Abstract = {In this paper, I draw a parallel between the stability of
physical systems and that of economic ones, such as the US
financial system. I argue that the use of equilibrium
assumptions is central to the analysis of dynamic behavior
for both kinds of systems, and that we ought to interpret
such idealizing strategies as footholds for causal
exploration and explanation. Our considerations suggest
multi-scale modeling as a natural home for such reasoning
strategies, which can provide a backdrop for the assessment
and (hopefully) prevention of financial crises. Equilibrium
assumptions are critical elements of the epistemic
scaffolding that make up multi-scale models, which we should
understand as a means of constructing explanations of
dynamic behavior.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-019-00113-6},
Key = {fds369342}
}
@article{fds369226,
Author = {Jhun, JS},
Title = {Modeling the Possible to Modeling the Actual},
Pages = {316-326},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138824201},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315739793-28},
Abstract = {In this chapter, we consider how practicing economists go
about the task of constructing explanations about the actual
world by using models. After considering some notable
positions in the literature in philosophy of science, we
draw attention to features of the process by which the
Federal Reserve produces the Tealbook forecasts for the
Federal Open Market Committee meetings. We then suggest
looking to narrative explanation as a possible way of
thinking about the construction of how-actually explanations
from models.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315739793-28},
Key = {fds369226}
}
@article{fds345611,
Author = {Jhun, JS},
Title = {What’s the point of ceteris paribus? Or, how to understand
supply and demand curves},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {85},
Number = {2},
Pages = {271-292},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/696385},
Abstract = {Philosophers sometimes claim that economics, and the
idealizing strategies it employs, is ultimately unable to
provide genuine laws of nature. Therefore, unlike physics,
it does not qualify as an actual science. Careful
consideration of thermodynamics, a well-developed physical
theory, reveals substantial parallels with economic
methodology. The corrective account of scientific
understanding I offer appreciates these parallels:
understanding in terms of efficient performance.},
Doi = {10.1086/696385},
Key = {fds345611}
}
%% Kingston, Ewan
@article{fds335568,
Author = {Kingston, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-186},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
Springer Nature. Our thesis is that there is no moral
requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) solely in order to enjoy oneself.
Joyriding in a gas guzzler (joyguzzling) provides our
paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there
is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from
other more radical claims. We then review several different
proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim
that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes
to harm, has negative expected value, exceeds our fair share
of global emissions, and undermines political duties. We
show why none of these objections succeeds and conclude that
no good reason has yet been proposed that shows why
joyguzzling violates a moral requirement.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Key = {fds335568}
}
@article{fds322927,
Author = {Kingston, E},
Title = {Climate Change as a Three-Part Ethical Problem: A Response
to Jamieson and Gardiner},
Journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1129-1148},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9483-y},
Doi = {10.1007/s11948-013-9483-y},
Key = {fds322927}
}
@article{fds322928,
Author = {Kingston, E},
Title = {Climate Justice and Temporally Remote Emissions},
Journal = {Social Theory and Practice},
Volume = {40},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-303},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Editor = {Dancy, M and Costa, V and Gert, J},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201440217},
Doi = {10.5840/soctheorpract201440217},
Key = {fds322928}
}
%% Kraemer, Daniel M
@article{fds218812,
Author = {D.M. Kraemer},
Title = {Normativity From an Organizational Perspective},
Journal = {Biological Theory},
Volume = {(forthcoming)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds218812}
}
@article{fds218813,
Author = {D.M. Kraemer},
Title = {Against “Soft” Statistical Information},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {(forthcoming)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2013.785127#.UY5B_a53Zms},
Key = {fds218813}
}
@article{fds218814,
Author = {D.M. Kraemer},
Title = {Statistical Theories of Functions and the Problem of
Epidemic Disease},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {423-438},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds218814}
}
%% Kushnir, Tamar
@article{fds375236,
Author = {Finiasz, Z and Gelman, SA and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact
in adults' and children's category-based
induction.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {244},
Pages = {105707},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
Abstract = {Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence
the use of information from direct observations in category
learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and
children integrate their observations with testimony when
learning about the causal property of a novel category.
Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four
types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or
only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed
that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a
causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123,
M<sub>age</sub> = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range
4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects
had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims
led both adults and children to generalize the causal
property beyond what was observed. Adults and children
diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that
could be verified by observations: adults were more
skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children
were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that
children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to
misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard.
The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult
learners integrate information from both sources, offering
insights into the mechanisms by which language frames
first-hand experience.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
Key = {fds375236}
}
@article{fds372785,
Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
cost affects this tendency.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {237},
Pages = {105764},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
their reputations through communicative acts. In the
experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
the act and more likely to protest when another individual
was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
as a moderating factor.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Key = {fds372785}
}
@article{fds376647,
Author = {Weisman, K and Ghossainy, ME and Williams, AJ and Payir, A and Lesage,
KA and Reyes-Jaquez, B and Amin, TG and Anggoro, FK and Burdett, ERR and Chen, EE and Coetzee, L and Coley, JD and Dahl, A and Dautel, JB and Davis,
HE and Davis, EL and Diesendruck, G and Evans, D and Feeney, A and Gurven,
M and Jee, BD and Kramer, HJ and Kushnir, T and Kyriakopoulou, N and McAuliffe, K and McLaughlin, A and Nichols, S and Nicolopoulou, A and Rockers, PC and Shneidman, L and Skopeliti, I and Srinivasan, M and Tarullo, AR and Taylor, LK and Yu, Y and Yucel, M and Zhao, X and Corriveau, KH and Richert, RA and Developing Belief
Network},
Title = {The development and diversity of religious cognition and
behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children
and parents by the Developing Belief Network.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0292755},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
Abstract = {The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers
studying human development in diverse social-cultural
settings, with a focus on the interplay between general
cognitive development and culturally specific processes of
socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle
childhood. The current manuscript describes the study
protocol for the network's first wave of data collection,
which aims to explore the development and diversity of
religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by
three key research questions: (1) How do children represent
and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How
do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect
of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural
beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The
protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of
nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years,
a comprehensive survey completed by their
parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit
conversations between children and caregivers. This study is
being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to
date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this
manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements
of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in
which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse
religious communities, and present the final,
English-language study materials for 6 of the 39
cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited
for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans,
American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously
unaffiliated Americans.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
Key = {fds376647}
}
@article{fds372600,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Katz, T and Stegall, J},
Title = {A Review of “Becoming Human”},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {4},
Pages = {620-622},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
Key = {fds372600}
}
@article{fds369144,
Author = {Heck, IA and Kushnir, T and Kinzler, KD},
Title = {Building representations of the social world: Children
extract patterns from social choices to reason about
multi-group hierarchies.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e13366},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13366},
Abstract = {How do children learn about the structure of the social
world? We tested whether children would extract patterns
from an agent's social choices to make inferences about
multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1,
4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New
York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and
Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of
individuals from different groups. Across pairwise
selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals
from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the
agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred"
and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and
the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's
reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups
and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to
10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York)
used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that
the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D
and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be
"leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence
for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to
10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made
inferences about groups' relative social but not physical
power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across
the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through
which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies
through the patterns they observe over time in people's
group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in
our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive
social choices between multiple groups to reason about
groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern
of an agent's positive social choices to guide their
reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and
"helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in
an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking
about groups' relative social but not physical power.
Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based
hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent
prefers) and societal level (which groups are
privileged).},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13366},
Key = {fds369144}
}
@article{fds370243,
Author = {Flanagan, T and Wong, G and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the
experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive
technologies.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {59},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1017-1031},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0001524},
Abstract = {Children are developing alongside interactive technologies
that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear
if children's beliefs about the agency of these household
technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced,
humanoid robots used in lab research. This study
investigated 4-11-year-old children's (<i>N</i> = 127,
<i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 7.50, <i>SD</i><sub>age</sub> =
2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United
States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and
moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa
and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid
robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these
technologies were organized into three distinct
clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving
moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features
for each technology type, but the extent to which they did
so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of
the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral
scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift
in children's understanding of technologies' limitations.
Importantly, there were systematic differences between
Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique
characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest
that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by
an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database
Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0001524},
Key = {fds370243}
}
@article{fds369077,
Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Rational learners and parochial norms.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {233},
Pages = {105366},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
Abstract = {Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they
apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm
acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early
age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are
prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However,
another possibility is rational learning: given the
available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms
in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we
introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm
acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In
one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with
children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants
viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two
unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of
social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled
group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) -
were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of
their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2)
we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used
statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or
inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive
regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis
shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children
inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a
naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work
highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not
necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial
norms.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
Key = {fds369077}
}
@article{fds363275,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental
changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral
praiseworthiness.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e13257},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13257},
Abstract = {Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral
praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults
recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving
an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires.
Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing
in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in
contrast with other work showing that children incorporate
notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning.
Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016)
vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly
moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving
inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children,
range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we
contrasted a character who paid a personal cost
(psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a
moral action with another who acted morally without paying a
cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and
9-year-old children and adults recognized the
praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically
or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only
recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are
physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically
costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that
paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire
or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both
adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct
motivational force on actions. They further suggest that
costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in
judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13257},
Key = {fds363275}
}
@article{fds372714,
Author = {Carpenter, E and Siegel, A and Urquiola, S and Liu, J and Kushnir,
T},
Title = {Being me in times of change: Young children's reflections on
their lives during the COVID-19 pandemic},
Journal = {Children and Society},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/chso.12790},
Abstract = {Research from the perspective of parents, educators and
mental health professionals has documented the negative
impacts of pandemic isolation on children, but few studies
have sought children's own perspectives on this difficult
year. The current study aims to provide a first-person
perspective on children's psychological health by asking
children directly about their experiences of isolating at
home. We interviewed 28 seven- to eleven-year-olds in early
days of lockdowns with follow-ups 6 months later. Children
answered questions about family, school, friendships and
feelings about the changes in their lives during lockdown.
Children's reflections showed resilience, adaptability,
positive appraisals and an ability to maintain meaningful
social connections. This data underscores the value of
including children's narratives to better understand the
pandemic's lasting effects on their lives.},
Doi = {10.1111/chso.12790},
Key = {fds372714}
}
@article{fds367417,
Author = {Shachnai, R and Kushnir, T and Bian, L},
Title = {Walking in Her Shoes: Pretending to Be a Female Role Model
Increases Young Girls' Persistence in Science.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {33},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1818-1827},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09567976221119393},
Abstract = {Pretend play is a ubiquitous learning tool in early
childhood, enabling children to explore possibilities
outside of their current reality. Here, we demonstrate how
pretend play can be leveraged to empower girls in scientific
domains. American children ages 4 to 7 years (<i>N</i> =
240) played a challenging science activity in one of three
conditions. Children in the exposure condition heard about a
successful gender-matched scientist, children in the
roleplay condition pretended to be that scientist, and
children in the baseline condition did not receive
information about the scientist. Girls in the roleplay
condition, but not in the exposure condition, persisted
longer in the science activity than girls in the baseline
condition. Pretending to be the scientist equated girls'
persistence to that of boys. These findings suggest that
pretend play of role models motivates young girls in science
and may help reduce gender gaps from their
roots.},
Doi = {10.1177/09567976221119393},
Key = {fds367417}
}
@article{fds363460,
Author = {Kushnir, T},
Title = {Imagination and social cognition in childhood.},
Journal = {Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive
science},
Volume = {13},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e1603},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1603},
Abstract = {Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new
ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and
fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about
alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue
for the central function of imagination in the development
of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1,
I review a work showing that even in the first year of life,
social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to
imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on
action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what
should happen is appropriately constrained by what can
happen, and how this influences children's moral
evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental
changes in imagination-especially the ability to imagine
improbable events-may have implications for social
inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can
conflict. These examples point to a flexible and
domain-general process that operates on knowledge to make
social meaning. This article is categorized under:
Psychology > Development and Aging Cognitive Biology >
Cognitive Development Philosophy > Knowledge and
Belief.},
Doi = {10.1002/wcs.1603},
Key = {fds363460}
}
@article{fds363276,
Author = {Ransom, A and LaGrant, B and Spiteri, A and Kushnir, T and Anderson, AK and De Rosa and E},
Title = {Face-to-face learning enhances the social transmission of
information.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {e0264250},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264250},
Abstract = {Learning from others provides the foundation for culture and
the advancement of knowledge. Learning a new visuospatial
skill from others represents a specific challenge-overcoming
differences in perspective so that we understand what
someone is doing and why they are doing it. The "what" of
visuospatial learning is thought to be easiest from a shared
0° first-person perspective and most difficult from a 180°
third-person perspective. However, the visual disparity at
180° promotes face-to-face interaction, which may enhance
learning by scaffolding social perspective taking, the "why"
of visuospatial learning. We tested these potentially
conflicting hypotheses in child and young adult learners.
Thirty-six children (4-6 years) and 57 young adults (18-27
years) observed a live model open a puzzle box from a
first-person (0°) or third-person (90° or 180°)
perspective. The puzzle box had multiple solutions, only one
of which was modelled, which allowed for the assessment of
imitation and goal emulation. Participants had three
attempts to open the puzzle box from the model's
perspective. While first-person (0°) observation increased
imitation relative to a 180° third-person perspective, the
180° observers opened the puzzle box most readily (i.e.,
fastest). Although both age groups were excellent imitators
and able to take the model's perspective, adults were more
faithful imitators, and children were more likely to
innovate a new solution. A shared visual perspective
increased imitation, but a shared mental perspective
promoted goal achievement and the social transmission of
innovation. "Perfection of means and confusion of goals-in
my opinion-seem to characterize our age" Einstein (1973) pg
337, Ideas and Opinions.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0264250},
Key = {fds363276}
}
@article{fds369792,
Author = {Flanagan, TM and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Children's Developing Beliefs About Agency and Free Will in
an Increasingly Technological World},
Journal = {Humana Mente},
Volume = {15},
Number = {42},
Pages = {179-204},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The idea of treating robots as free agents seems only to
have existed in the realm of science fiction. In our current
world, however, children are interacting with robotic
technologies that look, talk, and act like agents. Are
children willing to treat such technologies as agents with
thoughts, feelings, experiences, and even free will? In this
paper, we explore whether children's developing concepts of
agency and free will apply to robots. We first review the
literature on children's agency and free-will beliefs,
particularly looking at their beliefs about volition,
responding to constraints, and deliberation about different
options for action. We then review an emerging body of
research that investigates children's beliefs about agency
and free will in robots. We end by discussing the
implications for developing beliefs about agency and free
will in an increasingly technological world.},
Key = {fds369792}
}
@article{fds359168,
Author = {Zhao, X and Wente, A and Flecha, MF and Galvan, DS and Gopnik, A and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Culture moderates the relationship between self-control
ability and free will beliefs in childhood},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {210},
Pages = {104609-104609},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104609},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104609},
Key = {fds359168}
}
@article{fds359169,
Author = {Heck, IA and Kushnir, T and Kinzler, KD},
Title = {Social sampling: Children track social choices to reason
about status hierarchies.},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001008},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0001008},
Key = {fds359169}
}
@article{fds367418,
Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Is children’s norm learning rational? A
meta-analysis},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Comparative Cognition: Animal Minds, CogSci
2021},
Pages = {2752-2758},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {A good deal of recent research has examined children’s
norm learning across a wide range of novel contexts. The
typical interpretation of these findings is that
children’s norm learning is driven by group-based biases.
In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation and
corresponding meta-analyses that cast the current body of
evidence in a rather different light. First, we argue the
extant literature uses an ill-suited standard for assessing
bias. Rather than comparing children’s judgments to what
is expected under random chance (a ‘random standard’),
bias is better assessed by comparing children’s judgments
to what is most probable, given their total evidence (an
‘evidential standard’). Next, we report a meta-analysis
of the known findings to date (k = 40 effect sizes; N =
1,369 in total; ages 4- to 13-years-old) to compare
children’s norm learning against an appropriate evidential
standard. Meta-analytic estimates reveal that children’s
norm learning is not restrictively biased toward
narrow-scope inferences on account of group-based factors.
Rather, the findings to date are consistent with
children’s norm learning being rational (i.e.,
statistically appropriate, given their evidence) or even
inclusively biased toward making the wide-scope inference
that a novel norm applies to everyone in a population. We
conclude with brief discussion of implications for current
understanding and future research on norm
acquisition.},
Key = {fds367418}
}
@article{fds359236,
Author = {Liu, J and Partington, S and Suh, Y and Finiasz, Z and Flanagan, T and Kocher, D and Kiely, R and Kortenaar, M and Kushnir,
T},
Title = {The Community-Engaged Lab: A Case-Study Introduction for
Developmental Science.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {715914},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.715914},
Abstract = {Due to the closing of campuses, museums, and other public
spaces during the pandemic, the typical avenues for
recruitment, partnership, and dissemination are now
unavailable to developmental labs. In this paper, we show
how a shift in perspective has impacted our lab's ability to
successfully transition to virtual work during the COVID-19
shut-down. This begins by recognizing that any lab that
relies on local communities to engage in human research is
<i>itself a community organization</i>. From this, we
introduce a <i>community-engaged lab</i> model, and explain
how it works using our own activities during the pandemic as
an example. To begin, we introduce the vocabulary of
mission-driven community organizations and show how we
applied the key ideas of mission, vision, and culture to
discussions of our own lab's identity. We contrast the
community-engaged lab model with a traditional
bi-directional model of recruitment <i>from</i> and
dissemination <i>to</i> communities and describe how the
community-engaged model can be used to reframe these and
other ordinary lab activities. Our activities during the
pandemic serve as a case study: we formed new community
partnerships, engaged with child "citizen-scientists" in
online research, and opened new avenues of virtual
programming. One year later, we see modest but quantifiable
impact of this approach: a return to pre-pandemic diversity
in our samples, new engagement opportunities for trainees,
and new sustainable partnerships. We end by discussing the
promise and limitations of the community-engaged lab model
for the future of developmental research.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2021.715914},
Key = {fds359236}
}
@article{fds359170,
Author = {Zhao, X and Zhao, X and Gweon, H and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Leaving a Choice for Others: Children’s Evaluations of
Considerate, Socially-Mindful Actions},
Journal = {Child Development},
Volume = {92},
Pages = {1238-1253},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13480},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13480},
Key = {fds359170}
}
@article{fds359171,
Author = {Kocher, D and Sarmiento, L and Heller, S and Yang, Y and Kushnir, T and Green, KE},
Title = {No, Your Other Left! Language Children Use To Direct
Robots},
Journal = {2020 Joint IEEE 10th International Conference on Development
and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob)},
Publisher = {IEEE},
Year = {2020},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icdl-epirob48136.2020.9278108},
Doi = {10.1109/icdl-epirob48136.2020.9278108},
Key = {fds359171}
}
@article{fds363277,
Author = {Kocher, D and Kushnir, T and Green, KE},
Title = {Better together: Young children's tendencies to help a
non-humanoid robot collaborator},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Interaction Design and Children
Conference, IDC 2020},
Pages = {243-249},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781450379816},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3392063.3394426},
Abstract = {In child-robot collaborations, a robot may fail to
accomplish its part of a task. In this situation, the robot
is reliant on the child to recover. Inherently prosocial, a
child is inclined to help the robot collaborator if the
child can properly identify the robot failure and infer how
to help correct it. In this study, we investigate how a
non-humanoid robot can solicit the help of a
child-collaborator using only its motion path. We conducted
a study with twenty-two children, ages 3-7, who participated
in a collaborative building task with a non-humanoid mobile
robot. We found that autonomous motion of a non-humanoid
robot elicited prosocial behavior from 59% of children, and
that young children were willing to engage with the robot as
an animate partner despite its limited capabilities and
form. This finding has implications for robot design
striving to encourage prosocial behavior in children of
different ages.},
Doi = {10.1145/3392063.3394426},
Key = {fds363277}
}
@article{fds367419,
Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T},
Title = {When in Rome, do as Bayesians do: Statistical learning and
parochial norms},
Journal = {Proceedings for the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Developing a Mind: Learning in Humans,
Animals, and Machines, CogSci 2020},
Pages = {2679-2684},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {It's a familiar point in anthropology that many norms are
parochial, meaning they apply to people in certain groups
(e.g., one's ingroup) and not to others (e.g., one's
outgroup). One explanation for such parochialism is that
people are just innately biased against outsiders. But it's
also possible that, given the evidence, people infer the
parochiality of norms in statistically appropriate ways.
This paper uses a Bayesian learning framework to investigate
inferences of normative scope both experimentally and
computationally. An experiment in which adult participants
(n = 480) viewed sample violations of a novel rule among
novel groups reveals that both sensitivity to statistical
evidence and prior knowledge of relevant social categories
are integral to computations of normative scope. In tandem
with the experimental results, computational analysis
supports the notion that degree of prior inclusivity bias
(i.e., an expectation that a norm will be broad, rather than
narrow, in scope) is another key factor. Together, these
novel insights raise intriguing possibilities for
integrating perspectives on norms research.},
Key = {fds367419}
}
@article{fds359172,
Author = {Wang, Q and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Cultural Pathways in Cognitive Development: Introduction to
the Special Issue},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {52},
Pages = {100816-100816},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100816},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100816},
Key = {fds359172}
}
@article{fds359173,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {How U.S. And Chinese children talk about personal, moral and
conventional choices},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {52},
Pages = {100804-100804},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100804},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100804},
Key = {fds359173}
}
@article{fds359174,
Author = {Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The ontogeny of cumulative culture: Individual toddlers vary
in faithful imitation and goal emulation},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {23},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12862},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12862},
Key = {fds359174}
}
@article{fds359175,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kang, C and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The cultural roots of free will beliefs: How Singaporean and
U.S. Children judge and explain possibilities for action in
interpersonal contexts.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {55},
Pages = {866-876},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000670},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000670},
Key = {fds359175}
}
@article{fds367420,
Author = {Flanagan, T and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Individual differences in fluency with idea generation
predict children's beliefs in their own free
will},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {1738-1744},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {The ability to imagine alternative possibilities plays a
crucial role in everyday cognitive functioning beginning in
early childhood. Across two studies, we ask whether
individual differences in young children's (Mean Age = 5.01;
SD = 0.78 Range = 2) fluency in generating alternative
possibilities relates to a particular type of
social-cognitive counterfactual judgment, namely children's
belief in the possibility to “act otherwise” when
actions go against stated strong desires (i.e. “free
will”). We found that the fluency of generating ideas was
a consistent individual difference that held regardless of
domain. We also found that individual children's fluency
predicted judgments of free will for themselves (Study 2)
but not for others (Study 1). Our findings raise new
questions about how counterfactual thinking enables children
to overcome psychological barriers to self-control, and how
stimulating the imagination facilitates developing
cognitions that rely on it.},
Key = {fds367420}
}
@article{fds367421,
Author = {Varhol, AR and Kushnir, T and Koenig, MA},
Title = {Preschoolers' Evaluations of Ignorant Agents are
Situation-Specific},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {3022-3028},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {Preschool children's preference for knowledgeable agents
over ignorant and inaccurate agents (Sabbagh & Baldwin,
2001; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Rakoczy et al., 2015), is
generally interpreted as epistemic vigilance. However,
Kushnir and Koenig (2017) recently found that without a
contrasting accurate agent, preschoolers will learn new
information from an agent who professed ignorance, but not
from one who was inaccurate. Employing a two-speaker design
contrasting an agent who professed ignorance about familiar
object labels with a speaker whose knowledge state was not
revealed, we found that preschoolers (N = 41; 3.50-4.89
years, M = 4.08 years) avoided requesting and endorsing
novel information from the ignorant agent in the same domain
as her previous ignorance (i.e., labels). In different
domains, however, (i.e. novel function learning, resource
sharing, etc.) they were at chance in choosing the ignorant
agent. This suggests that preschoolers' view of ignorance is
situational, rather than uniformly negative.},
Key = {fds367421}
}
@article{fds367422,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {She Helped Even Though She Wanted to Play: Children Consider
Psychological Cost in Social Evaluations},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {3199-3205},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {Sometimes we incur a high psychological cost (for example,
forgo something we really like) in order to fulfill social
or moral obligations. How would the information of incurring
psychological costs influence children's social evaluations?
Prior work suggests that children do not recognize the
virtue of resolving inner conflicts until age 8. In two
studies, we deconfounded costs from inner conflicts and
found that when the difficulty was not explicitly stated as
having conflicting desires (a self-interested desire and a
moral desire) at once, most 8- to 9-year-olds and some 6 to
7-year-olds gave adult-like favorable evaluations of the
character who overcame psychological or physical difficulty
to act morally. Moreover, neither adults nor children
inferred conflicting moral and personal desires
spontaneously. These together suggest that children's
evaluation of moral virtue depends on understanding of cost
rather than conflict: Physical cost is incorporated early in
development, and psychological cost later.},
Key = {fds367422}
}
@article{fds359176,
Author = {Kushnir, T},
Title = {The developmental and cultural psychology of free
will},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {e12529-e12529},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12529},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12529},
Key = {fds359176}
}
@article{fds363278,
Author = {Eason, AE and Doctor, D and Chang, E and Kushnir, T and Sommerville,
JA},
Title = {The choice is yours: Infants' expectations about an agent's
future behavior based on taking and receiving
actions.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {54},
Number = {5},
Pages = {829-841},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000482},
Abstract = {Our social world is rich with information about other
people's choices, which subsequently inform our inferences
about their future behavior. For individuals socialized
within the American cultural context, which places a high
value on autonomy and independence, outcomes that are the
result of an agent's own choices may hold more predictive
value than similar outcomes that are the result of another
person's choices. Across two experiments we test the
ontogeny of this phenomenon; that is, whether infants are
sensitive to the causal history associated with an agent's
acquisition of an object. We demonstrate that on average,
12.5-month-old American infants view taking actions as a
better indication of an agent's future behavior than are
receiving actions. Furthermore, there were significant
individual differences in the extent to which infants
perceived object receipt to be indicative of future
behavior. Specifically, the less autonomous infants were
perceived to be (by their parents), socialized to be, and
behaved, the more they viewed object receipt as indicative
of future behavior. The results are discussed in terms of
the role of individual and cultural experience in early
understanding of intentional action. (PsycINFO Database
Record},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000482},
Key = {fds363278}
}
@article{fds359177,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The influence of understanding and having choice on
children's prosocial behavior},
Journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
Volume = {20},
Pages = {107-110},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.043},
Doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.043},
Key = {fds359177}
}
@article{fds359178,
Author = {Vondervoort, JWVD and Aknin, LB and Kushnir, T and Slevinsky, J and Hamlin, JK},
Title = {Selectivity in toddlers’ behavioral and emotional
reactions to prosocial and antisocial others.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {54},
Pages = {1-14},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000404},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000404},
Key = {fds359178}
}
@article{fds359179,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Young children consider individual authority and collective
agreement when deciding who can change rules},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
Volume = {165},
Pages = {101-116},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.04.004},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.04.004},
Key = {fds359179}
}
@article{fds359180,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Koenig, MA},
Title = {What I don’t know won’t hurt you: The relation between
professed ignorance and later knowledge claims.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {826-835},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000294},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000294},
Key = {fds359180}
}
@article{fds359181,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Trieu, BY and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Preschoolers’ Selfish Sharing Is Reduced by Prior
Experience With Proportional Generosity},
Journal = {Open Mind},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {42-52},
Publisher = {MIT Press - Journals},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00004},
Doi = {10.1162/opmi_a_00004},
Key = {fds359181}
}
@misc{fds363279,
Author = {Vredenburgh, C and Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Young children's flexible social cognition and sensitivity
to context facilitates their learning},
Pages = {238-257},
Booktitle = {Social Cognition: Development Across the Life
Span},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9781138859937},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315520575},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315520575},
Key = {fds363279}
}
@article{fds363280,
Author = {Wellman, HM and Kushnir, T and Xu, F and Brink, KA},
Title = {Infants Use Statistical Sampling to Understand the
Psychological World},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5},
Pages = {668-676},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12131},
Abstract = {Preverbal infants engage in statistical and probabilistic
inference to learn about their linguistic and physical
worlds. Do they also employ probabilistic information to
understand their social world? Do they infer underlying
causal mechanisms from statistical data? Here, we show, with
looking-time methods, that 10-month-olds attend to
statistical information to understand their
social–psychological world and plausibly infer underlying
causal mechanisms from violations of physical
probabilities.},
Doi = {10.1111/infa.12131},
Key = {fds363280}
}
@article{fds359182,
Author = {Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {When what’s inside counts: Sequence of demonstrated
actions affects preschooler’s categorization by nonobvious
properties.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {52},
Pages = {400-410},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000088},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000088},
Key = {fds359182}
}
@article{fds367423,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Gelman, SA},
Title = {Translating testimonial claims into evidence for
category-based induction},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2016},
Pages = {1307-1312},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196739},
Abstract = {Inductive generalizations about the properties of kinds are
based on evidence. But evidence can come either from our
observations, or from the testimony of knowledgeable
informants. The current study explores how we combine
information from these two sources to make inductive
inferences. Participants learned about a novel object
category, and observed the property occur with some
frequency in a sample of category members. Different groups
of participants also heard an informant making either
Generic, Quantified, or Specific claims about the prevalence
of the property. Participants who heard generic claims were
more resistant to a straightforward use of statistical
evidence in their generalizations. Moreover, participants
who rated the informant as more knowledgeable (across
conditions) gave higher prevalence estimates. The results
suggest two pathways through which testimony translates into
evidence for category learning, and raise questions on how
to best combine evidence from these different sources into a
common representational form.},
Key = {fds367423}
}
@article{fds367424,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Children's Awareness of Authority to Change Rules in Various
Social Contexts},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2016},
Pages = {1877-1882},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196739},
Abstract = {To investigate children's awareness of authority to change
rules, we showed children (ages 4-7) videos of one child
playing a game alone or three children playing a game
together. In the group video, the game rule was initiated
either: by one of the children, by three children
collaboratively or by an adult. They then were asked whether
the characters in the videos could change the rules.
Children believed that the character could change the rule
when playing alone. Their responses to the group video
depended on how the rule was initiated. They attributed
authority to change rules only to the child who initiated
the rule, unless the rule was created collaboratively. We
also asked children whether they could change norms
(school/moral/artifact norms) in daily life; and found
moral/artifact distinction in children's endorsement of norm
changing. These results suggest that children recognize
flexibility in changing rules even in preschool
years.},
Key = {fds367424}
}
@article{fds367425,
Author = {Wente, AO and Ting, T and Aboody, R and Kushnir, T and Gopnik,
A},
Title = {The Relationship Between Inhibitory Control and Free Will
Beliefs in 4-to 6-Year-Old-Children},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2016},
Pages = {770-775},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196739},
Abstract = {This study explores the relationship between beliefs about
self-control and the ability to exercise self-control in 4-
to 6-year-old children. Sixty-eight children were asked a
series of questions to gauge whether they believed that they
could freely choose to act against their desires or inhibit
themselves from performing desired actions. Children were
also asked to provide qualitative explanations for why they
could or could not exercise free will, and to complete two
inhibitory control tasks: forbidden toy and day/night.
Choice responses were negatively correlated with performance
on the forbidden toy task, when children performed that task
first. There was also a negative correlation between a
belief in an internal locus of control, and success on the
forbidden toy measure. Refraining from touching a forbidden
toy appears to be correlated to less belief in free will.
Though this may appear counter-intuitive, it is consistent
with cross-cultural research.},
Key = {fds367425}
}
@article{fds359183,
Author = {Josephs, M and Kushnir, T and Gräfenhain, M and Rakoczy,
H},
Title = {Children protest moral and conventional violations more when
they believe actions are freely chosen},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},
Volume = {141},
Pages = {247-255},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.08.002},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.08.002},
Key = {fds359183}
}
@article{fds359184,
Author = {Koenig, MA and Cole, CA and Meyer, M and Ridge, KE and Kushnir, T and Gelman, SA},
Title = {Reasoning about knowledge: Children’s evaluations of
generality and verifiability},
Journal = {Cognitive Psychology},
Volume = {83},
Pages = {22-39},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.007},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.007},
Key = {fds359184}
}
@article{fds359185,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Gopnik, A and Chernyak, N and Seiver, E and Wellman,
HM},
Title = {Developing intuitions about free will between ages four and
six},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {138},
Pages = {79-101},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.003},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.003},
Key = {fds359185}
}
@article{fds359186,
Author = {Vredenburgh, C and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Young Children\textquotesingles Help-Seeking as Active
Information Gathering},
Journal = {Cognitive Science},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {697-722},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12245},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12245},
Key = {fds359186}
}
@article{fds367426,
Author = {Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Understanding young children's imitative behavior from an
individual differences perspective},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2015},
Pages = {2769-2774},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196722},
Abstract = {Research has shown that after observing a sequence of
object-related actions, young children sometimes imitate the
goal-directed aspects of the actions only, but other times
faithfully imitate all aspects of the actions. In this study
we explore whether this mixture of goal-directed and
faithful imitation is based in part on individual
differences between children. Forty-eight 2-year-old
children (mean age = 26 months) completed a series of
imitation tasks. Results revealed stable individual
differences in children's imitation-measurements of their
imitative behavior correlated both within and between
different types of imitation tasks. We further used
Principle Component Analyses to cluster these correlated
measurements into two factors, and the two factors aligned
well with the concepts of goal-directed and faithful
imitation.},
Key = {fds367426}
}
@article{fds359187,
Author = {Vredenburgh, C and Kushnir, T and Casasola, M},
Title = {Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers\textquotesingle
transmission of recently demonstrated functions to
unfamiliar adults},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {645-654},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12233},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12233},
Key = {fds359187}
}
@article{fds359188,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but
Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {453-464},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2013.777843},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2013.777843},
Key = {fds359188}
}
@article{fds359189,
Author = {Fedyk, M and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Development links psychological causes to evolutionary
explanations},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {37},
Pages = {142-143},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2014},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x1300201x},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x1300201x},
Key = {fds359189}
}
@article{fds359190,
Author = {Lucas, CG and Griffiths, TL and Xu, F and Fawcett, C and Gopnik, A and Kushnir, T and Markson, L and Hu, J},
Title = {The Child as Econometrician: A Rational Model of Preference
Understanding in Children},
Journal = {PLoS ONE},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {e92160-e92160},
Publisher = {Public Library of Science (PLoS)},
Editor = {Daunizeau, J},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092160},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0092160},
Key = {fds359190}
}
@article{fds359191,
Author = {Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Social context effects in 2- and 4-year-olds’ selective
versus faithful imitation.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {50},
Pages = {922-933},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034242},
Doi = {10.1037/a0034242},
Key = {fds359191}
}
@article{fds359192,
Author = {Diesendruck, G and Salzer, S and Kushnir, T and Xu,
F},
Title = {When Choices Are Not Personal: The Effect of Statistical and
Social Cues on Children\textquotesingles Inferences About
the Scope of Preferences},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {370-380},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2013.848870},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2013.848870},
Key = {fds359192}
}
@article{fds363281,
Author = {Sobel, DM and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Knowledge matters: how children evaluate the reliability of
testimony as a process of rational inference.},
Journal = {Psychological review},
Volume = {120},
Number = {4},
Pages = {779-797},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034191},
Abstract = {Children's causal learning has been characterized as a
rational process, in which children appropriately evaluate
evidence from their observations and actions in light of
their existing conceptual knowledge. We propose a similar
framework for children's selective social learning,
concentrating on information learned from others' testimony.
We examine how children use their existing conceptual
knowledge of the physical and social world to determine the
reliability of testimony. We describe existing studies that
offer both direct and indirect support for selective trust
as rational inference and discuss how this framework may
resolve some of the conflicting evidence surrounding cases
of indiscriminate trust. Importantly, this framework
emphasizes that children are active in selecting evidence
(both social and experiential), rather than being passive
recipients of knowledge, and motivates further studies that
more systematically examine the process of learning from
social information.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0034191},
Key = {fds363281}
}
@article{fds363282,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T and Sullivan, KM and Wang,
Q},
Title = {A comparison of American and Nepalese children's concepts of
freedom of choice and social constraint.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {37},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1343-1355},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12046},
Abstract = {Recent work has shown that preschool-aged children and
adults understand freedom of choice regardless of culture,
but that adults across cultures differ in perceiving social
obligations as constraints on action. To investigate the
development of these cultural differences and
universalities, we interviewed school-aged children (4-11)
in Nepal and the United States regarding beliefs about
people's freedom of choice and constraint to follow
preferences, perform impossible acts, and break social
obligations. Children across cultures and ages universally
endorsed the choice to follow preferences but not to perform
impossible acts. Age and culture effects also emerged: Young
children in both cultures viewed social obligations as
constraints on action, but American children did so less as
they aged. These findings suggest that while basic notions
of free choice are universal, recognitions of social
obligations as constraints on action may be culturally
learned.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12046},
Key = {fds363282}
}
@article{fds359193,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Giving Preschoolers Choice Increases Sharing
Behavior},
Journal = {Psychological Science},
Volume = {24},
Pages = {1971-1979},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2013},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797613482335},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797613482335},
Key = {fds359193}
}
@article{fds359194,
Author = {Xu, F and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Infants Are Rational Constructivist Learners},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {22},
Pages = {28-32},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2013},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721412469396},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721412469396},
Key = {fds359194}
}
@article{fds367427,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Inferring One's Own Prosociality Through Choice: Giving
Preschoolers Costly Prosocial Choices Increases Subsequent
Sharing Behavior},
Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics -
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2013},
Pages = {2040-2045},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831891},
Abstract = {Prosociality emerges early in ontogeny, but the mechanisms
driving its early-emergence are not well understood. We
propose that the experience of choice is tied to the
expression of children's prosocial behavior. In Experiment
1, preschoolers shared with a puppet by either making a
Costly Choice (giving a resource they could have kept for
themselves), Non-Costly Choice (giving a resource that would
otherwise be thrown away), or No Choice. Subsequent
prosociality was measured by allowing children to share with
a new puppet. While most children shared initially, children
who were given costly choices shared more with the new
puppet. Experiment 2 replicated this result using a
different manipulation for Costly vs. Non-Costly choices.
Experiment 3 found that preschoolers were more likely to
infer that actions are intentional when they are costly.
Results suggest a prosocial construal hypothesis: that
children rationally infer their prosociality through making
difficult, autonomous choices.},
Key = {fds367427}
}
@article{fds367428,
Author = {Vredenburgh, C and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Help-Seeking As A Cause of Young Children's
Collaboration},
Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics -
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2013},
Pages = {3705-3710},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831891},
Abstract = {Young children's collaboration is a topic of great interest,
yet what causes children to initiate collaboration in some
circumstances but not others is unclear. In this research,
we analyzed preschoolers' collaboration as an information
gathering activity in a toy assembly activity. We
independently assessed children's competency at a similar
building task and, using a separate group of children, the
difficulty of each step of the activity. We hypothesized
that children would request collaborative assistance when
they needed assistance (that is, when they were less
competent and/or the task was more difficult), but act
independently when capable. The results confirmed that
preschoolers were more likely to request collaborative
assistance as the difficulty of the activity increased and
more so if they were initially less competent. The results
suggest that preschoolers' collaboration may be profitably
viewed as an information gathering activity.},
Key = {fds367428}
}
@article{fds359195,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Vredenburgh, C and Schneider, LA},
Title = {“Who can help me fix this toy?” The distinction between
causal knowledge and word knowledge guides
preschoolers\textquotesingle selective requests for
information.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {446-453},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031649},
Doi = {10.1037/a0031649},
Key = {fds359195}
}
@book{fds363283,
Author = {Xu, F and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Preface. What is rational constructivism?},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {xi-xiv},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.22001-7},
Doi = {10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.22001-7},
Key = {fds363283}
}
@misc{fds363284,
Author = {Kushnir, T},
Title = {Developing a concept of choice.},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {193-218},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.00007-1},
Abstract = {Our adult concept of choice is not a simple idea, but rather
a complex set of beliefs about the causes of actions. These
beliefs are situation-, individual- and culture-dependent,
and are thus likely constructed through social learning.
This chapter takes a rational constructivist approach to
examining the development of a concept of choice in young
children. Initially, infants' combine assumptions of
rational agency with their capacity for statistical
inference to reason about alternative possibilities for, and
constraints on, action. Preschoolers' build on this basic
understanding by integrating domain-specific causal
knowledge of physical, biological, and psychological
possibility into their appraisal of their own and others'
ability to choose. However, preschoolers continue to view
both psychological and social motivations as constraints on
choice--for example, stating that one cannot choose to harm
another, or to act against personal desires. It is not until
later that children share the adult belief that choice
mediates between conflicting motivations for action. The
chapter concludes by suggesting avenues for future
research--to better characterize conceptual changes in
beliefs about choice, and to understand how such beliefs
arise from children's everyday experiences.},
Doi = {10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.00007-1},
Key = {fds363284}
}
@article{fds367429,
Author = {Yu, Y and Kushnir, T},
Title = {It’s all about the game: Infants’ action strategies
during imitation are influenced by their prior
expectations},
Journal = {Expanding the Space of Cognitive Science - Proceedings of
the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society,
CogSci 2011},
Pages = {3570-3574},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831877},
Abstract = {Infants’ imitation is influenced by causal and intentional
cues. Here we examine whether imitation is influenced by
prior social expectations. Infants (mean age = 27 months)
first played one of three games either: 1) copying the
experimenters’ gestures, 2) establishing and working
toward a shared goal or 3) a non-interactive control. They
then participated in a separate imitation task involved both
causally necessary and unnecessary actions and a goal.
Infants who began by copying the experimenter were more
likely to imitate causally unnecessary actions, infants who
played a game with a shared goal were more likely to only
perform causally necessary actions. Infants in the
non-interactive control had no preferred response, and were
least likely to achieve outcome as demonstrated. These
results implicate the broader social context as an important
factor guiding the actions infants choose to imitate, and
have implications for the role of imitation in early
learning.},
Key = {fds367429}
}
@article{fds367430,
Author = {Chernyak, N and Kushnir, T and Sullivan, KM and Wang,
Q},
Title = {A Comparison of Nepalese and American Children’s Concepts
of Free Will},
Journal = {Expanding the Space of Cognitive Science - Proceedings of
the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society,
CogSci 2011},
Pages = {144-149},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831877},
Abstract = {Recent work finds that children as young as four years old
have an intuitive belief in free will. To what extent is
this early-developing intuition universal, and to what
extent culturally situated? We surveyed school-aged children
(4-11) in two countries (Nepal and the United States) about
their beliefs about people’s “free will” to follow
personal preferences; break physical and mental constraints;
and break social constraints. Results showed both universal
and culturally-learned beliefs in free will. Children across
cultures shared the early-developing intuitions of free will
and constraint, though American children were more likely
construe actions as choices. While American children were
more likely to believe in the free will to break social
constraints as they aged, Nepali children showed the
opposite pattern. These findings show that while a basic
notion of free will is present and early-developing across
both cultures, construals of choice are also culturally
learned over time.},
Key = {fds367430}
}
@article{fds359196,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Chernyak, N},
Title = {Understanding the adult moralist requires first
understanding the child scientist},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {343-344},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10002037},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x10002037},
Key = {fds359196}
}
@article{fds359197,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Xu, F and Wellman, HM},
Title = {Young Children Use Statistical Sampling to Infer the
Preferences of Other People},
Journal = {Psychological Science},
Volume = {21},
Pages = {1134-1140},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610376652},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797610376652},
Key = {fds359197}
}
@misc{fds363285,
Author = {Schulz, L and Kushnir, T and Gopnik, A},
Title = {Learning From Doing: Intervention and Causal
Inference},
Booktitle = {Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and
Computation},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780195176803},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176803.003.0006},
Abstract = {This chapter starts from the premise that much of children's
knowledge takes the form of abstract, coherent, causal
claims that are learned from, and defeasible by, evidence.
This view is consistent with an interventionist view of
causal knowledge, formalized in computational models using
causal Bayes net representations. The chapter reviews
empirical studies suggesting that, consistent with this
account, preschoolers use patterns of evidence to: a) create
novel, effective interventions; b) infer the structure of
causal relationships, including relationships involving
unobserved causes; c) accurately predict distinct outcomes
from observed evidence and evidence generated by
interventions; d) integrate novel evidence with prior
beliefs; and e) distinguish informative interventions from
confounded ones.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176803.003.0006},
Key = {fds363285}
}
@article{fds359198,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Gopnik, A and Lucas, C and Schulz,
L},
Title = {Inferring Hidden Causal Structure},
Journal = {Cognitive Science},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {148-160},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01072.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01072.x},
Key = {fds359198}
}
@article{fds359199,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Wellman, HM and Gelman, SA},
Title = {A self-agency bias in preschoolers\textquotesingle causal
inferences.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {597-603},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014727},
Doi = {10.1037/a0014727},
Key = {fds359199}
}
@article{fds359200,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Wellman, HM and Gelman, SA},
Title = {The role of preschoolers’ social understanding in
evaluating the informativeness of causal
interventions},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {107},
Pages = {1084-1092},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.10.004},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2007.10.004},
Key = {fds359200}
}
@article{fds359201,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Gopnik, A},
Title = {Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in causal
learning: Preschoolers use new contingency evidence to
overcome prior spatial assumptions.},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {186-196},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.186},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.186},
Key = {fds359201}
}
@article{fds363286,
Author = {Sobel, DM and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The importance of decision making in causal learning from
interventions.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {411-419},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/bf03193418},
Abstract = {Recent research has focused on how interventions benefit
causal learning. This research suggests that the main
benefit of interventions is in the temporal and conditional
probability information that interventions provide a
learner. But when one generates interventions, one must also
decide what interventions to generate. In three experiments,
we investigated the importance of these decision demands to
causal learning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that learners
were better at learning causal models when they observed
intervention data that they had generated, as opposed to
observing data generated by another learner. Experiment 2
demonstrated the same effect between self-generated
interventions and interventions learners were forced to
make. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when learners observed
a sequence of interventions such that the decision-making
process that generated those interventions was more readily
available, learning was less impaired. These data suggest
that decision making may be an important part of causal
learning from interventions.},
Doi = {10.3758/bf03193418},
Key = {fds363286}
}
@article{fds359202,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Gopnik, A},
Title = {Young Children Infer Causal Strength From Probabilities and
Interventions},
Journal = {Psychological Science},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {678-683},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2005},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01595.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01595.x},
Key = {fds359202}
}
@article{fds359203,
Author = {Gopnik, A and Glymour, C and Sobel, DM and Schulz, LE and Kushnir, T and Danks, D},
Title = {A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and
Bayes Nets.},
Journal = {Psychological Review},
Volume = {111},
Pages = {3-32},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.111.1.3},
Doi = {10.1037/0033-295x.111.1.3},
Key = {fds359203}
}
%% Liu, Wenjin
@article{fds365793,
Author = {Liu, W},
Title = {Ignorance in Plato's Protagoras},
Journal = {Phronesis},
Volume = {67},
Number = {3},
Pages = {309-337},
Publisher = {Brill},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10058},
Abstract = {Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in
Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In
the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive,
structural psychic flaw - the soul's domination by inferior
elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people
are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative
matters in specific situations and an enduring deception
about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation,
akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or
forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not
necessarily ignorant.},
Doi = {10.1163/15685284-bja10058},
Key = {fds365793}
}
%% Mahoney, Edward P
@book{fds14277,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {From the Medievals to the Early Moderns: Links Between
Medieval, Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14277}
}
@article{fds14276,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers on
Aristotle},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14276}
}
@article{fds18459,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {Marsilio Ficino and Ralph Cudworth on the Great Chain of
Being},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds18459}
}
@article{fds18457,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Agostino Nifo"},
Pages = {391},
Booktitle = {Revised New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 10},
Publisher = {Detroit: Thomson/Gale; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University
of America Press},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds18457}
}
@article{fds18458,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance
Philosophers"},
Pages = {1-34},
Booktitle = {The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press},
Editor = {Riccardo Pozzo},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds18458}
}
@article{fds18456,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Hiérarchie"},
Pages = {677-678},
Booktitle = {Dictionnaire du Moyen Age},
Publisher = {Paris: Presses Universitaires de France},
Editor = {Claude Gauvard and Alain de Libera and Michel
Zink},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds18456}
}
@article{fds18455,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277"},
Pages = {902-930},
Booktitle = {Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: After the Condemnation of
1277. Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in
the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and
Texts},
Publisher = {Miscellanea Mediaevalia, XXVII, Berlin: Walter de
Grayter},
Editor = {Jan A. Aertsen and Kent Emery, Jr. and Andreas
Speer},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds18455}
}
@book{fds18447,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance: Nicoletto
Vernia and Agostino Nifo-Aldershot},
Publisher = {Ashgate},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18447}
}
@article{fds18449,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) (1468-1534)"},
Pages = {118-119},
Booktitle = {Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18449}
}
@article{fds18450,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"James of Viterbo (c. 1255-1308)"},
Pages = {414},
Booktitle = {Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18450}
}
@article{fds18451,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"John of Jandun (c. 1280/9-1328)"},
Pages = {424},
Booktitle = {Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18451}
}
@article{fds18452,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Nifo, Agostino (c. 1470-1538)"},
Pages = {632},
Booktitle = {Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18452}
}
@article{fds18453,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Vernia, Nicoletto (d. 1499)"},
Pages = {914},
Booktitle = {Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18453}
}
@article{fds18454,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Pseudo-Dionysius's Conception of Metaphysical Hierarchy and
Its Influence on Medieval Philosophy"},
Pages = {429-475},
Booktitle = {Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter},
Publisher = {Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie
Médiévale -- Recontres de Philosophie Medievale, IX.
Tournhout: Brepols},
Editor = {Tzotche Boiadjiev and Georgi Kapriev and Andreas
Speer},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds18454}
}
@article{fds18448,
Author = {E.P. Mahoney},
Title = {"Stufen -- I. Antike bis frühe Neuzeit"},
Journal = {Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {352-358},
Publisher = {Basel:Schwabe},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds18448}
}
%% Martin, Stephen J.
@article{fds215035,
Author = {Flanagan, O. and Martin. S},
Title = {Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology},
Journal = {Humana Mente},
Volume = {21},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://www.humanamente.eu/PDF/Issue_21_Paper_Flanagan&Martin.pdf},
Abstract = {In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963) Wilfrid
Sellars raises a problem for the very possibility of
normative epistemology. How can the “scientific image,”
which celebrates the causal relation among often
imperceptible physical states, make room for justificatory
relations among introspectible propositional attitudes? We
sketch a naturalistic model of reason and of epistemic
decisions that parallels a compatibilist solution to the
problem of freedom of action. Not only doesn’t science
lead to rejection of our account of normative reasoning,
science depends on, sophisticates, and explains how
normative reasoning is possible.},
Key = {fds215035}
}
%% McShea, Daniel W.
@article{fds374935,
Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
Title = {Goal Directedness and the Field Concept},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {1-10},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.121},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>A long-standing
problem in understanding goal-directed systems has been the
insufficiency of mechanistic explanations to make sense of
them. This article offers a solution to this problem. It
begins by observing the limitations of mechanistic
decompositions when it comes to understanding physical
fields. We argue that introducing the field concept, as it
has been developed in <jats:italic>field
theory</jats:italic>, alongside mechanisms is able to
provide an account of goal directedness in the
sciences.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.121},
Key = {fds374935}
}
@article{fds366835,
Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
Title = {Resolving teleology's false dilemma},
Journal = {Biological Journal of the Linnean Society},
Volume = {139},
Number = {4},
Pages = {415-432},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the account of teleology previously
proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical
determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We
suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological
thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can
be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted
mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological
ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where
freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological
entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not,
it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's
modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic
assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and
determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not,
in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this,
we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we
see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that
our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding
teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical
position regarding free will that is known in the
contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position
maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its
actions are internal, when the agent itself is the
deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that
freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also
that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict
between teleology and causal determinism.},
Doi = {10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
Key = {fds366835}
}
@article{fds368096,
Author = {Keenan, JP and McShea, DW},
Title = {Synergies Among Behaviors Drive the Discovery of Productive
Interactions},
Journal = {Biological Theory},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-62},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
Abstract = {When behaviors assemble into combinations, then synergies
have a central role in the discovery of productive patterns
of behavior. In our view—what we call the Synergy
Emergence Principle (SEP)—synergies are dynamic
attractors, drawing interactions toward greater returns as
they happen, in the moment. This Principle offers an
alternative to the two conventionally acknowledged routes to
discovery: directed problem solving, involving forethought
and planning; and the complete randomness of trial and
error. Natural selection has a role in the process, in
humans favoring the maintenance and improvement of certain
key underlying capabilities, such as prosocial helping and
episodic foresight, but selection is not required for
discovery by synergy (which occurs too rapidly for selection
anyway). Here we discuss the consequences of the SEP for
the evolution in humans of key synergies such as tool
usage and interactions that reward cooperation, show how
discovery by synergy and the selection of synergy-supporting
abilities formed a positive feedback loop, and show how
synergies can combine, forming clusters and packages that
are the core of institutions and cultures. Finally, clusters
and packages represent an intermediate level of organization
above the individual and below whole society, with
consequences for our understanding of the major transitions
in evolution.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
Key = {fds368096}
}
@article{fds369050,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Four reasons for scepticism about a human major transition
in social individuality.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {378},
Number = {1872},
Pages = {20210403},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
Abstract = {The 'major transitions in evolution' are mainly about the
rise of hierarchy, new individuals arising at ever higher
levels of nestedness, in particular the eukaryotic cell
arising from prokaryotes, multicellular individuals from
solitary protists and individuated societies from
multicellular individuals. Some lists include human
societies as a major transition, but based on a comparison
with the non-human transitions, there are reasons for
scepticism. (i) The foundation of the major transitions is
hierarchy, but the cross-cutting interactions in human
societies undermine hierarchical structure. (ii) Natural
selection operates in three modes-stability, growth and
reproductive success-and only the third produces the complex
adaptations seen in fully individuated higher levels. But
human societies probably evolve mainly in the stability and
growth modes. (iii) Highly individuated entities are marked
by division of labour and commitment to morphological
differentiation, but in humans differentiation is mostly
behavioural and mostly reversible. (iv) As higher-level
individuals arise, selection drains complexity, drains
parts, from lower-level individuals. But there is little
evidence of a drain in humans. In sum, a comparison with the
other transitions gives reasons to doubt that human social
individuation has proceeded very far, or if it has, to doubt
that it is a transition of the same sort. This article is
part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in
light of evolutionary transitions'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
Key = {fds369050}
}
@article{fds370659,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary Success: Standards of Value},
Pages = {17-39},
Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
Implications},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190096168},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
Key = {fds370659}
}
@article{fds370848,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary trends and goal directedness.},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {201},
Number = {5},
Pages = {178},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
Abstract = {The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal
directed, that teleological considerations play no part in
our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that,
to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field
theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered
goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is
consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more
particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory
argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level
fields that direct entities contained within them to behave
persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a
goal-directed trajectory following perturbations
(persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed
trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points
(plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a
chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with
guidance provided by the external "food field," the chemical
gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced
by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and
plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an
"ecological field." Trends directed by selection-generated
boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal
constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other
words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have
been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field
theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are
discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that
evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the
level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible
implications for our thinking about evolutionary
directionality in the history of life are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
Key = {fds370848}
}
@article{fds363030,
Author = {De Castro and C and McShea, DW},
Title = {Applying the Prigogine view of dissipative systems to the
major transitions in evolution},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {48},
Number = {4},
Pages = {711-728},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pab.2022.7},
Abstract = {Ilya Prigogine's trinomial concept is, he argued, applicable
to many complex dissipative systems, from physics to biology
and even to social systems. For Prigogine, this trinomial -
functions, structure, fluctuations - was intended to capture
the feedback-rich relations between upper and lower levels
in these systems. The main novelty of his vision was his
view of causation, in which the causal arrow runs downward
from dissipative structures to their components or
functions. Following this insight, some physicists and
biophysicists are beginning to apply terms formerly used
mainly in biology, such as evolution, adaptation, learning,
and life-like behavior, to physical and chemical
nonequilibrium systems. Here, instead, we apply Prigogine's
view to biology, in particular to evolution, and especially
the major transitions in evolution (MTE), arguing that at
least the hierarchical transitions - the transitions in
individuality - follow a trajectory anticipated by the
trinomial. In this trajectory, formerly free-living
organisms are transformed into functions within a larger
organic structure. The Prigogine view also predicts that,
consistent with available data, the increase in number of
hierarchical levels in organisms should accelerate over
time. Finally, it predicts that, on geological timescales,
ecosystems and Gaia in particular will tend to de-Darwinize
or machinify their component organisms.},
Doi = {10.1017/pab.2022.7},
Key = {fds363030}
}
@article{fds356869,
Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
Title = {An externalist teleology},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {199},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {8755-8780},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03181-w},
Abstract = {Teleology has a complicated history in the biological
sciences. Some have argued that Darwin’s theory has
allowed biology to purge itself of teleological
explanations. Others have been content to retain teleology
and to treat it as metaphorical, or have sought to replace
it with less problematic notions like teleonomy. And still
others have tried to naturalize it in a way that distances
it from the vitalism of the nineteenth century, focusing on
the role that function plays in teleological explanation. No
consensus has seemed possible in this debate. This paper
takes a different approach. It argues that teleology is a
perfectly acceptable scientific notion, but that the debate
took an unfortunate misstep some 2300 years ago, one that
has confused things ever since. The misstep comes in the
beginning of Aristotle’s Physics when a distinction is
made between two types of teleological explanation. One type
pertains to artifacts while the other pertains to entities
in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are guided by something
external to themselves, human intentions, while natural
entities are guided by an internal nature. We aim to show
that there is, in fact, only one type of legitimate
teleological explanation, what Aristotle would have
considered a variant of an artifact model, where entities
are guided by external fields. We begin with an analysis of
the differences between the two types of explanation. We
then examine some evidence in Aristotle’s biological works
suggesting that in his account of the natural-artifactual
distinction, he encountered difficulties in trying to
provide teleological accounts of spontaneous generation. And
we show that it is possible to resolve these difficulties
with a more robust version of an artifact model of
teleology, in other words, with an externalist teleology.
This is McShea’s model, in which goal-directed entities
are guided by a nested series a of upper-level fields. To
explain teleological behavior, this account invokes only
external physical forces rather than mysterious internal
natures. We then consider how field theory differs from
other efforts to naturalize teleology in biology. And
finally, we show how the account enables us to grapple with
certain difficult cases—genes and intentions—where, even
in biology today, the temptation to posit internal natures
remains strong.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03181-w},
Key = {fds356869}
}
@article{fds355920,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolution of Complexity},
Pages = {169-179},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Developmental Biology},
Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {9783319329772},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32979-6_123},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-32979-6_123},
Key = {fds355920}
}
@article{fds365439,
Author = {Lee, JG and McShea, D},
Title = {Operationalizing goal directedness: An empirical route to
advancing a philosophical discussion},
Journal = {Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0012.005},
Doi = {10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0012.005},
Key = {fds365439}
}
@book{fds353115,
Author = {Brandon, R and McShea, DW},
Title = {The Missing Two-Thirds of Evolutionary Theory},
Pages = {75 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9781108716680},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108591508},
Abstract = {<jats:p>In this Element, we extend our earlier treatment of
biology's first law. The law says that in any evolutionary
system in which there is variation and heredity, there is a
tendency for diversity and complexity to increase. The law
plays the same role in biology that Newton's first law plays
in physics, explaining what biological systems are expected
to do when no forces act, in other words, what happens when
nothing happens. Here we offer a deeper explanation of
certain features of the law, develop a quantitative version
of it, and explore its consequences for our understanding of
diversity and complexity.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108591508},
Key = {fds353115}
}
@article{fds366836,
Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
Title = {The Missing Two-Thirds of Evolutionary Theory},
Pages = {1-+},
Booktitle = {MISSING TWO-THIRDS OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY},
Year = {2020},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108591508},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108591508},
Key = {fds366836}
}
@article{fds343318,
Author = {McShea, DW and Wang, SC and Brandon, RN},
Title = {A quantitative formulation of biology's first
law.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {73},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1101-1115},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/evo.13735},
Abstract = {The zero-force evolutionary law (ZFEL) states that in
evolutionary systems, in the absence of forces or
constraints, diversity and complexity tend to increase. The
reason is that diversity and complexity are both variance
measures, and variances tend to increase spontaneously as
random events accumulate. Here, we use random-walk models to
quantify the ZFEL expectation, producing equations that give
the probabilities of diversity or complexity increasing as a
function of time, and that give the expected magnitude of
the increase. We produce two sets of equations, one for the
case in which variation occurs in discrete steps, the other
for the case in which variation is continuous. The equations
provide a way to decompose actual trajectories of diversity
or complexity into two components, the portion due to the
ZFEL and a remainder due to selection and constraint.
Application of the equations is demonstrated using real and
hypothetical data.},
Doi = {10.1111/evo.13735},
Key = {fds343318}
}
@article{fds327277,
Author = {Heim, NA and Payne, JL and Finnegan, S and Knope, ML and Kowalewski, M and Lyons, SK and McShea, DW and Novack-Gottshall, PM and Smith, FA and Wang, SC},
Title = {Hierarchical complexity and the size limits of
life.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {284},
Number = {1857},
Pages = {20171039},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1039},
Abstract = {Over the past 3.8 billion years, the maximum size of life
has increased by approximately 18 orders of magnitude. Much
of this increase is associated with two major evolutionary
innovations: the evolution of eukaryotes from prokaryotic
cells approximately 1.9 billion years ago (Ga), and
multicellular life diversifying from unicellular ancestors
approximately 0.6 Ga. However, the quantitative relationship
between organismal size and structural complexity remains
poorly documented. We assessed this relationship using a
comprehensive dataset that includes organismal size and
level of biological complexity for 11 172 extant genera. We
find that the distributions of sizes within complexity
levels are unimodal, whereas the aggregate distribution is
multimodal. Moreover, both the mean size and the range of
size occupied increases with each additional level of
complexity. Increases in size range are non-symmetric: the
maximum organismal size increases more than the minimum. The
majority of the observed increase in organismal size over
the history of life on the Earth is accounted for by two
discrete jumps in complexity rather than evolutionary trends
within levels of complexity. Our results provide
quantitative support for an evolutionary expansion away from
a minimal size constraint and suggest a fundamental
rescaling of the constraints on minimal and maximal size as
biological complexity increases.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.1039},
Key = {fds327277}
}
@article{fds326590,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Logic, passion and the problem of convergence.},
Journal = {Interface focus},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {20160122},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0122},
Abstract = {Our estimate of the likelihood of convergence on human-style
intelligence depends on how we understand our various mental
capacities. Here I revive David Hume's theory of motivation
and action to argue that the most common understanding of
the two conventionally recognized components of
intelligence-reason and emotion-is confused. We say things
like, 'Reason can overcome emotion', but to make this
statement meaningful, we are forced to treat reason as a
compound notion, as a forced and unhappy mixture of concepts
that are incommensurate. An alternative is to parse
intelligence in a different way, into two sets of
capacities: (i) non-affective capacities, including logic,
calculation and problem-solving; (ii) affective capacities,
including wants, preferences and cares, along with the
emotions. Thus, the question of convergence becomes two
questions, one having to do with affective and one with
non-affective capacities. What is the likelihood of
convergence of these in non-human lineages, in other
ecologies, on other worlds? Given certain assumptions,
convergence of the non-affective capacities in thinking
species seems likely, I argue, while convergence of the
affective capacities seems much less likely.},
Doi = {10.1098/rsfs.2016.0122},
Key = {fds326590}
}
@article{fds355921,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolution of Complexity},
Pages = {1-11},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Developmental Biology},
Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {9783319330389},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33038-9_123-1},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-33038-9_123-1},
Key = {fds355921}
}
@article{fds229048,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Three Trends in the History of Life: An Evolutionary
Syndrome},
Journal = {Evolutionary Biology},
Volume = {43},
Number = {4},
Pages = {531-542},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0071-3260},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11692-015-9323-x},
Abstract = {The history of life seems to be characterized by three
large-scale trends in complexity: (1) the rise in complexity
in the sense of hierarchy, in other words, an increase in
the number of levels of organization within organisms; (2)
the increase in complexity in the sense of differentiation,
that is, a rise in the number of different part types at the
level just below the whole; and (3) a downward trend, the
loss of differentiation at the lowest levels in organisms, a
kind of complexity drain within the parts. Here, I describe
the three trends, outlining the evidence for each and
arguing that they are connected with each other, that
together they constitute an evolutionary syndrome, one that
has recurred a number times over the history of life.
Finally, in the last section, I offer an argument connecting
the third trend to the reduction at lower levels of
organization in “autonomy”, or from a different
perspective, to an increase in what might be called the
“machinification” of the lower levels.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11692-015-9323-x},
Key = {fds229048}
}
@article{fds322303,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Freedom and purpose in biology.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and
biomedical sciences},
Volume = {58},
Pages = {64-72},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.12.002},
Abstract = {All seemingly teleological systems share a common
hierarchical structure. They consist of a small entity
moving or changing within a larger field that directs it
from above (what I call "upper direction"). This is true for
organisms seeking some external resource, for the organized
behavior of cells and other parts in organismal development,
and for lineages evolving by natural selection. In all
cases, the lower-level entity is partly "free," tending to
wander under the influence of purely local forces, and
partly directed by a larger enveloping field. The persistent
and plastic behavior that characterizes goal-directedness
arises, I argue, at intermediate levels of freedom and upper
direction, when the two are in a delicate balance. I
tentatively extend the argument to human teleology (wants,
purposes).},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.12.002},
Key = {fds322303}
}
@article{fds322304,
Author = {Smith, FA and Payne, JL and Heim, NA and Balk, MA and Finnegan, S and Kowalewski, M and Lyons, SK and McClain, CR and McShea, DW and Novack-Gottshall, PM and Anich, PS and Wang, SC},
Title = {Body Size Evolution Across the Geozoic},
Journal = {Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1},
Pages = {523-553},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2016},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-earth-060115-012147},
Abstract = {The Geozoic encompasses the 3.6 Ga interval in Earth history
when life has existed. Over this time, life has diversified
from exclusively tiny, single-celled organisms to include
large, complex multicellular forms. Just how and why this
diversification occurred has been a major area of interest
for paleontologists and evolutionary biologists for
centuries. Here, we compile data on organism size throughout
the Geozoic fossil record for the three domains of life. We
describe canonical trends in the evolution of body size,
synthesize current understanding of the patterns and causal
mechanisms at various hierarchical scales, and discuss the
biological and geological consequences of variation in
organismal size.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-earth-060115-012147},
Key = {fds322304}
}
@article{fds327781,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Bernd Rosslenbroich: On the origin of autonomy: a new look
at the major transitions in evolution},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {30},
Number = {3},
Pages = {439-446},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-015-9474-2},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-015-9474-2},
Key = {fds327781}
}
@article{fds229051,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Unnecessary Complexity Complexity and the Arrow of Time
Charles H. Lineweaver, Paul C. W. Davies, and Michael
Ruse, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2013. 369 pp. $30, £21.99. ISBN 9781107027251.},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {342},
Number = {6164},
Pages = {1319-1320},
Publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000328196000028&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The contributors examine the nature of complexity
and its changes over time as well as their
causes.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1245386},
Key = {fds229051}
}
@article{fds229055,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Machine wanting.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and
biomedical sciences},
Volume = {44},
Number = {4 Pt B},
Pages = {679-687},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1369-8486},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23792091},
Abstract = {Wants, preferences, and cares are physical things or events,
not ideas or propositions, and therefore no chain of pure
logic can conclude with a want, preference, or care. It
follows that no pure-logic machine will ever want, prefer,
or care. And its behavior will never be driven in the way
that deliberate human behavior is driven, in other words, it
will not be motivated or goal directed. Therefore, if we
want to simulate human-style interactions with the world, we
will need to first understand the physical structure of
goal-directed systems. I argue that all such systems share a
common nested structure, consisting of a smaller entity that
moves within and is driven by a larger field that contains
it. In such systems, the smaller contained entity is
directed by the field, but also moves to some degree
independently of it, allowing the entity to deviate and
return, to show the plasticity and persistence that is
characteristic of goal direction. If all this is right, then
human want-driven behavior probably involves a
behavior-generating mechanism that is contained within a
neural field of some kind. In principle, for goal
directedness generally, the containment can be virtual,
raising the possibility that want-driven behavior could be
simulated in standard computational systems. But there are
also reasons to believe that goal-direction works better
when containment is also physical, suggesting that a new
kind of hardware may be necessary.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.05.015},
Key = {fds229055}
}
@misc{fds219847,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {Freedom and purpose in biology},
Booktitle = {Contingency and Order in History and the Sciences (working
title)},
Editor = {Peter Harrison},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219847}
}
@article{fds353116,
Author = {McShea, DW and Hordijk, W},
Title = {Complexity by Subtraction},
Journal = {Evolutionary Biology},
Pages = {1-17},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds353116}
}
@article{fds229073,
Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {737-744},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
in writing this book was to present a radically different
way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
Key = {fds229073}
}
@article{fds229074,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Upper-directed systems: A new approach to teleology in
biology},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {663-684},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9326-2},
Abstract = {How shall we understand apparently teleological systems?
What explains their persistence (returning to past
trajectories following errors) and their plasticity (finding
the same trajectory from different starting points)? Here I
argue that all seemingly goal-directed systems-e. g., a
food-seeking organism, human-made devices like thermostats
and torpedoes, biological development, human goal seeking,
and the evolutionary process itself-share a common
organization. Specifically, they consist of an entity that
moves within a larger containing structure, one that directs
its behavior in a general way without precisely determining
it. If so, then teleology lies within the domain of the
theory of compositional hierarchies. © 2012 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9326-2},
Key = {fds229074}
}
@article{fds229072,
Author = {Fleming, L and McShea, DW},
Title = {Drosophila mutants suggest a strong drive toward complexity
in evolution},
Journal = {Evolution and Development},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {53-62},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23331917},
Abstract = {The view that complexity increases in evolution is
uncontroversial, yet little is known about the possible
causes of such a trend. One hypothesis, the Zero Force
Evolutionary Law (ZFEL), predicts a strong drive toward
complexity, although such a tendency can be overwhelmed by
selection and constraints. In the absence of strong
opposition, heritable variation accumulates and complexity
increases. In order to investigate this claim, we evaluate
the gross morphological complexity of laboratory mutants in
Drosophila melanogaster, which represent organisms that
arise in a context where selective forces are greatly
reduced. Complexity was measured with respect to part types,
shape, and color over two independent focal levels. Compared
to the wild type, we find that D. melanogaster mutants are
significantly more complex. When the parts of mutants are
categorized by degree of constraint, we find that weakly
constrained parts are significantly more complex than more
constrained parts. These results support the ZFEL
hypothesis. They also represent a first step in establishing
the domain of application of the ZFEL and show one way in
which a larger empirical investigation of the principle
might proceed.},
Doi = {10.1111/ede.12014},
Key = {fds229072}
}
@article{fds229071,
Author = {Kowalewski, M and Payne, JL and Smith, FA and Wang, SC and McShea, DW and Xiao, S and Novack-Gottshall, PM and McClain, CR and Krause, RA and Boyer, AG and Finnegan, S and Lyons, SK and Stempien, JA and Alroy, J and Spaeth, PA},
Title = {The geozoic supereon},
Journal = {Palaios},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5},
Pages = {251-255},
Publisher = {Society for Sedimentary Geology},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0883-1351},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2110/palo.2011.S03},
Doi = {10.2110/palo.2011.S03},
Key = {fds229071}
}
@article{fds229070,
Author = {Liow, LH and Simpson, C and Bouchard, F and Damuth, J and Hallgrimsson,
B and Hunt, G and McShea, DW and Powell, JR and Stenseth, NC and Stoller,
MK and Wagner, G},
Title = {Pioneering paradigms and magnificent manifestos--Leigh Van
Valen's priceless contributions to evolutionary
biology.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {65},
Number = {4},
Pages = {917-922},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21463292},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01242.x},
Key = {fds229070}
}
@article{fds229069,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Untangling the morass},
Journal = {American Scientist},
Volume = {99},
Number = {2},
Pages = {154-156},
Publisher = {Sigma Xi},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0003-0996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1511/2011.89.154},
Abstract = {Daniel W. McShea reviews the book 'The mirage of a space
between nature and nurture,' by Evelyn Fox Keller. Keller
argues that much of the trouble has to do with linguistic
practice, with slippages in usage and concepts. In her apt
words, the nature- nurture debate is a 'morass of linguistic
and conceptual vegetation grown together in ways that seem
to defy untangling.' The address on an envelope makes a huge
difference in where the letter goes but has little to do
with generating the process that actually gets it there. A
mutant allele associated with a speech and language disorder
still gets labeled a speech and language gene. Most
behavioral geneticists would agree that a mistake has been
made when explicit claims about the genetic basis of
individual traits are inferred from measures of technical
heritability.},
Doi = {10.1511/2011.89.154},
Key = {fds229069}
}
@article{fds229075,
Author = {Payne, JL and McClain, CR and Boyer, AG and Brown, JH and Finnegan, S and Kowalewski, M and Krause, RA and Lyons, SK and McShea, DW and Novack-Gottshall, PM and Smith, FA and Spaeth, P and Stempien, JA and Wang, SC},
Title = {The evolutionary consequences of oxygenic photosynthesis: a
body size perspective.},
Journal = {Photosynthesis research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-57},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20821265},
Abstract = {The high concentration of molecular oxygen in Earth's
atmosphere is arguably the most conspicuous and geologically
important signature of life. Earth's early atmosphere lacked
oxygen; accumulation began after the evolution of oxygenic
photosynthesis in cyanobacteria around 3.0-2.5 billion
years ago (Gya). Concentrations of oxygen have since varied,
first reaching near-modern values ~600 million years ago
(Mya). These fluctuations have been hypothesized to
constrain many biological patterns, among them the evolution
of body size. Here, we review the state of knowledge
relating oxygen availability to body size. Laboratory
studies increasingly illuminate the mechanisms by which
organisms can adapt physiologically to the variation in
oxygen availability, but the extent to which these findings
can be extrapolated to evolutionary timescales remains
poorly understood. Experiments confirm that animal size is
limited by experimental hypoxia, but show that plant
vegetative growth is enhanced due to reduced
photorespiration at lower O(2):CO(2). Field studies of size
distributions across extant higher taxa and individual
species in the modern provide qualitative support for a
correlation between animal and protist size and oxygen
availability, but few allow prediction of maximum or mean
size from oxygen concentrations in unstudied regions. There
is qualitative support for a link between oxygen
availability and body size from the fossil record of
protists and animals, but there have been few quantitative
analyses confirming or refuting this impression. As oxygen
transport limits the thickness or volume-to-surface area
ratio-rather than mass or volume-predictions of maximum
possible size cannot be constructed simply from metabolic
rate and oxygen availability. Thus, it remains difficult to
confirm that the largest representatives of fossil or living
taxa are limited by oxygen transport rather than other
factors. Despite the challenges of integrating findings from
experiments on model organisms, comparative observations
across living species, and fossil specimens spanning
millions to billions of years, numerous tractable avenues of
research could greatly improve quantitative constraints on
the role of oxygen in the macroevolutionary history of
organismal size.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11120-010-9593-1},
Key = {fds229075}
}
@article{fds197562,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {(Review of The Tangled Web, by Carl Zimmer)},
Journal = {Quarterly Review of Biology},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {47},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197562}
}
@article{fds229045,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary progress},
Pages = {550-557},
Booktitle = {Evolution: The First Four Billion Years},
Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
Editor = {Ruse, M and Travis, J},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds229045}
}
@article{fds229046,
Author = {McShea, DW and Simpson, CG},
Title = {The miscellaneous transitions in evolution},
Pages = {19-34},
Booktitle = {The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Calcott, B and Sterelny, K},
Year = {2011},
ISBN = {9780262294539},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262015240.003.0002},
Doi = {10.7551/mitpress/9780262015240.003.0002},
Key = {fds229046}
}
@book{fds229047,
Author = {McShea, DW and Brandon, RN},
Title = {Biology's First Law The Tendency for Diversity and
Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems},
Pages = {184 pages},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9780226562278},
Abstract = {Intended for evolutionary biologists, paleontologists, and
other scientists studying complex systems, and written in a
concise and engaging format that speaks to students and
interdisciplinary practitioners alike, this book will also
find ...},
Key = {fds229047}
}
@book{fds139001,
Author = {D.W. McShea and Robert Brandon},
Title = {Biology's First Law},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds139001}
}
@article{fds229076,
Author = {Payne, JL and Boyer, AG and Brown, JH and Finnegan, S and Kowalewski, M and Krause, RA and Lyons, SK and McClain, CR and McShea, DW and Novack-Gottshall, PM and Smith, FA and Stempien, JA and Wang,
SC},
Title = {Two-phase increase in the maximum size of life over 3.5
billion years reflects biological innovation and
environmental opportunity.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {106},
Number = {1},
Pages = {24-27},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19106296},
Abstract = {The maximum size of organisms has increased enormously since
the initial appearance of life >3.5 billion years ago (Gya),
but the pattern and timing of this size increase is poorly
known. Consequently, controls underlying the size spectrum
of the global biota have been difficult to evaluate. Our
period-level compilation of the largest known fossil
organisms demonstrates that maximum size increased by 16
orders of magnitude since life first appeared in the fossil
record. The great majority of the increase is accounted for
by 2 discrete steps of approximately equal magnitude: the
first in the middle of the Paleoproterozoic Era
(approximately 1.9 Gya) and the second during the late
Neoproterozoic and early Paleozoic eras (0.6-0.45 Gya). Each
size step required a major innovation in organismal
complexity--first the eukaryotic cell and later eukaryotic
multicellularity. These size steps coincide with, or
slightly postdate, increases in the concentration of
atmospheric oxygen, suggesting latent evolutionary potential
was realized soon after environmental limitations were
removed.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0806314106},
Key = {fds229076}
}
@misc{fds219848,
Author = {Finnegan, Seth and Steve C. Wang and John Alroy and Alison G. Boyer and Matthew E. Clapham and Zoe V. Finkel and Matthew A. Kosnik and Michał Kowalewski and Richard A. Krause, Jr. and S. Kathleen
Lyons and Craig R. McClain and Daniel W. McShea and Philip M.
Novack- Gottshall and Rowan Lockwood and Jonathan L. Payne and Felisa
A. Smith and Paula A. Spaeth and Jennifer A.
Stempien},
Title = {No consistent relationship between body size and extinction
risk in the marine fossil record},
Journal = {GSA Abstracts},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds219848}
}
@article{fds366837,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Biology, human behavior, social science, and moral
philosophy},
Pages = {187-225},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366837}
}
@article{fds366838,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Complexity, directionality, and progress in
evolution},
Pages = {127-156},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366838}
}
@article{fds366839,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Genes, groups, teleosemantics, and the major
transitions},
Pages = {157-186},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366839}
}
@article{fds366840,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Reductionism about biology},
Pages = {96-126},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366840}
}
@article{fds366841,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Further problems of Darwinism Constraint, drift,
function},
Pages = {65-95},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366841}
}
@article{fds366842,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Biological laws and theories},
Pages = {32-64},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366842}
}
@article{fds366843,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Darwin makes a science},
Pages = {12-31},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366843}
}
@article{fds366844,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {What is the philosophy of biology? Introduction},
Pages = {1-+},
Booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds366844}
}
@article{fds322305,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary Trends},
Pages = {206-211},
Booktitle = {Palaeobiology II},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780632051496},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470999295ch.44},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470999295ch.44},
Key = {fds322305}
}
@article{fds229077,
Author = {Marcot, JD and McShea, DW},
Title = {Increasing hierarchical complexity throughout the history of
life: Phylogenetic tests of trend mechanisms},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {182-200},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0094-8373},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/06028.1},
Abstract = {The history of life is punctuated by a number of major
transitions in hierarchy, defined here as the degree of
nestedness of lower-level individuals within higher-level
ones: the combination of single-celled prokaryotic cells to
form the first eukaryotic cell, the aggregation of single
eukaryotic cells to form complex multicellular organisms,
and finally, the association of multicellular organisms to
form complex colonial individuals. These transitions
together constitute one of the most salient and certain
trends in the history of life, in particular, a trend in
maximum hierarchical structure, which can be understood as a
trend in complexity. This trend could be produced by a
biased mechanism, in which increases in hierarchy are more
likely than decreases, or by an unbiased one, in which
increases and decreases are about equally likely. At stake
is whether or not natural selection or some other force acts
powerfully over the history of life to drive complexity
upward. Too few major transitions are known to permit
rigorous statistical discrimination of trend mechanisms
based on these transitions alone. However, the mechanism can
be investigated by using "minor transitions" in hierarchy,
or, in other words, changes in the degree of individuation
of the upper level. This study tests the null hypothesis
that the probability (or rate) of increase and decrease in
individuation are equal in a phylogenetic context. We found
published phylogenetic trees for clades spanning minor
transitions across the tree of life and identified changes
in character states associated with those minor transitions.
We then used both parsimony- and maximum-likelihood-based
methods to test for asymmetrical rates of character
evolution. Most analyses failed to reject equal rates of
hierarchical increase and decrease. In fact, a bias toward
decreasing complexity was observed for several clades. These
results suggest that no strong tendency exists for
hierarchical complexity to increase. © 2007 The
Paleontological Society. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1666/06028.1},
Key = {fds229077}
}
@book{fds229049,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduction},
Pages = {1-241},
Publisher = {Routledge.},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415315920},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203926994},
Abstract = {Is life a purely physical process? What is human nature?
Which of our traits is essential to us? In this volume,
Daniel McShea and Alex Rosenberg - a biologist and a
philosopher, respectively - join forces to create a new
gateway to the philosophy of biology; making the major
issues accessible and relevant to biologists and
philosophers alike. Exploring concepts such as
supervenience; the controversies about genocentrism and
genetic determinism; and the debate about major transitions
central to contemporary thinking about macroevolution; the
authors lay out the broad terms in which we should assess
the impact of biology on human capacities, social
institutions and ethical values.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203926994},
Key = {fds229049}
}
@article{fds229054,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {A universal generative tendency toward increased organismal
complexity},
Pages = {435-453},
Booktitle = {Variation: A Central Concept in Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {B. Hallgrimsson and B. Hall},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012088777-4/50020-X},
Abstract = {Characterizing internal variance as complexity needs
justification, because in colloquial usage, complexity
connotes so much more. A complex organism is ordinarily
understood to be not just more internally varied, or more
differentiated, but more capable as well. The human brain is
thought to be complex not simply because it has many cell
types, but because of its impressive functional
capabilities, because of what it can do. Thus, as
conventionally understood, complexity depends on both
structure and function. However, in biology, a narrower view
has been adopted, herein complexity refers to number of part
types, or degree of differentiation among parts. Complexity
has other aspects besides number of part types. For example,
there is complexity of spatial arrangement of parts, a kind
of second-order complexity (where number of part types is
first order), and number of types of connections among
parts. The chapter introduces three simple models to
illustrate the internal-variance principle and also to
reveal its robustness. In each successive model, the
variations introduced are more finely tuned in such a way as
to negate or overcome the internal-variance principle. ©
2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-012088777-4/50020-X},
Key = {fds229054}
}
@article{fds229078,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {The evolution of complexity without natural selection, a
possible large-scale trend of the fourth
kind},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2 SUPPL.},
Pages = {146-156},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/0094-8373(2005)031[0146:TEOCWN]2.0.CO;2},
Abstract = {A simple principle predicts a tendency, or vector, toward
increasing organismal complexity in the history of life: As
the parts of an organism accumulate variations in evolution,
they should tend to become more different from each other.
In other words, the variance among the parts, or what I call
the "internal variance" of the organism, will tend to
increase spontaneously. Internal variance is complexity, I
argue, albeit complexity in a purely structural sense,
divorced from any notion of function. If the principle is
correct, this tendency should exist in all lineages, and the
resulting trend (if there is one) will be driven, or more
precisely, driven by constraint (as opposed to selection).
The existence of a trend is uncertain, because the
internal-variance principle predicts only that the range of
options offered up to selection will be increasingly
complex, on average. And it is unclear whether selection
will enhance this vector, act neutrally, or oppose it,
perhaps negating it. The vector might also be negated if
variations producing certain kinds of developmental
truncations are especially common in evolution.
Constraint-driven trends - or what I ca ll large-scale
trends of the fourth kind - have been in bad odor in
evolutionary studies since the Modern Synthesis. Indeed, one
such trend, orthogenesis, is famous for having been
discredited. In Stephen Jay Gould's last book, The Structure
of Evolutionary Thought, he tried to rehabilitate this
category (although not orthogenesis), showing how
constraint-driven trends could be produced by processes well
within the mainstream of contemporary evolutionary theory.
The internal-variance principle contributes to Gould's
project by adding another candidate trend to this category.
© 2005 The Paleontological Society. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1666/0094-8373(2005)031[0146:TEOCWN]2.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229078}
}
@article{fds43079,
Author = {D.W. McShea and C. Anderson},
Title = {The remodularization of the organism},
Pages = {185-206},
Booktitle = {Modularity: Understanding the Development and Evolution of
Natural Complex Systems},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Editor = {W. Callebaut and D. Rasskin-Gutman},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds43079}
}
@article{fds229081,
Author = {Marino, L and McShea, DW and Uhen, MD},
Title = {Origin and evolution of large brains in toothed
whales.},
Journal = {The anatomical record. Part A, Discoveries in molecular,
cellular, and evolutionary biology},
Volume = {281},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1247-1255},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1552-4884},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15497142},
Abstract = {Toothed whales (order Cetacea: suborder Odontoceti) are
highly encephalized, possessing brains that are
significantly larger than expected for their body sizes. In
particular, the odontocete superfamily Delphinoidea
(dolphins, porpoises, belugas, and narwhals) comprises
numerous species with encephalization levels second only to
modern humans and greater than all other mammals.
Odontocetes have also demonstrated behavioral faculties
previously only ascribed to humans and, to some extent,
other great apes. How did the large brains of odontocetes
evolve? To begin to investigate this question, we quantified
and averaged estimates of brain and body size for 36 fossil
cetacean species using computed tomography and analyzed
these data along with those for modern odontocetes. We
provide the first description and statistical tests of the
pattern of change in brain size relative to body size in
cetaceans over 47 million years. We show that brain size
increased significantly in two critical phases in the
evolution of odontocetes. The first increase occurred with
the origin of odontocetes from the ancestral group
Archaeoceti near the Eocene-Oligocene boundary and was
accompanied by a decrease in body size. The second occurred
in the origin of Delphinoidea only by 15 million years
ago.},
Doi = {10.1002/ar.a.20128},
Key = {fds229081}
}
@article{fds229068,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {A revised Darwinism},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {45-53},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013260.40162.dd},
Doi = {10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013260.40162.dd},
Key = {fds229068}
}
@article{fds28541,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {(Abstract) The evolution of complexity without
natural selection},
Journal = {Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of America, vol.
36},
Pages = {A-18},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds28541}
}
@article{fds28542,
Author = {Marcot, J.D. and D.W. McShea},
Title = {(Abstract) Phylogenetic tests of directional bias in
hierarchical evolution},
Journal = {Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of America, vol.
36},
Pages = {A-18},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds28542}
}
@article{fds16144,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {Adaptive glory},
Journal = {American Scientist},
Volume = {91},
Pages = {567-569},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds16144}
}
@article{fds229093,
Author = {McShea, DW and Changizi, MA},
Title = {Three puzzles in hierarchical evolution.},
Journal = {Integrative and comparative biology},
Volume = {43},
Number = {1},
Pages = {74-81},
Year = {2003},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {1540-7063},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21680411},
Abstract = {The maximum degree of hierarchical structure of organisms
has risen over the history of life, notably in three
transitions: the origin of the eukaryotic cell from
symbiotic associations of prokaryotes; the emergence of the
first multicellular individuals from clones of eukaryotic
cells; and the origin of the first individuated colonies
from associations of multicellular organisms. The trend is
obvious in the fossil record, but documenting it using a
high-resolution hierarchy scale reveals three puzzles: 1)
the rate of origin of new levels accelerates, at least until
the early Phanerozoic; 2) after that, the trend may slow or
even stop; and 3) levels may sometimes arise out of order.
The three puzzles and their implications are discussed; a
possible explanation is offered for the first.},
Doi = {10.1093/icb/43.1.74},
Key = {fds229093}
}
@article{fds229079,
Author = {Novack Gottshall and PM and McShea, DW},
Title = {(Abstract) Quantifying ecological disparity: comparative
paleoecology of Ordovician and Recent marine
assemblages},
Journal = {Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of
America},
Volume = {35},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds229079}
}
@article{fds229080,
Author = {Marino, L and Uhen, MD and McShea, D},
Title = {(Abstract) Encephalization trends in cetacean evolution: New
data and new analyses},
Journal = {Brain, Behavior, and Evolution},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds229080}
}
@article{fds229088,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {A complexity drain on cells in the evolution of
multicellularity.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {56},
Number = {3},
Pages = {441-452},
Year = {2002},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0014-3820},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11989676},
Abstract = {A hypothesis has been advanced recently predicting that, in
evolution, as higher-level entities arise from associations
of lower-level organisms, and as these entities acquire the
ability to feed, reproduce, defend themselves, and so on,
the lower-level organisms will tend to lose much of their
internal complexity (McShea 2001a). In other words, in
hierarchical transitions, there is a drain on numbers of
part types at the lower level. One possible rationale is
that the transfer of functional demands to the higher level
renders many part types at the lower level useless, and thus
their loss in evolution is favored by selection for economy.
Here, a test is conducted at the cell level, comparing
numbers of part types in free-living eukaryotic cells
(protists) and the cells of metazoans and land plants.
Differences are significant and consistent with the
hypothesis, suggesting that tests at other hierarchical
levels may be worthwhile.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.0014-3820.2002.tb01357.x},
Key = {fds229088}
}
@article{fds229087,
Author = {McShea, DW and Venit, EP},
Title = {Testing for bias in the evolution of coloniality: A
demonstration in cyclostome bryozoans},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {308-327},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {Summer},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/0094-8373(2002)028<0308:TFBITE>2.0.CO;2},
Abstract = {Colonial organisms vary in the degree to which they are
individuated at the colony level, i.e., in the degree to
which the colony constitutes a unified whole, as opposed to
a group of independent lower-level entities. Various
arguments have been offered suggesting that evolutionary
change along this continuum may be biased, that increases
may be more probable than decreases. However,
counterarguments can be devised, and the existing evidence
is meager and inconclusive. In this paper, we demonstrate
how the question can be addressed empirically by conducting
a test for bias in a group of stenolaemate bryozoans, the
cyclostomes. More specifically, we suggest three criteria
for colony individuation: degree of connectedness among
lower-level entities (in this case, zooids), degree of
differentiation among lower-level entities, and number of
intermediate-level parts. And we show these criteria can be
used together with a phylogeny and ancestral-state
reconstruction methods to test for bias. In this case,
results do not unambiguously support any single
interpretation but are somewhat supportive of a null
hypothesis of no bias in favor of increase. As part of the
demonstration, we also show how results can be transformed
into a quantitative estimate of an upper limit on bias.
Finally, we place the question of bias in a larger context,
arguing that the same criteria and methods we employ here
can be used to test for bias in other colonial taxa, and
also at other hierarchical levels, for example, in the
transitions from free-living eukaryotic cells to
multicellular organisms. © 2002 Paleontological
Society.},
Doi = {10.1666/0094-8373(2002)028<0308:TFBITE>2.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229087}
}
@article{fds229057,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Three provocative patterns in hierarchical
evolution.},
Journal = {AMERICAN ZOOLOGIST},
Volume = {41},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1522-1522},
Publisher = {SOC INTEGRATIVE COMPARATIVE BIOLOGY},
Year = {2001},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0003-1569},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174306500495&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds229057}
}
@article{fds229091,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {The minor transitions in hierarchical evolution and the
question of a directional bias},
Journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Biology},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {502-518},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2001},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1010-061X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1420-9101.2001.00283.x},
Abstract = {The history of life shows a clear trend in hierarchical
organization, revealed by the successive emergence of
organisms with ever greater numbers of levels of nestedness
and greater development, or 'individuation', of the highest
level. Various arguments have been offered which suggest
that the trend is the result of a directional bias, or
tendency, meaning that hierarchical increases are more
probable than decreases among lineages, perhaps because
hierarchical increases are favoured, on average, by natural
selection. Further, what little evidence exists seems to
point to a bias: some major increases are known-including
the origin of the eukaryotic cell from prokaryotic cells and
of animals, fungi and land plants from solitary eukaryotic
cells - but no major decreases (except in parasitic and
commensal organisms), at least at the cellular and
multicellular levels. The fact of a trend, combined with the
arguments and evidence, might make a bias seem beyond doubt,
but here I argue that its existence is an open empirical
question. Further, I show how testing is
possible.},
Doi = {10.1046/j.1420-9101.2001.00283.x},
Key = {fds229091}
}
@article{fds229084,
Author = {Anderson, C and McShea, DW},
Title = {Individual versus social complexity, with particular
reference to ant colonies.},
Journal = {Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical
Society},
Volume = {76},
Number = {2},
Pages = {211-237},
Year = {2001},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1464-7931},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11396847},
Abstract = {Insect societies colonies of ants, bees, wasps and
termites--vary enormously in their social complexity. Social
complexity is a broadly used term that encompasses many
individual and colony-level traits and characteristics such
as colony size, polymorphism and foraging strategy. A number
of earlier studies have considered the relationships among
various correlates of social complexity in insect societies;
in this review, we build upon those studies by proposing
additional correlates and show how all correlates can be
integrated in a common explanatory framework. The various
correlates are divided among four broad categories
(sections). Under 'polyphenism' we consider the differences
among individuals, in particular focusing upon 'caste' and
specialization of individuals. This is followed by a section
on 'totipotency' in which we consider the autonomy and
subjugation of individuals. Under this heading we consider
various aspects such as intracolony conflict, worker
reproductive potential and physiological or morphological
restrictions which limit individuals' capacities to perform
a range of tasks or functions. A section entitled
'organization of work' considers a variety of aspects, e.g.
the ability to tackle group, team or partitioned tasks,
foraging strategies and colony reliability and efficiency. A
final section, 'communication and functional integration',
considers how individual activity is coordinated to produce
an integrated and adaptive colony. Within each section we
use illustrative examples drawn from the social insect
literature (mostly from ants, for which there is the best
data) to illustrate concepts or trends and make a number of
predictions concerning how a particular trait is expected to
correlate with other aspects of social complexity. Within
each section we also expand the scope of the arguments to
consider these relationships in a much broader sense
of'sociality' by drawing parallels with other 'social'
entities such as multicellular individuals, which can be
understood as 'societies' of cells. The aim is to draw out
any parallels and common causal relationships among the
correlates. Two themes run through the study. The first is
the role of colony size as an important factor affecting
social complexity. The second is the complexity of
individual workers in relation to the complexity of the
colony. Consequently, this is an ideal opportunity to test a
previously proposed hypothesis that 'individuals of highly
social ant species are less complex than individuals from
simple ant species' in light of numerous social correlates.
Our findings support this hypothesis. In summary, we
conclude that, in general, complex societies are
characterized by large colony size, worker polymorphism,
strong behavioural specialization and loss of totipotency in
its workers, low individual complexity, decentralized colony
control and high system redundancy, low individual
competence, a high degree of worker cooperation wher
tackling tasks, group foraging strategies, high tempo,
multi-chambered tailor-made nests, high functional
integration, relatively greater use of cues and modulatory
signals to coordinate individuals and heterogeneous patterns
of worker-worker interaction.},
Doi = {10.1017/s1464793101005656},
Key = {fds229084}
}
@article{fds372477,
Author = {Mcshea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary Trends},
Series = {pp. 206-210},
Pages = {206-211},
Booktitle = {Palaeobiology II},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Editor = {DEG Briggs and PR Crowther},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780632051496},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470999295.ch44},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470999295.ch44},
Key = {fds372477}
}
@article{fds229085,
Author = {Anderson, C and Franks, NR and McShea, DW},
Title = {The complexity and hierarchical structure of tasks in insect
societies},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {62},
Number = {4},
Pages = {643-651},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0003-3472},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2001.1795},
Abstract = {To understand the functioning and organizational complexity
of insect societies, a combination of different approaches
is needed. One such approach, which we adopt in this study,
is to consider tasks in insect societies not based upon
their function, as is traditional, but upon their structure.
Four types of task in insect societies have been proposed:
individual, group, team and partitioned tasks. We examine
the relationships among these four task types and consider
'task complexity' to mean the degree of cooperation and
coordination required to complete a particular task
successfully. In this respect, individual tasks are
considered the simplest (low complexity), group tasks are
more complex (medium), and team and partitioned tasks the
most complex (high). We decompose tasks into their component
subtasks to understand how the demands of a task influence
how workers must work together to complete it successfully.
We describe a simple method to measure the complexity of
tasks using task deconstruction. Points are assigned to each
subtask within the task and summed to give a total score.
This measure, the task's score, allows objective comparison
of tasks (different tasks may be ranked in order of their
complexity) within and between species, or even higher taxa,
and we hope it will be of practical use to researchers. We
propose that both team and partitioned tasks may contain
individual, group, team and partitioned subtasks. We examine
each of the possible task-subtask relationships and provide
examples from known social insect behaviour. © 2001 The
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2001.1795},
Key = {fds229085}
}
@article{fds229089,
Author = {Ciampaglio, CN and Kemp, M and McShea, DW},
Title = {Detecting changes in morphospace occupation patterns in the
fossil record: Characterization and analysis of measures of
disparity},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {695-715},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/0094-8373(2001)027<0695:DCIMOP>2.0.CO;2},
Abstract = {Recently, there has been much interest in detecting and
measuring patterns of change in disparity. Although most
studies have used one or two measures of disparity to
quantify and characterize the occupation of morphospace,
multiple measures may be necessary to fully detect changes
in patterns of morphospace occupation. Also, the ability to
detect morphological trends and occupation patterns within
morphospace depends on using the appropriate measure(s) of
disparity. In this study, seven measures were used to
determine and characterize sensitivity to sample size of the
data, number of morphological characters, percentage of
missing data, and changes in morphospace occupation pattern.
These consist of five distance measures - sum of univariate
variances, total range, mean distance, principal coordinate
analysis volume, average pairwise dissimilarity - and two
non-distance measures - participation ratio and number of
unique pairwise character combinations. Evaluation of each
measure with respect to sensitivity to sample size, number
of morphological characters, and percentage of missing data
was accomplished by using both simulated and Ordovician
crinoid data. For simulated data, each measure of disparity
was evaluated for its response to changes of morphospace
occupation pattern, and with respect to simulated random and
nonrandom extinction events. Changes in disparity were also
measured within the Crinoidea across the Permian extinction
event. Although all measures vary in sensitivity with
respect to species sample size, number of morphological
characters, and percentage of missing data, the non-distance
measures overall produce the lowest estimates of variance
(in bootstrap analyses). The non-distance measures appear to
be relatively insensitive to changes in morphospace
occupation pattern. All measures, except average pairwise
dissimilarity, detect changes in occupation pattern in
simulated nonrandom extinction events, but all measures,
except number of unique pairwise character combinations and
principal coordinate analysis volume, are relatively
insensitive to changes in pattern in simulated random
extinction events. The distance measures report similar
changes in disparity over the Permian extinction event,
whereas the non-distance measures differ. This study
suggests that each measures of disparity is designed for
different purposes, and that by using a combination of
techniques a clearer picture of disparity should
emerge.},
Doi = {10.1666/0094-8373(2001)027<0695:DCIMOP>2.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229089}
}
@article{fds229090,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {The hierarchical structure of organisms: A scale and
documentation of a trend in the maximum},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {405-423},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/0094-8373(2001)027<0405:THSOOA>2.0.CO;2},
Abstract = {The degree of hierarchical structure of organisms-the number
of levels of nesting of lower-level entities within
higher-level individuals-has apparently increased a number
of times in the history of life, notably in the origin of
the eukaryotic cell from an association of prokaryotic
cells, of multicellular organisms from clones of eukaryotic
cells, and of intergrated colonies from aggregates of
multicellular individuals. Arranged in order of first
occurrence, these three transitions suggest a trend, in
particular a trend in the maximum, or an increase in the
degree of hierarchical structure present in the
hierarchically deepest organism on Earth. However, no
rigorous documentation of such a trend-based on operational
and consistent criteria for hierarchical levels-has been
attempted. Also, the trajectory of increase has not been
examined in any detail. One limitation is that no hierarchy
scale has been developed with sufficient resolution to
document more than these three major increases. Here, a
higher-resolution scale is proposed in which hierarchical
structure is decomposed into levels and sublevels, with
levels reflecting number of layers of nestedness, and
sublevels reflecting degree of individuation at the highest
level. The scale is then used, together with the body-fossil
record, to plot the trajectory of the maximum. Two
alternative interpretations of the record are considered,
and both reveal a long-term trend extending from the Archean
through the early Phanerozoic. In one, the pattern of
increase was incremental, with almost all sublevels arising
precisely in order. The data also raise the possibility that
waiting times for transitions between sublevels may have
decreased with increasing hierarchical level (and with
time). These last two findings-incremental increase in level
and decreasing waiting times-are tentative, pending a study
of possible biases in the fossil record.},
Doi = {10.1666/0094-8373(2001)027<0405:THSOOA>2.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229090}
}
@article{fds229094,
Author = {Anderson, C and McShea, DW},
Title = {Intermediate-level parts in insect societies: Adaptive
structures that ants build away from the
nest},
Journal = {Insectes Sociaux},
Volume = {48},
Number = {4},
Pages = {291-301},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0020-1812},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00001781},
Abstract = {Insect societies function at various organisational levels.
Most research has focused on one or other organisational
extreme. At one extreme, it is the adaptive behaviours at
the individual level, the behaviour of workers, which is of
interest. At the other extreme, colony-level adaptive
behaviour and swarm intelligence is the focus. However,
between these two extremes, numerous functional adaptive
units, or "parts," exist. These intermediate-level parts
include the behavioural properties of "groups" or "teams" in
which the functionality only emerges at the group-level and
not within the individuals themselves, and also the
structural properties of "self-assemblages" in which
individuals link themselves together to form an adaptive
configuration, such as a living bridge. We review another
type of intermediate-level part in insect societies: these
are the physical structures that ants build away from the
nest. The structures, that are larger than an individual
worker but smaller than the colony (hence intermediate),
include cleared trails, walled trenches, arcades, tunnels,
outstations, shelters, protective pens, shelters over
nectaries, food coverings on foraging trails, elevated
corridors, and bridges. They are found in a diverse range of
species, and are constructed using a variety of materials.
We detail the structures built by ants focussing chiefly on
the adaptive benefits these structures may confer to the
colony.},
Doi = {10.1007/PL00001781},
Key = {fds229094}
}
@article{fds3809,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {Parts and integration: consequences of hierarchy},
Series = {pp. 27-60},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Patterns: Growth, Form, and Tempo in the Fossil
Record},
Publisher = {Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press},
Editor = {JBC Jackson and S Lidgard and FK McKinney},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds3809}
}
@article{fds355922,
Author = {McShea, DW and Venit, EP},
Title = {What is a Part?},
Pages = {259-284},
Booktitle = {The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {G.P. Wagner},
Year = {2001},
ISBN = {9780127300559},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-012730055-9/50022-7},
Doi = {10.1016/b978-012730055-9/50022-7},
Key = {fds355922}
}
@article{fds229083,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Functional complexity in organisms: Parts as
proxies},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {5},
Pages = {641-668},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006695908715},
Abstract = {The functional complexity, or the number of functions, of
organisms has figured prominently in certain theoretical and
empirical work in evolutionary biology. Large-scale trends
in functional complexity and correlations between functional
complexity and other variables, such as size, have been
proposed. However, the notion of number of functions has
also been operationally intractable, in that no method has
been developed for counting functions in an organism in a
systematic and reliable way. Thus, studies have had to rely
on the largely unsupported assumption that number of
functions can be measured indirectly, by using number of
morphological, physiological, and behavioral partsas a
proxy. Here, a model is developed that supports this
assumption. Specifically, the model predicts that few parts
will have many functions overlapping in them, and therefore
the variance in number of functions per part will be low. If
so, then number of parts is expected to be well correlated
with number of functions, and we can use part counts as
proxies for function counts in comparative studies of
organisms, even when part counts are low. Also discussed
briefly is a strategy for identifying certain kinds of parts
in organisms in a systematic way.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006695908715},
Key = {fds229083}
}
@article{fds229061,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Sense and Depth},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {5},
Pages = {751-758},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2000},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000165088500008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/a:1006754311040},
Key = {fds229061}
}
@article{fds3923,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {A hypothesis about hierarchies},
Booktitle = {Unifying Themes in Complex Systems},
Editor = {Y. Bar-Yam},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds3923}
}
@article{fds229086,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Trends, tools, and terminology},
Journal = {PALEOBIOLOGY},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {330-333},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {0094-8373},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000089104700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1666/0094-8373(2000)026<0330:TTAT>2.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229086}
}
@article{fds3820,
Author = {R.J. McShea and D.W. McShea},
Title = {Biology and value theory},
Booktitle = {Biology and the Foundation of Ethics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {J. Maienschein and M. Ruse},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds3820}
}
@article{fds3803,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {Feelings as the proximate cause of behavior},
Booktitle = {Where Psychology Meets Biology: Philosophical
Essays},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {V.G. Hardcastle},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds3803}
}
@article{fds229092,
Author = {McShea, DW and Venit, EP and Simon, VB},
Title = {Hierarchical complexity of organisms: dynamics of a
well-known trend},
Journal = {Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of
America},
Volume = {31},
Pages = {A-171},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds229092}
}
@article{fds229082,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Possible largest-scale trends in organismal evolution: Eight
'live hypotheses'},
Journal = {Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {293-318},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {1998},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.29.1.293},
Abstract = {Historically, a great many features of organisms have been
said to show a trend over the history of life, and many
rationales for such trends have been proposed. Here I review
eight candidates, eight 'live hypotheses' that are inspiring
research on largest-scale trends today: entropy, energy
intensiveness, evolutionary versatility, developmental
depth, structural depth, adaptedness, size, and complexity.
For each, the review covers the principal arguments that
have been advanced for why a trend is expected, as well as
some of the empirical approaches that have been adopted.
Also discussed are three conceptual matters arising in
connection with trend studies: 1. Alternative bases for
classifying trends: pattern versus dynamics; 2. alternative
modes in which largest-scale trends have been studied:
'exploratory' versus 'skeptical'; and 3. evolutionary
progress.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.29.1.293},
Key = {fds229082}
}
@article{fds3926,
Author = {D.W. McShea},
Title = {Dynamics of large-scale trends},
Booktitle = {Biodiversity Dynamics},
Editor = {M.L. McKinney and J.A. Drake},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds3926}
}
@article{fds229053,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Comments on "evolutionary complexity, " H. Morowitz,
complexity 3(6): pp 12-14.},
Journal = {Complex.},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {11-12},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0526(199811/12)4:2<11::AID-CPLX2>3.0.CO;2},
Doi = {10.1002/(SICI)1099-0526(199811/12)4:2<11::AID-CPLX2>3.0.CO;2},
Key = {fds229053}
}
@article{fds353117,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {A post‐modern vision of artificial life},
Journal = {Complexity},
Volume = {1},
Number = {5},
Pages = {36-38},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1996},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cplx.6130010509},
Doi = {10.1002/cplx.6130010509},
Key = {fds353117}
}
@article{fds229067,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {PERSPECTIVE METAZOAN COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION: IS THERE A
TREND?},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {50},
Number = {2},
Pages = {477-492},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1996},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1996.tb03861.x},
Abstract = {The notion that complexity increases in evolution is widely
accepted, but the best-known evidence is highly
impressionistic. Here I propose a scheme for understanding
complexity that provides a conceptual basis for objective
measurement. The scheme also shows complexity to be a broad
term covering four independent types. For each type, I
describe some of the measures that have been devised and
review the evidence for trends in the maximum and mean. In
metazoans as a whole, there is good evidence only for an
early-Phanerozoic trend, and only in one type of complexity.
For each of the other types, some trends have been
documented, but only in a small number of metazoan
subgroups.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1558-5646.1996.tb03861.x},
Key = {fds229067}
}
@article{fds229059,
Author = {Mcshea, DW},
Title = {Unpredictability! and the Function of Mind in
Nature},
Journal = {Adaptive Behavior},
Volume = {4},
Number = {4},
Pages = {466-470},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1059-7123},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996VY98400009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1177/105971239600400309},
Key = {fds229059}
}
@article{fds355923,
Author = {McSHEA, DW},
Title = {COMPLEXITY AND HOMOPLASY},
Pages = {207-225},
Booktitle = {Homoplasy},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {1996},
ISBN = {9780126180305},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-012618030-5/50010-1},
Doi = {10.1016/b978-012618030-5/50010-1},
Key = {fds355923}
}
@article{fds229066,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {MECHANISMS OF LARGE-SCALE EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {48},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1747-1763},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1994},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1994.tb02211.x},
Abstract = {Large-scale evolutionary trends may result from driving
forces or from passive diffusion in bounded spaces. Such
trends are persistent directional changes in higher taxa
spanning significant periods of geological time; examples
include the frequently cited long-term trends in size,
complexity, and fitness in life as a whole, as well as
trends in lesser supraspecific taxa and trends in space. In
a driven trend, the distribution mean increases on account
of a force (which may manifest itself as a bias in the
direction of change) that acts on lineages throughout the
space in which diversification occurs. In a passive system,
no pervasive force or bias exists, but the mean increases
because change in one direction is blocked by a boundary, or
other inhomogeneity, in some limited region of the space.
Two tests have been used to distinguish these trend
mechanisms: (1) the test based on the behavior of the
minimum; and (2) the ancestor-descendant test, based on
comparisons in a random sample of ancestor-descendant pairs
that lie far from any possible lower bound. For skewed
distributions, a third test is introduced here: (3) the
subclade test, based on the mean skewness of a sample of
subclades drawn from the tail of a terminal distribution.
With certain restrictions, a system is driven if the minimum
increases, if increases significantly outnumber decreases
among ancestor-descendant pairs, and if the mean skew of
subclades is significantly positive. A passive mechanism is
more difficult to demonstrate but is the more likely
mechanism if decreases outnumber increases and if the mean
skew of subclades is negative. Unlike the other tests, the
subclade test requires no detailed phylogeny or
paleontological time series, but only terminal (e.g.,
modern) distributions. Monte Carlo simulations of the
diversification of a clade are used to show how the subclade
test works. In the empirical cases examined, the three tests
gave concordant results, suggesting first, that they work,
and second, that the passive and driven mechanisms may
correspond to natural categories of causes of large-scale
trends.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1558-5646.1994.tb02211.x},
Key = {fds229066}
}
@article{fds322306,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary Trends and the Salience Bias (with Apologies to
Oil Tankers, Karl Marx, and Others)},
Journal = {Technical Communication Quarterly},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {21-38},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10572259409364556},
Abstract = {Salient examples may bias human judgments about the
probability or frequency of events, an effect known as the
“availability heuristic” or the “salience bias.”
Scientific work has not been immune to this bias; in
particular, the existence of certain large-scale trends in
evolution, such as those in size, complexity, and fitness,
is widely accepted among professionals within evolutionary
biology and paleontology, as well as among people outside
these fields, even though these trends are poorly
documented. Often, what documentation exists consists mainly
of long lists of cases exemplifying the trend, or detailed
descriptions of a small number of salient cases. Here, it is
argued that although these lists and salient cases are not
good evidence that a trend is pervasive, they may convince
both the trend researcher and his or her audience. The
possibility is raised that the bias may be pervasive in
science and everyday thought, and a strategy for avoiding
it, namely the use of random samples, is offered. © 1994,
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1080/10572259409364556},
Key = {fds322306}
}
@article{fds229056,
Author = {Mcshea, DW},
Title = {Arguments, tests, and the Burgess Shale � a commentary on
the debate},
Journal = {Paleobiology},
Volume = {19},
Number = {4},
Pages = {399-402},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0094-8373},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1993ML91300001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1017/S0094837300014044},
Key = {fds229056}
}
@article{fds229060,
Author = {MCSHEA, DW},
Title = {EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN THE MORPHOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY OF THE
MAMMALIAN VERTEBRAL COLUMN},
Journal = {EVOLUTION},
Volume = {47},
Number = {3},
Pages = {730-740},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {0014-3820},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1993MA41600002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {The notion that morphological complexity increases in
evolution is widely accepted in biology and paleontology.
Several possible explanations have been offered for this
trend, among them the suggestion that it has an active
forcing mechanism, such as natural selection or the second
law of thermodynamics. No such mechanism has yet been
empirically demonstrated, but testing is possible: if a
forcing mechanism has operated, the expectation is that
complexity would have increased in evolutionary lineages
more frequently than it decreased. However, a quantitative
analysis of changes in the complexity of the vertebral
column in a random sample of mammalian lineages reveals a
nearly equal number of increases and decreases. This finding
raises the possibility that no forcing mechanism exists, or
at least that it may not be as powerful or pervasive as has
been assumed. The finding also highlights the need for more
empirical tests.},
Doi = {10.2307/2410179},
Key = {fds229060}
}
@article{fds355924,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Gene‐talk talk about sociobiology},
Journal = {Social Epistemology},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {183-192},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1992},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729208578653},
Doi = {10.1080/02691729208578653},
Key = {fds355924}
}
@article{fds229065,
Author = {McSHEA, DW},
Title = {A metric for the study of evolutionary trends in the
complexity of serial structures},
Journal = {Biological Journal of the Linnean Society},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {39-55},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0024-4066},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1095-8312.1992.tb00630.x},
Abstract = {Little empirical work has been done to see what sort of
patterns of change in morphological complexity occur in
evolution, mainly because the complexity of whole organisms
has been so hard to define and to measure. For serial
structures within organisms, there are fewer difficulties;
this paper introduces a set of complexity metrics that are
designed especially for serial structures, and then explores
some of the properties of the new metrics. Also, a principle
proposed in the last century by Herbert Spencer, and offered
recently in a new form by the thermodynamic school of
evolutionary thought, predicts that complexity should
increase in evolution as a consequence of the accumulation
of perturbations. Here, simulations in which perturbations
are introduced to ideal and real series of vertebral
measurements show how the complexity increase predicted by
Spencer's principle would be captured by the new metrics.
Copyright © 1992, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1095-8312.1992.tb00630.x},
Key = {fds229065}
}
@article{fds229064,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Complexity and evolution: What everybody
knows},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {303-324},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1991},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00132234},
Abstract = {The consensus among evolutionists seems to be (and has been
for at least a century) that the morphological complexity of
organisms increases in evolution, although almost no
empirical evidence for such a trend exists. Most studies of
complexity have been theoretical, and the few empirical
studies have not, with the exception of certain recent ones,
been especially rigorous; reviews are presented of both the
theoretical and empirical literature. The paucity of
evidence raises the question of what sustains the consensus,
and a number of suggestions are offered, including the
possibility that certain cultural and/or perceptual biases
are at work. In addition, a shift in emphasis from
theoretical to empirical inquiry is recommended for the
study of complexity, and guidelines for future empirical
studies are proposed. © 1991 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00132234},
Key = {fds229064}
}
@article{fds229063,
Author = {McShea, DW and Raup, DM},
Title = {Completeness of the geological record.},
Journal = {The Journal of geology},
Volume = {94},
Pages = {569-574},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-1376},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11542057},
Abstract = {The completeness of a sedimentary section of known timespan
may be assessed qualitatively by comparing its thickness
with the average accumulation for that timespan. Average
accumulations may be estimated from sediment volume and
continental area data. Quantitative completeness estimation
methods based on data compiled from the geological
literature have been proposed, but we argue that the
literature data are significantly biased and cannot support
such methods. Interestingly, however, a comparison of the
literature data and accumulation averages computed from
sediment volume data suggests that the thickest known
sections may be extremely complete.},
Doi = {10.1086/629058},
Key = {fds229063}
}
@article{fds229062,
Author = {Golob, RS and McShea, DW},
Title = {IMPLICATIONS OF THE IXTOC 1 BLOW-OUT AND OIL
SPILL.},
Pages = {743-759},
Year = {1981},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds229062}
}
%% Moi, Toril
@article{fds371699,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Acknowledging Hanna Pitkin: A Belated Discovery of a Kindred
Spirit},
Journal = {Polity},
Volume = {55},
Number = {3},
Pages = {479-487},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725254},
Doi = {10.1086/725254},
Key = {fds371699}
}
@misc{fds347392,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Response to eight respondents to my book Revolution of the
Ordinary},
Journal = {Nonsite.org},
Publisher = {Emory University},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds347392}
}
@book{fds347405,
Author = {Anderson, A and Felski, R and Moi, T},
Title = {Character Three Inquiries in Literary Studies},
Pages = {160 pages},
Publisher = {Trios},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {9780226658667},
Abstract = {In offering new perspectives on the question of fictional
character, this thought-provoking book makes an important
intervention in literary studies.},
Key = {fds347405}
}
@article{fds347379,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Acknowledging the Other: Reading, Writing, and Living in The
Mandarins},
Journal = {Yale French Studies},
Volume = {135-136},
Number = {135-136},
Pages = {100-115},
Publisher = {Yale University Press},
Editor = {du Graf, L and Elsky, J and Fauré, C},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds347379}
}
@article{fds347378,
Author = {Anderson, A and Moi, T and Felski, R},
Title = {Introduction & Rethinking Character},
Pages = {1-76},
Booktitle = {Character Three Inquiries in Literary Studies},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {9780226658667},
Abstract = {In offering new perspectives on the question of fictional
character, this thought-provoking book makes an important
intervention in literary studies.},
Key = {fds347378}
}
@article{fds347380,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Lidenskapens grammatikk: Om Vigdis Hjorth og Annie Ernaux
(The Grammar of Passion: About Vigdis Hjorth and Annie
Ernaux)},
Pages = {77-88},
Booktitle = {Fem kvinner, tre menn og en datter skriver om Vigdis
Hjorth},
Publisher = {Cappelen Damm},
Editor = {Grøner, E},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds347380}
}
@article{fds359617,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {From femininity to finitude: Freud, lacan, and feminism,
again},
Pages = {93-135},
Booktitle = {Dialogues on Sexuality, Gender and Psychoanalysis},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9781855753501},
Key = {fds359617}
}
@misc{fds347393,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Describing My Struggle},
Journal = {The Point},
Year = {2017},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds347393}
}
@book{fds347381,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Revolution of the Ordinary Literary Studies After
Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell},
Pages = {306 pages},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780226464442},
Abstract = {This radically original book argues for the power of
ordinary language philosophy—a tradition inaugurated by
Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, and extended by
Stanley Cavell—to transform literary studies.},
Key = {fds347381}
}
@article{fds341380,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {The adulteress wife},
Pages = {103-113},
Booktitle = {On Ne Nait Pas Femme: On Le Devient the Life of a
Sentence},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190608811},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190608811.003.0006},
Abstract = {Nearly 20 years after Margaret Simons broke the news of the
scandal of the English translation of Le deuxième sexe,
Toril Moi’s 2002 essay deepened feminist claims in
relation to Parshley’s translation, and chronicled the
long and still-unsuccessful struggle with Alfred Knopf for a
new translation/scholarly edition. Moi showed that “the
philosophical incompetence of the translation produces a
text that is damaging to Beauvoir’s intellectual
reputation in particular and to the reputation of feminist
philosophy in general” by detailing Parshley’s silent
deletions of sentences and parts of sentences, his tendency
to turn existence into essence, misread philosophical
references to “subjectivity”, remain clueless about
references to Hegel, and misunderstand Beauvoir’s account
of alienation. These failures falsely emboldened
Beauvoir’s critics by eliminating nuance from key
discussions of themes like motherhood. “Her works will not
enter the public domain until 2056,” Moi pointed out, and
the stubborn refusal of the publisher to commission a new
translation meant that essays like this one were absolutely
essential to teaching Beauvoir’s Second Sex to English
speaking students-“while we wait.”},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190608811.003.0006},
Key = {fds341380}
}
@article{fds336408,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Hedda’s words: The work of language in Hedda
Gabler},
Pages = {152-173},
Booktitle = {Ibsen's Hedda Gabler: Philosophical Perspectives},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190467876},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190467876.003.0008},
Abstract = {For ordinary language philosophy-the philosophical tradition
after Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, as constituted
and extended by Stanley Cavell-meaning arises in use.
Utterances are actions and expressions. This philosophy,
therefore, is closely attuned to the work of language in
theater. This paper shows that ordinary language philosophy
gives rise to a kind of literary criticism that considers
reading an practice of acknowledgment, as en effort to
understand exactly why the characters say precisely these
words in precisely this situation. By paying close attention
to Hedda’s interactions with three different linguistic
worlds-the Tesman world, the Brack world, and the world she
shared with Løvborg in the past-this chapter brings out the
contrast between the conventionality and brutality of
Hedda’s surroundings and Hedda’s ideals of courage and
freedom, and shows that Hedda is more vulnerable, and more
damaged, than previous readings have assumed.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190467876.003.0008},
Key = {fds336408}
}
@book{fds347382,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Toril Moi leser A.O. Vinje [Toril Moi reads A. O.
Vinje]},
Pages = {62 pages},
Publisher = {Nasjonalbiblioteket},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {9788279653011},
Key = {fds347382}
}
@article{fds286684,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {'Nothing Is Hidden’: From Confusion to Clarity, Or
Wittgenstein on Critique},
Booktitle = {Rethinking Critique},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Editor = {Anker, E and Felski, R},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds286684}
}
@article{fds347394,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Foreword},
Pages = {VII-XIV},
Booktitle = {The Utopian, by Michael Westlake},
Publisher = {Verbivoracious Press},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {9789810967659},
Abstract = {First, the story of Mesmer, who in 2411 sets out on his
Journey, a rite of passage which is to last a year and a
day, in a gloriously pansexual, matriarchal, and feminist
utopia, told in the third person by a gentle and guileless
narrator.},
Key = {fds347394}
}
@misc{fds347395,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Naised: sugu, soolisus ja vabadus [Translation of “Women:
Sex, Gender, and Freedom: Thoughts about Equality and
Difference” Manuscript written for the Ministry for
Equality’s Feminist Research Conference in Tallinn,
Estonia, on June 1, 2015]},
Journal = {Sirp: Eesti Kultuurileht},
Pages = {3-5},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds347395}
}
@article{fds286682,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {‘Øyeblikkets bedrageriske fylde’: Handling, språk og
eksistens i Liv Køltzows forfatterskap},
Booktitle = {Å forsvinne i teksten},
Publisher = {Flamme Forlag},
Editor = {Køltzow, L and Blad, HP},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds286682}
}
@article{fds286683,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Thinking through examples: What ordinary language philosophy
can do for feminist theory},
Journal = {New Literary History},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {191-216},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1080-661X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2015.0014},
Doi = {10.1353/nlh.2015.0014},
Key = {fds286683}
}
@article{fds311959,
Author = {Bauer, N and Beckwith, S and Crary, A and Laugier, S and Moi, T and Zerilli, L},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {New Literary History},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {v-xiii},
Publisher = {Project MUSE},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0028-6087},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000360324500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1353/nlh.2015.0012},
Key = {fds311959}
}
@article{fds344621,
Author = {Showalter, E and Moi, T},
Title = {Elaine showalter a literature of their own},
Pages = {24-52},
Booktitle = {Feminist Literary Criticism},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780582050150},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315846163},
Abstract = {ELAINE SHOWALTER A Literature of Their Own Elaine
Showalter's A Literature of Their Own: British Women
Novelists from Bronte' to Lessing (1977) traces a history of
women's writing through three phases - the 'feminine' from
1840-80, the 'feminist' from 1880-1920 and the 'female' from
1920 onwards. The two extracts included here are from the
female phase, from Showalter's chapter on Woolf, entitled
'Woolf and the Flight into Androgyny'. The chapter title is
suggestive. Showalter finds Woolf's concern with an
androgynous ideal escapist, a way of avoiding confrontation
with her family, her critics and readers, her social class.
Similarly, Woolf's 'room of one's own' has certain creative
and protective possibilities, but is more often viewed by
Showalter as a sign of Woolf's retreat from a necessary
interaction with the material world and with her own
psychosexual dilemmas. The section of the chapter excluded
focuses on Woolf's sexual and psychiatric history, relating
her mental crises to biological factors - the onset of
menstruation, her childlessness, the menopause - and to her
relationship with her husband, Leonard. The link is not one
of crude biologism - women because of their biological
make-up are periodically unstable and hysterical - but one
that points to the excessive and irreconcilable pressures
that Woolf felt at such moments of crisis. Fuelled by a
feminism that believes in a forthright declaration of one's
needs as a woman, Showalter contends that androgyny, private
space, aestheticism are inadequate answers to the problems
of sexual politics. (See Introduction, pp.
7-11).},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315846163},
Key = {fds344621}
}
@article{fds347396,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Fem røde epler: Fra navn til bruk. En kommentar til §1 i
Wittgensteins Filosofiske undersøkelser” [Five red
apples: from names to use, A commentary on §1 in
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations]},
Journal = {Edda},
Volume = {114},
Number = {4},
Pages = {348-353},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds347396}
}
@article{fds286695,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Ibsen’s Late Style},
Booktitle = {Henrik Ibsen, The Master Builder and Other
Plays},
Publisher = {Penguin Books},
Address = {London and New York},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds286695}
}
@article{fds286696,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Stumhet og kjærlighet: En lesning av Amtmandens Døttre
[Muteness and Love: A Reading of The District Governor’s
Daughters].},
Pages = {33-54},
Booktitle = {Å bli en stemme: Nye studier i Camilla Colletts
forfatterskap},
Publisher = {Novus Forlag},
Editor = {Haugen, T},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds286696}
}
@article{fds286708,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {’Something That Might Resemble a Kind of Love’: Fantasy
and Realism in Henrik Ibsen’s Little Eyolf},
Pages = {185-208},
Booktitle = {Understanding Love Through Philosophy, Film, and Fiction,
ed. Susan Wolfe and Christopher Grau},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York and Oxford},
Editor = {Susan Wolf and Christopher Grau},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {978-0195384505},
Key = {fds286708}
}
@article{fds286709,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Hedda's Silences: Beauty and Despair in Hedda
Gabler},
Journal = {MODERN DRAMA},
Volume = {56},
Number = {4},
Pages = {434-456},
Publisher = {University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Winter},
ISSN = {0026-7694},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000330715000002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This essay asks what it means to read literature with
philosophy and argues that we should discover the literary
work's own concepts before engaging it in a dialogue with
philosophy. The essay also considers the vexed question of
whether Hedda Gabler should be read as a "woman's play" or,
rather, as a critique of modernity. With reference to Simone
de Beauvoir, it argues that this "choice" is itself an
example of a sexist logic. By paying close attention to
Hedda's three significant silences, the essay shows that
Hedda chooses to place herself in Judge Brack's power, that
the play's key concerns are modernity, subjectivity, and
meaning, and that its key concepts are silence, hiddenness,
disgust, triviality, beauty, freedom, despair, and suicide.
The essay ends by relating Hedda Gabler to Kierkegaard's The
Sickness unto Death, before returning to the question of the
role of philosophy in literary readings.},
Doi = {10.3138/md.S89},
Key = {fds286709}
}
@article{fds286710,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Shame and Openness: On Karl Ove Knausgård},
Journal = {Salmagundi Magazine},
Volume = {107},
Number = {Winter},
Pages = {205-210},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds286710}
}
@article{fds287008,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Afterword: How the French Read},
Journal = {New Literary History},
Volume = {44},
Number = {2},
Pages = {299-314},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2013.0014},
Doi = {10.1353/nlh.2013.0014},
Key = {fds287008}
}
@article{fds286719,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {‘To Make them Other, and Face Them’: Literature,
Philosophy and ‘La Femme rompue’},
Pages = {11-24},
Booktitle = {Women, Genre and Circumstance: Essays in Memory of Elizabeth
Fallaize},
Publisher = {Oxford: Legenda},
Editor = {Atack, M and Holmes, D and Knight, D and Still, J},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds286719}
}
@article{fds286720,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Access to the Universal: Language, Literature and the
Humanities},
Pages = {183-87},
Booktitle = {The Critical Pulse: Thirty-Six Credos by Contemporary
Critics},
Publisher = {Columbia University Press},
Editor = {Williams, J and Steffen, H},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds286720}
}
@article{fds311958,
Author = {Toril, M},
Title = {Henrik Ibsen and idealism: Rethinking literary history of
the XIX century},
Journal = {Etudes Germaniques},
Volume = {62},
Number = {4},
Pages = {915-932},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0014-2115},
Abstract = {Considered as the incarnation of an outdated realism Ibsen's
theatre has often been opposed to forms apparently more
modern or modernistic like Artaud's, Brecht's or Becektt's.
The idea that realism is a naively transparent form of
representing the world, a form that has since been overruled
by more reflexive modes of writing, underlies this
judgement. In reality this opposition is untenable and
Ibsen's realism is a modernism full of reflections on
theatre and theatrality as well. Ibsen's realist plays
shocked his contemporaries not so much because of their
realism but because of their anti-idealism. The disputes
over naturalism caused by a play like Ghosts were in the end
disputes over idealism. Literary history of the second half
of the 19th century can be viewed as a long battle between
dying idealism and rising modernism in which Ibsen's plays
took a determining part.},
Key = {fds311958}
}
@article{fds311961,
Author = {Dupont, N and Moi, T},
Title = {The poetic piping of Christian Prigent: Ventiloquits
framework and glottic phrase},
Journal = {Contemporary French and Francophone Studies},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {127-140},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1740-9292},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17409290600560229},
Doi = {10.1080/17409290600560229},
Key = {fds311961}
}
@book{fds286817,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism: Art, Theater,
Philosophy},
Pages = {xvi + 396 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
ISBN = {978-0199202591},
Key = {fds286817}
}
@book{fds286831,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Sex, Gender and the Body: The Student Edition of What Is a
Woman?},
Pages = {xv + 274 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {978-0199276226},
Key = {fds286831}
}
@article{fds347397,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {iii},
Booktitle = {Camille The Lady of the Camellias, by Alexandre Dumas
Fils},
Publisher = {Signet Classics},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {9780451529206},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/693389},
Abstract = {With a new introduction, this Signet Classic is the only
available paperback edition of Camille, the instantly-famous
story of passion versus class that remains as timeless as
love itself.},
Doi = {10.1086/693389},
Key = {fds347397}
}
@book{fds286884,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {What Is a Woman? and Other Essays},
Pages = {xv + 517 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-0198186755},
Key = {fds286884}
}
@article{fds311971,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {"Am I That Name": Reply to Deborah Knight},
Journal = {New Literary History},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {57-62},
Publisher = {Project MUSE},
Year = {1995},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0028-6087},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995QE27000006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1353/nlh.1995.0013},
Key = {fds311971}
}
@article{fds286894,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {ANOTHER COLETTE - THE QUESTION OF GENDERED WRITING -
HUFFER,L},
Journal = {FRENCH FORUM},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {250-252},
Year = {1995},
ISSN = {0098-9355},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995QV21400014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds286894}
}
@book{fds286910,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual
Woman},
Pages = {xii + 324 pages},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Year = {1994},
ISBN = {978-0199238729},
Key = {fds286910}
}
@article{fds311963,
Author = {MOI, T and MITCHELL, J},
Title = {PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND POLITICS, A CONVERSATION WITH
MITCHELL,JULIET},
Journal = {SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY},
Volume = {93},
Number = {4},
Pages = {925-949},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {0038-2876},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1994PT35600008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311963}
}
@article{fds311957,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Review Article Femininity Revisited},
Journal = {Journal of Gender Studies},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {324-334},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1992},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0958-9236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09589236.1992.9960503},
Doi = {10.1080/09589236.1992.9960503},
Key = {fds311957}
}
@article{fds286916,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {She died because she came too late…" knowledge, doubles
and death in thomas's tristan},
Journal = {Exemplaria},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {105-133},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/exm.1992.4.1.105},
Doi = {10.1179/exm.1992.4.1.105},
Key = {fds286916}
}
@article{fds286922,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Simone de Beauvoir's L'Invitée: an existentialist
melodrama},
Journal = {Paragraph},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {151-169},
Publisher = {Edinburgh University Press},
Year = {1991},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0264-8334},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991FZ35200005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.3366/para.1991.0012},
Key = {fds286922}
}
@article{fds311969,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Subject to Change: Reading Feminist Writing. Miller,
Nancy K.},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {112-112},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991EZ32100067&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/45.1.112},
Key = {fds311969}
}
@article{fds311972,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other
Writings 1977-1984. Edited with an introduction by Lawrence
D. Kritzman. Foucault, Michel},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {370-370},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DT42000066&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/44.3.370},
Key = {fds311972}
}
@article{fds311975,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {BOOKS OR SPINNING-WHEELS - ON WOMEN, PHILOSOPHY, ET-CETERA -
FRENCH - LEDOEUFF,M},
Journal = {TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT},
Number = {4549},
Pages = {S13-S13},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0307-661X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DJ74100064&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311975}
}
@article{fds311970,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {SEXUAL SUBVERSIONS - 3 FRENCH FEMINISTS -
GROSZ,E},
Journal = {TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT},
Number = {4549},
Pages = {S13-S13},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0307-661X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DJ74100065&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311970}
}
@article{fds311976,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE - JOHNSON,B},
Journal = {SUB-STANCE},
Number = {59},
Pages = {120-122},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {0049-2426},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1989AT49900010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311976}
}
@article{fds311967,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Simone de Beauvoir: Witness to a Century. Wenzel,
Helene Vivienne (ed.)},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {235-236},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1988},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988N512500056&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/42.2.235},
Key = {fds311967}
}
@article{fds317185,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986, £15.45, 126
pp},
Journal = {History of the Human Sciences},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {276-279},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0952-6951},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/095269518800100208},
Doi = {10.1177/095269518800100208},
Key = {fds317185}
}
@article{fds311977,
Author = {DANIUS, S and MOI, T},
Title = {AN INTERVIEW WITH MOI,TORIL ON LITERATURE AND SEXUAL
POLITICS},
Journal = {BLM-BONNIERS LITTERARA MAGASIN},
Volume = {57},
Number = {4},
Pages = {258-264},
Year = {1988},
ISSN = {0005-3198},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988R589500012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311977}
}
@article{fds311965,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Feminism in France. From May '68 to Mitterrand.
Duchen, Claire},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {41},
Number = {4},
Pages = {494-494},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987L147100068&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/41.4.494},
Key = {fds311965}
}
@article{fds311966,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Theory as Fiction. Bowie, Malcolm, Freud, Proust and
Lacan.},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {41},
Number = {4},
Pages = {469-469},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987L147100041&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/41.4.469},
Key = {fds311966}
}
@article{fds311962,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Cross-References. Modern French Theory and the
Practice of Criticism. Kelley, David and Llasera, Isabelle
(eds)},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {41},
Number = {3},
Pages = {371-371},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987J887800069&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/41.3.371},
Key = {fds311962}
}
@book{fds306172,
Author = {Various},
Title = {French Feminist Thought},
Pages = {x + 260 pages},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Moi, T},
Year = {1987},
ISBN = {978-0631149736},
Key = {fds306172}
}
@article{fds311978,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {FRENCH FEMINIST CRITICISM, WOMEN, LANGUAGE, AND LITERATURE,
AN ANNOTATED-BIBLIOGRAPHY - GELFAND,ED, HULES,VT},
Journal = {FRENCH STUDIES},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {114-116},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987G420200067&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311978}
}
@article{fds311974,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {FEMMES, RECENT WRITINGS ON FRENCH WOMEN -
WEITZ,MC},
Journal = {FRENCH STUDIES},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {114-116},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987G420200066&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311974}
}
@article{fds311973,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. The Knowledge of Ignorance. From Genesis to Jules
Verne. Martin, Andrew},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {40},
Number = {2},
Pages = {246-246},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1986C400100073&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/40.2.246},
Key = {fds311973}
}
@article{fds311968,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {Review. Cousins, Mark and Hussain, Athar, Michel
Foucault},
Journal = {French Studies},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1},
Pages = {113-113},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0016-1128},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1986A119100071&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/fs/40.1.113},
Key = {fds311968}
}
@book{fds306173,
Author = {Kristeva, J},
Title = {The Kristeva Reader},
Pages = {viii + 327 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell, and New York: Columbia},
Editor = {Moi, T},
Year = {1986},
ISBN = {978-0231063258},
Key = {fds306173}
}
@article{fds311964,
Author = {MOI, T},
Title = {CIXOUS,HELENE, WRITING THE FEMININE - CONLEY,VA},
Journal = {QUINQUEREME-NEW STUDIES IN MODERN LANGUAGES},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {80-83},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0140-3397},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1986C373700008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds311964}
}
@book{fds286981,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary
Theory},
Pages = {xviii + 206 pages},
Publisher = {Methuen},
Year = {1985},
ISBN = {978-0415280129},
Key = {fds286981}
}
%% Neander, Karen
@article{fds326195,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Functional analysis and the species design},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {194},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1147-1168},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0940-9},
Abstract = {© 2015, The Author(s). This paper argues that a minimal
notion of function and a notion of normal-proper function
are used in explaining how bodies and brains operate.
Neither is Cummins’ (1975) notion, as originally defined,
and yet his is often taken to be the clearly relevant notion
for such an explanatory context. This paper also explains
how adverting to normal-proper functions, even if these are
selected functions, can play a significant scientific role
in the operational explanations of complex systems that
physiologists and neurophysiologists provide, despite a lack
of relevant causal efficacy on the part of such
functions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0940-9},
Key = {fds326195}
}
@article{fds336416,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Does biology need teleology?},
Pages = {64-76},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138789555},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315764863},
Abstract = {© 2018 Taylor & Francis. To ask the function of short-term
memory one might ask, “What is short-term memory for?" 1
Or, to ascribe a function to eyelashes one might say,
“Eyelashes divert airflow to protect the eye.” 2 If a
function of x is to z, it is for z-ing or is there to z.
This manner of speaking has a teleological flavor, but do
biologists really use a teleological notion of function in
contemporary biology, and, if so, what (if any) scientific
purpose is it serving?.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315764863},
Key = {fds336416}
}
@book{fds331100,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {A mark of the mental: In defense of informational
teleosemantics},
Pages = {1-327},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0262339862},
Abstract = {© 2017 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A Mark of the
Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power
of mental states -- described by the cognitive scientist
Zenon Pylyshyn as the “second hardest puzzle” of
philosophy of mind (the first being consciousness). The
puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called “the
problem of mental content," “Brentano’s problem," or
“the problem of intentionality." Its motivating mystery is
how neurobiological states can have semantic properties such
as meaning or reference. Neander proposes a naturalistic
account for sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual)
representations. Neander draws on insights from state-space
semantics (which appeals to relations of second-order
similarity between representing and represented domains),
causal theories of reference (which claim the reference
relation is a causal one), and teleosemantic theories (which
claim that semantic norms, at their simplest, depend on
functional norms). She proposes and defends an intuitive,
theoretically well-motivated but highly controversial
thesis: sensory-perceptual systems have the function to
produce inner state changes that are the analogs of as well
as caused by their referents. Neander shows that the three
main elements -- functions, causal-information relations,
and relations of second-order similarity -- complement
rather than conflict with each other. After developing an
argument for teleosemantics by examining the nature of
explanation in the mind and brain sciences, she develops a
theory of mental content and defends it against six main
content-determinacy challenges to a naturalized
semantics.},
Key = {fds331100}
}
@article{fds336417,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The methodological argument for informational
teleosemantics},
Pages = {121-140},
Booktitle = {How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for
Naturalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107055834},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.007},
Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2017. The Bare-Bones Version
Dennis Stampe (1977) and Fred Dretske (1986) proposed that
mental reference to content supervenes on
information-carrying functions. Their proposal endorsed two
main theses: (1) that mental reference to content is
grounded in the normal-proper functions of components of
cognitive systems (teleosemantics) and (2) that mental
reference to content is grounded in the natural information
processed by these systems (informational semantics). My aim
here is to make explicit a methodological argument in
support of this dual thesis (“informational
teleosemantics”). The argument is methodological in the
sense that it relies on certain claims concerning
explanatory concepts and practices in the mind and brain
sciences. This first section gives the bare-bones version of
the methodological argument. Later sections discuss each of
the premises in turn, and then they discuss the kind and
degree of support that the argument provides for the
conclusion. Without further ado, here is the bare-bones
version: P1: A notion of normal-proper function is central
to the multilevel componential analyses (aka “functional
analyses”) of the operation of bodies and brains that are
currently provided by physiologists and neurophysiologists.
P2: The brain’s normal-proper functions include cognitive
functions. P3: The same notion of function (mentioned in P1)
is central to the functional analyses of cognition that
cognitive scientists provide. P4: An assumption in the
mainstream branches of the cognitive sciences is that
cognition involves information processing. P5: The
(relevant) notion of information involved in talk of
information processing in cognitive science is a notion of
natural, factive information. P6: Cognitive science posits
“normative aboutness,” with the norms derived from the
normal-proper functions and the aboutness from the natural,
factive information. C: Some version of informational
teleosemantics (broadly conceived) is supported by the
explanations of cognition that the mind and brain sciences
currently provide. Though probably implicit in the
suggestions made by Stampe and Dretske, this argument has
not been fully articulated before. I try to cast some light
on the reasons for this in the discussion that follows.
Premise 1 The first premise says that a notion of
normal-proper function is central to the multilevel
componential analyses (aka “functional analyses”) of the
operation of bodies and brains that are currently provided
by physiologists and neurophysiologists.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781107295490.007},
Key = {fds336417}
}
@article{fds244514,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Biological Functions},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244514}
}
@article{fds219962,
Author = {Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg},
Title = {Solving the Circularity Problem for Functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
Keywords = {functions, etiological, modal theory},
Abstract = {A response to the circularity objection to an etiological
theory of functions and critique of the modal theory of
functions.},
Key = {fds219962}
}
@article{fds299423,
Author = {Neander, K and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to
Nanay},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {109},
Number = {10},
Pages = {613-622},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000322685100003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Key = {fds299423}
}
@article{fds244522,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Toward an Informational Teleosemantics},
Pages = {21-41},
Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Editor = {Kingsbury, J and Ryder, D},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {0470656859},
Abstract = {This argues against Millikan’s admonishments to the
contrary that a teleosemantic theory of mental content can
be a causal theory of content. Objections to the effect that
functions are selected effects and so are not causes are
mistaken about what follows from an etiological theory of
functions. There can be information carrying functions on an
appropriate understanding of natural functions and natural
information.},
Key = {fds244522}
}
@article{fds244513,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Teleological theories of mental content"},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244513}
}
@article{fds244541,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244541}
}
@article{fds244521,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Comment les traits sont-ils types dans le but leur
attribuuer des fonctions?" (How are traits typed for the
purpose of ascribing functions to them?)},
Pages = {99-124},
Booktitle = {Les Fonctions: des organismes aux Artifacts},
Publisher = {Press Universitaires France},
Editor = {Gayon, J},
Year = {2010},
Month = {Fall},
Keywords = {functions vestigial traits exaptations selection selection
for Cummins etiological theory of functions},
Abstract = {This paper discusses how traits are to be classified, not by
functions, but for the purpose of ascribing functions to
them.},
Key = {fds244521}
}
@article{fds244526,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homolgies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-39},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244526}
}
@article{fds244542,
Author = {Neander, KL and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Homologies SE (or CR) Function-Free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1464-3537},
Key = {fds244542}
}
@article{fds299430,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function
free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {307-334},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000273398800003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This article argues that at least very many judgments of
homology rest on prior attributions of selected-effect (SE)
function, and that many of the "parts" of biological systems
that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by
(are so classified in virtue of) their consequence
etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the
prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous
and are often used to differentiate more restricted
homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so,
we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been
offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1086/649807},
Key = {fds299430}
}
@article{fds244520,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Les explication fonctionnelles},
Pages = {5-35},
Booktitle = {Revue Philosophique},
Editor = {Lorne, MC and Forest, D},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244520}
}
@article{fds299424,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Les explications fonctionnelles},
Journal = {Revue Philosophique De La France Et De L'Étranger},
Volume = {134},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-5},
Publisher = {CAIRN},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0035-3833},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000263338100002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.3917/rphi.091.0005},
Key = {fds299424}
}
@article{fds244527,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Naturalistic Theories of Reference},
Pages = {374-391},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470757031.ch19},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470757031.ch19},
Key = {fds244527}
}
@article{fds244512,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve
the Problem of Intentionality?},
Pages = {381-409},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ruse, M},
Year = {2008},
Keywords = {content mental content teleological theories of mental
content teleosemantics representation Dretske Millikan
Fodor},
Abstract = {Survey and critique of teleological theories of mental
content.},
Key = {fds244512}
}
@article{fds244540,
Author = {Lycan, W and Neander, K},
Title = {Teleofunctionalism},
Journal = {Scholarpedia},
Volume = {3},
Number = {7},
Pages = {5358-5358},
Publisher = {Scholarpedia},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4249/scholarpedia.5358},
Doi = {10.4249/scholarpedia.5358},
Key = {fds244540}
}
@article{fds311265,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Biological Approaches To Mental Representation},
Pages = {549-565},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Abstract = {As per Brentano, one cannot have any mental attitude towards
a thing unless it is present in one's mind. One cannot hope,
doubt, taste, believe, or remember that thing unless the
thing and its characteristics are present in mind.
Teleosemantic theories are diverse range of answers on how
do minds and brains represent things and what is these
reference to these contents? But each teleosemantic theory
maintains that the answer involves a normative and
teleological notion of function, or in other words a notion
of function that underwrites talk of malfunction and that is
construed as a notion of what traits or items are for. There
are a number of different teleological theories of mental
content. Certainly there is a specific normative notion of
function that underwrites certain normative notion of
content. Content is said to be normative because some mental
states that have content may represent correctly or may also
misrepresent. Teleological theories of mental content, like
others, attempt to provide naturalistic theories of mental
content. According to Ontological Behaviorism, mental terms
have a behavioral analysis. The first analysis is that
mental states cannot be reduced to brain states because
mental states are multiply realizable and second analysis is
that mental states can be characterized in terms of their
functional role. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Key = {fds311265}
}
@article{fds244539,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Moths and Metaphors. Review Essay on Organisms and
Artifacts: Design in Nature and Elsewhere by Tim
Lewens},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {4},
Pages = {591-602},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000242448800009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-005-9006-6},
Key = {fds244539}
}
@article{fds244510,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {“Biological Approaches to Mental Representation”},
Pages = {561-77},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 3: The
Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Matthen, M and Stevens, C},
Year = {2006},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Keywords = {content mental content representation teleological
teleosemantics Millikan Dretske Papineau},
Abstract = {Survey and critique of teleological (teleosemantic) theories
of mental content.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Key = {fds244510}
}
@article{fds244511,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {“Naturalistic Theories of Reference”},
Pages = {374-391},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of
Language},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Editor = {Devitt, M and Hanley, R},
Year = {2006},
Keywords = {content mental content representation naturalistic reference
Fodor Millikan Dretske},
Abstract = {A survey of contemporary naturalistic theories of reference
in so far as they concern mental representations.},
Key = {fds244511}
}
@article{fds244519,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Content for Cognitive Science},
Pages = {140-159},
Booktitle = {Teleosemantics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Papineau, D and McDonald, G},
Year = {2006},
Keywords = {teleosemantics teleological theories of mental content
content mental content representation cognitive science
Millikan Dretske Fodor},
Abstract = {This paper on mental representation argues that only certain
contents are suitable for mainstream cognitive science and
information processing explanations of cognitive capacities.
It also argues via a detailed look at toad neuroethology
that standard teleosemantic theories (e.g., Millikan’s and
Sterelny’s) do not generate suitable content ascriptions
for simple systems (frogs and the like), though other
teleosemantic theories may do so (e.g., Neander’s and
Dretske’s).},
Key = {fds244519}
}
@article{fds219965,
Author = {K.L. Neander},
Title = {"Moths and Metaphors: A Critical Essay on Organisms and
Artifacts: Design in Nature and Elsewhere" by Tim
Lewens},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds219965}
}
@article{fds244509,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Evolutionary Theory and Natural Selection"},
Booktitle = {Encyclopdia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244509}
}
@article{fds244523,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Teleology},
Journal = {Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244523}
}
@article{fds244517,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional
Homologues},
Booktitle = {Functions: New Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology and
Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ariew, A and Cummins, R and Perlman, M},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244517}
}
@article{fds244518,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Warum Geschichte zahlt: Vier Theorien von Funktionen (Why
History Matters: Four Theories of Function in
Biology)},
Booktitle = {Formen der Erklaerung in der Biologie},
Publisher = {Verlag fuer Wissenschaft und Bildung},
Editor = {Weingarten, M and Schlosser, G},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244518}
}
@article{fds244516,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Fitness and the Fate of Unicorns},
Pages = {3-26},
Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays},
Publisher = {Bradford, MIT Press},
Address = {Cambridge, Mass},
Editor = {Hardcastle, V},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244516}
}
@article{fds244538,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for
representational theories of consciousness},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {32},
Number = {SUPPL. 12},
Pages = {411-434},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000076800200018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18},
Key = {fds244538}
}
@article{fds244508,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {MENTAL ILLNESS, concept of},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Craig, E and Jackson, S-EBF},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244508}
}
@article{fds244530,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The Function of Cognition: Godfrey-Smith's Environmental
Complexity Thesis},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {567-580},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006524203891},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006524203891},
Key = {fds244530}
}
@article{fds244533,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Dretske's innate modesty},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {258-274},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1996},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UL62300002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409612347241},
Key = {fds244533}
}
@article{fds244532,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Swampman Meets Swampcow},
Journal = {Mind & Language},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {118-129},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UW16900010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00036.x},
Key = {fds244532}
}
@article{fds244529,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Explaining complex adaptations: A reply to sober's 'reply to
neander'},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {583-587},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.4.583},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/46.4.583},
Key = {fds244529}
}
@article{fds244531,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Misrepresenting & malfunctioning},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {79},
Number = {2},
Pages = {109-141},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1995},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995RP14800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00989706},
Key = {fds244531}
}
@article{fds244534,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Pruning the tree of life},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {46},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-80},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995QL53800003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Some (eg. Elliott Sober) argue that natural selection does
not explain the genotypic arid phenotypic properties of
individuals. On this view, natural selection explains the
adaptedness of individuals, not by explaining why the
individuals that exist have the adaptations they do, but
rather by explaining why the individuals that exist are the
ones with those adaptations. This paper argues that this
'Negative' view of natural selection ignores the fact that
natural selection is a cumulative selection process. So
understood, it explains how the genetic sequences that
individuals inherit and that are responsible for their
complex (and co-adapted) adaptations first arose in the
gene-pool. © 1995 Oxford University Press.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/46.1.59},
Key = {fds244534}
}
@article{fds299422,
Author = {Neander, KD and Flohr, HJ},
Title = {The tautly stretched bedsheet as a trigger for decubitus
ulcers},
Journal = {Krankenpflege Journal},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {65-67},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0174-108X},
Key = {fds299422}
}
@article{fds244515,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Comments on Stich and Laurence},
Pages = {120-124},
Booktitle = {Prospects for Intentionality},
Editor = {Neander, K and Ravenscroft, I},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244515}
}
@article{fds244535,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The teleological notion of 'function},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {69},
Number = {4},
Pages = {454-468},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1991},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991GR92500005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409112344881},
Key = {fds244535}
}
@article{fds244536,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's
Defense},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {58},
Number = {2},
Pages = {168-184},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1991},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991FQ15000002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/289610},
Key = {fds244536}
}
@article{fds244528,
Author = {Neander, K and Menzies, P},
Title = {David omens on levels of explanation},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {99},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0026-4423},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DR99100010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/XCIX.395.459},
Key = {fds244528}
}
@article{fds340356,
Author = {NEANDER, K and MENZIES, P},
Title = {OWENS,DAVID ON LEVELS OF EXPLANATION},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {99},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds340356}
}
@article{fds219969,
Author = {K.L. Neander and Peter Menzies},
Title = {David Owens on Levels of Explanation},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {XCIX},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds219969}
}
@article{fds299421,
Author = {Neander, KD},
Title = {Prevention of decubitus ulcer--current perceptions},
Journal = {Krankenpflege Journal},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {204-211},
Year = {1989},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0174-108X},
Key = {fds299421}
}
@article{fds299427,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to
Sober},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {55},
Number = {3},
Pages = {422-426},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988P877200007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/289446},
Key = {fds299427}
}
@article{fds299428,
Author = {NEANDER, K},
Title = {ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE - THE VERY IDEA -
HAUGELAND,J},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {66},
Number = {2},
Pages = {269-271},
Year = {1988},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988P747700016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds299428}
}
@article{fds244525,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Discussion: What Does Natural Selection Explain?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {422-426},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244525}
}
@article{fds244537,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Pictorial representation: A matter of resemblance},
Journal = {The British Journal of Aesthetics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {213-226},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0007-0904},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987J128400002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/bjaesthetics/27.3.213},
Key = {fds244537}
}
@article{fds299429,
Author = {NEANDER, K},
Title = {THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION -
CUMMINS,R},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {64},
Number = {1},
Pages = {104-108},
Year = {1986},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1986C175500014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds299429}
}
@article{fds244524,
Author = {Neander, KL and Mortensen, C and Speck, C},
Title = {Art, Representation and Values},
Journal = {Journal of the Institute of Art Education},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-66},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244524}
}
@article{fds219963,
Author = {K.L. Neander},
Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"},
Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
Editor = {Justine Kingsbury},
Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation,
content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.},
Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems
can have the function to produce one thing in response to
another. This has consequences for the kind of
teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made
by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have
contents that are determined by the functions of sensory
systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper
further explores these implications and offers a
teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory
representations. It further offers a solution to the problem
of distal content.},
Key = {fds219963}
}
%% Norman, Wayne J.
@article{fds223990,
Author = {W. Norman},
Title = {Is there a "Point" to Markets? A Response to
Martin},
Journal = {Business Ethics Journal Review},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {22-28},
Year = {2014},
ISSN = {2326-7526},
url = {http://businessethicsjournalreview.com/2014/06/01/the-point-of-markets/},
Key = {fds223990}
}
%% Park, John J.
@article{fds216908,
Author = {J.J. Park},
Title = {The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Progressivism of
Scientific Explanation},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds216908}
}
@article{fds189340,
Author = {J.J. Park},
Title = {Moral Concepts & Moral Truth},
Booktitle = {Truth Matters: Knowledge, Politics, Ethics,
Religion},
Publisher = {McGill-Queens University Press},
Editor = {Lambert Zuidervaart},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds189340}
}
@article{fds296427,
Author = {JJ Park coauthored and H Sarkissian and D Tien and J Wright and J
Knobe},
Title = {Folk Moral Relativism},
Journal = {Mind & Language},
Volume = {26},
Pages = {482-505},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/Relativism.pdf},
Key = {fds296427}
}
@article{fds296428,
Author = {JJ Park},
Title = {Prototypes, Exemplars, and Theoretical & Applied
Ethics},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {237-247},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/6984 Duke open
access},
Key = {fds296428}
}
%% Pavese, Carlotta
@article{fds343712,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {The psychological reality of practical representation},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {785-822},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214},
Key = {fds343712}
}
@article{fds340900,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Know-how, action, and luck},
Journal = {Synthese},
Pages = {1-23},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
Abstract = {© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
Springer Nature A good surgeon knows how to perform a
surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We
value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes
it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is
valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how
explains their success at performing a surgery. And an
architect’s know-how explains their success at designing
houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its
special explanatory link to success. But in virtue of what
is know-how explanatorily linked to success? This essay
provides a novel argument for the thesis that know-how’s
special link to success is to be explained at least in part
in terms of its being, or involving, a doxastic attitude
that is epistemically alike propositional knowledge. It is
argued that the role played by know-how in explaining
intentional success shows that the epistemic differences
between know-how and knowledge, if any, are less than
usually thought; and that “revisionary intellectualism”,
the view that know-how is true belief that might well fall
short of knowledge, is not really a stable position. If its
explanatory link to success is what makes know-how valuable,
an upshot of my argument is that the value of know-how is
due, to a considerable extent, to its being, or involving, a
kind of propositional knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
Key = {fds340900}
}
@article{fds340901,
Author = {Beddor, B and Pavese, C},
Title = {Modal Virtue Epistemology},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12562},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12562},
Key = {fds340901}
}
@article{fds329157,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {A theory of practical meaning},
Journal = {Philosophical Topics},
Volume = {45},
Number = {2},
Pages = {65-96},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201745214},
Abstract = {This essay introduces the notion of practical meaning by
looking at a certain kind of procedural system-the motor
system-that plays a central role in computational models of
motor behavior. I suggest that a semantics for motor
commands has to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of
meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance of motor
representation and of its semantic properties in a
computational explanation of motor behavior, my argument
concludes that practical meanings play a central role in an
adequate explanation of motor behavior that is based on
these computational models. In the second part of this
essay, I generalize and clarify the notion of practical
meaning, and I defend the intelligibility of practical
meanings against an important objection.},
Doi = {10.5840/philtopics201745214},
Key = {fds329157}
}
@article{fds328610,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Know-how and gradability},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {126},
Number = {3},
Pages = {345-383},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3878493},
Abstract = {© 2017 by Cornell University. Orthodoxy has it that
knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees
(absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other
hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability
of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when
we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that
one knows how to do something better than somebody else.
When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions
of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against
intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a
species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends
intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is
argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how
should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic
phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible
with the absoluteness of the state reported.},
Doi = {10.1215/00318108-3878493},
Key = {fds328610}
}
@article{fds327430,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {On the meaning of 'therefore'},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {77},
Number = {1},
Pages = {88-97},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx040},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anx040},
Key = {fds327430}
}
@article{fds321609,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know
how},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {11},
Number = {11},
Pages = {650-660},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12364},
Abstract = {© 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley
& Sons Ltd The prequel to this paper has discussed the
relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the
topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This
sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent
debate on intellectualism about knowing how (Sections
1–3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether
intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and
intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how
fall or stand together (Sections 4–5).},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12364},
Key = {fds321609}
}
@article{fds321610,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {11},
Number = {11},
Pages = {642-649},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12359},
Abstract = {© 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley
& Sons Ltd Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In
this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and
of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of
explanation. I review some of the answers that have been
given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on
the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect
with the philosophy of skill.},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12359},
Key = {fds321610}
}
@article{fds324408,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Logical Inference and Its Dynamics},
Journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems},
Pages = {203-219},
Publisher = {COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS},
Editor = {Roy, O and Tamminga, A and Willer, M},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds324408}
}
@article{fds310114,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Knowing a rule},
Journal = {Philosophical Issues},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {165-188},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1533-6077},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12045},
Doi = {10.1111/phis.12045},
Key = {fds310114}
}
@article{fds310113,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Practical senses},
Journal = {Philosophers Imprint},
Volume = {15},
Number = {29},
Pages = {1-25},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds310113}
}
@article{fds330842,
Author = {Pavese, C},
Title = {Meanings, propositions and decitationalism},
Journal = {Iride},
Volume = {20},
Number = {51},
Pages = {361-368},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1414/25524},
Doi = {10.1414/25524},
Key = {fds330842}
}
%% Pickford, Henry
@article{fds369172,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Adorno and the categories of resistance},
Journal = {Constellations},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
Key = {fds369172}
}
@article{fds371498,
Author = {Pickford, H},
Title = {Life, Logic, Style: On Late Wittgenstein},
Pages = {168-193},
Booktitle = {Wittgenstein and Literary Studies},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2023},
ISBN = {9781108978163},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108973687},
Abstract = {In addition to explaining what "literary
Wittgensteinianism" is, it provides a point of entry
into the chapters of this volume by explaining the basic
difference between the "early" and
"late" Wittgenstein and how each has opened up
novel ...},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108973687},
Key = {fds371498}
}
@article{fds369978,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {"Teaching of Life": Tolstoy's moral-philosophical
aesthetics},
Pages = {597-619},
Booktitle = {The Palgrave Handbook of Russian Thought},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9783030629816},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62982-3_27},
Abstract = {This chapter outlines and evaluates Tolstoy's theory of art
as presented in his What is Art? I focus on his concept of
emotion, moral emotions and their expression or elicitation
in art works. Along the way I indicate where additional
theorizing is required to defend his theory.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-62982-3_27},
Key = {fds369978}
}
@article{fds358858,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Recognizing "the party of humankind": Käte Hamburger on
Mitleid},
Journal = {MLN - Modern Language Notes},
Volume = {136},
Number = {3},
Pages = {660-672},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mln.2021.0045},
Doi = {10.1353/mln.2021.0045},
Key = {fds358858}
}
@article{fds362924,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Knock Knock},
Journal = {Krisis},
Volume = {41},
Number = {2},
Pages = {106-108},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/KRISIS.41.2.38069},
Doi = {10.21827/KRISIS.41.2.38069},
Key = {fds362924}
}
@article{fds367056,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {THEODOR W. ADORNO (1903-69) Henry W. Pickford In memory
of Jonathan Hess},
Pages = {143-154},
Booktitle = {ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MARXISM AND POST-MARXISM},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {978-1-138-55552-5},
Key = {fds367056}
}
@article{fds358102,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Theodor W. Adorno (1903-69)},
Pages = {143-154},
Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Marxism and Post-Marxism},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781138555525},
Key = {fds358102}
}
@article{fds361218,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Adorno and literary Criticism},
Pages = {365-381},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Adorno},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781119146919},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119146940.ch23},
Abstract = {This essay first contextualizes Adorno’s essays in
literary criticism in relation to his historico-philosophical
account of modern rationalization and late capitalism, his
dialectical theory of culture, and his return to postwar
Germany. It then presents the neo-Marxist and formalist
principles that inform his literary criticism, emphasizing
the artwork’s critical relationship to society, on the one
hand, and the theory of aesthetic experience undergone by
the artwork’s recipient on the other. These principles are
exemplified in selective readings of Adorno’s essays on
Heinrich Heine and Friedrich Hölderlin. The essay concludes
by polemically juxtaposing Adorno’s practice of literary
criticism with that of neo-Aristotelian “ethical
criticism.”.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781119146940.ch23},
Key = {fds361218}
}
@article{fds367057,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {REMARKS ON THE RIDDLE-CHARACTER OF ART AND METAPHYSICAL
EXPERIENCE},
Journal = {CONSTELACIONES-REVISTA DE TEORIA CRITICA},
Volume = {11-12},
Pages = {78-99},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds367057}
}
@article{fds342139,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Tolstoy's Selfie},
Journal = {Novel},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {128-132},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00295132-3854431},
Doi = {10.1215/00295132-3854431},
Key = {fds342139}
}
@article{fds376883,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Poiêsis, Praxis, Aisthesis: Remarks on Aristotle and
Marx},
Pages = {23-48},
Booktitle = {Aesthetic Marx},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350024229},
Key = {fds376883}
}
@article{fds367058,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Poiesis, Praxis, Aisthesis: Remarks on
Aristotle and Marx},
Pages = {23-48},
Booktitle = {AESTHETIC MARX},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-3500-7471-2},
Key = {fds367058}
}
@book{fds352119,
Author = {Pickford, H},
Title = {Thinking with tolstoy and wittgenstein: Expression, emotion,
and art},
Pages = {1-228},
Publisher = {Northwestern University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780810131705},
Abstract = {In this highly original interdisciplinary study
incorporating close readings of literary texts and
philosophical argumentation, Henry W. Pickford develops a
theory of meaning and expression in art intended to counter
the meaning skepticism most commonly associated with the
theories of Jacques Derrida. Pickford arrives at his theory
by drawing on the writings of Wittgenstein to develop and
modify the insights of Tolstoy’s philosophy of art.
Pickford shows how Tolstoy’s encounter with
Schopenhauer’s thought on the one hand provided support
for his ethical views but on the other hand presented a
problem, exemplified in the case of music, for his aesthetic
theory, a problem that Tolstoy did not successfully resolve.
Wittgenstein’s critical appreciation of Tolstoy’s
thinking, however, not only recovers its viability but also
constructs a formidable position within contemporary debates
concerning theories of emotion, ethics, and aesthetic
expression.},
Key = {fds352119}
}
@article{fds352120,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Intertextuality as critique in khlebnikov: Towards a reading
of “serpent train”},
Pages = {139-159},
Booktitle = {A Convenient Territory: Russian Literature at the Edge of
Modernity: Essays in Honor of Barry Scherr},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780893574529},
Key = {fds352120}
}
@book{fds352121,
Author = {Chapman, A and Ellis, A and Hanna, R and Hildebrand, T and Pickford,
HW},
Title = {In defense of intuitions: A new rationalist
manifesto},
Pages = {1-427},
Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9781137347930},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137347954},
Abstract = {A reply to contemporary skepticism about intuitions and a
priori knowledge, and a defense of neo-rationalism from a
contemporary Kantian standpoint, focusing on the theory of
rational intuitions and on solving the two core problems of
justifying and explaining them.},
Doi = {10.1057/9781137347954},
Key = {fds352121}
}
@article{fds358103,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Towards a defense of rational intuitions},
Pages = {102-133},
Booktitle = {In Defense of Intuitions: A New Rationalist
Manifesto},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9781137347930},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137347954},
Doi = {10.1057/9781137347954},
Key = {fds358103}
}
@article{fds352122,
Author = {Pickford, H},
Title = {Thinking with Kleist: Michael Kohlhaas and moral
luck},
Journal = {German Quarterly},
Volume = {86},
Number = {4},
Pages = {381-403},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gequ.10188},
Abstract = {The concept of moral luck comprises four aspects of acts of
the Kantian will that are beyond the control of the agent
and yet, paradoxically, can affect her moral appraisal. The
challenge posed to Kantian moral theory by moral luck was
identified by Schleiermacher in his critical review of
Kant's Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, and evidence
suggests that Kleist was familiar with Kant's relevant
writings while composing Michael Kohlhaas, a novella in
which the various kinds of moral luck play a significant
role. I extend the concept of moral luck by discussing two
further versions of it in the novella, which I call
interpretive moral luck and - drawing on Max Weber - proxy
moral luck. In tracing these categories, I show how Kleist
dramatized paradoxical consequences of Kant's theory that
Kant himself acknowledged. Lastly, I interpret the secondary
narrative of the gypsy woman and her prophecy as a further
critique of Kantian morality. © 2013, American Association
of Teachers of German.},
Doi = {10.1111/gequ.10188},
Key = {fds352122}
}
@book{fds312518,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {The Sense of Semblance:Philosophical Analyses of Holocaust
Art},
Pages = {280 pages},
Publisher = {Fordham Univ Press},
Year = {2013},
ISBN = {9780823245406},
Abstract = {Drawing on work in contemporary analytic philosophy and
Adorno's normative aesthetic theory, this book aims to show
how selected Holocaust artworks in a variety of media (lyric
poetry by Paul Celan, Holocaust memorials, quotational texts
...},
Key = {fds312518}
}
@article{fds352123,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Dialectical reflections on Peter Eisenman's Memorial for the
Murdered Jews of Europe},
Journal = {Architectural Theory Review},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {419-439},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264826.2012.735636},
Abstract = {Normative, conceptual minimal conditions of adequacy for any
Holocaust memorial arguably include a historical relation,
in that the artwork must bear an intentional relation to
historical facts of the Holocaust, and an aesthetic
relation, in that the artwork must evince aesthetic
properties of some sort that elicit an aesthetic experience.
In this paper, after first outlining various design
possibilities, including abstract or formalist art in
general, within a dialectical framework of representation
and non-representation, I argue that Eisenman's Memorial for
the Murdered Jews of Europe fails to bear an adequate
historical relation and, hence, is an unsuccessful memorial,
despite defences of the design by Rauterberg, Eisenman and
Agamben. By contrast, I show how memorials incorporating
abstract art can successfully fulfil the minimal conditions
by analysing Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Finally,
drawing on the tradition of memorials to war dead, I propose
a more radical alternative to Eisenman's project. © 2012
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/13264826.2012.735636},
Key = {fds352123}
}
@article{fds352124,
Author = {Pickford, H},
Title = {The Last Soviet Photographer},
Journal = {Raritan},
Volume = {31},
Number = {3},
Publisher = {Rutgers University},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds352124}
}
@article{fds358104,
Author = {Adorno, TW and Pickford, HW},
Title = {Reason and revelation},
Pages = {167-173},
Booktitle = {The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major
Thinkers},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9780415966979},
Key = {fds358104}
}
@article{fds352125,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Conflict and commemoration: Two Berlin memorials},
Journal = {Modernism - Modernity},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {133-173},
Publisher = {Project Muse},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mod.2005.0048},
Doi = {10.1353/mod.2005.0048},
Key = {fds352125}
}
@book{fds356339,
Author = {Adorno, TW},
Title = {Critical Models Interventions and Catchwords},
Pages = {410 pages},
Publisher = {European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and
Cultural Criticism},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {9780231135054},
Abstract = {"Critical Models' combines two of Adorno's most
important postwar works - 'Interventions' and
'Catchwords"--And addresses issues such as the
dangers of ideological conformity, the fragility of
democracy, educational reform, the influence of
...},
Key = {fds356339}
}
@article{fds352126,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Critical Models: Adorno's Theory and Practice of Cultural
Criticism},
Journal = {The Yale Journal of Criticism},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {247-270},
Publisher = {Project MUSE},
Year = {1997},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/yale.1997.0026},
Doi = {10.1353/yale.1997.0026},
Key = {fds352126}
}
%% Powell, Russell
@article{fds146125,
Author = {R. Powell (w/ Allen Buchanan)},
Title = {Breaking Evolution's Chains: The Promise of Enhancement by
Design},
Booktitle = {Enhancement (Julian Savulescu, ed., Oxford)
(forthcoming)},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds146125}
}
@article{fds165198,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {The Evolutionary Biological Implications of Human Genetic
Engineering},
Journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds165198}
}
@article{fds165199,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {What’s the harm? An Evolutionary Theoretical Critique of
the Precautionary Principle},
Journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds165199}
}
@article{fds165200,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {On the Disappearance of Species: Ontological and
Epistemological Challenges to a Robust Environmental
Ethic},
Journal = {Oxford Handbook on Ethics and Animals},
Pages = {T.L. Beauchamp and R.J. Frey},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds165200}
}
@article{fds165197,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {Contingency and Convergence in Macroevolution: A Reply to
Beatty},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds165197}
}
@article{fds71019,
Author = {R. Powell (w/ Allen Buchanan)},
Title = {Fidelity to Constitutional Democracy and to the Rule of
International Law},
Journal = {Routledge Handbook for International Law},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds71019}
}
@article{fds165201,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law:
Are They Compatible?},
Journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {326-349},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds165201}
}
@article{fds146124,
Author = {R. Powell (w/ Allen Buchanan)},
Title = {Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law:
Are They Compatible?},
Journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy (forthcoming)},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds146124}
}
@article{fds70617,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {Is Convergence More than an Analogy? Homoplasy and its
Implications for Macroevolutionary Predictability},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {22},
Pages = {565-578},
Publisher = {Springer},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds70617}
}
@article{fds70618,
Author = {R. Powell},
Title = {The Law and Philosophy of Preventive War: An
Institution-Based Approach to Collective
Self-Defense},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {67-89},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds70618}
}
%% Purves, Dale
@book{fds370321,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Why Brains Don't Compute},
Pages = {1-168},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9783030710637},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71064-4},
Abstract = {This book examines what seems to be the basic challenge in
neuroscience today: understanding how experience generated
by the human brain is related to the physical world we live
in. The 25 short chapters present the argument and evidence
that brains address this problem on a wholly trial and error
basis. The goal is to encourage neuroscientists, computer
scientists, philosophers, and other interested readers to
consider this concept of neural function and its
implications, not least of which is the conclusion that
brains don't "compute."},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-71064-4},
Key = {fds370321}
}
@article{fds345466,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Opinion: What does AI's success playing complex board games
tell brain scientists?},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {116},
Number = {30},
Pages = {14785-14787},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1909565116},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1909565116},
Key = {fds345466}
}
@article{fds346898,
Author = {Ng, CJ and Purves, D},
Title = {An Alternative Theory of Binocularity.},
Journal = {Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {71},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2019.00071},
Abstract = {The fact that seeing with two eyes is universal among
vertebrates raises a problem that has long challenged vision
scientists: how do animals with overlapping visual fields
combine non-identical right and left eye images to achieve
fusion and the perception of depth that follows? Most
theories address this problem in terms of matching
corresponding images on the right and left retinas. Here we
suggest an alternative theory of binocular vision based on
anatomical correspondence that circumvents the
correspondence problem and provides a rationale for ocular
dominance.},
Doi = {10.3389/fncom.2019.00071},
Key = {fds346898}
}
@article{fds336007,
Author = {Bowling, DL and Purves, D and Gill, KZ},
Title = {Reply to Goffinet: In consonance, old ideas die
hard.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {115},
Number = {22},
Pages = {E4958-E4959},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805570115},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1805570115},
Key = {fds336007}
}
@article{fds331493,
Author = {Bowling, DL and Purves, D and Gill, KZ},
Title = {Vocal similarity predicts the relative attraction of musical
chords.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {115},
Number = {1},
Pages = {216-221},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1713206115},
Abstract = {Musical chords are combinations of two or more tones played
together. While many different chords are used in music,
some are heard as more attractive (consonant) than others.
We have previously suggested that, for reasons of biological
advantage, human tonal preferences can be understood in
terms of the spectral similarity of tone combinations to
harmonic human vocalizations. Using the chromatic scale, we
tested this theory further by assessing the perceived
consonance of all possible dyads, triads, and tetrads within
a single octave. Our results show that the consonance of
chords is predicted by their relative similarity to voiced
speech sounds. These observations support the hypothesis
that the relative attraction of musical tone combinations is
due, at least in part, to the biological advantages that
accrue from recognizing and responding to conspecific vocal
stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1713206115},
Key = {fds331493}
}
@article{fds348739,
Author = {Purves, D and Yegappan, C},
Title = {The Demands of Geometry on Color Vision.},
Journal = {Vision (Basel, Switzerland)},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {E9},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/vision1010009},
Abstract = {While studies of human color vision have made enormous
strides, an overarching rationale for the circular sense of
color relationships generated by two classes of color
opponent neurons and three cone types is still lacking. Here
we suggest that color circularity, color opponency and
trichromacy may have arisen, at least in part, because of
the geometrical requirements needed to unambiguously
distinguish all possible spectrally different regions on a
plane.},
Doi = {10.3390/vision1010009},
Key = {fds348739}
}
@article{fds268347,
Author = {Bowling, DL and Purves, D},
Title = {A biological rationale for musical consonance.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {112},
Number = {36},
Pages = {11155-11160},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1505768112},
Abstract = {The basis of musical consonance has been debated for
centuries without resolution. Three interpretations have
been considered: (i) that consonance derives from the
mathematical simplicity of small integer ratios; (ii) that
consonance derives from the physical absence of interference
between harmonic spectra; and (iii) that consonance derives
from the advantages of recognizing biological vocalization
and human vocalization in particular. Whereas the
mathematical and physical explanations are at odds with the
evidence that has now accumulated, biology provides a
plausible explanation for this central issue in music and
audition.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1505768112},
Key = {fds268347}
}
@article{fds359924,
Author = {Purves, D and Morgenstern, Y and Wojtach, WT},
Title = {Will understanding vision require a wholly empirical
paradigm?},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {1072},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01072},
Abstract = {Based on electrophysiological and anatomical studies, a
prevalent conception is that the visual system recovers
features of the world from retinal images to generate
perceptions and guide behavior. This paradigm, however, is
unable to explain why visual perceptions differ from
physical measurements, or how behavior could routinely
succeed on this basis. An alternative is that vision does
not recover features of the world, but assigns perceptual
qualities empirically by associating frequently occurring
stimulus patterns with useful responses on the basis of
survival and reproductive success. The purpose of the
present article is to briefly describe this strategy of
vision and the evidence for it.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01072},
Key = {fds359924}
}
@article{fds323313,
Author = {Purves, D and Morgenstern, Y and Wojtach, WT},
Title = {Perception and Reality: Why a Wholly Empirical Paradigm is
Needed to Understand Vision.},
Journal = {Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {156},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2015.00156},
Abstract = {A central puzzle in vision science is how perceptions that
are routinely at odds with physical measurements of real
world properties can arise from neural responses that
nonetheless lead to effective behaviors. Here we argue that
the solution depends on: (1) rejecting the assumption that
the goal of vision is to recover, however imperfectly,
properties of the world; and (2) replacing it with a
paradigm in which perceptions reflect biological utility
based on past experience rather than objective features of
the environment. Present evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that conceiving vision in wholly empirical terms
provides a plausible way to understand what we see and
why.},
Doi = {10.3389/fnsys.2015.00156},
Key = {fds323313}
}
@article{fds268349,
Author = {Morgenstern, Y and Rostami, M and Purves, D},
Title = {Properties of artificial networks evolved to contend with
natural spectra.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {111 Suppl 3},
Pages = {10868-10872},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1402669111},
Abstract = {Understanding why spectra that are physically the same
appear different in different contexts (color contrast),
whereas spectra that are physically different appear similar
(color constancy) presents a major challenge in vision
research. Here, we show that the responses of biologically
inspired neural networks evolved on the basis of accumulated
experience with spectral stimuli automatically generate
contrast and constancy. The results imply that these
phenomena are signatures of a strategy that biological
vision uses to circumvent the inverse optics problem as it
pertains to light spectra, and that double-opponent neurons
in early-level vision evolve to serve this purpose. This
strategy provides a way of understanding the peculiar
relationship between the objective world and subjective
color experience, as well as rationalizing the relevant
visual circuitry without invoking feature detection or image
representation.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1402669111},
Key = {fds268349}
}
@article{fds268350,
Author = {Purves, D and Monson, BB and Sundararajan, J and Wojtach,
WT},
Title = {How biological vision succeeds in the physical
world.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {111},
Number = {13},
Pages = {4750-4755},
Year = {2014},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1311309111},
Abstract = {Biological visual systems cannot measure the properties that
define the physical world. Nonetheless, visually guided
behaviors of humans and other animals are routinely
successful. The purpose of this article is to consider how
this feat is accomplished. Most concepts of vision propose,
explicitly or implicitly, that visual behavior depends on
recovering the sources of stimulus features either directly
or by a process of statistical inference. Here we argue
that, given the inability of the visual system to access the
properties of the world, these conceptual frameworks cannot
account for the behavioral success of biological vision. The
alternative we present is that the visual system links the
frequency of occurrence of biologically determined stimuli
to useful perceptual and behavioral responses without
recovering real-world properties. The evidence for this
interpretation of vision is that the frequency of occurrence
of stimulus patterns predicts many basic aspects of what we
actually see. This strategy provides a different way of
conceiving the relationship between objective reality and
subjective experience, and offers a way to understand the
operating principles of visual circuitry without invoking
feature detection, representation, or probabilistic
inference.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1311309111},
Key = {fds268350}
}
@article{fds268348,
Author = {Morgenstern, Y and Rukmini, DV and Monson, BB and Purves,
D},
Title = {Properties of artificial neurons that report lightness based
on accumulated experience with luminance.},
Journal = {Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience},
Volume = {8},
Pages = {134},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2014.00134},
Abstract = {The responses of visual neurons in experimental animals have
been extensively characterized. To ask whether these
responses are consistent with a wholly empirical concept of
visual perception, we optimized simple neural networks that
responded according to the cumulative frequency of
occurrence of local luminance patterns in retinal images.
Based on this estimation of accumulated experience, the
neuron responses showed classical center-surround receptive
fields, luminance gain control and contrast gain control,
the key properties of early level visual neurons determined
in animal experiments. These results imply that a major
purpose of pre-cortical neuronal circuitry is to contend
with the inherently uncertain significance of luminance
values in natural stimuli.},
Doi = {10.3389/fncom.2014.00134},
Key = {fds268348}
}
@article{fds268352,
Author = {Monson, BB and Han, S and Purves, D},
Title = {Are auditory percepts determined by experience?},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {8},
Number = {5},
Pages = {e63728},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23667666},
Abstract = {Audition--what listeners hear--is generally studied in terms
of the physical properties of sound stimuli and
physiological properties of the auditory system. Based on
recent work in vision, we here consider an alternative
perspective that sensory percepts are based on past
experience. In this framework, basic auditory qualities
(e.g., loudness and pitch) are based on the frequency of
occurrence of stimulus patterns in natural acoustic stimuli.
To explore this concept of audition, we examined five
well-documented psychophysical functions. The frequency of
occurrence of acoustic patterns in a database of natural
sound stimuli (speech) predicts some qualitative aspects of
these functions, but with substantial quantitative
discrepancies. This approach may offer a rationale for
auditory phenomena that are difficult to explain in terms of
the physical attributes of the stimuli as
such.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0063728},
Key = {fds268352}
}
@article{fds268353,
Author = {Ng, C and Sundararajan, J and Hogan, M and Purves,
D},
Title = {Network connections that evolve to circumvent the inverse
optics problem.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e60490},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23555981},
Abstract = {A fundamental problem in vision science is how useful
perceptions and behaviors arise in the absence of
information about the physical sources of retinal stimuli
(the inverse optics problem). Psychophysical studies show
that human observers contend with this problem by using the
frequency of occurrence of stimulus patterns in cumulative
experience to generate percepts. To begin to understand the
neural mechanisms underlying this strategy, we examined the
connectivity of simple neural networks evolved to respond
according to the cumulative rank of stimulus luminance
values. Evolved similarities with the connectivity of early
level visual neurons suggests that biological visual
circuitry uses the same mechanisms as a means of creating
useful perceptions and behaviors without information about
the real world.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0060490},
Key = {fds268353}
}
@article{fds323314,
Author = {Bowling, D and Purves, D},
Title = {A biological basis for musical tonality},
Pages = {205-214},
Booktitle = {Sensory Perception: Mind and Matter},
Publisher = {Springer Vienna},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783211997505},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-99751-2_12},
Abstract = {Like other sensory qualities, the human ability to perceive
tonal sound stimuli has presumably evolved because of its
utility. Although a variety of tonal sounds are present in
the human auditory environment, the vocalizations of other
humans are the most biologically relevant and the most
frequently experienced. It is thus reasonable to assume that
our appreciation of tonal sounds has arisen primarily for
the benefits that accrue from this conspecific information.
It follows that the structure and function of the tonal
sounds produced by the human vocal apparatus may provide the
key to understanding how and why we perceive tonality in
music the way that we do. Here we consider recent evidence
that bears on this idea.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-211-99751-2_12},
Key = {fds323314}
}
@article{fds268472,
Author = {Bowling, DL and Sundararajan, J and Han, S and Purves,
D},
Title = {Expression of emotion in Eastern and Western music mirrors
vocalization.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e31942},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22431970},
Abstract = {In Western music, the major mode is typically used to convey
excited, happy, bright or martial emotions, whereas the
minor mode typically conveys subdued, sad or dark emotions.
Recent studies indicate that the differences between these
modes parallel differences between the prosodic and spectral
characteristics of voiced speech sounds uttered in
corresponding emotional states. Here we ask whether tonality
and emotion are similarly linked in an Eastern musical
tradition. The results show that the tonal relationships
used to express positive/excited and negative/subdued
emotions in classical South Indian music are much the same
as those used in Western music. Moreover, tonal variations
in the prosody of English and Tamil speech uttered in
different emotional states are parallel to the tonal trends
in music. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that the association between musical tonality and emotion is
based on universal vocal characteristics of different
affective states.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0031942},
Key = {fds268472}
}
@article{fds268471,
Author = {Purves, D and Wojtach, WT and Lotto, RB},
Title = {Understanding vision in wholly empirical
terms.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {108 Suppl 3},
Pages = {15588-15595},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21383192},
Abstract = {This article considers visual perception, the nature of the
information on which perceptions seem to be based, and the
implications of a wholly empirical concept of perception and
sensory processing for vision science. Evidence from studies
of lightness, brightness, color, form, and motion all
indicate that, because the visual system cannot access the
physical world by means of retinal light patterns as such,
what we see cannot and does not represent the actual
properties of objects or images. The phenomenology of visual
perceptions can be explained, however, in terms of empirical
associations that link images whose meanings are inherently
undetermined to their behavioral significance. Vision in
these terms requires fundamentally different concepts of
what we see, why, and how the visual system
operates.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1012178108},
Key = {fds268471}
}
@article{fds268470,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Clarke, R and Corney, D and Purves,
D},
Title = {Seeing in colour},
Journal = {Optics & Laser Technology},
Volume = {43},
Number = {2},
Pages = {261-269},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2011},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0030-3992},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.optlastec.2010.02.006},
Abstract = {Understanding perception of colour is challenging because
what we see is not always what is there, which is a
phenomenon we call illusions. Here we review the nature of
colour vision, and the problems facing most current models
and explanations. Focusing on our recent research on humans,
bees and computers, we describe a new, more ecologically
based explanation that provides a clear framework for why we
see what we do. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.optlastec.2010.02.006},
Key = {fds268470}
}
@article{fds268469,
Author = {Han, SE and Sundararajan, J and Bowling, DL and Lake, J and Purves,
D},
Title = {Co-variation of tonality in the music and speech of
different cultures.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {6},
Number = {5},
Pages = {e20160},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21637716},
Abstract = {Whereas the use of discrete pitch intervals is
characteristic of most musical traditions, the size of the
intervals and the way in which they are used is culturally
specific. Here we examine the hypothesis that these
differences arise because of a link between the tonal
characteristics of a culture's music and its speech. We
tested this idea by comparing pitch intervals in the
traditional music of three tone language cultures (Chinese,
Thai and Vietnamese) and three non-tone language cultures
(American, French and German) with pitch intervals between
voiced speech segments. Changes in pitch direction occur
more frequently and pitch intervals are larger in the music
of tone compared to non-tone language cultures. More
frequent changes in pitch direction and larger pitch
intervals are also apparent in the speech of tone compared
to non-tone language cultures. These observations suggest
that the different tonal preferences apparent in music
across cultures are closely related to the differences in
the tonal characteristics of voiced speech.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0020160},
Key = {fds268469}
}
@article{fds268466,
Author = {Bowling, DL and Gill, K and Choi, JD and Prinz, J and Purves,
D},
Title = {Major and minor music compared to excited and subdued
speech.},
Journal = {The Journal of the Acoustical Society of
America},
Volume = {127},
Number = {1},
Pages = {491-503},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20058994},
Abstract = {The affective impact of music arises from a variety of
factors, including intensity, tempo, rhythm, and tonal
relationships. The emotional coloring evoked by intensity,
tempo, and rhythm appears to arise from association with the
characteristics of human behavior in the corresponding
condition; however, how and why particular tonal
relationships in music convey distinct emotional effects are
not clear. The hypothesis examined here is that major and
minor tone collections elicit different affective reactions
because their spectra are similar to the spectra of voiced
speech uttered in different emotional states. To evaluate
this possibility the spectra of the intervals that
distinguish major and minor music were compared to the
spectra of voiced segments in excited and subdued speech
using fundamental frequency and frequency ratios as
measures. Consistent with the hypothesis, the spectra of
major intervals are more similar to spectra found in excited
speech, whereas the spectra of particular minor intervals
are more similar to the spectra of subdued speech. These
results suggest that the characteristic affective impact of
major and minor tone collections arises from associations
routinely made between particular musical intervals and
voiced speech.},
Doi = {10.1121/1.3268504},
Key = {fds268466}
}
@article{fds268465,
Author = {Gill, KZ and Purves, D},
Title = {A biological rationale for musical scales.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {4},
Number = {12},
Pages = {e8144},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19997506},
Abstract = {Scales are collections of tones that divide octaves into
specific intervals used to create music. Since humans can
distinguish about 240 different pitches over an octave in
the mid-range of hearing, in principle a very large number
of tone combinations could have been used for this purpose.
Nonetheless, compositions in Western classical, folk and
popular music as well as in many other musical traditions
are based on a relatively small number of scales that
typically comprise only five to seven tones. Why humans
employ only a few of the enormous number of possible tone
combinations to create music is not known. Here we show that
the component intervals of the most widely used scales
throughout history and across cultures are those with the
greatest overall spectral similarity to a harmonic series.
These findings suggest that humans prefer tone combinations
that reflect the spectral characteristics of conspecific
vocalizations. The analysis also highlights the spectral
similarity among the scales used by different
cultures.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0008144},
Key = {fds268465}
}
@article{fds268468,
Author = {Wojtach, WT and Sung, K and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of the speed-distance
effect.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {4},
Number = {8},
Pages = {e6771},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19707552},
Abstract = {Understanding motion perception continues to be the subject
of much debate, a central challenge being to account for why
the speeds and directions seen accord with neither the
physical movements of objects nor their projected movements
on the retina. Here we investigate the varied perceptions of
speed that occur when stimuli moving across the retina
traverse different projected distances (the speed-distance
effect). By analyzing a database of moving objects projected
onto an image plane we show that this phenomenology can be
quantitatively accounted for by the frequency of occurrence
of image speeds generated by perspective transformation.
These results indicate that speed-distance effects are
determined empirically from accumulated past experience with
the relationship between image speeds and moving
objects.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0006771},
Key = {fds268468}
}
@article{fds268351,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Perception of Surfaces and Forms},
Pages = {513-521},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-008045046-9.00229-1},
Abstract = {The purpose of this article is to consider the strategy that
vision uses to generate perceptions of surface qualities
such as brightness and color, as well as perceptions of
surface form. The basic challenge that vision must contend
with in elaborating these subjective experiences is linking
inherently ambiguous retinal stimuli to their real-world
sources in a manner that leads to successful visually guided
behavior. The evidence derived from what people actually see
indicates that this problem is solved in a fundamentally
empirical manner - that is, by the accumulation of past
experience rather than by analytical operations on visual
stimulus features. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-008045046-9.00229-1},
Key = {fds268351}
}
@article{fds268467,
Author = {Sung, K and Wojtach, WT and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of aperture effects.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {106},
Number = {1},
Pages = {298-303},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19114661},
Abstract = {The perceived direction of a moving line changes, often
markedly, when viewed through an aperture. Although several
explanations of this remarkable effect have been proposed,
these accounts typically focus on the percepts elicited by a
particular type of aperture and offer no biological
rationale. Here, we test the hypothesis that to contend with
the inherently ambiguous nature of motion stimuli the
perceived direction of objects moving behind apertures of
different shapes is determined by a wholly empirical
strategy of visual processing. An analysis of moving line
stimuli generated by objects projected through apertures
shows that the directions of motion subjects report in
psychophysical testing is accounted for by the frequency of
occurrence of the 2D directions of stimuli generated by
simulated 3D sources. The completeness of these predictions
supports the conclusion that the direction of perceived
motion is fully determined by accumulated behavioral
experience with sources whose physical motions cannot be
conveyed by image sequences as such.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0811702106},
Key = {fds268467}
}
@article{fds268464,
Author = {Gill, KZ and Purves, D},
Title = {A biological rationale for musical scales.},
Journal = {Plos One},
Volume = {4},
Number = {12},
Pages = {e8144},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {1932-6203},
Abstract = {Scales are collections of tones that divide octaves into
specific intervals used to create music. Since humans can
distinguish about 240 different pitches over an octave in
the mid-range of hearing, in principle a very large number
of tone combinations could have been used for this purpose.
Nonetheless, compositions in Western classical, folk and
popular music as well as in many other musical traditions
are based on a relatively small number of scales that
typically comprise only five to seven tones. Why humans
employ only a few of the enormous number of possible tone
combinations to create music is not known. Here we show that
the component intervals of the most widely used scales
throughout history and across cultures are those with the
greatest overall spectral similarity to a harmonic series.
These findings suggest that humans prefer tone combinations
that reflect the spectral characteristics of conspecific
vocalizations. The analysis also highlights the spectral
similarity among the scales used by different
cultures.},
Key = {fds268464}
}
@article{fds268462,
Author = {Wojtach, WT and Sung, K and Truong, S and Purves,
D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of the flash-lag
effect.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {105},
Number = {42},
Pages = {16338-16343},
Year = {2008},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18852459},
Abstract = {When a flash of light is presented in physical alignment
with a moving object, the flash is perceived to lag behind
the position of the object. This phenomenon, known as the
flash-lag effect, has been of particular interest to vision
scientists because of the challenge it presents to
understanding how the visual system generates perceptions of
objects in motion. Although various explanations have been
offered, the significance of this effect remains a matter of
debate. Here, we show that: (i) contrary to previous reports
based on limited data, the flash-lag effect is an increasing
nonlinear function of image speed; and (ii) this function is
accurately predicted by the frequency of occurrence of image
speeds generated by the perspective transformation of moving
objects. These results support the conclusion that
perceptions of the relative position of a moving object are
determined by accumulated experience with image speeds, in
this way allowing for visual behavior in response to
real-world sources whose speeds and positions cannot be
perceived directly.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0808916105},
Key = {fds268462}
}
@article{fds268463,
Author = {Ross, D and Choi, J and Purves, D},
Title = {Musical intervals in speech.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {104},
Number = {23},
Pages = {9852-9857},
Year = {2007},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17525146},
Abstract = {Throughout history and across cultures, humans have created
music using pitch intervals that divide octaves into the 12
tones of the chromatic scale. Why these specific intervals
in music are preferred, however, is not known. In the
present study, we analyzed a database of individually spoken
English vowel phones to examine the hypothesis that musical
intervals arise from the relationships of the formants in
speech spectra that determine the perceptions of distinct
vowels. Expressed as ratios, the frequency relationships of
the first two formants in vowel phones represent all 12
intervals of the chromatic scale. Were the formants to fall
outside the ranges found in the human voice, their
relationships would generate either a less complete or a
more dilute representation of these specific intervals.
These results imply that human preference for the intervals
of the chromatic scale arises from experience with the way
speech formants modulate laryngeal harmonics to create
different phonemes.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0703140104},
Key = {fds268463}
}
@article{fds268461,
Author = {Boots, B and Nundy, S and Purves, D},
Title = {Evolution of visually guided behavior in artificial
agents.},
Journal = {Network: Computation in Neural Systems},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-34},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0954-898X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17454680},
Abstract = {Recent work on brightness, color, and form has suggested
that human visual percepts represent the probable sources of
retinal images rather than stimulus features as such. Here
we investigate the plausibility of this empirical concept of
vision by allowing autonomous agents to evolve in virtual
environments based solely on the relative success of their
behavior. The responses of evolved agents to visual stimuli
indicate that fitness improves as the neural network control
systems gradually incorporate the statistical relationship
between projected images and behavior appropriate to the
sources of the inherently ambiguous images. These results:
(1) demonstrate the merits of a wholly empirical strategy of
animal vision as a means of contending with the inverse
optics problem; (2) argue that the information incorporated
into biological visual processing circuitry is the
relationship between images and their probable sources; and
(3) suggest why human percepts do not map neatly onto
physical reality.},
Doi = {10.1080/09548980601113254},
Key = {fds268461}
}
@article{fds268460,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Beau Lotto and R and Purves, D},
Title = {Comparison of Bayesian and empirical ranking approaches to
visual perception.},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology},
Volume = {241},
Number = {4},
Pages = {866-875},
Year = {2006},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0022-5193},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16537082},
Abstract = {Much current vision research is predicated on the idea--and
a rapidly growing body of evidence--that visual percepts are
generated according to the empirical significance of light
stimuli rather than their physical characteristics. As a
result, an increasing number of investigators have asked how
visual perception can be rationalized in these terms. Here,
we compare two different theoretical frameworks for
predicting what observers actually see in response to visual
stimuli: Bayesian decision theory and empirical ranking
theory. Deciding which of these approaches has greater merit
is likely to determine how the statistical operations that
apparently underlie visual perception are eventually
understood.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.01.017},
Key = {fds268460}
}
@article{fds268457,
Author = {Long, F and Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {Spectral statistics in natural scenes predict hue,
saturation, and brightness.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {103},
Number = {15},
Pages = {6013-6018},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16595630},
Abstract = {The perceptual color qualities of hue, saturation, and
brightness do not correspond in any simple way to the
physical characteristics of retinal stimuli, a fact that
poses a major obstacle for any explanation of color vision.
Here we test the hypothesis that these basic color
attributes are determined by the statistical covariations in
the spectral stimuli that humans have always experienced in
typical visual environments. Using a database of 1,600
natural images, we analyzed the joint probability
distributions of the physical variables most relevant to
each of these perceptual qualities. The cumulative density
functions derived from these distributions predict the major
colorimetric functions that have been reported in
psychophysical experiments over the last
century.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0600890103},
Key = {fds268457}
}
@article{fds268459,
Author = {Holcombe, AO and Clifford, CWG and Eagleman, DM and Pakarian,
P},
Title = {Illusory motion reversal in tune with motion
detectors.},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {12},
Pages = {559-560},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1364-6613},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.009},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.009},
Key = {fds268459}
}
@article{fds268458,
Author = {Andrews, T and Purves, D},
Title = {The wagon-wheel illusion in continuous light.},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {6},
Pages = {261-263},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.004},
Abstract = {The fact that a perceptual experience akin to the familiar
wagon-wheel illusion in movies and on TV can occur in the
absence of stroboscopic presentation is intriguing because
of its relevance to visuo-temporal parsing. The wagon-wheel
effect in continuous light has also been the source of
considerable misunderstanding and dispute, as is apparent in
a series of recent papers. Here we review this potentially
confusing evidence and suggest how it should be
interpreted.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.004},
Key = {fds268458}
}
@article{fds268455,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {The Poggendorff illusion explained by natural scene
geometry.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {102},
Number = {21},
Pages = {7707-7712},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15888555},
Abstract = {One of the most intriguing of the many discrepancies between
perceived spatial relationships and the physical structure
of visual stimuli is the Poggendorff illusion, when an
obliquely oriented line that is interrupted no longer
appears collinear. Although many different theories have
been proposed to explain this effect, there has been no
consensus about its cause. Here, we use a database of range
images (i.e., images that include the distance from the
image plane of every pixel in the scene) to show that the
probability distribution of the possible locations of line
segments across an interval in natural environments can
fully account for all of the behavior of this otherwise
puzzling phenomenon.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0502893102},
Key = {fds268455}
}
@article{fds268346,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {Perceiving geometry: Geometrical illusions explained by
natural scene statistics},
Journal = {Perceiving Geometry: Geometrical Illusions Explained by
Natural Scene Statistics},
Pages = {1-126},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b135453},
Abstract = {Understanding vision, whether from a neurobiological,
psychological or philosophical perspective, represents a
daunting challenge that has been pursued for millennia.
During at least the last few centuries, natural
philosophers, and more recently vision scientists, have
recognized that a fundamental problem in biological vision
is that the physical sources underlying sensory stimuli are
unknowable in any direct sense. In vision, because physical
qualities are conflated when the 3-D world is projected onto
the 2-D image plane of the retina, the provenance of light
reaching the eye at any moment is inevitably uncertain. This
quandary is referred to as the inverse optics problem. The
relationship of the real world and the information conveyed
to the brain by light present a profound problem. Successful
behavior in a complex and potentially hostile environment
clearly depends on responding appropriately to the sources
of visual stimuli rather than to the physical
characteristics of the stimuli as such. If the retinal
images generated by light cannot specify the underlying
reality an observer must deal with, how then does the visual
system produce behavior that is generally successful?
Perceiving Geometry considers the evidence that, with
respect to the perception of geometry, the human visual
system solves this problem by incorporating past human
experience of what retinal images have typically
corresponded to in the real world. This empirical strategy,
which is documented by extensive analyses of scene geometry,
explains many otherwise puzzling aspects of what we see
(i.e., the so-called "geometrical illusions"), providing the
best indication to date as to how perceptions of the
geometrical aspects of the world are actually generated by
the brain.},
Doi = {10.1007/b135453},
Key = {fds268346}
}
@article{fds268453,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {The Müller-Lyer illusion explained by the statistics of
image-source relationships.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {102},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1234-1239},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15657142},
Abstract = {The Müller-Lyer effect, the apparent difference in the
length of a line as the result of its adornment with
arrowheads or arrow tails, is the best known and most
controversial of the classical geometrical illusions. By
sampling a range-image database of natural scenes, we show
that the perceptual effects elicited by the Müller-Lyer
stimulus and its major variants are correctly predicted by
the probability distributions of the possible physical
sources underlying the relevant retinal images. These
results support the conclusion that the Müller-Lyer
illusion is a manifestation of the probabilistic strategy of
visual processing that has evolved to contend with the
uncertain provenance of retinal stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0409314102},
Key = {fds268453}
}
@article{fds268456,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {Natural-scene geometry predicts the perception of angles and
line orientation.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {102},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1228-1233},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15657143},
Abstract = {Visual stimuli that entail the intersection of two or more
straight lines elicit a variety of well known perceptual
anomalies. Preeminent among these anomalies are the
systematic overestimation of acute angles, the
underestimation of obtuse angles, and the misperceptions of
line orientation exemplified in the classical tilt, Zollner,
and Hering illusions. Here we show that the probability
distributions of the possible real-world sources of
projected lines and angles derived from a range-image
database of natural scenes accurately predict each of these
perceptual peculiarities. These findings imply that the
perception of angles and oriented lines is determined by the
statistical relationship between geometrical stimuli and
their physical sources in typical visual
environments.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0409311102},
Key = {fds268456}
}
@article{fds114100,
Title = {Lotto RB, Purves D (2005) Understanding the basis of color
perception. International Review of Neurobiology (In
press).},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds114100}
}
@article{fds268452,
Author = {Schwartz, DA and Purves, D},
Title = {Pitch is determined by naturally occurring periodic
sounds.},
Journal = {Hearing Research},
Volume = {194},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {31-46},
Year = {2004},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0378-5955},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15276674},
Abstract = {The phenomenology of pitch has been difficult to rationalize
and remains the subject of much debate. Here we test the
hypothesis that audition generates pitch percepts by
relating inherently ambiguous sound stimuli to their
probable sources in the human auditory environment. A
database of speech sounds, the principal source of periodic
sound energy for human listeners, was compiled and the
dominant periodicity of each speech sound determined. A set
of synthetic test stimuli were used to assess whether the
major pitch phenomena described in the literature could be
explained by the probabilistic relationship between the
stimuli and their probable sources (i.e., speech sounds).
The phenomena tested included the perception of the missing
fundamental, the pitch-shift of the residue, spectral
dominance and the perception of pitch strength. In each
case, the conditional probability distribution of speech
sound periodicities accurately predicted the pitches
normally heard in response to the test stimuli. We conclude
from these findings that pitch entails an auditory process
that relates inevitably ambiguous sound stimuli to their
probable natural sources.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.heares.2004.01.019},
Key = {fds268452}
}
@article{fds268454,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {The statistical structure of natural light patterns
determines perceived light intensity.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {101},
Number = {23},
Pages = {8745-8750},
Year = {2004},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15152077},
Abstract = {The same target luminance in different contexts can elicit
markedly different perceptions of brightness, a fact that
has long puzzled vision scientists. Here we test the
proposal that the visual system encodes not luminance as
such but rather the statistical relationship of a particular
luminance to all possible luminance values experienced in
natural contexts during evolution. This statistical
conception of vision was validated by using a database of
natural scenes in which we could determine the probability
distribution functions of co-occurring target and contextual
luminance values. The distribution functions obtained in
this way predict target brightness in response to a variety
of challenging stimuli, thus explaining these otherwise
puzzling percepts. That brightness is determined by the
statistics of natural light patterns implies that the
relevant neural circuitry is specifically organized to
generate these probabilistic responses.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0402192101},
Key = {fds268454}
}
@article{fds268447,
Author = {Purves, D and Williams, SM and Nundy, S and Lotto,
RB},
Title = {Perceiving the intensity of light.},
Journal = {Psychological Review},
Volume = {111},
Number = {1},
Pages = {142-158},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0033-295X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14756591},
Abstract = {The relationship between luminance (i.e., the photometric
intensity of light) and its perception (i.e., sensations of
lightness or brightness) has long been a puzzle. In addition
to the mystery of why these perceptual qualities do not
scale with luminance in any simple way, "illusions" such as
simultaneous brightness contrast, Mach bands,
Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet edge effects, and the
Chubb-Sperling-Solomon illusion have all generated much
interest but no generally accepted explanation. The authors
review evidence that the full range of this perceptual
phenomenology can be rationalized in terms of an empirical
theory of vision. The implication of these observations is
that perceptions of lightness and brightness are generated
according to the probability distributions of the possible
sources of luminance values in stimuli that are inevitably
ambiguous.},
Doi = {10.1037/0033-295x.111.1.142},
Key = {fds268447}
}
@article{fds268450,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {Size contrast and assimilation explained by the statistics
of natural scene geometry.},
Journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {90-102},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15006039},
Abstract = {The term "size contrast and assimilation" refers to a large
class of geometrical illusions in which the apparent sizes
of identical visual targets in various contexts are
different. Here we have examined whether these intriguing
discrepancies between physical and perceived size can be
explained by a visual process in which percepts are
determined by the probability distribution of the possible
real-world sources of retinal stimuli. To test this idea, we
acquired a range image database of natural scenes that
specified the location of every image point in 3-D space. By
sampling the possible physical sources of various size
contrast or assimilation stimuli in the database, we
determined the probability distributions of the size of the
target in the images generated by these sources. For each of
the various stimuli tested, these probability distributions
of target size in different contexts accurately predicted
the perceptual effects reported in psychophysical studies.
We conclude that size contrast and assimilation effects are
a further manifestation of a fundamentally probabilistic
process of visual perception.},
Doi = {10.1162/089892904322755584},
Key = {fds268450}
}
@article{fds268451,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {Perceiving colour},
Journal = {Review of Progress in Coloration and Related
Topics},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {12-25},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0557-9325},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-4408.2004.tb00149.x},
Abstract = {Understanding the percepts elicited by spectral
distributions in visual stimuli (i.e. understanding the
perception of colour) is made especially challenging by the
peculiar phenomenology of colour contrast and constancy
effects. Interestingly as the first systematic account of
colour contrast was published in 1839 by the French chemist
Michel Chevreul based on work done while serving as the
director of dyes for the Royal Manufacturers. In this
current paper we review the nature of colour vision, the
problems that the observations of Chevreul and others
present for colour science, and recent work that suggests a
solution. © Rev. Prog. Color.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1478-4408.2004.tb00149.x},
Key = {fds268451}
}
@article{fds114060,
Title = {Purves, D., S.M. Williams, S. Nundy and B.B. Lotto (2003)
Perceiving the Intensity of Light. Psychological Rev. Vol
111: 142-158.},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114060}
}
@article{fds114066,
Title = {Howe Q, Purves D (2004) Size contrast and assimilation
explained by the statistics of scene geometry. J Cog
Neurosci 16(1): 90-102.},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114066}
}
@article{fds114099,
Title = {Purves D, Lotto RB (2004) The Cornsweet effect. Encyclopedia
of Neuroscience, 3rd edition. G. Adelman and B.H. Smith,
eds. Elsevier Press 2004.},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114099}
}
@article{fds114101,
Title = {Lotto RB, Purves D (2004) Perceiving color. Color Dyers Rev
(in press).},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114101}
}
@article{fds114102,
Title = {Yang Z, Purves D (2004) The statistical structure of natural
light patterns determines perceived light intensity. Proc
Natl Acad Sci 101: 8745-8750},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114102}
}
@article{fds114103,
Title = {Schwartz D, Purves D (2004) Pitch is determined by naturally
occurring periodic sounds. Hearing Research 194:
31-46.},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds114103}
}
@article{fds268442,
Author = {Long, F and Purves, D},
Title = {Evidence that color contrast effects have a probabilistic
foundation},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {3},
Number = {9},
Pages = {314-314},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/3.9.314},
Abstract = {Surfaces returning identical light spectra to the eye can
elicit different color percepts when embedded in spectrally
different surrounds. Although various theories have been put
forward to rationalize these color contrast effects, there
is no consensus about their basis. Here we tested the
hypothesis that color contrast is generated by the
probability distribution of the possible physical sources of
spectral stimuli (see Lotto and Purves, PNAS 97:12834,
2001). The analysis used a database of 41 natural scenes in
which the radiance spectrum of each point (i.e., the
projected light spectrum for each pixel in the images) was
known. The relevant reflectance spectra for corresponding
points were computed by removing the influence of both the
illuminant and scene geometry from the radiance spectrum.
The illumination spectra for each pixel (which include the
influence of both the illuminant and scene geometry) were
then determined by dividing the radiance spectrum by
reflectance spectrum. To facilitate the statistical
analysis, the radiance spectrum on each pixel was converted
into RGB tristimulus values. Each image in the database was
sampled repeatedly with a center/surround template, and the
probability distributions of the possible combinations of
reflectance and illumination spectra that could have
generated the relevant RGB values were determined. The
probability distributions of the reflectance and
illumination spectra of the central target varied as a
function of the RGB values of the surround, indicating that
the typical physical sources of target spectra differ when
they are embedded in spectrally different surrounds. The
color percepts predicted by these distributions were in good
agreement with the percepts elicited by color contrast
stimuli. This evidence supports the conclusion that color
contrast effects are determined by the probabilistic
relationship between ambiguous spectral stimuli and the
distribution of their possible sources.},
Doi = {10.1167/3.9.314},
Key = {fds268442}
}
@article{fds268443,
Author = {Purves, D and Howe, CQ and Schwartz, DA},
Title = {Vision and the perception of music have a common
denominator},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {3},
Number = {9},
Pages = {518-518},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/3.9.518},
Abstract = {All human listeners perceive tones in the presence of
regularly repeating patterns of sound pressure fluctuation
over a wide range of frequencies. In music, the salient and
widely-shared features of this aspect of auditory perception
are: 1) an iterated partitioning of the continuous dimension
of pitch into octave intervals bounded by tones that are
musically similar; 2) the division of each octave into the
12 intervals of the chromatic scale; 3) the preference in
musical composition and performance for particular subsets
of these 12 intervals (e.g., the intervals of the pentatonic
or diatonic scales); and 4) the similar consonance ordering
of chromatic scale tone combinations produced by listeners
of all ages, places, and periods. Despite intense interest
in these perceptual phenomena over several millennia, they
have no generally accepted explanation in physical,
psychological or biological terms. A rapidly growing body of
work in vision has shown that the fundamental qualities that
characterize visual percepts (lightness/brightness, color,
geometry and motion) accord with the probability
distributions of the possible sources of visual stimuli.
Since the uncertain provenance of sensory stimuli is
general, this empirical solution to the inverse optics
problem might be expected to extend to other sensory
modalities. We therefore examined the hypothesis that
musical percepts also arise from the statistical
relationship between sound stimuli and their natural
sources. An analysis of recorded speech shows that the
probability distribution of amplitude/frequency combinations
in human utterances, the principal source of periodic
stimuli in the human acoustical environment, predicts
octaves, scales and consonance. These observations suggest
that the auditory system, like the visual system, generates
percepts determined by the probability distributions that
link inherently ambiguous stimuli and their
sources.},
Doi = {10.1167/3.9.518},
Key = {fds268443}
}
@article{fds268444,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {Size contrast explained by the statistics of scene
geometry},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {3},
Number = {9},
Pages = {522-522},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/3.9.522},
Abstract = {Standard presentations of size contrast stimuli include the
well-known Ebbinghaus circles and the Delboeuf figures. When
presented with such stimuli, observers perceive a target
form surrounded by larger but otherwise similar forms to be
smaller than the same target surrounded by smaller forms.
Here we have examined the hypothesis that the anomalous
perception of these stimuli is a consequence of a wholly
probabilistic strategy of vision in which percepts accord
with the probability distribution of the possible sources of
the stimuli. To test this idea, we used a range image
database acquired by laser scanning natural scenes to
determine the probability distribution of the size of the
real-world sources of the central targets in the size
contrast stimuli. In good quantitative agreement with a
large body of psychophysical evidence, the average physical
size of the sources of a given form embedded in a context of
larger surrounding forms in the image plane is smaller than
the sources of the same target surrounded by smaller forms.
Thus, the reason why the two identical central targets look
different in size is because their possible physical sources
are, in fact, different in size. These findings support the
hypothesis that the size contrast effect is a signature of a
fundamentally probabilistic process of vision
perception.},
Doi = {10.1167/3.9.522},
Key = {fds268444}
}
@article{fds268445,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {Statistical concatenations of luminance can explain
lightness/brightness percepts},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {3},
Number = {9},
Pages = {423-423},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/3.9.423},
Abstract = {A number of recent studies have indicated that perceptions
of lightness/brightness are determined by the probabilistic
relationship between the luminances in the retinal stimulus
and the possible physical sources (reviewed in Purves and
Lotto, "Why we see what we do" Sinauer, 2002). To date,
these analyses have relied primarily on qualitative
paradigms, or limited quantitative arguments to rationalize
the lightness/brightness percepts elicited by Cornsweet
edges, stimuli that elicit Mach bands, or the reduced cue
conditions used in brightness scaling experiments.
Considering the linkage between stimulus luminances and
lightness/brightness percepts more broadly, however, the
visual system must instantiate a more fundamental set of
underlying statistical relationships to generate
lightness/brightness percepts in any and all circumstances.
Given the high dimensionality of real-world effects on the
probability distribution of lightness/brightness sources, it
seems inevitable that the relevant statistical
instantiations entail the conditional probabilities of
concatenations of luminance values in retinal images with
respect to the underlying natural sources. Accordingly, we
have explored whether anomalies of lightness/brightness can
be explained in these terms by analyzing the distribution of
luminance in 4200 images of natural visual environments in
the so-called Netherlands database (hlab.phys.rug.nl). A
large number of samples were generated using various
templates in which the pattern of light was similar to the
basic unit in several well-known lightness/brightness
stimuli that generate unusual percepts (e.g., the Hermann
grid, the Wertheimer-Benary pattern, White's stimulus and
the criss-cross pattern), thus allowing us to compute the
probability distribution of light in the 'target' area of
these stimuli. The relative shifts in the probability
distributions of luminance in these stimuli appear to
account for the associated perceptions of
lightness/brightness.},
Doi = {10.1167/3.9.423},
Key = {fds268445}
}
@article{fds268449,
Author = {Long, F and Purves, D},
Title = {Natural scene statistics as the universal basis of color
context effects.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {100},
Number = {25},
Pages = {15190-15193},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14623975},
Abstract = {The color context effects referred to as color contrast,
constancy, and assimilation underscore the fact that color
percepts do not correspond to the spectral characteristics
of the generative stimuli. Despite a variety of proposed
theories, these phenomena have resisted explanation in a
single principled framework. Using a hyperspectral image
database of natural scenes, we here show that color
contrast, constancy, and assimilation are all predicted by
the statistical organization of spectral returns from
natural visual environments.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2036361100},
Key = {fds268449}
}
@article{fds268446,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {Image/source statistics of surfaces in natural
scenes.},
Journal = {Network: Computation in Neural Systems},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {371-390},
Year = {2003},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0954-898X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12938763},
Abstract = {Perceiving surfaces in a manner that accords with their
physical properties is essential for successful behaviour.
Since, however, a given retinal image can have been
generated by an infinite variety of natural surfaces with
different geometrical and/or physical qualities, the
corresponding percepts cannot be determined by the stimulus
per se. Rather, resolution of this quandary requires a
strategy of vision that incorporates the statistical
relationship of the information in retinal images to its
sources in representative environments. To examine this
probabilistic relationship with respect to the features of
object surfaces, we analysed a database of range images in
which the distances of all the objects in a series of
natural scenes were measured with respect to the image plane
by a laser range scanner. By taking any particular scene
obtained in this way to be made up of a set of concatenated
surface patches, we were able to explore the statistics of
scene roughness, size-distance relationships, surface
orientation and local curvature, as well as the independent
components of natural surfaces. The relevance of these
statistics to both perception and the neuronal organization
of the underlying visual circuitry is discussed.},
Doi = {10.1088/0954-898x_14_3_301},
Key = {fds268446}
}
@article{fds268448,
Author = {Schwartz, DA and Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {The statistical structure of human speech sounds predicts
musical universals.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {23},
Number = {18},
Pages = {7160-7168},
Year = {2003},
Month = {August},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12904476},
Abstract = {The similarity of musical scales and consonance judgments
across human populations has no generally accepted
explanation. Here we present evidence that these aspects of
auditory perception arise from the statistical structure of
naturally occurring periodic sound stimuli. An analysis of
speech sounds, the principal source of periodic sound
stimuli in the human acoustical environment, shows that the
probability distribution of amplitude-frequency combinations
in human utterances predicts both the structure of the
chromatic scale and consonance ordering. These observations
suggest that what we hear is determined by the statistical
relationship between acoustical stimuli and their naturally
occurring sources, rather than by the physical parameters of
the stimulus per se.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.23-18-07160.2003},
Key = {fds268448}
}
@article{fds268501,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {A statistical explanation of visual space.},
Journal = {Nature Neuroscience},
Volume = {6},
Number = {6},
Pages = {632-640},
Year = {2003},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1097-6256},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12754512},
Keywords = {Humans Models, Neurological Models, Statistical* Photic
Stimulation Psychomotor Performance Space Perception Spatial
Behavior Visual Fields physiology*},
Abstract = {The subjective visual space perceived by humans does not
reflect a simple transformation of objective physical space;
rather, perceived space has an idiosyncratic relationship
with the real world. To date, there is no consensus about
either the genesis of perceived visual space or the
implications of its peculiar characteristics for visually
guided behavior. Here we used laser range scanning to
measure the actual distances from the image plane of all
unoccluded points in a series of natural scenes. We then
asked whether the differences between real and apparent
distances could be explained by the statistical relationship
of scene geometry and the observer. We were able to predict
perceived distances in a variety of circumstances from the
probability distribution of physical distances. This finding
lends support to the idea that the characteristics of human
visual space are determined probabilistically.},
Language = {eng},
Doi = {10.1038/nn1059},
Key = {fds268501}
}
@article{fds114062,
Title = {Yang, Z. and D. Purves (2003) Image/source statistics in
natural scenes. Network: Computation in Neural Systems 14
(3): 371-390.},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds114062}
}
@article{fds114063,
Title = {Schwartz, D., C.Q. Howe and D. Purves (2003) Statistical
evidence that musical universals derive from the acoustical
characteristics of human speech. J. Neurosci. 23:
7160-7168.},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds114063}
}
@article{fds114092,
Title = {Long, F. and D. Purves (2003) Natural scene statistics as
the universal basis for color context effects. Proc Natl
Acad Sci 100 (25): 15190-15193.},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds114092}
}
@article{fds114095,
Title = {Purves, D. and R.B. Lotto (2003) Why We See What We Do:
An Empirical Theory of Vision. Sinauer Associates:
Sunderland, MA.},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds114095}
}
@article{fds268438,
Author = {Purves, D and Yang, Z},
Title = {The Poggendorff illusion explained by the statistics of
natural scene geometry},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {2},
Number = {7},
Pages = {201-201},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/2.7.201},
Abstract = {One of the most intriguing discrepancies between the
perception of a visual stimulus and its real-world source is
the Poggendorff illusion. When an obliquely oriented line is
occluded by a bar, the continuation of the line across the
occluder appears to be shifted vertically, despite of the
collinearity of the separated line segments. A great deal of
literature on this subject notwithstanding, none of the
explanations so far provided (the angle theory and the depth
theory are the two major categories) has satisfactorily
accounted for all aspects of this effect. Here we have
tested a wholly empirical explanation of this illusion. To
this end, we acquired a database of natural scenes
(including indoor, outdoor and natural scenes) in which the
distances of all the objects from the image plane were
determined with a laser range scanner. We found the
probability distribution of the possible positions of the
line segments in the database lying on the 'far side' of an
imagined occluder to be shifted vertically compared to the
positions obtained by direct extension of the same line
segments. This shift was apparent in indoor, outdoor and
fully natural scenes, albeit with different magnitudes and
variances. Moreover, the magnitude of the shift 1) increased
with the width of the occluding bar; 2) increased with a
decrease in the (acute) angle of the intersection of the
line with the occluder; 3) diminished for the acute angle
components of the stimulus, but was maintained for the
obtuse angle components; and 4) diminished when the stimulus
configuration was rotated. Each of these behaviors has been
described in the perceptual responses to corresponding
variations in the presentation of the Poggendorff stimulus.
We conclude that this otherwise peculiar set of perceptual
discrepancies is generated by the probabilistic relationship
between the relevant features in the image plane and the
probability distribution of the possible underlying sources
of the stimulus in the real world.},
Doi = {10.1167/2.7.201},
Key = {fds268438}
}
@article{fds268439,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {A probabilistic explanation of perceived line length and
orientation},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {2},
Number = {7},
Pages = {706-706},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/2.7.706},
Abstract = {Human perception of the length and the orientation of a
straight line is systematically biased as a function of the
2D orientation of the line in the retinal image. Motivated
by recent evidence that the relationship between the retinal
image and perception is a wholly probabilistic one, we have
explored the idea that perceived length and orientation of a
linear stimulus are determined by the probabilistic
relationship between the linear projection in the image
plane and its possible physical sources. To test this
hypothesis, we collected a database of natural scenes that
included the range and luminance of every pixel in the
images. The database thus relates projections in the image
plane to the arrangement of objects in the physical world.
Accordingly, we could determine the 3-D orientations of the
physical sources of all straight-line projections on the
retina (the image plane), as well as the ratio of the
physical length of the sources to the length of their
projections. We found that the probability distributions of
the tilt, slant and the physical-to-image length ratio of
straight lines determined in this way change systematically
as a function of the orientation of the projected line.
These variations in the probability distributions predict
the perception of line length and line orientation as a
function of line orientation. Because the probability
distributions of the possible sources of oblique projections
show greater variance than those of the linear projections
in the cardinal axes, these statistical relationships can
also rationalize the oblique effect (i.e., the poorer and
more variable performance of human observers confronted with
oblique lines compared to performance with lines in the
cardinal axes).},
Doi = {10.1167/2.7.706},
Key = {fds268439}
}
@article{fds268440,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {The probabilistic foundation of visual space},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {2},
Number = {7},
Pages = {715-715},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/2.7.715},
Abstract = {An assumption in many studies is that visual space (i.e.,
the space we perceive) is metrical. For example, perceived
space has often been considered a Riemann space of constant
curvature. In such cases, perceived spatial relationships
should be independent of the context of the visual scene.
This category of assumptions, however, is inconsistent with
numerous experimental observations showing that the
relationship between the perceived and the physical
parameters of scene geometry is systematically distorted. In
the absence of a principled account of what this distortion
of physical space actually means, other investigators have
assumed that visual space is either affine or subject to
some other transformation of physical space. Here we have
explored an alternative hypothesis, namely that visual space
is generated solely by the statistical properties of the
physical world. To this end, we acquired and analyzed a
database of natural scenes in which the distances of all
object points from the image plane were measured with a
laser range scanner. The probability distributions of these
distances are scale invariant, a feature that accords with
the human perception of distance and location under
impoverished stimulus conditions. Furthermore, the
probability distributions of the physical sources of visual
stimuli (i.e., their distance, depth, size, and surface
orientation) were found to be systematically influenced by
the range distribution of the surround. These
context-dependent probability distributions of physical
sources generally account for the known distortion in the
perception of distance, depth, size, and orientation (e.g.,
the "terrain influence" on distance judgment, and the
well-known contextual effects that influence the perception
of orientation). Our results thus suggest that visual
perceptual space, for reasons of biological advantage, is
straightforwardly determined by the probability
distributions of the sources underlying visual
stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1167/2.7.715},
Key = {fds268440}
}
@article{fds268441,
Author = {Long, F and Purves, D},
Title = {A probabilistic explanation of simultaneous brightness
contrast},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {2},
Number = {7},
Pages = {366-366},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/2.7.366},
Abstract = {A growing body of evidence suggests that visual perception
is generated according to the probabilistic relationship
between the components of retinal images and their possible
physical sources. We have further explored this idea by
asking whether simultaneous brightness contrast effects can
be explained by the statistical relationship between the
physical sources of the light reaching the retina and the
corresponding luminance values in the retinal image. To this
end we first created a database of spectral returns
(radiances) based on the interaction of average daylight
(CIE D65) at 500 different levels of light intensity with
200 achromatic reflectances (interpolated from 6 standard
achromatic reflectances of Macbeth ColorChecker). A database
of luminances was then created by converting each of the
100,000 spectral returns obtained in this way into an RGB
value using the standard CIE conversion. We then used the
luminance database to create standard and 'articulated'
brightness contrast stimuli. An analysis of the probability
distributions of the possible illumination and reflectance
values that could have generated the stimuli showed that: 1)
the illumination of a gray patch with a dark surround is
likely to be less intense than the illumination of the same
patch in a lighter surround; 2) the illumination difference
of gray patches in uniform surrounds is likely to be less
than the illumination difference of the same patches in
articulated surrounds. Thus on solely empirical grounds,
these probability distributions predict that a gray patch
with a darker surround will look brighter than the same
patch on a lighter surround, and that the articulated
version will generate a stronger perceptual effect. The
significance of this work is to demonstrate that the effects
of standard brightness contrast stimuli can be rationalized
on the basis of the probability distributions of the sources
derived from a contrived but nevertheless plausible database
of visual 'scenes'.},
Doi = {10.1167/2.7.366},
Key = {fds268441}
}
@article{fds268498,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {The empirical basis of color perception.},
Journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {609-629},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1053-8100},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12470626},
Keywords = {Color Perception Humans Light Photic Stimulation
Probability* physiology*},
Abstract = {Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has
been a major challenge in vision science for at least the
last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise
puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical
strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees
is entirely determined by the probability distribution of
the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this
strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual
domains, is the inherent ambiguity of the real-world origins
of any spectral stimulus.},
Doi = {10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00014-4},
Key = {fds268498}
}
@article{fds268500,
Author = {Howe, CQ and Purves, D},
Title = {Range image statistics can explain the anomalous perception
of length.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {99},
Number = {20},
Pages = {13184-13188},
Year = {2002},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12237401},
Keywords = {Humans Lasers Retina Space Perception Vision Visual
Perception* physiology physiology*},
Abstract = {A long-standing puzzle in visual perception is that the
apparent extent of a spatial interval (e.g., the distance
between two points or the length of a line) does not simply
accord with the length of the stimulus but varies as a
function of orientation in the retinal image. Here, we show
that this anomaly can be explained by the statistical
relationship between the length of retinal projections and
the length of their real-world sources. Using a laser range
scanner, we acquired a database of natural images that
included the three-dimensional location of every point in
the scenes. An analysis of these range images showed that
the average length of a physical interval in
three-dimensional space changes systematically as a function
of the orientation of the corresponding interval in the
projected image, the variation being in good agreement with
perceived length. This evidence implies that the perception
of visual space is determined by the probability
distribution of the possible real-world sources of retinal
images.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.162474299},
Key = {fds268500}
}
@article{fds268502,
Author = {Nundy, S and Purves, D},
Title = {A probabilistic explanation of brightness
scaling.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {99},
Number = {22},
Pages = {14482-14487},
Year = {2002},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12388786},
Keywords = {Computer Simulation* Humans Light Models, Neurological*
Models, Statistical* Photic Stimulation Visual Perception
physiology*},
Abstract = {The perceptions of lightness or brightness elicited by a
visual target are linked to its luminance by a nonlinear
function that varies according to the physical
characteristics of the target and the background on which it
is presented. Although no generally accepted explanation of
this scaling relationship exists, it has long been
considered a byproduct of low- or mid-level visual
processing. Here we examine the possibility that brightness
scaling is actually the signature of a biological strategy
for dealing with inevitably ambiguous visual stimuli, in
which percepts of lightness/brightness are determined by the
probabilistic relationship between luminances in the image
plane and their possible real-world sources.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.172520399},
Key = {fds268502}
}
@article{fds268499,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {A rationale for the structure of color space.},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {84-88},
Year = {2002},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11814560},
Keywords = {Animals Color Color Perception Humans Light Photic
Stimulation physiology*},
Abstract = {The colors perceived by humans in response to light stimuli
are generally described in terms of four color categories
(reds, greens, blues and yellows), the members of which are
systematically arrayed around gray. This broadly accepted
description of color sensation differs fundamentally from
the light that induces it, which is neither 'circular' nor
categorical. What, then, accounts for these discrepancies
between the structure of color experience and the physical
reality that underlies it? We suggest that these differences
are based on two related requirements for successful color
vision: (1) that spectra be ordered according to their
physical similarities and differences; and (2) that this
ordering be constrained by the four-color map
problem.},
Doi = {10.1016/s0166-2236(02)02059-3},
Key = {fds268499}
}
@article{fds268497,
Author = {Yang, Z and Shimpi, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Perception of objects that are translating and
rotating.},
Journal = {Perception},
Volume = {31},
Number = {8},
Pages = {925-942},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0301-0066},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12269587},
Keywords = {Discrimination Learning Form Perception Humans Motion Motion
Perception Psychophysics Rotation physiology*},
Abstract = {The motion of objects that are both translating and rotating
can be decomposed into an infinite number of translational
and rotational combinations. How, then, do such stimuli
routinely elicit specific percepts and behavioral responses
that are usually appropriate? A possible answer is that
motion percepts are fully determined by the probability
distributions of all the possible correspondences and
differences in the stimulus sequence. To test the merits of
this conceptual framework, we investigated the perceived
motion elicited by a line that is both translating and
rotating behind an aperture. When stimuli are presented such
that a particular sequence of appearance and disappearance
occurs at the aperture boundary, subjects report that the
line is rotating only; furthermore, the perceived centers of
rotation appear to describe a cycloidal trajectory, even
when one aperture shape is replaced by another. These and
other perceptual effects elicited by translating and
rotating stimuli are all accurately predicted by the
probability distribution of the possible sources of the
physical movements, supporting the conclusion that motion
perception is indeed generated by a wholly probabilistic
strategy.},
Doi = {10.1068/p3379},
Key = {fds268497}
}
@article{fds114059,
Title = {Lotto, R.B and D. Purves (2002) An empirical explanation of
the Chubb Illusion. J. Cog. Neurosci. 13:
1-9.},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds114059}
}
@article{fds114094,
Title = {Purves D., R. B. Lotto and S. Nundy (2002) Why we see what
we do. American Scientist 90(3): 236-243.},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds114094}
}
@article{fds268431,
Author = {Purves, D and Lotto, B},
Title = {Explanation of some major features of color
perception},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {60-60},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/1.3.60},
Abstract = {It has long been known that a particular red, green, blue
and yellow is seen as being entirely free of any other
color, and that the four color categories defined in this
way are arranged in a circular manner. Most textbook
accounts suppose that these features of color experience are
an incidental consequence of color opponency. An alternative
possibility is that these aspects of color experience
represent the solution of a fundamental problem in topology,
namely insuring that no two areas separated by a common
boundary in a 2-dimensional array will appear the same if
they are actually different (the four color map problem).
However, unlike the cartographer, whose task is simply to
distinguish the surfaces in a map as being the 'same' or
'different', the visual system must distinguish surfaces and
at the same time maintain the full range of spectral
relationships. Simply differentiating surfaces in color
experience would provide little behavioral advantage if the
relative similarities and differences among different
spectra were not also preserved in perception. If this
argument is correct, then structure of subjective color
space (i.e., the circular organization of the four color
categories and their unique members), should reflect an
analogous ordering of spectra. Here we use multidimensional
scaling of a spectral data set to show that arranging
spectra according to their relative similarities and
differences defines a space that is similar to subjective
color space. These results are consistent with the
conclusion that the major features of subjective color
experience represent a simultaneous solution of the four
color map problem while maintaining the relative
similarities and differences among the full range of light
spectra.},
Doi = {10.1167/1.3.60},
Key = {fds268431}
}
@article{fds268432,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of the Chubb illusion},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {48-48},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/1.3.48},
Abstract = {The brightness of any luminant stimulus varies, often quite
markedly, as a function of the context in which it is
presented. An especially intriguing example of this
phenomenon is the illusion described by Chubb and colleagues
(1989) in which the apparent contrast of a patterned target
is reduced when it is embedded in a pattern of the same
spatial frequency but of higher luminance contrast. Illusory
percepts of brightness, like this one, are usually
considered epiphenomena of inhibitory interactions between
neurons tuned to the same attributes of the stimulus, in
this case between neurons in the primary visual cortex
similarly tuned to spatial contrast frequency. Here we
tested a different possibility, namely that the Chubb
illusion is generated according to the experience of the
visual system with background textures seen through an
imperfectly transmitting medium. In agreement with this
suggestion, making the stimulus more consistent with a
contribution to the target of imperfect transmittance
increased the effect for naïve subjects, whereas making the
stimulus less consistent with this possibility decreased the
effect. Because the luminance contrasts and spatial
frequencies of the stimuli were unchanged in these
experiments, these results are difficult to explain in terms
of the receptive field properties of neurons early in the
visual processing stream. Rather, the results suggest that
the Chubb illusion, like other illusions of brightness (and
color), are generated empirically according to what the
sources of the same or similar stimuli have typically turned
out to be in the experience of both the species and the
individual.},
Doi = {10.1167/1.3.48},
Key = {fds268432}
}
@article{fds268433,
Author = {Yang, Z and Purves, D},
Title = {Perception of objects that are both rotating and
translating},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {325-325},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/1.3.325},
Abstract = {The velocity field generated by a rigid body can be
decomposed into a translation and a rotation in an infinite
number of ways. How, then, can the visual system generate a
definite perception of such stimuli? The conceptual
framework we used to examine this problem is that the
physical motion underlying any image sequence is determined
by: 1) the identity of image features in any two sequential
images; 2) the appearance of new features in the second
image compared to the first; 3) the disappearance of
features in the second image; and 4) any deformation in the
interval between the two images. Accordingly, the stochastic
structure of identity, appearance, disappearance and
deformation in the image plane in relation to the
displacement of the source can be used to generate a 4
dimensional probability distribution of physical movements
underlying the stimulus. Using this approach to study the
perceptions elicited by a line translating and rotating
around a fixed center in different contexts, we found that:
1) the moving line is perceived to rotate but not translate;
2) the perceived centers of rotation fall on a cycloid
defined by all the possible movements underlying the
stimulus; and 3) contexts such as an aperture have no effect
on the nature of this cycloid. The fact that the probability
distribution of the physical displacements underlying the
stimulus accounts for these remarkable percepts supports the
conclusion that motion perception is generated on an
entirely empirical basis.},
Doi = {10.1167/1.3.325},
Key = {fds268433}
}
@article{fds268434,
Author = {Nundy, S and Shimpi, A and Purves, D},
Title = {The relationship between luminance and brightness},
Journal = {Journal of Vision},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {426-426},
Publisher = {Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology
(ARVO)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/1.3.426},
Abstract = {How the luminance of a visual stimulus is translated into a
perceptual value of brightness has been debated since the
middle of the 19th C. Although it seems intuitively clear
that the perception of brightness should scale directly with
the intensity of the light that activates retinal receptors,
this is not the case. Thus, doubling the luminance of a
stimulus under the laboratory conditions in which such
studies are typically done does not double its perceived
brightness. The exponential relationship between luminance
and brightness in these circumstances is referred to as the
Weber-Fechner Law or, alternatively, as Stevens' Power Law.
Although measurements of the relationship between luminance
and brightness have become progressively more sophisticated,
the reason for this relationship and its modification under
more natural viewing conditions has never been explained.
Operating with the assumption that the basis of these
relationships might be based entirely on past experience, we
analyzed the luminance of a visual stimulus as a function of
its generative sources, i.e. the reflectance of and
illumination giving rise to the visual stimulus in both
restricted and more natural scenes. The results of the study
show that the form of the luminance/brightness relationship
changes predictably according to the relative contributions
of reflectance and illumination that would previously have
been experienced in the presence of the same or a similar
stimulus. We conclude, therefore, that the relationship
between luminance and brightness is determined empirically
according the success or failure of visually-guided
behavior.},
Doi = {10.1167/1.3.426},
Key = {fds268434}
}
@article{fds268503,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Viktor Hamburger 1900-2001.},
Journal = {Nature Neuroscience},
Volume = {4},
Number = {8},
Pages = {777-778},
Year = {2001},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {1097-6256},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11477419},
Keywords = {Animals History, 20th Century Humans Neurosciences Portraits
United States history*},
Doi = {10.1038/90470},
Key = {fds268503}
}
@article{fds268437,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of the Chubb illusion.},
Journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
Volume = {13},
Number = {5},
Pages = {547-555},
Year = {2001},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11506656},
Abstract = {The perceived difference in brightness between elements of a
patterned target is diminished when the target is embedded
in a similar surround of higher luminance contrast (the
Chubb illusion). Here we show that this puzzling effect can
be explained by the degree to which imperfect transmittance
is likely to have affected the light that reaches the eye.
These observations indicate that this 'illusion' is yet
another signature of the fundamentally empirical strategy of
visual perception, in this case generated by the typical
influence of transmittance on inherently ambiguous
stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1162/089892901750363154},
Key = {fds268437}
}
@article{fds268436,
Author = {Yang, Z and Shimpi, A and Purves, D},
Title = {A wholly empirical explanation of perceived
motion.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {98},
Number = {9},
Pages = {5252-5257},
Year = {2001},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11320255},
Abstract = {Because the retinal activity generated by a moving object
cannot specify which of an infinite number of possible
physical displacements underlies the stimulus, its
real-world cause is necessarily uncertain. How, then, do
observers respond successfully to sequences of images whose
provenance is ambiguous? Here we explore the hypothesis that
the visual system solves this problem by a probabilistic
strategy in which perceived motion is generated entirely
according to the relative frequency of occurrence of the
physical sources of the stimulus. The merits of this concept
were tested by comparing the directions and speeds of moving
lines reported by subjects to the values determined by the
probability distribution of all the possible physical
displacements underlying the stimulus. The velocities
reported by observers in a variety of stimulus contexts can
be accounted for in this way.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.091095298},
Key = {fds268436}
}
@article{fds268435,
Author = {Purves, D and Lotto, RB and Williams, SM and Nundy, S and Yang,
Z},
Title = {Why we see things the way we do: evidence for a wholly
empirical strategy of vision.},
Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological Sciences},
Volume = {356},
Number = {1407},
Pages = {285-297},
Year = {2001},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0962-8436},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11316481},
Abstract = {Many otherwise puzzling aspects of the way we see
brightness, colour, orientation and motion can be understood
in wholly empirical terms. The evidence reviewed here leads
to the conclusion that visual percepts are based on patterns
of reflex neural activity shaped entirely by the past
success (or failure) of visually guided behaviour in
response to the same or a similar retinal stimulus. As a
result, the images we see accord with what the sources of
the stimuli have typically turned out to be, rather than
with the physical properties of the relevant objects. If
vision does indeed depend upon this operational strategy to
generate optimally useful perceptions of inevitably
ambiguous stimuli, then the underlying neurobiological
processes will eventually need to be understood within this
conceptual framework.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2000.0772},
Key = {fds268435}
}
@article{fds114090,
Title = {Purves, D., R.B. Lotto, S.M. Williams, S. Nundy and Z.Yang
(2001) Why we see things the way we do: Evidence for a
wholly empirical strategy of vision. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
Lond. B, 356: 285-297.},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds114090}
}
@article{fds114091,
Title = {Yang, Z., A. Shimpi and D. Purves (2001) A wholly empirical
explanation of perceived motion. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 9:
5252-5257.},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds114091}
}
@article{fds268429,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of color contrast.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {97},
Number = {23},
Pages = {12834-12839},
Year = {2000},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11058148},
Abstract = {For reasons not well understood, the color of a surface can
appear quite different when placed in different chromatic
surrounds. Here we explore the possibility that these color
contrast effects are generated according to what the same or
similar stimuli have turned out to signify in the past about
the physical relationships between reflectance,
illumination, and the spectral returns they produce. This
hypothesis was evaluated by (i) comparing the physical
relationships of reflectances, illuminants, and spectral
returns with the perceptual phenomenology of color contrast
and (ii) testing whether perceptions of color contrast are
predictably changed by altering the probabilities of the
possible sources of the stimulus. The results we describe
are consistent with a wholly empirical explanation of color
contrast effects.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.210369597},
Key = {fds268429}
}
@article{fds268430,
Author = {Nundy, S and Lotto, B and Coppola, D and Shimpi, A and Purves,
D},
Title = {Why are angles misperceived?},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {97},
Number = {10},
Pages = {5592-5597},
Year = {2000},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10805814},
Abstract = {Although it has long been apparent that observers tend to
overestimate the magnitude of acute angles and underestimate
obtuse ones, there is no consensus about why such
distortions are seen. Geometrical modeling combined with
psychophysical testing of human subjects indicates that
these misperceptions are the result of an empirical strategy
that resolves the inherent ambiguity of angular stimuli by
generating percepts of the past significance of the stimulus
rather than the geometry of its retinal projection.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.97.10.5592},
Key = {fds268430}
}
@article{fds268427,
Author = {Purves, D and Lotto, B and Polger, T},
Title = {Color vision and the four-color-map problem.},
Journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {233-237},
Year = {2000},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10771407},
Abstract = {Four different colors are needed to make maps that avoid
adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal
image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of
chromatic experience would also be needed to optimally
distinguish regions returning spectrally different light to
the eye. We therefore suggest that the organization of human
color vision according to four-color classes (reds, greens,
blues, and yellows) has arisen as a solution to this logical
requirement in topology.},
Doi = {10.1162/089892900562011},
Key = {fds268427}
}
@article{fds268428,
Author = {Purves, D and Williams, SM and Lotto, RB},
Title = {The relevance of visual perception to cortical evolution and
development.},
Journal = {Novartis Foundation Symposium},
Volume = {228},
Pages = {240-254},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1528-2511},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10929326},
Abstract = {The quality of brightness--perhaps the simplest visual
attribute we perceive--appears to be determined
probabilistically. In this empirical conception of the
perception of light, the stimulus-induced activity of visual
cortical neurons does not encode the retinal image or the
properties of the stimulus per se, but associations
(percepts) determined by the relative probabilities of the
possible sources of the stimulus. If this theory is correct,
the rationale for the prolonged postnatal construction of
visual circuitry--and the evolution of this visual
scheme--is to strengthen and/or create by activity-dependent
feedback the empirically determined association on which
vision depends.},
Doi = {10.1002/0470846631.ch16},
Key = {fds268428}
}
@article{fds114057,
Title = {Lotto, R.B. and D. Purves (2000) An empirical explanation of
color contrast. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 97:
12834-12839.},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds114057}
}
@article{fds114058,
Title = {Purves, D., B. Lotto and T. Polger (2000) Color vision and
the four-color-map problem. J. Cog. Neurosci. 12:
233-237.},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds114058}
}
@article{fds114087,
Title = {Nundy, S., B. Lotto, D. Coppola, A. Shimpi and D. Purves
(2000) Why are angles misperceived? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
97: 5592-5597.},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds114087}
}
@article{fds114088,
Title = {Purves, D., G.A. Augustine, D. Fitzpatrick, L.C. Katz, A.-S.
LaMantia and J.O. McNamara (2000) Neuroscience, 2nd edition.
Sinauer Associates: Sunderland, MA.},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds114088}
}
@article{fds114089,
Title = {Purves, D., S.M. Williams and R.B. Lotto (2000) The
relevance of visual perception to cortical evolution and
development. In: Evolutionary Developmental Biology of the
Cerebral Cortex (Novartis Foundation Symposium Series, G.R.
Bock and G. Cardew, eds.) John Wiley & Sons, Vol. 228, pp.
240-258.},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds114089}
}
@article{fds268425,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Perception as probability.},
Journal = {Brain Research Bulletin},
Volume = {50},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {321-322},
Year = {1999},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0361-9230},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10643417},
Doi = {10.1016/s0361-9230(99)00152-5},
Key = {fds268425}
}
@article{fds268426,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Purves, D},
Title = {The effects of color on brightness.},
Journal = {Nature Neuroscience},
Volume = {2},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1010-1014},
Year = {1999},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {1097-6256},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10526341},
Abstract = {Observation of human subjects shows that the spectral
returns of equiluminant colored surrounds govern the
apparent brightness of achromatic test targets. The
influence of color on brightness provides further evidence
that perceptions of luminance are generated according to the
empirical frequency of the possible sources of visual
stimuli, and suggests a novel way of understanding color
contrast and constancy.},
Doi = {10.1038/14808},
Key = {fds268426}
}
@article{fds268422,
Author = {Purves, D and Shimpi, A and Lotto, RB},
Title = {An empirical explanation of the cornsweet
effect.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {19},
Number = {19},
Pages = {8542-8551},
Year = {1999},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10493754},
Abstract = {A long-standing puzzle in vision is the assignment of
illusory brightness values to visual territories based on
the characteristics of their edges (the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet
effect). Here we show that the perception of the
equiluminant territories flanking the Cornsweet edge varies
according to whether these regions are more likely to be
similarly illuminated surfaces having the same material
properties or unequally illuminated surfaces with different
properties. Thus, if the likelihood is increased that these
territories are surfaces with similar reflectance properties
under the same illuminant, the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet
effect is diminished; conversely, if the likelihood is
increased that the adjoining territories are differently
reflective surfaces receiving different amounts of
illumination, the effect is enhanced. These findings
indicate that the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet effect is
determined by the relative probabilities of the possible
sources of the luminance profiles in the
stimulus.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.19-19-08542.1999},
Key = {fds268422}
}
@article{fds268421,
Author = {Halpern, SD and Andrews, TJ and Purves, D},
Title = {Interindividual variation in human visual
performance.},
Journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
Volume = {11},
Number = {5},
Pages = {521-534},
Year = {1999},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10511641},
Abstract = {The responses of 20 young adult emmetropes with normal color
vision were measured on a battery of visual performance
tasks. Using previously documented tests of known
reliability, we evaluated orientation discrimination,
contrast sensitivity, wavelength sensitivity, vernier
acuity, direction-of-motion detection, velocity
discrimination, and complex form identification. Performance
varied markedly between individuals, both on a given test
and when the scores from all tests were combined to give an
overall indication of visual performance. Moreover,
individual performances on tests of contrast sensitivity,
orientation discrimination, wavelength discrimination, and
vernier acuity covaried, such that proficiency on one test
predicted proficiency on the others. These results indicate
a wide range of visual abilities among normal subjects and
provide the basis for an overall index of visual proficiency
that can be used to determine whether the surprisingly large
and coordinated size differences of the components of the
human visual system (Andrews, Halpern, & Purves, 1997) are
reflected in corresponding variations in visual
performance.},
Doi = {10.1162/089892999563580},
Key = {fds268421}
}
@article{fds268423,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Williams, SM and Purves, D},
Title = {Erratum: An empirical basis for Mach bands (Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America (April 27, 1999) 96:9 (5239-5244))},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {96},
Number = {13},
Pages = {7610},
Year = {1999},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.13.7610-b},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.96.13.7610-b},
Key = {fds268423}
}
@article{fds268420,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Williams, SM and Purves, D},
Title = {Mach bands as empirically derived associations.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {96},
Number = {9},
Pages = {5245-5250},
Year = {1999},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10220451},
Abstract = {If Mach bands arise as an empirical consequence of
real-world luminance profiles, several predictions follow.
First, the appearance of Mach bands should accord with the
appearance of naturally occurring highlights and lowlights.
Second, altering the slope of an ambiguous luminance
gradient so that it corresponds more closely to gradients
that are typically adorned with luminance maxima and minima
in the position of Mach bands should enhance the illusion.
Third, altering a luminance gradient so that it corresponds
more closely to gradients that normally lack luminance
maxima and minima in the position of Mach bands should
diminish the salience of the illusion. Fourth, the
perception of Mach bands elicited by the same luminance
gradient should be changed by contextual cues that indicate
whether the gradient is more or less likely to signify a
curved or a flat surface. Because each of these predictions
is met, we conclude that Mach bands arise because the
association elicited by the stimulus (the percept)
incorporates these features as a result of past
experience.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.96.9.5245},
Key = {fds268420}
}
@article{fds268424,
Author = {Lotto, RB and Williams, SM and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical basis for Mach bands.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {96},
Number = {9},
Pages = {5239-5244},
Year = {1999},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10220450},
Abstract = {Mach bands, the illusory brightness maxima and minima
perceived at the initiation and termination of luminance
gradients, respectively, are generally considered a direct
perceptual manifestation of lateral inhibitory interactions
among retinal or other lower order visual neurons. Here we
examine an alternative explanation, namely that Mach bands
arise as a consequence of real-world luminance gradients. In
this first of two companion papers, we analyze the natural
sources of luminance gradients, demonstrating that
real-world gradients arising from curved surfaces are
ordinarily adorned by photometric highlights and lowlights
in the position of the illusory bands. The prevalence of
such gradients provides an empirical basis for the
generation of this perceptual phenomenon.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.96.9.5239},
Key = {fds268424}
}
@article{fds114046,
Title = {Purves, D., A. Shimpi and R.B. Lotto (1999) An empirical
explanation of the Cornsweet effect. J. Neurosci. 19:
8542-8551.},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds114046}
}
@article{fds114056,
Title = {Lotto, R.B. and D. Purves (1999) The effects of color on
brightness. Nature Neurosci. 2: 1010-1014.},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds114056}
}
@article{fds114071,
Title = {Lotto, R.B., S.M. Williams and D. Purves (1999) Mach bands
as empirically derived associations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
96: 5245-5250.},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds114071}
}
@article{fds114085,
Title = {Halpern, S.D., T.J. Andrews and D. Purves (1999)
Interindividual variation in human visual performance. J.
Cog. Neurosci. 11: 521-534.},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds114085}
}
@article{fds114086,
Title = {Lotto, R.B., S.M. Williams and D. Purves (1999a) An
empirical basis for Mach bands. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 96:
5239-5244.},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds114086}
}
@article{fds268418,
Author = {Williams, SM and McCoy, AN and Purves, D},
Title = {The influence of depicted illumination on
brightness.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {95},
Number = {22},
Pages = {13296-13300},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9789082},
Abstract = {The striking illusions produced by simultaneous brightness
contrast generally are attributed to the center-surround
receptive field organization of lower order neurons in the
primary visual pathway. Here we show that the apparent
brightness of test objects can be either increased or
decreased in a predictable manner depending on how light and
shadow are portrayed in the scene. This evidence suggests
that perceptions of brightness are generated empirically by
experience with luminance relationships, an idea whose
implications we pursue in the accompanying
paper.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.95.22.13296},
Key = {fds268418}
}
@article{fds268419,
Author = {Williams, SM and McCoy, AN and Purves, D},
Title = {An empirical explanation of brightness.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {95},
Number = {22},
Pages = {13301-13306},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9789083},
Abstract = {In this second part of our study on the mechanism of
perceived brightness, we explore the effects of manipulating
three-dimensional geometry. The additional scenes portrayed
here demonstrate that the same luminance profile can elicit
different sensations of brightness as a function of how the
objects in the scene are arranged in space. This further
evidence confirms the implication of the scenes presented in
the accompanying paper, namely that sensations of relative
brightness-including standard demonstrations of simultaneous
brightness contrast-cannot arise by computations of local
contrast. The most plausible explanation of the full range
of perceptual phenomena we have described is an empirical
strategy that links the luminance profile in a visual
stimulus with an association (the percept) that represents
the profile's most probable real-world source.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.95.22.13301},
Key = {fds268419}
}
@article{fds268416,
Author = {Coppola, DM and Purves, HR and McCoy, AN and Purves,
D},
Title = {The distribution of oriented contours in the real
world.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {95},
Number = {7},
Pages = {4002-4006},
Year = {1998},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9520482},
Abstract = {In both humans and experimental animals, the ability to
perceive contours that are vertically or horizontally
oriented is superior to the perception of oblique angles.
There is, however, no consensus about the developmental
origins or functional basis of this phenomenon. Here, we
report the analysis of a large library of digitized scenes
using image processing with orientation-sensitive filters.
Our results show a prevalence of vertical and horizontal
orientations in indoor, outdoor, and even entirely natural
settings. Because visual experience is known to influence
the development of visual cortical circuitry, we suggest
that this real world anisotropy is related to the enhanced
ability of humans and other animals to process contours in
the cardinal axes, perhaps by stimulating the development of
a greater amount of visual circuitry devoted to processing
vertical and horizontal contours.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.95.7.4002},
Key = {fds268416}
}
@article{fds268417,
Author = {Coppola, DM and White, LE and Fitzpatrick, D and Purves,
D},
Title = {Unequal representation of cardinal and oblique contours in
ferret visual cortex.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {95},
Number = {5},
Pages = {2621-2623},
Year = {1998},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9482936},
Abstract = {We have measured the amount of cortical space activated by
differently oriented gratings in 25 adult ferrets by optical
imaging of intrinsic signal. On average, 7% more area of the
exposed visual cortex was preferentially activated by
vertical and horizontal contours than by contours at oblique
angles. This anisotropy may reflect the real-world
prevalence of contours in the cardinal axes and could
explain the greater sensitivity of many animals to vertical
and horizontal stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.95.5.2621},
Key = {fds268417}
}
@article{fds114055,
Title = {Williams, S.M., A.N. McCoy and D. Purves (1998) The
influence of depicted illumination on perceived brightness.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 95: 13296-13300.},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds114055}
}
@article{fds114069,
Title = {Williams, S.M., A.N. McCoy and D. Purves (1998) An empirical
explanation of brightness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 95:
13301-13306.},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds114069}
}
@article{fds114083,
Title = {Coppola, D.M, L.E. White, D. Fitzpatrick and D. Purves
(1998) Unequal representation of cardinal and oblique
contours in ferret visual cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci 95:
2621-2623.},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds114083}
}
@article{fds114084,
Title = {Coppola, D.M., H.R. Purves, A.N .McCoy and D. Purves
(1998) The distribution of oriented contours in the real
world. Proc Natl Acad Sci 95: 4002-4006.},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds114084}
}
@article{fds268414,
Author = {Andrews, TJ and Purves, D},
Title = {Similarities in normal and binocularly rivalrous
viewing.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {94},
Number = {18},
Pages = {9905-9908},
Year = {1997},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9275224},
Abstract = {We report here a series of observations-most of which the
reader can experience directly-showing that distinct
components of patterned visual stimuli (orthogonal lines of
a different hue) vary in perception as sets. Although less
frequent and often less complete, these perceptual
fluctuations in normal viewing are otherwise similar to the
binocular rivalry experienced when incompatible scenes are
presented dichoptically.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.94.18.9905},
Key = {fds268414}
}
@article{fds268411,
Author = {Sporns, O},
Title = {Variation and selection in neural function.},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {20},
Number = {7},
Pages = {291},
Year = {1997},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-2236(97)88843-1},
Doi = {10.1016/S0166-2236(97)88843-1},
Key = {fds268411}
}
@article{fds268415,
Author = {Purves, D and Andrews, TJ},
Title = {The perception of transparent three-dimensional
objects.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {94},
Number = {12},
Pages = {6517-6522},
Year = {1997},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9177250},
Abstract = {When the proximal and distal elements of wire-frame cubes
are conflated, observers perceive illusory structures that
no longer behave veridically. These phenomena suggest that
what we normally see depends on visual associations
generated by experience. The necessity of such learning may
explain why the mammalian visual system is subject to a
prolonged period of plasticity in early life, when novel
circuits are made in enormous numbers.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.94.12.6517},
Key = {fds268415}
}
@article{fds268412,
Author = {Andrews, TJ and Halpern, SD and Purves, D},
Title = {Correlated size variations in human visual cortex, lateral
geniculate nucleus, and optic tract.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {8},
Pages = {2859-2868},
Year = {1997},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9092607},
Abstract = {We have examined several components of the human visual
system to determine how the dimensions of the optic tract,
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and primary visual cortex
(V1) vary within the same brain. Measurements were made of
the cross-sectional area of the optic tract, the volumes of
the magnocellular and parvocellular layers of the LGN, and
the surface area and volume of V1 in one or both cerebral
hemispheres of 15 neurologically normal human brains
obtained at autopsy. Consistent with previous observations,
there was a two- to threefold variation in the size of each
of these visual components among the individuals studied.
Importantly, this variation was coordinated within the
visual system of any one individual. That is, a relatively
large V1 was associated with a commensurately large LGN and
optic tract, whereas a relatively small V1 was associated
with a commensurately smaller LGN and optic tract. This
relationship among the components of the human visual system
indicates that the development of its different parts is
interdependent. Such coordinated variation should generate
substantial differences in visual ability among
humans.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.17-08-02859.1997},
Key = {fds268412}
}
@article{fds114052,
Title = {White, L.E., T. J. Andrews, C. Hulette, A. Richards, M.
Groelle, J. Paydarfar and D. Purves (1997) Structure of
the Human Sensorimotor System II. Lateral symmetry.
Cereb Cortex 7:31-47.},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds114052}
}
@article{fds114053,
Title = {Purves, D. and T. J. Andrews (1997) The perception of
transparent 3-dimensional objects. Proc Natl Acad Sci 94:
6517-6522.},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds114053}
}
@article{fds114054,
Title = {Andrews T.J., and D. Purves (1997) Similarities in
normal and binocularly rivalrous viewing. Proc Natl Acad
Sci 94: 9905-9908.},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds114054}
}
@article{fds114081,
Title = {White L.E., T. J. Andrews, C. Hulette, A. Richards, M.
Groelle, J. Paydarfar and D. Purves (1997) Structure
of the human sensorimotor system I. Morphology and
cytoarchitecture of the central sulcus. Cereb Cortex
7:18-30.},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds114081}
}
@article{fds114082,
Title = {Andrews T.J., S. D. Halpern and D. Purves (1997)
Correlated size variations in human visual cortex, lateral
geniculate nucleus and optic tract. J Neurosci 17:
2859-2868.},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds114082}
}
@article{fds268473,
Author = {White, LE and Andrews, TJ and Hulette, C and Richards, A and Groelle, M and Paydarfar, J and Purves, D},
Title = {Structure of the human sensorimotor system. I: Morphology
and cytoarchitecture of the central sulcus.},
Journal = {Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {18-30},
Year = {1997},
ISSN = {1047-3211},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9023429},
Abstract = {We have studied the morphology of the central sulcus and the
cytoarchitecture of the primary sensorimotor cortex in 20
human brains obtained at autopsy. Although the surface
appearance of the central sulcus varies greatly from brain
to brain (and between hemispheres of individual brains), its
deep structure is remarkably consistent. The fundus of the
central sulcus is divided into medial and lateral limbs by a
complex junction midway between the sagittal and Sylvian
fissures. Based on functional imaging studies, this junction
appears to be a structural hallmark of the sensorimotor
representation of the distal upper extremity. We also
identified and measured area 4 (primary motor cortex) and
area 3 (primary somatic sensory cortex) in Nissl-stained
sections cut orthogonal to the course of the central sulcus.
Although the positions of the cytoarchitectonic boundaries
in the paracentral lobule showed considerable
interindividual variation, the locations of the borders of
areas 4 and 3 along the course of the sulcus were similar
among the 40 hemispheres examined. In addition to describing
more thoroughly this portion of the human cerebral cortex,
these observations provide a basis for evaluating lateral
symmetry of the human primary sensorimotor
cortex.},
Doi = {10.1093/cercor/7.1.18},
Key = {fds268473}
}
@article{fds268474,
Author = {White, LE and Andrews, TJ and Hulette, C and Richards, A and Groelle, M and Paydarfar, J and Purves, D},
Title = {Structure of the human sensorimotor system. II: Lateral
symmetry.},
Journal = {Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {31-47},
Year = {1997},
ISSN = {1047-3211},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9023430},
Abstract = {We have evaluated the lateral symmetry of the human central
sulcus, brainstem and spinal cord using quantitative
histological and imaging techniques in specimens from 67
autopsy cases. Our purpose was to determine whether the
preferred use of the right hand in the majority of humans is
associated with grossly discernible asymmetries of the
neural centers devoted to the upper extremities. In the
accompanying report, we described a consistent set of
morphological features in the depths of the central sulcus
that localize the sensorimotor representation of the distal
upper extremity. Measurements of the cortical surface in
this region, and indeed throughout the entire central
sulcus, showed no average lateral asymmetry.
Cytoarchitectonic measurements of area 4 and area 3
confirmed this similarity between the left and right
hemispheres. The medullary pyramids, which contain the
corticospinal tracts, were also symmetrical, as were the
cross-sectional areas of white and gray matter in the
cervical and lumbar enlargements of the spinal cord.
Finally, we found no lateral difference in the size and
number of motor neurons in the ventral horns at these levels
of the cord. Based on these several observations, we
conclude that the preferred use of the right hand in humans
occurs without a gross lateral asymmetry of the primary
sensorimotor system.},
Doi = {10.1093/cercor/7.1.31},
Key = {fds268474}
}
@article{fds268413,
Author = {Purves, D and White, LE and Riddle, DR},
Title = {Is neural development Darwinian?},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {19},
Number = {11},
Pages = {460-464},
Year = {1996},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8931267},
Abstract = {Gradually, and without much debate, the idea that the
developing nervous system is in some sense darwinian has
become one of the canons of neurobiology. In fact, there is
little evidence to support this idea.},
Doi = {10.1016/s0166-2236(96)20038-4},
Key = {fds268413}
}
@article{fds268410,
Author = {Coppola, D and Purves, D},
Title = {The extraordinarily rapid disappearance of entoptic
images.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {93},
Number = {15},
Pages = {8001-8004},
Year = {1996},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8755592},
Abstract = {It has been known for more than 40 years that images fade
from perception when they are kept at the same position on
the retina by abrogating eye movements. Although aspects of
this phenomenon were described earlier, the use of
close-fitting contact lenses in the 1950s made possible a
series of detailed observations on eye movements and visual
continuity. In the intervening decades, many investigators
have studied the role of image motion on visual perception.
Although several controversies remain, it is clear that
images deteriorate and in some cases disappear following
stabilization; eye movements are, therefore, essential to
sustained exoptic vision. The time course of image
degradation has generally been reported to be a few seconds
to a minute or more, depending upon the conditions. Here we
show that images of entoptic vascular shadows can disappear
in less than 80 msec. The rapid vanishing of these images
implies an active mechanism of image erasure and creation as
the basis of normal visual processing.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.93.15.8001},
Key = {fds268410}
}
@article{fds268409,
Author = {Andrews, TJ and White, LE and Binder, D and Purves,
D},
Title = {Temporal events in cyclopean vision.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {93},
Number = {8},
Pages = {3689-3692},
Year = {1996},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8622998},
Abstract = {The majority of neurons in the primary visual cortex of
primates can be activated by stimulation of either eye;
moreover, the monocular receptive fields of such neurons are
located in about the same region of visual space. These
well-known facts imply that binocular convergence in visual
cortex can explain our cyclopean view of the world. To test
the adequacy of this assumption, we examined how human
subjects integrate binocular events in time. Light flashes
presented synchronously to both eyes were compared to
flashes presented alternately (asynchronously) to one eye
and then the other. Subjects perceived very-low-frequency (2
Hz) asynchronous trains as equivalent to synchronous trains
flashed at twice the frequency (the prediction based on
binocular convergence). However, at higher frequencies of
presentation (4-32 Hz), subjects perceived asynchronous and
synchronous trains to be increasingly similar. Indeed, at
the flicker-fusion frequency (approximately 50 Hz), the
apparent difference between the two conditions was only 2%.
We suggest that the explanation of these anomalous findings
is that we parse visual input into sequential
episodes.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.93.8.3689},
Key = {fds268409}
}
@article{fds268408,
Author = {Purves, D and Paydarfar, JA and Andrews, TJ},
Title = {The wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {93},
Number = {8},
Pages = {3693-3697},
Year = {1996},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8622999},
Abstract = {Wheels turning in the movies or in other forms of
stroboscopic presentation often appear to be rotating
backward. Remarkably, a similar illusion is also seen in
continuous light. The occurrence of this perception in the
absence of intermittent illumination suggests that we
normally see motion, as in movies, by processing a series of
visual episodes.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.93.8.3693},
Key = {fds268408}
}
@article{fds114050,
Title = {Andrews, T.J., L.E. White, D. Binder and D. Purves (1996)
Temporal events in cyclopean vision. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. 93: 3689-3692.},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds114050}
}
@article{fds114051,
Title = {Purves, D., L.E. White and D.R. Riddle (1996) Is neural
development Darwinian? Trends Neurosci 19:
460-464.},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds114051}
}
@article{fds114078,
Title = {Purves, D., J.E. Paydarfar and T.J. Andrews (1996) The
wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. 93: 3693-3697.},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds114078}
}
@article{fds114079,
Title = {Coppola, D. and D. Purves (1996) The extraordinarily
rapid disappearance of entoptic images. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. 93: 8001-8004.},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds114079}
}
@article{fds114080,
Title = {Purves D., L. White, D. Zheng, T. Andrews and D. Riddle
(1996) Brain size, behavior and the allocation of neural
space. In: The Lifespan Development of Individuals:
Behavioral, Neurobiological, and Psychosocial
Perspectives, (Magnusson D, ed). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, Chapter 8, pp. 162-178.},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds114080}
}
@article{fds268405,
Author = {Riddle, DR and Purves, D},
Title = {Individual variation and lateral asymmetry of the rat
primary somatosensory cortex.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {15},
Number = {6},
Pages = {4184-4195},
Year = {1995},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7790904},
Abstract = {We have evaluated the interindividual variability and
lateral symmetry of a major cortical area by comparing the
primary somatosensory cortex (S1) of adult rats. Our choice
of the rat was dictated by the accuracy with which one can
measure S1 and its component representations in the rodent
brain; the importance of such measurements lies in
understanding the rules that govern the allocation of
cortical space and, ultimately, the consequences of
differential allocation for behavior. With respect to
interindividual differences, the major somatic
representations in S1 are surprisingly variable in size. The
area of the whiskerpad representation, for example, ranged
from 3.72 to 6.84 mm2 in a sample of 53 rats; other
components of S1 showed comparable differences among
animals. With respect to lateral symmetry, the average area
of each major representation was similar for the right and
left hemispheres; thus, we found no consistent bias in the
size of S1 or its elements in the sample as a whole. Within
individual animals, however, the sizes of the major somatic
representations were often quite different in the two
hemispheres. The magnitude of the lateral differences
averaged 7.9 +/- 0.8% (mean +/- SEM) for the whisker pad
representation, 11.6 +/- 1.3% for the upper lip, 15.4 +/-
1.6% for the furry buccal pad, 13.9 +/- 1.4% for the lower
jaw, and 13.3 +/- 1.2% for the forepaw. These results show
that the amount of cortical space allocated to corresponding
functions in individual rats--or in the two hemispheres of a
particular rat--are often different. Such variations are
likely to be reflected in somatosensory performance.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.15-06-04184.1995},
Key = {fds268405}
}
@article{fds268406,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Race plus IQ does not equal science.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {374},
Number = {6517},
Pages = {10},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/374010d0},
Doi = {10.1038/374010d0},
Key = {fds268406}
}
@article{fds268407,
Author = {Zheng, D and Purves, D},
Title = {Effects of increased neural activity on brain
growth.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {92},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1802-1806},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7892181},
Abstract = {We have measured the effects of regionally increased
metabolic activity--and by inference electrical activity--on
cortical growth in the developing rat brain. Cortical growth
is significantly and specifically greater in regions of
chronically increased activity. This effect of activity on
cortical growth may help explain the permanent storage of
early experience in the developing nervous
system.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.92.6.1802},
Key = {fds268407}
}
@article{fds114049,
Title = {Riddle, D.R. and D. Purves (1995) Individual variation
and lateral asymmetry of the rat primary somatosensory
cortex. J. Neurosci. 15: 4184-4195.},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds114049}
}
@article{fds114075,
Title = {Zheng, D. and D. Purves (1995) The effects of increased
neural activity on brain growth. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
92: 1802-1806.},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds114075}
}
@article{fds114076,
Title = {Purves, D. (1995) Race plus IQ does not equal science.
Nature 374: 10.},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds114076}
}
@article{fds114077,
Title = {White, L.E., T.J.Andrews, C. Hulette, A. Richards, M.
Groelle, J. Paydarfar and D. Purves (1995) Structural
symmetry of the human sensorimotor system. Cerebral Cortex
(submitted).},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds114077}
}
@article{fds268404,
Author = {Purves, D and White, LE},
Title = {Monocular preferences in binocular viewing.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {91},
Number = {18},
Pages = {8339-8342},
Year = {1994},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8078884},
Abstract = {Faced with an unobstructed view, both foveas can be readily
aligned with a distant visual target. The minor difference
in the view of the two eyes (which arises from slightly
different lines of sight) presents no special problem and
is, indeed, the basis of stereopsis. However, when
obstructing objects are present in the foreground, the view
provided by one eye becomes wholly or partially incompatible
with the view of the other. We have investigated how we cope
with this everyday situation by having volunteers observe
distant targets through a fenestrated screen. In this
circumstance, subjects naturally position themselves to view
a target of interest with one eye--usually the right eye.
This monocular habit in normal viewing reinforces other
evidence for the unorthodox idea that visual perception
arises from a union in consciousness of monocular images
that are elaborated independently.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.91.18.8339},
Key = {fds268404}
}
@article{fds268403,
Author = {Purves, D and White, LE and Andrews, TJ},
Title = {Manual asymmetry and handedness.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {91},
Number = {11},
Pages = {5030-5032},
Year = {1994},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8197178},
Abstract = {Volumetric measurements show that right-handed individuals
have larger right hands than left hands. In contrast, the
hands of left-handers are much more nearly symmetrical.
Based on what is known about trophic interactions between
neurons and targets, these findings predict a corresponding
asymmetry of the relevant parts of the sensorimotor system
in right-handers. The lack of an opposite-hand asymmetry
among left-handers further implies that right- and
left-handed phenotypes do not arise according to the same
developmental rules.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.91.11.5030},
Key = {fds268403}
}
@article{fds268402,
Author = {White, LE and Lucas, G and Richards, A and Purves,
D},
Title = {Cerebral asymmetry and handedness.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {368},
Number = {6468},
Pages = {197-198},
Year = {1994},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0028-0836},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8145817},
Doi = {10.1038/368197a0},
Key = {fds268402}
}
@article{fds268401,
Author = {Purves, D and Riddle, DR and White, LE and Gutierrez-Ospina,
G},
Title = {Neural activity and the development of the somatic sensory
system.},
Journal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-123},
Year = {1994},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0959-4388},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8173318},
Abstract = {Present thinking about the role of neural activity in the
developing brain is based largely upon observations in the
visual system. Attempts to generalize these findings in the
somatic sensory system, however, have yielded perplexing
results. Unlike the visual system, recent evidence suggests
that activity plays a relatively minor role in establishing
structural patterns in the primary somatic sensory cortex.
Activity levels in the primary somatic sensory cortex are
nonetheless highest in those regions that grow most during
postnatal development, implying that activity promotes
differential cortical growth.},
Doi = {10.1016/0959-4388(94)90041-8},
Key = {fds268401}
}
@article{fds114047,
Title = {White, L., G. Lucas, A. Richards and D. Purves (1994)
Cerebral asymmetry and handedness. Nature 368:
197-198.},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds114047}
}
@article{fds114048,
Title = {Purves, D. (1994) Neural Activity and the Growth of the
Brain. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds114048}
}
@article{fds114072,
Title = {Purves, D., L. White and T. Andrews (1994) Manual
asymmetry and handedness. Proc Natl Acad Sci 91:
5030-5032.},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds114072}
}
@article{fds114073,
Title = {Purves, D., D.Riddle, L. White and G. Gutierrez (1994)
Neural activity and the development of the somatic sensory
system. Curr Opin Neurobiol 4: 120-123.},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds114073}
}
@article{fds114074,
Title = {Purves, D. and L. E. White (1994) Monocular preferences in
binocular viewing. Proc Natl Acad Sci 91:
8339-8342.},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds114074}
}
@article{fds268400,
Author = {Purves, D and Riddle, DR and White, LE and Gutierrez-Ospina, G and LaMantia, AS},
Title = {Categories of cortical structure.},
Journal = {Progress in Brain Research},
Volume = {102},
Pages = {343-355},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {0079-6123},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7800824},
Doi = {10.1016/S0079-6123(08)60551-8},
Key = {fds268400}
}
@article{fds268397,
Author = {Riddle, DR and Gutierrez, G and Zheng, D and White, LE and Richards, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Differential metabolic and electrical activity in the
somatic sensory cortex of juvenile and adult
rats.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {13},
Number = {10},
Pages = {4193-4213},
Year = {1993},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8410183},
Abstract = {We have examined relative levels of metabolic and electrical
activity across layer IV in the primary somatic sensory
cortex (S1) of the rat in relation to regions of
differential postnatal cortical growth. Each of several
indices used--mitochondrial enzyme histochemistry,
microvessel density, Na+/K+ pump activity, action potential
frequency, and deoxyglucose uptake--indicate regional
variations of metabolic and electrical activity in this part
of the brain in both juvenile (1-week-old) and adult
(10-12-week-old) animals. At both ages, areas of the somatic
sensory map related to special sensors such as whiskers and
digital pads showed evidence of the most intense activity.
Thus, mitochondrial enzyme staining, blood vessel density,
and Na+/K+ ATPase activity were all greatest in the barrels
and barrel-like structures within S1, and least in the
adjacent interbarrel cortex and the cortex surrounding S1.
Multiunit recordings in and around the posteromedial barrel
subfield of anesthetized animals also showed that the
average ratio of evoked to spontaneous activity was greater
in barrels than in the surrounding, metabolically less
active cortex. Furthermore, autoradiograms of labeled
deoxyglucose accumulation in awake behaving animals
indicated systematic differences in neural activity across
S1 barrels and barrel-like structures showed more
deoxyglucose accumulation than interbarrel, nonbarrel, or
peri-S1 cortex. These regional differences in neural
activity correspond to regional differences in neocortical
growth (Riddle et al., 1992). The correlation of greater
electrical activity, increased metabolism, and enhanced
cortical growth during postnatal maturation suggests that
neural activity foments the elaboration of circuitry in the
developing brain.},
Doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.13-10-04193.1993},
Key = {fds268397}
}
@article{fds268396,
Author = {Purves, D and LaMantia, A},
Title = {Development of blobs in the visual cortex of
macaques.},
Journal = {The Journal of Comparative Neurology},
Volume = {334},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-175},
Year = {1993},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0021-9967},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8366193},
Abstract = {We have examined the area of the primary visual cortex and
the number and size of blobs within it in 10 neonatal and 11
adult rhesus monkeys. The average area of the primary visual
cortex (V1) increases from 919 mm2 in newborns to 1,069 mm2
in adult animals (16%). The number of blobs decreases per
unit area from an average of 5.2/mm2 at birth to 4.3/mm2 in
maturity (18%). As a consequence, the number of blobs
remains approximately the same during maturation, at about
4,800/hemisphere. These observations correct a preliminary
report on a subset of the animals studied here (Purves and
LaMantia: Proc Natl Acad Sci 87:5765, '90), in which it
appeared that blob number might increase between birth and
maturity. As in other regions of the developing postnatal
brain, we found no net loss of modular circuitry.},
Doi = {10.1002/cne.903340202},
Key = {fds268396}
}
@article{fds268399,
Author = {Purves, D and Riddle, D and LaMantia, A},
Title = {Reply},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {16},
Number = {5},
Pages = {180-181},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(93)90149-G},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(93)90149-G},
Key = {fds268399}
}
@article{fds114070,
Title = {Riddle, D.R., G. Gutierrez, D. Zheng, L. White, A. Richards
and D. Purves (1993) Differential metabolic and electrical
activity in the somatic sensory cortex of juvenile and adult
rats. J. Neurosci. 13: 4193-4213.},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds114070}
}
@article{fds268398,
Author = {Hevner, RF and Illing, RB and Purves, D and Riddle, D and LaMantia,
A},
Title = {More modules [2]},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {16},
Number = {5},
Pages = {178-180},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds268398}
}
@article{fds268395,
Author = {Purves, D and Riddle, DR and LaMantia, AS},
Title = {Iterated patterns of brain circuitry (or how the cortex gets
its spots)},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {15},
Number = {10},
Pages = {362-368},
Year = {1992},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1279855},
Abstract = {The prominence of repeating patterns of circuitry in the
mammalian brain has led to the general view that iterated
modular units reflect a fundamental principle of cortical
function. Here we argue that these intriguing patterns arise
not because the functional organization of the brain demands
them, but as an incidental consequence of the rules of
synapse formation.},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(92)90180-g},
Key = {fds268395}
}
@article{fds268394,
Author = {Riddle, D and Richards, A and Zsuppan, F and Purves,
D},
Title = {Growth of the rat somatic sensory cortex and its constituent
parts during postnatal development.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {12},
Number = {9},
Pages = {3509-3524},
Year = {1992},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1527593},
Abstract = {We have compared the size and arrangement of the primary
somatic sensory cortex (SI) and its constituent parts in
juvenile (1 week old) and mature (10-12 weeks old) rats
using succinic dehydrogenase histochemistry and digital
image analysis. Our goal was to determine whether some
regions of the maturing cortex grow more than others. To
this end, we examined (1) the growth of barrels and the
surrounding (interbarrel) cortex, (2) the growth of the
major somatic representations within SI, and (3) the overall
growth of SI compared to the neocortex as a whole. With
respect to the first of these issues, SI barrels and
barrel-like structures grow more than the intervening
cortex. The growth of these elements varies according to
region: barrels in the head representation more than double
in size, whereas the barrel-like structures in the paw
representations increase by only about half this amount. The
growth of the major somatic representations within SI is
also heterogeneous, the representation of the head enlarging
to a greater extent than the representations of the paws.
Thus, the ratio of the total area of head representation to
the combined paw representation is 15% greater in adults
than in juveniles. Finally, the primary somatic sensory
cortex grows to a somewhat greater extent than the neocortex
as a whole. These observations demonstrate that postnatal
cortical growth is not uniform; it varies among cortical
barrels and the immediately surrounding (interbarrel)
cortex, among the representations of different body parts,
and between SI and the rest of the neocortex. As an
explanation of this differential growth, we suggest that the
neuropil of metabolically (and/or electrically) more active
cortical regions grows to a greater extent during maturation
than that of less active regions.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.12-09-03509.1992},
Key = {fds268394}
}
@article{fds268393,
Author = {LaMantia, AS and Pomeroy, SL and Purves, D},
Title = {Vital imaging of glomeruli in the mouse olfactory
bulb.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {976-988},
Year = {1992},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1545246},
Abstract = {We have monitored the pattern of identified glomeruli in the
olfactory bulbs of newborn, juvenile, and adult mice over
intervals of several hours to several weeks. Our purpose was
to assess the development and stability of these complex
units in the mammalian brain. Glomeruli can be observed by
vital fluorescent staining and laser-scanning confocal
microscopy without causing acute or long-term damage to
brain tissue. Repeated observation of bulbs in the same
animals between birth and 3 weeks of age showed that this
region of the brain develops by progressive addition of
these units to the original population. This increment
occurs by the genesis of smaller new glomeruli between
larger existing ones; no elimination of glomeruli was
observed during this process. Finally, no addition (or loss)
of glomeruli occurred in adult animals over a 2 week
interval; once established, the number, size, and pattern of
glomeruli are evidently stable.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.12-03-00976.1992},
Key = {fds268393}
}
@article{fds114045,
Title = {LaMantia, A-S., S. Pomeroy and D. Purves (1992) Vital
imaging of glomeruli in the mouse olfactory bulb. J.
Neurosci. 12: 976-988.},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds114045}
}
@article{fds268392,
Author = {Zheng, D and LaMantia, AS and Purves, D},
Title = {Specialized vascularization of the primate visual
cortex.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {11},
Number = {8},
Pages = {2622-2629},
Year = {1991},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1714496},
Abstract = {We have analyzed blood vessel distribution in the primary
and secondary visual cortices of the squirrel monkey in
relation to cortical modules, laminae, and cytoarchitectonic
areas. Measurements of microvessel length in tangential
sections through the primary visual cortex showed that blobs
are more richly vascularized than intervening cortical
regions. Thus, the mean total length of microvessel profiles
per unit was 42% greater within these cortical modules than
within adjacent (interblob) areas. Total microvessel length
per unit area in another class of module, the stripes in the
secondary visual cortex, was 27% greater than in interstripe
regions. Microvessel distribution also varied systematically
from layer to layer in the primary visual cortex, being
greatest in lamina IVc. Finally, the overall microvessel
length per unit area in sections of the primary visual
cortex was 26% greater than that in the secondary visual
cortex. These observations indicate that the modular,
laminar, and regional organization of the primate visual
cortex is reflected in the underlying distribution of
cortical microvessels. These vascular patterns should be
discernable in living animals with vascular contrast agents
and appropriate imaging techniques.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.11-08-02622.1991},
Key = {fds268392}
}
@article{fds268389,
Author = {Purves, D and LaMantia, AS},
Title = {Numbers of "blobs" in the primary visual cortex of neonatal
and adult monkeys.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {87},
Number = {15},
Pages = {5764-5767},
Year = {1990},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0027-8424},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.87.15.5764},
Abstract = {We have examined the number of "blobs" (cytochrome
oxidase-positive cortical modules) in the primary visual
cortex (area 17) of infant and adult rhesus monkeys. The
density of these iterated circuits--about five per mm2--was
not significantly different in three newborn and three
mature animals. Measurement of the surface of area 17 in
serial sections, however, showed that the total area
occupied by the primary visual cortex increases by about 50%
during maturation. Based on these measurements, the number
of blobs in this species is about 8000 at birth and about
12,000 in maturity. Evidently, these complex functional
units are added gradually to the developing primate brain
over a period that extends into postnatal
life.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.87.15.5764},
Key = {fds268389}
}
@article{fds268391,
Author = {Pomeroy, SL and LaMantia, AS and Purves, D},
Title = {Postnatal construction of neural circuitry in the mouse
olfactory bulb.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {10},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1952-1966},
Year = {1990},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.10-06-01952.1990},
Abstract = {We have undertaken a quantitative analysis of the mouse
olfactory bulb to address several major questions concerning
the development of neural circuitry in the postnatal
mammalian brain. These are: (1) To what degree are new
elements and circuits added during maturation? (2) How long
do such processes go on? and (3) Does postnatal development
involve a net addition of circuits and their constituent
elements, or is there elimination of some portion of an
initial surfeit? Using male mice of known age, weight, and
length, we measured the overall size of the bulb, the
numbers of processing units (glomeruli) within the bulb, the
extent and complexity of postsynaptic dendrites within the
glomeruli, and the number of synapses in different regions
of the bulb. Between birth and the time mice reach sexual
maturity at 6-7 weeks of age, the bulb increases in size by
a factor of 8, the number of glomeruli by a factor of 4-5,
the length of mitral cell dendritic branches by a factor of
11, and the number of glomerular and extraglomerular
synapses by factors of 90 and 170, respectively. Each of
these parameters increases steadily from birth, in concert
with the enlargement of the olfactory mucosa, the overall
growth of the brain, and indeed, of the entire animal. We
found no evidence of an initial surfeit of processing units,
dendritic branches, or synapses. Further elaboration of
neural circuitry by each of these measures is also apparent
from the time of sexual maturity until the animals reach
their full adult size at about 10-12 weeks of age. The
developmental strategy in this part of the mouse brain
evidently involves prolonged construction that persists
until the growth of the body is complete. This ongoing
elaboration of neural circuitry in the postnatal mammalian
brain may be relevant to understanding a number of
unexplained developmental phenomena, including critical
periods, the ability of the juvenile brain to recover from
injuries that would cause severe and permanent deficits in
older animals, and the special ability of the maturing brain
to encode large amounts of new information.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.10-06-01952.1990},
Key = {fds268391}
}
@article{fds268390,
Author = {Purves, D and LaMantia, AS},
Title = {Construction of modular circuits in the mammalian
brain.},
Journal = {Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative
Biology},
Volume = {55},
Pages = {445-452},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0091-7451},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2132831},
Abstract = {Comparison of seemingly different modular units in the
mammalian brain raises the possibility of a common mechanism
for their formation: the growth of neuropil mediated by
trophic interactions. The ongoing postnatal construction of
modular circuits according to trophic interplay may in turn
account for the remarkable plasticity of the juvenile brain.
By the same token, the normal waning of circuit construction
during postnatal development may explain the end of critical
periods, the diminished ability to recover from injury in
older animals, and the decline with increasing age in the
ability of mammals to learn complex skills.},
Doi = {10.1101/sqb.1990.055.01.044},
Key = {fds268390}
}
@article{fds268385,
Author = {LaMantia, AS and Purves, D},
Title = {Development of glomerular pattern visualized in the
olfactory bulbs of living mice.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {341},
Number = {6243},
Pages = {646-649},
Year = {1989},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/341646a0},
Abstract = {Many regions of the mammalian brain are characterized by
iterated ensembles of nerve cells which can be distinguished
anatomically and physiologically. A particularly striking
example is the pattern of glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs;
other instances are columns and 'blobs' in the visual
cortex, barrels and columns in the somatosensory cortex, and
striasomes and cell islands in the neostriatum.
Understanding the generation of these neuronal ensembles has
a bearing on a variety of important neurobiological
problems, including the nature of critical periods, the
age-dependent response of the nervous system to injury and
the manner in which neural information is stored. Analysis
of these issues has usually been restricted to studies of
the brains of different individuals at various ages. Many
questions about the formation of such units, however, can
only be answered by observing the same brain repeatedly in a
living animal. This strategy would enable a direct
assessment of how these units are assembled, whether the
initial ensembles persist and whether units are lost or
gained as an animal matures. We have succeeded in studying
the pattern of glomeruli in the mouse olfactory bulb on two
separate occasions during postnatal development. Comparison
of the patterns observed at intervals of up to three weeks
show that this part of the brain is gradually constructed by
the addition of new glomeruli to a persisting
population.},
Doi = {10.1038/341646a0},
Key = {fds268385}
}
@article{fds268386,
Author = {Harris, LW and Purves, D},
Title = {Rapid remodeling of sensory endings in the corneas of living
mice.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {9},
Number = {6},
Pages = {2210-2214},
Year = {1989},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.09-06-02210.1989},
Abstract = {The terminals of trigeminal neurons were followed over time
in the corneas of living mice by repeated staining with a
nontoxic fluorescent dye. The purpose of these observations
was to evaluate remodeling of sensory nerve endings in an
adult mammal. Video images of topically stained nerve
endings within particular corneal regions were recorded
initially, and then again after intervals ranging from 4 hr
to 30 d. Comparison of the 2 sets of images showed that
sensory endings in the corneal epithelium undergo continual
rearrangement under normal circumstances. Substantial
changes in terminal configuration occurred over periods as
brief as a day.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.09-06-02210.1989},
Key = {fds268386}
}
@article{fds268387,
Author = {Ivanov, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Ongoing electrical activity of superior cervical ganglion
cells in mammals of different size.},
Journal = {The Journal of Comparative Neurology},
Volume = {284},
Number = {3},
Pages = {398-404},
Year = {1989},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cne.902840307},
Abstract = {The ongoing synaptic activity of superior cervical ganglion
cells in adult mammals was examined in situ by intracellular
recording in anesthetized mice, hamsters, rats, guinea pigs,
and rabbits. The proportion of neurons exhibiting
subthreshold and suprathreshold synaptic activity during a
standard period of observation was least in a small mammal
like the mouse (30%), intermediate among neurons of mammals
of intermediate size such as the hamster and rat (48% and
45%, respectively), and greatest in the largest animals in
the series, the guinea pig (89%) and rabbit (91%). Ganglion
cells in all species fell silent after transection of the
cervical trunk. The average frequency of synaptic activity
among tonically active cells also increased with animal
size, being least in the mouse (1.0/second) and greatest in
the rabbit (6.4/second). This variation of ongoing synaptic
activity in sympathetic ganglion cells may reflect the
demands of progressively larger peripheral targets on
relatively fixed populations of autonomic
neurons.},
Doi = {10.1002/cne.902840307},
Key = {fds268387}
}
@article{fds268388,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Assessing some dynamic properties of the living nervous
system},
Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Experimental Physiology},
Volume = {74},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1089-1105},
Year = {1989},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/expphysiol.1989.sp003335},
Doi = {10.1113/expphysiol.1989.sp003335},
Key = {fds268388}
}
@article{fds268384,
Author = {Purves, D and Snider, WD and Voyvodic, JT},
Title = {Trophic regulation of nerve cell morphology and innervation
in the autonomic nervous system.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {336},
Number = {6195},
Pages = {123-128},
Year = {1988},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0028-0836},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3054564},
Abstract = {A remarkable feature of nerve cells is the complex and
variable pattern of their axonal and dendritic branches.
Quantitative studies of a simple part of the nervous system
in mammals provide evidence that neuronal geometry and
innervation are regulated by long-term trophic interactions
between neurons and their targets. This trophic linkage may
explain how nerve cells adjust their function to the needs
of bodies that vary markedly in size and
form.},
Doi = {10.1038/336123a0},
Key = {fds268384}
}
@article{fds268383,
Author = {Pomeroy, SL and Purves, D},
Title = {Neuron/glia relationships observed over intervals of several
months in living mice.},
Journal = {The Journal of Cell Biology},
Volume = {107},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1167-1175},
Year = {1988},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1083/jcb.107.3.1167},
Abstract = {Identified neurons and glial cells in a parasympathetic
ganglion were observed in situ with video-enhanced
microscopy at intervals of up to 130 d in adult mice.
Whereas the number and position of glial cells associated
with particular neurons did not change over several hours,
progressive differences were evident over intervals of weeks
to months. These changes involved differences in the
location of glial nuclei on the neuronal surface,
differences in the apparent number of glial nuclei
associated with each neuron, and often both. When we
examined the arrangement of neurons and glial cells in the
electron microscope, we also found that presynaptic nerve
terminals are more prevalent in the vicinity of glial nuclei
than elsewhere on the neuronal surface. The fact that glial
nuclei are associated with preganglionic endings, together
with the finding that the position and number of glial
nuclei associated with identified neurons gradually changes,
is in accord with the recent observation that synapses on
these neurons are normally subject to ongoing rearrangement
(Purves, D., J. T. Voyvodic, L. Magrassi, and H. Yawo. 1987.
Science (Wash. DC). 238:1122-1126). By the same token, the
present results suggest that glial cells are involved in
synaptic remodeling.},
Doi = {10.1083/jcb.107.3.1167},
Key = {fds268383}
}
@article{fds114044,
Title = {Purves, D., W.D. Snider and J.T. Voyvodic (1988) Trophic
regulation of nerve cell morphology and innervation in the
autonomic nervous system. Nature 336: 123-128.},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds114044}
}
@article{fds268380,
Author = {Purves, D and Voyvodic, JT and Magrassi, L and Yawo,
H},
Title = {Nerve terminal remodeling visualized in living mice by
repeated examination of the same neuron.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {238},
Number = {4830},
Pages = {1122-1126},
Year = {1987},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3685967},
Abstract = {The distribution of presynaptic endings on the surfaces of
autonomic ganglion cells was mapped in living mice after
intravenous administration of a styryl pyridinium dye. The
staining and imaging techniques did not appear to damage the
ganglion cells, or the synapses on them; these procedures
could therefore be repeated after an arbitrary period.
Observations of the same neurons at intervals of up to 3
weeks indicate that the pattern of preganglionic terminals
on many of these nerve cells gradually changes.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.3685967},
Key = {fds268380}
}
@article{fds268496,
Author = {Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Synaptic sites on reinnervated nerve cells visualized at two
different times in living mice.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {7},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1492-1497},
Year = {1987},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.07-05-01492.1987},
Abstract = {Synaptic boutons on the surface of identified autonomic
ganglion cells were visualized by methylene blue staining at
intervals of 1-2 months following denervation to assess
whether regenerating axon terminals reoccupy original
synaptic sites. The distribution of synapses observed on the
same neuronal cell bodies was almost always different in
appearance after reinnervation. These results are at odds
with the conclusions of earlier workers, who have argued
that mammalian neurons bear a fixed number of synaptic
sites, which are reoccupied during reinnervation.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.07-05-01492.1987},
Key = {fds268496}
}
@article{fds268494,
Author = {Lichtman, JW and Magrassi, L and Purves, D},
Title = {Visualization of neuromuscular junctions over periods of
several months in living mice.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1215-1222},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.07-04-01215.1987},
Abstract = {Identified neuromuscular junctions were followed in the
sternomastoid muscle of living mice for several months by
repeated staining with the fluorescent dye
4-(4-diethylaminostyryl)-N-methylpyridinium iodide
(4-Di-2-ASP; Magrassi et al., 1987). Overall terminal growth
occurred at many endplates; however, the branching pattern
of presynaptic arbors was largely unchanged, even after
several months. The absence of significant remodeling over
time was not a result of dye-staining, since sprouting was
readily induced at residual motor endings by partial
denervation. We conclude that--apart from overall
growth--most neuromuscular junctions in the adult mouse are
stable over intervals that represent a significant fraction
of the animal's lifetime.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.07-04-01215.1987},
Key = {fds268494}
}
@article{fds268495,
Author = {Magrassi, L and Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Fluorescent probes that stain living nerve
terminals.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1207-1214},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.07-04-01207.1987},
Abstract = {We have evaluated the efficacy of 18 cationic mitochondrial
dyes that, as a class, show some ability to stain living
nerve terminals. Several of these agents provide excellent
staining of neuromuscular junctions in a wide range of
species. More detailed studies of the most effective of
these dyes--4-(4-diethylaminostyryl)-N-methylpyridinium
iodide (4-Di-2-ASP)--indicate that it has no lasting effect
on the structure or function of motor nerve terminals. As
demonstrated in the accompanying paper (Lichtman et al.,
1987; see also Lichtman et al., 1986), 4-Di-2-ASP can
therefore be used to follow the configuration of identified
motor terminals over arbitrarily long intervals.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.07-04-01207.1987},
Key = {fds268495}
}
@article{fds268381,
Author = {Purves, D and Sanes, JR},
Title = {The 1986 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {6},
Pages = {231-235},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(87)90163-9},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(87)90163-9},
Key = {fds268381}
}
@article{fds268382,
Author = {Purves, D and Voyvodic, JT},
Title = {Imaging mammalian nerve cells and their connections over
time in living animals},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {10},
Pages = {398-404},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(87)90005-1},
Abstract = {A variety of technical advances have provided a means of
following individual nerve cells and their connections over
intervals of weeks or months in living animals. Such
observations allow an assessment of the stability of pre-
and postsynaptic elements in several regions of the nervous
system of adult mammals. © 1987.},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(87)90005-1},
Key = {fds268382}
}
@article{fds268379,
Author = {Purves, D and Hadley, RD and Voyvodic, JT},
Title = {Dynamic changes in the dendritic geometry of individual
neurons visualized over periods of up to three months in the
superior cervical ganglion of living mice.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {6},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1051-1060},
Year = {1986},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0270-6474},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3701409},
Abstract = {We describe a means of visualizing the same neuron in the
superior cervical ganglion of young adult mice over
intervals of up to 3 months. The dendrites of these neurons
change during this interval; some branches retract, others
elongate, and still others appear to form de novo. Thus,
neuronal dendrites in this part of the nervous system are
subject to continual change beyond what is usually
considered the developmental period. The remodeling of
postsynaptic processes further implies that the synaptic
connections made onto these cells undergo substantial
rearrangement well into adulthood.},
Doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.06-04-01051.1986},
Key = {fds268379}
}
@article{fds268492,
Author = {Purves, D and Rubin, E and Snider, WD and Lichtman,
J},
Title = {Relation of animal size to convergence, divergence, and
neuronal number in peripheral sympathetic
pathways.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {158-163},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.06-01-00158.1986},
Abstract = {The enormous range of animal size raises a fundamental
problem: How do larger animals maintain adequate control of
peripheral structures that are many times more massive and
extensive than the homologous structures in smaller animals?
To explore this question, we have determined neuronal
number, the number of axons that innervate each neuron
(convergence) and the number of neurons innervated by each
axon (divergence), in a peripheral sympathetic pathway of
several mammals (mouse, hamster, rat, guinea pig, and
rabbit). The average adult weights of these species vary
over approximately a 65-fold range. However, the number of
superior cervical ganglion cells increases by only a factor
of 4 between the smallest of these animals (mice; about 25
gm) and the largest (rabbits; about 1700 gm); the number of
spinal preganglionic neurons that innervate the ganglion
increases by only a factor of 2. Thus, the number of nerve
cells in the sympathetic system does not increase in
proportion to animal size. On the other hand, our results
indicate that there are systematic differences across these
species in the number of axons that innervate each ganglion
cell and in the number of ganglion cells innervated by each
axon. We suggest that modulation of convergence and
divergence in sympathetic ganglia allows this part of the
nervous system to effectively activate homologous peripheral
targets over a wide range of animal size.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.06-01-00158.1986},
Key = {fds268492}
}
@article{fds268493,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {The trophic theory of neural concentrations},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {C},
Pages = {486-489},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(86)90155-4},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(86)90155-4},
Key = {fds268493}
}
@article{fds114068,
Title = {Purves, D., R.D. Hadley and J. Voyvodic (1986) Dynamic
changes in the dendritic geometry of individual neurons
visualized over periods of up to three months in the
superior cervical ganglion of living mice. J. Neurosci. 6:
1051-1060.},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds114068}
}
@article{fds268377,
Author = {Easter, SS and Purves, D and Rakic, P and Spitzer,
NC},
Title = {The changing view of neural specificity.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {230},
Number = {4725},
Pages = {507-511},
Year = {1985},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.4048944},
Abstract = {The generation of specific patterns of neuronal connections
has usually been regarded as a central problem in
neurobiology. The prevailing view for many years has been
that these connections are established by complementary
recognition molecules on the pre- and postsynaptic cells
(the chemoaffinity theory). Experimental results obtained in
the past decade, however, indicate that the view that axon
guidance and synaptogenesis proceed according to restrictive
chemical markers is too narrow. Although a more rigid plan
may prevail in some invertebrates, the formation of specific
connections in vertebrates also involves competition between
axon terminals, trophic feedback between pre- and
postsynaptic cells, and modification of connections by
functional activity.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.4048944},
Key = {fds268377}
}
@article{fds268378,
Author = {Purves, D and Hadley, RD},
Title = {Changes in the dendritic branching of adult mammalian
neurones revealed by repeated imaging in
situ.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {315},
Number = {6018},
Pages = {404-406},
Year = {1985},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/315404a0},
Abstract = {A major obstacle to understanding the mechanism of long-term
change in the vertebrate nervous system has been the
inability to observe the same nerve cell at different times
during the life of an animal. The possibility that changes
in neural connectivity underlie the remarkable flexibility
of the nervous systems of mammals has therefore not been
tested by direct observation. Here, we report studies in
which we have visualized the same neurone in the superior
cervical ganglion of young adult mice at intervals of up to
33 days. This collection of nerve cells is particularly
accessible and therefore well suited to our approach. We
find that the dendritic branches of the neurones examined
change appreciably over intervals of 2 weeks or more; some
branches retract, others elongate and others seem to form de
novo. The apparent remodelling of these postsynaptic
elements implies that the synaptic connections of these
cells normally undergo significant rearrangement beyond what
is usually considered to be the developmental
period.},
Doi = {10.1038/315404a0},
Key = {fds268378}
}
@article{fds268376,
Author = {Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Geometrical differences among homologous neurons in
mammals.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {228},
Number = {4697},
Pages = {298-302},
Year = {1985},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.3983631},
Abstract = {The dendritic arbors of sympathetic neurons in different
species of mammals vary systematically: the superior
cervical ganglion cells of smaller mammals have fewer and
less extensive dendrites than the homologous neurons in
larger animals. This difference in dendritic complexity
according to body size is reflected in the convergence of
ganglionic innervation; the ganglion cells of progressively
larger mammals are innervated by progressively more axons.
These relations have implications both for the function of
homologous neural systems in animals of different sizes and
for the regulation of neuronal geometry during
development.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.3983631},
Key = {fds268376}
}
@article{fds114067,
Title = {Purves, D. and J.W. Lichtman (1985) Geometrical differences
among homologous neurons in mammals. Science 228:
298-302.},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds114067}
}
@article{fds268375,
Author = {Forehand, CJ and Purves, D},
Title = {Regional innervation of rabbit ciliary ganglion cells by the
terminals of preganglionic axons.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-12},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.04-01-00001.1984},
Abstract = {In the rabbit, ciliary ganglion neurons with dendrites
maintain inputs from several different axons during the
period of synaptic rearrangement that occurs in early
postnatal life. Neurons without dendrites, on the other
hand, lose the majority of their initial inputs and are
innervated in maturity by the terminals of only one or two
axons (Purves, D., and R.I. Hume (1981) J. Neurosci. 1:
441-452; Hume, R.I., and D. Purves (1981) Nature 293:
469-471). We have explored the basis of this phenomenon by
individually marking preganglionic axons and the neurons
they innervate with horseradish peroxidase. In general, the
innervation of geometrically complex (multiply innervated)
neurons by individual preganglionic axons is regional. That
is, the synaptic contacts made by an axon on these neurons
are limited to a portion of the postsynaptic surface that
includes some, but not all, of the dendrites. This regional
innervation of target neurons is consistent with the view
that dendrites allow multiple innervation to persist by
providing relatively separate postsynaptic domains for
individual preganglionic axons. Such regional innervation
may mitigate competitive interactions between the several
axons which initially innervate the same
neuron.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.04-01-00001.1984},
Key = {fds268375}
}
@article{fds268369,
Author = {Johnson, DA and Purves, D},
Title = {Tonic and reflex synaptic activity recorded in ciliary
ganglion cells of anaesthetized rabbits.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {339},
Pages = {599-613},
Year = {1983},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014737},
Abstract = {We have studied patterns of synaptic activity in rabbit
ciliary ganglion cells by intracellular recording in vivo,
and have examined the morphology of functionally
characterized neurones by intracellular injection of
horseradish peroxidase. Nearly all of the neurones studied
(293 of 300) received tonic synaptic input from
preganglionic neurones. This tonic activity was not
decreased by darkness or by acute optic nerve section. The
rate of tonic synaptic activity recorded in the vast
majority of neurones (94%) changed in response to retinal
illumination. Most ganglion cells showed an increased rate;
some cells, however, showed decreased activity during
illumination. The rate of synaptic activity recorded in
ciliary neurones tended to be progressively higher in
neurones with more complex geometries. Neurones with similar
reflex properties included cells that lacked dendrites and
cells with complex dendritic arborizations; conversely,
neurones with similar geometries often had different reflex
characteristics. The synaptic activity arising from
different preganglionic axons innervating the same ganglion
cell was not temporally linked in any obvious way. The
relevance of these results to the regulation of the number
of axons that innervate target neurones is
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014737},
Key = {fds268369}
}
@article{fds268368,
Author = {Hume, RI and Purves, D},
Title = {Apportionment of the terminals from single preganglionic
axons to target neurones in the rabbit ciliary
ganglion.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {338},
Pages = {259-275},
Year = {1983},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014672},
Abstract = {We have studied the apportionment of terminals from single
preganglionic axons to target neurones in the ciliary
ganglion of adult rabbits. Both electrical recording and
intra-axonal injection of horseradish peroxidase (HRP)
showed that each preganglionic axon innervates only a small
fraction of the ganglion cell population (about 10-20 of the
approximately 400 ganglion cells). Examination of ganglia in
whole mounts showed that neurones whose cell bodies were
enveloped by HRP-labelled boutons from a single axon were
often surrounded by other neurones which received no
contacts from the labelled fibre. Electron microscopical
examination of labelled presynaptic terminals on individual
ganglion cells confirmed that the boutons of single axons
were sharply confined to particular target cells. This
suggests that individual target neurones (or portions of
them) are the unit of innervation during the development of
these synaptic connexions. Comparison of the amplitudes of
synaptic responses in singly and multiply innervated
ganglion cells indicated that, on average, an individual
axon made a weaker synaptic connexion with a multiply
innervated neurone than with neurone that received only one
input. Moreover, neurones innervated by several different
axons tended to have fewer synapses on their somata than
neurones innervated by only one or two preganglionic axons.
Individual post-synaptic profiles were often contacted
exclusively by labelled terminals when examined in the
electron microscope. Since many of these neurones are
multiply innervated, this observation suggests some regional
separation of the several inputs contacting the same cell.
For several reasons, however, this inference must be
regarded as tentative. Taken together, these findings
provide a possible explanation of the correlation between
the dendritic geometry of ganglion cells and the number of
different axons that innervate them (Purves & Hume, 1981).
The several axons that initially innervate ganglion cells
without dendrites evidently compete during early life until
only a single input remains. On ganglion cells with
dendrites, however, the number of inputs that persists is
proportional to dendritic complexity. The present results
suggest that the diminished competition between axons
innervating neurones with dendrites may result from some
degree of terminal segregation on dendritic
arborizations.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014672},
Key = {fds268368}
}
@article{fds268373,
Author = {Lichtman, JW and Purves, D},
Title = {Activity-mediated neural change.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {301},
Number = {5901},
Pages = {563},
Year = {1983},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/301563a0},
Doi = {10.1038/301563a0},
Key = {fds268373}
}
@article{fds268370,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Modulation of neuronal competition by postsynaptic geometry
in autonomic ganglia},
Journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
Volume = {6},
Number = {C},
Pages = {10-16},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0166-2236},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(83)90007-3},
Abstract = {The number of axons that innervate autonomic ganglion cells
is the result of competition in early life between terminals
contacting the same target cell. In maturity, a correlation
between the number of inputs a cell receives and dendritic
complexity implies that geometry modulates neuronal
competition. These observations suggest a novel view of the
role that dendrites play in neuronal development. ©
1983.},
Doi = {10.1016/0166-2236(83)90007-3},
Key = {fds268370}
}
@article{fds268371,
Author = {Purves, D and Wigston, DJ},
Title = {Neural units in the superior cervical ganglion of the
guinea-pig.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {334},
Pages = {169-178},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014487},
Abstract = {The size and arrangement of the set of neurones innervated
by individual preganglionic axons (the neural unit) has been
investigated in the superior cervical ganglion of the
guinea-pig. 1. Based on the ratio of preganglionic neurones
to ganglion cells, and the average number of axons
contacting each ganglion cell, we estimated that individual
preganglionic axons innervate on the order of 50-200
superior cervical ganglion cells. 2. Of 562 pairs of
ganglion cells examined with intracellular recording,
forty-seven (8.4%) were innervated by one or more common
axons. 3. Pairs of ganglion cells innervated by the same
axon were not necessarily near each other. Although nearby
cells were more likely to share innervation than neurones
far apart, cells sharing innervation were often found
several hundred micrometers apart, and were occasionally
separated by the largest dimension of the ganglion (about
1-2 mm). 4. The incidence of cell pairs that shared
innervation from more than one axon was greater than
expected from the frequency of pairs sharing at least one
axon. 5. Extracellular recordings from small fascicles of
the cervical sympathetic trunk showed that preganglionic
axons from different segmental levels intermingle
extensively en route to the superior cervical ganglion. 6.
Taken together, these findings support the view that sets of
ganglion cells are innervated in common not because of any
special topographic relationship within the ganglion, but
because they share one or more properties that make them
especially attractive to particular preganglionic
axons.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1983.sp014487},
Key = {fds268371}
}
@article{fds268372,
Author = {Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Specific connections between nerve cells.},
Journal = {Annual Review of Physiology},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {553-565},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ph.45.030183.003005},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev.ph.45.030183.003005},
Key = {fds268372}
}
@article{fds268367,
Author = {Hume, RI and Purves, D},
Title = {Geometry of neonatal neurones and the regulation of synapse
elimination.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {293},
Number = {5832},
Pages = {469-471},
Year = {1981},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/293469a0},
Abstract = {In the ciliary ganglion of adult rabbits, ganglion cells
lacking dendrites are generally innervated by a single axon,
whereas cells with one or more dendrites are innervated by a
number of different axons that increases in proportion to
the complexity of their dendritic arbor. We have now
explored the basis of this correlation by comparing the
dendritic arborization of cells receiving different numbers
of axons during and after the period of synapse elimination
that occurs early in postnatal life. Our results suggest
that the geometry of neonatal neurones influences the
competitive interaction between the several axons that
initially innervate the same cell. This finding in turn
implies that an important function of dendrites is to
regulate the number of different axons that ultimately
innervate each neurone.},
Doi = {10.1038/293469a0},
Key = {fds268367}
}
@article{fds268363,
Author = {Johnson, DA and Purves, D},
Title = {Post-natal reduction of neural unit size in the rabbit
ciliary ganglion.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {318},
Pages = {143-159},
Year = {1981},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1981.sp013855},
Abstract = {We have studied the innervation of adult and neonatal
ciliary ganglia in the rabbit to determine the average
number of ganglion cells innervated by each preganglionic
neurone at different stages of development. 1. The adult
ciliary ganglion comprises about 380 ganglion cells which
are innervated by about forty preganglionic neurones. 2.
Ciliary ganglion cells in adult rabbits are on average
innervated by 2.2 different axons; in contrast, neonatal
ganglion cells are on average innervated by 4.6 different
axons. The transition to the adult pattern of innervation
occurs gradually during the first few post-natal weeks. 3.
The numbers of ganglion cells and preganglionic neurones do
not change appreciably after birth. Accordingly, the loss of
some innervation to individual neurones during post-natal
development indicates that each preganglionic axon
innervates progressively fewer ciliary ganglion cells. 4.
The number of synaptic boutons found in ganglia at birth,
however, is less than the number of synaptic boutons found
in adult ganglia. 5. We conclude that synaptic connexions in
this ganglion age gradually rearranged in early post-natal
life such that each preganglionic neurone focuses an
increasing number of synaptic contacts on a progressively
smaller subset of the ganglion cell population.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1981.sp013855},
Key = {fds268363}
}
@article{fds268366,
Author = {Purves, D and Hume, RI},
Title = {The relation of postsynaptic geometry to the number of
presynaptic axons that innervate autonomic ganglion
cells.},
Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
Society for Neuroscience},
Volume = {1},
Number = {5},
Pages = {441-452},
Year = {1981},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.01-05-00441.1981},
Abstract = {We have studied the shape of rabbit ciliary ganglion cells
in relation to the number of axons that innervate each
neuron. Adult ganglion cells receive synapses from one to
seven different preganglionic axons. Some neurons lack
dendrites altogether, whereas others have complex
arborizations of up to eight primary dendrites. The neurons
that receive all of their synaptic contacts from a single
preganglionic axon usually have no dendrites; on the other
hand, multiply innervated ganglion cells receive synapses
from a number of different axons that increases in
proportion to the number of primary dendrites that they
possess. A possible explanation of these results is that
individual ciliary ganglion cells comprise a number of
separate spatial domains, each of which is largely
constrained to receive innervation from a single
preganglionic axon.},
Doi = {10.1523/jneurosci.01-05-00441.1981},
Key = {fds268366}
}
@article{fds268365,
Author = {Purves, D and Thompson, W and Yip, JW},
Title = {Re-innervation of ganglia transplanted to the neck from
different levels of the guinea-pig sympathetic
chain.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {313},
Pages = {49-63},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1981.sp013650},
Abstract = {Thoracic and lumbar sympathetic ganglia from donor
guinea-pigs were transplanted to the bed of an excised
superior cervical ganglion in host animals. Homotopic
transplants of superior cervical ganglia served as controls.
In this way the same set of preganglionic axons (the
cervical sympathetic trunk) was confronted with ganglia from
different levels of the sympathetic chain. Re-innervation of
the transplants was studied after 3-5 months. 1. Neurones in
ganglia transplanted from different levels of the
sympathetic chain were re-innervated to about the same
over-all degree by the preganglionic axons of the host's
cervical sympathetic trunk. Thus, the mean amplitude of
post-synaptic potentials, the estimated number of
innervating axons, and the number of spinal segments
providing innervation to each neurone were similar in
transplanted thoracic, lumbar and superior cervical ganglion
cells. 2. Neurones in transplanted mid-thoracic ganglia,
however, were re-innervated more frequently, and more
strongly, by axons arising from more caudal thoracic
segments than neurones in transplanted superior cervical
ganglia. Stimulation of axons arising from the fourth
thoracic spinal segment (T4), for example, elicited
post-synaptic potentials that on average were twice as large
in transplanted fifth thoracic ganglion cells as in
transplanted superior cervical ganglion cells; conversely,
axons arising from T1 re-innervated neurones in the superior
cervical ganglion about 2-3 times more effectively than
fifth thoracic ganglion cells. This difference in the
re-innervation of the fifth thoracic and the superior
cervical ganglion is in the same direction as (although less
pronounced than) the normal difference in the segmental
innervation of these ganglia. 3. Transplanted lumbar ganglia
were also re-innervated more effectively by relatively
caudal segments compared to re-innervated cervical ganglia,
but this difference was no greater than that observed for
transplanted thoracic ganglia. 4. We conclude that
preganglionic axons can distinguish (or be distinguished by)
ganglia derived from different levels of the sympathetic
chain. Our findings are consistent with the view that
ganglion cells have some permanent property that biases the
innervation they receive.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1981.sp013650},
Key = {fds268365}
}
@article{fds340940,
Author = {Purves, D and Johnson, DA and Hume, RI},
Title = {Regulation of synaptic connections in the rabbit ciliary
ganglion.},
Journal = {Ciba Foundation Symposium},
Volume = {83},
Pages = {232-251},
Year = {1981},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470720653.ch12},
Abstract = {One of the intriguing questions about the establishment of
synaptic connections is how appropriate numbers of different
axons come to innervate each target neuron. A reorganization
of connections in early postnatal life appears to be an
important aspect of this process, since many of the axons
terminals that initially innervate target cells are
subsequently lost. The rabbit ciliary ganglion is a
remarkably simple neural ensemble in which to examine this
rearrangement of developing synaptic connections. Using this
system we have found that a reduction in the number of axons
innervating each cell occurs without any change in the
number of ciliary ganglion cells or preganglionic neurons;
therefore the rearrangement is not based on cell death. The
number of different axons that ultimately innervate each
cell is, however, influenced in some way by the geometry of
individual target neurons. Thus, mature ganglion cells that
lack dendrites are generally innervated by a single axon,
while neurons with increasingly complex dendritic arbors
receive innervation from a commensurate number of different
axons. At birth, on the other hand, neurons with or without
dendritic processes receive about the same number of
preganglionic inputs. These results suggest that the
geometry of the target cell influences the competitive
interaction between different axons innervating the same
neuron. Indeed, an important function of dendrites may be to
regulate the number of axons that innervate each nerve
cell.},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470720653.ch12},
Key = {fds340940}
}
@article{fds268361,
Author = {Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Elimination of synapses in the developing nervous
system.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {210},
Number = {4466},
Pages = {153-157},
Year = {1980},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.7414326},
Abstract = {Reduction of the number of axons that contact target cells
may be a general feature of neural development. This process
may underlie the progressively restricted malleability of
the maturing nervous system.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.7414326},
Key = {fds268361}
}
@article{fds268362,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Neuronal competition.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {287},
Number = {5783},
Pages = {585-586},
Year = {1980},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0028-0836},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/287585a0},
Doi = {10.1038/287585a0},
Key = {fds268362}
}
@article{fds268359,
Author = {Rubin, E and Purves, D},
Title = {Segmental organization of sympathetic preganglionic neurons
in the mammalian spinal cord.},
Journal = {The Journal of Comparative Neurology},
Volume = {192},
Number = {1},
Pages = {163-174},
Year = {1980},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cne.901920111},
Abstract = {We have used retrograde transport of horseradish peroxidase
to determine the distribution of the preganglionic cell
bodies whose axons join particular rami of the thoracic
spinal cord in a series of guinea pigs, and in a small
number of hamsters and cats. In contrast to other recent
studies, our results show that the neurons sending axons to
a ramus are confined to a single segment at the
corresponding spinal level. This segmental organization
supports the idea that the rostro-caudal position of
preganglionic cell bodies is one determinant of selective
synapse formation between preganglionic axons and
sympathetic ganglion cells.},
Doi = {10.1002/cne.901920111},
Key = {fds268359}
}
@article{fds268360,
Author = {Lichtman, JW and Purves, D},
Title = {The elimination of redundant preganglionic innervation to
hamster sympathetic ganglion cells in early post-natal
life.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {301},
Pages = {213-228},
Year = {1980},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1980.sp013200},
Abstract = {The superior cervical ganglion of adult and neonated
hamsters has been studied with intracellular recording. 1.
Neurones in adult hamster ganglia are innervated by an
average of 6-7 preganglionic axons. During the first week of
post-natal life, however, these cells are innervated by at
least eleven to twelve axons. Ganglion cells in animals 2-3
weeks old are innervated to an intermediate degree,
indicating that these neurones lose a substantial portion of
their initial synaptic contacts during the first weeks after
birth. 2. The over-all innervation of the superior cervical
ganglion in adult hamsters arises from thoracic segments
T1-T5; no additional segments contribute significantly to
the innervation of neonatal ganglia. 3. The average number
of segments innervating each adult ganglion cell is 2 . 8
compared to 3 . 7 segments innervating neonatal neurones.
Throughout post-natal development the innervation of
individual neurones arises from a contiguous subset of the
spinal segments that innervate the ganglion as a whole. 4.
We conclude that the elimination of redundant innervatin in
early life is not limited to those nerve and muscle cells
contacted by a sigle axon in maturity, but also occurs in
sympathetic ganglia where adult neurones remain multiply
innervated. Moreover, the loss of some synaptic contacts
during development refines the selective innervation of
individual neurones.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1980.sp013200},
Key = {fds268360}
}
@article{fds268358,
Author = {Lichtman, JW and Purves, D and Yip, JW},
Title = {Innervation of sympathetic neurones in the guinea-pig
thoracic chain.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {298},
Pages = {285-299},
Year = {1980},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1980.sp013081},
Abstract = {We have investigated the organization of the guinea-pig
thoracic chain by studying the innervation of the stellate
and fifth thoracic sympathetic ganglia with intracellular
recording. 1. These ganglia receive preganglionic
innervation from different but overlapping sets of spinal
cord segments: the stellate ganglion is innervated by
preganglionic axons from spinal segments more rostral than
those supplying the fifth thoracic ganglion, but somewhat
more caudal than those innervating the superior cervical
ganglion. 2. Individual thoracic ganglion cells are
innervated by only some of the spinal segments that supply
each ganglion as a whole. In general, the subset of spinal
segments innervating a ganglion cell is contiguous; one of
these segments provides the strongest innervation, with
progressively weaker innervation arising from spinal levels
adjacent to the dominant one. This selective pattern of
innervation is similar to that in the superior cervical
ganglion (Njå & Purves, 1977 a). 3. Preganglionic axons
frequently innervate neurones in more than one ganglion. 4.
Although neurones innervated by the same spinal cord
segments are found in both the stellate and the fifth
thoracic ganglion, as well as in the superior cervical, the
number of ganglion cells receiving innervation from
particular spinal segments is different in each ganglion.
Moreover, neurones dominated by the same segment but located
in different ganglia receive somewhat different average
innervation from adjacent segments as a function of the
ganglion in which they reside. 5. These results indicate
that neurones in the thoracic chain ganglia, as those in the
superior cervical ganglion, are selectively innervated by
particular spinal cord segments. We suggest that the
different average innervation of sympathetic ganglia
reflects at least two related factors: the selective
qualities of their constituent neurones, and the
availability of different preganglionic axons to each
ganglion.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1980.sp013081},
Key = {fds268358}
}
@article{fds268488,
Author = {Lichtman, JW and Purves, D and Yip, JW},
Title = {On the purpose of selective innervation of guinea-pig
superior cervical ganglion cells.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {292},
Pages = {69-84},
Year = {1979},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1979.sp012839},
Abstract = {Preganglionic axons arising from different levels of the
mammalian spinal cord make preferential connexions with
different classes of superior cervical ganglion cells
(Langley, 1892, 1900; Njå & Purves, 1977a). For example,
preganglionic axons from the first thoracic segment (T1)
make relatively strong connexions with ganglion cells
activating end-organs of the eye; conversely, axons arising
from T4 selectively innervate ganglion cells projecting to
the ear. In the present work we have asked whether this
selectivity reflects the function of the pre- and
post-synaptic cells, and aspect of their respective
positions, or some other criterion. 1. End-organs with
different functions at the same locus (the eye) respond to
stimulation of the same ventral roots; end-organs of a
single modality (hairs or blood vessels) at different
positions, however, tend to be activated by different spinal
segments. Thus the segmental innervation of ganglion cells
is correlated with the position rather than the function of
post-ganglionic targets. 2. The role of target position in
ganglion cell innervation was examined directly by recording
from neurones sending axons to different destinations.
Superior cervical ganglion cells running dorso-medially in a
spinal nerve receive, on average, innervation from more
caudal segments than cells projecting ventro-laterally. 3.
These selective connexions do not depend on intraganglionic
cell position: neurones located at different points along
the major axes of the superior cervical ganglion receive, on
average, the same segmental innervation. In accord with this
observation, retrogradely labelled neurones innervating a
particular target such as the eye or ear are widely and
randomly distributed within a large portion of the ganglion.
Thus the importance of post-ganglionic target position in
ganglion cell innervation is not simply a reflexion of
ganglionic topography. 4. We conclude that one purpose of
the selective connexions in the superior cervical ganglion
is to bring together preganglionic axons arising from
different levels of the spinal cord and ganglion cells whose
axons innervate particular regions of the superior cervical
territory.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1979.sp012839},
Key = {fds268488}
}
@article{fds268491,
Author = {Purves, D and Thompson, W},
Title = {The effects of post-ganglionic axotomy on selective synaptic
connexions in the superior cervical ganglion of the
guinea-pig.},
Journal = {Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {297},
Pages = {95-110},
Year = {1979},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1979.sp013029},
Abstract = {Stimulation of preganglionic axons arising from different
levels of the thoracic spinal cord causes different effects
on end-organs supplied by the superior cervical ganglion
(Langley, 1892; Nja & Purves, 1977a; Lichtman, Purves
& Yip, 1979). For example, stimulation of the first
thoracic ventral root (T1) causes pupillary dilatation and
widening of the palpebral fissure; stimulation of T4, on the
other hand, has little effect on the eye, even though axons
arising from this level innervate about as many superior
cervical ganglion cells as those from T1. Thus ganglion cell
innervation is selective. (1) Three months after crushing
the major post-ganglionic branches of the superior cervical
ganglion this differential effectiveness is lost: T1 and T4
stimulation have approximately equal effects on the
end-organs of the eye. (2) In normal animals, the cellular
counterpart of selective end-organ effects is the
innervation of each ganglion cell by a contiguous subset of
the spinal segments that innervate the ganglion as a whole.
One of these segments is usually dominant, the strength of
innervation from adjacent segments falling off as a function
of distance from the dominant one (Nja & Purves, 1977a).
Intracellular recordings from ganglion cells 3 months after
post-ganglionic axotomy showed that this selective pattern
is re-established. (3) Since the innervation of ganglion
cells appears normal, the abnormal end-organ responses after
post-ganglionic axotomy suggest that ganglion cell axons are
not limited to their original targets during peripheral
re-innervation. This suggestion is supported by the finding
that ganglion cells sending axons to different peripheral
destinations via the second and third cervical spinal nerves
were no longer distinguishable on the basis of their
segmented inputs 3 months after post-ganglionic axotomy. (4)
Similar results were obtained when the preganglionic
cervical trunk was cut at the same time as the
post-ganglionic axons were crushed; the pattern of end-organ
responses was abnormal, whereas individual ganglion cells
were re-innervated according to the rules of contiguity and
segmental dominance. (5) These results indicate that
ganglion cells do not undergo a compensatory change in the
segmental innervation they receive when their axons
regenerate to targets different from, or in addition to
those they originally innervated, even when an entirely new
set of ganglionic connexions is formed. This suggests that
ganglion cells, or some aspect of their immediate
environment, possess a permanent label that determines the
segmental innervation they receive.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1979.sp013029},
Key = {fds268491}
}
@article{fds268489,
Author = {Purves, D and Lichtman, JW},
Title = {Formation and maintenance of synaptic connections in
autonomic ganglia.},
Journal = {Physiological Reviews},
Volume = {58},
Number = {4},
Pages = {821-862},
Year = {1978},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/physrev.1978.58.4.821},
Abstract = {The purpose is to review results that shed some light on the
way in which specific patterns of synaptic connections are
established and maintained in autonomic ganglia and, by
analogy, perhaps in other parts of the nervous
system.},
Doi = {10.1152/physrev.1978.58.4.821},
Key = {fds268489}
}
@article{fds268490,
Author = {Njå, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Specificity of initial synaptic contacts made on guinea-pig
superior cervical ganglion cells during regeneration of the
cervical sympathetic trunk.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {281},
Pages = {45-62},
Year = {1978},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1978.sp012408},
Abstract = {1. Largely appropriate synaptic connexions are formed with
neurones in the superior cervical ganglion at long intervals
after interruption of the preganglionic nerve. In the
present study we have assessed the accuracy of connexions
during the early stages of re-innervation by observing
end-organ responses to ventral root stimulation in vivo, and
by recording intracellularly from ganglion cells during
ventral root stimulation in isolated preparations. 2.
Appropriate, but weak, end-organ responses were elicited by
stimulation of the first and fourth thoracic ventral roots
(T1 and T4) 15--30 days after freezing the cervical
sympathetic trunk. 3. Intracellular recordings from ganglion
cells during stimulation of the ventral roots C8--T7 in
vitro showed that synaptic contacts are first re-established
8--11 days after freezing the preganglionic nerve. The
proportion of re-innervated cells, and the strength of
innervation of individual neurones, increased rapidly for up
to about 3 months after nerve injury, but showed little
change thereafter. Innervation remained weaker than normal
even after 6 months. 4. Patterns of segmental innervation
recorded intracellularly during the early stages of
regeneration were similar to, but more restricted than
normal. Even 13--19 days after interruption of the
preganglionic nerve, neurones re-innervated by more than one
spinal cord segment tended to be innervated by a contiguous
subset of the spinal segments which contribute innervation
to the ganglion. The incidence of neurones receiving
innervation from a discontinuous segmental subset was about
the same at early and late stages or re-innervation. 5.
Throughout the course of nerve regeneration, re-innervated
neurones tended to receive dominant synaptic input from
axons arising at a particular spinal level, as do normal
cells, with adjacent segments contributing a synaptic
influence that diminished as a function of distance from the
dominant segment. 6. The results of these experiments argue
against the initial formation of imprecise connexions with
subsequent retention of appropriate contacts and a loss of
inappropriate ones. Rather our findings suggest that the
re-innervation of ganglion cells proceeds by a gradual
accumulation of synaptic connexions which are, from the
outset, appropriate.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1978.sp012408},
Key = {fds268490}
}
@article{fds268487,
Author = {Njå, A and Purves, D},
Title = {The effects of nerve growth factor and its antiserum on
synapses in the superior cervical ganglion of the
guinea-pig.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {277},
Number = {1},
Pages = {53-75},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1978},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1978.sp012260},
Abstract = {1. The effects of nerve growth factor (NGF) and its
antiserum on synapses in the superior cervical ganglion of
the guinea-pig have been examined by intracellular recording
and electron microscopy. 2. Exogenous NGF, supplied locally
from a silicone rubber pellet implanted near ganglia for 4-7
days, had little effect on either the function or the number
of ganglionic synapses. 3. However, the depression of
synaptic transmission and loss of synaptic contacts on
ganglion cells which follow post-ganglionic axotomy were
diminished by about 50% in the presence of exogenous NGF. 4.
Other post-axotomy changes such as the development of
subthreshold regenerative responses in neuronal processes,
the appearance of ultrastructurally abnormal neuronal
profiles suggesting rapid membrane turnover, and the
cytoplasmic and nuclear changes characteristic of
"chromatolysis", were also largely prevented by exogenous
NGF. 5. Systemic treatment of neonatal and young adult
guinea-pigs with antiserum to NGF for 4-5 days caused
depression of intracellularly recorded synaptic responses
within 5-8 days of the end of antiserum administration.
Synapse counts in electron microscopical sections from these
ganglia showed only about half as many contacts as in
control ganglia from animals receiving normal rabbit serum.
6. These findings suggest that the loss of synapses from
sympathetic neurones which follows axotomy results from a
reduction in the amount of NGF supplied to ganglion cells. A
corollary is that, among other biological roles, NGF is
required by peripheral sympathetic neurones to maintain the
synapses they receive.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1978.sp012260},
Key = {fds268487}
}
@article{fds268486,
Author = {Nja, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Re-innervation of guinea-pig superior cervical ganglion
cells by preganglionic fibres arising from different levels
of the spinal cord.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {272},
Number = {3},
Pages = {633-651},
Year = {1977},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1977.sp012064},
Abstract = {1. The ability of preganglionic axons to re-establish their
normal pattern of synaptic connexions with superior cervical
ganglion cells has been studied after section of the
cervical sympathetic trunk.2. In vivo stimulation of the
last cervical (C8) and the first seven thoracic ventral
roots (T1-T7) 3-4 months after section of the trunk produced
end-organ responses similar to those observed in normal
animals.3. The pattern of innervation of individual
neurones, determined by intracellular recording of synaptic
potentials 4-9 months after cutting the sympathetic trunk,
was also similar to that observed in normal neurones. Both
normal and re-innervated ganglion cells were contacted by
pre-ganglionic axons arising from C8 to T7, and each neurone
was usually innervated by a contiguous subset of these
segments.4. Re-innervated neurones, as normal cells, were
typically dominated by the innervation from a particular
spinal cord segment, with the adjacent segments contributing
a synaptic influence that decreased as a function of
distance from the dominant segment. This was true whether
the amplitude of the post-synaptic potential, or the
estimated number of contributing axons, was used as the
criterion of segmental dominance.5. Re-innervated neurones,
however, showed some abnormalities. The average number of
ventral roots contributing innervation to each neurone was
reduced from 4.1 to 3.0, and discontinuities in the sequence
of innervating segments were more frequent than in normal
neurones. Moreover, fewer preganglionic axons contacted each
neurone after regeneration.6. A further difference between
normal and re-innervated neurones during the period covered
by these experiments was that axons from the more caudal
spinal cord segments were less successful in re-establishing
contacts with ganglion cells than those from the rostral
segments. The more caudal the position of the preganglionic
neurones, the more pronounced was this relative
deficiency.7. Although anomalies of ganglion cell
innervation were apparent, the basis for the restoration of
normal functional effects appears to be the re-establishment
of a pattern of innervation of individual neurones similar
to that observed in normal ganglia.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1977.sp012064},
Key = {fds268486}
}
@article{fds268485,
Author = {Njå, A and Purves, D},
Title = {Specific innervation of guinea-pig superior cervical
ganglion cells by preganglionic fibres arising from
different levels of the spinal cord.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {264},
Number = {2},
Pages = {565-583},
Year = {1977},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1977.sp011683},
Abstract = {1. The synaptic contribution of preganglionic nerve fibres
arising from the last cervical (C8) and the first seven
thoracic spinal cord segments (T1-T7) to neurones of the
guinea-pig superior cervical ganglion has been studied by
means of intracellular recording during ventral root
stimulation in vitro. 2. The majority of neurones received
innervation from the middle segments (T2 and T3) of the
length of spinal cord from which preganglionic fibres
derive; an intermediate number of ganglion cells were
innervated by fibres from the segments adjacent to these
(T1, T4, and T5), and relatively few neurones by fibres from
the most rostral and caudal segments supplying innervation
to the ganglion (C8, T6 and T7). 3. Each neurone received
preganglionic terminals from multiple thoracic segments
(range 1-7, mean = 4-0). The estimated minimum number of
preganglionic fibres contacting each neurone was 10, on
average. 4. As a rule, the spinal segments innervating a
neurone were contiguous. Thus we rarely encountered neurones
innervated by segments located both rostrally and caudally
to a segment which failed to provide innervation. 5.
Neurones tended to be innervated predominantly by axons
arising from a single spinal segment, with adjacent segments
contributing a synaptic influence that diminished as a
function of their distance from the dominant segment. All
segments provided dominant innervation to at least some
neurones. 6. Stimulating the ventral roots of C8-T7 in vivo
showed that the axons arising from each segment produced a
characteristic pattern of peripheral effects. Thus different
populations of neurones in the superior cervical ganglion of
the guinea-pig are innervated by preganglionic axons from
different levels of the spinal cord, as originally suggested
by Langley (1892) for the cat, dog, and rabbit. 7. On the
basis of our in vitro studies we conclude that underlying
the specificity of innervation of neurones of the superior
cervical ganglion that can be inferred from in vivo
experiments is a tendency for individual neurones to be
innervated in a systematically graded fashion by a
contiguous subset of the eight spinal segments which provide
innervation to the ganglion.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1977.sp011683},
Key = {fds268485}
}
@article{fds268482,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Competitive and non-competitive re-innervation of mammalian
sympathetic neurones by native and foreign
fibres.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {261},
Number = {2},
Pages = {453-475},
Year = {1976},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011568},
Abstract = {The ability of native (sympathetic preganglionic) and
foreign (vagal) nerve fibres to re-innervate neurones of the
guinea-pig superior cervical ganglion, either alone or in
competition with each other, has been studied by means of
intracellular recording and electron microscopy. 1. Native
fibres make synaptic contacts with nearly all ganglion cells
within one month of cervical trunk section; within 6 months
the degree of innervation, judged by measurement of
excitatory post-synaptic potential (e.p.s.p.) amplitude and
electron microscopical synapse counts, approaches normal.
However, even after 15 months innervation was weaker than in
normal control ganglia. 2. Vagal fibres are less successful
during re-innervation. Although a similar number of foreign
fibres grown into denervated ganglia and make contact with
nearly all ganglion cells within a month, after 6-12 months
e.p.s.p. amplitudes in response to foreign nerve stimulation
remain relatively small, and counts of synapses are only
about 60% as great as in ganglia re-innervated with the
native nerve. 3. When both native and foreign fibres are
allowed to re-innervate ganglion cells simultaneously, about
half the neurones in the ganglion receive synapses from both
sources after 1 month. The proportion of dually invervated
cells remains roughly constant for at least 14 months.
Neither set of preganglionic fibres dominates or displaces
the other, although neurones generally are re-innervated
more effectively by native than foreign fibres, as is true
during non-competitive re-innervation. 4. Thus during
re-innervation of mammalian sympathetic neurones native
fibres are preferred to foreign ones only in the sense that
roughly the same number of native fibres form many more
synapses on ganglion cells than do vagal axons. A foreign
synapse, once formed, is as stable as a native one, and
shows no tendency to be replaced by native terminals. These
findings are discussed in relation to other evidence which
has suggested specificity and selectivity during
re-innervation of mammalian autonomic neurones.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011568},
Key = {fds268482}
}
@article{fds268481,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Functional and structural changes in mammalian sympathetic
neurones following colchicine application to post-ganglionic
nerves.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {259},
Number = {1},
Pages = {159-175},
Year = {1976},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011459},
Abstract = {1. The effects of post-ganglionic colchicine application on
neurones of the guinea-pig superior cervical ganglion were
studied with intracellular recording and electron
microscopy. 2. Local colchicine application for 30 min to
one of the major post-ganglionic nerves caused several
electrophysiological changes after 4-7 days in many neurones
whose axons run in this nerve. These changes include: (a) a
reduction in the amplitude of synaptic potentials elicited
by supramaximal preganglionic stimulation; (b) a decrease in
the number of preganglionic fibres innervating individual
neurones; (c) the development of regenerative responses in
dendrites; and (d) the failure of antidromic action
potentials to fully invade the neuronal soma. These
functional changes occurred in the absence of impaired
impulse conduction or axon degeneration, and were not
observed in nearby neurones whose axons ran in an untreated
post-ganglionic nerve. The effects of colchicine are similar
to the changes produced by axotomy. 3. Counts of synapses in
thin sections from the region of the ganglion where the
affected neurones were located showed a reduction, compared
to the number of synapses in other regions of the colchicine
treated ganglia, or normal control ganglia. This finding
indicates that synaptic depression after colchicine
treatment, like that after axotomy, is due primarily to a
loss of synaptic contacts from the dendrites of affected
nerve cells. Unusual profiles containing numerous vesicular
and tubular organelles frequently seen after interruption of
the axons were also observed in thin sections after
colchicine treatment. 4. The similarity of the
electrophysiological and ultrastructural effects of
colchicine treatment and axon interruption offers further
support for the view that synaptic contacts on sympathetic
neurones are normally regulated by an interaction of the
neuronal soma with its axonal extension to the
periphery.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011459},
Key = {fds268481}
}
@article{fds268484,
Author = {Purves, D and Njå, A},
Title = {Effect of nerve growth factor on synaptic depression after
axotomy.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {260},
Number = {5551},
Pages = {535-536},
Year = {1976},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/260535a0},
Abstract = {The authors report that exogenous NGF can, to a large
extent, prevent the synaptic depression seen in adult
sympathetic ganglion cells after interruption of their
axons. Ten adult guinea pigs were used.},
Doi = {10.1038/260535a0},
Key = {fds268484}
}
@article{fds268477,
Author = {Roper, S and Purves, D and McMahan, UJ},
Title = {Synaptic organization and acetylcholine sensitivity of
multiply innervated autonomic ganglion cells.},
Journal = {Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative
Biology},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {283-295},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/sqb.1976.040.01.029},
Abstract = {The principal cells of the mudpuppy cardiac ganglion receive
synapses from three sources: vagal axons, interneurons and
axon collaterals from other principal cells. The simplicity
of the structural organization and the visual clarity in the
living preparation provide favorable conditions for
examining the function of these synapses and how different
classes of synapses on the same cell influence its function.
We have studied the sensitivity of the principal cells to
iontophoretically applied acetylcholine--the transmitter at
synapses made by the vagal axons and by postganglionic axon
collaterals from other principal cells. In normal ganglia,
the ACh sensitivity on the cell surface is highest at the
region of synapses. Partial denervation, produced by
severing the vagus nerves, results in an increased ACh
sensitivity in nonsynaptic areas but does not appear to
affect synaptic transmission at the remaining
synapses.},
Doi = {10.1101/sqb.1976.040.01.029},
Key = {fds268477}
}
@article{fds268479,
Author = {McMahan, UJ and Purves, D},
Title = {Visual identification of two kinds of nerve cells and their
synaptic contacts in a living autonomic ganglion of the
mudpuppy (Necturus maculosus).},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {254},
Number = {2},
Pages = {405-425},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011238},
Abstract = {1. Many of the nerve cells comprising the cardiac
parasympathetic ganglion of the mudpuppy are spread out in a
thin, transparent sheet of tissue, enabling one to see
cellular details in living preparations with differential
interference contrast optics. The aim of this study was
twofold: to establish the morphology of the nerve cells and
their synaptic connections by light and electron microscopy,
and to determine which aspects of the ganglion's structure
could be reliably identified in the living tissue. 2. There
are two types of neurones in the ganglion: (a) principal
cells that send post-ganglionic axons to cardiac muscle
fibres, and (b) interneurones whose processes are confined
to the ganglion. 3. Interneurones are distinguished from
principal cells by the presence of numerous granular
vesicles seen with the electron microscope, and by intense
formaldehyde-induced fluorescence. The interneurones are
thus similar to catecholamine-containing interneurones in
autonomic ganglia of other vertebrates. 4. Principal cells
are innervated by processes that terminate mainly on the
cell body, forming up to forty-five synaptic boutons and
covering, on the average, 5% of the perikaryal surface. The
synaptic terminals are derived from three sources: (a) axons
from the vagus nerves, (b) interneurones and (c) other
principal cells. Vagal terminals contacting principal cells
contain agranular vesicles typical of preganglionic
cholinergic endings. At regions of contact between processes
of interneurones and principal cells, the interneurones have
granular vesicles focused at membrane specializations; in
addition there are small areas of close plasma membrane
apposition, probably gap junctions. Some of the contacts
between principal cells are characterized by gap junctions;
others are structurally similar to vagal endings but persist
after vagal degeneration. 6. Interneurones are innervated by
axons that make contact mainly with their processes. The
axon terminals on processes of interneurones contain
agranular vesicles similar to vagal terminals on principal
cells. 7. In live preparations principal cells are
distinguished from interneurones by their size and the
appearance of their organelles. Synaptic contacts on
principal cells could often be identified and, in some
cases, large contacts from interneurones or those from other
nearby principal cells could be traced back to their cell
bodies of origin. The validity of these identifications was
confirmed by subsequent electron microscopic examination of
the same cells.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1976.sp011238},
Key = {fds268479}
}
@article{fds268478,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Functional and structural changes in mammalian sympathetic
neurones following interruption of their
axons.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {252},
Number = {2},
Pages = {429-463},
Year = {1975},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1975.sp011151},
Abstract = {The effects of interrupting the axons of principal neurones
in the superior cervical ganglion of adult guinea-pigs were
studied by means of intracellular recording, and light and
electron microscopy. 1. Within 72 hr of axon interruption,
the amplitude of exitatory postsynaptic potentials
potentials (e.p.s.p.s) recorded in principal neurons in
response to maximal preganglionic stimulation declined.
E.p.s.p.s were maximally reduced (by more than 70% on
average) 4-7 days following interruption, and failed to
bring many cells to threshold. E.p.s.p.s. recorded in nearby
neurones whose axons remained intact were unaffected. 2. In
ganglia in which axon interruption was achieved by means of
nerve crush (thus allowing prompt regeneration), mean
e.p.s.p. amplitudes began to increase again after about 1-2
weeks. One month after the initial injury many neurones had
e.p.s.p.s of normal amplitude, and by 2 months affected
neurones were indistinguishable from control cells.
Functional peripheral connexions were re-established during
the period of synaptic recovery. 3. The mean number of
synapses identified electron microscopically in ganglia in
which all the major efferent branches had been crushed
decreased by 65-70% in parallel with synaptic depression
measured by intracellular recording. However synapse counts
did not return to normal levels even after 3 months. 4.
During the period of maximum synaptic depression, numerous
abnormal profiles which contained accumulations of vesicular
and tubular organelles, vesicles, and mitochondria were
observed in electron microscopic sections. Injection of
horseradish peroxidase into affected neurones demonstrated
dendritic swelling which probably correspond to these
profiles. 5. Little or no difference was found in the
electrical properties of normal neurones and neurones whose
axons had been interrupted 4-7 days previously. However, the
mean amplitude of spontaneously occurring synaptic
potentials was reduced, and the amplitude distribution was
shifted. This abnormality of the synapses which remain on
affected neurones also contributes to synaptic depression.
6. Counts of neurones in normal and experimental ganglia
showed that approximately half the principal cells died 1-5
weeks after crushing the major efferent brances. This
finding presumably explains the failure of synapse counts to
return to control levels after recovery. 7. If axons were
prevented from growing back to their target organ by chronic
ligation, surviving neurones whose axons were enclosed by
the ligature did not generally recover normal synaptic
function. Following ligation, most affected cells died
within a month. 8. Thus the integrity of a principal cell's
axon is necessary for the maintenance of preganglionic
synaptic contacts, and ultimately for neuronal survival. The
basis of neuronal recovery from the effects of axon
interruption appears to be some aspect of regeneration to
the peripheral target.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1975.sp011151},
Key = {fds268478}
}
@article{fds268480,
Author = {Purves, D},
Title = {Persistent innervation of mammalian sympathetic neurones by
native and foreign fibres.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {256},
Number = {5518},
Pages = {589-590},
Year = {1975},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/256589a0},
Doi = {10.1038/256589a0},
Key = {fds268480}
}
@article{fds268483,
Author = {Roper, S and Purves, D and McMahan, UJ},
Title = {Synaptic organization and acetylcholine sensitivity of
multiply innervated autonomic ganglion cells},
Journal = {Symposia on Quantitative Biology},
Volume = {Vol. 40},
Pages = {283-295},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The principal cells of the mudpuppy cardiac ganglion receive
synapses from three sources: vagal axons, interneurons and
axon collaterals from other principal cells. The simplicity
of the structural organization and the visual clarity in the
living preparation provide favorable conditions for
examining the function of these synapses and how different
classes of synapses on the same cell influence its function.
We have studied the sensitivity of the principal cells to
iontophoretically applied acetylcholine, the transmitter at
synapses made by the vagal axons and by postganglionic axon
collaterals from other principal cells. In normal ganglia,
the ACh sensitivity on the cell surface is highest at the
region of synapses. Partial denervation, produced by
severing the vagus nerves, results in an increased ACh
sensitivity in monosynaptic areas but does not appear to
affect synaptic transmission at the remaining
synapses.},
Key = {fds268483}
}
@article{fds268357,
Author = {Purves, D and Sakmann, B},
Title = {Membrane properties underlying spontaneous activity of
denervated muscle fibres.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {239},
Number = {1},
Pages = {125-153},
Year = {1974},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0022-3751},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1974.sp010559},
Abstract = {We have examined the events underlying the initiation of
spontaneous action potentials (fibrillation) in fibres of
previously denervated rat diaphragm maintained in organ
culture for up to 10 days.1. Based on discharge pattern, two
classes of spontaneously active fibres were found:
rhythmically discharging fibres, and fibres in which action
potentials occur at irregular intervals.2. Sites of action
potentials initiation were located by exploration along the
fibre length with two independent extracellular recording
electrodes. The majority of sites of origin in both regular
and irregular fibres were at the former end-plate zone;
however, there was no region along the length that could
not, at least in some fibres, be a site of origin.3.
Intracellular recording at or near sites of origin of action
potential discharge showed two types of initiating events.
Irregularly discharging fibres were brought to threshold by
discrete depolarizations of up to 15 mV in amplitude, while
regularly occurring action potentials were associated with
oscillations of the membrane potential.4. Discrete
depolarizations (called fibrillatory origin potentials or
f.o.p.s) at sites of origin in irregularly discharging
fibres have the following properties: (a) random occurrence
and nearly constant amplitude outside a refractory period
during which both amplitude and probability of a second
f.o.p. are reduced; (b) associated inward current flow which
is localized to about 100 mum or less along the fibre
length, and (c) dependence of amplitude and frequency on
membrane potential.5. Oscillation of membrane potential
found at sites of origin of action potential discharge in
regular fibres also occurred locally along the fibre length
and was sensitive to changes in membrane potential.6. Both
f.o.p.s and oscillations of membrane potential were
reversibly abolished by low Na(+)-Ringer fluid or
tetrodotoxin.7. Neither type of initiating event was
appreciably affected by concentrations of D-tubocurarine
which blocked extrajunctional sensitivity to
acetylcholine.8. We conclude that spontaneous action
potentials under these conditions arise from a localized
Na(+)-conductance change in the membrane of the active
fibre; this conductance change is distinct from the
increased Na(+)-conductance which follows the interaction of
acetylcholine with its receptor. Spontaneous activity in
single, denervated muscle fibres is cyclical and
self-inhibiting (Purves & Sakmann, 1974); thus the
Na(+)-conductance change underlying the initiation of
spontaneous action potentials is affected by muscle fibre
activity.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1974.sp010559},
Key = {fds268357}
}
@article{fds268356,
Author = {Purves, D and Sakmann, B},
Title = {The effect of contractile activity on fibrillation and
extrajunctional acetylcholine-sensitivity in rat muscle
maintained in organ culture.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {237},
Number = {1},
Pages = {157-182},
Year = {1974},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0022-3751},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1974.sp010475},
Abstract = {1. The effect of contractile activity on the initiation of
spontaneous action potentials (fibrillation) and on
extrajunctional acetylcholine-sensitivity has been studied
in single fibres in strips of previously denervated rat
diaphragm maintained in organ culture for up to 10 days.2.
Following removal of the diaphragm from the animal,
fibrillation slowed and usually stopped altogether for about
24-36 hr. Thereafter, spontaneously active fibres were found
in all cultured muscle strips.3. At any one time, about
(1/4) to (1/3) of fibres impaled with micro-electrodes were
active (defined as more than one action potential/10 sec),
with a mean discharge frequency of 4.5/sec (range
0.1-24/sec).4. The duration of continuous activity in single
fibres was, on average, 21-22 hr; a period of activity was
followed by a longer inactive interval. Thus activity in
single fibres is cyclical.5. Direct stimulation of
fibrillating strips for 24 hr at 10/sec suppressed
spontaneous activity for 1-3 days.6. Conversely, blockade of
spontaneous activity with tetrodotoxin for 72 hr led to a
two- to threefold increase in the number of fibrillating
fibres when the drug was washed out; in some strips nearly
all fibres became spontaneously active.7. The mean rate of
activity of diaphragm fibres during normal breathing,
determined by recording single units from the phrenic nerve
in lightly anaesthetized animals, is about 18/sec.8. Direct
stimulation of cultured diaphragm strips in a pattern
similar to breathing for 7-8 days at an average rate of
10-12/sec (or 5/sec in some experiments), resulted in a
marked reduction (about 95% in experiments at 10/sec) in
extrajunctional sensitivity to ionophoretically applied
ACh.9. Direct stimulation for 24 hr at 10/sec (comparable to
a period of spontaneous activity) caused only a small
reduction in extrajunctional ACh-sensitivity.10. We conclude
that spontaneous activity in single fibres under these
conditions occurs cyclically because activity, over a period
of hours, inhibits the ability of the fibrillating fibre to
initiate further action potentials. Repeated self-inhibition
of spontaneous activity probably explains why denervated
muscle fibres remain highly sensitive to extrajunctionally
applied ACh.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1974.sp010475},
Key = {fds268356}
}
@article{fds268355,
Author = {Purves, D and McMahan, UJ},
Title = {The distribution of synapses on a physiologically identified
motor neuron in the central nervous system of the leech. An
electron microscope study after the injection of the
fluorescent dye procion yellow.},
Journal = {The Journal of Cell Biology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {1},
Pages = {205-220},
Year = {1972},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1083/jcb.55.1.205},
Abstract = {The fine structure of a physiologically identified motor
neuron in the segmental ganglion of the leech central
nervous system and the morphology of synapses on it were
studied after injection of the fluorescent dye Procion
yellow as a marker. The injected cell and its processes
within the neuropil were located in thick or thin sections
with fluorescence optics after initial fixation with
glutaraldehyde and brief treatment with osmium tetroxide.
The same or adjacent thin sections could then be examined in
the electron microscope. Comparison with uninjected cells
showed that the general features of the injected cell are
retained although some organelles are distorted. The main
features of the geometry of this neuron are the same from
animal to animal: a single large process runs from the soma
through the neuropil to bifurcate and enter the
contralateral roots. Within the neuropil the main process
gives off long branches (up to 150 micro), but these are
greatly outnumbered by short branches and spines, one or a
few microns in length, which were not appreciated in
previous light microscope studies after injection of Procion
yellow. Serial thin sections of selected areas along the
main process within the neuropil showed that there are
synapses on most of the shorter branches and spines;
occasional synaptic contacts were also made on the main
process itself and on longer branches. At least two
morphologically distinct types of synapse could be
recognized. A minimum estimate of the total number of
synapses on the motor cell is 300, based on their occurrence
in reconstructed segments.},
Doi = {10.1083/jcb.55.1.205},
Key = {fds268355}
}
@article{fds268354,
Author = {Nicholls, JG and Purves, D},
Title = {A comparison of chemical and electrical synaptic
transmission between single sensory cells and a motoneurone
in the central nervous system of the leech.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {225},
Number = {3},
Pages = {637-656},
Year = {1972},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0022-3751},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1972.sp009961},
Abstract = {In leech ganglia, three sensory cells of different modality
converge on a motoneurone, where they form chemical and
electrical synapses. Each of these synapses behaves in a
characteristic manner and the nature of the transmission
mechanism has significant functional consequences for the
operation of the reflexes. An analysis has been made of the
effects of trains of impulses on synaptic transmission
through these pathways, using frequencies that correspond to
natural firing.1. At the chemical synapse between the
nociceptive sensory cell and the motoneurone, two opposing
events occur: facilitation and depression. Thus, with trains
of impulses, the synaptic potentials first increase in
amplitude and then decrease. The two processes could be
separated by altering the Mg and Ca content of the bathing
fluid. In concentrations of Mg that reduced the amplitude of
a single control chemical synaptic potential, pure
facilitation occurred during a train. Depression
predominated during brief trains in raised concentrations of
Ca, although synaptic potentials were initially larger.
These results suggest that changes in the amount of
transmitter released by each presynaptic action potential
can account for the changes observed in chemical synaptic
transmission.2. In contrast, electrical transmission between
the sensory cell responding to touch and the same
motoneurone did not show facilitation or depression. The
electrical coupling potential in the motoneurone was
relatively constant when the touch cell fired at high or low
frequencies in normal Ringer fluid, high Mg, or high Ca
fluid.3. Further differences between chemical and electrical
synapses were apparent when the preparation was cooled to 4
degrees C. In the cold the latency of chemically evoked
synaptic potentials in the motoneurone increased and their
amplitude declined drastically with repetitive stimulation,
while electrical coupling potentials were unaffected.4. A
brief hyperpolarization of the presynaptic cell by injected
current produced a marked and prolonged increase in
chemically evoked synaptic potentials, but did not influence
electrical synaptic transmission.5. The synapses of the
sensory cell responding to pressure, which are both chemical
and electrical, behaved as expected: the chemical synaptic
potentials showed facilitation and depression while
electrical transmission remained relatively constant.6.
These experiments emphasize the different functional
consequences of electrical or chemical synapses in reflex
pathways for the transmission of signals that arise as a
result of natural sensory stimuli.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1972.sp009961},
Key = {fds268354}
}
@article{fds268475,
Author = {McMahan, UJ and Purves, D},
Title = {An electron-microscopic study of a physiologically
identified motoneurone in the leech C.N.S. after injection
of the fluorescent dye Procion yellow.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {222},
Number = {1},
Pages = {64P-66P},
Year = {1972},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds268475}
}
@article{fds268476,
Author = {Nicholls, JG and Purves, D},
Title = {Monosynaptic chemical and electrical connexions between
sensory and motor cells in the central nervous system of the
leech.},
Journal = {The Journal of Physiology},
Volume = {209},
Number = {3},
Pages = {647-667},
Year = {1970},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.1970.sp009184},
Abstract = {The synaptic connexions that underlie three different
segmental shortening reflexes have been traced by recording
intracellularly from individual sensory and motor nerve
cells in the C.N.S. of the leech. The fourteen sensory cells
involved in these reflexes respond specifically to one of
three modalities: touch, pressure, or noxious stimuli
applied to the skin. All three types of sensory neurone give
rise to excitatory synaptic potentials in two large
motoneurones. Each of these motor cells provides excitatory
innervation to the longitudinal muscle fibres of the
opposite side of the segment. The mechanism of synaptic
transmission is, however, different for each type of sensory
cell.1. An impulse in a sensory cell that responds to touch
gives rise to a short-latency depolarizing potential in the
large longitudinal motoneurones by way of an electrical
synapse. This junction rectifies so that excitation can
spread in only one direction (from the sensory to the motor
cell), whereas a hyperpolarizing potential can pass only in
the opposite direction.2. The synaptic potential evoked in
the motoneurone by an action potential in a sensory cell
responding to noxious stimuli can be attributed to the
action of a chemical transmitter agent and has different
properties: the post-synaptic potential arises after a delay
of about 2-4 msec, is abolished by high concentrations of
Mg, and enhanced by high concentrations of Ca. Several lines
of evidence show that this connexion is monosynaptic.3. The
synaptic potential following an impulse in a pressure cell
is produced by both chemical and electrical synaptic
mechanisms. Rectification, similar to that described for the
touch cell, also occurs at this electrical synapse.4. One or
more impulses in any one of the fourteen mechanoreceptor
cells in the ganglion can initiate impulses in the large
longitudinal motoneurones to produce a shortening of the
segment. The contraction is abolished by blocking impulse
initiation in the motoneurones.5. The arborizations of the
sensory cells and the motoneurone within the neuropile have
been studied histologically after injecting a fluorescent
dye. Their processes are intertwined in a highly complex
manner so that the sites of the synaptic junctions cannot be
determined with the resolutions so far achieved.
Nevertheless, taken together the histological and the
electrical results support the idea that individual cells
are connected in a stereotyped pattern and operate by
distinctive mechanisms.6. These findings provide a basis for
studying the functional role of chemical and electrical
synaptic mechanisms in these pathways.},
Doi = {10.1113/jphysiol.1970.sp009184},
Key = {fds268476}
}
%% Richardson, Kevin A
@article{fds369854,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Social construction and indeterminacy},
Journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
Volume = {65},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-52},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12299},
Abstract = {An increasing number of philosophers argue that
indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that
indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather
than how the world is represented or known). The standard
arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around
the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel
argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that
metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of
constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in
the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the
social world is constructed.},
Doi = {10.1111/phib.12299},
Key = {fds369854}
}
@article{fds367526,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively)
substantial},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-207},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12916},
Abstract = {According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive
just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently,
Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of
substantivity, many of the central questions in the
metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it
is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are
multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this
view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender.
The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of
substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates
gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least
as used in the ontology room) are referentially
indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in
virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a
degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical
substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that
they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively,
although not absolutely, substantial.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12916},
Key = {fds367526}
}
@article{fds371117,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Critical social ontology},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {201},
Number = {6},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
Abstract = {Critical social ontology is any study of social ontology
that is done in order to critique ideology or end social
injustice. The goal of this paper is to outline what I call
the fundamentality approach to critical social ontology. On
the fundamentality approach, social ontologists are in the
business of distinguishing between appearances and
(fundamental) reality. Social reality is often obscured by
the acceptance of ideology, where an ideology is a distorted
system of beliefs that leads people to promote or accept
widespread social injustices. Social reality is also
obscured in cases where ordinary thought and language simply
is not perspicuous enough to represent the social objects,
kinds, and structures that are central to understanding
social injustice. In both cases, I argue that the critical
social ontologist will benefit from using the tools and
concepts of fundamental metaphysics.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
Key = {fds371117}
}
@article{fds370224,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Exclusion and Erasure: Two Types of Ontological
Opression},
Journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {9},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2279},
Doi = {10.3998/ergo.2279},
Key = {fds370224}
}
@article{fds370868,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Derivative Indeterminacy},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
Abstract = {Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its
source in the way the world is (rather than how it is
represented or known). There are two questions we could ask
about indeterminacy. First: does it exist? Second: is
indeterminacy derivative? I focus on the second question.
Specifically, I argue that (at least some) metaphysical
indeterminacy can be derivative, where this roughly means
that facts about indeterminacy are metaphysically grounded
in facts about what is determinate.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
Key = {fds370868}
}
@article{fds367525,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {468-483},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.32},
Abstract = {It is natural to think that social groups are concrete
material particulars, but this view faces an important
objection. Suppose the chess club and nature club have the
same members. Intuitively, these are different clubs even
though they have a common material basis. Some philosophers
take these intuitions to show that the materialist view must
be abandoned. I propose an alternative explanation. Social
groups are concrete material particulars, but there is a
psychological explanation of nonidentity intuitions. Social
groups appear coincident but nonidentical because they are
perceived to be governed by conflicting social
norms.},
Doi = {10.1017/can.2022.32},
Key = {fds367525}
}
@article{fds367527,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Grounding is necessary and contingent},
Journal = {Inquiry (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4},
Pages = {453-480},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1612777},
Abstract = {Grounding is necessary just in case: if P grounds Q, then
necessarily: if P, then Q. Many accept this principle.
Others propose counterexamples. Instead of straightforwardly
arguing for, or against, necessity, I explain the sense in
which grounding is necessary and contingent. I argue that
there are two kinds of grounding: what-grounding (which
tells us what it is for things to be the case) and
why-grounding (which tells us why things are the case),
where the former kind is necessary while the latter is
contingent.},
Doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2019.1612777},
Key = {fds367527}
}
@article{fds367528,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Grounding Pluralism: Why and How},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {85},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1399-1415},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0083-8},
Abstract = {Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple
kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an
explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism.
Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding:
why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and
how-grounding—which tells us how things are the
case.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-0083-8},
Key = {fds367528}
}
@article{fds367529,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {On What (In General) Grounds What},
Journal = {Metaphysics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-15},
Publisher = {Ubiquity Press, Ltd.},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/met.18},
Doi = {10.5334/met.18},
Key = {fds367529}
}
%% Rosenberg, Alexander
@article{fds371630,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {THE INEVITABILITY OF A GENERALIZED DARWINIAN THEORY OF
BEHAVIOR, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {50-62},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The paper argues that the evident features of all human
affairs of interest to the social scientist demand Darwinian
explanations. It must however be recognized that the range
of regularities, models, theories that a successful
Darwinian research program will inspire must be
heterogeneous, operate at very different scales, identify a
diversity of distinct and often unrepeated processes
operating through multifarious instances of blind variation
and environmental selection. There will be no canonical
statement of a Darwinian theory of cultural and/or social
affairs.},
Key = {fds371630}
}
@book{fds350322,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reduction and Mechanism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781108605113},
Abstract = {This Element expounds the debate about reductionism in
biology, from the work of the post-positivists to the end of
the century debates about supervenience, multiple
realizability, and explanatory exclusion.},
Key = {fds350322}
}
@article{fds340757,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophical challenges for scientism (and how to meet
them?)},
Pages = {83-105},
Booktitle = {Scientism: Prospects and Problems},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780190462758},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
Abstract = {<p>Scientism is expounded. Then its two major challenges are
stated and responses to them sketched. The first challenge
is to its epistemology of mathematics-how we know the
necessary truths of mathematics. The second challenge is to
the very coherence of its eliminativist account of
cognition. The first of these problems is likely to be taken
more seriously by philosophers than by other advocates of
scientism. It is a problem that has absorbed philosophers
since Plato and on which little progress has been made. The
second is often unnoticed, even among those who endorse
scientism, since they don’t recognize their own commitment
to eliminativism and so do not appreciate the threat of
incoherence it poses. It is important for scientism to
acknowledge these challenges.</p>},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
Key = {fds340757}
}
@article{fds336418,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can we make sense of subjective experience in metabolically
situated cognitive processes?},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1-2},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
Abstract = {In “Mind, matter and metabolism,” Godfrey-Smith’s
objective is to “develop a picture” in which, first, the
basis of living activity in physical processes “makes
sense,” second, the basis of proto-cognitive activity in
living activity “makes sense” and third, “the basis of
subjective experience in metabolically situated cognitive
processes also makes sense.” show that he fails to attain
all three of these objectives, largely owing to the nature
and modularization of metabolism.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
Key = {fds336418}
}
@book{fds336419,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of social science, fifth edition},
Pages = {1-347},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780813349732},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429494840},
Abstract = {Philosophy of Social Science provides a tightly argued yet
accessible introduction to the philosophical foundations of
the human sciences, including economics, anthropology,
sociology, political science, psychology, history, and the
disciplines emerging at the intersections of these subjects
with biology. Philosophy is unavoidable for social
scientists because the choices they make in answering
questions in their disciplines force them to take sides on
philosophical matters. Conversely, the philosophy of social
science is equally necessary for philosophers since the
social and behavior sciences must inform their understanding
of human action, norms, and social institutions. The fifth
edition retains from previous editions an illuminating
interpretation of the enduring relations between the social
sciences and philosophy, and reflects on developments in
social research over the past two decades that have informed
and renewed debate in the philosophy of social science. An
expanded discussion of philosophical anthropology and modern
and postmodern critical theory is new for this
edition.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780429494840},
Key = {fds336419}
}
@article{fds332348,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Making mechanism interesting},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {195},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-33},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
Abstract = {I note the multitude of ways in which, beginning with the
classic paper by Machamer et al. (Philos Sci 67:1–25,
2000), the mechanists have qualify their methodological
dicta, and limit the vulnerability of their claims by
strategic vagueness regarding their application. I go on to
generalize a version of the mechanist requirement on
explanations due to Craver and Kaplan (Philos Sci
78(4):601–627, 2011) in cognitive and systems neuroscience
so that it applies broadly across the life sciences in
accordance with the view elaborated by Craver and Darden in
In Search of Mechanisms (2013). I then go on to explore what
ramifications their mechanist requirement on explanations
may have for explanatory “dependencies” reported in
biology and the special sciences. What this exploration
suggests is that mechanism threatens to eliminate instead of
underwrite a large number of such “dependencies”
reported in higher-levels of biology and the special
sciences. I diagnose the source of this threat in
mechanism’s demand that explanations identify nested
causal differences makers in mechanisms, their components,
the components further components, and so forth. Finally, I
identify the “love–hate” relationship mechanism must
have with functional explanation, and show how it makes
mechanism an extremely interesting thesis
indeed.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
Key = {fds332348}
}
@article{fds327007,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why Social Science is Biological Science},
Journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {341-369},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
Abstract = {The social sciences need to take seriously their status as
divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the
central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena
they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is
formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise
premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and
taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical
taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a
Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist
or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic
Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human
affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian
processes operate in human affairs by selecting for
strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups
employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social
science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s
approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the
fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology,
and in particular the studies of one particular biological
species.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
Key = {fds327007}
}
@article{fds363773,
Author = {Graves, L and Horan, BL and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of
Evolutionary Theory?},
Pages = {237-254},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {Brandon and Carson (1996) [hereafter BC] dispute at least
one part of these analyses. They hold that the theory of
evolution [hereafter ET] "is fundamentally indeterministic."
More fully, they argue for a conditional: What we have shown
is that if one is a realist in one's attitude towards
science-that if one thinks that a primary aim of doing
science is to develop theories that truly describe the
mechanisms producing the phenomena, and if one takes
theoretical fruitfulness and experimental confirmation as
evidence for the reality of theoretical entities-then one
should conclude that ET is fundamentally indeterministic.
(336) Actually we suspect that this statement ofBC's
misstates their position: that evolution (not, as they say
here, evolutionary theory) is indeterministic, and that is
why the theory is statistical. We shall therefore assume
that their argument is that the theory is statistical
because the phenomena are indeterministic.},
Key = {fds363773}
}
@article{fds363774,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo},
Pages = {447-472},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the consensus physicalist
antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot
accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent
findings of molecular developmental biology. After
describing Wolpert's programmatic claims on its behaW and
recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular
determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify
the relationship between evolutionary and developmental
biology by rcconciling two apparcntly conflicting accounts
ofbio-function - Wright's and Nagcl's (as elaborated by
Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks a way of defending the
two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the
light of the research program of molecular developmental
biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical
force.},
Key = {fds363774}
}
@article{fds363775,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural
Selection},
Pages = {299-318},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {We argue that a fashionable interpretation of the theory of
natural selection as a claim exclusively about populations
is mistaken. The interpretation rests on adopting an
analysis of fitness as a probabilistic propensity which
cannot be substantiated, draws parallels with thermodynamics
which are without foundations, and fails to do justice to
the fundamental distinction between drift and selection.
This distinction requires a notion of fitness as a pairwise
comparison between individuals taken two at a time, and so
vitiates the interpretation of the theory as one about
populations exclusively.},
Key = {fds363775}
}
@article{fds368058,
Author = {Sommers, T and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwin's Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness
of Life},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {169-184},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Ethics: Volume III},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627586},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315255767-19},
Abstract = {No one has expressed the destructive power of Darwinian
theory more effectively than Daniel Dennett. Others have
recognized that the theory of evolution offers us a
universal acid. but Dennett, bless his heart, coined the
term. Many have appreciated that the mechanism of random
variation and natural selection is a substrate-neutral
algorithm that operates at every level of organization from
the macromolecular to the mental, at every time scale from
the geological epoch to the nanosecond. But it took Dennett
to express the idea in a polysyllable or two. These two
features of Darwinism undermine more wishful thinking about
the way the world is than any other brace of notions since
mechanism was vindicated in physics.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315255767-19},
Key = {fds368058}
}
@article{fds323663,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {ON the VERY IDEA of IDEAL THEORY in POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {55-75},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000376},
Abstract = {The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory
in political philosophy, even under Rawls's conception of
its aims. It begins by identifying features of a standard
example of ideal theory in physics - the ideal gas law,
PV=NRT and draws attention to the lack of these features in
Rawls's derivation of the principles of justice from the
original position. A. John Simmons's defense of ideal theory
against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are
further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes
on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations
to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a
moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of
Rawls's later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal
theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken
starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy.
Differences between the domains of ideal theory in
mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and
political philosophy on the other, reinforce this
conclusion.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052516000376},
Key = {fds323663}
}
@article{fds336420,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism as philosophy can the universal acid be
contained?},
Pages = {23-50},
Booktitle = {How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for
Naturalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107055834},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.003},
Abstract = {The history of science has a broad pattern. Each science,
including mathematics, began its life as a subdiscipline of
philosophy, or at least as among the concerns of
philosophers. Mathematics - at first mainly the science of
space - separated itself from philosophy in the time of
Plato and Euclid, physics in the period from Galileo to
Newton, chemistry in a process that mainly took place during
the lifetimes of figures from Boyle to Lavoisier, and
biology from 1859, when the “Newton of the blade of
grass” was compelled to publish On the Origin of Species.
As each of these disciplines separated itself from
philosophy, it left questions to philosophy that it didn’t
need to answer or was unable to answer, questions that
looked like they should be addressed by the science that
relegated them to “mere” philosophy. Two obvious
examples: mathematicians never seemed to need to answer the
question, “What is a number?" Physicists have for the most
part steered clear of addressing the question, “What is
time?" The agenda of philosophy is replete with questions
the sciences (and mathematics) can’t answer yet, may never
be able to answer, and don’t need to answer. In addition
to this first set of questions the sciences cannot (yet or
perhaps ever) answer or don’t need to answer, there are
the second-order questions about why the sciences can’t
(yet) or don’t need to answer the first set of questions.
This pattern in the history of science was finally broken by
Darwin. Instead of leaving questions to philosophy, his
breakthrough enabled the sciences, in particular, biology,
to begin to take on questions that from Aristotle’s time
onward had been the exclusive preserve of philosophy. It
took more than a century of repeated forays by biologists
and philosophers inspired by Darwin to convince the
disciplines - biology and philosophy - that the former could
deal with the questions of the latter and then to shape the
answers biology provides to a host of perennial questions in
philosophy. The prominence of “naturalism” in
metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, the
philosophy of language, and moral philosophy is evidence of
this achievement. Nowadays, philosophical “naturalism”
pretty much means philosophy driven by mainly insights from
Darwin.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781107295490.003},
Key = {fds336420}
}
@article{fds320318,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an
Illusion},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {537-547},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
Abstract = {Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its
conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the
theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is
correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it
must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to
this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically
a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher
vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the
illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the
illusion of intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ
the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why
there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that
there is intentional content runs so deep.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
Key = {fds320318}
}
@article{fds320319,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The biological character of social theory},
Pages = {31-58},
Booktitle = {Handbook on Evolution and Society: Toward an Evolutionary
Social Science},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781612058146},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315634203},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that all social sciences need to take
seriously their status as divisions of biology, and that, as
such, they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian
processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. The
argument is formulated in terms of a small number of
relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the
kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The
analytical taxonomy of the social sciences is shown to
require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a
nativist or genetically driven framework. Hie fundamental
role of Darwinian processes in human cultural evolution
establishes limitations on the explanatory aspirations of
alternative theories in the social sciences, including
especially rational choice theory, the currently most
fashionable explanatory approach in several social and
behavioral sciences. An apparently widespread objection to a
biological approach to human affairs proceeds from the
denial that there are "replicators," and in particular
"menies," in human affairs. This objection is shown to be
misdirected. The chapter goes on to expound a general
account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs
by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies humans
employ. The last section shows how a great deal of social
science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s
approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the
fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology,
and in particular the studies of one particular biological
species.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315634203},
Key = {fds320319}
}
@book{fds303580,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science, 4th edition revised,
enlarged},
Publisher = {Westview press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds303580}
}
@book{fds303581,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
Edition, portuguese translation},
Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds303581}
}
@article{fds331101,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Replies to critics: Very brief, very selective, rather
snarky},
Pages = {166-170},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable?: Debates in Philosophy, Science,
and Rhetoric},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415709408},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315885544-12},
Abstract = {The notion that a serious discussion of the existence of God
should require pro and con, response and rejoinder,
timekeepers, votes of who “won”, and judges of rhetoric
is laughable. Paul Moser is a serious and influential
epistemologist. He employs expertise in the area to identify
an epistemic location from which you can defend a belief in
God as responsible while ungrounded by justification. And
the mere fact of acquaintance suffices to justify Moser’s
belief in God in the absence of any argument in which, for
example, an assertion of his/her/its presence would serve as
a premise. Knowledge by acquaintance is a familiar device in
epistemology. Moser Conveniently, however, Moser provides it
himself earlier in his own essay: “Neither mere claims nor
mere subjective experiences are self-attesting about
objective reality”. Hence Christian philosophers would do
well to focus on these problems if they really want to
convince anyone but themselves that their views are not
irrational.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315885544-12},
Key = {fds331101}
}
@article{fds244619,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Craig, WL},
Title = {The debate: Is faith in God reasonable?},
Series = {Routledge Studies inthe Philosophy of Religion},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
and Rhetoric},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244619}
}
@book{fds219753,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
Edition, portuguese translation},
Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
Address = {Sao Paulo, Brazil},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds219753}
}
@article{fds244764,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to
Anti-Darwinism, and how we can avoid the same
fate},
Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-17},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1879-4912},
url = {http://http://link.springer.com/search?query=rosenberg&search-within=Journal&facet-journal-id=%2213194%22},
Abstract = {There is only one physically possible process that builds
and operates purposive systems in nature: natural selection.
What it does is build and operate systems that look to us
purposive, goal directed, teleological. There really are not
any purposes in nature and no purposive processes ether. It
is just one vast network of linked causal chains. Darwinian
natural selection is the only process that could produce the
appearance of purpose. That is why natural selection must
have built and must continually shape the intentional causes
of purposive behavior. Fodor's argument against Darwinian
theory involves a biologist's modus tollens which is a
cognitive scientist's modus ponens. Assuming his argument is
valid, the right conclusion is not that Darwin's theory is
mistaken but that Fodor's and any other non-Darwinian
approaches to the mind are wrong. It shows how getting
things wrong in the philosophy of biology leads to mistaken
conclusions with the potential to damage the acceptance of a
theory with harmful consequences for human well-being. Fodor
has shown that the real consequence of rejecting a Darwinian
approach to the mind is to reject a Darwinian theory of
phylogenetic evolution. This forces us to take seriously a
notion that otherwise would not have much of a chance: that
when it comes to the nature of mental states, indeterminacy
rules. This is an insight that should have the most
beneficial impact on freeing cognitive neuroscience from
demands on the adequacy of its theories that it could never
meet. © 2012 Springer Science + Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13194-012-0055-9},
Key = {fds244764}
}
@article{fds358345,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Biology},
Pages = {575-585},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Science},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415518741},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203744857-65},
Abstract = {It is only since the 1950s that philosophers of science
began to pay serious attention to biology. Initially
philosophers used biological examples to test the claims
about science that logical positivists and logical
empiricists had drawn from their studies of physics. Over
the same time the revolution in biological theorizing - both
evolutionary and molecular - gave rise to a number of
abstract questions that have jointly interested biologists
and philosophers with no independent interest in assessing
positivism or the post-positivist picture of science that
succeeded it (Monod 1971; Wilson 1975; Dawkins 1976).
Nonetheless, this work was done with enough knowledge of the
details of the biological revolution and developments in
philosophy of science to draw conclusions about the adequacy
or failure of post-positivist accounts of laws, theories,
explanations, reduction, and scientic method. This essay
examines the main issues that interest contemporary
philosophers of biology, issues that clearly show the
relevance of biology not only for philosophy of science but
for philosophy in general.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203744857-65},
Key = {fds358345}
}
@article{fds244630,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {From rational choice to reflexivity},
Journal = {Economic Thought (on-line)},
Pages = {32-32},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://etdiscussion.worldeconomicsassociation.org/?post=from-rational-choice-to-reflexivity-learning-from-sen-keynes-hayek-soros-and-most-of-all-from-darwin},
Key = {fds244630}
}
@article{fds244632,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reflexivity, Uncertainty and the Unity of
Science},
Journal = {Review of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {20},
Number = {4},
Pages = {14-14},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.859413},
Abstract = {The paper argues that substantial support for Soros' claims
about uncertainty and reflexivity in economics and human
affairs generally are provided by the operation of both
factors in the biological domain to produce substantially
the same processes which have been recognized by ecologists
and evolutionary biologists. In particular predator prey
relations have their sources in uncertainty - i.e. the
random character of variations, and frequency dependent
co-evolution - reflexivity. The paper argues that despite
Soros' claims, intentionality is not required to produce
these phenomena, and that where it does so, in the human
case, it provides no basis to deny a reasonable thesis of
the methodological or causal unity of science. The argument
for this conclusion is developed by starting with a
biological predator/prey relation and successively
introducing intentional components without affecting the
nature of the process. Accepting the conclusion of this
argument provides substantial additional inductive support
for Soros' theory in its economic application. © 2014 ©
2014 Taylor & Francis.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2013.859413},
Key = {fds244632}
}
@article{fds244737,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Free markets and the myth of earned inequalities},
Journal = {3AM Magazine},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/free-markets-and-the-myth-of-earned-inequalities/},
Key = {fds244737}
}
@article{fds244738,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Curtain, T},
Title = {What is economics good for?},
Publisher = {The New York Times},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/what-is-economics-good-for/?_r=1},
Key = {fds244738}
}
@article{fds244614,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Disenchanted Naturalism},
Pages = {17-36},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its
Implications},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Bashour, B and Muller, H},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244614}
}
@article{fds244615,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can naturalism save the humanities?},
Pages = {39-42},
Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Haug, M},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244615}
}
@article{fds244616,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reply to critics},
Series = {Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
and Rhetoric},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244616}
}
@article{fds244617,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why I am a naturalist},
Pages = {32-35},
Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Haug, M},
Year = {2013},
ISBN = {978-0-415-53131-3},
Key = {fds244617}
}
@article{fds244618,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Theism and Allism},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Peter Van Inwagen},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Keller, JCA},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244618}
}
@article{fds244759,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why do spatiotemporally restricted regularities explain in
the social sciences?},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000300327100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Employing a well-known local regularity from macroeconomics,
the Phillips curve, I examine Woodward's ([2000], [2003])
account of the explanatory power of such historically
restricted generalizations and the mathematical models with
which they are sometimes associated. The article seeks to
show that, pace Woodward, to be explanatory such
generalizations need to be underwritten by more fundamental
ones, and that rational choice theory would not avail in
this case to provide the required underwriting. Examining
how such explanatory restricted regularities are
underwritten in biology - by unrestricted Darwinian
regularities - provides the basis for an argument that
Darwinian regularities serve the same function in human
affairs. The general argument for this claim requires, inter
alia, that we accept some version or other of a theory of
memes. The article concludes by clearing the field of some
prominent objections to the existence of memes, and
extracting some policy implications from the persistence and
acceleration of arms races in human affairs. © The Author
2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of
British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
Key = {fds244759}
}
@article{fds318391,
Author = {Neander, K and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to
Nanay},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {109},
Number = {10},
Pages = {613-622},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Key = {fds318391}
}
@article{fds331102,
Author = {Braddock, M and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reconstruction in moral philosophy?},
Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
Volume = {2012},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-80},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2012-0105},
Abstract = {We raise three issues for Kitcher's Ethical Project: First,
we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the
advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them,
which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we
challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the
sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while
circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive
normative conclusions from positive ones-'ought' from 'is'.
Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's metaethical
opponents could respond to his arguments against them. ©
Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2012-0105},
Key = {fds331102}
}
@article{fds183673,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {"Why do spatiotemporally restricted regularities explain in
the social sciences?"},
Journal = {British Journal for Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/63/1/1.full},
Abstract = {Br J Philos Sci (2012) 63 (1): 1-26.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
Key = {fds183673}
}
@article{fds320320,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Designing a successor to the patent as second best solution
to the problem of optimum provision of good
ideas},
Pages = {88-109},
Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
Property},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107009318},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
Abstract = {This chapter reviews welfarist arguments for government
intervention to optimize the provision of good ideas that
arise from their nature. It shows that, paradoxically, these
same considerations provide reasons to think that, as a
solution to the good idea-optimization problem, the patent
will increasingly fail to be effective. This ineffectiveness
is accelerated by technological developments as well. The
problem that welfarism thus faces is to provide a new
institution or regime that encourages the optimum provision
and utilization of good ideas that will avoid the
difficulties which the patent must inevitably impose and
which technological developments are hastening. An
examination of the reward system of pure science, however,
suggests such a solution, and the chapter goes on to sketch
ways in which this solution pure science uses can be
implemented more broadly. The near-public goods character of
good ideas and argument for intellectual property rights The
welfarist argument for intellectual property rights is based
on the near-public goods properties of good ideas. In a
competitive market among economically rational agents that
lacks property rights in good ideas, there must inevitably
be an undersupply of good ideas: discovering and testing
good ideas is costly and risky. Consider the obvious example
of crop rotation. Establishing its enhancement of
agricultural yields takes several growing seasons, during
which some fields are removed from production altogether. No
one has an incentive to undertake the experiment, but
everyone has an incentive to watch others undertake it and
copy the early adopters should the innovation work. But if
no one has the appropriate incentive, there are no early
adopters and crop rotation is unlikely ever to be invented.
Ergo, the absence of property rights in good ideas leads to
underinvestment in and undersupply of them.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
Key = {fds320320}
}
@article{fds244613,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Designing an alternative to the patent as a second best
solution to the problem of intellectual property},
Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
Property},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Lever, A},
Year = {2012},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds244613}
}
@article{fds200378,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {"How physcis fakes design"},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
Issues},
Publisher = {Cambridge U.P.},
Editor = {Thompson and Walsh},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds200378}
}
@article{fds244766,
Author = {Lange, M and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can There beA PrioriCausal Models of Natural
Selection?},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {89},
Number = {4},
Pages = {591-599},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
Key = {fds244766}
}
@article{fds244629,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can nuerophilosophy save the humanities},
Journal = {New York Times},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/?s=can+neurophilosophy},
Key = {fds244629}
}
@article{fds244628,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why I am a Naturalist},
Journal = {New York Times},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/why-i-am-a-naturalist/},
Key = {fds244628}
}
@article{fds244765,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds244765}
}
@book{fds244754,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Atheist’s Guide to Reality},
Publisher = {W.W. Norton},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244754}
}
@book{fds244755,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, 3d
Edition, revised, enlarged},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244755}
}
@book{fds336421,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Japanese
translation},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds336421}
}
@book{fds336422,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Arabic
translation},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds336422}
}
@article{fds244612,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How physics fakes design},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
Issues},
Publisher = {Cambridge U.P.},
Editor = {Thompson, and Walsh},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244612}
}
@article{fds166628,
Author = {A. Rosenberg and K. Neander},
Title = {Are homolgies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-39},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds166628}
}
@article{fds320321,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195304787},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
Abstract = {This article discusses the lessons from neurogenomics that
are applicable to cognitive science. It argues that the work
of some leading cognitive scientists who employed the
resources of neurogenomics has already provided strong
grounds to be pessimistic about the representations to which
a computational theory of mind is committed, and to be
optimistic about the syntactic character of processes of
thinking and reasoning in the brain. It also discusses
research findings concerning how the brain recalls memories
and the storage of explicit memories.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
Key = {fds320321}
}
@article{fds318392,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function
free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {307-334},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/649807},
Abstract = {This article argues that at least very many judgments of
homology rest on prior attributions of selected-effect (SE)
function, and that many of the "parts" of biological systems
that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by
(are so classified in virtue of) their consequence
etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the
prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous
and are often used to differentiate more restricted
homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so,
we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been
offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1086/649807},
Key = {fds318392}
}
@book{fds336423,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction–Portuguese
translation},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds336423}
}
@article{fds244610,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in moral philosophy and social
theory},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2d Edition},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Raddick, G and Hodge, J},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244610}
}
@article{fds244611,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lessons from neurogenomics for cognitive
science},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Bickle, J},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244611}
}
@article{fds244767,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {approximately 35 pages},
Year = {2008},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds244767}
}
@article{fds303579,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in Biology},
Pages = {550-567},
Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Editor = {Plutinsky, A and Sarkar, S},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781405125727},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
Key = {fds303579}
}
@article{fds320322,
Author = {Love, AC and Brigandt, I and Stotz, K and Schweitzer, D and Rosenberg,
A},
Title = {More worry and less love?},
Journal = {Metascience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {18-26},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
Doi = {10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
Key = {fds320322}
}
@article{fds244620,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If economics is a science, what kind of a science is
it?},
Pages = {55-68},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kincaid, H},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244620}
}
@book{fds52014,
Author = {Alex Rosenberg and Daniel McShea},
Title = {The Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary
Introduction},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds52014}
}
@article{fds244756,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in biology},
Pages = {349-368},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
Abstract = {Reductionism is a thesis about formal logical relations
among theories that were undermined by the philosophers of
science with the powers of mathematical logic to illuminate
interesting and important methodological matters such as
explanation and theory testing. A major problem of
reductionism in both molecular biology, and in functional
biology is the absence of laws, either at the level of the
reducing theory or the reduced theory, or between them. The
real dispute is not about the derivability or undesirability
of laws in functional biology from laws in molecular
biology, but since there is only one general theory in
biology, Darwinism. Reductionism claims that the most
complete, correct, and adequate explanations of historical
facts uncovered in functional biology is by appealing to
other historical facts uncovered in molecular biology, plus
some laws that operate at the level of molecular biology.
Reductionism in biology turns out to be the radical thesis
that ultimate explanations must give way to proximate ones
and that these latter will be molecular explanations. ©
2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
Key = {fds244756}
}
@article{fds244768,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinian Reductionism: How stupid of me to have thought of
it},
Journal = {Metascience},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds244768}
}
@article{fds244769,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is epigeneis a counterexample to the central
dogma},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
Volume = {28},
Pages = {509-526},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds244769}
}
@book{fds244752,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduction},
Pages = {1-241},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415315920},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203926994},
Abstract = {Is life a purely physical process? What is human nature?
Which of our traits is essential to us? In this volume,
Daniel McShea and Alex Rosenberg - a biologist and a
philosopher, respectively - join forces to create a new
gateway to the philosophy of biology; making the major
issues accessible and relevant to biologists and
philosophers alike. Exploring concepts such as
supervenience; the controversies about genocentrism and
genetic determinism; and the debate about major transitions
central to contemporary thinking about macroevolution; the
authors lay out the broad terms in which we should assess
the impact of biology on human capacities, social
institutions and ethical values.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203926994},
Key = {fds244752}
}
@article{fds331103,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism (and antireductionism) in biology},
Pages = {120-138},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521851282},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
Abstract = {Accelerating developments in molecular biology since 1953
have strongly encouraged the advocacy of reductionism by a
number of important biologists, including Crick, Monod, and
E. O. Wilson, and strong opposition by equally prominent
biologists, especially Lewontin, along with most
philosophers of biology. Reductionism is a metaphysical
thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program.
The metaphysical thesis that reductionists advance (and
antireductionists accept) is physicalism, the thesis that
all facts, including the biological facts, are fixed by the
physical and chemical facts; there are no nonphysical
events, states, or processes, and so biological events,
states, and processes are “nothing but” physical ones.
This metaphysical thesis is one reductionists share with
antireductionists. The reductionist argues that the
metaphysical thesis has consequences for biological
explanations: they need to be completed, corrected, made
more precise, or otherwise deepened by more fundamental
explanations in molecular biology. The antireductionist
denies this inference, arguing that nonmolecular biological
explanations are adequate and need no macromolecular
correction, completion, or grounding. The research program
that reductionists claim follows from the conclusion about
explanations can be framed as the methodological moral that
biologists should seek such macromolecular
explanations.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
Key = {fds331103}
}
@book{fds244751,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love
Molecular Biology},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds244751}
}
@article{fds318393,
Author = {Rosoff, PM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How Darwinian reductionism refutes genetic
determinism.},
Journal = {Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {122-135},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
Abstract = {Genetic determinism labels the morally problematical claim
that some socially significant traits, traits we care about,
such as sexual orientation, gender roles, violence,
alcoholism, mental illness, intelligence, are largely the
results of the operation of genes and not much alterable by
environment, learning or other human intervention. Genetic
determinism does not require that genes literally fix these
socially significant traits, but rather that they constrain
them within narrow channels beyond human intervention. In
this essay we analyze genetic determinism in light of what
is now known about the inborn error of metabolism
phenylketonuria (PKU), which has for so long been the poster
child 'simple' argument in favor of some form of genetic
determinism. We demonstrate that this case proves the exact
opposite of what it has been proposed to support and
provides a strong refutation of genetic determinism in all
its guises.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
Key = {fds318393}
}
@article{fds320323,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is epigenetic inheritance a counterexample to the central
dogma?},
Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {549-565},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This paper argues that nothing that has been discovered in
the increasingly complex delails of gene regulation has
provided any grounds to retract or qualify Crick's version
of the central dogma. In particular it defends the role of
the genes as the sole bearers of information, and argues
that the mechanism of epigenetic modification of the DNA is
but another vindication of Crick's version of the central
dogma. The paper shows that arguments of C.K. Waters for the
distinctive causual role of the genes are equivalent in
important respects to the present ones and concludes with a
defense of the informational role of the genes against an
argument from trans-acting genetic regulation due to
Stotz.},
Key = {fds320323}
}
@book{fds244750,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction
(Portuegese translation)},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244750}
}
@article{fds244736,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {In defence of Genocentrism},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. 2005
;27:345-59},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244736}
}
@article{fds244606,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in molecular biology},
Booktitle = {Oxford handbook in Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, D and Ruse, M},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244606}
}
@article{fds244607,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism},
Booktitle = {Handbook for the Philosophy of Science, v.3 Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244607}
}
@article{fds244609,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Biology, Philosophy of},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of
Science},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Curd, M and Psillos, S},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244609}
}
@article{fds244770,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Rosoff, P},
Title = {How reductionism refutes genetic determinism},
Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and
Biomedical Sciences},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244770}
}
@article{fds244735,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Linquist, S},
Title = {On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human
Evolution},
Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {136-157},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0108},
Abstract = {This paper considers whether the available evidence from
archeology, biological anthropology, primatology, and
comparative gene-sequencing, can test evolutionary game
theory models of cooperation as historical hypotheses about
the actual course of human prehistory. The examination
proceeds on the assumption that cooperation is the product
of cultural selection and is not a genetically encoded
trait. Nevertheless, we conclude that gene sequence data may
yet shed significant light on the evolution of
cooperation.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2005-0108},
Key = {fds244735}
}
@article{fds244774,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Matten and Ariews Obituary for Fitness},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {343-353},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds244774}
}
@article{fds320324,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Matthen and Ariew's obituary for fitness: Reports of its
death have been greatly exaggerated},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {343-353},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
Key = {fds320324}
}
@article{fds244775,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Kaplan, DM},
Title = {How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about
biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {72},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-68},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000229131300003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in
the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are
difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic
antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and
antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests
and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be
improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover,
antireductionists themselves view their claim as a
metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts
molecular biology cannot identify, express or explain.
However, this is tantamount to a rejection of physicalism
and so causes the antireductionist discomfort. In this paper
we argue that vindicating physicalism requires a
physicalistic account of the principle of natural selection,
and we provide such an account. The most important payoff to
the account is that it provides for the very sort of
autonomy from the physical that antireductionists need
without threatening their commitment to physicalism.
Copyright 2005 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/428389},
Key = {fds244775}
}
@article{fds320325,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Defending information-free genocentrism.},
Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {345-359},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Genocentrism, the thesis that the genes play a special role
in the causation of development is often rejected in favor
of a 'causal democracy thesis' to the effect that all
causally necessary conditions for development are equal.
Genocentrists argue that genes play a distinct causal role
owing to their informational content and that this content
enables them to program the embryo. I show that the special
causal role of the genome hinges not on its informational
status--it has none, or at least no more than computer
programs have independent of our interpretations of
them--but on its power literally to program the embryo, a
power nicely illustrated in the use of polynucleotide
sequences to compute solutions to NP hard problems in
mathematics.},
Key = {fds320325}
}
@article{fds244603,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genomics and cultural evolution},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology,},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Boniolo, G and Anna, GD},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244603}
}
@article{fds244604,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will genomics do more for metaphysics than
Locke},
Pages = {186-206},
Booktitle = {Scientific Evidence},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins Unversity},
Editor = {Achinstein, P},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {9780521856294},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
Abstract = {Origin of man now solved. He who understands baboon would do
more for metaphysics than Locke. Darwin, Notebooks. THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND “JUST-SO STORIES”.
Darwin's claim is probably guilty of pardonable
exaggeration. After all he did not prove the origin of man,
and Locke's greatest contributions were to political
philosophy, not metaphysics. But it may turn out that
Darwin's twentieth-century grandchild, genomics, vindicates
this claim with respect to both metaphysics and political
philosophy. Here I focus on the latter claim alone, however.
From the year that William Hamilton first introduced the
concept of inclusive fitness and the mechanism of kin
selection, biologists, psychologists, game theorists,
philosophers, and others have been adding details to answer
the question of how altruism is possible as a biological
disposition. We now have a fairly well-articulated story of
how wecould havegotten from there, nature red in tooth and
claw, to here, an almost universal commitment to morality.
That is, there is now a scenario showing how a lineage of
organisms selected for maximizing genetic representation in
subsequent generations could come eventually to be composed
of cooperating creatures. Establishing this bare possibility
was an important turning point for biological anthropology,
for human sociobiology, and for evolutionary psychology.
Prior to Hamilton's breakthrough it was intellectually
permissible to write off Darwinism as irrelevant to
distinctively human behavior and human institutions.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
Key = {fds244604}
}
@article{fds244605,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Good Ideas and Human Welfare: Big Pharma versus the
Developing Nations},
Booktitle = {Developmental Dilemmas},
Publisher = {London: Routledge},
Editor = {Ayogu, M and Ross, D},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244605}
}
@article{fds244631,
Author = {Brav, A and Heaton, JB and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The rational-behavioral debate in financial
economics},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {393-409},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178042000177978},
Abstract = {The contest between rational and behavioral finance is
poorly understood as a contest overtestability' and
'predictive success.' In fact, neither rational nor
behavioral finance offer much in the way of testable
predictions of improving precision. Researchers in the
rational paradigm seem to have abandoned testability and
prediction in favor of a scheme of ex post
'rationalizations' of observed price behavior. These
rationalizations, however, have an unemphasized relevance
for behavioral finance. While behavioral finance advocates
may justly criticize rationalizations as unlikely to lead to
a science of financial economics with improving predictive
power, rational finance's explanatory power plays a key role
supporting the limits of arbitrage arguments that make
behavioral finance possible.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178042000177978},
Key = {fds244631}
}
@book{fds336425,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, First
Edition, Chinese Translation},
Series = {Philosopher's Stone Series},
Publisher = {Shanghai Scientific and Technological Education Publishing
House},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds336425}
}
@article{fds336424,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Priority of Intellectual Property Rights, Especially
in Biotechnology},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-95},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X04039983},
Abstract = {This article argues that considerations about the role and
predictability of intellectual innovation make the
protection of intellectual property morally obligatory even
when it greatly reduces short-term welfare. Since the
provision of good new ideas is the only productive input not
subject to decreasing marginal productivity, welfarist
considerations require that no impediment to its maximal
provision be erected and the potentially substantial welfare
losses imposed by a patent system be mitigated by taxation
of other sources of wealth and income. © 2004, SAGE
Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X04039983},
Key = {fds336424}
}
@article{fds244757,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, probability and the principles of natural
selection},
Journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE},
Volume = {55},
Number = {4},
Pages = {693-712},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2004},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000225362200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/55.4.693},
Key = {fds244757}
}
@article{fds244771,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Political Philosophy of Intellectual Property, with
Applications in Biotechnology},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {102-130},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds244771}
}
@article{fds244772,
Author = {Sommers, T and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwin's nihilistic idea: Evolution and the meaninglessness
of life},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {653-668},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000186204700003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1026311011245},
Key = {fds244772}
}
@article{fds244734,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The priority of intellectual property},
Journal = {Fraser Forum, February 2003, pp. 12-15},
Volume = {February},
Pages = {12-15},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244734}
}
@article{fds303578,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Drift, fitness, and the foundations of probability},
Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
Editor = {Hutterman, A},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds303578}
}
@article{fds244600,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Brandon, R},
Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Biology},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Science Today},
Publisher = {Oxford: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clark, P and Hawley, K},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244600}
}
@article{fds244602,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in Moral Philosophy and Social
Theory},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Hodge, and Radick},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244602}
}
@article{fds244758,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Drift, fitness and the foundations of probability},
Journal = {DETERMINISM IN PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY},
Pages = {108-135},
Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
Editor = {Adreas Hutterman},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {3-89785-371-X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000230579000008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244758}
}
@article{fds244599,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
Pages = {125-155},
Booktitle = {Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical
Sciences},
Publisher = {John Wiley},
Editor = {Hull, D and Regenmortel, MV},
Year = {2002},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds244599}
}
@article{fds244597,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Fitness},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244597}
}
@article{fds244598,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Good ideas and human welfare},
Booktitle = {Proceedings of International Conference on Economics,
Development and Ethics, University of Cape
Woen},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Ross, D},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244598}
}
@article{fds244763,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How is biological explanation possible?},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {735-760},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000172447300006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {That biology provides explanations is not open to doubt. But
how it does so must be a vexed question for those who deny
that biology embodies laws or other generalizations with the
sort of explanatory force that the philosophy of science
recognizes. The most common response to this problem has
involved redefining law so that those grammatically general
statements which biologists invoke in explanations can be
counted as laws. But this terminological innovation cannot
identify the source of biology's explanatory power. I argue
that because biological science is historical, the problem
of biological explanation can be assimilated to the parallel
problem in the philosophy of history, and that the problem
was solved by Carl Hempel. All we need to do is recognize
that the only laws that biology - in all its compartments
from the molecular onward - has or needs are the laws of
natural selection.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/52.4.735},
Key = {fds244763}
}
@article{fds244733,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Indeterminacy, probability and randomness in evolutionary
theory},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Pages = {536-544},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244733}
}
@article{fds244761,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On multiple realization and the special sciences},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {98},
Number = {7},
Pages = {365-373},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169968600003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2678441},
Key = {fds244761}
}
@article{fds244762,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE},
Volume = {68},
Number = {2},
Pages = {135-163},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169074200001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/392870},
Key = {fds244762}
}
@article{fds244596,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of molecular biology},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Life Sciences},
Publisher = {London: McMillan},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244596}
}
@article{fds244731,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Privacy as a matter of taste and right},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {68-90},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002119},
Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500002119},
Key = {fds244731}
}
@book{fds244747,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science and
Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge, Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244747}
}
@article{fds244730,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Clark, A},
Title = {La Genetique et le holism debride},
Journal = {Review Internationale de Philosophie},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {35-61},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244730}
}
@article{fds244732,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Problem of Enforcement: Is there an Alternative to
Leviathan?},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {236-239},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244732}
}
@article{fds244591,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Character Concept in Taxonomy, Evolution, and
Development},
Pages = {199-214},
Booktitle = {The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {New Haven, CT: Yale University Press},
Editor = {Wagner, G},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244591}
}
@article{fds244593,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Limits to Biology},
Pages = {247-265},
Booktitle = {Science at Century’s End},
Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press},
Editor = {Carrier, M and Ruetsche, L and Massey, G},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244593}
}
@article{fds244594,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Laws, History and the Nature of Scientific
Understanding},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {51-71},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers},
Editor = {Hecht, M and Clegg},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244594}
}
@article{fds244595,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
Pages = {451-460},
Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {London: Blackwell},
Editor = {Newton-Smith, W},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244595}
}
@article{fds287553,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The problem of enforcement: Is there an alternative to
Leviathan},
Pages = {236-239},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Origins of Morality},
Publisher = {Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic},
Editor = {Katz, L},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds287553}
}
@article{fds303577,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right (Reprint)},
Pages = {68-91},
Booktitle = {The Right to Privacy},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, M and Paul},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds303577}
}
@article{fds244726,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economic theory as political philosophy},
Journal = {Social Science Journal},
Volume = {36},
Number = {4},
Pages = {575-587},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
Abstract = {I defend the integrity of the question of what the cognitive
status of economic theory could amount to, and I argue that
the theory is best understood as a compartment of formal
political philosophy, in particular a species of
contractarianism. This seems particularly apt as an account
of general equilibrium theory. Given the intentional
character of the explanatory variables of economic theory
and the role of information in effecting choice, it is
argued that economic theory is unlikely to secure the
predictive power that would enable it to function as a
factual instead of a normative theory.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
Key = {fds244726}
}
@article{fds244727,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative
Materialists},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {59},
Pages = {1-24},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244727}
}
@article{fds244728,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Les Limits de la Connaissance Biologique},
Journal = {Annales d’histoire et de philosophie du
vivant},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {15-35},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244728}
}
@article{fds244729,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Horan, B and Graves, L},
Title = {Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of
the Theory of natural Selection},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {140-157},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392680},
Abstract = {We argue that Brandon and Carson's (1996) "The
Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory" fails to
identify any indeterminism that would require evolutionary
theory to be a statistical or probabilistic theory.
Specifically, we argue that (1) their demonstration of a
mechanism by which quantum indeterminism might "percolate
up" to the biological level is irrelevant; (2) their
argument that natural selection is indeterministic because
it is inextricably connected with drift fails to join the
issue with determinism; and (3) their view that experimental
methodology in botany assumes indeterminism is both false
and incompatible with the commitment to discoverable causal
mechanisms underlying biological processes. We remain
convinced that the probabilism of the theory of evolution is
epistemically, not ontologically, motivated.},
Doi = {10.1086/392680},
Key = {fds244729}
}
@article{fds244725,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {La teoria economica como filosofia politica},
Journal = {Teoria},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {279-299},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244725}
}
@article{fds244585,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sociobiology},
Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
Editor = {Craig, E},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244585}
}
@article{fds244586,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Social Science},
Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
Editor = {Craig, E},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244586}
}
@article{fds244587,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Altruism: theoretical Considerations (Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244587}
}
@article{fds244588,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
Strategies (Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244588}
}
@article{fds244589,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Folk Psychology},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Economic Methodology},
Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
Editor = {Davis, JB},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244589}
}
@article{fds244724,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {445-470},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006574719901},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the consensus physicalist
antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot
accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent
findings of molecular developmental biology. After
describing Wolpert's programmatic claims on its behalf, and
recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular
determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify
the relationship between evolutionary and developmental
biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts
of bio-function - Wright's and Nagel's (as elaborated by
Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks a way of defending the
two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the
light of the research program of molecular developmental
biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical
force.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006574719901},
Key = {fds244724}
}
@article{fds320326,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can physicalist antireductionism compute the
embryo?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
Pages = {S359-S371},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392614},
Abstract = {It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of
organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at
least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained
in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular
developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I
show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with
a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of
controversial claims about causation and explanation which
undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.
Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/392614},
Key = {fds320326}
}
@article{fds244720,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-29},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
Abstract = {This review of recent work in the philosophy of science
motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by
identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by
philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and
Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common
agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they
have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the
theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the
philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements
in the work of Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue
that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency
in its foundations.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
Key = {fds244720}
}
@article{fds244722,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Laws, damn laws, and ceteris paribus clauses},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {34},
Number = {S1},
Pages = {183-204},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
Key = {fds244722}
}
@article{fds320327,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical review: Sober's philosophy of biology and his
philosophy of biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {3},
Pages = {452-464},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289921},
Abstract = {An examination of the foundations of Elliot Sober's
philosophy of biology as reflected in his introductory
textbook of that title reveals substantial and controversial
philosophical commitments. Among these are the claim that
all understanding is historical, the assertion that there
are biological laws but they are necessary truths, the view
that the fundamental theory in biology is a narrative, and
the suggestion that biology adverts to ungrounded
probabilistic propensities of the sort to be met with
elsewhere only in quantum mechanics.},
Doi = {10.1086/289921},
Key = {fds320327}
}
@article{fds244627,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
Volume = {Supplementary},
Pages = {407-411},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244627}
}
@article{fds244721,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sober’s "Philosophy of Biology" and His Philosophy of
Biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Pages = {452-465},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244721}
}
@article{fds244723,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Research Tactics and Economic Strategies: Case of the Human
Genome Project},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {1-18},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244723}
}
@article{fds244582,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
Strategies (Reprint)},
Pages = {1-26},
Booktitle = {Scientific Innovation, Philosophy and Public
Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, E and Miller, F and Paul, J},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244582}
}
@article{fds244583,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Economics},
Pages = {582-583},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244583}
}
@article{fds244584,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {217-228},
Booktitle = {Readings in Animal Cognition},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244584}
}
@article{fds303576,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
Volume = {Supplementary},
Pages = {407-411},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds303576}
}
@article{fds244718,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just
Society},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {54-71},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004672},
Abstract = {<jats:p>It seems to be almost a given of contemporary
Anglo-American political philosophy that the just society is
obligated to establish and ensure the equality of its
members. Debate begins when we come to delineate the forms
and limits of the equality society is obligated to
underwrite. In this essay I offer the subversive suggestion
that equality is not something the just society should aim
for. Instead I offer another objective, one which is to be
preferred both because it is more attainable and because it
is morally more defensible than equality, either as an ideal
or as an operative principle. The demand for equality of
treatment, of opportunity, or of outcome, is a distraction
from morally more significant aims.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500004672},
Key = {fds244718}
}
@article{fds244719,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Metaphysical Foundations of Microeconomics},
Journal = {Monist},
Volume = {78},
Pages = {353-367},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244719}
}
@article{fds244580,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
(Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Ethics and Biology},
Publisher = {SUNY Press},
Editor = {Thompson, P},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244580}
}
@book{fds244745,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244745}
}
@article{fds244717,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Hoefer, C},
Title = {Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination and Systems of the
World},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {592-607},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244717}
}
@article{fds244576,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome
Project},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {329-338},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244576}
}
@article{fds244577,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {661-674},
Booktitle = {Readings in the philosophy of Social Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
Editor = {Martin, M and McIntyre, L},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244577}
}
@article{fds244578,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Does Evolutionary Theory Give Aid or Comfort to
Economics},
Pages = {384-407},
Booktitle = {Natural Images in Economic Thought},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Mirowski, P},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244578}
}
@article{fds244579,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Cognitive Status of Economic theory},
Pages = {216-235},
Booktitle = {Nature of Economic Method},
Publisher = {London: Routledge},
Editor = {Backhouse},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244579}
}
@article{fds320328,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Genie Selection, Molecular Biology and Biological
Instrumentalism},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {343-362},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
Key = {fds320328}
}
@article{fds244713,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {"Hausman, Inexact and Separate Science of Economics,”
Critical Notice},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {90},
Pages = {533-537},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244713}
}
@article{fds244714,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Scientific Innovation and the Limits of Social Scientific
Prediction},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {97},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-21},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1993},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064113},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064113},
Key = {fds244714}
}
@article{fds244715,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genic Selection and Biological Instrumentalism},
Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
Volume = {XVIII},
Pages = {343-362},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244715}
}
@article{fds244716,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Powers and Limits of Agricultural Economics},
Journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {15-24},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244716}
}
@article{fds244574,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {426-442},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics},
Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
Editor = {Caldwell, B},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244574}
}
@article{fds244575,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How is Eliminative Materialism Possible?},
Booktitle = {Mind and Common Sense},
Publisher = {Cambridge:Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Bogdan, R},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244575}
}
@article{fds244712,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Selection and Science: Critical notice of David Hull's
Science as a Process},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {217-228},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1992},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00129886},
Abstract = {An examination of Hull's claims about the nature of
interactors, replicators and selection, with special
attention to how the genetic material realizes the first two
types, and a critique of Hull's attempt to apply the theory
of natural selection to the explanation of scientific
change, and in particular the succession of theories. I
conclude that difficulties attending the molecular
instantiation of Hull's theory are vastly increased when it
comes to be applied to "memes." © 1992 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00129886},
Key = {fds244712}
}
@article{fds244710,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Contractarianism and the "trolley" problem.},
Journal = {Journal of social philosophy},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {88-104},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
Key = {fds244710}
}
@book{fds244744,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing
Returns?},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244744}
}
@article{fds244711,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation, Probability and the Monarchy},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {305-318},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244711}
}
@article{fds244570,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Hume and the Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {64-89},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Hume},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Norton},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244570}
}
@article{fds244571,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Evolutionary Biology and Neoclassical Economics: Strange
Bedfellows},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {174-183},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244571}
}
@article{fds244572,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Altruism: Theoretical Context},
Pages = {20-28},
Booktitle = {Keywords in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press},
Editor = {Fox-Keller, E and Lloyd, L},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244572}
}
@article{fds244573,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Common Knowledge, Equilibrium and Other Idealizations:
Commentary Bicchieri},
Pages = {189-194},
Booktitle = {Postpopperian Methodology of Economics},
Publisher = {Boston: Dordrecht},
Editor = {DeMarchi, N},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244573}
}
@article{fds244708,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Adequacy criteria for a theory of fitness},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {38-41},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426822},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02426822},
Key = {fds244708}
}
@article{fds244567,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Teleology},
Pages = {391-393},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Metaphysics},
Publisher = {Munich, Germany: Philosophia Verlag},
Editor = {Burkhardt, EA},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244567}
}
@article{fds244568,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {What’s So Special About General Equilibrium?},
Pages = {10-133},
Booktitle = {Economics, Culture, Education},
Publisher = {London: Elgar},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244568}
}
@article{fds303575,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
(Reprint)},
Pages = {86-101},
Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
Editor = {Paul, M and Rowe},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds303575}
}
@article{fds244706,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Moral Realism and Social Science},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {150-166},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
Key = {fds244706}
}
@article{fds244709,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The biological justification of ethics: A best-case
scenario},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {86-101},
Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Editor = {Paul, Miller and Rowe},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003757},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500003757},
Key = {fds244709}
}
@article{fds244707,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Normative Naturalism and the Role of Philosophy},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {57},
Pages = {34-43},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244707}
}
@article{fds244564,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A quoi bon la theorie de l’equilibre general?”},
Pages = {170-187},
Booktitle = {La Methodologie de L’economie Theorique et Applique
Aujourd’hui},
Publisher = {Paris Nathan},
Editor = {Wolff, J and al, E},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244564}
}
@article{fds244565,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, Reinforcement and Underlying Mechanisms
(reprint)},
Pages = {57-59},
Booktitle = {The Selection of Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Catania, C and Harnad, S},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244565}
}
@article{fds244566,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?},
Pages = {180-196},
Booktitle = {Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Annual
Behavior},
Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press},
Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244566}
}
@article{fds320329,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is lewis's 'genuine modal realism' magical
too?},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {98},
Number = {391},
Pages = {411-421},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1989},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
Key = {fds320329}
}
@article{fds244704,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are generic predictions enough?},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {43-68},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1989},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00184815},
Abstract = {I have argued not that economics has no predictive content,
but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited
to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of
prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to
specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of
an important episode in the twentieth century history of the
subject I have given is both correct and representative,
then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of
generic prediction. And at least some influential economists
and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with
stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least
they give no other reason than its power to produce such
predictions as a justification for the character of economic
theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of
my paper, is generic prediction enough? © 1989 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00184815},
Key = {fds244704}
}
@article{fds244700,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Superseding Explanation vs. Understanding: The View from
Rorty},
Journal = {Social Research},
Volume = {56},
Pages = {479-510},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244700}
}
@article{fds244701,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is Lewis’s Genuine Modal Realism Magical
Too?},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {98},
Pages = {412-421},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244701}
}
@article{fds244702,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Perceptual Presentations and Biological Functions: A Comment
on Matthen},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {38-44},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244702}
}
@article{fds244703,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intensionality, intenSionality and Representation},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {137-140},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244703}
}
@article{fds244705,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Russell vs. Steiner on Physics and Causality},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {56},
Pages = {341-347},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244705}
}
@article{fds244563,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {From Reductionism to Instrumentalism},
Pages = {245-262},
Booktitle = {What Philosophy of Biology is},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244563}
}
@article{fds303574,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough (reprint)},
Pages = {43-68},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Economics II},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
Editor = {Hamminga, B},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds303574}
}
@article{fds244693,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Past Recaptured: Mongin on the Problem of Realism in
Economics},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {379-381},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318801800307},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318801800307},
Key = {fds244693}
}
@article{fds244697,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is the Theory of Natural Selection a Statistical
Theory?},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {sup1},
Pages = {187-207},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
Key = {fds244697}
}
@article{fds320330,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will the argument for abstracta please stand
up?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {526-527},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
Key = {fds320330}
}
@book{fds244743,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Oxford: Oxford University
Press},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244743}
}
@article{fds244694,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough?},
Journal = {Fundamenta Scientiae},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {329-352},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244694}
}
@article{fds244695,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will the Real Argument for "Abstracta" Please Stand
Up?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {526-527},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244695}
}
@article{fds244696,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Grievous Faults in "Vaulting Ambition"?},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {98},
Pages = {827-838},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244696}
}
@article{fds244698,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Rhetoric is Not Important Enough for Economists to Bother
About},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {173-175},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244698}
}
@article{fds244699,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economics Is Too Important to be Left to the
Rhetoricians},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {129-149},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244699}
}
@article{fds350323,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Structure of Biological Science.},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {84},
Number = {4},
Pages = {224-224},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2027161},
Doi = {10.2307/2027161},
Key = {fds350323}
}
@article{fds244689,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is there really “juggling,” “artifice,” and
“trickery” in Genes, Mind, and Culture?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {80-82},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
Key = {fds244689}
}
@article{fds244690,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The political philosophy of biological endowments: Some
considerations},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-31},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001229},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500001229},
Key = {fds244690}
}
@article{fds244691,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Weintraub’s aims: A Brief Rejoinder},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {143-144},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002807},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100002807},
Key = {fds244691}
}
@article{fds244692,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why Does the Nature of Species Matter},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {192-197},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds244692}
}
@article{fds244560,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Autonomy and Provincialism (Reprint)},
Pages = {10-21},
Booktitle = {Holisme en Reductionisme en de Empirishe
Wetenschappen},
Publisher = {Groningen, Studium Generale},
Editor = {Geinert, G},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds244560}
}
@article{fds303573,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some
Considerations (Reprint)},
Pages = {1-31},
Booktitle = {Equal Opportunity},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {Paul, M and Ahrens},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds303573}
}
@article{fds244681,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Ignorance and disinformation in the philosophy of biology: A
reply to Stent},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {4},
Pages = {461-471},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1986},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00140963},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00140963},
Key = {fds244681}
}
@article{fds244685,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lakatosian consolations for economics},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-139},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100000821},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100000821},
Key = {fds244685}
}
@article{fds244682,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology: Part II:
Crucial Disanalogy},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {125-138},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244682}
}
@article{fds244683,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology, Part I: The
Uneasy Analogy},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {15-28},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244683}
}
@article{fds244684,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Explanation in Evolutionary
Biology},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {77-88},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244684}
}
@article{fds244686,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Explanatory Role of Existence Proofs},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {177-186},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244686}
}
@article{fds244687,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {What Rosenberg’s Philosophy of Economics Is
Not},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {127-132},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244687}
}
@article{fds244688,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
Title = {Fitness as Primitive and Propensity},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {412-418},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244688}
}
@article{fds244678,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Prospects for the elimination of tastes from economics and
ethics},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {48-68},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003216},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500003216},
Key = {fds244678}
}
@book{fds244742,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Structure of Biological Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244742}
}
@article{fds244677,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Methodology, Theory and the Philosophy of
Science},
Journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {377-393},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244677}
}
@article{fds244679,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Place of Psychology in a Vacuum of Theories},
Journal = {Annals of Theoretical Psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {95-102},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244679}
}
@article{fds244680,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
Title = {Fitness in Fact and Fiction},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {82},
Pages = {738-749},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244680}
}
@article{fds244555,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes in Economics and
Ethics (Reprint)},
Pages = {48-69},
Booktitle = {Ethics and Economics},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {Paul, EF and Paul, J and Miller, FD},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244555}
}
@article{fds244556,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Davidson’s Unintended Attack on Psychology},
Pages = {399-407},
Booktitle = {Actions and Events},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {LePore, E},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244556}
}
@article{fds244557,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Adaptionalist Imperatives and Panglossian
Paradigms},
Pages = {161-179},
Booktitle = {Sociobiology and Epistemology},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Fetzer, JM},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244557}
}
@article{fds244558,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science and the Potential for Knowledge in
Social Sciences},
Pages = {339-346},
Booktitle = {Pluralisms and Subjectivities in Social Science},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Fiske, D and Schweder, R},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244558}
}
@article{fds244559,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism Today–Tomorrow, But Not Yesterday},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {157-173},
Booktitle = {PSA 1984},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Editor = {Kitcher, P and Asquith, P},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244559}
}
@article{fds244675,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, reinforcement, underlying mechanisms},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {495-496},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0002690X},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X0002690X},
Key = {fds244675}
}
@article{fds244676,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and
Properties},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-91},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
Abstract = {In “Dispositions and Powers,” J. L. Mackie identifies
three different “ontological views about dispositions”:
The first is the one Armstrong calls phenomenalist and
ascribes to Ryle: we attribute a minimal disposition, which
is in effect to assert a conditional or set of conditionals,
themselves to be interpreted as inference tickets; but this
does not mean anything is going on in the things to which we
attribute the disposition which is not going on in similar
things from which we withhold this description. The second
is the ‘realist’ view, that dispositions have occurrent
(and concurrent) categorical bases consisting of properties
which are not in themselves peculiarly dispositional, though
they may be introduced in the dispositional style and may be
known only as the bases of these dispositions; although the
dispositional descriptions are conditional‐entailing, the
properties to which they point are only contingently related
to the displays of the dispositions. The third is what we
may call the rationalist view; dispositions (while still
being intrinsically dispositional and conditional‐entailing)
are real occurrent states of the object, different from
anything a realist would call a categorical basis (which may
or may not be there as well), but actually present both when
the disposition is being manifested and when it is not.
Copyright © 1984, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
Key = {fds244676}
}
@article{fds244551,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Straussman, JD},
Title = {Maximization, Markets and the Measurement of Productivity in
the Public Sector},
Pages = {280-287},
Booktitle = {New Directions in Public Administration},
Publisher = {Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole},
Editor = {Bozeman, and Straussman},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244551}
}
@article{fds244552,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Public Sector Monopolies},
Pages = {219-233},
Booktitle = {Productivity and Public Policy},
Publisher = {Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications},
Editor = {Holzer, and Nagle},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244552}
}
@article{fds244553,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics
(Reprint)},
Series = {1st},
Pages = {324-343},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Economics},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Hausman, D},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244553}
}
@article{fds244554,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts
(Reprint)},
Pages = {99-116},
Booktitle = {Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press},
Editor = {Sober, E},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244554}
}
@article{fds244670,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Protagoras Among the Physicists},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {311-317},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300018011},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300018011},
Key = {fds244670}
}
@article{fds320331,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Content and consciousness versus the International
stance},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {375-376},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
Key = {fds320331}
}
@article{fds244668,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Consciousness and Content vs. the Intentional
Stance},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {375-376},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244668}
}
@article{fds244669,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Coefficients, Effects and Genic Selection},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {50},
Pages = {332-338},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244669}
}
@article{fds244671,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t Science, What Is It?},
Journal = {Philosophical Forum},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {296-314},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244671}
}
@article{fds244672,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Sciences: Obstacles and Opportunities},
Journal = {Syracuse Scholar},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {63-80},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244672}
}
@article{fds244673,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical Notice of Genes, Mind and Culture},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {80},
Pages = {304-311},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244673}
}
@article{fds244674,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {80},
Pages = {457-474},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244674}
}
@article{fds244550,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Human Science and Biological Science},
Pages = {37-52},
Booktitle = {Scientific Explanation and Understanding},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: University Presses of America},
Editor = {Rescher, N},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244550}
}
@article{fds244666,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are there culturgens?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-24},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1982},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
Key = {fds244666}
}
@article{fds244664,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
Title = {In Defense of Convergent Realism},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {604-615},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244664}
}
@article{fds244665,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
Title = {On the Propensity Definition of Fitness},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {605-615},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244665}
}
@article{fds244667,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {In Hume’s Cause: A Reply to Mackie and
Flew},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {23},
Pages = {140-146},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244667}
}
@article{fds244549,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Teleology in Contemporary Philosophy of
Science},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {51-86},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey},
Publisher = {The Hague: Nijhoff},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244549}
}
@article{fds244662,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Typologies: Obstacles and opportunities in scientific
change},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {298-299},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
Key = {fds244662}
}
@book{fds244741,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Hume and the Problem of Causation},
Publisher = {New York: Oxford University Press},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244741}
}
@article{fds244663,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical Notice of Method and Appraisal in
Economics},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {225-230},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244663}
}
@article{fds244547,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A Skeptical History of Microeconomic Theory
(Reprint)},
Pages = {47-62},
Booktitle = {Philosophy in Economics},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Pitt, J},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244547}
}
@article{fds244548,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Interaction of Evolutionary and Genetic
Theory},
Pages = {207-219},
Booktitle = {Pragmatism and Purpose},
Publisher = {Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press},
Editor = {Summer, S and Wilson},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244548}
}
@article{fds244660,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A skeptical history of microeconomic theory},
Journal = {Theory and Decision},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-93},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1980},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00154660},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00154660},
Key = {fds244660}
}
@article{fds244661,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Obstacles to the Nomological Connection of Reasons and
Actions},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-91},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1980},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318001000106},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318001000106},
Key = {fds244661}
}
@book{fds244740,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social
Science},
Publisher = {Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244740}
}
@article{fds244659,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Species Notions and the Theoretical Hierarchy of
Biology},
Journal = {Nature and System},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {163-172},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244659}
}
@article{fds244546,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Ruse’s Treatment of the Evidence for Evolution: A
Reconsideration},
Pages = {83-93},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Editor = {Giere, and Asquith},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244546}
}
@article{fds244657,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {509-529},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317900900409},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317900900409},
Key = {fds244657}
}
@article{fds244658,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A and MARTIN, RM},
Title = {The Extensionality of Causal Contexts},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {401-408},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
Key = {fds244658}
}
@article{fds343294,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and counteifactuals: Lewis’ treatment
reconsidered},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-219},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300048071},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300048071},
Key = {fds343294}
}
@article{fds244656,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Counterfactuals: Lewis’ Treatment
Reconsidered},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {18},
Number = {02},
Pages = {210-219},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1979},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300048071},
Doi = {10.1017/s0012217300048071},
Key = {fds244656}
}
@article{fds244655,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Hollis and Nell: Rationalist Economic Men},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {87-98},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1978},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317800800109},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317800800109},
Key = {fds244655}
}
@article{fds244652,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genetics and the Theory of Natural Selection: Synthesis or
Sustenance?},
Journal = {Nature and System, 1, 1978: 3-15.},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {3-15},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244652}
}
@article{fds244653,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Puzzle of Economic Modeling},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {679-683},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244653}
}
@article{fds244654,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {368-386},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244654}
}
@article{fds244651,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Concrete occurrences vs. explanatory facts: Mackie on the
extensionality of causal statements},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {133-140},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1977},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01857183},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01857183},
Key = {fds244651}
}
@article{fds244650,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Critical Notice of The Cement of the Universe},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {371-404},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1977},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
Key = {fds244650}
}
@article{fds244647,
Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Rejoinder to Puccetti},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {143-144},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
Key = {fds244647}
}
@article{fds244648,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-53},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317600600103},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317600600103},
Key = {fds244648}
}
@article{fds244649,
Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Materialism and Evolution: A Reconsideration},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-138},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
Key = {fds244649}
}
@book{fds244739,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis},
Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press},
Year = {1976},
Key = {fds244739}
}
@article{fds244545,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Towards the Assimilation of Rules to Generalizations},
Pages = {156-172},
Booktitle = {Basic Issues in Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {New York: Science History Publications},
Editor = {Shea, W},
Year = {1976},
Key = {fds244545}
}
@article{fds244643,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Terms of experience and theory: A rejoinder to
Körner},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {309-311},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043420},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043420},
Key = {fds244643}
}
@article{fds244644,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The virtues of vagueness in the languages of
science},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-305},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043407},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043407},
Key = {fds244644}
}
@article{fds244646,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The nomological character of microeconomics},
Journal = {Theory and Decision},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139817},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00139817},
Key = {fds244646}
}
@article{fds244645,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Proper Hoc, Ergo Post Hoc},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {245-254},
Year = {1975},
Key = {fds244645}
}
@article{fds244640,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and MacIntosh, NJ},
Title = {Strong, Weak, and Functional Equivalence in Machine
Simulation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {412-414},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244640}
}
@article{fds244641,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On Kim’s Account of Events and Event Identity},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {71},
Pages = {327-336},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244641}
}
@article{fds244642,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Singular Causal Statements: a Reconsideration},
Journal = {Philosophical Forum, 5, 1974: 611-618},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {611-618},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244642}
}
@article{fds244543,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Partial Interpretation and Microeconomics},
Pages = {93-109},
Booktitle = {Developments in the Methodology of Social Science: Theory
and Decision Library},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Leinfellner, W and Kohler, W},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244543}
}
@article{fds244544,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
Title = {Vincula Revindicata},
Pages = {217-222},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Problems of Causation},
Publisher = {Encino, CA: Dickenson},
Editor = {Beauchamp, TL},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244544}
}
@article{fds244639,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and recipes: The mixture as before?},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {24},
Number = {6},
Pages = {378-385},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1973},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00376106},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00376106},
Key = {fds244639}
}
@article{fds244636,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Campbell, R},
Title = {Action, Purpose and Consciousness Among the
Computers},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {547-557},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244636}
}
@article{fds244637,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Mill and Some Contemporary Critics on ‘Cause’},
Journal = {Personalist},
Volume = {54},
Pages = {123-129},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244637}
}
@article{fds244638,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On Fodor’s Distinction Between Strong and Weak Equivalence
in Machine Simulation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {118-120},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244638}
}
@article{fds244635,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Friedman's ‘Methodology’ for Economics: A Critical
Examination},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {15-29},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1972},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200102},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200102},
Key = {fds244635}
}
@article{fds331104,
Author = {Braybrooke, D and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Comment: Getting the war news straight: The actual situation
in the philosophy of science},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {66},
Number = {3},
Pages = {818-826},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1972},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1957480},
Doi = {10.2307/1957480},
Key = {fds331104}
}
@article{fds244633,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
Title = {Anti-behaviourism in the Hour of its Disintegration},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {355-363},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1972},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200127},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200127},
Key = {fds244633}
}
@article{fds244634,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
Title = {Getting the War News Straight: The Actual Situation in the
Philosophy of Science},
Journal = {American Political Science Review, 66, 1972:
818-826},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {818-826},
Year = {1972},
Key = {fds244634}
}
%% Sanford, David H.
@article{fds203155,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Determinates vs. Determinables},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds203155}
}
@article{fds287555,
Author = {Sanford, DH},
Title = {Can a sum change its parts?},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {71},
Number = {2},
Pages = {235-239},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr018},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anr018},
Key = {fds287555}
}
@book{fds287554,
Author = {Sanford, D},
Title = {If P, Then Q},
Pages = {304 pages},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {1135199310},
Abstract = {This new edition includes three new chapters, thus updating
the book to take into account developments in
the},
Key = {fds287554}
}
@article{fds203154,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Causation},
Series = {2nd},
Pages = {1-10},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Metaphysics},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa and Gary S. Rosenkrantz},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {978-1-4051-5298-3},
Key = {fds203154}
}
@article{fds52335,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {"Determinates vs. Determinables" (over 10,000
words),},
Booktitle = {in online encyclopedia. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy,},
Editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Summer},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu.},
Key = {fds52335}
}
@article{fds287557,
Author = {Sanford, DH},
Title = {Distinctness and non-identity},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {65},
Number = {4},
Pages = {269-274},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000232227000001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/65.4.269},
Key = {fds287557}
}
@article{fds287556,
Author = {SANFORD, DH},
Title = {Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects:
Some Symmetries},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {70},
Number = {1},
Pages = {240-244},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000227788000011&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling
project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not
imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The
estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter-
entailment argument if of the form A is consistent with C,
and C entails not-B. Therefore A does not entail B. An
instance of the counter-entailment arguments undermines a
central argument for the reconciling project. Another
instance undermines a central argument for the estranging
project. This is one symmetry. In each case, the natural
response to the counter-entailment argument begs the
question. This is another symmetry.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00514.x},
Key = {fds287556}
}
@article{fds29445,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Causation and Explanation by Stathis Psillos},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {94-96},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds29445}
}
@article{fds287560,
Author = {Sanford, DH},
Title = {“Vague Numbers”},
Journal = {Acta Analytica},
Number = {29},
Pages = {45-59},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds287560}
}
@article{fds287558,
Author = {Sanford, DH},
Title = {“Reply to Mr. Aranyosi”},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {63.4},
Number = {280},
Pages = {305-309},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00443},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8284.00443},
Key = {fds287558}
}
@book{fds15305,
Author = {David H. Sanford},
Title = {If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of
Reasoning},
Series = {Second},
Pages = {xv, 275},
Publisher = {London and New York: Routledge},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds15305}
}
@article{fds287559,
Author = {Sanford, DH},
Title = {Fusion confusion},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {63},
Number = {277},
Pages = {1-4},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000180551800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.0003-2638.2003.00385.x},
Key = {fds287559}
}
@article{fds15311,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {"Determinates vs. Determinables"},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
Year = {2002},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu},
Key = {fds15311}
}
@article{fds15318,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Review of Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms by Josph E. Corbi
and Josph L. Prades},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {211-13},
Year = {2001},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds15318}
}
@article{fds15325,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Causal Asymmetries by Daniel M. Hausman},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {62},
Pages = {243-6},
Year = {2001},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds15325}
}
@article{fds15317,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {“The Thesis of Extensionality”},
Series = {The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences},
Pages = {305-306},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
Editor = {Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds15317}
}
@article{fds15316,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {“Demonstrative inference,” “Reasoning,” and "Vacuous
Truth"},
Series = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second
Edition},
Pages = {420, 427},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Robert Audi},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds15316}
}
@article{fds15326,
Author = {D.H. Sanford},
Title = {Conditionals by Michael Woods},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {40},
Number = {29},
Pages = {119-22},
Year = {1999},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds15326}
}
@article{fds140159,
Author = {Cynthia Macdonald},
Title = {Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary
Metaphysics},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {48},
Series = {Tony Ellis},
Number = {1 (January 2007)},
Pages = {81-2},
ISSN = {0031-8951},
Key = {fds140159}
}
%% Sarbey, Ben
@article{fds323480,
Author = {Sarbey, B},
Title = {Definitions of death: brain death and what matters in a
person},
Journal = {Journal of Law and the Biosciences},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {743-752},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsw054},
Doi = {10.1093/jlb/lsw054},
Key = {fds323480}
}
%% Sarkissian, Hagop S
@article{fds70994,
Author = {H.S. Sarkissian and M. Phelan},
Title = {Is The Trade-Off Hypothesis Worth Trading
For?},
Journal = {Mind & Language},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds70994}
}
@article{fds70995,
Author = {H.S. Sarkissian and O. Flanagan and D. Wong},
Title = {What is the nature of morality? A response to Casebeer,
Railton, and Ruse},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology Volume I, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {W.Sinnott-Armstrong},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds70995}
}
@article{fds70996,
Author = {H.S. Sarkissian and O. Flanagan and D. Wong},
Title = {Naturalizing ethics},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology Volume I, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {W.Sinnott-Armstrong},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds70996}
}
@article{fds49175,
Author = {H.S. Sarkissian and M. Phelan},
Title = {The folk strike back: Or, why you didn't do it
intentionally, though it was bad and you knew
it},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds49175}
}
%% Schmaltz, Tad M
@article{fds165989,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Descartes on the Extensions of Space and
Time},
Journal = {Revista Analytica},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds165989}
}
@article{fds165988,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranche and Leibniz on the Best of All Possible
Worlds},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {48},
Number = {1},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds165988}
}
@article{fds165994,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Entries on "Cause," "Containment, Eminent and Formal,"
"Concurrence/Conservation," and "Conservation of Motion,
Principle of"},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Descartes Dictionary},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Lawrence Nolan},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds165994}
}
@article{fds170517,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Primary and Secondary Causes in Descartes's
Physics},
Series = {Routledge Advances in the History of Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Causation and Modern Philosophy},
Editor = {K. Allen and T. Stoneham},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds170517}
}
@book{fds152389,
Title = {Descartes on Causation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152389}
}
@article{fds152388,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Occasionalism and Mechanism: Fontenelle's Objections to
Malebranche"},
Journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {293-313},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152388}
}
@article{fds152409,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Cartesian Mind:
Interaction, Happiness, Freedom},
Booktitle = {Feminist History of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {M. Lascano and E. O'Neill},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152409}
}
@article{fds152400,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Causa Sui and Created Truth in Descartes},
Booktitle = {volume on historical answers to the question, why there is
something rather than nothing?},
Editor = {J. Wippel},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152400}
}
@article{fds152401,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Theories of Substance},
Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy},
Editor = {D. Kaufman},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152401}
}
@article{fds152402,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Cartesianism in Crisis: The Case of the Eucharist},
Booktitle = {volume on theology and early modern philosophy, in series,
Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152402}
}
@article{fds152403,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Substantial Forms as Causes: From Suarez to
Descartes},
Booktitle = {volume on hylomorphism in early modern thought},
Editor = {J. Buchwald and M. Feingold and G. Manning},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152403}
}
@article{fds152404,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Primary and Secondary Causes in Descartes's
Physics},
Booktitle = {volume on causation 1500-1800, for the British Society for
the History of Philosophy},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152404}
}
@article{fds152405,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {From Causes to Laws: Descartes, Malebranche,
Berkeley},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern
Europe},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {D. Clarke and C. Wilson},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152405}
}
@article{fds152406,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Theories of Substance},
Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {D. Kaufman},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152406}
}
@article{fds152407,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Spinoza and Descartes},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook to Spinoza},
Editor = {M. Della Rocca},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152407}
}
@article{fds152408,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Causation and Causal Axioms},
Booktitle = {Descartes' :Meditations': A Critical Guide},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {K. Detlefsen},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152408}
}
@article{fds152392,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranche: Neigungen und Leidenschaften},
Pages = {331-349},
Booktitle = {Klassische Emotionstheorien},
Publisher = {Walter de Gruyter},
Editor = {U. Renz and H. Landweer},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152392}
}
@article{fds152393,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Cartesian Freedom in Historical Perspective},
Pages = {127-150},
Booktitle = {Descartes and the Modern},
Publisher = {Cambridge Scholars Press},
Editor = {G. McOuat and N. Robertson and T. Vinci},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds152393}
}
@article{fds47990,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Deflating Descartes's Causal Axiom},
Journal = {Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {1-31},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds47990}
}
@article{fds47995,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranch on Natural and Free Loves},
Pages = {41-52},
Booktitle = {The Concept of Love in Modern Philosophy},
Publisher = {KVAB},
Editor = {G. Boros and M. Moors and H. De Dijn},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds47995}
}
@article{fds47994,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Seventeenth-century responses to the Meditations},
Pages = {193-203},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {S. Gaukroger},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds47994}
}
@article{fds14290,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {The Science of Mind},
Pages = {136-69},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {D. Rutherford},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds14290}
}
@article{fds71680,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {"Arnauld, Antoine," "Cartesianism [addendum]," "Condillac,
Etienne Bonnet de," "Desgabets, Roberts," "Jansensim,"
"Malebranche, Nicolas," "Nicole, Pierre," "Regius (Henry de
Roy)"},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edn.},
Publisher = {Macmillan Reference USA},
Editor = {D. Borchert},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds71680}
}
@misc{fds38090,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranche},
Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {E. N. Zalta},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds38090}
}
@article{fds29403,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {French Cartesianism in Context: The Paris Formulary and
Regis's Usage},
Pages = {80-95},
Booktitle = {Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism
in Early Modern Europe},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {T. Schmaltz},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds29403}
}
@book{fds24794,
Title = {Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism
in Early Modern Europe},
Series = {Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {T. Schmaltz},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds24794}
}
@article{fds24796,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {A Tale of Two Condemnations: Two Cartesian Condemnations in
17th-Century France},
Pages = {203-21},
Booktitle = {Descartes ei suoi Avversari: Incontri cartesiani
II},
Publisher = {Florence, IT: Le Monnier Università},
Editor = {A. Del Prete},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds24796}
}
@book{fds14285,
Title = {The Historical Dictionary of Descartes and
Cartesianism},
Series = {Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and
Movements},
Publisher = {Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press},
Editor = {R. Ariew and D. Des Chene and D. Jesseph and T. Schmaltz and T.
Verbeek},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds14285}
}
@article{fds24789,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Cartesian causation: body-body interaction, motion, and
eternal truths},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {737-62},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds24789}
}
@book{fds14283,
Title = {Radical Cartesianism: The French Reception of
Descartes},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds14283}
}
@article{fds17579,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {The Cartesian Refutation of Idealism},
Journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
Volume = {10},
Number = {4},
Pages = {513-40},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds17579}
}
@article{fds14287,
Author = {Tad M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Review of Jonathan Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers ,
Vol. 1: Descartes,Spinoza, Leibniz; Vol. 2: Locke, Berkeley,
Hume (Oxford, 2001)},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {111},
Number = {442},
Pages = {367-73},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds14287}
}
@article{fds14286,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranche},
Series = {Blackwell Companions to Philosophy},
Pages = {152-66},
Booktitle = {Companion to Early Modern Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {S. Nadler},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds14286}
}
@article{fds24790,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {The Disappearance of Analogy in Descartes, Spinoza, and
Regis},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {85-114},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds24790}
}
@article{fds24795,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God},
Pages = {59-86},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {S. Nadler},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds24795}
}
@article{fds24791,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {Spinoza on the Vacuum},
Journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
Volume = {81},
Number = {2},
Pages = {174-205},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds24791}
}
@article{fds24792,
Author = {T.M. Schmaltz},
Title = {What Has Cartesianism to Do with Jansenism?},
Journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas},
Volume = {60},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-56},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds24792}
}
@book{fds24793,
Title = {Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A Cartesian
Interpretation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds24793}
}
%% Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter
@article{fds372262,
Author = {McKee, P and Kim, H-E and Tang, H and Everett, JAC and Chituc, V and Gibea,
T and Marques, LM and Boggio, P and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Does it matter who harmed whom? A cross-cultural study of
moral judgments about harm by and to insiders and
outsiders.},
Journal = {Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)},
Volume = {43},
Number = {9},
Pages = {7997-8007},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Abstract = {This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral
wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying
combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims
across six countries: the United States of America
(N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania
(N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea
(N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with
our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect,
where moral violations committed by outsider agents are
generally considered more morally wrong than the same
violations done by insider agents. We also found support for
an insider victim effect where moral violations that were
committed against an insider victim generally were seen as
more morally wrong than when the same violations were
committed against an outsider, and this effect held across
all countries. These findings provide evidence that the
insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does
affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these
identities with collectivism, psychological closeness, and
type of harm (emotional or physical) are more complex than
what is suggested by previous literature.<h4>Supplementary
information</h4>The online version contains supplementary
material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Key = {fds372262}
}
@article{fds375504,
Author = {Earp, BD and Porsdam Mann and S and Allen, J and Salloch, S and Suren, V and Jongsma, K and Braun, M and Wilkinson, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Rid, A and Wendler, D and Savulescu, J},
Title = {A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted
Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically
Desirable.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Abstract = {When making substituted judgments for incapacitated
patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the
patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also
agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such
a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient
Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use
an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of
individual patients from population-level data about the
known preferences of people with similar demographic
characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even
if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human
surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed
algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's
(former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of
data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual
patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual
values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do.
Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new
approach: the <i>Personalized</i> Patient Preference
Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in
machine learning, which allow technologies including large
language models to be more cheaply and efficiently
'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the
PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's
preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions)
that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in
addition to being potentially more accurate at the
individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the
predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each
patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review
recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that
suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it
is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage
some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the
original PPP. We then consider various objections to our
proposal and offer some tentative replies.},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Key = {fds375504}
}
@article{fds372776,
Author = {Hopp, FR and Amir, O and Fisher, JT and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Weber, R},
Title = {Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical
activation modulated by political ideology.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {7},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2182-2198},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Abstract = {Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements
are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral
foundations but where and how these foundations are
represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs
remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement
task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral
foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral
judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms,
reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind.
Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each
moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations
distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT,
individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated
neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm
that each moral foundation recruits domain-general
mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable
neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We
discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable
accounts of morality and their neurological support for
MFT.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Key = {fds372776}
}
@article{fds370405,
Author = {Simmons, C and Helming, K and Musholt, K and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Where is the golden mean of intellectual humility? Comments
on Ballantyne},
Journal = {Journal of Positive Psychology},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {240-243},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Abstract = {In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes
intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way ‘to manage
evidence … in seeking truth.’ However, not every way of
managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an
intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood
as a ‘golden mean’ or ‘middle path’ between extremes
of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or
between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should
not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean
of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy
in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or
pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable
or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and
considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of
locating the golden mean.},
Doi = {10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Key = {fds370405}
}
@article{fds372817,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Dahl’s Definition of Morality},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {106-109},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Key = {fds372817}
}
@article{fds374251,
Author = {Boggio, PS and Rêgo, GG and Everett, JAC and Vieira, GB and Graves, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US,
and Brazil},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Abstract = {Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an
impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral
psychological research has largely followed in this vein,
focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral
judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who
is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness,
manipulating whether the person doing the action was a
friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings
across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in
Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent
findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly
when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when
committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified
agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified
agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e.,
conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and
Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK
participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are
judged differently according to who committed them and
according to the political ideology of the judges. We
discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups
dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and
the black sheep effect.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Key = {fds374251}
}
@article{fds376731,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {206-221},
Booktitle = {The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics: 2Nd Edition},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350217881},
Key = {fds376731}
}
@article{fds368516,
Author = {Krasich, K and Simmons, C and O'Neill, K and Giattino, CM and De
Brigard, F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mudrik, L and Woldorff,
MG},
Title = {Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked
recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual
perception.},
Journal = {Sci Rep},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22126},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Abstract = {We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory
activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact
to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants
tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually
masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed
that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with
greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that
resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously
argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious
perception. This effect, however, was not associated with
better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was
elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated
with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then
associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was
worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the
stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase
and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest
that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables
temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates
conscious perception in OSM.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Key = {fds368516}
}
@article{fds368007,
Author = {Khoudary, A and Hanna, E and O'Neill, K and Iyengar, V and Clifford, S and Cabeza, R and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations
Theory.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {491-507},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Abstract = {Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind
contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally
specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social
world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and
Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive
architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during
moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we
use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC)
analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of
foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's
cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A
mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables
that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation
violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty,
Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and
suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than
other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses
confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm
from moral foundation violations, and distinguished
individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority
is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations
were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas
moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage
the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence
for neural modularity and motivate further research on the
novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Key = {fds368007}
}
@article{fds368006,
Author = {Simmons, C and McKee, P and Antonios, I and Smith, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Bad dream frequency predicts mental health needs during the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.},
Journal = {Journal of affective disorders reports},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {100448},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jadr.2022.100448},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jadr.2022.100448},
Key = {fds368006}
}
@article{fds368308,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and McKee, P},
Title = {Certain prosocial motives limit redistribution aimed at
equality.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {119},
Number = {51},
Pages = {e2219059119},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2219059119},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2219059119},
Key = {fds368308}
}
@article{fds367258,
Author = {Yu, H and Contreras-Huerta, LS and Prosser, AMB and Apps, MAJ and Hofmann, W and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Crockett,
MJ},
Title = {Neural and Cognitive Signatures of Guilt Predict
Hypocritical Blame.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {33},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1909-1927},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09567976221122765},
Abstract = {A common form of moral hypocrisy occurs when people blame
others for moral violations that they themselves commit. It
is assumed that hypocritical blamers act in this manner to
falsely signal that they hold moral standards that they do
not really accept. We tested this assumption by
investigating the neurocognitive processes of hypocritical
blamers during moral decision-making. Participants (62 adult
UK residents; 27 males) underwent functional MRI scanning
while deciding whether to profit by inflicting pain on
others and then judged the blameworthiness of others'
identical decisions. Observers (188 adult U.S. residents;
125 males) judged participants who blamed others for making
the same harmful choice to be hypocritical, immoral, and
untrustworthy. However, analyzing hypocritical blamers'
behaviors and neural responses shows that hypocritical blame
was positively correlated with conflicted feelings, neural
responses to moral standards, and guilt-related neural
responses. These findings demonstrate that hypocritical
blamers may hold the moral standards that they apply to
others.},
Doi = {10.1177/09567976221122765},
Key = {fds367258}
}
@article{fds367869,
Author = {Kappes, A and Zohny, H and Savulescu, J and Singh, I and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wilkinson, D},
Title = {Race and resource allocation: an online survey of US and UK
adults' attitudes toward COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine
distribution.},
Journal = {BMJ open},
Volume = {12},
Number = {11},
Pages = {e062561},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2022-062561},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>This study aimed to assess US/UK adults'
attitudes towards COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine
allocation.<h4>Design</h4>Online survey including US and UK
adults, sampled to be representative for sex, age, race,
household income and employment. A total of 2580
participated (women=1289, age range=18 to 85 years, Black
American=114, BAME=138).<h4>Interventions</h4>Participants
were asked to allocate ventilators or vaccines in scenarios
involving individuals or groups with different medical risk
and additional risk factors.<h4>Results</h4>Participant race
did not impact vaccine or ventilator allocation decisions in
the USA, but did impact ventilator allocation attitudes in
the UK (<i>F</i>(4,602)=6.95, p<0.001). When a racial
minority or white patient had identical chances of survival,
14.8% allocated a ventilator to the minority patient (UK
BAME participants: 24.4%) and 68.9% chose to toss a coin.
When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower chance of
survival, 12.4% participants allocated them the ventilator
(UK BAME participants: 22.1%). For patients with identical
risk of severe COVID-19, 43.6% allocated a vaccine to a
minority patient, 7.2% chose a white patient and 49.2% chose
a coin toss. When the racial minority patient had a 10%
lower risk of severe COVID-19, 23.7% participants allocated
the vaccine to the minority patient. Similar results were
seen for obesity or male sex as additional risk factors. In
both countries, responses on the Modern Racism Scale were
strongly associated with attitudes toward race-based
ventilator and vaccine allocations (p<0.0001).<h4>Conclusions</h4>Although
living in countries with high racial inequality during a
pandemic, most US and UK adults in our survey allocated
ventilators and vaccines preferentially to those with the
highest chance of survival or highest chance of severe
illness. Race of recipient led to vaccine prioritisation in
cases where risk of illness was similar.},
Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2022-062561},
Key = {fds367869}
}
@article{fds362667,
Author = {Niso, G and Krol, LR and Combrisson, E and Dubarry, AS and Elliott, MA and François, C and Héjja-Brichard, Y and Herbst, SK and Jerbi, K and Kovic, V and Lehongre, K and Luck, SJ and Mercier, M and Mosher, JC and Pavlov, YG and Puce, A and Schettino, A and Schön, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Somon, B and Šoškić, A and Styles, SJ and Tibon, R and Vilas, MG and van Vliet, M and Chaumon,
M},
Title = {Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress
and perspectives.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {257},
Pages = {119056},
Year = {2022},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119056},
Abstract = {Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and
implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help
scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at
any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the
community for further scrutiny or utilization. For
experimental research using magneto- and
electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific
standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are
periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However,
GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light.
At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was
fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and
technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a
general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal
realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This
article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG
contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to
synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers
GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies,
pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early
pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative
and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize
misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data
acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new
tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally,
GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG
research and the resulting responsibility that scientists
have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among
other things the benefits of peer review and open access at
all stages, the need to coordinate larger international
projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's
prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we
find that current GSP tends to favor collective and
cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal
reasons.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119056},
Key = {fds362667}
}
@article{fds362973,
Author = {Mudrik, L and Arie, IG and Amir, Y and Shir, Y and Hieronymi, P and Maoz,
U and O'Connor, T and Schurger, A and Vargas, M and Vierkant, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Free will without consciousness?},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {26},
Number = {7},
Pages = {555-566},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005},
Abstract = {Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity
preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion
about how science can inform the free will debate. These
discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that
decisions might be influenced or biased by various
unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do
they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree?
Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on
decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will
in general, they provide important information about
limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We
demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy
are empirically testable and provide insight into their
bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for
future scientific-philosophical approaches.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005},
Key = {fds362973}
}
@article{fds365176,
Author = {Rehren, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How Stable are Moral Judgments?},
Journal = {Review of philosophy and psychology},
Pages = {1-27},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7},
Abstract = {Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to
investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper,
we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been
relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over
time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists
should consider stability and then surveying previous
research, we will present the results of an original
three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make
judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial
dilemmas three times, 6-8 days apart. In addition to
investigating the stability of our participants' ratings
over time, we also explored some potential explanations for
instability. To end, we will discuss these and other
potential psychological sources of moral stability (or
instability) and highlight possible philosophical
implications of our findings.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7},
Key = {fds365176}
}
@article{fds362925,
Author = {Awad, E and Levine, S and Anderson, M and Anderson, SL and Conitzer, V and Crockett, MJ and Everett, JAC and Evgeniou, T and Gopnik, A and Jamison,
JC and Kim, TW and Liao, SM and Meyer, MN and Mikhail, J and Opoku-Agyemang, K and Borg, JS and Schroeder, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Slavkovik, M and Tenenbaum,
JB},
Title = {Computational ethics.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5},
Pages = {388-405},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Abstract = {Technological advances are enabling roles for machines that
present novel ethical challenges. The study of 'AI ethics'
has emerged to confront these challenges, and connects
perspectives from philosophy, computer science, law, and
economics. Less represented in these interdisciplinary
efforts is the perspective of cognitive science. We propose
a framework - computational ethics - that specifies how the
ethical challenges of AI can be partially addressed by
incorporating the study of human moral decision-making. The
driver of this framework is a computational version of
reflective equilibrium (RE), an approach that seeks
coherence between considered judgments and governing
principles. The framework has two goals: (i) to inform the
engineering of ethical AI systems, and (ii) to characterize
human moral judgment and decision-making in computational
terms. Working jointly towards these two goals will create
the opportunity to integrate diverse research questions,
bring together multiple academic communities, uncover new
interdisciplinary research topics, and shed light on
centuries-old philosophical questions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Key = {fds362925}
}
@article{fds362974,
Author = {Simmons, C and Rehren, P and Haynes, J-D and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of
freedom.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {101},
Pages = {103318},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2022.103318},
Abstract = {Debates about freedom of will and action and their
connections with moral responsibility have raged for
centuries, but the opposing sides might disagree because
they use different concepts of freedom. Based on previous
work, we hypothesized that people who assert freedom in a
determined (D) or counterfactual-intervener (CI) scenario
assert this because they are thinking about freedom from
constraint and not about freedom from determination (in D)
or from inevitability (in CI). We also hypothesized that
people who deny that freedom in D or in CI deny this because
they are thinking about freedom from determination or from
inevitability, respectively, and not about freedom from
constraint. To test our hypotheses, we conducted two main
online studies. Study I supported our hypotheses that people
who deny freedom in D and CI are thinking about freedom from
determinism and from inevitability, respectively, but these
participants seemed to think about freedom from constraint
when they were later considering modified scenarios where
acts were not determined or inevitable. Study II
investigated a contrary bypassing hypothesis that those who
deny freedom in D denied this because they took determinism
to exclude mental causation and hence to exclude freedom
from constraint. We found that participants who took
determinism to exclude freedom generally did not deny
causation by mental states, here represented by desires and
decisions. Their responses regarding causation by desires
and decisions at most weakly mediated the relation between
determinism and freedom or responsibility among this
subgroup of our participants. These results speak against
the bypassing hypothesis and in favor of our hypothesis that
these participants were not thinking about freedom from
constraint.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2022.103318},
Key = {fds362974}
}
@article{fds367687,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Cameron, CD},
Title = {Some potential philosophical lessons of implicit moral
attitudes},
Pages = {564-583},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780198871712},
Key = {fds367687}
}
@article{fds362975,
Author = {Chan, L and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Wilkinson, D and Savulescu, J and Zohny, H and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Which features of patients are morally relevant in
ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.},
Journal = {BMC medical ethics},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>In the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK,
developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of
ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient
understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and
little evidence on which features of a patient the public
believe should and should not be considered in ventilator
triage.<h4>Methods</h4>Two surveys were conducted with
representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525
participants were asked in an open-ended format to provide
features they thought should and should not be considered in
allocating ventilators for COVID-19 patients when not enough
ventilators are available. In the second survey, 505
participants were presented with 30 features identified from
the first study, and were asked if these features should
count in favour of a patient with the feature getting a
ventilator, count against the patient, or neither.
Statistical tests were conducted to determine if a feature
was generally considered by participants as morally relevant
and whether its mean was non-neutral.<h4>Results</h4>In
Survey 1, the features of a patient most frequently cited as
being morally relevant to determining who would receive
access to ventilators were age, general health, prospect of
recovery, having dependents, and the severity of COVID
symptoms. The features most frequently cited as being
morally irrelevant to determining who would receive access
to ventilators are race, gender, economic status, religion,
social status, age, sexual orientation, and career. In
Survey 2, the top three features that participants thought
should count in favour of receiving a ventilator were
pregnancy, having a chance of dying soon, and having waited
for a long time. The top three features that participants
thought should count against a patient receiving a
ventilator were having committed violent crimes in the past,
having unnecessarily engaged in activities with a high risk
of COVID-19 infection, and a low chance of
survival.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The public generally agreed
with existing UK guidelines that allocate ventilators
according to medical benefits and that aim to avoid
discrimination based on demographic features such as race
and gender. However, many participants expressed potentially
non-utilitarian concerns, such as inclining to deprioritise
ventilator allocation to those who had a criminal history or
who contracted the virus by needlessly engaging in high-risk
activities.},
Doi = {10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Key = {fds362975}
}
@article{fds362199,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Which Agent? Questions for Schechter},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {170-178},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.1.170},
Doi = {10.53765/20512201.29.1.170},
Key = {fds362199}
}
@article{fds376285,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Responsibility without (Some Kinds of)
Freedom},
Pages = {91-114},
Booktitle = {Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and
Responsibility},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350188082},
Key = {fds376285}
}
@article{fds366193,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Skorburg, JGA},
Title = {How AI Can Aid Bioethics},
Journal = {Journal of Practical Ethics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/jpe.1175},
Abstract = {<jats:p>This paper explores some ways in which artificial
intelligence (AI) could be used to improve human moral
judgments in bioethics by avoiding some of the most common
sources of error in moral judgment, including ignorance,
confusion, and bias. It surveys three existing proposals for
building human morality into AI: Top-down, bottom-up, and
hybrid approaches. Then it proposes a multi-step, hybrid
method, using the example of kidney allocations for
transplants as a test case. The paper concludes with brief
remarks about how to handle several complications, respond
to some objections, and extend this novel method to other
important moral issues in bioethics and beyond.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.3998/jpe.1175},
Key = {fds366193}
}
@article{fds360075,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Simmons, C},
Title = {Some common fallacies in arguments from M/EEG
data.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {245},
Pages = {118725},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118725},
Abstract = {Like all humans, M/EEG researchers commit certain fallacies
or mistakes in reasoning. This article surveys seven
well-known but still common fallacies, including reverse
inference, hasty generalization, hasty exclusion, inferring
from group to individual, inferring from correlation to
causation, affirming a disjunct, and false dichotomy. These
fallacies are illustrated with classic EEG research by Libet
and collaborators, but many researchers (not just Libet)
continue to commit them in all areas of research (not just
M/EEG). This article gives practical suggestions about how
to spot and avoid each fallacy.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118725},
Key = {fds360075}
}
@article{fds356450,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Niemi, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Making moral principles suit yourself.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1735-1741},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Abstract = {Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer
general moral principles for people to follow. These moral
principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid,
offering reliable guides for moral judgment and
decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found
consistent evidence that agreement with general moral
principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed
in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of
moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with
those very principles-relative to participants who recalled
events in which other people violated the principles. This
shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people's
willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but
not the transgressions of others. These results have
important implications for understanding the roles memory
and personal identity in moral judgment. People's commitment
to moral principles may be maintained when they recall
others' past violations, but their commitment may wane when
they recall their own violations.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Key = {fds356450}
}
@article{fds357499,
Author = {Everett, JAC and Colombatto, C and Awad, E and Boggio, P and Bos, B and Brady, WJ and Chawla, M and Chituc, V and Chung, D and Drupp, MA and Goel,
S and Grosskopf, B and Hjorth, F and Ji, A and Kealoha, C and Kim, JS and Lin,
Y and Ma, Y and Maréchal, MA and Mancinelli, F and Mathys, C and Olsen,
AL and Pearce, G and Prosser, AMB and Reggev, N and Sabin, N and Senn, J and Shin, YS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sjåstad, H and Strick, M and Sul,
S and Tummers, L and Turner, M and Yu, H and Zoh, Y and Crockett,
MJ},
Title = {Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health
crisis.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {5},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1074-1088},
Year = {2021},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01156-y},
Abstract = {Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with
public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how
leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and
non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past
research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can
both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some
people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces
trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equally
('impartial beneficence') may increase trust. In a
multi-site experiment spanning 22 countries on six
continents, participants (N = 23,929) completed
self-report (N = 17,591) and behavioural
(N = 12,638) measures of trust in leaders who endorsed
utilitarian or non-utilitarian principles in dilemmas
concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the
self-report and behavioural measures, endorsement of
instrumental harm decreased trust, while endorsement of
impartial beneficence increased trust. These results show
how support for different ethical principles can impact
trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication
during times of global crisis. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION
STATEMENT: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report
was accepted in principle on 13 November 2020. The protocol,
as accepted by the journal, can be found at
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.13247315.v1
.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-021-01156-y},
Key = {fds357499}
}
@article{fds356128,
Author = {McDonald, K and Graves, R and Yin, S and Weese, T and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Valence framing effects on moral judgments: A
meta-analysis.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {212},
Pages = {104703},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104703},
Abstract = {Valence framing effects occur when participants make
different choices or judgments depending on whether the
options are described in terms of their positive outcomes
(e.g. lives saved) or their negative outcomes (e.g. lives
lost). When such framing effects occur in the domain of
moral judgments, they have been taken to cast doubt on the
reliability of moral judgments and raise questions about the
extent to which these moral judgments are self-evident or
justified in themselves. One important factor in this debate
is the magnitude and variability of the extent to which
differences in framing presentation impact moral judgments.
Although moral framing effects have been studied by
psychologists, the overall strength of these effects pooled
across published studies is not yet known. Here we conducted
a meta-analysis of 109 published articles (contributing a
total of 146 unique experiments with 49,564 participants)
involving valence framing effects on moral judgments and
found a moderate effect (d = 0.50) among between-subjects
designs as well as several moderator variables. While we
find evidence for publication bias, statistically accounting
for publication bias attenuates, but does not eliminate,
this effect (d = 0.22). This suggests that the magnitude
of valence framing effects on moral decisions is small, yet
significant when accounting for publication
bias.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104703},
Key = {fds356128}
}
@article{fds354215,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Contrastive mental causation},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {198},
Pages = {861-883},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02506-0},
Abstract = {Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation.
Kim’s (upward) exclusion argument concludes that
non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One
classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally
relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive
to physical realization. However, this reply suggests
downward exclusion (if mental properties are causally
efficacious, their physical realizers are causally
impotent), contrary to physicalism’s assumption of
closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can
solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of
causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has
independent justification, because it is also needed to
solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property
and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect
without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when
they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This
contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts
of mental causation and is defended against
objections.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02506-0},
Key = {fds354215}
}
@article{fds355512,
Author = {McElfresh, DC and Chan, L and Doyle, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V and Borg, JS and Dickerson, JP},
Title = {Indecision Modeling},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {5975-5983},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-866-4},
Abstract = {AI systems are often used to make or contribute to important
decisions in a growing range of applications, including
criminal justice, hiring, and medicine. Since these
decisions impact human lives, it is important that the AI
systems act in ways which align with human values.
Techniques for preference modeling and social choice help
researchers learn and aggregate peoples’ preferences,
which are used to guide AI behavior; thus, it is imperative
that these learned preferences are accurate. These
techniques often assume that people are willing to express
strict preferences over alternatives; which is not true in
practice. People are often indecisive, and especially so
when their decision has moral implications. The philosophy
and psychology literature shows that indecision is a
measurable and nuanced behavior—and that there are several
different reasons people are indecisive. This complicates
the task of both learning and aggregating preferences, since
most of the relevant literature makes restrictive
assumptions on the meaning of indecision. We begin to close
this gap by formalizing several mathematical indecision
models based on theories from philosophy, psychology, and
economics; these models can be used to describe (indecisive)
agent decisions, both when they are allowed to express
indecision and when they are not. We test these models using
data collected from an online survey where participants
choose how to (hypothetically) allocate organs to patients
waiting for a transplant.},
Key = {fds355512}
}
@article{fds356129,
Author = {Rehren, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral framing effects within subjects},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {34},
Number = {5},
Pages = {611-636},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328},
Abstract = {Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that
evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our
moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous
empirical work on moral framing effects has used
between-subject experimental designs. We argue that
between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately
estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly
evaluate the case from framing effects against the
reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report
results of our new within-subject study on four types of
moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of
our findings for the reliability of moral judgments.
Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral
framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328},
Key = {fds356129}
}
@article{fds365846,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
Title = {How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever
Achieve?},
Pages = {269-289},
Booktitle = {Rethinking Moral Status},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780192894076},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0016},
Abstract = {Philosophers often argue about whether fetuses, animals, or
AI systems do or do not have moral status. We will suggest
instead that different entities have different degrees of
moral status with respect to different moral reasons in
different circumstances for different purposes. Recognizing
this variability of moral status will help to resolve some
but not all debates about the potential moral status of AI
systems in particular.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0016},
Key = {fds365846}
}
@article{fds362231,
Author = {McElfresh, DC and Chan, L and Doyle, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V and Borg, JS and Dickerson, JP},
Title = {Indecision Modeling.},
Journal = {AAAI},
Pages = {5975-5983},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-866-4},
Key = {fds362231}
}
@article{fds354336,
Author = {Wilkinson, D and Zohny, H and Kappes, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu, J},
Title = {Which factors should be included in triage? An online survey
of the attitudes of the UK general public to pandemic triage
dilemmas.},
Journal = {BMJ open},
Volume = {10},
Number = {12},
Pages = {e045593},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045593},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>As cases of COVID-19 infections surge,
concerns have renewed about intensive care units (ICUs)
being overwhelmed and the need for specific triage protocols
over winter. This study aimed to help inform triage guidance
by exploring the views of lay people about factors to
include in triage decisions.<h4>Design, setting and
participants</h4>Online survey between 29th of May and 22nd
of June 2020 based on hypothetical triage dilemmas.
Participants recruited from existing market research panels,
representative of the UK general population. Scenarios were
presented in which a single ventilator is available, and two
patients require ICU admission and ventilation. Patients
differed in one of: chance of survival, life expectancy,
age, expected length of treatment, disability and degree of
frailty. Respondents were given the option of choosing one
patient to treat or tossing a coin to decide.<h4>Results</h4>Seven
hundred and sixty-three participated. A majority of
respondents prioritised patients who would have a higher
chance of survival (72%-93%), longer life expectancy
(78%-83%), required shorter duration of treatment (88%-94%),
were younger (71%-79%) or had a lesser degree of frailty
(60%-69%, all p<0.001). Where there was a small difference
between two patients, a larger proportion elected to toss a
coin to decide which patient to treat. A majority (58%-86%)
were prepared to withdraw treatment from a patient in
intensive care who had a lower chance of survival than
another patient currently presenting with COVID-19.
Respondents also indicated a willingness to give higher
priority to healthcare workers and to patients with young
children.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Members of the UK general public
potentially support a broadly utilitarian approach to ICU
triage in the face of overwhelming need. Survey respondents
endorsed the relevance of patient factors currently included
in triage guidance, but also factors not currently included.
They supported the permissibility of reallocating treatment
in a pandemic.},
Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045593},
Key = {fds354336}
}
@article{fds351434,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Whitehead, PS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Seli,
P},
Title = {Exposure to opposing reasons reduces negative impressions of
ideological opponents},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
Volume = {91},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Abstract = {Americans have become increasingly likely to dislike,
distrust, and derogate their ideological opponents on
contemporary social and political issues. We hypothesized
that a lack of exposure to compelling reasons, arguments,
and evidence from ideological opponents might at least
partly explain negative views of those opponents. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we found that participants assume
their ideological opponents, in comparison to their
ideological allies, are less likely to have good reasons for
their positions. Moreover, we found that the more strongly
participants believe their opponents lack good reasons for
their positions, the more likely they are to report that
those opponents lack both intellectual capabilities and
moral character. Critically, exposure to arguments favoring
their opponents' position produced more favorable
impressions of those opponents. We discuss possible
implications of these results for the role of reasons and
reasoning in political discourse, and for productive
disagreement in a functioning democracy.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Key = {fds351434}
}
@article{fds348864,
Author = {Brenner, RG and Oliveri, AN and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Levin,
ED},
Title = {Effects of sub-chronic methylphenidate on risk-taking and
sociability in zebrafish (Danio rerio).},
Journal = {Naunyn Schmiedebergs Arch Pharmacol},
Volume = {393},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1373-1381},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00210-020-01835-z},
Abstract = {Attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) is the most
common psychiatric disorder in children affecting around 11%
of children 4-17 years of age (CDC 2019). Children with
ADHD are widely treated with stimulant medications such as
methylphenidate (Ritalin®). However, there has been little
research on the developmental effects of methylphenidate on
risk-taking and sociability. We investigated in zebrafish
the potential developmental neurobehavioral toxicity of
methylphenidate on these behavioral functions. We chose
zebrafish because they provide a model with extensive
genetic tools for future mechanistic studies. We studied
whether sub-chronic methylphenidate exposure during juvenile
development causes neurobehavioral impairments in zebrafish.
Methylphenidate diminished responses to environmental
stimuli after both acute and sub-chronic dosing. In adult
zebrafish, acute methylphenidate impaired avoidance of an
approaching visual stimulus modeling a predator and
decreased locomotor response to the social visual stimulus
of conspecifics. Adult zebrafish dosed acutely with
methylphenidate demonstrated behaviors of less retreat from
threatening visual stimuli and less approach to conspecifics
compared with controls. In a sub-chronic dosing paradigm
during development, methylphenidate caused less robust
exploration of a novel tank. In the predator avoidance
paradigm, sub-chronic dosing that began at an older
age (28 dpf) decreased activity levels more than
sub-chronic dosing that began at earlier ages (14 dpf and
21 dpf). In the social shoaling task, sub-chronic
methylphenidate attenuated reaction to the social stimulus.
Acute and developmental methylphenidate exposure decreased
response to environmental cues. Additional research is
needed to determine critical mechanisms for these effects
and to see how these results may be translatable to
neurobehavioral toxicity of prescribing Ritalin® to
children and adolescents.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00210-020-01835-z},
Key = {fds348864}
}
@article{fds349181,
Author = {Freedman, R and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {283},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Abstract = {The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a
classical problem in economics and computer science. In
kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living
kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and
donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc
weights decided on by committee and then fed into an
allocation algorithm that determines who gets what—and who
does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end
methodology for estimating weights of individual participant
profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human
subjects a list of patient attributes they consider
acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g.,
medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on).
Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient
profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their
responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney
exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the
impact of the weights in simulations and find that the
precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter
little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply.
However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there
is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients
being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Key = {fds349181}
}
@article{fds349538,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How does inequality affect our sense of moral
obligation?},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {e87},
Year = {2020},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19002310},
Abstract = {Tomasello's novel and insightful theory of obligation
explains why we sometimes sense an obligation to treat each
other equally, but he has not yet explained why human
morality also allows and enables much inequality in wealth
and power. Ullman-Margalit's (1977) account of norms of
partiality suggested a different source and kind of norms
that might help to fill out Tomasello's picture.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19002310},
Key = {fds349538}
}
@article{fds373379,
Author = {Chituc, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {262-282},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2020.1719395},
Abstract = {The psychological and philosophical literature exploring the
role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that
conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases,
seems to be motivated by epistemic rather than purely social
concerns. We argue that there is strong reason to suppose
that moral conformity leads to unreliable moral judgments,
and, insofar as this is true, the prevalence of conformity
proves a problem for both humility as a moral virtue and for
some views in moral epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2020.1719395},
Key = {fds373379}
}
@article{fds348902,
Author = {Chan, L and Doyle, K and McElfresh, DC and Conitzer, V and Dickerson,
JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Artificial artificial intelligence: Measuring influence of
AI 'Assessments' on moral decision-making},
Journal = {AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI,
Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {214-220},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Abstract = {Given AI's growing role in modeling and improving
decision-making, how and when to present users with feedback
is an urgent topic to address. We empirically examined the
effect of feedback from false AI on moral decision-making
about donor kidney allocation. We found some evidence that
judgments about whether a patient should receive a kidney
can be influenced by feedback about participants' own
decision-making perceived to be given by AI, even if the
feedback is entirely random.We also discovered different
effects between assessments presented as being from human
experts and assessments presented as being from
AI.},
Doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Key = {fds348902}
}
@article{fds352991,
Author = {Skorburg, JA and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some ethics of deep brain stimulation},
Pages = {117-132},
Booktitle = {Global Mental Health and Neuroethics},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128150641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-815063-4.00008-3},
Abstract = {Case reports about patients undergoing deep brain
stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric
disorders-including Parkinson's disease,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and treatment resistant
depression-have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics.
Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have
been at the fore. The present chapter brings these
neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research
in moral psychology. We begin in section "Clinical uses of
DBS" by reviewing the recent clinical literature on DBS. In
section "DBS and threats to identity," we consider whether
DBS poses a threat to personal identity. In section "Surveys
of judgments of identity change" we argue for engagement
with recent empirical work examining judgments of when
identity changes. We conclude in section "Some ethics of
DBS" by highlighting a range of ethical issues raised by
DBS, including various cross-cultural considerations.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-815063-4.00008-3},
Key = {fds352991}
}
@article{fds347180,
Author = {Amoroso, CR and Hanna, EK and LaBar, KS and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Zucker, NL},
Title = {Disgust Theory Through the Lens of Psychiatric
Medicine},
Journal = {Clinical Psychological Science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-24},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2167702619863769},
Abstract = {The elicitors of disgust are heterogeneous, which makes
attributing one function to disgust challenging. Theorists
have proposed that disgust solves multiple adaptive problems
and comprises multiple functional domains. However, theories
conflict with regard to what the domains are and how they
should be delineated. In this article, we examine clinical
evidence of aberrant disgust symptoms in the contamination
subtype of obsessive-compulsive disorder,
blood-injury-injection phobia, and posttraumatic stress
disorder to adjudicate between two prevailing theories of
disgust. We argue that the pattern of disgust sensitivities
in these psychiatric disorders sheds new light on the domain
structure of disgust. Specifically, the supported domain
structure of disgust is likely similar to an adaptationist
model of disgust, with more subdivisions of the domain of
pathogen disgust. We discuss the implications of this
approach for the prevention and treatment of psychiatric
disorders relevant to disgust.},
Doi = {10.1177/2167702619863769},
Key = {fds347180}
}
@article{fds349036,
Author = {Skorburg, JA and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {AI Methods in Bioethics.},
Journal = {AJOB empirical bioethics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-39},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Doi = {10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Key = {fds349036}
}
@article{fds366402,
Author = {Marques, LM and Clifford, S and Iyengar, V and Bonato, GV and Cabral,
PM and Dos Santos and RB and Cabeza, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Boggio,
PS},
Title = {Translation and validation of the moral foundations
vignettes (MFVs) for the portuguese language in a Brazilian
sample},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {149-158},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently
developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of
various moral foundations – enables investigators to
directly examine differences in moral judgments about
different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV
instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end,
the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the
MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in
Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation
of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV
instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5)
Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which
used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao
Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven
factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships
between the moral foundations and political ideology are
similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity
of moral judgment on individualizing foundations tended to
be significantly higher in the Sao Paulo sample, compared to
a sample from the USA. Overall, the present study provides a
Portuguese version of the MFV that performs similarly to the
original English version, enabling a broader examination of
how the moral foundations operate.},
Key = {fds366402}
}
@article{fds350333,
Author = {Freedman, R and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human
Values.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/2005.09755},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds350333}
}
@article{fds349037,
Author = {Chan, L and Doyle, K and McElfresh, DC and Conitzer, V and Dickerson,
JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of
AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.},
Journal = {AIES},
Pages = {214-220},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Markham, AN and Powles, J and Walsh, T and Washington,
AL},
Year = {2020},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-7110-0},
Key = {fds349037}
}
@article{fds342279,
Author = {Ancell, AJ and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The need for feasible compromises on conscientious
objection: response to Card.},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {45},
Number = {8},
Pages = {560-561},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
Abstract = {Robert Card criticises our proposal for managing some
conscientious objections in medicine. Unfortunately, he
severely mischaracterises the nature of our proposal, its
scope and its implications. He also overlooks the fact that
our proposal is a compromise designed for a particular
political context. We correct Card's mischaracterisations,
explain why we believe compromise is necessary and explain
how we think proposed compromises should be
evaluated.},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
Key = {fds342279}
}
@article{fds342280,
Author = {Harris, AA and Romer, AL and Hanna, EK and Keeling, LA and LaBar, KS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Strauman, TJ and Wagner, HR and Marcus, MD and Zucker, NL},
Title = {The central role of disgust in disorders of food
avoidance.},
Journal = {Int J Eat Disord},
Volume = {52},
Number = {5},
Pages = {543-553},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/eat.23047},
Abstract = {BACKGROUND: Individuals with extreme food avoidance such as
Avoidant Restrictive Food Intake Disorder (ARFID) experience
impairing physical and mental health consequences from
nutrition of insufficient variety or/and quantity.
Identifying mechanisms contributing to food avoidance is
essential to develop effective interventions. Anxiety
figures prominently in theoretical models of food avoidance;
however, there is limited evidence that repeated exposures
to foods increases approach behavior in ARFID. Studying
disgust, and relationships between disgust and anxiety, may
offer novel insights, as disgust is functionally associated
with avoidance of contamination from pathogens (as may occur
via ingestion) and is largely resistant to extinction.
METHOD: This exploratory, cross-sectional study included
data from 1,644 adults who completed an online
questionnaire. Participant responses were used to measure
ARFID classification, picky eating, sensory sensitivity,
disgust, and anxiety. Structural equation modeling tested a
measurement model of latent disgust and anxiety factors as
measured by self-reported frequency of disgust and anxiety
reactions. Mediational models were used to explore causal
ordering. RESULTS: A latent disgust factor was more strongly
related to severity of picky eating (B ≈ 0.4) and
ARFID classification (B ≈ 0.6) than the latent anxiety
factor (B ≈ 0.1). Disgust partially mediated the
association between anxiety and picky eating and fully
mediated the association between anxiety and ARFID. Models
testing the reverse causal ordering demonstrated poorer fit.
Findings suggest anxiety may be associated with food
avoidance in part due to increased disgust. CONCLUSIONS:
Disgust may play a prominent role in food avoidance.
Findings may inform novel approaches to treatment.},
Doi = {10.1002/eat.23047},
Key = {fds342280}
}
@article{fds332865,
Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {176},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1177-1201},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Abstract = {In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we
judge that people are responsible for the consequences of
their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies
to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences
of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to
hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The
level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates
judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that
the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action
does not. We argue that this result has important
implications for a long-running debate about the nature of
responsible agency.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Key = {fds332865}
}
@article{fds341882,
Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
Furniture},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-139},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some
skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the
principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not
simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments
for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to
support the claim that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Key = {fds341882}
}
@article{fds342588,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Yin, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {120-129},
Publisher = {SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo
violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical
evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral
judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly
occurs when an individual remains obstinately and
steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even
after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments
to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the
moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and
psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and
intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the
predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We
investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for
moral dumbfounding: That putatively harmless taboo
violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the
high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused
harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our
results indicate that judgments about the likelihood of
causing harm consistently and strongly predicted moral
wrongness judgments. Critically, a manipulation drawing
attention to harms that could have occurred (but did not
actually occur) systematically increased the severity of
moral wrongness judgments. Thus, many participants were
sensitive to at least one reason — the likelihood of
harm—in making their moral judgments about these kinds of
taboo violations. We discuss the implications of these
findings for rationalist and anti-rationalist models of
moral judgment and decision-making.},
Key = {fds342588}
}
@article{fds343799,
Author = {Vierkant, T and Deutschländer, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Haynes, J-D},
Title = {Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About
Deliberate Actions.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {1133},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133},
Abstract = {A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is
that a person can be held morally responsible for an action
only if they had the freedom to choose and to act otherwise.
Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary
condition for moral responsibility. However, empirical
findings suggest that this assumption might not be in line
with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study
we used surveys to show that - counter to positions held by
many philosophers - lay people consider actions to be free
when they are spontaneous rather than being based on
reasons. In contrast, responsibility is often considered to
require that someone has thought about the alternative
options. In this study we used an online survey to directly
test the degree to which lay judgements of freedom and
responsibility match. Specifically, we tested whether
manipulations of deliberation affect freedom and
responsibility judgements in the same way. Furthermore, we
also tested the dependency of these judgements on a person's
belief that their decision had consequences for their
personal life. We found that deliberation had an opposite
effect on freedom and responsibility judgements. People were
considered more free when they acted spontaneously, whereas
they were considered more responsible when they deliberated
about their actions. These results seem to suggest that
deliberating about reasons is crucially important for the
lay concept of responsibility, while for the lay notion of
freedom it is perceived to be detrimental. One way of
interpreting our findings for the interdisciplinary debate
on free will and responsibility could be to suggest that lay
beliefs match the philosophical position of
semi-compatibilism. Semi-compatibilists insist that the
metaphysical debate on the nature of free will can be
separated from the debate on conditions of responsible
agency. According to our findings the beliefs of lay people
are in line with views held by semi-compatibilists, even
though we did not test whether they endorse that position
explicitly.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133},
Key = {fds343799}
}
@article{fds346287,
Author = {McDonald, K and Yin, S and Weese, T and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?},
Journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {2 pages},
Publisher = {CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x18002662},
Abstract = {May argues that framing effects do not undermine moral
beliefs, because they affect only a minority of moral
judgments in small ways. We criticize his estimates of the
extent of framing effects on moral judgments, and then we
argue that framing effects would cause trouble for moral
judgments even if his estimates were correct.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x18002662},
Key = {fds346287}
}
@article{fds341335,
Author = {Kramer, MF and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?},
Journal = {AIES 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {204-209},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Abstract = {AI systems are now or will soon be sophisticated enough to
make consequential decisions. Although this technology has
flourished, we also need public appraisals of AI systems
playing these more important roles. This article reports
surveys of preferences for and against AI systems making
decisions in various domains as well as experiments that
intervene on these preferences. We find that these
preferences are contingent on subjects' previous exposure to
computer systems making these kinds of decisions, and some
interventions designed to mimic previous exposure
successfully encourage subjects to be more hospitable to
computer systems making these weighty decisions.},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Key = {fds341335}
}
@article{fds347785,
Author = {Freedman, R and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human
Values},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society},
Pages = {115-115},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Furman, J and Marchant, GE and Price, H and Rossi,
F},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Key = {fds347785}
}
@article{fds363779,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, JS},
Title = {Defining addiction: A pragmatic perspective},
Pages = {123-131},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of
Addiction},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781138909281},
Key = {fds363779}
}
@article{fds331598,
Author = {Cameron, CD and Payne, BK and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Scheffer, JA and Inzlicht, M},
Title = {Corrigendum to "Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial
modeling approach" [Cognition 158 (2017)
224-241].},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {173},
Pages = {138},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
Key = {fds331598}
}
@article{fds332751,
Author = {Kingston, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-186},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Abstract = {Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain
from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler
(joyguzzling) provides our paradigm example. We first
distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to
refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We
then review several different proposed objections to our
view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies
a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected
value, exceeds our fair share of global emissions, and
undermines political duties. We show why none of these
objections succeeds and conclude that no good reason has yet
been proposed that shows why joyguzzling violates a moral
requirement.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Key = {fds332751}
}
@article{fds326605,
Author = {Wright, JC and Nadelhoffer, T and Thomson Ross and L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Be it ever so humble: Proposing a dual-dimension account and
measurement of humility},
Journal = {Self and Identity},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {92-125},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
Abstract = {What does it mean to be humble? We argue that humility is an
epistemically and ethically aligned state of awareness–the
experience of ourselves as a small part of a larger universe
and as one among a host of other morally relevant beings. So
conceived, humility can be operationalized and measured
along the dual dimensions of low self-focus and high
other-focus and is distinct from other related constructs
(e.g., modesty and open-mindedness). We discuss our newly
developed scale (Study 1 and 2), and provide preliminary
validation using self-report (Study 3) and behavioral
measures (Study 4), showing that humility is related to
people’s general ethical orientation (e.g., empathy,
universalism/benevolence, and civic responsibility), their
well-being (e.g., sense of autonomy, life-purpose, and
secure attachment), mature religious beliefs/practices, and
reactions to disagreement–specifically, people high in
humility sat closer and less angled away from their
conversation partner with whom they disagreed. Together,
this provides support for our new Dual-Dimension Humility
Scale.},
Doi = {10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
Key = {fds326605}
}
@article{fds339913,
Author = {Tang, H and Wang, S and Liang, Z and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Su, S and Liu, C},
Title = {Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image
Concerns in Appearing Fair.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {9},
Number = {NOV},
Pages = {2268},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
Abstract = {Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The
present research explored how individual difference measured
by social value orientations, and situations, affect
deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments,
participants made allocations between themselves and
recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where
recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1
demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and
hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair,
especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2
showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image
in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They
decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and
evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when
deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show
that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception
and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications
for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
Key = {fds339913}
}
@article{fds336427,
Author = {Freedman, R and Dickerson, JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2018},
Pages = {1636-1643},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {McIlraith, SA and Weinberger, KQ},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358008},
Abstract = {The efficient allocation of limited resources is a classical
problem in economics and computer science. In kidney
exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney
donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors
in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights
decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation
algorithm that determines who get what-and who does not. In
this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for
estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a
kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list
of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the
purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical
characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask
subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and
estimate weights in a principled way from their responses.
We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market
clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the
weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical
values of the weights we computed matter little, other than
the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared
to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant
effect, with certain classes of patients being
(de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Key = {fds336427}
}
@article{fds336429,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2018},
Pages = {4831-4835},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Singh, SP and Markovitch, S},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds336429}
}
@article{fds336426,
Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
Pages = {54-67},
Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
of Neuroscience},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Abstract = {In Chapter 4, the authors explore whether neuroscience
undermines morality. The authors distinguish, analyze, and
assess the main arguments for neuroscientific skepticism
about morality and argue that neuroscience does not
undermine all of our moral judgments, focusing the majority
of their attention on one argument in particular-the idea
that neuroscience and psychology might undermine moral
knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs result from
unreliable processes. They argue that the background
arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail to
adequately support it. They conclude that the overall issue
of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled, but, they
contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
together.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Key = {fds336426}
}
@article{fds329190,
Author = {Stanton, SJ and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Huettel,
SA},
Title = {Neuromarketing: Ethical Implications of its Use and
Potential Misuse},
Journal = {Journal of Business Ethics},
Volume = {144},
Number = {4},
Pages = {799-811},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3059-0},
Abstract = {Neuromarketing is an emerging field in which academic and
industry research scientists employ neuroscience techniques
to study marketing practices and consumer behavior. The use
of neuroscience techniques, it is argued, facilitates a more
direct understanding of how brain states and other
physiological mechanisms are related to consumer behavior
and decision making. Herein, we will articulate common
ethical concerns with neuromarketing as currently practiced,
focusing on the potential risks to consumers and the ethical
decisions faced by companies. We argue that the most
frequently raised concerns—threats to consumer autonomy,
privacy, and control—do not rise to meaningful ethical
issues given the current capabilities and implementation of
neuromarketing research. But, we identify how potentially
serious ethical issues may emerge from neuromarketing
research practices in industry, which are largely
proprietary and opaque. We identify steps that can mitigate
associated ethical risks and thus reduce the threats to
consumers. We conclude that neuromarketing has clear
potential for positive impact on society and consumers, a
fact rarely considered in the discussion on the ethics of
neuromarketing.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10551-016-3059-0},
Key = {fds329190}
}
@article{fds327008,
Author = {Kelly, M and Ngo, L and Chituc, V and Huettel, S and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral conformity in online interactions: rational
justifications increase influence of peer opinions on moral
judgments},
Journal = {Social Influence},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {57-68},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2017.1323007},
Abstract = {Over the last decade, social media has increasingly been
used as a platform for political and moral discourse. We
investigate whether conformity, specifically concerning
moral attitudes, occurs in these virtual environments apart
from face-to-face interactions. Participants took an online
survey and saw either statistical information about the
frequency of certain responses, as one might see on social
media (Study 1), or arguments that defend the responses in
either a rational or emotional way (Study 2). Our results
show that social information shaped moral judgments, even in
an impersonal digital setting. Furthermore, rational
arguments were more effective at eliciting conformity than
emotional arguments. We discuss the implications of these
results for theories of moral judgment that prioritize
emotional responses.},
Doi = {10.1080/15534510.2017.1323007},
Key = {fds327008}
}
@article{fds326087,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {146},
Number = {6},
Pages = {884-895},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
people judge those actions that happened further in the past
to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
believed that they were very different people than they are
now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
Key = {fds326087}
}
@article{fds330527,
Author = {Medaglia, JD and Zurn, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Bassett,
DS},
Title = {Mind control as a guide for the mind},
Journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},
Volume = {1},
Number = {6},
Pages = {0119-0119},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0119},
Abstract = {The human brain is a complex network that supports mental
function. The nascent field of network neuroscience applies
tools from mathematics to neuroimaging data in the hope of
shedding light on cognitive function. A critical question
arising from these empirical studies is how to modulate a
human brain network to treat cognitive deficits or enhance
mental abilities. While historically a number of tools have
been employed to modulate mental states (such as cognitive
behavioural therapy and brain stimulation), theoretical
frameworks to guide these interventions-and to optimize them
for clinical use-are fundamentally lacking. One promising
and as yet under-explored approach lies in a subdiscipline
of engineering known as network control theory. Here, we
posit that network control fundamentally relates to mind
control, and that this relationship highlights important
areas for future empirical research and opportunities to
translate knowledge into practical domains. We clarify the
conceptual intersection between neuroanatomy, cognition, and
control engineering in the context of network neuroscience.
Finally, we discuss the challenges, ethics, and promises of
mind control.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-017-0119},
Key = {fds330527}
}
@article{fds322470,
Author = {Ancell, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While
Protecting Patient Rights.},
Journal = {Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the
international journal of healthcare ethics
committees},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-131},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000694},
Abstract = {Paradigmatic cases of conscientious objection in medicine
are those in which a physician refuses to provide a medical
service or good because doing so would conflict with that
physician's personal moral or religious beliefs. Should such
refusals be allowed in medicine? We argue that (1) many
conscientious objections to providing certain services must
be allowed because they fall within the range of freedom
that physicians have to determine which services to offer in
their practices; (2) at least some conscientious objections
to serving particular groups of patients should be allowed
because they are not invidiously discriminatory; and (3)
even in cases of invidiously discriminatory conscientious
objections, legally prohibiting individual physicians from
refusing to serve patients on the basis of such objections
is not always the best solution.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0963180116000694},
Key = {fds322470}
}
@article{fds321506,
Author = {Cameron, CD and Payne, BK and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Scheffer, JA and Inzlicht, M},
Title = {Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial modeling
approach.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {158},
Pages = {224-241},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013},
Abstract = {Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional
assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a
central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life.
Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously
measure individual differences in implicit moral
evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new
sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and
a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task
into multiple component processes. These include implicit
moral evaluations of moral transgression primes
(Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about
target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional
tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias).
Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but
not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional
Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than
non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional
Judgment was associated with increased error-related
negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral
control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an
anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional
Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across
Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with
moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong
primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated
with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with
moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and
practical applications of formal modeling for moral
psychology are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013},
Key = {fds321506}
}
@article{fds329371,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schaich Borg and J and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {4831-4835},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds329371}
}
@article{fds336428,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report},
Volume = {WS-17-01 - WS-17-15},
Pages = {105-109},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357865},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds336428}
}
@article{fds321508,
Author = {Fede, SJ and Borg, JS and Nyalakanti, PK and Harenski, CL and Cope, LM and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Koenigs, M and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Distinct neuronal patterns of positive and negative moral
processing in psychopathy.},
Journal = {Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience},
Volume = {16},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1074-1085},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-016-0454-z},
Abstract = {Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by severe and
frequent moral violations in multiple domains of life.
Numerous studies have shown psychopathy-related limbic brain
abnormalities during moral processing; however, these
studies only examined negatively valenced moral stimuli.
Here, we aimed to replicate prior psychopathy research on
negative moral judgments and to extend this work by
examining psychopathy-related abnormalities in the
processing of controversial moral stimuli and positive moral
processing. Incarcerated adult males (N = 245) completed a
functional magnetic resonance imaging protocol on a mobile
imaging system stationed at the prison. Psychopathy was
assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R). Participants were then shown words describing three
types of moral stimuli: wrong (e.g., stealing), not wrong
(e.g., charity), and controversial (e.g., euthanasia).
Participants rated each stimulus as either wrong or not
wrong. PCL-R total scores were correlated with not wrong
behavioral responses to wrong moral stimuli, and were
inversely related to hemodynamic activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex in the contrast of wrong > not wrong. In
the controversial > noncontroversial comparison, psychopathy
was inversely associated with activity in the temporal
parietal junction and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These
results indicate that psychopathy-related abnormalities are
observed during the processing of complex, negative, and
positive moral stimuli.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13415-016-0454-z},
Key = {fds321508}
}
@article{fds321507,
Author = {Fede, SJ and Harenski, CL and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W and Rao, V and Caldwell, BM and Nyalakanti, PK and Koenigs, MR and Decety, J and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl, KA},
Title = {Abnormal fronto-limbic engagement in incarcerated stimulant
users during moral processing.},
Journal = {Psychopharmacology},
Volume = {233},
Number = {17},
Pages = {3077-3087},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00213-016-4344-4},
Abstract = {<h4>Rationale</h4>Stimulant use is a significant and
prevalent problem, particularly in criminal populations.
Previous studies found that cocaine and methamphetamine use
is related to impairment in identifying emotions and
empathy. Stimulant users also have abnormal neural structure
and function of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
amygdala, and anterior (ACC) and posterior cingulate (PCC),
regions implicated in moral decision-making. However, no
research has studied the neural correlates of stimulant use
and explicit moral processing in an incarcerated
population.<h4>Objectives</h4>Here, we examine how stimulant
use affects sociomoral processing that might contribute to
antisocial behavior. We predicted that vmPFC, amygdala, PCC,
and ACC would show abnormal neural response during a moral
processing task in incarcerated methamphetamine and cocaine
users.<h4>Methods</h4>Incarcerated adult males (N = 211)
were scanned with a mobile MRI system while completing a
moral decision-making task. Lifetime drug use was assessed.
Neural responses during moral processing were compared
between users and non-users. The relationship between
duration of use and neural function was also
examined.<h4>Results</h4>Incarcerated stimulant users showed
less amygdala engagement than non-users during moral
processing. Duration of stimulant use was negatively
associated with activity in ACC and positively associated
with vmPFC response during moral processing.<h4>Conclusions</h4>These
results suggest a dynamic pattern of fronto-limbic moral
processing related to stimulant use with deficits in both
central motive and cognitive integration elements of
biological moral processes theory. This increases our
understanding of how drug use relates to moral processing in
the brain in an ultra-high-risk population.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00213-016-4344-4},
Key = {fds321507}
}
@article{fds323961,
Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
'Can'},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {283-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
Key = {fds323961}
}
@article{fds321509,
Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
"ought" implies "can".},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {20-25},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
empirical work has studied the relationships among these
concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
which states that if someone ought to do something, then
they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
"ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
of obligation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Key = {fds321509}
}
@article{fds321510,
Author = {Alexander, P and Schlegel, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies,
AL and Wheatley, T and Tse, PU},
Title = {Readiness potentials driven by non-motoric
processes.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {39},
Pages = {38-47},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.011},
Abstract = {An increase in brain activity known as the "readiness
potential" (RP) can be seen over central scalp locations in
the seconds leading up to a volitionally timed movement.
This activity precedes awareness of the ensuing movement by
as much as two seconds and has been hypothesized to reflect
preconscious planning and/or preparation of the movement.
Using a novel experimental design, we teased apart the
relative contribution of motor-related and non-motor-related
processes to the RP. The results of our experiment reveal
that robust RPs occured in the absence of movement and that
motor-related processes did not significantly modulate the
RP. This suggests that the RP measured here is unlikely to
reflect preconscious motor planning or preparation of an
ensuing movement, and instead may reflect decision-related
or anticipatory processes that are non-motoric in
nature.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.011},
Key = {fds321510}
}
@article{fds303593,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Treatment},
Pages = {161-179},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Moseley, D and Gala, G},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-0-415-70816-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315688725},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315688725},
Key = {fds303593}
}
@article{fds321511,
Author = {Ngo, L and Kelly, M and Coutlee, CG and Carter, RM and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Huettel, SA},
Title = {Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying
Intentionality},
Journal = {Scientific Reports},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {17390},
Publisher = {Macmillan Publishers Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep17390},
Abstract = {Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about
how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality
and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental
philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge
actions leading to negative consequences as being more
intentional than those leading to positive ones. The
implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there
is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on
converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate
that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two
distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion
drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative
consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms
leads to the denial of intentionality for positive
consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to
illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments
of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in
legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining
to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among
others.},
Doi = {10.1038/srep17390},
Key = {fds321511}
}
@article{fds244859,
Author = {Clifford, S and Iyengar, V and Cabeza, R and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus
database of scenarios based on moral foundations
theory.},
Journal = {Behavior research methods},
Volume = {47},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1178-1198},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1554-351X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-0551-2},
Abstract = {Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social
determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years.
The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played
an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality.
Moral psychology has responded by investigating how
different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety
of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a
validated set of moral violations that span the moral
domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on
judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the
moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by
developing and validating a large set of moral foundations
vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating
a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes
are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic
structure and complexity making them suitable for
neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our
vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral
violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor
analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the
extracted factors and existing measures of the moral
foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for
a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations
of moral cognition.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13428-014-0551-2},
Key = {fds244859}
}
@article{fds244874,
Author = {Summers, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Scrupulous agents},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {7},
Pages = {947-966},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Abstract = {Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with
morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of
moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After
defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and
discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar
aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients:
perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral
thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and
reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain
whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Key = {fds244874}
}
@article{fds303582,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neural Lie Detection in Courts},
Booktitle = {Using Imaging to Identify Deceit: Scientific and Ethical
Questions},
Publisher = {American Academy of Arts and Sciences},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://www.amacad.org/publications/deceit.aspx},
Key = {fds303582}
}
@article{fds303596,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Definition of Terrorism},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-120},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1468-5930},
Key = {fds303596}
}
@article{fds303583,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Philosophy},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303583}
}
@article{fds303591,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Asking the Right Questions in Moral Psychology},
Booktitle = {The Atlas of Moral Psychology},
Publisher = {Guilford Press},
Editor = {Graham, J and Gray, K},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303591}
}
@article{fds303592,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Judgments},
Booktitle = {Studies in Normative Ethics},
Publisher = {Oxforfd Univesity Press},
Editor = {Timmons, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303592}
}
@article{fds303594,
Author = {Summers, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Scrupulous Characters},
Booktitle = {Character: Perspectives from Philosophy and
Psychology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fileva, I},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303594}
}
@article{fds303595,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Disunity of Morality},
Booktitle = {Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Liao, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303595}
}
@article{fds244858,
Author = {Schlegel, A and Alexander, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious
volition.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {196-203},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1053-8100},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002},
Abstract = {The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most
controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to
its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in
action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes
both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing
that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious
will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP
indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both
volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling
of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate
that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying
feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural
processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the
experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still
occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated
movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a
conscious feeling of having willed those
movements.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002},
Key = {fds244858}
}
@book{fds306215,
Title = {Moral Disagreements},
Publisher = {LuLu Press},
Editor = {Ancell, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds306215}
}
@book{fds306216,
Title = {Drugs and Addiction},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Summers, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds306216}
}
@article{fds244846,
Author = {Singh, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The DSM-5 Definition of Mental Disorder},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-31},
Publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
Key = {fds244846}
}
@article{fds244873,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {What's wrong? Moral understanding in psychopathic
offenders.},
Journal = {Journal of research in personality},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {175-181},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0092-6566},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.10.002},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jrp.2014.10.002},
Key = {fds244873}
}
@article{fds321512,
Author = {Strohminger, N and Caldwell, B and Cameron, D and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Implicit morality: A methodological survey},
Pages = {133-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan UK},
Year = {2014},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9781137409799},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137409805},
Doi = {10.1057/9781137409805},
Key = {fds321512}
}
@article{fds244965,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Are moral judgments unified?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {451-474},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.736075},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2012.736075},
Key = {fds244965}
}
@book{fds219464,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert J. Fogelin},
Title = {Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Concise
Version},
Pages = {350},
Publisher = {Cengage},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds219464}
}
@book{fds244909,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Fogelin, RJ},
Title = {Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Complete
Version},
Pages = {494 pages},
Publisher = {Cengage},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds244909}
}
@book{fds306217,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral psychology, volume 4: Free will and moral
responsibility},
Pages = {1-474},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
Abstract = {Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will
and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that
seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In
recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology
and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral
philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays,
commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and
scientists who explain and use empirical findings from
psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new
problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The
contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as
Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga
-- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and
libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism;
naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings
show that although science does not settle the issues of
free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the
field by asking novel, profound, and important
questions.<B>Contributors</B>Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne,
Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman,
William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher
G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S.
Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris,
John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert
Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian
Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas
Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith
Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos,
Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler,
Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe.},
Key = {fds306217}
}
@book{fds349996,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0001},
Doi = {10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0001},
Key = {fds349996}
}
@article{fds244876,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Mallett, J and Vincent, GM and Harenski, CL and Calhoun,
VD and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, MS and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Predictive accuracy in the neuroprediction of
rearrest.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {332-336},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1747-0919},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2014.907201},
Abstract = {A recently published study by the present authors reported
evidence that functional changes in the anterior cingulate
cortex within a sample of 96 criminal offenders who were
engaged in a Go/No-Go impulse control task significantly
predicted their rearrest following release from prison. In
an extended analysis, we use discrimination and calibration
techniques to test the accuracy of these predictions
relative to more traditional models and their ability to
generalize to new observations in both full and reduced
models. Modest to strong discrimination and calibration
accuracy were found, providing additional support for the
utility of neurobiological measures in predicting
rearrest.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2014.907201},
Key = {fds244876}
}
@article{fds321513,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
Key = {fds321513}
}
@article{fds244830,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Interview by Simon Cushing},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics},
Pages = {1-22},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244830}
}
@article{fds244828,
Author = {Alexander, P and Schlegel, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Dissecting the Readiness Potential: An investigation of the
relationship between readiness potentials, conscious
willing, and action},
Pages = {205-230},
Booktitle = {Surrounding Free Will},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Mele, A},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244828}
}
@article{fds244829,
Author = {Strohminger, N and Caldwell, B and Cameron, D and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Implicit Moral Attitudes},
Pages = {133-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Editor = {Luetage, C and Rusch, H and Uhl, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244829}
}
@article{fds244831,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {131-132},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Freedom and Responsibility},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2016.1148383},
Doi = {10.1080/02691728.2016.1148383},
Key = {fds244831}
}
@article{fds244879,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Levy, N},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244879}
}
@article{fds244898,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Introduction to Neuroscience and Society},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neurosciences V},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Gazzaniga, M and Mangum, R},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244898}
}
@article{fds244899,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths},
Booktitle = {Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and
Evolution},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Bergmann, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244899}
}
@article{fds244900,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?},
Booktitle = {Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Schramme, T},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244900}
}
@article{fds336430,
Title = {Neuroscience and Society edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
and Adina Roskies},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neurosciences},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Gazzaniga, MS and Mangun, GR},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds336430}
}
@article{fds368008,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Psychology Volume 4: Free Will and Moral
Responsibility Introduction},
Pages = {XIII-+},
Booktitle = {MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL 4: FREE WILL AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY},
Year = {2014},
ISBN = {978-0-262-52547-3},
Key = {fds368008}
}
@article{fds244919,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Kahn, RE and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kurzban, R and Robinson, PH and Kiehl, KA},
Title = {Subcomponents of psychopathy have opposing correlations with
punishment judgments.},
Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {667-687},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23834639},
Abstract = {Psychopathy research is plagued by an enigma: Psychopaths
reliably act immorally, but they also accurately report
whether an action is morally wrong. The current study
revealed that cooperative suppressor effects and conflicting
subsets of personality traits within the construct of
psychopathy might help explain this conundrum. Among a
sample of adult male offenders (N = 100) who ranked deserved
punishment of crimes, Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)
total scores were not linearly correlated with deserved
punishment task performance. However, these null results
masked significant opposing associations between task
performance and factors of psychopathy: the PCL-R
Interpersonal/Affective (i.e., manipulative and callous)
factor was positively associated with task performance,
while the PCL-R Social Deviance (i.e., impulsive and
antisocial) factor was simultaneously negatively associated
with task performance. These relationships were qualified by
a significant interaction where the Interpersonal/Affective
traits were positively associated with task performance when
Social Deviance traits were high, but Social Deviance traits
were negatively associated with task performance when
Interpersonal/Affective traits were low. This interaction
helped reveal a significant nonlinear relationship between
PCL-R total scores and task performance such that
individuals with very low or very high PCL-R total scores
performed better than those with middle-range PCL-R total
scores. These results may explain the enigma of why
individuals with very high psychopathic traits, but not
other groups of antisocial individuals, usually have normal
moral judgment in laboratory settings, but still behave
immorally, especially in contexts where social deviance
traits have strong influence.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0033485},
Key = {fds244919}
}
@article{fds244921,
Author = {Schlegel, A and Alexander, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Barking up the wrong free: readiness potentials reflect
processes independent of conscious will.},
Journal = {Experimental brain research},
Volume = {229},
Number = {3},
Pages = {329-335},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23535835},
Abstract = {In the early 1980s, Libet found that a readiness potential
(RP) over central scalp locations begins on average several
hundred milliseconds before the reported time of awareness
of willing to move (W). Haggard and Eimer Exp Brain Res
126(1):128-133, (1999) later found no correlation between
the timing of the RP and W, suggesting that the RP does not
reflect processes causal of W. However, they did find a
positive correlation between the onset of the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP) and W, suggesting that the LRP
might reflect processes causal of W. Here, we report a
failure to replicate Haggard and Eimer's LRP finding with a
larger group of participants and several variations of their
analytical method. Although we did find a between-subject
correlation in just one of 12 related analyses of the LRP,
we crucially found no within-subject covariation between LRP
onset and W. These results suggest that the RP and LRP
reflect processes independent of will and consciousness.
This conclusion has significant implications for our
understanding of the neural basis of motor action and
potentially for arguments about free will and the causal
role of consciousness.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00221-013-3479-3},
Key = {fds244921}
}
@article{fds244920,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Vincent, GM and Harenski, CL and Calhoun, VD and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, MS and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Neuroprediction of future rearrest.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {110},
Number = {15},
Pages = {6223-6228},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23536303},
Abstract = {Identification of factors that predict recurrent antisocial
behavior is integral to the social sciences, criminal
justice procedures, and the effective treatment of high-risk
individuals. Here we show that error-related brain activity
elicited during performance of an inhibitory task
prospectively predicted subsequent rearrest among adult
offenders within 4 y of release (N = 96). The odds that an
offender with relatively low anterior cingulate activity
would be rearrested were approximately double that of an
offender with high activity in this region, holding constant
other observed risk factors. These results suggest a
potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial
behavior.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1219302110},
Key = {fds244920}
}
@book{fds306218,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Memory and Law},
Pages = {1-432},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.001.0001},
Abstract = {The legal system depends upon memory function in a number of
critical ways, including the memories of victims; the
memories of individuals who witness crimes or other critical
events; the memories of investigators, lawyers and judges
engaged in the legal process; and the memories of jurors.
How well memory works, how accurate it is, how it is
affected by various aspects of the criminal justice
system-all these are important questions. This book tackles
others as well. Can we tell when someone is reporting an
accurate memory? Can we distinguish a true memory from a
false one? Can memories be selectively enhanced, or erased?
Are memories altered by emotion, by stress, by drugs? This
book presents the current state of knowledge among cognitive
and neural scientists about memory.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.001.0001},
Key = {fds306218}
}
@book{fds343594,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds343594}
}
@book{fds376409,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Preface},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds376409}
}
@article{fds244850,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Preface},
Journal = {Memory and Law},
Pages = {xi},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-032304289-5.10056-6},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-032304289-5.10056-6},
Key = {fds244850}
}
@article{fds244851,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds244851}
}
@article{fds244959,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Miller, FG},
Title = {Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to
critics.},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {12-14},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23161616},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2012-100948},
Key = {fds244959}
}
@article{fds244960,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Miller, FG},
Title = {What makes killing wrong?},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-7},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22267342},
Abstract = {What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the
act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the
act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account
implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill
patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled,
because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital
organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead
donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible
with morality.},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2011-100351},
Key = {fds244960}
}
@article{fds219450,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Thalia Wheatley},
Title = {Are Moral Judgments Unified?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219450}
}
@article{fds219452,
Author = {Alexander Schlegel and Prescott Alexander and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies and Peter U. Tse and Thalia
Wheatley},
Title = {Barking Up the Wrong Free},
Journal = {Experimental Brain Research},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219452}
}
@article{fds219454,
Author = {Jana Schaich Borg and Rachel E. Kahn and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Kurzban and Paul H. Robinson and Kent A.
Kiehl},
Title = {Subcomponents of Psychopathy have Opposing Correlations with
Punishment Judgment},
Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {667-687},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219454}
}
@article{fds219457,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Free Contrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Martijn Blaauw},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219457}
}
@article{fds219458,
Author = {Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Is Psychopathy a Mental Illness?},
Booktitle = {Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nicole Vincent},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219458}
}
@book{fds212198,
Author = {Ilina Singh and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Bioprediction of Bad Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds212198}
}
@book{fds306219,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Shannon Sullivan},
Title = {The Ethics of War and Terrorism},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sullivan, S},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306219}
}
@book{fds306220,
Author = {Kent Kiehl and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kiehl, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306220}
}
@book{fds306221,
Title = {Bioprediction, Biomarkers, and Bad Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Singh, I and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306221}
}
@article{fds244891,
Author = {Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Do Psychopaths Make Moral Judgments?},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kiehl, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244891}
}
@article{fds244892,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Gromet, D and Goodwin, G and Eddy Nahmias and CS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Mind, the Brain, and the Law},
Booktitle = {The Future of Punishment},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nadelhoffer, T},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244892}
}
@article{fds244893,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Pickard, H},
Title = {What is Addiction?},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fulford, KWM and Davies, M and Gipps, RGT and George Graham and JZS and Stranghelllini, G and Thornton, T},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244893}
}
@article{fds244894,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How Religion Undermines Compromise},
Booktitle = {Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clark, S and Powell, R and Savulescu, J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244894}
}
@article{fds244895,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Are Moral Judgments Unified?},
Pages = {96-98},
Booktitle = {Report, Science of Morality Workshop: Disciplinary and
Interdisciplinary Approaches Now and in the
Future},
Publisher = {Sociology Program, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and
Economic Sciences, National Science Foundation,
2009},
Editor = {Hitlin, S and Stets, J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244895}
}
@article{fds244964,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A new look
at the moral/conventional distinction.},
Journal = {Journal of abnormal psychology},
Volume = {121},
Number = {2},
Pages = {484-497},
Year = {2012},
Month = {May},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21842959},
Abstract = {A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests
that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish
between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present
study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which
109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of
psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional
transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated
healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic
Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a
forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the
present study found that total psychopathy score did not
predict performance on the task. Task performance was
explained by some individual subfacets of psychopathy and by
other variables unrelated to psychopathy, such as IQ. The
authors conclude that, contrary to earlier claims,
insufficient data exist to infer that psychopathic
individuals cannot know what is morally wrong.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0024796},
Key = {fds244964}
}
@article{fds244962,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Does Morality Have an Essence?},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {194-197},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1047-840X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000304680300016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2012.666653},
Key = {fds244962}
}
@article{fds244972,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Bibas, S and Grafton, S and Kiehl, KA and Mansfield,
A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, M},
Title = {Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the
Stage.},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-99},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1874-5490},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000302482700009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {In this paper, our goal is to (a) survey some of the legal
contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays
a prominent role, (b) explore whether developments in
neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our
ability to predict violence, and (c) discuss whether
neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal
or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems
already associated with prediction more generally. In
"Violence Risk Assessment and the Law", we briefly examine
the role currently played by predictions of violence in
three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing
("Violence Risk Assessment and Capital Sentencing"), civil
commitment hearings ("Violence Risk Assessment and Civil
Commitment"), and "sexual predator" statutes ("Violence Risk
Assessment and Sexual Predator Statutes"). In "Clinical vs.
Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment", we briefly examine the
distinction between traditional clinical methods of
predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial
methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR) software created by John Monahan and colleagues as
part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence
[1]. In "The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy", we explore
what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural
correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific
research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some
recent advances in both data collection ("Cutting-Edge Data
Collection: Genetically Informed Neuroimaging") and data
analysis ("Cutting-Edge Data Analysis: Pattern
Classification") that we believe will play an important role
when it comes to future neuroscientific research on
violence. In "The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction", we
discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to
improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in
"The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction", we explore some
potential evidentiary ("Evidentiary Issues"), constitutional
("Constitutional Issues"), and moral ("Moral Issues") issues
that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of
violence.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12152-010-9095-z},
Key = {fds244972}
}
@article{fds244880,
Author = {Keister, LA and McCarthy, J and Finke, R},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {23},
Pages = {xi-xvi},
Booktitle = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781780523460},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0277-2833(2012)0000023003},
Doi = {10.1108/s0277-2833(2012)0000023003},
Key = {fds244880}
}
@book{fds306222,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Daniel Fishman},
Title = {Mental Illness and Ethical Responsibility},
Pages = {1-299 pages},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Fishman, D},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Mental illnesses devastate individuals and families. They
also raise profound and important theoretical and practical
issues for us all. How can we tell whether someone really is
mentally ill instead of just eccentric? When people with
mental illnesses cause harm to themselves, should we
restrict their freedom and force them to accept treatment?
When people with mental illnesses cause harm to others,
should we hold them criminally responsible? Particular cases
of mental illness lead to general questions about the nature
of responsibility, the purpose of law, and essence of
personhood. All of these questions as well as several cases
studies are addressed in original essays by students who
took Ethics 200, the capstone course in the Ethics
Certificate Program of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at
Duke University in the Spring terms of 2011 and
2012.},
Key = {fds306222}
}
@article{fds244961,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and
Perils},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {7},
Number = {9},
Pages = {631-642},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00494.x},
Abstract = {Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system
for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility,
and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both
promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the
admissibility of neuroscientific evidence. © 2012 The
Authors.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00494.x},
Key = {fds244961}
}
@article{fds244963,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wheatley, T},
Title = {The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to
Philosophy},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {95},
Number = {3},
Pages = {355-377},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2012},
ISSN = {0026-9662},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/42751157},
Doi = {10.2307/42751157},
Key = {fds244963}
}
@article{fds244889,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Case Study in Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Series = {NOMOS LII},
Pages = {194-211},
Booktitle = {Evolution and Morality},
Publisher = {New York University Press},
Editor = {Fleming, JE and Levinson, S},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244889}
}
@article{fds244890,
Author = {Sandberg, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Title = {The Memory of Jurors: Enhancing Trial Performance},
Booktitle = {Memory and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244890}
}
@article{fds244896,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Free Constrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Blaauw, M},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244896}
}
@article{fds244968,
Author = {Parkinson, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Koralus, PE and Mendelovici, A and McGeer, V and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems
underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and
disgust.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {23},
Number = {10},
Pages = {3162-3180},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21452951},
Abstract = {Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis
of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether
"moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied
scientifically as a unified category. We tested this
assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of
moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm,
dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment
of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems
for each of the different moral areas and that these
differences were much more robust than differences in
wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest,
disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited
networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing,
affective processing, and action understanding,
respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region
activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in
comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was
also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not
to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role
that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral
decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not
a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather,
instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged
differentially depending on the type of transgression being
judged.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_00017},
Key = {fds244968}
}
@article{fds244969,
Author = {Schweitzer, NJ and Saks, MJ and Murphy, ER and Roskies, AL and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gaudet, LM},
Title = {Neuroimages as evidence in a mens rea defense: No
Impact},
Journal = {Psychology, Public Policy, and Law},
Volume = {17},
Number = {3},
Pages = {357-393},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {1076-8971},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000293926000002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Recent developments in the neuropsychology of criminal
behavior have given rise to concerns that neuroimaging
evidence (such as MRI and functional MRI [fMRI] images)
could unduly influence jurors. Across four experiments, a
nationally representative sample of 1,476 jury-eligible
participants evaluated written summaries of criminal cases
in which expert testimony was presented in support of a
mental disorder as exculpatory. The evidence varied in the
extent to which it presented neuroscientific explanations
and neuroimages in support of the expert's conclusion.
Despite suggestive findings from previous research, we found
no evidence that neuroimagery affected jurors' judgments
(verdicts, sentence recommendations, judgments of the
defendant's culpability) over and above verbal
neuroscience-based testimony. A meta-analysis of our four
experiments confirmed these findings. In addition, we found
that neuroscientific evidence was more effective than
clinical psychological evidence in persuading jurors that
the defendant's disorder reduced his capacity to control his
actions, although this effect did not translate into
differences in verdicts. © 2011 American Psychological
Association.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0023581},
Key = {fds244969}
}
@article{fds244935,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Why We Laugh Inside Jokes Using Humor to
Reverse-Engineer the Mind by Matthew M. Hurley,
Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams Jr. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011. 373 pp. $29.95, £22.95. ISBN
9780262015820.},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {332},
Number = {6035},
Pages = {1265-1265},
Publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000291441700027&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Contemplating why we find some things funny, the
authors provide cognitive and evolutionary perspectives on
humor and its importance to humans.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1206802},
Key = {fds244935}
}
@article{fds244967,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {6},
Number = {4},
Pages = {398-413},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21590588},
Abstract = {How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a
fundamental question of both the sciences and the
humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes
that underlie the specific conclusion that something is
morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction
between "moral deliberation," or the weighing of moral
considerations, and the formation of a "moral verdict," or
the commitment to one moral conclusion. We predict and
identify hemodynamic activity in the bilateral anterior
insula and basal ganglia that correlates with committing to
the moral verdict "this is morally wrong" as opposed to
"this is morally not-wrong," a finding that is consistent
with research from economic decision-making. Using
comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-locked
analyses, we also demonstrate that hemodynamic activity in
high-level cortical regions previously implicated in
morality--including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal
junction--correlates primarily with moral deliberation as
opposed to moral verdicts. These findings provide new
insights into what types of processes comprise the
enterprise of moral judgment, and in doing so point to a
framework for resolving why some clinical patients,
including psychopaths, may have intact moral judgment but
impaired moral behavior.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2011.559363},
Key = {fds244967}
}
@article{fds244971,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Emotion and reliability in moral psychology},
Journal = {Emotion Review},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {288-289},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Editor = {Joshua Greene},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1754-0739},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000306274600019&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based
on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate
the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of
framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under
different conditions by different people. © The Author(s)
2011.},
Doi = {10.1177/1754073911402382},
Key = {fds244971}
}
@book{fds197238,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Yifan Wang},
Title = {Crime and Punishment},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197238}
}
@article{fds197256,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from
Peay},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {245-248},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197256}
}
@article{fds197271,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {How Religion Undermines Compromise},
Booktitle = {Religion and Conflict: Empirical Perspectives},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Stephen Clarke and Russell Powell},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197271}
}
@article{fds197267,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Free Contrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Martijn Blaauw},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197267}
}
@article{fds197268,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Neil Levy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197268}
}
@article{fds197270,
Author = {Anders Sandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Julian
Savulescu},
Title = {The Memory of Jurors: Enhancing Trial Performance},
Booktitle = {Memory and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Lynn Nadel and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197270}
}
@article{fds244966,
Author = {Sinnott Armstrong and W},
Title = {Neurolaw and Consciousness Detection},
Journal = {Cortex},
Volume = {47},
Number = {10},
Pages = {1246-1247},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.021},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.021},
Key = {fds244966}
}
@misc{fds244903,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Special Issue: Pardo and Patterson on Neuroscience and the
Law},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {4},
Number = {3},
Pages = {179-222},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244903}
}
@article{fds244877,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Consequentialism},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244877}
}
@article{fds244878,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244878}
}
@article{fds244884,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism},
Pages = {11-28 & 200-203-11-28 & 200-203},
Booktitle = {The New Intuitionism},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Hernandez, JG},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244884}
}
@article{fds244885,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Levy, K},
Title = {Insanity Defenses},
Pages = {299-334},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal
Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Deigh, J and Dolinko, D},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244885}
}
@article{fds244886,
Author = {Roskies, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Brain Images as Evidence in the Criminal
Law},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {97-114},
Booktitle = {Law and Neuroscience, Current Legal Issues},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Freeman, M},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244886}
}
@article{fds244887,
Author = {Sandberg, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Title = {Cognitive Enhancements in Court},
Pages = {273-284},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics},
Editor = {Illes, J and Federico, BSAECA and Morein-Zamir,
S},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244887}
}
@article{fds244888,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Ethics},
Pages = {261-274},
Booktitle = {The Continuum Companion to Ethics},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Miller, C},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244888}
}
@article{fds244897,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease?},
Booktitle = {Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Vincent, N},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244897}
}
@article{fds244860,
Author = {Cope, L and Borg, JS and Harenski, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Lieberman, D and Nyalakanti, PK and Calhoun, VD and Kieh,
K},
Title = {Hemispheric Asymmetries During Processing of Immoral
Stimuli},
Journal = {Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience},
Volume = {2},
Number = {110},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244860}
}
@article{fds244954,
Author = {O'Hara, RE and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sinnott-Armstrong,
NA},
Title = {Wording effects in moral judgments},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {5},
Number = {7},
Pages = {547-554},
Editor = {Jonathan Baron},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1930-2975},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000285745100009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative
to compare results across studies in order to create unified
theories within the field. These efforts are potentially
undermined, however, by variations in wording used by
different researchers. The current study sought to determine
whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral
judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different
moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4
adjectives: "wrong", "inappropriate", "forbidden", or
"blameworthy". For half of the sample, these adjectives were
preceded by the adverb "morally". Results indicated that
people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or
inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that
disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when "morally"
was included. Although some wording differences emerged,
effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral
judgment with different wordings can legitimately be
compared.},
Key = {fds244954}
}
@article{fds244854,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Preface},
Journal = {Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin
Libet},
Volume = {205-208},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cma.2011.05.012},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cma.2011.05.012},
Key = {fds244854}
}
@article{fds244973,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how
moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality
and causation},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {349-350},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0140-525X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000284381100055&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a
continuum to explain how moral judgments influence
intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask
(1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they
exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3)
how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant
alternatives when applying such notions. © 2010 Cambridge
University Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X1000186X},
Key = {fds244973}
}
@article{fds244958,
Author = {May, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Hull, JG and Zimmerman,
A},
Title = {Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge
Attributions: an Empirical Study.},
Journal = {Review of philosophy and psychology},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {265-273},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1878-5158},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22558061},
Abstract = {In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge,
Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several
bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that
Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions
about these cases. Additionally, we test the empirical
claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make, regarding the
salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley. Our
data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error
nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing
knowledge to denying it. However, the raising of stakes (but
not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people
have in their attributions of knowledge. We argue that our
data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our
common-sense judgments about such cases are.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-009-0014-3},
Key = {fds244958}
}
@article{fds244974,
Author = {Miller, MB and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Young, L and King, D and Paggi,
A and Fabri, M and Polonara, G and Gazzaniga, MS},
Title = {Abnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy
patients.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {48},
Number = {7},
Pages = {2215-2220},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20188113},
Abstract = {Recent neuroimaging studies suggest lateralized cerebral
mechanisms in the right temporal parietal junction are
involved in complex social and moral reasoning, such as
ascribing beliefs to others. Based on this evidence, we
tested 3 anterior-resected and 3 complete callosotomy
patients along with 22 normal subjects on a reasoning task
that required verbal moral judgments. All 6 patients based
their judgments primarily on the outcome of the actions,
disregarding the beliefs of the agents. The similarity in
performance between complete and partial callosotomy
patients suggests that normal judgments of morality require
full interhemispheric integration of information critically
supported by the right temporal parietal junction and right
frontal processes.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.02.021},
Key = {fds244974}
}
@article{fds244949,
Author = {Belcher, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neurolaw.},
Journal = {Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive
science},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {18-22},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1939-5078},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000298171200004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Less than three decades ago, the fields of cognitive
psychology and neuroscience joined forces to form cognitive
neuroscience. More recently, neuroscience has combined with
social psychology and with economics to produce social
neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Each of these amalgamations
has been revolutionary in its own way. Neurolaw extends this
trend. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further
resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs
website.},
Doi = {10.1002/wcs.8},
Key = {fds244949}
}
@article{fds183866,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology},
Journal = {Emotion Review},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds183866}
}
@article{fds183867,
Author = {Lora Cope and Jana Schaich Borg and Carla Harenski and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Debra Lieberman and Prashanth K. Nyalakanti and Vince D. Calhoun and Kent Kiehl},
Title = {Unique Hemispheric Laterality During Processing of Immoral
Stimuli},
Journal = {Frontiers},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds183867}
}
@book{fds306223,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel},
Title = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Editor = {Sinott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds306223}
}
@book{fds306224,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Title = {Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin
Libet},
Pages = {1-288},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
ISBN = {9780195381641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001},
Abstract = {We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we
consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is
thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising
experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will
occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that
produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often
claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and
moral responsibility, and to have practical implications for
criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of
further fascinating scientific research-including findings
in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by
John-Dylan Haynes-that raises novel questions about whether
conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics
respond that both commonsense views of action and
traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as
well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of
Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, this
book discusses whether our conscious choices really cause
our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for
how we view ourselves and how we should treat each
other.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001},
Key = {fds306224}
}
@article{fds244908,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from
Peay},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244908}
}
@article{fds244970,
Author = {Walter Sinnott Armstrong},
Title = {Does Good Need God?},
Journal = {Encompass Ethics Magazine},
Volume = {Spring},
Pages = {40-43},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244970}
}
@article{fds244906,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Alfred R. Mele’s Effective Intentions: The Power of
Conscious Will},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {51},
Number = {3},
Pages = {127-143},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244906}
}
@article{fds244881,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Lessons from Libet},
Pages = {235-246},
Booktitle = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244881}
}
@article{fds244882,
Author = {Harman, G and Mason, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Reasoning},
Booktitle = {The Moral Psychology Handbook},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Doris, J and Group, TMPR},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244882}
}
@article{fds244883,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Young, L and Cushman,
F},
Title = {Moral Intuition},
Booktitle = {The Moral Psychology Handbook},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Doris, J and Group, TMPR},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244883}
}
@article{fds244941,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral perception and heuristics},
Journal = {Modern Schoolman},
Volume = {86},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {327-347},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Editor = {John Greco},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0026-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000207873600007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.5840/schoolman2009863/47},
Key = {fds244941}
}
@book{fds244847,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244847}
}
@article{fds244922,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How strong is this obligation? An argument for
consequentialism from concomitant variation},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {69},
Number = {3},
Pages = {438-442},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000268568600005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/40607654},
Key = {fds244922}
}
@article{fds244931,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {MIXED-UP META-ETHICS},
Journal = {NOUS},
Pages = {235-256},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000207925600012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244931}
}
@article{fds244776,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Mackie’s Internalisms},
Pages = {55-70},
Booktitle = {A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral
Error Theory},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Joyce, R and Kirchin, S},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244776}
}
@article{fds244777,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation
for Morality},
Pages = {101-115},
Booktitle = {Is Goodness without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith,
Secularism, and Ethics},
Publisher = {Rownan & Littlewfield},
Editor = {King, NL and Garcia, RK},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244777}
}
@article{fds244937,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Précis of moral scepticisms},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {77},
Number = {3},
Pages = {789-793},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260337800012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00222.x},
Key = {fds244937}
}
@article{fds244942,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Replies to copp, timmons, and railton},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {77},
Number = {3},
Pages = {820-836},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260337800016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00226.x},
Key = {fds244942}
}
@misc{fds244810,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Pollsters with Dirty Tricks},
Journal = {Valley News},
Pages = {A9-A9},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds244810}
}
@article{fds244811,
Author = {Sinnott‐armstrong, W},
Title = {REPLIES TO DREIER AND MCNAUGHTON},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {49},
Number = {3},
Pages = {218-228},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8051},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2008.00463.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0149.2008.00463.x},
Key = {fds244811}
}
@article{fds244918,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A contrastivist manifesto},
Journal = {Social Epistemology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {257-270},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0269-1728},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691720802546120},
Abstract = {General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are
relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to
explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy
(reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief),
and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue
paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an
account of justified belief that is compatible with
reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also
provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on
suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant.
This view contrasts with contextualism, invariantism, and
Schaffer's contrastivism.},
Doi = {10.1080/02691720802546120},
Key = {fds244918}
}
@article{fds244956,
Author = {Cushman, F and Knobe, J and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {108},
Number = {1},
Pages = {281-289},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0010-0277},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18377886},
Abstract = {An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction
between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping
moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of
experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral
appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically,
morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as
actively 'doing' than as passively 'allowing'. This finding
adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral
appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We
therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view
that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping
diverse cognitive representations across multiple
domains.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.005},
Key = {fds244956}
}
@article{fds244926,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Is moral phenomenology unified?},
Journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {85-97},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1568-7759},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000264104200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral
judgment is not unified across different areas of morality
(involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or
even across different relations to harm. Common responses,
such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt
demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too
narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to
capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The
disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible
with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology
and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of
morality. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11097-007-9065-z},
Key = {fds244926}
}
@article{fds244957,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Funk, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga,
M},
Title = {Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal
responsibility? Lessons from law and neuroscience.},
Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
Volume = {1124},
Pages = {145-160},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0077-8923},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18400929},
Abstract = {Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal
responsibility? To answer this question, we must first
specify legal criteria for criminal responsibility and then
ask how neurological findings can be used to determine
whether particular defendants meet those criteria. Cognitive
neuroscience may speak to at least two familiar conditions
of criminal responsibility: intention and sanity. Functional
neuroimaging studies in motor planning, awareness of
actions, agency, social contract reasoning, and theory of
mind, among others, have recently targeted a small
assortment of brain networks thought to be instrumental in
such determinations. Advances in each of these areas bring
specificity to the problems underlying the application of
neuroscience to criminal law.},
Doi = {10.1196/annals.1440.007},
Key = {fds244957}
}
@article{fds244924,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mallon, R and McCoy, T and Hull,
JG},
Title = {Intention, temporal order, and moral judgments},
Journal = {Mind and Language},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {90-106},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252400500007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect
claims that agents' intentions affect whether acts are
morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents'
intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong,
whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects
whether acts are classified as killings. This finding
suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the
classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims
that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen
as causing effects intentionally rather than as side
effects. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00330.x},
Key = {fds244924}
}
@article{fds244875,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Brown, T and Murphy,
E},
Title = {Brain Images as Legal Evidence},
Journal = {Episteme},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {359-373},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1742-3600},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/E1742360008000452},
Abstract = {This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as
evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, which weighs probative value against the danger of
being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders.
The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research
relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the
probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility
is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to
be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments
that will directly assess how jurors are influenced by brain
images. © 2008, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.3366/E1742360008000452},
Key = {fds244875}
}
@article{fds244927,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moderate classy pyrrhonian moral scepticism},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {448-456},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000256690000005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This précis summarizes my book 'Moral Skepticisms', with
emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral
belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on
meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral
epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral
philosophers. © 2008 The Author.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.553.x},
Key = {fds244927}
}
@article{fds244929,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {478-488},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000256690000009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {I reply to comments by Gerry Hough, Peter Baumann and
Martijn Blaauw on my book Moral Skepticisms. The main issues
concern whether modest justifiedness is epistemic and how it
is related to extreme justifiedness; how contrastivists can
handle crazy contrast classes, indeterminacy and common
language; whether Pyrrhonian scepticism leads to paralysis
in decision-making or satisfies our desires to evaluate
beliefs as justified or not; and how contextualists can
respond to my arguments against relevance of contrast
classes. © 2008 The Author.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.561.x},
Key = {fds244929}
}
@article{fds244857,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Preventive War, What Is It Good For?},
Pages = {202-221},
Booktitle = {Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199233137},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0009},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that although Bush's preventive war in
Iraq is morally wrong, and his policy is too broad, some
exceptional preventive wars can still be morally justified.
It develops and defends a version of consequentialism about
war. It then criticizes the relevant part of the most common
deontological alternative - just war theory. Finally, all of
this theory is applied to preventive war in general and
Bush's war and policy in particular.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0009},
Key = {fds244857}
}
@book{fds306225,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Vol. 1: The Evolution of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306225}
}
@book{fds306226,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306226}
}
@book{fds306227,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306227}
}
@article{fds244812,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticisms},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {49},
Number = {3},
Pages = {193-196},
Publisher = {Wiley: No OnlineOpen},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244812}
}
@article{fds244872,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {448-456},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208637},
Abstract = {This précis summarizes my book 'Moral Skepticisms', with
emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral
belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on
meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral
epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral
philosophers.},
Doi = {10.2307/40208637},
Key = {fds244872}
}
@article{fds244907,
Author = {Kranzler, HR and Li, TK},
Title = {What is addiction?},
Journal = {Alcohol Research and Health},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {93-95},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry},
Editor = {William Fulford},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1535-7414},
Abstract = {This issue of Alcohol Research & Health examines
addiction to multiple substances - that is, combined
dependence on alcohol and other drugs (AODs), including
marijuana, cocaine, and opioids. It seems fitting, then, to
begin the issue with a look at what constitutes "addiction."
The Oxford English Dictionary (pp. 24-25) traces the term
addiction to Roman law, under which addiction was a "formal
giving over by sentence of court; hence, a dedication of
person to a master." This notion of relinquishment of
control by the addicted person is the central feature of
many lay and professional definitions of the term. The study
of addictive behavior crosses several disciplines,
including, among others, behavioral neuroscience,
epidemiology, genetics, molecular biology, pharmacology,
psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. Articles in this
issue examine aspects of AOD use disorders from the
perspective of some of these varied disciplines.},
Key = {fds244907}
}
@misc{fds244809,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schauer, F},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {251-252},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244809}
}
@misc{fds244845,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Section B: Ethics},
Journal = {Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, Philosophical
Issues},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {143-293},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244845}
}
@misc{fds306228,
Author = {, },
Title = {Evidence and Law},
Journal = {Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schauer, F},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306228}
}
@article{fds244778,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Abstract + Concrete = Paradox},
Pages = {209-230},
Booktitle = {Experimental Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Knobe, J and Nichols, S},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244778}
}
@article{fds244779,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How to Apply Generalities: Reply to Tolhurst and
Shafer-Landau},
Pages = {97-105},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244779}
}
@article{fds244780,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Framing Moral Intuitions},
Pages = {47-76},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244780}
}
@article{fds244781,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {9789400723764},
Pages = {xiii-xix},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {940072375X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2376-4},
Abstract = {This book presents a unique collection of the most relevant
perspectives in contemporary human rights philosophy.
Different intellectual traditions are brought together to
explore some of the core postmodern issues challenging
standard justifications. Widely accessible also to non
experts, contributions aim at opening new perspectives on
the state of the art of the philosophy of human rights. This
makes this book particularly suitable to human rights
experts as well as master and doctoral students. Further,
while conceived in a uniform and homogeneous way, the book
is internally organized around three central themes: an
introduction to theories of rights and their relation to
values; a set of contributions presenting some of the most
influential contemporary strategies; and finally a number of
articles evaluating those empirical challenges springing
from the implementation of human rights. This specific
set-up of the book provides readers with a stimulating
presentation of a growing and interconnecting number of
problems that post-natural law theories face today. While
most of the contributions are new and specifically conceived
for the present occasion, the volume includes also some
recently published influential essays on rights, democracy
and their political implementation.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-2376-4},
Key = {fds244781}
}
@article{fds244782,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0742-332220160000034025},
Doi = {10.1108/s0742-332220160000034025},
Key = {fds244782}
}
@article{fds244783,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {9697},
Pages = {xi-xvii},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {9781628419313},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2231307},
Doi = {10.1117/12.2231307},
Key = {fds244783}
}
@article{fds321514,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {R. M. Hare (1919-)},
Pages = {326-333},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Analytic Philosophy},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishers Inc.},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780631214151},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470998656.ch26},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470998656.ch26},
Key = {fds321514}
}
@article{fds244856,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi's Moral
Intuitionism},
Pages = {19-29},
Booktitle = {Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and
Epistemology of Robert Audi},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195311952},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0002},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that Audi's views on moral intuitions,
specifically concerning whether they can be justified
without being based on inference, raise a number of
questions Audi has yet to address. First, it asks, can moral
intuitions be justified without reflection? Second, does
Audi's account of reflection turn out to involve inference?
And are conclusions of reflection therefore based on
inference? Third, can conclusions of reflection be justified
without second-order beliefs concerning the reliability of
the reflection? And if not, wouldn't this also involve
inference? Fourth, can conclusions of reflection be
justified without at least an ability to infer? And if not,
wouldn't this leave the view unable to block the skeptical
regress?},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0002},
Key = {fds244856}
}
@article{fds244784,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Overcoming Christianity},
Pages = {69-79},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Anthony, LM},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds244784}
}
@article{fds244814,
Author = {Grafton, ST and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP and Gazzaniga, SI and Gazzaniga, MS},
Title = {Brain Scans Go Legal},
Journal = {Scientific American Mind},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {30-37},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1555-2284},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamericanmind1206-30},
Doi = {10.1038/scientificamericanmind1206-30},
Key = {fds244814}
}
@article{fds244813,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Which Evidence Law? A Response to Schauer},
Journal = {PENNumbra, The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review},
Volume = {155},
Number = {1},
Pages = {129-133},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds244813}
}
@article{fds244955,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Hynes, C and Van Horn and J and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Consequences, action, and intention as factors in moral
judgments: an FMRI investigation.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {803-817},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16768379},
Abstract = {The traditional philosophical doctrines of Consequentialism,
Doing and Allowing, and Double Effect prescribe that moral
judgments and decisions should be based on consequences,
action (as opposed to inaction), and intention. This study
uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate
how these three factors affect brain processes associated
with moral judgments. We find the following: (1) Moral
scenarios involving only a choice between consequences with
different amounts of harm elicit activity in similar areas
of the brain as analogous non-moral scenarios; (2) Compared
to analogous non-moral scenarios, moral scenarios in which
action and inaction result in the same amount of harm elicit
more activity in areas associated with cognition (such as
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and less activity in
areas associated with emotion (such as the orbitofrontal
cortex and temporal pole); (3) Compared to analogous
non-moral scenarios, conflicts between goals of minimizing
harm and of refraining from harmful action elicit more
activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal
cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas
associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and
superior frontal gyrus); (4) Compared to moral scenarios
involving only unintentional harm, moral scenarios involving
intentional harm elicit more activity in areas associated
with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and
less activity in areas associated with cognition (including
the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus). These
findings suggest that different kinds of moral judgment are
preferentially supported by distinguishable brain
systems.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn.2006.18.5.803},
Key = {fds244955}
}
@article{fds244853,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction to Pyrrhonian Skepticism},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780195169720},
Key = {fds244853}
}
@article{fds244855,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Classy Pyrrhonism},
Pages = {188-205},
Booktitle = {Pyrrhonian Skepticism},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780195169720},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195169727.003.0011},
Abstract = {This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes
within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge
claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes,
but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all
presuppositions about which contrast classes are really
relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of
everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday
perspective or any other perspective. This framework
provides a precise way to understand the central claims of
neo- Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the
problems and objections raised by its critics.},
Doi = {10.1093/0195169727.003.0011},
Key = {fds244855}
}
@book{fds244902,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticisms},
Pages = {1-288},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780195187724},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195187725.001.0001},
Abstract = {Moral Skepticisms provides a detailed overview of moral
epistemology, addressing such profound questions as: Are any
moral beliefs true? Are any justified? Is moral knowledge
possible? These questions lead to fundamental issues about
the nature of morality, language, metaphysics,
justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous
practical importance for controversial moral debates in
politics, law, education, and health care ethics. To help
understand these questions, Part 1 provides essential
background, clarifies the issues, and argues for a novel
contrastivist account of justified belief. Part 2 then
explores the main alternatives in moral epistemology,
including naturalism, normativism, intuitionism,
contextualism, and coherentism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues
that all of these approaches fail to rule out moral
nihilism-the view that nothing is really morally wrong or
right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory -
moderate classy Pyrrhonian moral skepticism - which
concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a
modest contrast class, but no moral beliefs can be justified
out of an unlimited contrast class, and neither contrast
class is the relevant one, so no moral belief is justified
without qualification.},
Doi = {10.1093/0195187725.001.0001},
Key = {fds244902}
}
@article{fds244852,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology},
Pages = {339-366},
Booktitle = {Metaethics after Moore},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199269914},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016},
Abstract = {This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology
and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral
intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a
set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs
require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short,
whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial,
emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious
sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by
confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically
justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical
work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of
his principles, and thus are in need of support from other
relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is
incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being
non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More
cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be
some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs
that do not require inferential support, still, for educated
adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting
factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are
non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not
themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed
entirely by empirical means (including the methods of
science), it does not follow that developments in the
sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not
relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs
are epistemically justified.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016},
Key = {fds244852}
}
@article{fds244806,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {McMillan Reference},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244806}
}
@article{fds244917,
Author = {Howarth, RB and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {Advances in the Economics of Environmental
Resources},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {xi-xx},
Publisher = {Emerald (MCB UP )},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1569-3740},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05016-9},
Doi = {10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05016-9},
Key = {fds244917}
}
@article{fds244928,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {You ought to be ashamed of yourself (when you violate an
imperfect moral obligation)},
Journal = {NOUS},
Pages = {193-208},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000235231600013&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244928}
}
@article{fds244916,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral
Obligations},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {285-307},
Booktitle = {Advances in the Economics of Environmental
Resources},
Publisher = {Emerald (MCB UP )},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780762312719},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05013-3},
Doi = {10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05013-3},
Key = {fds244916}
}
@book{fds306229,
Title = {Perspectives on Climate Change Science, Economics, Politics,
Ethics},
Pages = {307 pages},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Howarth, R},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {9780762312719},
Abstract = {This book explores the interplay between science, economics,
politics, and ethics in understanding the challenge that
climate change poses to the international
community.},
Key = {fds306229}
}
@article{fds244815,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation},
Journal = {San Diego Law Review},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {465-492},
Publisher = {University of San Diego},
Year = {2005},
ISSN = {0036-4037},
Key = {fds244815}
}
@book{fds244848,
Author = {Craig, WL and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {God? A Debate Between a Christian and an
Atheist},
Pages = {156 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA},
Year = {2004},
ISBN = {9780195165999},
Abstract = {The book is composed of six chapters that alternate between
Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, so that each separate point can
be discussed as it arises.},
Key = {fds244848}
}
@misc{fds244816,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Can You Believe It?},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine},
Pages = {30-33},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds244816}
}
@article{fds244938,
Author = {SINNOTT‐ARMSTRONG, W},
Title = {Experience and Foundationalism in Audi's The Architecture
of Reason},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {181-187},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185605800010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00032.x},
Key = {fds244938}
}
@article{fds244915,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {For goodness' sake},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {41},
Number = {SUPPL.},
Pages = {83-91},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00977.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00977.x},
Key = {fds244915}
}
@article{fds244817,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture
of Reason},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {181-187},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
Key = {fds244817}
}
@article{fds244945,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Weak and Strong Judicial Review},
Journal = {Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3/4},
Pages = {381-392},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000183942400008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/3505113},
Key = {fds244945}
}
@article{fds244940,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Recusal and Bush v. Gore},
Journal = {Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {221-248},
Publisher = {Test accounts},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174360900006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1014574117133},
Key = {fds244940}
}
@article{fds244943,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Malhotra, A},
Title = {How to avoid deviance (in logic)},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {215-236},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0144-5340},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000180233500004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {We show that classical two-valued logic is included in weak
extensions of normal three-valued logics and also that
normal three-valued logics are best viewed not as deviant
logics but instead as strong extensions of classical
two-valued logic obtained by adding a modal operator and the
right axioms. This article develops a general method for
formulating the right axioms to construct a two-valued
system with theorems that correspond to all of the logical
truths of any normal three-valued logic. The extended
classical system can then express anything that can be
expressed in the three-valued logic, so there can be no
reason to abandon two-valued logic in favor of three-valued
logic. Moreover, the two-valued modal system is preferable,
because it enables us to study interactions of different
operators with different rationales. It also makes it easier
to introduce quantifiers and iteration. Nothing is lost and
much is gained by choosing the extended two-valued approach
over normal three-valued logics. © 2002 Taylor & Francis
Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/01445340210154394},
Key = {fds244943}
}
@article{fds244948,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sparrow, D},
Title = {A light theory of color},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {110},
Number = {3},
Pages = {267-284},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000179261000004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Traditional theories locate color in primary qualities of
objects, in dispositional properties of objects, in visual
fields, or nowhere. In contrast, we argue that color is
located in properties of light. More specifically, light is
red iff there is a property P of the light that typically
interacts with normal human perceivers to give the sensation
of red. This is an error theory, because objects and visual
fields that appear red are not really red, since they lack
the properties that make light red. We show how this light
theory solves or avoids problems that afflict its
competitors. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1020608528373},
Key = {fds244948}
}
@book{fds306230,
Title = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with Reply},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds306230}
}
@article{fds244932,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What's in a Contrast Class?},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {62},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-84},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000173469000014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/3329072},
Key = {fds244932}
}
@article{fds244785,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Gert Contra Consequentialism},
Pages = {145-163},
Booktitle = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with a Reply},
Publisher = {Rowan and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244785}
}
@article{fds244786,
Author = {Audi, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Scope and Structure of the Essays; A Brief
Introduction},
Pages = {1-3},
Booktitle = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with a Reply},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244786}
}
@article{fds244787,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Two Ways to Derive Constitutional Rights},
Pages = {231-244},
Booktitle = {Legal Interpretation in Democratic States},
Publisher = {Ashgate/Dartmouth Publishing},
Editor = {Goldsworthy, J and Campbell, T},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244787}
}
@article{fds244952,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder},
Journal = {Utilitas},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {342-349},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800003228},
Abstract = {If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do
X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X,
then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle
is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It
can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but
not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral
theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that
this argument fails to establish consequentialism as
understood by ‘most philosophers’, because it fails to
establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing
consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from
utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder
also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory
that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I
respond that her explanation cannot be completed without
introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories.
© 2001, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0953820800003228},
Key = {fds244952}
}
@article{fds244925,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Responsibility and fault},
Journal = {LAW AND PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {103-106},
Publisher = {KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000167317100005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244925}
}
@article{fds244818,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Behnke, S},
Title = {Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder: The Vexing
Problems of Personhood and Responsibility},
Journal = {Southern California Interdisciplinary Law
Journal},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-296},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {1077-0704},
Key = {fds244818}
}
@article{fds244788,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {R. M. Hare},
Pages = {326-333},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Analytic Philosophy},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Martinich, AP and Sosa, D},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244788}
}
@article{fds244804,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Gert, Bernard},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {608-610},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244804}
}
@article{fds244805,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Ought’ Implies ‘Can'},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1265-1266},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244805}
}
@article{fds244946,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Expressivism and Embedding},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {61},
Number = {3},
Pages = {677-677},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {2000},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000165224900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2653618},
Key = {fds244946}
}
@article{fds244936,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Behnke, S},
Title = {Responsibility in cases of multiple personality
disorder},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {34},
Number = {SUPPL. 14},
Pages = {301-323},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2000},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000165836300016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.16},
Key = {fds244936}
}
@article{fds244914,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {From 'is' to 'ought' in moral epistemology},
Journal = {Argumentation},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {159-174},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0920-427X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007861512274},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can
have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral
conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently
proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine: All
of Dahlia's beliefs are true. Dahlia believes that Bertie
morally ought to marry Madeleine. ∴ Bertie morally ought
to marry Madeleine. I argue that Nelson's universal premise
has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid
formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs
essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that
Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is
used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a
moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral
belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme
views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against
moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in
believing the conjunction of its premises without depending
on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus,
arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important
in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited. ©
2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1007861512274},
Key = {fds244914}
}
@article{fds244951,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Value judgment: Improving our ethical beliefs},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH},
Volume = {60},
Number = {1},
Pages = {237-240},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084910400025&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244951}
}
@article{fds244789,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Patchwork Quilt Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {315-334},
Booktitle = {Judicial Power, Democracy, and Legal Positivism},
Publisher = {Dartmouth Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Campbell, T and Goldsworthy, J},
Year = {2000},
ISBN = {9780754620617},
Key = {fds244789}
}
@article{fds244791,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Perspectival Theory of Law},
Pages = {185-213},
Booktitle = {Judicial Power, Democracy, and Legal Positivism},
Publisher = {Dartmouth Publishing},
Editor = {Campbell, T and Goldsworthy, J},
Year = {2000},
ISBN = {9780754620617},
Key = {fds244791}
}
@article{fds244933,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Begging the question},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {77},
Number = {2},
Pages = {174-191},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081467900004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409912348921},
Key = {fds244933}
}
@article{fds244923,
Author = {Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {Book ReviewRuth Chang, , ed.Incommensurability,
Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. ix+303. $57.50 (cloth);
$24.95 (paper).},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {110},
Number = {1},
Pages = {190-192},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000083491100009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/233210},
Key = {fds244923}
}
@article{fds244819,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {"MPP, RIP" RIP},
Journal = {Philosophical Papers},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {125-131},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0556-8641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568649909506596},
Doi = {10.1080/05568649909506596},
Key = {fds244819}
}
@article{fds244913,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Entrapment in the Net?},
Journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {95-104},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1388-1957},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1010059427954},
Abstract = {Internet stings to catch child molesters raise problems for
popular tests of entrapment that focus on causation,
initiative, counterfactuals, and subjective predisposition.
An objective test of entrapment works better in the context
of the Internet. The best form of objective test is
determined by consequences of drawing a line at various
places. This approach allows some Internet stings but counts
other stings as entrapment when they go too far. © 1999
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the
Netherlands.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1010059427954},
Key = {fds244913}
}
@article{fds244930,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some varieties of particularism},
Journal = {Metaphilosophy},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-12},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0026-1068},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081248900001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral
wrongness are about particular acts rather than general
principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what
makes true moral judgments true is not general principles
but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological
particularism claims that studying particular acts apart
from general principles can justify beliefs in moral
judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will
do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at
each particular decision as it arises and give up the search
for a complete moral theory. This paper raises problems for
each of these versions of particularism. © Metaphilosophy
LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-9973.00108},
Key = {fds244930}
}
@article{fds244950,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Argument for Descriptivism},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-291},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081656600006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00868.x},
Key = {fds244950}
}
@article{fds244947,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Explanation and justification in moral epistemology},
Journal = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY,
VOL 1},
Pages = {117-127},
Publisher = {PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CTR},
Editor = {Brinkmann, K},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {1-889680-05-2},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086292600012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244947}
}
@article{fds244790,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Perspectival Theory of Law},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy},
Volume = {24},
Pages = {27-55},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {1440-4982},
Key = {fds244790}
}
@article{fds244939,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {You Can't Lose What You Ain't Never Had: A Reply to Marquis
on Abortion},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
Volume = {96},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-72},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000082721700004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/4320972},
Key = {fds244939}
}
@article{fds244844,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {191-193},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {1572-8447},
Key = {fds244844}
}
@article{fds244799,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
Pages = {535-535},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244799}
}
@article{fds244800,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism},
Pages = {589-590},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244800}
}
@article{fds244801,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Impartiality},
Pages = {419-419},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244801}
}
@article{fds244797,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Pages = {427-428},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Werhane, P and Freeman, RE},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds244797}
}
@article{fds244843,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality, Normativity, and Society},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {552-554},
Year = {1996},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds244843}
}
@book{fds306231,
Title = {The Philosophy of Law Classic and Contemporary Readings with
Commentary},
Pages = {1002 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
ISBN = {9780155008274},
Abstract = {PHILOSOPHY OF LAW examines such topics as the concept of
law, the dispute between natural law theorists and legal
positivists, the relations between law and morality,
criminal responsibility and legal punishment, rights of the
individual ...},
Key = {fds306231}
}
@book{fds306232,
Title = {Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology},
Pages = {342 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds306232}
}
@article{fds244842,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality and Action},
Journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {193-196},
Year = {1996},
ISSN = {0967-2559},
Key = {fds244842}
}
@article{fds244792,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Has Ethics Kept Up With the Development of Science,
Technology, and Medicine?},
Pages = {91-103},
Booktitle = {The Human Predicament: An International Dialogue on the
Meaning of Human Behavior},
Publisher = {Promerhus Books},
Editor = {Razis, DV},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244792}
}
@article{fds244793,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and Rights},
Pages = {48-65},
Booktitle = {Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Mason, HE},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244793}
}
@article{fds244794,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism and Justification},
Pages = {3-48},
Booktitle = {Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244794}
}
@article{fds244832,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Problems of Philosophy of Law (Update)},
Pages = {414-416},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement},
Publisher = {Macmillian},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244832}
}
@article{fds244841,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Structure of Justification},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {45},
Number = {180},
Pages = {394-397},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1995},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1467-9213},
Key = {fds244841}
}
@article{fds244953,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Nihilism and scepticism about moral obligations},
Journal = {Utilitas},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {217-236},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002053},
Abstract = {<jats:p>There are many disagreements about<jats:italic>what</jats:italic>people
have moral obligations to do, but almost everyone believes
that<jats:italic>some</jats:italic>people
have<jats:italic>some</jats:italic>moral obligations.
Moreover, there are some moral obligations in which almost
everyone believes. For example, if I promise to give a talk
at this conference, I have a moral obligation to do so. Of
course, my obligation might be overridden. Moreover, even if
my obligation were overridden, I would still
have<jats:italic>a</jats:italic>moral obligation to give a
talk at this conference.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S0953820800002053},
Key = {fds244953}
}
@book{fds306233,
Title = {Modality, Morality and Belief Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan
Marcus},
Pages = {270 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Raffman, D and Asher, N and Marcus,
RB},
Year = {1995},
ISBN = {9780521440820},
Abstract = {This collection of original essays honours one of the most
influential philosophical pioneers of the twentieth century,
Ruth Barcan Marcus.},
Key = {fds306233}
}
@article{fds244798,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Pages = {508-508},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244798}
}
@article{fds244840,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Imagination},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {103},
Number = {411},
Pages = {381-384},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
G},
Year = {1994},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1460-2113},
Key = {fds244840}
}
@article{fds244820,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Truth of Performatives},
Journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {99-107},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1994},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0967-2559},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570785},
Doi = {10.1080/09672559408570785},
Key = {fds244820}
}
@book{fds306234,
Author = {Brison, SJ},
Title = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {266 pages},
Publisher = {Westview Press},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1993},
ISBN = {9780813383941},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429501364},
Abstract = {Brings together ten of the nation's finest and most
provocative legal scholars to present their views on
constitutional interpretation. All of these papers are very
recent, and four were written especially for this
volume.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780429501364},
Key = {fds306234}
}
@article{fds244912,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some Problems for Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
Volume = {69},
Number = {2/3},
Pages = {297-313},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4320388},
Abstract = {I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the
traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of
these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up
expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not
really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some
ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about
morality which have at most indirect connections to his
expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later
discussions of hyperscepticism (180), parochialism (203
ff.), and indirect pragmatism (224). These views could still
be developed even if he gave up expressivism. All I have
tried to show here is that he does need to give up
expressivism unless he can solve the problems that I have
raised. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.2307/4320388},
Key = {fds244912}
}
@article{fds244839,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Human Morality},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {235-239},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244839}
}
@article{fds244795,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Brison, S},
Title = {A Philosophical Introduction to Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {1-25},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Publisher = {Westview},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244795}
}
@misc{fds306235,
Author = {, },
Title = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Journal = {Boston University law review. Boston University. School of
Law},
Volume = {72},
Number = {4},
Pages = {681-799},
Publisher = {The Boston University School of Law},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1992},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds306235}
}
@article{fds244838,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Playing by the Rules},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {116-118},
Year = {1992},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244838}
}
@article{fds244869,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Risks, National Defense, and Nuclear Deterrence},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {345-362},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435816},
Doi = {10.2307/40435816},
Key = {fds244869}
}
@article{fds244870,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Argument for Consequentialism},
Journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {399-421},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {1520-8583},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214254},
Doi = {10.2307/2214254},
Key = {fds244870}
}
@article{fds244796,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Value of Bad Grades},
Pages = {54-56},
Booktitle = {Falling in Love with Wisdom},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244796}
}
@article{fds244802,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {835-837},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Garland Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244802}
}
@article{fds244803,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Intuitionism},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {628-630},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Garland Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244803}
}
@article{fds244821,
Author = {Donohue, L and Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {20 YEARS OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1 S},
Pages = {217-229},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {2041-6962},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00623.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00623.x},
Key = {fds244821}
}
@article{fds244822,
Author = {Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {MORAL EXPERIENCE AND JUSTIFICATION},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1 S},
Pages = {89-96},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00614.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00614.x},
Key = {fds244822}
}
@article{fds244823,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The wrongful intentions principle},
Journal = {Philosophical Papers},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-24},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0556-8641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568649109506350},
Doi = {10.1080/05568649109506350},
Key = {fds244823}
}
@article{fds333209,
Author = {SINNOTT‐ARMSTRONG, W},
Title = {On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-120},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00412.x},
Abstract = {ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz
defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of
violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people,
with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a
course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue
that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring
that the harm or threat be to persons other than those
intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern
action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who know they
are terrorists from those who do not. Copyright © 1991,
Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00412.x},
Key = {fds333209}
}
@article{fds244837,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
Davidson},
Journal = {Nous},
Pages = {120-123},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {1468-0068},
Key = {fds244837}
}
@misc{fds244824,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Ethics of the Bomb},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine},
Pages = {14-15},
Year = {1990},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds244824}
}
@article{fds244862,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Moor, J and Fogelin, R},
Title = {A Defence of Modus Tollens},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {9-16},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3328201},
Doi = {10.2307/3328201},
Key = {fds244862}
}
@article{fds244836,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {30},
Number = {3},
Pages = {183-185},
Year = {1989},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244836}
}
@article{fds244911,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Promises which cannot be kept},
Journal = {Philosophia},
Volume = {18},
Number = {4},
Pages = {399-407},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1988},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0048-3893},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02380651},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02380651},
Key = {fds244911}
}
@book{fds244849,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244849}
}
@article{fds244910,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A resolution of a paradox of promising},
Journal = {Philosophia},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {572},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1987},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0048-3893},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02381077},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02381077},
Key = {fds244910}
}
@article{fds244835,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Spreading the Word},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {48},
Number = {1},
Pages = {163-166},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1987},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
Key = {fds244835}
}
@article{fds244864,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and 'Ought and Ought Not'},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-139},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0045-5091},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231517},
Doi = {10.2307/40231517},
Key = {fds244864}
}
@article{fds244868,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {84},
Number = {5},
Pages = {263-276},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026753},
Doi = {10.2307/2026753},
Key = {fds244868}
}
@article{fds244871,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Insanity vs. Irrationality},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-21},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435648},
Doi = {10.2307/40435648},
Key = {fds244871}
}
@article{fds244863,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Moor, J and Fogelin, R},
Title = {A Defense of Modus Ponens},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {83},
Number = {5},
Pages = {296-300},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026144},
Doi = {10.2307/2026144},
Key = {fds244863}
}
@article{fds244861,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Solution to Forrester's Paradox of Gentle
Murder},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {82},
Number = {3},
Pages = {162-168},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026353},
Doi = {10.2307/2026353},
Key = {fds244861}
}
@article{fds244866,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {'Ought to Have' and 'Could Have'},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {44-48},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3327403},
Doi = {10.2307/3327403},
Key = {fds244866}
}
@article{fds244867,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {321-329},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0003-0481},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014112},
Doi = {10.2307/20014112},
Key = {fds244867}
}
@article{fds244865,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {`Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {93},
Number = {2},
Pages = {249-261},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1984},
ISSN = {0031-8108},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184585},
Doi = {10.2307/2184585},
Key = {fds244865}
}
@article{fds244834,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine,},
Volume = {75},
Number = {9},
Pages = {18-20},
Year = {1983},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds244834}
}
@article{fds244833,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Life of the Mind},
Journal = {Grolier’s Masterplots: 1979 Annual},
Pages = {196-199},
Publisher = {Grolier Enterprises},
Year = {1979},
Key = {fds244833}
}
@article{fds219478,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Neil Levy},
Key = {fds219478}
}
%% Soon, Valerie-Jean
@article{fds349795,
Author = {Soon, V},
Title = {Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory
approach},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {177},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1857-1877},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01288-y},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-019-01288-y},
Key = {fds349795}
}
%% Sreenivasan, Gopal
@article{fds375846,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Courage, Consistency, and Other Conundra},
Journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {281-296},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
Abstract = {I am very grateful to Rachel Barney and Christian Miller for
their helpful and challenging comments on my book, Emotion
and Virtue (Princeton, 2020). My response aims first to
clarify and then to fortify my position on some of the many
excellent points they raise in this symposium.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
Key = {fds375846}
}
@article{fds356449,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Varieties of Minimalism about Informed Consent.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5},
Pages = {66-68},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1906999},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2021.1906999},
Key = {fds356449}
}
@article{fds355409,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual.},
Journal = {ETHICS},
Volume = {131},
Number = {2},
Pages = {383-390},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds355409}
}
@article{fds343340,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {What Is Adequate Understanding?},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Volume = {19},
Number = {5},
Pages = {38-40},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2019.1591542},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2019.1591542},
Key = {fds343340}
}
@article{fds339292,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Emotions, Reasons, and Epistemology},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {97},
Number = {2},
Pages = {500-506},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12539},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12539},
Key = {fds339292}
}
@article{fds335569,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Acts, agents, and the definition of virtue},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {251-274},
Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9780198808930},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0013},
Abstract = {This chapter discusses the direction of epistemological
priority between traits and actions in the definition of
virtue. Do we first identify a character trait as kind, say,
and only then identify its characteristic expressions as
kind acts? Or do we identify various acts as kind acts
first, and only then identify the agents who perform them as
kind agents? This chapter defends a modest agent-centered
view: some kind acts can be identified as kind without
reference to any kind agent, while other kind acts cannot be
identified as kind except by identifying them as the
characteristic expressions of a certain trait (kindness).
Many proponents of virtue ethics are committed to a
privileged role for agents in the definition of virtue; and
they regard this commitment as making their enterprise
distinctive. In preserving an indispensable role for
virtuous agents in the identification of virtuous actions,
the present argument vindicates their aspiration.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0013},
Key = {fds335569}
}
@article{fds318394,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Health care and human rights: against the split duty
gambit.},
Journal = {Theoretical medicine and bioethics},
Volume = {37},
Number = {4},
Pages = {343-364},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-016-9375-7},
Abstract = {There are various grounds on which one may wish to
distinguish a right to health care from a right to health.
In this article, I review some old grounds before
introducing some new grounds. But my central task is to
argue that separating a right to health care from a right to
health has objectionable consequences. I offer two main
objections. The domestic objection is that separating the
two rights prevents the state from fulfilling its duty to
maximise the health it provides each citizen from its fixed
health budget. The international objection is that
separating a human right to health care fails the moral
requirement that, for any given moral human right, the
substance to which any two right-holders are entitled be of
an equal standard.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11017-016-9375-7},
Key = {fds318394}
}
@article{fds244984,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Taking international legality seriously: A Methodology for
human rights},
Pages = {211-229},
Booktitle = {Human Rights: Moral or Political?},
Publisher = {Oxford},
Editor = {Etinson, A},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {9780198713258},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
Abstract = {The chapter aims to draw philosophical attention to the
neglected enterprise of figuring out whether the existence
of international legal human rights is morally justified.
Philosophers usually focus on whether moral human rights
exist, which is often rather controversial. As is argued
here, however, the existence of a moral right not to be
imprisoned for debt (say) is neither necessary nor
sufficient for an international legal human right not to be
imprisoned for debt to be morally justified. The chapter
proceeds to indicate how rich and complex the issues
involved in morally justifying an international legal human
right really are; and to show how much philosophical
distance there is between such a justification and the
existence of a relevant moral right. Finally, the chapter
draws some lessons from its analysis for the methodological
debate over political approaches to human
rights.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
Key = {fds244984}
}
@article{fds311740,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {HESC and equitable residues.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Volume = {15},
Number = {3},
Pages = {54-55},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1526-5161},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2014.998388},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2014.998388},
Key = {fds311740}
}
@article{fds376593,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {A plea for moral deference},
Journal = {Etica e Politica},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {41-59},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature
that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps,
more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified
deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise.
On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to
have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is
illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous phenomenon of
taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of
individual moral virtues, but is not limited to exemplars of
virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference
against overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to
contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role in
moral theory.},
Key = {fds376593}
}
@article{fds311739,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {A plea for moral deference},
Journal = {Ethics & Politics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {41-59},
Year = {2015},
url = {http://www2.units.it/etica/2015_2/SREENIVASAN.pdf},
Abstract = {It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature
that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps,
more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified
deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise.
On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to
have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is
illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous phenomenon of
taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of
individual moral virtues, but is not limited to exemplars of
virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference
against overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to
contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role in
moral theory.},
Key = {fds311739}
}
@article{fds244990,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Equality, opportunity, ambiguity},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {82-92},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {1470-594X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X13496071},
Abstract = {I distinguish four different interpretations of 'equality of
opportunity.' We get four interpretations because a
neglected ambiguity in 'opportunity' intersects a well-known
ambiguity in 'equality.' The neglected ambiguity holds
between substantive and non-substantive conceptions of
'opportunity' and the well-known ambiguity holds between
comparative and non-comparative conceptions of 'equality.'
Among other things, distinguishing these four
interpretations reveals how misleading 'equal opportunity
for advantage' formulations of luck egalitarianism can be.
These formulations are misleading in so far as they obscure
the difference between two separate claims about which
inequalities are consistent with true equality. Luck
egalitarianism claims that inequalities that have been
chosen in some suitable sense are consistent with true
equality, while the traditional ideal of equality of
opportunity only claims that inevitable inequalities that
have been determined through fair competitions are
consistent with true equality. Obscuring the difference
between these two claims therefore serves both to arrogate
the rhetorical advantages of the traditional ideal to luck
egalitarianism and to cover over a limitation to luck
egalitarianism's ambition to provide a comprehensive
principle of distributive justice. © The Author(s)
2013.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X13496071},
Key = {fds244990}
}
@article{fds244986,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Justice, Inequality, and Health},
Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Stanford University},
Year = {2014},
ISSN = {1095-5054},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-inequality-health/},
Key = {fds244986}
}
@article{fds244987,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {The situationist critique of virtue ethics},
Pages = {290-314},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Russell, D},
Year = {2013},
ISBN = {9781107001169},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCO9780511734786.014},
Abstract = {Traditional philosophical theories of virtue define a
“virtue” as a species of character trait. Many
contemporary philosophical theories of virtue follow suit,
though not all do. Adopting this traditional definition
exposes a theory of virtue to what has come to be known as
the “situationist” critique of virtue ethics. To explain
this critique, and to keep track of the ensuing debate, it
helps to distinguish philosophical situationism from
psychological situationism (compare Snow 2010).
Psychological situationists are not philosophers and they
make no philosophical claims. Rather, they belong to a
particular experimental tradition within social psychology,
a tradition that is opposed to traditional personality
theory or “personology” (for an accessible introduction,
see Ross and Nisbett 1991). Since they are the original
situationists, I shall henceforth refer to psychological
situationists as “situationists” tout court.
Philosophical situationists - principally, Gilbert Harman
(1999, 2000) and John Doris (1998, 2002) - reject theories
of virtue that employ the traditional philosophical
definition of ‘virtue.’ Specifically, they claim that
such theories are “empirically inadequate” and their
argument for this claim centrally appeals to the
experimental results of situationism. It is their argument
that constitutes the “situationist critique.”.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCO9780511734786.014},
Key = {fds244987}
}
@article{fds244989,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {What is non-ideal theory?},
Series = {NOMOS 51},
Pages = {233-256},
Booktitle = {Transitional Justice},
Publisher = {NOMOS LI and Oxford},
Editor = {Williams, M and Elster, J},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780814794661},
Key = {fds244989}
}
@article{fds244980,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {A human right to health? Some inconclusive
scepticism},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supplementary
volume)},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {239-265},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00216.x/abstract},
Key = {fds244980}
}
@article{fds244975,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Non-ideal Theory: A Taxonomy with Illustration},
Pages = {135-152},
Booktitle = {Global Justice and Bioethics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {9780195379907},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.003.0006},
Abstract = {© 2012 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This
chapter discusses non-ideal theory of justice and its
significance in bioethics, with special emphasis on
distributive justice. The two major branches of this theory
are an innovation of John Rawls. The divisions are: the
partial compliance theory and the transitional theory. But a
discourse into non-ideal theory shouldn't stop there, as one
may extend the concepts of the theory beyond the two
branches mentioned above. The chapter concludes with an
illustrative example of their extension vis-à-vis Rawls'
division.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195379907.003.0006},
Key = {fds244975}
}
@article{fds244983,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Why justice requires rationing in health
care},
Pages = {143-153},
Booktitle = {Medicine and Social Justice},
Publisher = {Oxford},
Editor = {Rhodes, R and Silvers, A},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {9780199744206},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199744206.003.0013},
Abstract = {This chapter explains why justice requires rationing in
health care, arguing that justice not only permits but in
principle requires a national health scheme to deny some
people some effective medical treatment they need. The basic
moral structure of a national health care system is defined
by its answers to two questions: whom to treat and which
medical services to offer (to those whom the system treats).
At first glance, the most compelling answers to these
questions are the simplest ones, namely, "everyone" and
"everything." Or, a little more precisely, "everyone,
without regard to her ability to pay" and "every effective
medical service that a sick person needs." This chapter
contends that the second answer is actually mistaken. Not
only does morality- or, more specifically, justice- permit a
national health care system to deny some sick people some
effective medical services that they need, but it positively
requires as much. The chapter also compares the "rationing"
approach to what it calls the "reverse-engineered" approach
and describes premises that are required to reach the
conclusion that justice requires health care
rationing.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199744206.003.0013},
Key = {fds244983}
}
@article{fds245003,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Duties and Their Direction},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {120},
Number = {3},
Pages = {465-494},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000278649700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/652303},
Key = {fds245003}
}
@article{fds244996,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Ethics and Epidemiology: Residual Health
Inequalities},
Journal = {Public Health Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {244-249},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
D},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {1754-9981},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000208221700006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/phe/php030},
Key = {fds244996}
}
@article{fds244994,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Disunity of virtue},
Journal = {Journal of Ethics},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {195-212},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1382-4554},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/gkt5505r54360217/},
Abstract = {This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while
trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on
the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins
from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor
morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the
possibility of completely insulating an agent's set of
virtues from any liability to moral error. I then
distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this
possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is
more to morality than virtue alone-that is, not all moral
considerations are ones to which some virtue is
characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not
unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also
turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have
supposed. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
2009.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10892-009-9048-0},
Key = {fds244994}
}
@article{fds245000,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Ethics and Epidemiology: The Income Debate},
Journal = {Public Health Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {45-52},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
D},
Year = {2009},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1754-9981},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000208221500005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/phe/php004},
Key = {fds245000}
}
@article{fds244985,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Review of D. Estlund, Democratic Authority},
Journal = {Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Pages = {62-72},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0021-3306},
url = {http://gopalsreenivasan.com/iyyun},
Key = {fds244985}
}
@article{fds244988,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Democracy and international law: A peril from the
"public"?},
Pages = {240-250},
Booktitle = {Moral Universalism and Pluralism},
Publisher = {New York University Pres},
Editor = {Richardson, HS and Williams, MS},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {9780814794487},
Key = {fds244988}
}
@article{fds244995,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Character and consistency: Still more errors},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {117},
Number = {467},
Pages = {603-612},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
G},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1460-2113},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000258808700003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn046},
Key = {fds244995}
}
@article{fds244982,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Global health and non-ideal justice},
Pages = {369-375},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics},
Publisher = {Cambridge},
Editor = {Singer, P and Viens, A},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244982}
}
@article{fds244997,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Review of M. Otsuka, Libertarianism without
inequality},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {74},
Number = {3},
Pages = {792-796},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000248617000018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00056.x},
Key = {fds244997}
}
@article{fds244979,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Health and justice in our non-ideal world},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {218-236},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1470-594X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X07077273},
Abstract = {In this article, I explore some advantages of viewing
well-being in terms of an individual's health status.
Principally, I argue that this perspective makes it easier
to establish that rich countries at least have an obligation
to transfer 1 percent of their GDP to poor countries. If
properly targeted at the fundamental determinants of health
in developing countries, this transfer would very plausibly
yield a disproportionate ‘bang for the buck’ in terms of
individual well-being. This helps to explain how the
obligation can be both light enough in its burden on the
rich to avoid being ‘too demanding’ and yet also
bountiful enough in its effects to be worthy of the status
of a ‘minimum obligation’. The advantages I enunciate
are particularly relevant to establishing an obligation in
the context of a non-ideal theory of international justice,
which aims to set interim targets for practical action
before an ideal theory has been settled. © 2007, Sage
Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X07077273},
Key = {fds244979}
}
@article{fds245012,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Health care and equality of opportunity.},
Journal = {Hastings Cent Rep},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {21-31},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0093-0334},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17474342},
Doi = {10.1353/hcr.2007.0033},
Key = {fds245012}
}
@article{fds244981,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {In defense of the hybrid theory},
Pages = {299-307},
Booktitle = {Law: Metaphysics, Meaning, and Objectivity},
Publisher = {Rodopi},
Editor = {Villanueva, E},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds244981}
}
@article{fds245010,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G and Benatar, SR},
Title = {Challenges for global health in the 21st century: some
upstream considerations.},
Journal = {Theoretical medicine and bioethics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-11},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16532300},
Doi = {10.1007/s11017-005-5752-3},
Key = {fds245010}
}
@article{fds244978,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Does today's international trade agreement bind tomorrow's
citizen?},
Journal = {Chicago - Kent Law Review},
Volume = {81},
Pages = {119-145},
Year = {2006},
ISSN = {0009-3599},
Key = {fds244978}
}
@article{fds245002,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Review of S. Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural
foundations of Moral judgment},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {800-805},
Year = {2006},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000240012900014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/504630},
Key = {fds245002}
}
@article{fds244993,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {A hybrid theory of claim-rights},
Journal = {Oxford Journal of Legal Studies},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {257-274},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0143-6503},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi013},
Abstract = {In this article, I propose and defend a new analysis of
claim-rights. My proposal is a hybrid of the two best known
analyses, the Will theory and the Interest theory. For good
reason, the debate between these theories is often regarded
as a stand-off. That is because the Will theory has had no
satisfactory answer to the Interest theory's best objections
(inalienable rights and incompetent right-holders), while
the Interest theory has likewise had no satisfactory answer
to the Will theory's best objection (third party
beneficiaries). After reviewing these various objections and
criticizing some recent attempts to meet them, I introduce
my hybrid alternative and explain how it provides a
satisfactory solution to all of these objections. © The
Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/ojls/gqi013},
Key = {fds244993}
}
@article{fds244992,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Does the gats undermine democratic control over
health?},
Journal = {Journal of Ethics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {269-281},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1382-4554},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-004-3329-4},
Abstract = {This paper examines the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which is one of the World Trade
Organisation's free trade agreements. In particular, I
examine the extent to which the GATS unduly restricts the
scope for national democratic choice. For purposes of
illustration, I focus on the domestic health system as the
subject of policy choice. I argue that signatories to the
GATS effectively acquire a constitutional obligation to
maintain a domestic health sector with a certain minimum
degree of privatisation. Like constitutional obligations,
the restrictions the GATS imposes on the freedom of future
generations to structure their domestic health sector are
(i) very difficult, though not strictly impossible, to
alter; and (ii) not chosen in any ordinary sense by the
subject generation. To gain democratic legitimacy,
therefore, the relevant provisions of the GATS must pass
some higher standard of democratic scrutiny, such as
ratification by a supermajority. Ordinary legislative
ratification does not suffice. © Springer
2005.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10892-004-3329-4},
Key = {fds244992}
}
@article{fds245011,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Informed consent and the therapeutic misconception:
clarifying the challenge.},
Journal = {The Journal of clinical ethics},
Volume = {16},
Number = {4},
Pages = {369-371},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1046-7890},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16447525},
Key = {fds245011}
}
@article{fds245009,
Author = {Belsky, L and Lie, R and Mattoo, A and Emanuel, EJ and Sreenivasan,
G},
Title = {The general agreement on trade in services: implications for
health policymakers.},
Journal = {Health affairs (Project Hope)},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {137-145},
Year = {2004},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0278-2715},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15160811},
Abstract = {The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), created
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, aims to
regulate measures affecting international trade in
services-including health services such as health insurance,
hospital services, telemedicine, and acquisition of medical
treatment abroad. The agreement has been the subject of
great controversy, for it may affect the freedom with which
countries can change the shape of their domestic health care
systems. We explain the rationale behind the agreement and
discuss its scope. We also address the major controversies
surrounding the GATS and their implications for the U.S.
health care system.},
Doi = {10.1377/hlthaff.23.3.137},
Key = {fds245009}
}
@article{fds245007,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Does informed consent to research require
comprehension?},
Journal = {Lancet},
Volume = {362},
Number = {9400},
Pages = {2016-2018},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14683665},
Doi = {10.1016/S0140-6736(03)15025-8},
Key = {fds245007}
}
@article{fds245006,
Author = {Astor, A and Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Providing free care to the uninsured: how much should
physicians give?},
Journal = {Annals of internal medicine},
Volume = {139},
Number = {9},
Pages = {W78},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14597477},
Doi = {10.7326/0003-4819-139-9-200311040-00022-w2},
Key = {fds245006}
}
@article{fds245005,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Errors about errors: Virtues theory and trait
attribution},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {111},
Number = {441},
Pages = {47-68},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
G},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1460-2113},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174222700005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/111.441.47},
Key = {fds245005}
}
@article{fds245008,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {International justice and health: a proposal.},
Journal = {Ethics Int Aff},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {81-90},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {0892-6794},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15709281},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00399.x},
Key = {fds245008}
}
@article{fds244976,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {A Proliferation of Liberties},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {229-237},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2001},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00100.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00100.x},
Key = {fds244976}
}
@article{fds244999,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Understanding alien morals},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {62},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-32},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000166842100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244999}
}
@article{fds327372,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Opportunity is not the key},
Journal = {American Journal of Bioethics},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1b-2b},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152651601300168997},
Doi = {10.1162/152651601300168997},
Key = {fds327372}
}
@article{fds244977,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Judicial review and individual self-rule},
Journal = {Teoría Jurídica},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1-13},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244977}
}
@article{fds245004,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {What is the general will?},
Journal = {Philosophical Review},
Volume = {109},
Number = {4},
Pages = {545-581},
Publisher = {Duke University Press},
Year = {2000},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1558-1470},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169238500003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2693624},
Key = {fds245004}
}
@article{fds244998,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Interpretation and reason},
Journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {142-171},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1998},
ISSN = {1088-4963},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000074544600003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1088-4963.1998.tb00065.x},
Key = {fds244998}
}
@article{fds245001,
Author = {SREENIVASAN, G},
Title = {BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND SCEPTICISM - ETHICS AS SOCIAL
ARTEFACT - PHILIPS,M},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {46},
Number = {183},
Pages = {260-261},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1996},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1467-9213},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UC71700026&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2956399},
Key = {fds245001}
}
%% Stern, Reuben E
@article{fds367761,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {3},
Pages = {613-637},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
that there exist situations in which rational agents
inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
class of normative theories than has been previously
recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
saddled with the inevitability of rational
opinion loss.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
Key = {fds367761}
}
@article{fds371706,
Author = {Stern, R and Eva, B},
Title = {Anti-reductionist Interventionism},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {74},
Number = {1},
Pages = {241-267},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/714792},
Abstract = {Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate
that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental
properties (and macro-level properties in general) as
causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist
Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of
Woodward’s interventionist conception of causation. The
viability of these responses has been challenged by
Gebharter, who argues that the causal exclusion argument is
vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs).
Since the interventionist conception of causation relies
crucially on CBNs for its foundations, Gebharter’s
argument appears to cast significant doubt on
interventionism’s anti-reductionist credentials. In the
present article, we both (1) demonstrate that Gebharter’s
CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies
on some unmotivated and philosophically significant
assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between
CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use
Bayesian networks to develop a general theory of causal
inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the
foundation for an anti-reductionist interventionist account
of causation.1},
Doi = {10.1086/714792},
Key = {fds371706}
}
@article{fds365042,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Interventionist counterfactuals and the nearness of
worlds},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {199},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {10721-10737},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03265-7},
Abstract = {A number of authors have recently used causal models to
develop a promising semantics for non-backtracking
counterfactuals. Briggs (Philosophical Studies 160:39–166,
2012) shows that when this semantics is naturally extended
to accommodate right-nested counterfactuals, it invalidates
modus ponens, and therefore violates weak centering given
the standard Lewis/Stalnaker interpretation of the
counterfactual in terms of nearness or similarity of worlds.
In this paper, I explore the possibility of abandoning the
Lewis/Stalnaker interpretation for some alternative that is
better suited to accommodate the causal modeling (CM)
semantics. I argue that a revision of McGee’s (The Journal
of Philosophy 82:462–471, 1985) semantics can accommodate
CM semantics without sacrificing weak centering, and that CM
semantics can therefore be situated within a general
semantics for counterfactuals that is based on the nearness
or similarity of worlds.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03265-7},
Key = {fds365042}
}
@article{fds365043,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Causal concepts and temporal ordering},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {198},
Pages = {6505-6527},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02235-4},
Abstract = {Though common sense says that causes must temporally
precede their effects, the hugely influential
interventionist account of causation makes no reference to
temporal precedence. Does common sense lead us astray? In
this paper, I evaluate the power of the commonsense
assumption from within the interventionist approach to
causal modeling. I first argue that if causes temporally
precede their effects, then one need not consider the
outcomes of interventions in order to infer causal
relevance, and that one can instead use temporal and
probabilistic information to infer exactly when X is
causally relevant to Y in each of the senses captured by
Woodward’s interventionist treatment. Then, I consider the
upshot of these findings for causal decision theory, and
argue that the commonsense assumption is especially powerful
when an agent seeks to determine whether so-called
“dominance reasoning” is applicable.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02235-4},
Key = {fds365043}
}
@article{fds371707,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Erratum: An Interventionist's Guide to Exotic Choice (Mind
(2021) 130:518 (537–566) DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa082)},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {130},
Number = {520},
Pages = {1421},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab034},
Abstract = {This manuscript was first published with some formatting
errors that resulted in the illegibility of Figure 4 and
Figure 8. These formatting errors have now been
corrected.},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzab034},
Key = {fds371707}
}
@article{fds365044,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {An Interventionist's Guide to Exotic Choice},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {130},
Number = {518},
Pages = {537-566},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa082},
Abstract = {In this paper, I use interventionist causal models to
identify some novel Newcomb problems, and subsequently use
these problems to refine existing interventionist treatments
of causal decision theory. The new Newcomb problems that
make trouble for existing interventionist treatments involve
so-called 'exotic choice' - that is, decision-making
contexts where the agent has evidence about the outcome of
her choice. I argue that when choice is exotic, the
interventionist can adequately capture causal
decision-theoretic reasoning by introducing a new
interventionist approach to updating on exotic evidence. But
I also argue that this new updating procedure is principled
only if the interventionist trades in the typical
interventionist conception of choice for an alternative
Ramseyan conception. I end by arguing that the guide to
exotic choice developed here may, despite its name, be
useful in some everyday contexts.},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzaa082},
Key = {fds365044}
}
@article{fds365045,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R and Hartmann, S},
Title = {The similarity of causal structure},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {86},
Number = {5},
Pages = {821-835},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705566},
Abstract = {Whether y obtains under the counterfactual supposition that
x is thought to depend on whether y obtains in the most
similar world(s) in which x obtains. Graphical causal models
have proved useful in developing a principled notion of
similarity between worlds, but this notion is limited
insofar as it does not apply to counterfactual suppositions
about causal structure. Here, we explore the possibility of
filling this lacuna by introducing a notion of similarity
between causal graphs. Since there are multiple principled
senses in which graphs can be similar, we introduce multiple
similarity metrics and multiple ways to prioritize these
metrics.},
Doi = {10.1086/705566},
Key = {fds365045}
}
@article{fds365046,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
Title = {Causal Explanatory Power},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {70},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1029-1050},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy012},
Abstract = {Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel
probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power
that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding
explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general
approach, we argue that it does not (without revision)
adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory
power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge.
We then amend their approach so that it does capture this
variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less
ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger's in the sense that it
is limited to causal explanatory power, it is also more
ambitious because we do not limit its domain to cases where
c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c causally
explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e
with some positive amount of causal explanatory power.
1Introduction2The Logic of Explanatory Power3Subjective and
Nomic Distributions 3.1Actual degrees of belief3.2The causal
distribution4Background Knowledge 4.1Conditionalization and
colliders4.2A helpful intervention5Causal Explanatory Power
5.1The applicability of explanatory power5.2Statistical
relevance c causal explanatory power5.3Interventionist
explanatory power5.4E illustrated6Conclusion.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axy012},
Key = {fds365046}
}
@article{fds365047,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Decision and Intervention},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {84},
Number = {4},
Pages = {783-804},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9980-0},
Abstract = {Meek and Glymour (Br J Philos Sci 45:1001–1021, 1994) use
the graphical approach to causal modeling to argue that one
and the same norm of rational choice can be used to deliver
both causal-decision-theoretic verdicts and
evidential-decision-theoretic verdicts. Specifically, they
argue that if an agent maximizes conditional expected
utility, then the agent will follow the causal decision
theorist’s advice when she represents herself as
intervening, and will follow the evidential decision
theorist’s advice when she represents herself as not
intervening. Since Meek and Glymour take no stand on whether
agents should represent themselves as intervening, they
provide more general advice than standard causal decision
theorists and evidential decision theorists. But I argue
here that even Meek and Glymour’s advice is not
sufficiently general. This is because (1) their advice is
not sensitive to the distinct ways in which agents can fail
to intervene, and (2) there are decision-making contexts in
which agents can reasonably have non-extreme confidence that
they are intervening. I then show that the most natural
extension of Meek and Glymour’s framework fails, but offer
a generalization of my (Synthese 194:4133–4153, 2017)
“Interventionist Decision Theory” that does not suffer
from the same problems.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-9980-0},
Key = {fds365047}
}
@article{fds365048,
Author = {Stern, R and Hartmann, S},
Title = {Two sides of modus ponens},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {115},
Number = {11},
Pages = {605-621},
Year = {2018},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20181151135},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil20181151135},
Key = {fds365048}
}
@article{fds365049,
Author = {Forster, M and Raskutti, G and Stern, R and Weinberger,
N},
Title = {The frugal inference of causal relations},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {69},
Number = {3},
Pages = {821-848},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw033},
Abstract = {Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal
Markov condition, which specifies which probability
distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose
among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given
probability distribution. Here we present a principle that
we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the
DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that frugality
has several desirable properties compared to the other
principles that have been suggested, including the
well-known causal faithfulness condition.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axw033},
Key = {fds365049}
}
@article{fds365050,
Author = {Polger, TW and Shapiro, LA and Stern, R},
Title = {In defense of interventionist solutions to
exclusion.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science},
Volume = {68},
Pages = {51-57},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.012},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.012},
Key = {fds365050}
}
@article{fds367334,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Diagnosing Newcomb’s Problem with Causal
Graphs},
Pages = {201-220},
Booktitle = {Newcomb’s Problem},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107180277},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316847893.011},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316847893.011},
Key = {fds367334}
}
@article{fds371708,
Author = {Easwaran, K and Stern, R},
Title = {The Many Ways to Achieve Diachronic Unity},
Pages = {240-263},
Booktitle = {Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality: New
Essays},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781108420099},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108329170.012},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108329170.012},
Key = {fds371708}
}
@article{fds365051,
Author = {Stern, R},
Title = {Interventionist decision theory},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {194},
Number = {10},
Pages = {4133-4153},
Year = {2017},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1133-x},
Abstract = {Jim Joyce has argued that David Lewis’s formulation of
causal decision theory is inadequate because it fails to
apply to the “small world” decisions that people face in
real life. Meanwhile, several authors have argued that
causal decision theory should be developed such that it
integrates the interventionist approach to causal modeling
because of the expressive power afforded by the language of
causal models, but, as of now, there has been little work
towards this end. In this paper, I propose a variant of
Lewis’s causal decision theory that is intended to meet
both of these demands. Specifically, I argue that Lewis’s
causal decision theory can be rendered applicable to small
world decisions if one analyzes his dependency hypotheses as
causal hypotheses that depend on the interventionist causal
modeling framework for their semantics. I then argue that
this interventionist variant of Lewis’s causal decision
theory is preferable to interventionist causal decision
theories that purportedly generalize Lewis’s through the
use of conditional probabilities. This is because Lewisian
interventionist decision theory captures the causal decision
theorist’s conviction that any correlation between what
the agent does and cannot cause should be irrelevant to the
agent’s choice, while purported generalizations do
not.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-016-1133-x},
Key = {fds365051}
}
@article{fds365052,
Author = {Schwan, B and Stern, R},
Title = {A causal understanding of when and when not to Jeffrey
conditionalize},
Journal = {Philosophers Imprint},
Volume = {17},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1-21},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {There are cases of ineffable learning — i. e., cases where
an agent learns something, but becomes certain of nothing
that she can express — where it is rational to update by
Jeffrey conditionalization. But there are likewise cases of
ineffable learning where updating by Jeffrey
conditionalization is irrational. In this paper, we first
characterize a novel class of cases where it is irrational
to update by Jeffrey conditionalization. Then we use the
d-separation criterion (from the graphical approach to
causal modeling) to develop a causal understanding of when
and when not to Jeffrey conditionalize that (unlike other
norms on offer) bars updating by Jeffrey conditionalization
in these cases. Finally, we reflect on how the possibility
of so-called “unfaithful” causal systems bears on the
normative force of the causal updating norm that we
advocate.},
Key = {fds365052}
}
@article{fds365053,
Author = {Hausman, DM and Stern, R and Weinberger, N},
Title = {Erratum to: Systems without a graphical causal
representation[Synthese (2014) 191, 1925-1930,
DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3]},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {192},
Number = {9},
Pages = {3053},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0686-4},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0686-4},
Key = {fds365053}
}
@article{fds365054,
Author = {Hausman, DM and Stern, R and Weinberger, N},
Title = {Systems without a graphical causal representation},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {191},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1925-1930},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3},
Abstract = {There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal
representation. We describe one that cannot be represented
in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests
limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference
and makes salient the point that causal relations among
variables depend upon details of causal setups, including
values of variables. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3},
Key = {fds365054}
}
@article{fds365055,
Author = {Barrett, M and Clatterbuck, H and Goldsby, M and Helgeson, C and McLoone, B and Pearce, T and Sober, E and Stern, R and Weinberger,
N},
Title = {Puzzles for ZFEL, McShea and Brandon's zero force
evolutionary law},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {723-735},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9321-7},
Abstract = {In their 2010 book, Biology's First Law, D. McShea and R.
Brandon present a principle that they call "ZFEL," the zero
force evolutionary law. ZFEL says (roughly) that when there
are no evolutionary forces acting on a population, the
population's complexity (i. e., how diverse its member
organisms are) will increase. Here we develop criticisms of
ZFEL and describe a different law of evolution; it says that
diversity and complexity do not change when there are no
evolutionary causes. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9321-7},
Key = {fds365055}
}
%% Sterrett, Susan G.
@article{fds155272,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Similarity and Dimensional Analysis" (to
appear)},
Volume = {9},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Dov Gabbay and Paul Thagard and John Woods},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds155272}
}
@article{fds155273,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Abstracting Matter"},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds155273}
}
@article{fds52432,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {Models of Machines and Models of Phenomena},
Journal = {International Studies in Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-80},
Publisher = {Taylor and Francis},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/(ensrh3455dv1bs55hy5upi55)/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,9;journal,3,20;linkingpublicationresults,1:104603,1},
Abstract = {Experimental engineering models have been used both to model
general phenomena, such as the onset of turbulence in fluid
flow, and to predict the performance of machines of
particular size and configuration in particular contexts.
Various sorts of knowledge are involved in the
method—logical consistency, general scientific principles,
laws of specific sciences, and experience. I critically
examine three different accounts of the foundations of the
method of experimental engineering models (scale models),
and examine how theory, practice, and experience are
involved in employing the method to obtain practical
results. Models of machines and mechanisms can be (and
generally are) involved in establishing criteria for similar
phenomena, which provide guidance in using events to model
other events. Conversely, models of phenomena such as events
that model other events can be (and generally are) involved
in experimentation on models of machines. I conclude that
often it is not more detailed models or the more precise
equations they engender that leads to better understanding,
but rather an insightful use of knowledge at hand to
determine which similarity principles are appropriate in
allowing us to infer what we do not know from what we are
able to observe.},
Key = {fds52432}
}
@book{fds14297,
Author = {Susan G. Sterrett},
Title = {Wittgenstein Flies A Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and
Models of the World},
Publisher = {Pi Press (Penguin Group imprint)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://www.pipress.net},
Abstract = {Wittgenstein told friends on many occasions that he came to
see how things in the world can be represented in language
by thinking about scale models, and that it occurred while
he was a soldier, in the autumn of 1914. This book is the
result of asking: what if he meant, experimental engineering
scale models? It is well known that Wittgenstein had been an
aeronautical engineer before going to Cambridge to study
philosophy with Bertrand Russell in 1911. Why only in 1914,
then, did this insight occur? It so happens 1914 was the
year that the basis of the method was formulated, by a
philosophically-minded physicist, as a matter of a purely
logical principle about any symbolic system that is used to
represent physical relationships. In fact, a whole array of
discussions about similarity arose in 1913-1914, in physics,
biology, and chemistry. This book lays out this previously
untold story in the history of ideas, presents a new reading
of Wittgenstein's philosophical work (Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus) and explains how many heretofore
puzzling claims in it click into a coherent account on this
new reading.},
Key = {fds14297}
}
@article{fds42921,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {Pictures of Sound: Wittgenstein on Gramophone Records and
the Logic of Depiction},
Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part
A},
Volume = {36},
Number = {2},
Pages = {351-362},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002019/01/SterrettPicturesOfSoundsR1.pdf},
Abstract = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002019/},
Key = {fds42921}
}
@article{fds17710,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"The Proper Uses of Proportion: Understanding Galileo's
Advance Over the Pythagoreans"},
Journal = {12th UK Conference on Foundations of Physics},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds17710}
}
@article{fds14296,
Author = {Michael Potter},
Title = {Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic from Kant
to Carnap},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {294-296},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Books},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds14296}
}
@article{fds14294,
Author = {S. G. Sterrett},
Title = {"How Many Thoughts Can Fit in the Form of a Proposition:
Revisiting Frege on Hilbert and Interpretations of
Geometrical Axioms"},
Year = {2003},
url = {http//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001816},
Key = {fds14294}
}
@article{fds17697,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {Physical Models and Fundamental Laws: Using One Piece of the
World to Tell About Another},
Journal = {Mind and Society},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {51-66},
Year = {2003},
url = {http//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000720},
Key = {fds17697}
}
@article{fds17726,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Nested Algorithms and 'The Original Imitation Test': A
Reply to James Moor"},
Journal = {Mind and Machines},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {131-136},
Year = {2002},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds17726}
}
@article{fds17730,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Darwin's Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection:
How Does It Go?"},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and
Biomedical Sciences},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {151-168},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2002},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds17730}
}
@article{fds38109,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Physical Pictures: Engineering Models circa 1914 and in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus"},
Series = {Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook},
Booktitle = {History of Philosophy of Science: New Trends and
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Editor = {Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds38109}
}
@article{fds38115,
Author = {S. G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Too Many Instincts: Contrasting Philosophical Views on
Intelligence in Humans and Non-Humans"},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {39-60},
Year = {2002},
Keywords = {Intelligence Instinct robot architecture},
Key = {fds38115}
}
@article{fds17716,
Author = {S.G. Sterrett},
Title = {"Turing's Two Tests for Intelligence"},
Journal = {Mind and Machines},
Volume = {10},
Series = {Studies in Cognitive Systems 30, Kluwer Academic},
Pages = {541-549},
Booktitle = {The Turing Test: The Elusive Standard of Artificial
Intelligence},
Publisher = {Taylor and Francis},
Editor = {James H. Moor},
Year = {2001},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds17716}
}
%% Summers, Jesse S
@article{fds373672,
Author = {Dasgupta, J and Lockwood Estrin and G and Summers, J and Singh,
I},
Title = {Cognitive Enhancement and Social Mobility: Skepticism from
India},
Journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {341-351},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
Doi = {10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
Key = {fds373672}
}
@article{fds353877,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {Joshua May, Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 288.
$64.00.},
Journal = {Utilitas},
Volume = {32},
Number = {3},
Pages = {382-385},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820819000499},
Doi = {10.1017/s0953820819000499},
Key = {fds353877}
}
@misc{fds370953,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, JS},
Title = {Defining addiction: A pragmatic perspective},
Pages = {123-131},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of
Addiction},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781138909281},
Key = {fds370953}
}
@article{fds326702,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {Post hoc ergo propter hoc: some benefits of
rationalization},
Journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
Volume = {20},
Number = {sup1},
Pages = {21-36},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1287292},
Abstract = {Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to
ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we
act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes,
emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary
pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other
than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a
post hoc story to justify our actions. I consider two
benefits of rationalization, once we realize that
rationalization is sincere. It allows us to work out, under
practical pressure of rational consistency, which are good
reasons to act on. Rationalization also prompts us to
establish meaningful patterns out of merely permissible
options.},
Doi = {10.1080/13869795.2017.1287292},
Key = {fds326702}
}
@article{fds325744,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {Rationalizing our Way into Moral Progress},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {93-104},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9750-5},
Abstract = {Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to
ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we
act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes,
emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary
pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other
than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a
post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for
views of moral progress according to which moral progress
proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’
reasons. I consider an account of rationalization, based on
Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike
simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and
because we also have a desire to be consistent with
ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for
becoming better people over time, and that a similar case
can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of
people can proceed via rationalization.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-016-9750-5},
Key = {fds325744}
}
@article{fds358800,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {Explaining irrational actions},
Journal = {Ideas y Valores},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {81-96},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65651},
Abstract = {We sometimes want to understand irrational action, or
actions a person undertakes given that their acting that way
conflicts with their beliefs, their (other) desires, or
their (other) goals. What is puzzling about all explanations
of such irrational actions is this: If we explain the action
by offering the agent's reasons for the action, the action
no longer seems irrational, but only (at most) a bad
decision. If we explain the action mechanistically, without
offering the agent's reasons for it, then the explanation
fails to explain the behavior as an action at all. I focus
on cases that result from compulsion or irresistible desire,
especially addiction, and show that this problem of
explaining irrational actions may be insurmountable because,
given the constraints on action explanations, we cannot
explain irrational actions both as irrational and as
actions.},
Doi = {10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65651},
Key = {fds358800}
}
@misc{fds319039,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Treatment},
Pages = {161-179},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Moseley, D and Gala, G},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-0-415-70816-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315688725},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315688725},
Key = {fds319039}
}
@article{fds319038,
Author = {Summers, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Scrupulous agents},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {7},
Pages = {947-966},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Abstract = {Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with
morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of
moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After
defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and
discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar
aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients:
perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral
thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and
reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain
whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Key = {fds319038}
}
@article{fds319041,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {Addiction by any other name},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {49-51},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2015.0004},
Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2015.0004},
Key = {fds319041}
}
@article{fds319040,
Author = {Summers, JS},
Title = {What is wrong with addiction},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-40},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2015.0011},
Abstract = {Clinical criteria have trouble distinguishing addictions, on
the one hand, from, on the other hand, appetites—like our
appetites for food and water—and non-addictive passions
that guide our lives, from serious hobbies to parenting. The
simplest explanation of how addictions are distinct from
non-addictive appetites and passions is that addictive
behavior reveals some misvaluation by the addict, that the
addict is wrong to act as she does. Psychological evidence
supports this philosophical proposal by explaining how such
a misvaluation is reinforced, namely by the addict’s
acting in unthinking, impulsive ways. This reinforcement
explains addiction’s chronic resistance to contrary
evidence. This proposal neatly accounts for the questions
left unanswered by standard diagnostic criteria of
addiction.},
Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2015.0011},
Key = {fds319040}
}
%% Tomasello, Michael
@article{fds374401,
Author = {Winter Née Grocke and P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {From what I want to do to what we decided to do:
5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, honor their agreements
with peers.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {239},
Pages = {105811},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
Abstract = {Sometimes we have a personal preference but we agree with
others to follow a different course of action. In this
study, 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 160) expressed a
preference for playing a game one way and were then
confronted with peers who expressed a different preference.
The experimenter then either got the participants to agree
with the peers explicitly or just shrugged her shoulders and
moved on. The children were then left alone to play the game
unobserved. Only the older children stuck to their agreement
to play the game as the peers wished. These results suggest
that by 5 years of age children's sense of commitment to
agreements is strong enough to override their personal
preferences.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
Key = {fds374401}
}
@article{fds374171,
Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
cost affects this tendency.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {237},
Pages = {105764},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
their reputations through communicative acts. In the
experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
the act and more likely to protest when another individual
was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
as a moderating factor.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Key = {fds374171}
}
@article{fds374236,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans
and Other Great Apes.},
Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {588-604},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
Abstract = {Humans share with other mammals and primates many social
motivations and emotions, but they are also much more
cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here
I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that
illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and
emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other
great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i)
'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and
pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me'
(e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment);
(iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt);
and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group
loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group
biases). The existence of these species-typical and
species-universal motivations and emotions provides
compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative
activities in the human species.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
Key = {fds374236}
}
@article{fds374400,
Author = {Vasil, J and Price, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Thought and language: Effects of group-mindedness on young
children's interpretation of exclusive we.},
Journal = {Child development},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.14049},
Abstract = {The current study investigated whether age-related changes
in the conceptualization of social groups influences
interpretation of the pronoun we. Sixty-four 2- and
4-year-olds (N = 29 female, 50 White-identifying) viewed
scenarios in which it was ambiguous how many puppets
performed an activity together. When asked who performed the
activity, a speaker puppet responded, "We did!" In one
condition, the speaker was near one and distant from another
puppet, implying a dyadic interpretation of we. In another
condition, the speaker was distant from both, thus pulling
for a group interpretation. In the former condition, 2- and
4-year-olds favored the dyadic interpretation. In the latter
condition, only 4-year-olds favored the group
interpretation. Age-related conceptual development "expands"
the set of conceivable plural person referents.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.14049},
Key = {fds374400}
}
@article{fds373982,
Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social
Bonding.},
Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the
Association for Psychological Science},
Pages = {17456916231201795},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17456916231201795},
Abstract = {Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all
primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are
unique to the species. These involve various kinds of
interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to
having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic
sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding
have no explanation for why humans should have these unique
bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality
account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to
participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and
communicative activities that both depend on and create
shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities
causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to
assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation
toward them and because the shared representations created
during such interactions make subsequent cooperative
interactions easier and more effective.},
Doi = {10.1177/17456916231201795},
Key = {fds373982}
}
@article{fds370890,
Author = {Vasil, J and Moore, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with
young English-speaking children’s production of
pronouns},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {43},
Number = {5},
Pages = {516-538},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01427237231169398},
Abstract = {Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children
expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or
more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this
conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use.
We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical
generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking
children’s first-person plural, first-person singular,
second-person, third-person plural, and third-person
singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children
used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0
compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp.
pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a
proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were
used more often as children aged. These findings suggest
that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at
age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.},
Doi = {10.1177/01427237231169398},
Key = {fds370890}
}
@article{fds370629,
Author = {Benozio, A and House, BR and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Apes reciprocate food positively and negatively.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {290},
Number = {1998},
Pages = {20222541},
Year = {2023},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
Abstract = {Reciprocal food exchange is widespread in human societies
but not among great apes, who may view food mainly as a
target for competition. Understanding the similarities and
differences between great apes' and humans' willingness to
exchange food is important for our models regarding the
origins of uniquely human forms of cooperation. Here, we
demonstrate in-kind food exchanges in experimental settings
with great apes for the first time. The initial sample
consisted of 13 chimpanzees and 5 bonobos in the control
phases, and the test phases included 10 chimpanzees and 2
bonobos, compared with a sample of 48 human children aged 4
years. First, we replicated prior findings showing no
spontaneous food exchanges in great apes. Second, we
discovered that when apes believe that conspecifics have
'intentionally' transferred food to them, positive
reciprocal food exchanges (food-for-food) are not only
possible but reach the same levels as in young children
(approx. 75-80%). Third, we found that great apes engage in
negative reciprocal food exchanges (no-food for no-food) but
to a lower extent than children. This provides evidence for
reciprocal food exchange in great apes in experimental
settings and suggests that while a potential mechanism of
<i>fostering</i> cooperation (via positive reciprocal
exchanges) may be shared across species, a stabilizing
mechanism (via negative reciprocity) is not.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
Key = {fds370629}
}
@article{fds368903,
Author = {Schäfer, M and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's consideration of collaboration and merit when
making sharing decisions in private.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {228},
Pages = {105609},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
Abstract = {Young children share equally when they acquire resources
through collaboration with a partner, yet it is unclear
whether they do so because in such contexts resources are
encountered as common and distributed in front of the
recipient or because collaboration promotes a sense of
work-based fairness. In the current studies, 5- and
8-year-old children from Germany (N = 193) acquired
resources either by working individually alongside or by
collaborating with a peer. After finding out that the
partner's container was empty, they decided in private
whether they wanted to donate some resources to the peer.
When both partners had worked with equal efforts (Study 1),
children shared more after collaboration than after
individual work. When one partner had worked with much more
effort than the other (Study 2), children shared more with a
harder-working partner than with a less-working partner
independently of whether they had collaborated or worked
individually. Younger children were more generous than older
children, in particular after collaboration. These findings
support the view that collaboration promotes a genuine sense
of fairness in young children, but they also indicate that
merit-based notions of fairness in the context of work may
develop independently of collaboration, at least by the
beginning of middle childhood and in Western
societies.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
Key = {fds368903}
}
@article{fds367773,
Author = {Colle, L and Grosse, G and Behne, T and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Just teasing! - Infants' and toddlers' understanding of
teasing interactions and its effect on social
bonding.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {231},
Pages = {105314},
Year = {2023},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
Abstract = {The current study investigates infants' and toddlers'
understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on
subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of
social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a
slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by
positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an
especially interesting test case to inform us about young
children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions.
In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and
18-month-old infants' ability to understand and
differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention
and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age,
infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months
they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the
second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old
children in closely matched purely playful and teasing
situations. We also investigated potential social effects of
teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence.
Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing
than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers,
additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease
than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could
be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and
toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from
superficially similar but serious behavior and from around
18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers
are able to process a complex social intention like teasing.
Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler
intention understanding abilities.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
Key = {fds367773}
}
@article{fds362755,
Author = {Hepach, R and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Gerdemann, SC and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation
underlying helping in early childhood.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e13253},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253},
Abstract = {We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator
of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-,
and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an
individual or watch as another person provided help.
Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging,
we measured children's positive emotions through changes in
postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual
and watching another person help was equally rewarding;
5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively
helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive
emotions following helping were greater when an audience was
watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old
children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be
helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional,
strategic motivation to improve their reputation by
helping.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13253},
Key = {fds362755}
}
@article{fds365125,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a
theory.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-35},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
Abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal,
there existed only a few conflicting findings about great
apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½
decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand
the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others,
and they use this knowledge to their advantage in
competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there
existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive
skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that
great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their
decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information
to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past
25 years of research on great ape social cognition and
metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are
evolutionarily related.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
Key = {fds365125}
}
@article{fds371813,
Author = {Wolf, W and Thielhelm, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for
faces with white sclera.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {225},
Pages = {105532},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
Abstract = {The cooperative eye hypothesis posits that human eye
morphology evolved to facilitate cooperation. Although it is
known that young children prefer stimuli with eyes that
contain white sclera, it is unknown whether white sclera
influences children's perception of a partner's
cooperativeness specifically. In the current studies, we
used an online methodology to present 5-year-old children
with moving three-dimensional face models in which facial
morphology was manipulated. Children found "alien" faces
with human eyes more cooperative than faces with dark sclera
(Study 2) but not faces with enlarged irises (Study 1). For
more human-like faces (Study 3), children found human eyes
more cooperative than either enlarged irises or dark sclera
and found faces with enlarged irises cuter (but not more
cooperative) than eyes with dark sclera. Together, these
results provide strong support for the cooperative eye
hypothesis.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
Key = {fds371813}
}
@misc{fds371506,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Having Intentions, Understanding Intentions, and
Understanding Communicative Intentions},
Pages = {63-75},
Booktitle = {Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and
Self-Control},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780805831412},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003417927-5},
Abstract = {This chapter looks at a major cause and a major consequence
of the 9-month social-cognitive revolution; and both of
these also concern infant intentionality. It argues that
young children’s understanding of other persons as
intentional agents results in large part from newly emerging
forms of intentionality in their own sensory-motor actions.
The chapter explores young children’s understanding of a
special type of intention that emerges directly on the heels
of the 9-month revolution, namely, communicative intentions.
Intentional agents have goals and make active choices among
behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important,
intentional agents also make active choices about what they
pay attention to in pursuing those goals. ntentional agents
have goals and make active choices among behavioral means
for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents
also make active choices about what they pay attention to in
pursuing those goals.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003417927-5},
Key = {fds371506}
}
@article{fds364183,
Author = {Li, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Disagreement, justification, and equitable moral judgments:
A brief training study.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {223},
Pages = {105494},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494},
Abstract = {Although theorists agree that social interactions play a
major role in moral development, previous research has not
experimentally assessed how specific features of social
interactions affect children's moral judgments and
reasoning. The current study assessed two features:
disagreement and justification. In a brief training phase,
children aged 4-5.5 years (N = 129) discussed simple
moral scenarios about issues of fairness (how to allocate
things between individuals) with a puppet who, in a
between-participants factorial design, either agreed or
disagreed with the children's ideas and either asked or did
not ask the children to justify their ideas. Children then
responded to another set of moral scenarios in a test phase
that was the same for all children. Children in the "agree
and do not justify" baseline condition showed an inflexible
equality bias (preferring only equal allocations regardless
of context), but children who had experiences of
disagreement or experiences of being asked to justify
themselves shifted toward making equitable decisions based
on common ground norms and values. Furthermore, false belief
competence was related to children's decisions and
justifications. These findings support the classic Piagetian
hypothesis that social interactions are a catalyst of
cognitive disequilibrium and moral development.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494},
Key = {fds364183}
}
@article{fds367772,
Author = {Li, L and Tucker, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children judge defection less negatively when there's
a good justification},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {64},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101268},
Abstract = {Morality includes a common ground ranking of values, of
which a central theme is that prosocial actions are more
justifiable than selfish ones. Learning to distinguish
between good versus bad justifications for actions based on
a common ground ranking of values is a key aspect of moral
development. The current study assessed this type of
understanding in young children. In a within-participants
design, young children (N = 64) saw puppets who promised to
show them a cool toy, failed to fulfill their promise, and
then gave either a good (prosocial), bad (selfish), or no
justification for their defection. Children's judgments
about defection following good justifications were less
negative than their judgments about defection following bad
or no justifications, which did not differ. When asked to
justify their judgments, 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds)
made more normative or promise-referencing statements when
reasoning about puppets who gave good justifications as
opposed to bad or no justifications. Children's rates of
tattling on, liking, and inviting puppets to play did not
vary by the type of justification that a puppet gave.
Overall, the findings suggest that the capacity to reference
a common ground ranking of values, a key component of human
cooperation and morality, is present in young
children.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101268},
Key = {fds367772}
}
@article{fds362987,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How fairness and dominance guide young children's bargaining
decisions.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {93},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1318-1333},
Year = {2022},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13757},
Abstract = {Reaching agreements in conflicts is an important
developmental challenge. Here, German 5-year-olds
(N = 284, 49% female, mostly White, mixed socioeconomic
backgrounds; data collection: June 2016-November 2017) faced
repeated face-to-face bargaining problems in which they
chose between fair and unfair reward divisions. Across three
studies, children mostly settled on fair divisions. However,
dominant children tended to benefit more from bargaining
outcomes (in Study 1 and 2 but not Study 3) and children
mostly failed to use leverage to enforce fairness.
Communication analyses revealed that children giving orders
to their partner had a bargaining advantage and that
children provided and responded to fairness reasons. These
findings indicate that fairness concerns and dominance are
both key factors that shape young children's bargaining
decisions.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13757},
Key = {fds362987}
}
@article{fds364336,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The coordination of attention and action in great apes and
humans.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {377},
Number = {1859},
Pages = {20210093},
Year = {2022},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0093},
Abstract = {Great apes can discern what others are attending to and even
direct others' attention to themselves in flexible ways. But
they seemingly do not coordinate their attention with one
another recursively-understanding that the other is
monitoring their attention just as they are monitoring
hers-in acts of joint attention, at least not in the same
way as young human children. Similarly, great apes
collaborate with partners in many flexible ways, but they
seemingly do not coordinate with others to form mutually
obligating joint goals and commitments, nor regulate the
collaboration via acts of intentional communication, at
least not in the same way as young human children. The
hypothesis defended here is that it is precisely in their
capacities to coordinate attention and action with
others-that is, in their capacities for shared
intentionality-that humans are most clearly distinguished
from other great apes. This article is part of the theme
issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine':
comparative approaches to social action coordination'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0093},
Key = {fds364336}
}
@article{fds362986,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {What is it like to be a chimpanzee?},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {200},
Number = {2},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03574-5},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees and humans are close evolutionary relatives who
behave in many of the same ways based on a similar type of
agentive organization. To what degree do they experience the
world in similar ways as well? Using contemporary research
in evolutionarily biology and animal cognition, I explicitly
compare the kinds of experience the two species of capable
of having. I conclude that chimpanzees’ experience of the
world, their experiential niche as I call it, is: (i)
intentional in basically the same way as humans’; (ii)
rational in the sense that it is self-critical and operates
with logically structured causal and intentional inferences;
but (iii) not normative at all in that it does not operate
with “objective” evaluative standards. Scientific data
do not answer philosophical questions, but they provide rich
raw material for scientists and philosophers alike to
reflect on and clarify fundamental psychological
concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-022-03574-5},
Key = {fds362986}
}
@article{fds362632,
Author = {O'Madagain, C and Helming, KA and Schmidt, MFH and Shupe, E and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Great apes and human children rationally monitor their
decisions.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {289},
Number = {1971},
Pages = {20212686},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686},
Abstract = {Several species can detect when they are uncertain about
what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice,
or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we
do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they
need more information to make a decision because new
evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we
explore this ability in great apes and human children.
First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence
contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was
greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their
belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep
track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational
monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the
same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second
study, participants formed a belief about a reward's
location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by
picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old
children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the
disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict
in physical evidence, the youngest children were more
sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical
evidence.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2021.2686},
Key = {fds362632}
}
@article{fds359682,
Author = {Vasil, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Effects of "we"-framing on young children's commitment,
sharing, and helping.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {214},
Pages = {105278},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105278},
Abstract = {By around 3 years of age, collaboration induces in young
children a normative sense of "we" that creates a sense of
obligation (e.g., commitment, fairness) toward their
collaborative partner. The current study investigated
whether this normative sense of we could be induced purely
verbally in 3- and 4-year-old children. Children joined a
puppet at a table to draw. In one condition the puppet
repeatedly framed things as "we" are going to sit at the
table, "we" are going to draw, and so forth, whereas in the
other condition the pronoun used was always "you." Dependent
measures gauged children's commitment, resource
distribution, and helping behavior toward their partner.
Results showed that both 3- and 4-year-olds felt a greater
sense of commitment to their partner after "we"-framing than
after "you"-framing. The 4-year-olds evidenced this
commitment by showing a greater reluctance to abandon their
partner for a more fun game compared with the 3-year-olds.
The 3-year-olds did not share this reluctance, but when they
did abandon their partner they more often took leave
following we-framing by "announcing" their leaving. There
were no effects of we-framing on children's sharing with
their partner or helping behavior. These results suggest
that verbal we-framing, as compared with you-framing, is an
effective means of inducing in children a sense of shared
agency and commitment with a partner.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105278},
Key = {fds359682}
}
@article{fds360579,
Author = {O'Madagain, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Shared intentionality, reason-giving and the evolution of
human culture.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {377},
Number = {1843},
Pages = {20200320},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0320},
Abstract = {The biological approach to culture focuses almost
exclusively on processes of social learning, to the neglect
of processes of cultural coordination including joint action
and shared intentionality. In this paper, we argue that the
distinctive features of human culture derive from humans'
unique skills and motivations for coordinating with one
another around different types of action and information. As
different levels of these skills of 'shared intentionality'
emerged over the last several hundred thousand years, human
culture became characterized first by such things as
collaborative activities and pedagogy based on cooperative
communication, and then by such things as collaborative
innovations and normatively structured pedagogy. As a kind
of capstone of this trajectory, humans began to coordinate
not just on joint actions and shared beliefs, but on the
reasons for what we believe or how we act. Coordinating on
reasons powered the kinds of extremely rapid innovation and
stable cumulative cultural evolution especially
characteristic of the human species in the last several tens
of thousands of years. This article is part of a discussion
meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and
cumulative culture in animals, humans and
machines'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2020.0320},
Key = {fds360579}
}
@article{fds362756,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Schäfer, M and Herrmann, E and Zeidler, H and Haun,
D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children across societies enforce conventional norms but in
culturally variable ways.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {119},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e2112521118},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2112521118},
Abstract = {Individuals in all societies conform to their cultural
group's conventional norms, from how to dress on certain
occasions to how to play certain games. It is an open
question, however, whether individuals in all societies
actively enforce the group's conventional norms when others
break them. We investigated third-party enforcement of
conventional norms in 5- to 8-y-old children (<i>n</i> =
376) from eight diverse small-scale and large-scale
societies. Children learned the rules for playing a new
sorting game and then, observed a peer who was apparently
breaking them. Across societies, observer children
intervened frequently to correct their misguided peer (i.e.,
more frequently than when the peer was following the rules).
However, both the magnitude and the style of interventions
varied across societies. Detailed analyses of children's
interactions revealed societal differences in children's
verbal protest styles as well as in their use of actions,
gestures, and nonverbal expressions to intervene. Observers'
interventions predicted whether their peer adopted the
observer's sorting rule. Enforcement of conventional norms
appears to be an early emerging human universal that comes
to be expressed in culturally variable ways.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2112521118},
Key = {fds362756}
}
@misc{fds368121,
Author = {Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {THE EARLY ONTOGENY OF HUMAN COOPERATION AND
MORALITY},
Pages = {200-216},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Moral Development, Third Edition},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780367497569},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003047247-16},
Abstract = {In this chapter, we consider children’s moral development
from an evolutionary perspective. We propose that human
morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives
for cooperating with others. Following recent accounts by
Tomasello and colleagues of a two-step sequence in the
evolution of human cooperation and morality, we propose and
review empirical evidence in support of a two-step sequence
in the ontogeny of human cooperation and morality: first, a
second-personal morality that emerges in infancy and
toddlerhood, in which children are sympathetic or fair to
particular others, and second, a norm-based morality that
emerges during the preschool years, in which children follow
and enforce group-wide social norms. These prosocial and
moral tendencies compete throughout ontogeny with
children’s selfish tendencies and are modified
significantly by socialization and culture.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003047247-16},
Key = {fds368121}
}
@article{fds359904,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Knowledge-by-acquaintance before propositional
knowledge/belief.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {44},
Pages = {e173},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x20001387},
Abstract = {More basic than the authors' distinction between knowing and
believing is a distinction between knowledge-by-acquaintance
(I know John Smith) and propositional knowledge/belief (I
know/believe that John Smith lives in Durham). This
distinction provides a better account of both the
comparative and developmental data.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x20001387},
Key = {fds359904}
}
@article{fds359733,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Mammen, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of justifications for
breaking a promise},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {60},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101127},
Abstract = {There are sometimes legitimate reasons for breaking a
promise when circumstances change. We investigated 3- and
5-year-old German children's understanding of promise
breaking in prosocial (helping someone else) and selfish
(playing with someone else) conditions. In Study 1 (n = 80,
50% girls), preschoolers initially kept their own promise in
all conditions. When they eventually broke their promise,
3-year-olds’ justifications mostly referenced salient
events, whereas 5-year-olds also referenced social norms. In
Study 2 (n = 65, 49% girls), 5-year-olds preferred others’
promise-breaking more in prosocial than selfish conditions;
3-year-olds showed the reverse pattern. Three-year-olds’
justifications focused on desires, whereas 5-year-olds
focused on relevant events. Overall, 3-year-olds were able
to offer justifications, but 5-year-olds started to
distinguish what counted in the eyes of others as “good”
and “bad” reasons for promise breaking.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101127},
Key = {fds359733}
}
@article{fds359681,
Author = {Straka, BC and Stanaland, A and Tomasello, M and Gaither,
SE},
Title = {Who can be in a group? 3- to 5-year-old children construe
realistic social groups through mutual intentionality},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {60},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101097},
Abstract = {Recent research suggests that young children's causal
justification for minimal group membership can be induced
via a cognitive framework of mutual intentionality. That is,
an individual can become a group member when both the
individual and group agree to membership. Here, we
investigated if children ages 3–5 understand groups formed
by mutual intentions and whether they apply mutual
intentions to realistic groups with varying entitative and
essentialized qualities. In two studies (N = 197), we asked
3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children if a novel character could
join an existing group based on intentionality (mutual,
individual-, group-only) and group type (task, friends,
family). We find that 4- and 5-year-olds robustly relied on
mutual intentions to constitute group membership and
3-year-olds also demonstrated emerging usage of this
cognitive framework. Moreover, children employed mutual
intentionality across different group types, suggesting a
general framework for children's understanding of different
social groups.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101097},
Key = {fds359681}
}
@article{fds355156,
Author = {Kachel, G and Moore, R and Hepach, R and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Toddlers Prefer Adults as Informants: 2- and 3-Year-Olds'
Use of and Attention to Pointing Gestures From Peer and
Adult Partners.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {92},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e635-e652},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13544},
Abstract = {Two- and 3-year-old children (N = 96) were tested in an
object-choice task with video presentations of peer and
adult partners. An immersive, semi-interactive procedure
enabled both the close matching of adult and peer conditions
and the combination of participants' choice behavior with
looking time measures. Children were more likely to use
information provided by adults. As the effect was more
pronounced in the younger age-group, the observed bias may
fade during toddlerhood. As there were no differences in
children's propensity to follow peer and adult gestures with
their gaze, these findings provide some of the earliest
evidence to date that young children take an interlocutor's
age into account when judging ostensively communicated
testimony.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13544},
Key = {fds355156}
}
@article{fds352448,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response to: Rethinking Human Development and the Shared
Intentionality Hypothesis},
Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {465-468},
Year = {2021},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00510-9},
Abstract = {I respond to Moll, Nichols, and Mackey’s review of my book
Becoming Human. I agree with many of their points, but have
my own point of view on some others.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-020-00510-9},
Key = {fds352448}
}
@article{fds357565,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Norms Require Not Just Technical Skill and Social Learning,
but Real Cooperation},
Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
Volume = {43},
Number = {1},
Pages = {219-223},
Year = {2021},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2021-0012},
Abstract = {Birch's account of the evolutionary origins of social norms
is essentially individualistic. It begins with individuals
regulating their own actions toward internally represented
goals, as evaluative standards, and adds in a social
dimension only secondarily. I argue that a better account
begins at the outset with uniquely human collaborative
activity in which individuals share evaluative standards
about how anyone who would play a given role must behave
both toward their joint goal and toward one another. This
then scaled up to the shared normative standards for anyone
who would be a member of 'our' social group.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2021-0012},
Key = {fds357565}
}
@article{fds358692,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Kano, F and Albiach-Serrano, A and Benziad,
L and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) internal arousal remains
elevated if they cannot themselves help a
conspecific.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {135},
Number = {2},
Pages = {196-207},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000255},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees help conspecifics achieve their goals in
instrumental situations, but neither their immediate
motivation nor the evolutionary basis of their motivation is
clear. In the current study, we gave chimpanzees the
opportunity to instrumentally help a conspecific to obtain
food. Following recent studies with human children, we
measured their pupil diameter at various points in the
process. Like young children, chimpanzees' pupil diameter
decreased soon after they had helped. However, unlike
children, chimpanzees' pupils remained more dilated upon
watching a third party provide the needed help instead of
them. Our interpretation is that chimpanzees are motivated
to help others, and the evolutionary basis is direct or
indirect reciprocity, as providing help oneself sets the
conditions for a payback. This is in contrast to young
children whose goal is to see others being helped-by
whomever-presumably because their helping is not based on
reciprocity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/com0000255},
Key = {fds358692}
}
@article{fds356461,
Author = {Wolf, W and Nafe, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Development of the Liking Gap: Children Older Than 5
Years Think That Partners Evaluate Them Less Positively Than
They Evaluate Their Partners.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {789-798},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797620980754},
Abstract = {After two strangers have briefly interacted with one
another, both believe that they like their partner more than
their partner likes them. A plausible explanation for this
<i>liking gap</i> is that people are constantly worrying
about how others are evaluating them. If so, one would
expect the liking gap to emerge in young children as they
become more concerned with their reputations and the
impression they make on other people. The current study
(<i>N</i> = 241 U.S. children; age range = 4-11 years)
supported this hypothesis, showing a liking gap beginning
when children were 5 years old, the age at which they first
become concerned with other people's evaluations of them.
Moreover, the liking gap became more pronounced as children
got older. These findings provide the first developmental
description of the liking gap and support the hypothesis
that this phenomenon is related to individuals' concerns for
how others evaluate them.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797620980754},
Key = {fds356461}
}
@article{fds356996,
Author = {O’Madagain, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint attention to mental content and the social origin of
reasoning},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {198},
Number = {5},
Pages = {4057-4078},
Year = {2021},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02327-1},
Abstract = {Growing evidence indicates that our higher rational
capacities depend on social interaction—that only through
engaging with others do we acquire the ability to evaluate
beliefs as true or false, or to reflect on and evaluate the
reasons that support our beliefs. Up to now, however, we
have had little understanding of how this works. Here we
argue that a uniquely human socio-linguistic phenomenon
which we call ‘joint attention to mental content’ (JAM)
plays a key role. JAM is the ability to focus together in
conversation on the content of our mental states, such as
beliefs and reasons. In such conversations it can be made
clear that our attitudes to beliefs or reasons may
conflict—that what I think is true, you might think is
false, or that what I think is a good reason for believing
something, you might think is a bad reason. We argue that
through JAM, children discover that mental contents can be
evaluated under various attitudes, and that this discovery
transforms their mind-reading and reasoning
abilities.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02327-1},
Key = {fds356996}
}
@article{fds352900,
Author = {Siposova, B and Grueneisen, S and Helming, K and Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M},
Title = {Common knowledge that help is needed increases helping
behavior in children.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {201},
Pages = {104973},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104973},
Abstract = {Although there is considerable evidence that at least some
helping behavior is motivated by genuine concern for others'
well-being, sometimes we also help solely out of a sense of
obligation to the persons in need. Our sense of obligation
to help may be particularly strong when there is common
knowledge between the helper and the helpee that the helpee
needs help. To test whether children's helping behavior is
affected by having common knowledge with the recipient about
the recipient's need, 6-year-olds faced a dilemma: They
could either collect stickers or help an experimenter.
Children were more likely to help when they and the
experimenter had common knowledge about the experimenter's
plight (because they heard it together) than when they each
had private knowledge about it (because they heard it
individually). These results suggest that already in young
children common knowledge can heighten the sense of
obligation to help others in need.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104973},
Key = {fds352900}
}
@article{fds354956,
Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's moral judgments depend on the social
relationship between agents},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {57},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100973},
Abstract = {Moral judgments can vary depending on the social
relationship between agents. We presented 4- and 6-year-old
peer dyads (N = 128) with stories, in which a parent (parent
condition) or a peer protagonist (peer condition) faced a
child in need of help (e.g., the child is thirsty). The
dyads had to decide whether the protagonist helped at a cost
(e.g., by giving up their water) or not. 6-year-olds
expected a parent to help their child more than they
expected a child to help their peer. Moreover, children
justified their expectations more often with normative
statements (e.g., “She has to help”) in the parent
condition than in the peer condition. Thus, refusal to help
a child was more acceptable coming from a peer than from a
parent. The results suggest that young children take into
account multiple perspectives and form different normative
expectations for different social agents when making moral
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100973},
Key = {fds354956}
}
@article{fds355300,
Author = {Domberg, A and Tomasello, M and Köymen, B},
Title = {Collaborative reasoning in the context of group
competition.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {e0246589},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246589},
Abstract = {A key skill in collaborative problem-solving is to
communicate and evaluate reasons for proposals to arrive at
the decision benefiting all group members. Although it is
well-documented that collaborative contexts facilitate young
children's reasoning, less is known about whether
competition with other groups contributes to children's
collaborative reasoning. We investigated whether
between-group competition facilitates children's
within-group collaborative reasoning, regarding their
production of reasons and their use of transacts,
communicative acts that operate on one another's proposals
and reasoning. We presented 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads
with two collaborative problem-solving tasks (decorating a
zoo and a dollhouse). In one task, children competed against
another group (the competitive condition); whereas in the
other task, they did not (non-competitive condition). Our
results suggest that children's sensitivity to group
competition as reflected in their reasoning changed
depending on the task. When they decorated a house, they
produced more transacts in the competitive condition than in
the non-competitive condition; whereas when they decorated a
zoo, this pattern was reversed. Thus, our results highlight
that group competition did not influence children's
collaborative reasoning consistently across different
contexts.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0246589},
Key = {fds355300}
}
@article{fds355723,
Author = {Plötner, M and Hepach, R and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children share more under time pressure than after a
delay.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0248121},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248121},
Abstract = {Adults under time pressure share with others generously, but
with more time they act more selfishly. In the current
study, we investigated whether young children already
operate in this same way, and, if so, whether this changes
over the preschool and early school age years. We tested 144
children in three age groups (3-, 5-, and 7-year olds) in a
one-shot dictator game: Children were given nine stickers
and had the possibility to share stickers with another child
who was absent. Children in the Time Pressure condition were
instructed to share quickly, whereas children in the Delay
condition were instructed to take time and consider their
decision carefully. Across ages, children in the Time
Pressure condition shared significantly more stickers than
children in the Delay condition. Moreover, the longer
children waited, the less they shared. Thus, children, like
adults, are more prosocial when acting spontaneously than
after considering their decision more carefully.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0248121},
Key = {fds355723}
}
@article{fds356997,
Author = {Li, L and Britvan, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children conform more to norms than to
preferences.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {16},
Number = {5},
Pages = {e0251228},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0251228},
Abstract = {As members of cultural groups, humans continually adhere to
social norms and conventions. Researchers have hypothesized
that even young children are motivated to act
conventionally, but support for this hypothesis has been
indirect and open to other interpretations. To further test
this hypothesis, we invited 3.5-year-old children (N = 104)
to help set up items for a tea party. Children first
indicated which items they preferred but then heard an
informant (either an adult or another child) endorse other
items in terms of either conventional norms or personal
preferences. Children conformed (i.e., overrode their own
preference to follow the endorsement) more when the
endorsements were framed as norms than when they were framed
as preferences, and this was the case whether the informant
was an adult or another child. The priority of norms even
when stated by another child opposes the interpretation that
children only conformed in deference to adult authority.
These findings suggest that children are motivated to act
conventionally, possibly as an adaptation for living in
cultural groups.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0251228},
Key = {fds356997}
}
@misc{fds358297,
Author = {Mannle, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Fathers, siblings, and the bridge hypothesis},
Pages = {23-41},
Booktitle = {Children’s Language: Volume 6},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780898597608},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315792668-2},
Abstract = {The underlying assumption of the Bridge Hypothesis-which is
not shared by all developmental psycholinguists-is that
communication pressure is beneficial to the child’s
development of communicative competence, including the
acquisition of linguistic skills. This chapter reviews the
existing research on fathers’ and siblings’ linguistic
interactions with young children, including some recent
research from our own laboratory. In the traditional family
situation, fathers spend significantly less time than
mothers interacting with their children, and so presumably
are less familiar with the everyday behavioral routines that
are so important for early language acquisition. As with
fathers, the research on siblings’ communicative
interactions with young children has just begun. Most of the
relevant research on sibling speech to infants is concerned
with structural/linguistic features, and it is thus unclear
in this case as well whether siblings do in fact place
communication pressure on the language learning child and
thereby act as a linguistic bridge.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315792668-2},
Key = {fds358297}
}
@article{fds355827,
Author = {Li, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {On the moral functions of language},
Journal = {Social Cognition},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {99-116},
Publisher = {Guilford Press},
Year = {2021},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.99},
Abstract = {Previous comparisons of language and morality have taken a
cognitively internalist (i.e., within-minds) perspective. We
take a socially externalist (i.e., between-minds)
perspective, viewing both language and morality as forms of
social action. During human evolution, social cognitive
adaptations for cooperation evolved, including cooperative
communication (social acts to mentally coordinate with
others for common goals) and social normativity (social acts
to regulate cooperative social relationships). As human
cooperation scaled up in complexity, cooperative
communication and social normativity scaled up as well,
leading to the development of culturally elaborated forms of
language and morality. Language facilitates all aspects of
morality and is even necessary for certain aspects. Humans
use language to (1) initiate, (2) preserve, (3) revise, and
(4) act on morality in ways such as forming joint
commitments, teaching norms, modifying social realities, and
engaging in moral reason-giving.},
Doi = {10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.99},
Key = {fds355827}
}
@article{fds352447,
Author = {Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Early Ontogeny of Reason Giving},
Journal = {Child Development Perspectives},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {215-220},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12384},
Abstract = {The key context within which preschool children learn to
justify beliefs with reasons is collaborative
problem-solving and decision-making with peers, including in
the moral domain, in which they engage with another coequal
mind in a cooperative spirit. Evidence for this proposal
comes from recent studies in which children demonstrated
sensitivity to the common ground assumptions they shared
with their peer partners in decision-making, as well as an
ability to provide reasons relevant to their shared
understanding. Training studies suggest that discourse with
others about reasons for beliefs provides children with the
appropriate learning experiences. Internalizing this
communicative process may be crucial for individual
deliberative reasoning.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdep.12384},
Key = {fds352447}
}
@article{fds351010,
Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Human children, but not great apes, become socially closer
by sharing an experience in common ground.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {199},
Pages = {104930},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104930},
Abstract = {To create social closeness, humans engage in a variety of
social activities centered around shared experiences. Even
simply watching the same video side by side creates social
closeness in adults and children. However, perhaps
surprisingly, a similar psychological mechanism was recently
shown in great apes. Here we asked whether the process by
which this social closeness is created is the same for
children and great apes. Each participant entered a room to
see an experimenter (E1) watching a video. In one condition,
E1 looked to the participant at the start of the video to
establish common ground that they were watching the video
together. In another condition, E1 did not look to the
participant in this way so that the participant knew they
were watching the same video, but the participant did not
know whether E1 was aware of this as well, so there was no
common ground (E1 looked to the participant later in the
procedure). Children, but not great apes, approached the
experimenter faster after the common ground condition,
suggesting that although both humans and great apes create
social closeness by co-attending to something in close
proximity, creating social closeness by sharing experiences
in common ground may be a uniquely human social-cognitive
process.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104930},
Key = {fds351010}
}
@article{fds351568,
Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Do 7-year-old children understand social
leverage?},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {199},
Pages = {104963},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104963},
Abstract = {Individuals with an advantageous position during a
negotiation possess leverage over their partners. Several
studies with adults have investigated how leverage can
influence the coordination strategies of individuals when
conflicts of interest arise. In this study, we explored how
pairs of 7-year-old children solved a coordination game
(based on the Snowdrift scenario) when one child had
leverage over the other child. We presented a social dilemma
in the form of an unequal reward distribution on a rotating
tray. The rotating tray could be accessed by both children.
The child who waited longer to act received the best
outcome, but if both children waited too long, they would
lose the rewards. In addition, one child could forgo the
access to the rotating tray for an alternative option-the
leverage. Although children rarely used their leverage
strategically, children with access to the alternative were
less likely to play the social dilemma, especially when
their leverage was larger. Furthermore, children waited
longer to act as the leverage decreased. Finally, children
almost never failed to coordinate. The results hint to a
trade-off between maximizing benefits while maintaining
long-term collaboration in complex scenarios where
strategies such as turn taking are hard to
implement.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104963},
Key = {fds351568}
}
@article{fds351570,
Author = {Li, J and Hou, W and Zhu, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The development of intent-based moral judgment and moral
behavior in the context of indirect reciprocity: A
cross-cultural study},
Journal = {International Journal of Behavioral Development},
Volume = {44},
Number = {6},
Pages = {525-533},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0165025420935636},
Abstract = {The current study aimed to investigate the cultural
differences in the developmental origins of children’s
intent-based moral judgment and moral behavior in the
context of indirect reciprocity. To this end, we compared
how German and Chinese children interpret and react to
antisocial and prosocial interactions between puppets. An
actor puppet performed either a positive or negative act
toward a prosocial or antisocial target puppet with the
intention to cause harm or not; 197 three and five-year-old
children participated as a third party and were asked to
judge the actor puppet’s behavior and to distribute
stickers. Results showed that 3-year-old Chinese children
were able to take intention and context into account when
making moral judgments and distributing resources, whereas
German children did not show sensitivity to intention until
the age of 5. These findings suggest that culture may
mediate children’s intent-based moral judgment and moral
behavior in the context of indirect reciprocity.},
Doi = {10.1177/0165025420935636},
Key = {fds351570}
}
@article{fds351569,
Author = {Ulber, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's prosocial responses toward peers and adults
in two social contexts.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {198},
Pages = {104888},
Year = {2020},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104888},
Abstract = {Young children help and share with others, but little is
known about the "how" and "who" of this early prosocial
behavior. In the current study, we compared 2- and
3-year-old children's (N = 203; 101 girls) prosocial
behavior of sharing and helping. We asked whether the
process was different (a) if the social partner was an adult
or a same-age peer and (b) if the child was actively
interacting and engaged with the partner or not. The highest
prosocial responses were found in bilateral joint tasks such
as sharing the spoils after a collaborative effort and
helping a partner finish a mutual activity. Prosocial
responses were lower in unilateral autonomous tasks such as
assisting another person in opening a locked box and
distributing a windfall of resources. Children did not show
an overall preference for helping or sharing with adults
versus peers except that they were more likely to support a
peer than an adult in an instrumental helping task.
Together, these findings suggest that toddlers' early
prosocial skills and motivations are more sensitive to how
toddlers are engaged with a partner than to who that partner
is, implying that children have a nondiscriminatory general
inclination to benefit others, especially in bilateral
interactive scenarios.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104888},
Key = {fds351569}
}
@article{fds353880,
Author = {Hepach, R and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children show positive emotions when seeing someone
get the help they deserve},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {56},
Year = {2020},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100935},
Abstract = {Little is known about the underlying emotional bases of
children's prosociality. Here we engaged 32 dyads of
4-year-old children in a reward-collecting task at the end
of which one child was more in need of help. An adult then
either helped the needier child (deserving outcome) or the
less needy child (less deserving outcome). Both children
expressed elevated upper-body posture (positively valenced
emotions) when the more needy (but not the less needy) child
was helped, whether it was themselves or not. In contrast,
both children showed decreased elevation when the less needy
(but not the more needy) child received the help, again
whether it was themselves or not. These results suggest that
preschool children's prosocial emotions are regulated not
only by sympathy for those needing help, but also by a sense
of deservingness as determined by social
comparison.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100935},
Key = {fds353880}
}
@article{fds349814,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Ontogenetic Foundations of Epistemic
Norms},
Journal = {Episteme},
Volume = {17},
Number = {3},
Pages = {301-315},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.50},
Abstract = {In this paper, I approach epistemic norms from an
ontogenetic point of view. I argue and present evidence that
to understand epistemic norms - e.g., scientific norms of
methodology and the evaluation of evidence - children must
first develop through their social interactions with others
three key concepts. First is the concept of belief, which
provides the most basic distinction on which scientific
investigations rest: the distinction between individual
subjective perspectives and an objective reality. Second is
the concept of reason, which in the context of science
obligates practitioners to justify their claims to others
with reasons by grounding them in beliefs that are
universally shared within the community. Third is the
concept of social norm, which is not primarily epistemic,
but provides children with an understanding of norms as
collective agreements. The theoretical argument is that all
three of these concepts emerge not from just any kind of
social interaction, but specifically from social
interactions structured by the human species' unique
capacities for shared intentionality.},
Doi = {10.1017/epi.2019.50},
Key = {fds349814}
}
@misc{fds353328,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Why don't apes point?},
Pages = {506-524},
Booktitle = {Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and
Interaction},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781845203948},
Key = {fds353328}
}
@book{fds352651,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The gestural communication of apes and monkeys},
Pages = {1-256},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780805853650},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003064541},
Abstract = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys is an
intriguing compilation of naturalistic and experimental
research conducted over the course of 20 years on gestural
communication in primates, as well as a comparison to what
is known about the vocal communication of nonhuman primates.
The editors also make systematic comparisons to the gestural
communication of prelinguistic and just-linguistic human
children. An enlightening exploration unfolds into what may
represent the starting point for the evolution of human
communication and language. This especially significant read
is organized into nine chapters that discuss: *the gestural
repertoire of chimpanzees; *gestures in orangutans, subadult
gorillas, and siamangs; *gestural communication in Barbary
macaques; and *a comparison of the gestures of apes and
monkeys. This book will appeal to psychologists,
anthropologists, and linguists interested in the
evolutionary origins of language and/or gestures, as well as
to all primatologists. A CD insert offers video of gestures
for each of the species.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003064541},
Key = {fds352651}
}
@misc{fds352650,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Introduction: Intentional communication in nonhuman
primates},
Pages = {1-15},
Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780805853650},
Key = {fds352650}
}
@misc{fds352649,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Ape gestures and the origins of language},
Pages = {221-239},
Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780805853650},
Key = {fds352649}
}
@misc{fds352648,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The gestural repertoire of chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes)},
Pages = {17-39},
Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780805853650},
Key = {fds352648}
}
@misc{fds352652,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Comparing the gestures of apes and monkeys},
Pages = {197-220},
Booktitle = {The Gestural Communication of Apes and Monkeys},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780805853650},
Key = {fds352652}
}
@article{fds349805,
Author = {Gopnik, A and Frankenhuis, WE and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction to special issue: 'Life history and learning:
how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and
culture in humans and other animals'.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {375},
Number = {1803},
Pages = {20190489},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0489},
Abstract = {This special issue focuses on the relationship between life
history and learning, especially during human evolution.
'Life history' refers to the developmental programme of an
organism, including its period of immaturity, reproductive
rate and timing, caregiving investment and longevity. Across
many species an extended childhood and high caregiving
investment appear to be correlated with particular kinds of
plasticity and learning. Human life history is particularly
distinctive; humans evolved an exceptionally long childhood
and old age, and an unusually high level of caregiving
investment, at the same time that they evolved distinctive
capacities for cognition and culture. The contributors
explore the relations between life history, plasticity and
learning across a wide range of methods and populations,
including theoretical and empirical work in biology,
anthropology and developmental psychology. This article is
part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how
childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and
culture in humans and other animals'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2019.0489},
Key = {fds349805}
}
@article{fds349806,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The adaptive origins of uniquely human sociality.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {375},
Number = {1803},
Pages = {20190493},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0493},
Abstract = {Humans possess some unique social-cognitive skills and
motivations, involving such things as joint attention,
cooperative communication, dual-level collaboration and
cultural learning. These are almost certainly adaptations
for humans' especially complex sociocultural lives. The
common assumption has been that these unique skills and
motivations emerge in human infancy and early childhood as
preparations for the challenges of adult life, for example,
in collaborative foraging. In the current paper, I propose
that the curiously early emergence of these skills in
infancy--well before they are needed in adulthood--along
with other pieces of evidence (such as almost exclusive use
with adults not peers) suggests that aspects of the
evolution of these skills represent ontogenetic adaptations
to the unique socio-ecological challenges human infants face
in the context of a regime of cooperative breeding and
childcare. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life
history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age
shape cognition and culture in humans and other
animals'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2019.0493},
Key = {fds349806}
}
@article{fds349808,
Author = {Bohn, M and Kordt, C and Braun, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Learning Novel Skills From Iconic Gestures: A Developmental
and Evolutionary Perspective.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {31},
Number = {7},
Pages = {873-880},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797620921519},
Abstract = {Cumulative cultural learning has been argued to rely on
high-fidelity copying of other individuals' actions. Iconic
gestures of actions have no physical effect on objects in
the world but merely represent actions that would have an
effect. Learning from iconic gestures thus requires paying
close attention to the teacher's precise bodily movements-a
prerequisite for high-fidelity copying. In three studies, we
investigated whether 2- and 3-year-old children (<i>N</i> =
122) and great apes (<i>N</i> = 36) learn novel skills from
iconic gestures. When faced with a novel apparatus,
participants watched an experimenter perform either an
iconic gesture depicting the action necessary to open the
apparatus or a gesture depicting a different action.
Children, but not great apes, profited from iconic gestures,
with older children doing so to a larger extent. These
results suggest that high-fidelity copying abilities are
firmly in place in humans by at least 3 years of
age.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797620921519},
Key = {fds349808}
}
@article{fds349807,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The development of coordination via joint expectations for
shared benefits.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {56},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1149-1156},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000936},
Abstract = {People frequently need to cooperate despite having strong
self-serving motives. In the current study, pairs of 5- and
7-year-olds (<i>N</i> = 160) faced a one-shot coordination
problem: To benefit, children had to choose the same of 3
reward divisions. They could not communicate or see each
other and thus had to accurately predict each other's
choices to succeed. One division split the rewards evenly,
while the others each favored one child. Five-year-olds
mostly chose the division favorable to themselves, resulting
in coordination failure. By contrast, 7-year-olds mostly
coordinated successfully by choosing the division that split
the rewards equally (even though they behaved selfishly in a
control condition in which they could choose independently).
This suggests that by age 7, children jointly expect
benefits to be shared among interdependent social partners
"fairly" and that fair compromises can emanate from a
cooperative rationality adapted for social coordination.
(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights
reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000936},
Key = {fds349807}
}
@article{fds349811,
Author = {Schmelz, M and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The psychological mechanisms underlying reciprocal
prosociality in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {134},
Number = {2},
Pages = {149-157},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000200},
Abstract = {In both the wild and captivity, chimpanzees engage in
reciprocal patterns of prosocial behavior. However, the
proximate mechanisms underlying these patterns are unclear.
In the current study, we investigated whether chimpanzees
prefer to act prosocially toward conspecifics who have
directly benefited them (perhaps based on an affective bond)
or whether they simply observe the prosocial behavior of
others in general (including indirectly to third parties)
and preferentially interact with and behave prosocially
toward the most prosocial individuals. We found good
evidence for direct reciprocity but little evidence for a
general (indirect) preference for prosocial individuals.
These results suggest that cooperative reciprocity in
chimpanzees may be based mostly on social-affective
processes and direct interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record
(c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/com0000200},
Key = {fds349811}
}
@article{fds349809,
Author = {Hepach, R and Benziad, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees help others with what they want; children help
them with what they need.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e12922},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12922},
Abstract = {Humans, including young children, are strongly motivated to
help others, even paying a cost to do so. Humans' nearest
primate relatives, great apes, are likewise motivated to
help others, raising the question of whether the motivations
of humans and apes are the same. Here we compared the
underlying motivation to help in human children and
chimpanzees. Both species understood the situation and
helped a conspecific in a straightforward situation.
However, when helpers knew that what the other was
requesting would not actually help her, only children gave
her what she needed instead of giving her what she
requested. These results suggest that both chimpanzees and
human children help others but the underlying motivation for
why they help differs. In comparison to chimpanzees, young
children help in a paternalistic manner. The evolutionary
hypothesis is that uniquely human socio-ecologies based on
interdependent cooperation gave rise to uniquely human
prosocial motivations to help others paternalistically.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12922},
Key = {fds349809}
}
@article{fds349810,
Author = {Köymen, B and Jurkat, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers refer to direct and indirect evidence in their
collaborative reasoning.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {193},
Pages = {104806},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104806},
Abstract = {Collaborative reasoning requires partners to evaluate
options and the evidence for or against each option. We
investigated whether preschoolers can explain why one option
is best (direct reasons) and why the other option is not
(indirect reasons), looking at both problems that have a
correct answer and those that require choosing the better
option. In Study 1, both age groups produced direct reasons
equally frequently in both problems. However, 5-year-olds
produced indirect reasons more often than 3-year-olds,
especially when there was a correct answer. In Study 2 with
a nonverbal task with a correct answer, 3-year-olds produced
indirect reasons more often than in Study 1, although
5-year-olds' indirect reasons were more efficiently stated.
These results demonstrate that even 3-year-olds, and even
nonverbally, can point out to a partner a fact that
constitutes a reason for them to arrive at a correct joint
decision.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104806},
Key = {fds349810}
}
@article{fds349820,
Author = {Köymen, B and O'Madagain, C and Domberg, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young Children's Ability to Produce Valid and Relevant
Counter-Arguments.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {91},
Number = {3},
Pages = {685-693},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13338},
Abstract = {In collaborative problem solving, children produce and
evaluate arguments for proposals. We investigated whether 3-
and 5-year-olds (N = 192) can produce and evaluate
arguments against those arguments (i.e., counter-arguments).
In Study 1, each child within a peer dyad was privately
given a reason to prefer one over another solution to a
task. One child, however, was given further information that
would refute the reasoning of their partner. Five-year-olds,
but not 3-year-olds, identified and produced valid and
relevant counter-arguments. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were
given discourse training (discourse that contrasted valid
and invalid counter-arguments) and then given the same
problem-solving tasks. After training, 3-year-olds could
also identify and produce valid and relevant
counter-arguments. Thus, participating in discourse about
reasons facilitates children's counter-argumentation.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13338},
Key = {fds349820}
}
@article{fds351571,
Author = {Duguid, S and Wyman, E and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The strategies used by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and
children (Homo sapiens) to solve a simple coordination
problem.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000220},
Abstract = {One of the challenges of collaboration is to coordinate
decisions with others, and recent theories have proposed
that humans, in particular, evolved skills to address this
challenge. To test this hypothesis, we compared the
coordination abilities of 4-year-old children and
chimpanzees with a simple coordination problem. To retrieve
a reward from a "puzzle box," pairs of individuals were
simply required to choose the same 1 of 4 options. If
successful, they each received the same reward, so there
were no conflicts of interest. Individuals were paired with
multiple partners over time. Both species were able to
coordinate, but there were marked differences in the way
they did so. Children were able to coordinate quickly and
flexibly, adjusting easily to new partners, suggesting an
understanding of the coordination process. In contrast,
chimpanzees took time to converge on a single solution with
each new partner, with no gains across partners, suggesting
that their coordination was based only on repeating
successful past choices. Together, these results support the
hypothesis that humans have evolved unique skills for
coordinating decisions and actions with others in the
pursuit of common interests. (PsycInfo Database Record (c)
2020 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/com0000220},
Key = {fds351571}
}
@article{fds349812,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The many faces of obligation.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {e89},
Year = {2020},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19002620},
Abstract = {My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1)
the diversity both within and between cultures of the many
different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary
roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources
that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots
of the sense of obligation, including especially children's
understanding of groups from a third-party perspective
(rather than through participation, as in my account); and
(4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative
phenomena in general - which are pitched as not totally
empirical - and empirical accounts such as my own. I have
tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of
the theory from those that represent genuine
disagreement.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19002620},
Key = {fds349812}
}
@article{fds349813,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of roles in uniquely human cognition and
sociality},
Journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-19},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12223},
Abstract = {To understand themselves as playing a social role,
individuals must understand themselves to be contributing to
a cooperative endeavor. Psychologically, the form of
cooperation required is a specific type that only humans may
possess, namely, one in which individuals form a joint or
collective agency to pursue a common end. This begins
ontogenetically not with the societal level but rather with
more local collaboration between individuals. Participating
in collaborative endeavors of this type leads young
children, cognitively, to think in terms of different
perspectives on a joint focus of attention - including
ultimately an objective perspective - and to organize their
experience in terms of a relational-thematic-narrative
dimension. Socially, such participation leads young children
to an understanding of self-other equivalence with mutual
respect among collaborative partners and, ultimately, to a
normative (i.e. moral) stance toward “we” in the
community within which one is forming a moral role or
identity. The dual-level structure of shared
endeavors/realities with individual roles/perspectives is
responsible for many aspects of the human species' most
distinctive psychology.},
Doi = {10.1111/jtsb.12223},
Key = {fds349813}
}
@book{fds359683,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Foreword},
Volume = {27},
Pages = {VII-IX},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9789027261007},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/tilar.27.for},
Doi = {10.1075/tilar.27.for},
Key = {fds359683}
}
@article{fds349815,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Frickel, R and Tomm, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children, but not great apes, respect ownership.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e12842},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12842},
Abstract = {Access to and control of resources is a major source of
costly conflicts. Animals, under some conditions, respect
what others control and use (i.e. possession). Humans not
only respect possession of resources, they also respect
ownership. Ownership can be viewed as a cooperative
arrangement, where individuals inhibit their tendency to
take others' property on the condition that those others
will do the same. We investigated to what degree great apes
follow this principle, as compared to human children. We
conducted two experiments, in which dyads of individuals
could access the same food resources. The main test of
respect for ownership was whether individuals would refrain
from taking their partner's resources even when the partner
could not immediately access and control them. Captive apes
(N = 14 dyads) failed to respect their partner's claim on
food resources and frequently monopolized the resources when
given the opportunity. Human children (N = 14 dyads),
tested with a similar apparatus and procedure, respected
their partner's claim and made spontaneous verbal references
to ownership. Such respect for the property of others
highlights the uniquely cooperative nature of human
ownership arrangements.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12842},
Key = {fds349815}
}
@article{fds349816,
Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Watching a video together creates social closeness between
children and adults.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {189},
Pages = {104712},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104712},
Abstract = {Human social relationships are often formed through shared
social activities in which individuals share mental states
about external stimuli. Previous work on joint attention has
shown that even minimal shared experiences such as watching
something together facilitates social closeness between
individuals. Here, we examined whether young children
already connect with others through joint attention. In the
current studies, children sat next to a novel adult who
either watched a film with them or was not able to see the
film and read a book instead. After the video, we measured
children's willingness (i.e., latency) to approach the
experimenter holding out a toy. In both studies, the
2.5-year-olds who watched the film together approached more
quickly than the other children. These results show that
both minimally interactive shared experiences and
noninteractive shared experiences lead children to feel more
comfortable with a novel adult. This suggests that joint
attention interactions, and shared experiences in general,
play an important role not only in children's cognitive
development but also in their social development and the
formation of their social relationships.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104712},
Key = {fds349816}
}
@article{fds349817,
Author = {Pouscoulous, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Early birds: Metaphor understanding in 3-year-olds},
Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics},
Volume = {156},
Pages = {160-167},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2019.05.021},
Abstract = {To assess children's cognitive capacities to understand
(rather than explain or paraphrase) metaphors, we
investigated how 3-year-olds (n = 36; 3;0–3;3) fare with
novel metaphors corresponding to their world knowledge and
linguistic competences using a behavioural choice paradigm.
In a game, participants had to give the experimenter one of
two objects referred to by a metaphorical expression. Unlike
what previous literature suggests, our results indicate that
3-year-olds are able to understand novel metaphors that are
appropriate for their vocabulary and world knowledge, based
on action measures rather than metalinguistic responses. We
discuss how factors other than incompetence with pragmatic
inferencing can explain difficulties with metaphor
comprehension.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2019.05.021},
Key = {fds349817}
}
@article{fds349818,
Author = {Bohn, M and Kachel, G and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children spontaneously recreate core properties of
language in a new modality.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {116},
Number = {51},
Pages = {26072-26077},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1904871116},
Abstract = {How the world's 6,000+ natural languages have arisen is
mostly unknown. Yet, new sign languages have emerged
recently among deaf people brought together in a community,
offering insights into the dynamics of language evolution.
However, documenting the emergence of these languages has
mostly consisted of studying the end product; the process by
which ad hoc signs are transformed into a structured
communication system has not been directly observed. Here we
show how young children create new communication systems
that exhibit core features of natural languages in less than
30 min. In a controlled setting, we blocked the possibility
of using spoken language. In order to communicate novel
messages, including abstract concepts, dyads of children
spontaneously created novel gestural signs. Over usage,
these signs became increasingly arbitrary and
conventionalized. When confronted with the need to
communicate more complex meanings, children began to
grammatically structure their gestures. Together with
previous work, these results suggest that children have the
basic skills necessary, not only to acquire a natural
language, but also to spontaneously create a new one. The
speed with which children create these structured systems
has profound implications for theorizing about language
evolution, a process which is generally thought to span
across many generations, if not millennia.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1904871116},
Key = {fds349818}
}
@article{fds349819,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Müller, K and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Toddlers' intrinsic motivation to return help to their
benefactor.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {188},
Pages = {104658},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.011},
Abstract = {A natural reaction to receiving help from someone is to help
that person in return. In two studies, we investigated the
developmental origins of children's motivation to return
help. In Study 1, 18- and 24-month-old toddlers were either
helped or not helped by an adult, and they could
subsequently provide that adult with help or else observe
another person providing help. We measured children's
internal arousal, via changes in pupil dilation, both before
and after help was provided. At both ages, children's
internal arousal was higher when they could not help the
adult who had previously helped them (and was lower when
they could). On the other hand, if the adult needing help
had not previously helped children, their internal arousal
was equally low regardless of whether they or another person
provided the help. Study 2 replicated this result and also
found that if children had previously been helped but the
person needing help was a different adult (not their
benefactor), children's internal arousal was equally low
regardless of whether they or another person provided the
help. Together, these results suggest that young children
are intrinsically motivated to return a received favor
specifically to the previous benefactor, perhaps indicating
a nascent sense of gratitude.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.011},
Key = {fds349819}
}
@article{fds349821,
Author = {Isella, M and Kanngiesser, P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's Selective Trust in Promises.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {90},
Number = {6},
Pages = {e868-e887},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13105},
Abstract = {There has been extensive research into the development of
selective trust in testimony, but little is known about the
development of selective trust in promises. The present
research investigates children's (N = 264) selective trust
in others' promises to help. In Study 1, 6-year-olds
selectively trusted speakers who had previously kept a
promise. In Study 2, 5-year-olds displayed selective trust
for speakers who had previously kept a prosocial promise
(promise to help). In Study 3, 5-year-olds trusted a
speaker, who kept a prosocial promise, over a helper. These
data suggest that from the age of 5 children show selective
trust in others' promises using prosociality, promise
keeping, or both to inform their judgments.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.13105},
Key = {fds349821}
}
@article{fds349822,
Author = {Zhang, Z and Grocke, P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The influence of intention and outcome on young children's
reciprocal sharing.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {187},
Pages = {104645},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.05.012},
Abstract = {This study investigated the influence of underlying
intentions and outcomes of a partner's sharing behavior on
young children's reciprocity. We provided 3- and 5-year-old
children with the opportunity to share with a partner
following different treatments of a partner's intention (to
share or not to share) that led to different outcomes
(children got or did not get stickers from their partner).
For the 3-year-olds, we found that the outcome of the
previous interaction influenced how much they shared,
whereas the intention of their partner affected how readily
they initiated sharing in response to social cues. For the
5-year-olds, we found that both outcome and intention
affected how much they shared as well as how readily they
initiated sharing. This suggests that already 3-year-olds
are able to take into account outcome and intention
information separately in reciprocal sharing. However, only
5-year-olds can combine both to flexibly maintain social
interactions without running the risk of being exploited by
others.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.05.012},
Key = {fds349822}
}
@article{fds349823,
Author = {Hardecker, S and Buryn-Weitzel, JC and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Adult instruction limits children's flexibility in moral
decision making.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {187},
Pages = {104652},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.005},
Abstract = {Children's moral behavior is guided, in part, by adults
teaching children how to treat others. However, when
circumstances change, such instructions may become either
unhelpful or limiting. In the current study, 48 dyads of
5-year-olds played a collaborative game and either (a)
received an instruction by an adult to share the spoils of
the game equally, (b) did not receive any instruction (but
still chose to share equally), or (c) agreed between
themselves on a rule to share equally. Afterward, each child
played with a new partner who was needier or worked harder
in his or her collaboration and so plausibly deserved more
than just half of the spoils. Results showed that children
who were instructed by an adult shared less with their more
deserving partner than children who did not receive any
instruction. Thus, moral instruction by adults may, in some
circumstances, make children more rigid in their moral
decisions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.005},
Key = {fds349823}
}
@article{fds349824,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Zeidler, H and Haun, D and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children's respect for ownership across diverse
societies.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {11},
Pages = {2286-2298},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000787},
Abstract = {Ownership is a cornerstone of many human societies and can
be understood as a cooperative arrangement, where
individuals refrain from taking each other's property.
Owners can thus trust others to respect their property even
in their absence. We investigated this principle in 5- to
7-year-olds (N = 152) from 4 diverse societies. Children
participated in a resource task with a peer-partner, where
we established ownership by assigning children to one side
or the other of an apparatus and by marking resources with
colors to help children keep track of them. When retrieving
resources in the partner's presence, the majority of
children took their own things and respected what belonged
to their partner. A proportion of children in all societies
also respected ownership in their partner's absence,
although the strength of respect varied considerably across
societies. We discuss implications for the development of
ownership concepts and possible explanations for societal
differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000787},
Key = {fds349824}
}
@article{fds349825,
Author = {Tennie, C and Völter, CJ and Vonau, V and Hanus, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees use observed temporal directionality to learn
novel causal relations.},
Journal = {Primates; journal of primatology},
Volume = {60},
Number = {6},
Pages = {517-524},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10329-019-00754-9},
Abstract = {We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal
sequence of external events to determine causation.
Seventeen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human
experimenter press a button in two different conditions.
When she pressed the "causal button" the delivery of juice
and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In
contrast, she pressed the "non-causal button" only after the
delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given
the opportunity to produce the desired juice delivery
themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the
causal button, i.e., the one that preceded the effect.
Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even
though both buttons were equally associated with juice
delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human
children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make
use of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal
sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these
findings in relation to the literature on causal inferences
as well as associative learning.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10329-019-00754-9},
Key = {fds349825}
}
@article{fds349826,
Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's reasoning with peers and parents about moral
dilemmas.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {11},
Pages = {2324-2335},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000807},
Abstract = {Children encounter moral norms in several different social
contexts. Often it is in hierarchically structured
interactions with parents or other adults, but sometimes it
is in more symmetrically structured interactions with peers.
Our question was whether children's discussions of moral
norms differ in these two contexts. Consequently, we had 4-
and 6-year-old children (<i>N</i> = 72) reason about moral
dilemmas with their mothers or peers. Both age groups
opposed their partner's views and explicitly justified their
own views more often with peers than with mothers. Mothers
adapted their discussions to the cognitive levels of their
children (e.g., focused more on the abstract moral norms
with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children), but
almost always with a pedagogical intent. Our results suggest
that with mothers, moral judgments are experienced mostly as
non-negotiable dictums, but with coequal peers they are
experienced more as personal beliefs that can be actively
negotiated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000807},
Key = {fds349826}
}
@article{fds349827,
Author = {Domberg, A and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children choose to reason with partners who submit to
reason},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {52},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100824},
Abstract = {When reasoning with others, the reasons used in an exchange
can have varying degrees of quality, irrespective of the
facts under discussion. Partners often evaluate one
another's evaluation of reasons – one another's reasoning.
Can children evaluate their partner's judgment of the
quality of reasons independent of objective truth? 5- and
7-year-olds (N = 122) chose among two partners for
cooperation. In the experimental condition, one acceded to a
good reason, the other to a poor reason. In the control
condition, each agreed to a different good reason.
Crucially, in both conditions, both partners arrived at the
wrong conclusion. Results suggested that 7-year-olds, and
5-year-olds to a lesser degree, chose the partner who
endorsed the good reason in the experimental condition, but
showed no preference for partners in the control condition.
Thus, young children distinguish good from poor reasons,
even if neither leads to success, and choose partners who do
the same.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2019.100824},
Key = {fds349827}
}
@article{fds349828,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Respect Defended.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {23},
Number = {9},
Pages = {716-717},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.001},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.001},
Key = {fds349828}
}
@article{fds349829,
Author = {Kachel, U and Svetlova, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Three- and 5-year-old children's understanding of how to
dissolve a joint commitment.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {184},
Pages = {34-47},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.03.008},
Abstract = {When young children form a joint commitment with a partner,
they understand that this agreement generates obligations.
In this study, we investigated whether young children
understand that joint commitments, and their associated
obligations, may likewise be dissolved by agreement. The
participants (3- and 5-year-olds; N = 144) formed a
joint commitment with a puppet to play a collaborative game.
In one condition, the puppet asked permission to break off
and the children agreed; in a second condition, the puppet
notified the children of his or her leaving; and in a third
condition, the puppet just left abruptly. Children at both
ages protested more and waited longer for the puppet's
return (and said that the puppet deserved scolding and no
prize at the end) when the puppet left abruptly than in the
other two conditions (with "asking permission" leading to
the least protest of all). Overall, 3-year-olds protested
more, and waited longer for the partner's return, than
5-year-olds. Preschool children understand that the
obligations of a joint commitment may be dissolved by
agreement or, to a lesser degree, by notification.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2019.03.008},
Key = {fds349829}
}
@article{fds332984,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Thirty years of great ape gestures.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {461-469},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1},
Abstract = {We and our colleagues have been doing studies of great ape
gestural communication for more than 30 years. Here we
attempt to spell out what we have learned. Some aspects of
the process have been reliably established by multiple
researchers, for example, its intentional structure and its
sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient. Other
aspects are more controversial. We argue here that it is a
mistake to assimilate great ape gestures to the
species-typical displays of other mammals by claiming that
they are fixed action patterns, as there are many
differences, including the use of attention-getters. It is
also a mistake, we argue, to assimilate great ape gestures
to human gestures by claiming that they are used
referentially and declaratively in a human-like manner, as
apes' "pointing" gesture has many limitations and they do
not gesture iconically. Great ape gestures constitute a
unique form of primate communication with their own unique
qualities.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-018-1167-1},
Key = {fds332984}
}
@article{fds349830,
Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Visually attending to a video together facilitates great ape
social closeness.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {286},
Number = {1907},
Pages = {20190488},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0488},
Abstract = {Humans create social closeness with one another through a
variety of shared social activities in which they align
their emotions or mental states towards an external stimulus
such as dancing to music together, playing board games
together or even engaging in minimal shared experiences such
as watching a movie together. Although these specific
behaviours would seem to be uniquely human, it is unclear
whether the underlying psychology is unique to the species,
or if other species might possess some form of this
psychological mechanism as well. Here we show that great
apes who have visually attended to a video together with a
human (study 1) and a conspecific (study 2) subsequently
approach that individual faster (study 1) or spend more time
in their proximity (study 2) than when they had attended to
something different. Our results suggest that one of the
most basic mechanisms of human social bonding-feeling closer
to those with whom we act or attend together-is present in
both humans and great apes, and thus has deeper evolutionary
roots than previously suspected.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2019.0488},
Key = {fds349830}
}
@article{fds349831,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Correct Non-Conforming Actions by
Others.},
Journal = {Infancy : the official journal of the International Society
on Infant Studies},
Volume = {24},
Number = {4},
Pages = {613-635},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12292},
Abstract = {At around their third birthday, children begin to enforce
social norms on others impersonally, often using generic
normative language, but little is known about the
developmental building blocks of this abstract norm
understanding. Here, we investigate whether even toddlers
show signs of enforcing on others interpersonally how "we"
do things. In an initial dyad, 18-month-old infants learnt a
simple game-like action from an adult. In two experiments,
the adult either engaged infants in a normative interactive
activity (stressing that this is the way "we" do it) or, as
a non-normative control, marked the same action as
idiosyncratic, based on individual preference. In a test
dyad, infants had the opportunity to spontaneously intervene
when a puppet partner performed an alternative action.
Infants intervened, corrected, and directed the puppet more
in the normative than in the non-normative conditions. These
findings suggest that, during the second year of life,
infants develop second-personal normative expectations about
their partner's behavior ("You should do X!") in social
interactions, thus making an important step toward
understanding the normative structure of human cultural
activities. These simple normative expectations will later
be scaled up to group-minded and abstract social
norms.},
Doi = {10.1111/infa.12292},
Key = {fds349831}
}
@article{fds349832,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's Sense of Fairness as Equal Respect.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {23},
Number = {6},
Pages = {454-463},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.03.001},
Abstract = {One influential view holds that children's sense of fairness
emerges at age 8 and is rooted in the development of an
aversion to unequal resource distributions. Here, we suggest
two amendments to this view. First, we argue and present
evidence that children's sense of fairness emerges already
at age 3 in (and only in) the context of collaborative
activities. This is because, in our theoretical view,
collaboration creates a sense of equal respect among
partners. Second, we argue and present evidence that
children's judgments about what is fair are essentially
judgments about the social meaning of the distributive act;
for example, children accept unequal distributions if the
procedure gave everyone an equal chance (so-called
distributive justice). Children thus respond to unequal (and
other) distributions not based on material concerns, but
rather based on interpersonal concerns: they want equal
respect.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2019.03.001},
Key = {fds349832}
}
@article{fds349833,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The moral psychology of obligation.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {e56},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19001742},
Abstract = {Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the
sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral
philosophers have identified two of its key features: First,
it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of
coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to
agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which
breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and
apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other.
Drawing on empirical research in comparative and
developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological
foundation for these unique features by showing that the
human sense of obligation is intimately connected
developmentally with the formation of a shared agent "we,"
which not only directs collaborative efforts but also
self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is
first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative
activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it
is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not
out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you
and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in
interdependent collaboration - scaled up to our lives
together in an interdependent cultural group - this
transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel
when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that "we"
put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in
this "we") to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me
self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore
be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19001742},
Key = {fds349833}
}
@article{fds349834,
Author = {Knofe, H and Engelmann, J and Tomasello, M and Herrmann,
E},
Title = {Chimpanzees monopolize and children take turns in a limited
resource problem.},
Journal = {Scientific reports},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {7597},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-44096-4},
Abstract = {Competition over scarce resources is common across the
animal kingdom. Here we investigate the strategies of
chimpanzees and children in a limited resource problem. Both
species were presented with a tug-of-war apparatus in which
each individual in a dyad received a tool to access a
reward, but tools could not be used simultaneously. We
assessed the equality of tool use as well as the frequency
of turn taking. Both species managed to overcome this
conflict of interest but used different strategies to do so.
While there was substantial variation in chimpanzee
behaviour, monopolization was the common course of action:
tool use was asymmetric with individual chimpanzees
monopolizing the resource. In children, turn-taking emerged
as the dominant strategy: tool use was symmetric and
children alternated access to the tool at a high rate. These
results suggest that while both species possess strategies
for solving limited resource problems, humans might have
evolved species unique motivations and socio-cognitive
skills for dealing with such conflicts of
interest.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-019-44096-4},
Key = {fds349834}
}
@article{fds349835,
Author = {Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) coordinate by communicating
in a collaborative problem-solving task.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {286},
Number = {1901},
Pages = {20190408},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0408},
Abstract = {Successful collaboration often relies on individuals'
capacity to communicate with each other. Despite extensive
research on chimpanzee communication, there is little
evidence that chimpanzees are capable, without extensive
human training, of regulating collaborative activities via
communication. This study investigated whether pairs of
chimpanzees were capable of communicating to ensure
coordination during collaborative problem-solving. The
chimpanzee pairs needed two tools to extract fruits from an
apparatus. The communicator in each pair could see the
location of the tools (hidden in one of two boxes), whereas
only the recipient could open the boxes. The subjects were
first successfully tested for their capacity to understand
the pointing gestures of a human who indicated the location
of the tools. In a subsequent conspecifics test, the
communicator increasingly communicated the tools' location,
by approaching the baited box and giving the key needed to
open it to the recipients. The recipient used these signals
and obtained the tools, transferring one of the tools to the
communicator so that the pair could collaborate in obtaining
the fruits. The study suggests that chimpanzees have the
necessary socio-cognitive skills to naturally develop a
simple communicative strategy to ensure coordination in a
collaborative task.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2019.0408},
Key = {fds349835}
}
@article{fds329385,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Müller, K and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The relation between young children's physiological arousal
and their motivation to help others.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {126},
Pages = {113-119},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010},
Abstract = {Children are motivated to help others from an early age.
However, little is known about the internal biological
mechanisms underlying their motivation to help. Here, we
compiled data from five separate studies in which children,
ranging in age from 18 months to 5.5 years, witnessed an
adult needing help. In all studies, we assessed both (1)
children's internal physiological arousal via changes in
their pupil dilation, and (2) the latency and likelihood of
them providing help. The results showed that the greater the
baseline-corrected change in children's internal arousal in
response to witnessing the need situation, the faster and
more likely children were to help the adult. This was not
the case for the baseline measure of children's tonic
arousal state. Together, these results suggest that
children's propensity to help is systematically related to
their physiological arousal after they witness others
needing help. This sheds new light on the biological
mechanisms underlying not only young children's social
perception but also their prosocial motivation more
generally.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.010},
Key = {fds329385}
}
@article{fds349836,
Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Natural reference: A phylo- and ontogenetic perspective on
the comprehension of iconic gestures and
vocalizations.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {e12757},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12757},
Abstract = {The recognition of iconic correspondence between signal and
referent has been argued to bootstrap the acquisition and
emergence of language. Here, we study the ontogeny, and to
some extent the phylogeny, of the ability to spontaneously
relate iconic signals, gestures, and/or vocalizations, to
previous experience. Children at 18, 24, and 36 months of
age (N = 216) and great apes (N = 13) interacted with
two apparatuses, each comprising a distinct action and
sound. Subsequently, an experimenter mimicked either the
action, the sound, or both in combination to refer to one of
the apparatuses. Experiments 1 and 2 found no spontaneous
comprehension in great apes and in 18-month-old children. At
24 months of age, children were successful with a composite
vocalization-gesture signal but not with either vocalization
or gesture alone. At 36 months, children succeeded both
with a composite vocalization-gesture signal and with
gesture alone, but not with vocalization alone. In general,
gestures were understood better compared to vocalizations.
Experiment 4 showed that gestures were understood
irrespective of how children learned about the corresponding
action (through observation or self-experience). This
pattern of results demonstrates that iconic signals can be a
powerful way to establish reference in the absence of
language, but they are not trivial for children to
comprehend and not all iconic signals are created
equal.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12757},
Key = {fds349836}
}
@article{fds349837,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children engage in competitive altruism.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {179},
Pages = {176-189},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.008},
Abstract = {Humans cultivate their reputations as good cooperators,
sometimes even competing with group mates, to appear most
cooperative to individuals during the process of selecting
partners. To investigate the ontogenetic origins of such
"competitive altruism," we presented 5- and 8-year-old
children with a dyadic sharing game in which both children
simultaneously decided how many rewards to share with each
other. The children were either observed by a third-person
peer or not. In addition, the children either knew that one
of them would be picked for a subsequent collaborative game
or had no such knowledge. We found that by 8 years of age,
children were more generous in the sharing game not only
when their behavior was observed by a third party but also
when it could affect their chances of being chosen for a
subsequent game. This is the first demonstration of
competitive altruism in young children, and as such it
underscores the important role of partner choice (and
individual awareness of the process) in encouraging human
cooperation from an early age.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.008},
Key = {fds349837}
}
@article{fds349838,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children use rules to coordinate in a social
dilemma.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {179},
Pages = {362-374},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.001},
Abstract = {Humans are frequently required to coordinate their actions
in social dilemmas (e.g. when one of two drivers has to
yield for the other at an intersection). This is commonly
achieved by individuals following communally known rules
that prescribe how people should behave. From relatively
early in development, children swiftly pick up the rules of
their culture and even start creating game rules among
peers. Thus far, however, little is known about children's
abilities create rules to regulate their own interactions in
social dilemma situations in which individuals' interests
are partially in conflict. Here, we repeatedly selected
dyads of children (5- and 8-year-olds, N = 144) at
random from a group and presented them with a chicken game -
a social dilemma in which individuals have conflicting
motives but coordination is required to avoid mutual
failure. In game breaks, groups reconvened and had the
opportunity to think of additional game rules. Eight- but
not five-year-olds readily came up with and agreed upon
impartial rules to guide their subsequent game behavior (but
only after adult prompting). Moreover, when playing by the
self-made rules, children achieved higher payoffs, had fewer
conflicts, and coordinated with greater efficiency than when
playing without a rule - which mimics the functional
consequences of rules on a societal level. These findings
suggest that by at least age 8, children are capable of
using rules to independently self-regulate potential
conflicts of interest with peers.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2018.11.001},
Key = {fds349838}
}
@article{fds349839,
Author = {Rapp, DJ and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's reputational strategies in a peer group
context.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {2},
Pages = {329-336},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000639},
Abstract = {Reputational concerns are known to promote cooperation.
Individuals regularly act more prosocially when their
behavior is observable by others. Here, we investigate 4-
and 5-year-old (N = 144) children's reputational strategies
in a competitive group setting. The aim of the current study
was to explore whether children's sharing behavior is
affected by the future possibility of being singled out
publicly as the most generous or, alternatively, the least
generous member of the group. Children were told that they
could share stickers with other children and that the
picture of either the (1) most generous or (2) least
generous donor would be displayed publicly. In both
conditions, children shared significantly more than in a
control condition. Moreover, 5-year-old, but not 4-year-old
children's sharing was affected more by the possibility of
being presented as the most generous than being presented as
the least generous member of the group. This study is the
first to show that children as young as 4 invest in their
future reputation and that by age 5 children flexibly apply
different reputational strategies depending on context.
(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights
reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000639},
Key = {fds349839}
}
@article{fds349840,
Author = {Kachel, U and Tomasello, M},
Title = {3- and 5-year-old children's adherence to explicit and
implicit joint commitments.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {1},
Pages = {80-88},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000632},
Abstract = {The problem with collaboration is that there are temptations
to defect. Explicit joint commitments are designed to
mitigate some of the risks, but people also feel committed
to others implicitly when they both know together that they
each hold the other's fate in their hands. In the current
study, pairs of 3-year-old and 5-year-old children (<i>N</i>
= 192) played a collaborative game. One child was offered
individual rewards (bribed) to opt out of the collaboration.
In 3 different conditions, the level of the commitment was
manipulated. Three-year-old children were more likely to
resist the bribes when there was an explicit joint
commitment to the partner than when they were only playing
in parallel, with their reactions to an implicit commitment
falling in between. Five-year-olds were more likely to
resist bribes in both the implicit and explicit commitment
conditions than in the no-commitment condition. Thus,
children at both ages showed some level of commitment to a
collaborative partner in the face of bribes to defect, but
only 5-year-olds clearly appreciated that a common-ground
understanding of interdependence between partners generates
an implicit commitment or obligation. (PsycINFO Database
Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000632},
Key = {fds349840}
}
@article{fds349841,
Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers consider (absent) others when choosing a
distribution procedure.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {14},
Number = {8},
Pages = {e0221186},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221186},
Abstract = {This study investigated how the presence of others and
anticipated distributions for self influence children's
fairness-related decisions in two different socio-moral
contexts. In the first part, three- and five-year-old
children (N = 120) decided between a fair and an unfair
wheel of fortune to allocate resources (procedural justice).
In the second part, they directly chose between two
distributions of resources (distributive justice). While
making a decision, each child was either observed by the
affected group members (public), alone (private), or no
others were introduced (non-social control). Children choose
the fair option more often when others were affected
(independently of their presence) only in the procedural
justice task. These results suggest that using a fair
procedure to distribute resources allows young preschoolers
to overcome selfish tendencies.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0221186},
Key = {fds349841}
}
@article{fds349842,
Author = {John, M and Duguid, S and Tomasello, M and Melis,
AP},
Title = {How chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) share the spoils with
collaborators and bystanders.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {14},
Number = {9},
Pages = {e0222795},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222795},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees hunt cooperatively in the wild, but the factors
influencing food sharing after the hunt are not well
understood. In an experimental study, groups of three
captive chimpanzees obtained a monopolizable food resource,
either via two individuals cooperating (with the third as
bystander) or via one individual acting alone alongside two
bystanders. The individual that obtained the resource first
retained most of the food but the other two individuals
attempted to obtain food from the "captor" by begging. We
found the main predictor of the overall amount of food
obtained by bystanders was proximity to the food at the
moment it was obtained by the captor. Whether or not an
individual had cooperated to obtain the food had no effect.
Interestingly, however, cooperators begged more from captors
than did bystanders, suggesting that they were more
motivated or had a greater expectation to obtain food. These
results suggest that while chimpanzee captors in cooperative
hunting may not reward cooperative participation directly,
cooperators may influence sharing behavior through increased
begging.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0222795},
Key = {fds349842}
}
@article{fds366586,
Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees and children avoid mutual defection in a social
dilemma},
Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1},
Pages = {46-54},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.07.004},
Abstract = {Cooperation often comes with the temptation to defect and
benefit at the cost of others. This tension between
cooperation and defection is best captured in social
dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma. Adult humans have
specific strategies to maintain cooperation during
Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. Yet, little is known about
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of human
decision-making strategies in conflict scenarios. To shed
light on this question, we compared the strategies used by
chimpanzees and 5-year old children to overcome a social
dilemma. In our task, waiting for the partner to act first
produced the best results for the subject. Alternatively,
they could mutually cooperate and divide the rewards. Our
findings indicate that the two species differed
substantially in their strategies to solve the task.
Chimpanzees became more strategic across the study period by
waiting longer to act in the social dilemma. Children
developed a more efficient strategy of taking turns to
reciprocate their rewards. Moreover, children used specific
types of communication to coordinate with their partners.
These results suggest that while both species behaved
strategically to overcome a conflict situation, only
children engaged in active cooperation to solve a social
dilemma.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.07.004},
Key = {fds366586}
}
@misc{fds351572,
Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Punishment},
Pages = {214-221},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128132517},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1},
Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior
of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no
regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the
other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be
motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment,
third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special
cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these
may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More
socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more
flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular
interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since
these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale
non-kin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is
known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment
in other animals.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1},
Key = {fds351572}
}
@misc{fds372674,
Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Punishment},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {V1-214-V1-219},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior, Second Edition: Volume
1-5},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128132517},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1},
Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior
of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no
regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the
other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be
motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment,
third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special
cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these
may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More
socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more
flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular
interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since
these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale
non-kin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is
known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment
in other animals.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809633-8.01093-1},
Key = {fds372674}
}
@article{fds349843,
Author = {Stengelin, R and Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Why should I trust you? Investigating young children's
spontaneous mistrust in potential deceivers},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {48},
Pages = {146-154},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.08.006},
Abstract = {Children must learn not to trust everyone to avoid being
taken advantage of. In the current study, 5- and 7-year-old
children were paired with a partner whose incentives were
either congruent (cooperative condition) or conflicting
(competitive condition) with theirs. Children of both ages
were more likely to mistrust information spontaneously
provided by the competitive than the cooperative partner,
showing a capacity for detecting contextual effects on
incentives. However, a high proportion of children, even at
age 7, initially trusted the competitive partner. After
being misled once, almost all children mistrusted the
partner on a second trial irrespective of the partner's
incentives. These results demonstrate that while even school
age children are mostly trusting, they are only beginning to
spontaneously consider other's incentives when interpreting
the truthfulness of their utterances. However, after
receiving false information only once they immediately
switch to an untrusting attitude.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.08.006},
Key = {fds349843}
}
@article{fds349844,
Author = {Siposova, B and Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M},
Title = {Communicative eye contact signals a commitment to cooperate
for young children.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {179},
Pages = {192-201},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.010},
Abstract = {Making commitments to cooperate facilitates cooperation.
There is a long-standing theoretical debate about how
promissory obligations come into existence, and whether
linguistic acts (such as saying "I promise") are a necessary
part of the process. To inform this debate we experimentally
investigated whether even minimal, nonverbal behavior can be
taken as a commitment to cooperate, as long as it is
communicative. Five- to 7-year-old children played a Stag
Hunt coordination game in which they needed to decide
whether to cooperate or play individually. During the
decision-making phase, children's partner made either
ostensive, communicative eye contact or looked
non-communicatively at them. In Study 1 we found that
communicative looks produced an expectation of collaboration
in children. In Study 2 we found that children in the
communicative look condition normatively protested when
their partner did not cooperate, thus showing an
understanding of the communicative looks as a commitment to
cooperate. This is the first experimental evidence, in
adults or children, that in the right context,
communicative, but not non-communicative, looks can signal a
commitment.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.010},
Key = {fds349844}
}
@article{fds366587,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The normative turn in early moral development},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {61},
Number = {4-5},
Pages = {248-263},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000492802},
Abstract = {The Cooperation Theory of moral development starts from the
premise that morality is a special form of cooperation.
Before 3 years of age, children help and share with others
prosocially, and they collaborate with others in ways that
foster a sense of equally deserving partners. But then, at
around the age of 3, their social interactions are
transformed by an emerging understanding of, and respect
for, normative standards. Three-year-olds become capable of
making and respecting joint commitments, treating
collaborative partners fairly, enforcing social norms, and
feeling guilty when they violate any of these. The almost
simultaneous emergence of a normative attitude in all of
these interactional contexts demands explanation. We suggest
a transactional causal model: the maturation of capacities
for shared intentionality (adaptations for cultural life)
makes possible new forms of cooperative social interaction,
and these new forms of cooperative social interaction foster
and guide moral development.},
Doi = {10.1159/000492802},
Key = {fds366587}
}
@article{fds326700,
Author = {Kachel, U and Svetlova, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Three-Year-Olds' Reactions to a Partner's Failure to Perform
Her Role in a Joint Commitment.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {89},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1691-1703},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12816},
Abstract = {When children make a joint commitment to collaborate,
obligations are created. Pairs of 3-year-old children
(N = 144) made a joint commitment to play a game. In three
different conditions the game was interrupted in the middle
either because: (a) the partner child intentionally
defected, (b) the partner child was ignorant about how to
play, or (c) the apparatus broke. The subject child reacted
differently in the three cases, protesting normatively
against defection (with emotional arousal and later
tattling), teaching when the partner seemed to be ignorant,
or simply blaming the apparatus when it broke. These results
suggest that 3-year-old children are competent in making
appropriate normative evaluations of intentions and
obligations of collaborative partners.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12816},
Key = {fds326700}
}
@article{fds333648,
Author = {Kachel, G and Moore, R and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds use adults' but not peers'
points.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5},
Pages = {e12660},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12660},
Abstract = {In the current study, 24- to 27-month-old children (N = 37)
used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task
with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the
location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally
accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for
adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding
places, children used adults' pointing to find a hidden toy
significantly more often than they used peers'. In
interaction with peers, children's choice behavior was at
chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe
informative value to adults' but not peers' pointing
gestures, and highlight the role of children's social
expectations in their communicative development.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12660},
Key = {fds333648}
}
@article{fds332985,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Great Apes and Human Development: A Personal
History},
Journal = {Child Development Perspectives},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {189-193},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12281},
Abstract = {In this article, I recount my history of research with great
apes. From the beginning, the idea was to compare apes to
human children, with an eye to discovering facts relevant to
describing and explaining processes of human development.
The research went through three more or less distinct
stages, focusing on communication and social learning,
social cognition and theory of mind, and cooperation and
shared intentionality. I conclude by identifying problems
and prospects for comparative research in developmental
psychology.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdep.12281},
Key = {fds332985}
}
@article{fds349845,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {HOW WE LEARNED TO PUT OUR FATE IN ONE ANOTHER'S HANDS THE
ORIGINS OF MORALITY},
Journal = {SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN},
Volume = {319},
Number = {3},
Pages = {70-75},
Publisher = {SPRINGER},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0918-70},
Doi = {10.1038/scientificamerican0918-70},
Key = {fds349845}
}
@article{fds337395,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared
intentionality account.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {115},
Number = {34},
Pages = {8491-8498},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804761115},
Abstract = {To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must
understand that their actions are determined not by reality
but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children
come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at
about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different
response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have
some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not
possible with current theories based on individual
cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing
that the key processes in constructing an understanding of
belief are social and mental coordination with other persons
and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in
such social and mental coordination involves species-unique
skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially
as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic
communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive
function to coordinate the different perspectives involved.
This shared intentionality account accords well with
documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great
apes and human children, and it explains why infants and
apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only
older children pass others.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1804761115},
Key = {fds337395}
}
@article{fds335757,
Author = {Bohn, M and Zimmermann, L and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The social-cognitive basis of infants' reference to absent
entities.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {177},
Pages = {41-48},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that infants as young as 12 month
of age use pointing to communicate about absent entities.
The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that
infants do so based on tracking what their interlocutor
experienced in a previous shared interaction. The present
study addresses this assumption empirically. In three
experiments, 12-month-old infants could request additional
desired objects by pointing to the location in which these
objects were previously located. We systematically varied
whether the adult from whom infants were requesting had
previously experienced the former content of the location
with the infant. Infants systematically adjusted their
pointing to the now empty location to what they experienced
with the adult previously. These results suggest that
infants' ability to communicate about absent referents is
based on an incipient form of common ground.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.024},
Key = {fds335757}
}
@article{fds366588,
Author = {John, M and Melis, AP and Read, D and Rossano, F and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The preference for scarcity: A developmental and comparative
perspective},
Journal = {Psychology and Marketing},
Volume = {35},
Number = {8},
Pages = {603-615},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.21109},
Abstract = {Human adults often show a preference for scarce over
abundant goods. In this paper, we investigate whether this
preference was shared by 4- and 6-year-old children as well
as chimpanzees, humans’ nearest primate relative. Neither
chimpanzees nor 4-year-olds displayed a scarcity preference,
but 6-year-olds did, especially in the presence of
competitors. We conclude that scarcity preference is a
human-unique preference that develops as humans increase
their cognitive skills and social experiences with peers and
competitors. We explore different potential psychological
explanations for scarcity preference and conclude scarcity
preference is based on children's fear of missing out an
opportunity, especially when dealing with uncertainty or
goods of unknown value in the presence of competitors.
Furthermore, the results are in line with studies showing
that supply-based scarcity increases the desirability of
hedonic goods, suggesting that even as early as 6 years of
age humans may use scarce goods to feel unique or
special.},
Doi = {10.1002/mar.21109},
Key = {fds366588}
}
@article{fds366589,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Precís of a natural history of human morality},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {31},
Number = {5},
Pages = {661-668},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1486605},
Abstract = {Here I summarize the main points in my 2016 book, A Natural
History of Human Morality. Taking an evolutionary point of
view, I characterize human morality as a special form of
cooperation. In particular, human morality represents a kind
of we > me orientation and valuation that emanates from the
logic of social interdependence, both at the level of
individual collaboration and at the level of the cultural
group. Human morality emanates from psychological processes
of shared intentionality evolved to enable individuals to
function effectively in ever more cooperative
lifeways.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2018.1486605},
Key = {fds366589}
}
@article{fds366590,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response to commentators},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {31},
Number = {5},
Pages = {817-829},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1486604},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2018.1486604},
Key = {fds366590}
}
@article{fds333647,
Author = {House, BR and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Modeling social norms increasingly influences costly sharing
in middle childhood.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {171},
Pages = {84-98},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014},
Abstract = {Prosocial and normative behavior emerges in early childhood,
but substantial changes in prosocial behavior in middle
childhood may be due to it becoming integrated with
children's understanding of what is normative. Here we show
that information about what is normative begins influencing
children's costly sharing in middle childhood in a sample of
6- to 11-year-old German children. Information about what is
normative was most influential when indicating what was
"right" (i.e., "The right thing is to choose this"). It was
less influential when indicating what was prescribed by a
rule (i.e., "There is a rule that says to choose this") or
when it indicated what the majority of people do (i.e.,
"Most people choose this"). These findings support the idea
that middle childhood is when social norms begin to shape
children's costly sharing and provide insight into the
psychological foundations of the relationship between norms
and prosocial behavior.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.12.014},
Key = {fds333647}
}
@article{fds329386,
Author = {Domberg, A and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and
competitive contexts.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {36},
Number = {1},
Pages = {64-77},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12213},
Abstract = {We report two studies that demonstrate how five- and
seven-year-olds adapt their production of arguments to
either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games
elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on
either of two halves of a playing field owned by either
child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these
decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged
placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments
showed a bias that was the result of withholding known
arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not
only more arguments, but also more 'two-sided' arguments.
Also, seven-year-olds demonstrated a more frequent and
strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted
decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest
that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context
for children to produce arguments. Statement of contribution
What is already known on this subject? Reasoning is a social
skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer
conversations. By adolescence, children use sophisticated
arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals). What the
present study adds? Cooperation offers a more motivating
context for children's argument production. Seven-year-olds
are more strategic than five-year-olds in their reasoning
with peers. Children's reasoning with others becomes more
sophisticated after preschool years.},
Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12213},
Key = {fds329386}
}
@article{fds331567,
Author = {Vaish, A and Hepach, R and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The specificity of reciprocity: Young children reciprocate
more generously to those who intentionally benefit
them.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {167},
Pages = {336-353},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005},
Abstract = {Young children engage in direct reciprocity, but the
mechanisms underlying such reciprocity remain unclear. In
particular, prior work leaves unclear whether children's
reciprocity is simply a response to receiving benefits
(regardless of whether the benefits were intended) or driven
by a mechanism of rewarding or preferring all benefactors
(regardless of whom they benefited). Alternatively, perhaps
children engage in genuine reciprocity such that they are
particularly prosocial toward benefactors who intentionally
provided them with benefits. Our findings support this
third, richer possibility; the 3-year-olds who received
benefits through the good intentions of a benefactor were
subsequently more generous toward the benefactor than
children who either (a) received the same benefits from the
benefactor unintentionally or (b) observed the benefactor
bestow the same benefits on another individual. Thus, young
children are especially motivated to benefit those who have
demonstrated goodwill toward them, suggesting, as one
possible mechanism, an early sense of gratitude.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005},
Key = {fds331567}
}
@article{fds351573,
Author = {Li, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The development of intention-based sociomoral judgment and
distribution behavior from a third-party
stance.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {167},
Pages = {78-92},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.021},
Abstract = {The current study investigated children's intention-based
sociomoral judgments and distribution behavior from a
third-party stance. An actor puppet showed either positive
or negative intention toward a target puppet, which had
previously performed a prosocial or antisocial action toward
others (i.e., children witnessed various types of indirect
reciprocity). Children (3- and 5-year-olds) were asked to
make sociomoral judgments and to distribute resources to the
actor puppet. Results showed that 5-year-olds were more
likely than 3-year-olds to be influenced by intention when
they made their judgment and distributed resources. The
target's previous actions affected only 5-year-olds'
intent-based social preference. These results suggest that
children's judgments about intent-based indirect reciprocity
develop from ages 3 to 5 years.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.021},
Key = {fds351573}
}
@article{fds330413,
Author = {Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making
with peers.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {166},
Pages = {549-566},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018},
Abstract = {In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the
evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality
of their respective proposals with their partners. In the
main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were
presented with a novel animal. In the key condition,
children in a dyad individually received conflicting
information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs.
sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with
first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups
were able to reliably settle on the option with the best
supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision,
children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds
of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a
modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and
5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried
to convince children to change their minds by producing
meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk,
5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change
their minds if their information was unreliable. These
results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in
collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to
reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine
the evidence emerges only during the early school
years.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018},
Key = {fds330413}
}
@article{fds330414,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Concern for Group Reputation Increases Prosociality in Young
Children.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {181-190},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617733830},
Abstract = {The motivation to build and maintain a positive personal
reputation promotes prosocial behavior. But individuals also
identify with their groups, and so it is possible that the
desire to maintain or enhance group reputation may have
similar effects. Here, we show that 5-year-old children
actively invest in the reputation of their group by acting
more generously when their group's reputation is at stake.
Children shared significantly more resources with fictitious
other children not only when their individual donations were
public rather than private but also when their group's
donations (effacing individual donations) were public rather
than private. These results provide the first experimental
evidence that concern for group reputation can lead to
higher levels of prosociality.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797617733830},
Key = {fds330414}
}
@article{fds332050,
Author = {Mammen, M and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The reasons young children give to peers when explaining
their judgments of moral and conventional
rules.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {54},
Number = {2},
Pages = {254-262},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000424},
Abstract = {Moral justifications work, when they do, by invoking values
that are shared in the common ground of the interlocutors.
We asked 3- and 5-year-old peer dyads (N = 144) to identify
and punish norm transgressors. In the moral condition, the
transgressor violated a moral norm (e.g., by stealing); in
the social rules condition, she/he violated a
context-specific rule (e.g., by placing a yellow toy in a
green box, instead of a yellow box). Children in both age
groups justified their punishment in the social rules
condition mostly by referring to the rule (e.g., "He must
put yellow toys in the yellow box"). In contrast, in the
moral condition they mostly justified their punishment by
simply referring to the observed fact (e.g., "He stole"),
seeing no need to state the norm involved (e.g., "He must
not steal"), presumably because they assumed this as part of
their moral common ground with their partner. These results
suggest that preschoolers assume certain common ground moral
values with their peers and use these in formulating
explicit moral judgments and justifications. (PsycINFO
Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000424},
Key = {fds332050}
}
@article{fds329017,
Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children are more willing to accept group decisions in
which they have had a voice.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {166},
Pages = {67-78},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003},
Abstract = {People accept an unequal distribution of resources if they
judge that the decision-making process was fair. In this
study, 3- and 5-year-old children played an allocation game
with two puppets. The puppets decided against a fair
distribution in all conditions, but they allowed children to
have various degrees of participation in the decision-making
process. Children of both ages protested less when they were
first asked to agree with the puppets' decision compared
with when there was no agreement. When ignored, the younger
children protested less than the older children-perhaps
because they did not expect to have a say in the
process-whereas they protested more when they were given an
opportunity to voice their opinion-perhaps because their
stated opinion was ignored. These results suggest that
during the preschool years, children begin to expect to be
asked for their opinion in a decision, and they accept
disadvantageous decisions if they feel that they have had a
voice in the decision-making process.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.08.003},
Key = {fds329017}
}
@article{fds335758,
Author = {Halina, M and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The goal of ape pointing.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {13},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e0195182},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195182},
Abstract = {Captive great apes regularly use pointing gestures in their
interactions with humans. However, the precise function of
this gesture is unknown. One possibility is that apes use
pointing primarily to direct attention (as in "please look
at that"); another is that they point mainly as an action
request (such as "can you give that to me?"). We
investigated these two possibilities here by examining how
the looking behavior of recipients affects pointing in
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus).
Upon pointing to food, subjects were faced with a recipient
who either looked at the indicated object (successful-look)
or failed to look at the indicated object (failed-look). We
predicted that, if apes point primarily to direct attention,
subjects would spend more time pointing in the failed-look
condition because the goal of their gesture had not been
met. Alternatively, we expected that, if apes point
primarily to request an object, subjects would not differ in
their pointing behavior between the successful-look and
failed-look conditions because these conditions differed
only in the looking behavior of the recipient. We found that
subjects did differ in their pointing behavior across the
successful-look and failed-look conditions, but contrary to
our prediction subjects spent more time pointing in the
successful-look condition. These results suggest that apes
are sensitive to the attentional states of gestural
recipients, but their adjustments are aimed at multiple
goals. We also found a greater number of individuals with a
strong right-hand than left-hand preference for
pointing.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0195182},
Key = {fds335758}
}
@article{fds366591,
Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Backus, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Constructively combining languages},
Journal = {Linguistic Approaches to Bilingualism},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {393-409},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lab.17008.qui},
Abstract = {Language development in bilingual children is often related
to differing levels of proficiency. Objective measurements
of bilingual development include for example mean length of
utterance (MLU). MLU is almost always calculated for each
language context (including both monolingual and code-mixed
utterances). In the current study, we analyzed the MLUs of
three German-English bilingual children, aged 2;3-3;11
separately for the monolingual and code-mixed utterances.
Our results showed that language preference was reflected in
MLU values: the more children spoke in one language the
higher the MLU was in that language. However, it was the
mixed utterances that had the highest MLU for all three
children. We support the results with a construction type
analysis and suggest a potential usage-based explanation for
these results based on individual differences in each
child's developmental inventory of words and
constructions.},
Doi = {10.1075/lab.17008.qui},
Key = {fds366591}
}
@article{fds366593,
Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Identifying partially schematic units in the code-mixing of
an English and German speaking child},
Journal = {Linguistic Approaches to Bilingualism},
Volume = {8},
Number = {4},
Pages = {477-501},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lab.15049.qui},
Abstract = {Intra-sentential code-mixing presents a number of puzzles
for theories of bilingualism. In this paper, we examine the
code-mixed English-German utterances of a young
English-German-Spanish trilingual child between 1;10 –
3;1, using both an extensive diary kept by the mother and
audio recordings. We address the interplay between lexical
and syntactic aspects of language use outlined in the
usage-based approach (e.g. Tomasello, 2003). The data
suggest that partially schematic constructions play an
important role in the code-mixing of this child. In
addition, we find, first, that the code-mixing was not
mainly the result of lexical gaps. Second, there was more
mixing of German function words than content words. Third,
code-mixed utterances often consisted of the use of a
partially schematic construction with the open slot filled
by material from the other language. These results raise a
number of important issues for all theoretical approaches to
code mixing, which we discuss.},
Doi = {10.1075/lab.15049.qui},
Key = {fds366593}
}
@article{fds366594,
Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees' understanding of social leverage.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {13},
Number = {12},
Pages = {e0207868},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207868},
Abstract = {Social primates can influence others through the control of
resources. For instance, dominant male chimpanzees might
allow subordinates access to mate with females in exchange
for social support. However, little is known about how
chimpanzees strategically use a position of leverage to
maximize their own benefits. We address this question by
presenting dyads of captive chimpanzee (N = 6) with a task
resulting in an unequal reward distribution. To gain the
higher reward each individual should wait for their partner
to act. In addition, one participant had leverage: access to
an alternative secure reward. By varying the presence and
value of the leverage we tested whether individuals used it
strategically (e.g. by waiting longer for partners to act
when they had leverage in the form of alternatives).
Additionally, non-social controls served to show if
chimpanzees understood the social dilemma. We measured the
likelihood to choose the leverage and their latencies to
act. The final decision made by the chimpanzees did not
differ as a function of condition (test versus non-social
control) or the value of the leverage, but they did wait
longer to act when the leverage was smaller-particularly in
test (versus non-social control) trials suggesting that they
understood the conflict of interest involved. The
chimpanzees thus recognized the existence of social
leverage, but did not use it strategically to maximize their
rewards.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0207868},
Key = {fds366594}
}
@misc{fds366592,
Author = {Sanchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Coordination Strategies of Chimpanzees and Children in a
Prisoner's Dilemma},
Journal = {FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA},
Volume = {89},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {186-186},
Publisher = {KARGER},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds366592}
}
@misc{fds349846,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {What did we learn from theape language studies?},
Pages = {95-104},
Booktitle = {Bonobos: Unique in Mind, Brain, and Behavior},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780198728511},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007},
Abstract = {The ‘ape language’ studies have come and gone, with
wildly divergent claims about what they have shown. Without
question, the most sophisticated skills have been displayed
by Kanzi, a male bonobo exposed from youth to a human-like
communicative system. This chapter attempts to assess, in an
objective a manner as possible, the nature of the
communicative skills that Kanzi and other great apes
acquired during the various ape language projects. The
overall conclusion is that bonobos and other apes possess
most of the requisite cognitive skills for something like a
human language, including such things as basic symbol
learning, categorization, sequential (statistical) learning,
etc. What they lack are the skills and motivations of shared
intentionality-such things as joint attention,
perspective-taking and cooperative motives- for adjusting
their communicative acts for others pragmatically, or for
learning symbols whose main function is pragmatic.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007},
Key = {fds349846}
}
@article{fds328848,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children's developing metaethical judgments.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {164},
Pages = {163-177},
Year = {2017},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008},
Abstract = {Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may
approach things more relativistically if different cultures
are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children
(N=136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral
matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong
to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it
is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical
judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party
(objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right.
We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were
more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a
normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative
extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and
background) than when the antinormative judge was another
ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a
comparison case where parties disagreed about the
possibility of different physical laws. These findings
suggest that although young children often exhibit moral
objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their
objectivism with culturally relative metaethical
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008},
Key = {fds328848}
}
@misc{fds361197,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T},
Title = {How children turn objects into symbols: A cultural learning
account},
Pages = {69-97},
Booktitle = {Symbol Use and Symbolic Representation: Developmental and
Comparative Perspectives},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780805845976},
Key = {fds361197}
}
@article{fds326493,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Gonzalez-Cabrera, I},
Title = {The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of Human
Cooperation.},
Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {274-288},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1},
Abstract = {To explain the evolutionary emergence of uniquely human
skills and motivations for cooperation, Tomasello et al.
(2012, in Current Anthropology 53(6):673-92) proposed the
interdependence hypothesis. The key adaptive context in this
account was the obligate collaborative foraging of early
human adults. Hawkes (2014, in Human Nature 25(1):28-48),
following Hrdy (Mothers and Others, Harvard University
Press, 2009), provided an alternative account for the
emergence of uniquely human cooperative skills in which the
key was early human infants' attempts to solicit care and
attention from adults in a cooperative breeding context.
Here we attempt to reconcile these two accounts. Our
composite account accepts Hrdy's and Hawkes's contention
that the extremely early emergence of human infants'
cooperative skills suggests an important role for
cooperative breeding as adaptive context, perhaps in early
Homo. But our account also insists that human cooperation
goes well beyond these nascent skills to include such things
as the communicative and cultural conventions, norms, and
institutions created by later Homo and early modern humans
to deal with adult problems of social coordination. As part
of this account we hypothesize how each of the main stages
of human ontogeny (infancy, childhood, adolescence) was
transformed during evolution both by infants' cooperative
skills "migrating up" in age and by adults' cooperative
skills "migrating down" in age.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12110-017-9291-1},
Key = {fds326493}
}
@article{fds320781,
Author = {Hepach, R and Kante, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Toddlers Help a Peer.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {88},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1642-1652},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12686},
Abstract = {Toddlers are remarkably prosocial toward adults, yet little
is known about their helping behavior toward peers. In the
present study with 18- and 30-month-old toddlers (n = 192,
48 dyads per age group), one child needed help reaching an
object to continue a task that was engaging for both
children. The object was within reach of the second child
who helped significantly more often compared to a no-need
control condition. The helper also fulfilled the peer's need
when the task was engaging only for the child needing help.
These findings suggest that toddlers' skills and motivations
of helping do not depend on having a competent and helpful
recipient, such as an adult, but rather they are much more
flexible and general.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12686},
Key = {fds320781}
}
@article{fds327646,
Author = {Kano, F and Krupenye, C and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Submentalizing Cannot Explain Belief-Based Action
Anticipation in Apes.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {21},
Number = {9},
Pages = {633-634},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011},
Key = {fds327646}
}
@article{fds326494,
Author = {Haux, L and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Do young children preferentially trust gossip or firsthand
observation in choosing a collaborative partner?},
Journal = {Social Development},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {466-474},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2017},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sode.12225},
Abstract = {From early on in ontogeny, young children hear things being
said about particular individuals. Here we investigate the
ways in which testimony with social content, that is,
gossip, influences children's decision-making. We explored
whether five-year-old (N = 72) and seven-year-old (N = 72)
children trust gossip or firsthand observation in a partner
choice setting. Seven-year-old children preferentially
trusted what they had seen firsthand over gossip;
five-year-old children, in contrast, did not differentiate
between these two sources of information. However,
five-year-old children (but not seven-year-olds) generally
gave negative information more weight, that is, they showed
a “negativity bias.” These results suggest that at
around school age, young children become more
“epistemically vigilant” about gossip.},
Doi = {10.1111/sode.12225},
Key = {fds326494}
}
@article{fds328849,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Duguid, S and Saur, H and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children, chimpanzees, and bonobos adjust the visibility of
their actions for cooperators and competitors.},
Journal = {Scientific reports},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {8504},
Year = {2017},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees and bonobos are highly capable of tracking
other's mental states. It has been proposed, however, that
in contrast to humans, chimpanzees are only able to do this
in competitive interactions but this has rarely been
directly tested. Here, pairs of chimpanzees or bonobos
(Study 1) and 4-year-old children (Study 2) were presented
with two almost identical tasks differing only regarding the
social context. In the cooperation condition, players'
interests were matched: they had to make corresponding
choices to be mutually rewarded. To facilitate coordination,
subjects should thus make their actions visible to their
partner whose view was partially occluded. In the
competition condition, players' interests were directly
opposed: the partner tried to match the subject's choice but
subjects were only rewarded if they chose differently, so
that they benefited from hiding their actions. The apes
successfully adapted their decisions to the social context
and their performance was markedly better in the cooperation
condition. Children also distinguished between the two
contexts, but somewhat surprisingly, performed better in the
competitive condition. These findings demonstrate
experimentally that chimpanzees and bonobos can take into
account what others can see in cooperative interactions.
Their social-cognitive skills are thus more flexible than
previously assumed.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-017-08435-7},
Key = {fds328849}
}
@article{fds328850,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Clift, JB and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Social disappointment explains chimpanzees' behaviour in the
inequity aversion task.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {284},
Number = {1861},
Pages = {20171502},
Year = {2017},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1502},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees' refusal of less-preferred food when an
experimenter has previously provided preferred food to a
conspecific has been taken as evidence for a sense of
fairness. Here, we present a novel hypothesis-the social
disappointment hypothesis-according to which food refusals
express chimpanzees' disappointment in the human
experimenter for not rewarding them as well as they could
have. We tested this hypothesis using a two-by-two design in
which food was either distributed by an experimenter or a
machine and with a partner present or absent. We found that
chimpanzees were more likely to reject food when it was
distributed by an experimenter rather than by a machine and
that they were not more likely to do so when a partner was
present. These results suggest that chimpanzees' refusal of
less-preferred food stems from social disappointment in the
experimenter and not from a sense of fairness.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.1502},
Key = {fds328850}
}
@article{fds320785,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's Intrinsic Motivation to Provide Help Themselves
After Accidentally Harming Others.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {88},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1251-1264},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12646},
Abstract = {Little is known about the flexibility of children's
prosocial motivation. Here, 2- and 3-year-old children's
(n = 128) internal arousal, as measured via changes in
pupil dilation, was increased after they accidentally harmed
a victim but were unable to repair the harm. If they were
able to repair (or if they themselves did not cause the harm
and the help was provided by someone else) their arousal
subsided. This suggests that children are especially
motivated to help those whom they have harmed, perhaps out
of a sense of guilt and a desire to reconcile with them.
Young children care not only about the well-being of others
but also about the relationship they have with those who
depend on their help.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12646},
Key = {fds320785}
}
@article{fds325488,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Köymen, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children mostly keep, and expect others to keep, their
promises.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {159},
Pages = {140-158},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004},
Abstract = {Promises are speech acts that create an obligation to do the
promised action. In three studies, we investigated whether
3- and 5-year-olds (N=278) understand the normative
implications of promising in prosocial interactions. In
Study 1, children helped a partner who promised to share
stickers. When the partner failed to uphold the promise, 3-
and 5-year-olds protested and referred to promise norms. In
Study 2, when children in this same age range were asked to
promise to continue a cleaning task-and they agreed-they
persisted longer on the task and mentioned their obligation
more frequently than without such a promise. They also
persisted longer after a promise than after a cleaning
reminder (Study 3). In prosocial interactions, thus, young
children feel a normative obligation to keep their promises
and expect others to keep their promises as
well.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.02.004},
Key = {fds325488}
}
@article{fds327020,
Author = {Schmelz, M and Grueneisen, S and Kabalak, A and Jost, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees return favors at a personal cost.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {114},
Number = {28},
Pages = {7462-7467},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1700351114},
Abstract = {Humans regularly provide others with resources at a personal
cost to themselves. Chimpanzees engage in some cooperative
behaviors in the wild as well, but their motivational
underpinnings are unclear. In three experiments, chimpanzees
(<i>Pan troglodytes</i>) always chose between an option
delivering food both to themselves and a partner and one
delivering food only to themselves. In one condition, a
conspecific partner had just previously taken a personal
risk to make this choice available. In another condition, no
assistance from the partner preceded the subject's decision.
Chimpanzees made significantly more prosocial choices after
receiving their partner's assistance than when no assistance
was given (experiment 1) and, crucially, this was the case
even when choosing the prosocial option was materially
costly for the subject (experiment 2). Moreover, subjects
appeared sensitive to the risk of their partner's assistance
and chose prosocially more often when their partner risked
losing food by helping (experiment 3). These findings
demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees are willing to
incur a material cost to deliver rewards to a conspecific,
but only if that conspecific previously assisted them, and
particularly when this assistance was risky. Some key
motivations involved in human cooperation thus may have
deeper phylogenetic roots than previously
suspected.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1700351114},
Key = {fds327020}
}
@article{fds326490,
Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees, bonobos, and children successfully coordinate
in conflict situations.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences},
Volume = {284},
Number = {1856},
Publisher = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.0259},
Abstract = {Social animals need to coordinate with others to reap the
benefits of group-living even when individuals’ interests
are misaligned. We compare how chimpanzees, bonobos and
children coordinate their actions with a conspecific in a
Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how
organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict. In
study 1, we presented pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and
children with an unequal reward distribution. In the
critical condition, the preferred reward could only be
obtained by waiting for the partner to act, with the risk
that if no one acted, both would lose the rewards. Apes and
children successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards.
Children used a ‘both-partner-pull’ strategy and
communicated during the task, while some apes relied on an
‘only-one-partner-pulls’ strategy to solve the task,
although there were also signs of strategic behaviour as
they waited for their partner to pull when that strategy led
to the preferred reward. In study 2, we presented pairs of
chimpanzees and bonobos with the same set-up as in study 1
with the addition of a non-social option that provided them
with a secure reward. In this situation, apes had to
actively decide between the unequal distribution and the
alternative. In this set-up, apes maximized their rewards by
taking their partners’ potential actions into account. In
conclusion, children and apes showed clear instances of
strategic decision-making to maximize their own rewards
while maintaining successful coordination.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2017.0259},
Key = {fds326490}
}
@article{fds326491,
Author = {Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {From imitation to implementation: How two- and
three-year-old children learn to enforce social
norms.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {35},
Number = {2},
Pages = {237-248},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12159},
Abstract = {Young children enforce social norms from early on, but
little research has examined how this enforcement behaviour
emerges. This study investigated whether observing an
adult's norm enforcement influences children's own
enforcement of that norm compared with observing an action
demonstration without enforcement. Additionally, children
experienced enforcement either following their own
(second-party) or a third-party's transgression (N = 120).
Results revealed that observing enforcement increased two-
and three-year-old children's protest against the sanctioned
action regardless of second- or third-party context.
However, only three-year-olds generalized their enforcement
to a novel action not matching the norm, whereas
two-year-olds only protested against the previously
sanctioned action. Importantly, without any enforcement
demonstration, two-year-olds rarely protested at all while
three-year-olds did so quite frequently. Thus, providing an
opportunity to imitate enforcement seems to give rise to
enforcement behaviour in two-year-olds while three-year-olds
already understand normative implications following a
variety of cues and even apply norm enforcement without any
demonstration of how to do it. Statement of contribution
What is already known on this subject? Children conform to
social norms from early in development. Young children from
2 to 3 years of age also enforce social norms on third
parties. What does this study add? Observing enforcement by
an adult increases two- and three-year-olds' protest against
the sanctioned action. It does not matter whether children
experienced enforcement on their own or a third party's
action. Three-, but not two-year-olds, generalize their
enforcement to novel actions that do not match the
norm.},
Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12159},
Key = {fds326491}
}
@article{fds326492,
Author = {Rapp, DJ and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The impact of choice on young children's prosocial
motivation.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {158},
Pages = {112-121},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004},
Abstract = {The current study explored how freedom of choice affects
preschoolers' prosocial motivation. Children (3- and
5-year-olds) participated in either a choice condition
(where they could decide for themselves whether to help or
not) or a no-choice condition (where they were instructed to
help). Prosocial motivation was subsequently assessed by
measuring the amount children helped an absent peer in the
face of an attractive alternative game. The 5-year-olds
provided with choice helped more than the children not
provided with choice, and this effect was stronger for girls
than for boys. There was no difference between conditions
for the 3-year-olds. These results highlight the importance
of choice in young children's prosocial development.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2017.01.004},
Key = {fds326492}
}
@article{fds320783,
Author = {Hardecker, S and Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children’s Developing Understanding of the Conventionality
of Rules},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {163-188},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624},
Abstract = {Much research has investigated how children relate to norms
taught to them by adult authorities. Very few studies have
investigated norms that arise out of children’s own peer
interactions. In two studies, we investigated how 5- and
7-year-old children teach, enforce, and understand rules
that they either created themselves or were taught by an
adult. Children (N = 240) were asked to either invent game
rules on their own or were taught these exact same rules by
an adult (yoked design). Children of both ages enforced and
transmitted the rules in a normative way, regardless of
whether they had invented them or were taught the rules by
an adult, suggesting that they viewed even their own
self-made rules as normatively binding. However, creating
the rules led 5-year-old children to understand them as much
more changeable as compared with adult-taught rules.
Seven-year-olds, in contrast, regarded both kinds of rules
as equally changeable, indeed allowing fewer changes to
their self-created rules than 5-year-olds. While the process
of creating rules seemed to enlighten preschoolers’
understanding of the conventionality of the rules,
school-aged children regarded both self-created rules and
adult-taught rules in a similar manner, suggesting a deeper
understanding of rule normativity as arising from social
agreement and commitment.},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624},
Key = {fds320783}
}
@article{fds320782,
Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children, but not chimpanzees, are averse to
disadvantageous and advantageous inequities.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {155},
Pages = {48-66},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013},
Abstract = {The age at which young children show an aversion to
inequitable resource distributions, especially those
favoring themselves, is unclear. It is also unclear whether
great apes, as humans' nearest evolutionary relatives, have
an aversion to inequitable resource distributions at all.
Using a common methodology across species and child ages,
the current two studies found that 3- and 4-year-old
children (N=64) not only objected when they received less
than a collaborative partner but also sacrificed to equalize
when they received more. They did neither of these things in
a nonsocial situation, demonstrating the fundamental role of
social comparison. In contrast, chimpanzees (N=9) showed no
aversion to inequitable distributions, only a concern for
maximizing their own resources, with no differences between
social and nonsocial conditions. These results underscore
the unique importance for humans, even early in ontogeny,
for treating others fairly, presumably as a way of becoming
a cooperative member of one's cultural group.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.10.013},
Key = {fds320782}
}
@article{fds325489,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by taking
turns and along dominance asymmetries.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {53},
Number = {2},
Pages = {265-273},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000236},
Abstract = {Humans constantly have to coordinate their decisions with
others even when their interests are conflicting (e.g., when
2 drivers have to decide who yields at an intersection). So
far, however, little is known about the development of these
abilities. Here, we present dyads of 5-year-olds (N = 40)
with a repeated chicken game using a novel methodology: Two
children each steered an automated toy train carrying a
reward. The trains simultaneously moved toward each other so
that in order to avoid a crash-which left both children
empty-handed-1 train had to swerve. By swerving, however,
the trains lost a portion of the rewards so that it was in
each child's interest to go straight. Children coordinated
their decisions successfully over multiple rounds, and they
mostly did so by taking turns at swerving. In dyads in which
turn-taking was rare, dominant children obtained
significantly higher payoffs than their partners. Moreover,
the coordination process was more efficient in turn-taking
dyads as indicated by a significant reduction in conflicts
and verbal protest. These findings indicate that already by
the late preschool years children can independently
coordinate decisions with peers in recurrent conflicts of
interest. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000236},
Key = {fds325489}
}
@book{fds351574,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction: A cognitive-functional perspective on language
structure},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {vii-xxiii},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780585115191},
Key = {fds351574}
}
@book{fds351575,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional
approaches to language structure},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {1-292},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780585115191},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315085678},
Abstract = {This book, which gathers in one place the theories of 10
leading cognitive and functional linguists, represents a new
approach that may define the next era in the history of
psychology: It promises to give psychologists a new
appreciation of what this variety of linguistics can offer
their study of language and communication. In addition, it
provides cognitive-functional linguists new models for
presenting their work to audiences outside the boundaries of
traditional linguistics. Thus, it serves as an excellent
text for courses in psycholinguistics, and appeal to
students and researchers in cognitive science and functional
linguistics.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315085678},
Key = {fds351575}
}
@article{fds329018,
Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance
in a false belief task inanimate control.},
Journal = {Communicative & integrative biology},
Volume = {10},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e1343771},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771},
Abstract = {Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with
humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as
desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief
task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a
human actor would search for a goal object where he had last
seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no
longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking
behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but
rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use
of inanimate controls to test this alternative
submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we
implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous
false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but
showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant
tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no
evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes'
anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.},
Doi = {10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771},
Key = {fds329018}
}
@article{fds322245,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The fulfillment of others' needs elevates children's body
posture.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {53},
Number = {1},
Pages = {100-113},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000173},
Abstract = {Much is known about young children's helping behavior, but
little is known about the underlying motivations and
emotions involved. In 2 studies we found that 2-year-old
children showed positive emotions of similar magnitude-as
measured by changes in their postural elevation using depth
sensor imaging technology-after they achieved a goal for
themselves and after they helped another person achieve her
goal. Conversely, children's posture decreased in elevation
when their actions did not result in a positive outcome.
These results suggest that for young children, working for
themselves and helping others are similarly rewarding.
(PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000173},
Key = {fds322245}
}
@article{fds326212,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Buttelmann, F and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an
interactive helping task.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e0173793},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173793},
Abstract = {Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of
circumstances requires an understanding of their
psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the
great apes, understand many psychological states of others,
for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so
far there is little evidence that they possess the key
marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding
of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal
(implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human
1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and
orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and
false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may
possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's
actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such
understanding might not be the exclusive province of the
human species.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0173793},
Key = {fds326212}
}
@article{fds351576,
Author = {Hepach, R and Haberl, K and Lambert, S and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Toddlers Help Anonymously},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {130-145},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12143},
Abstract = {Young children are extremely motivated to help others, but
it is not clear whether they do so in anonymous situations
without social recognition. In two studies, we found that
18-month-old toddlers provided help equally in situations
where an adult recipient was present and in situations
where an adult recipient was not present. We included
several control conditions to rule out that toddlers were
simply unaware of their anonymity or were merely motivated
to restore the physical order of things. Together, these
findings suggest that early in ontogeny children are
motivated to help others in need regardless of whether they
can immediately be recognized for their prosocial
intentions.},
Doi = {10.1111/infa.12143},
Key = {fds351576}
}
@article{fds351577,
Author = {Schmid, B and Karg, K and Perner, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Great apes are sensitive to prior reliability of an
informant in a gaze following task.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {12},
Number = {11},
Pages = {e0187451},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187451},
Abstract = {Social animals frequently rely on information from other
individuals. This can be costly in case the other individual
is mistaken or even deceptive. Human infants below 4 years
of age show proficiency in their reliance on differently
reliable informants. They can infer the reliability of an
informant from few interactions and use that assessment in
later interactions with the same informant in a different
context. To explore whether great apes share that ability,
in our study we confronted great apes with a reliable or
unreliable informant in an object choice task, to see
whether that would in a subsequent task affect their gaze
following behaviour in response to the same informant. In
our study, prior reliability of the informant and
habituation during the gaze following task affected both
great apes' automatic gaze following response and their more
deliberate response of gaze following behind barriers. As
habituation is very context specific, it is unlikely that
habituation in the reliability task affected the gaze
following task. Rather it seems that apes employ a
reliability tracking strategy that results in a general
avoidance of additional information from an unreliable
informant.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0187451},
Key = {fds351577}
}
@misc{fds365126,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Middle Step: Joint Intentionality as a Human-Unique Form
of Second-Personal Engagement},
Pages = {433-446},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138783638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315768571-41},
Abstract = {The crucial middle step consists in second-personal
engagement with engagement others. In this chapter, the
authors present face-to-face interactions joint
intentionality. On the other hand there are capacities for
acting collectively within a social group or culture,
relying on an understanding and sensitivity to
supra-individual constructions as cultural conventions,
norms, and institutional reality. Much attention has been
paid to processes of collective intentionality, often under
the rubric of “social ontology”. While the social life
of even our nearest living relatives, chimpanzees and
bonobos is characterized by individual intentions, humans
routinely coordinate with others to form intricate modes of
collective intentions and enduring cultural practices.
Chimpanzees have robust and selective intentions to behave
cooperatively toward their bond partners, including a
tendency to preferentially trust those partners. The authors
discuss how early humans evolved new cognitive adaptations,
most importantly and fundamentally the dual-level cognitive
structure of joint intentionality.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315768571-41},
Key = {fds365126}
}
@misc{fds366595,
Author = {Engelmann, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Prosociality and morality in children and
chimpanzees},
Pages = {15-32},
Booktitle = {New Perspectives on Moral Development},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138188013},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315642758},
Abstract = {The modern study of moral development began with Piaget’s
(1932) The Moral Judgment of the Child, which although
originally published in the 1930s only became
internationally known in the 1960s through its influence on
Kohlberg’s theory (e.g. Kohlberg, 1981). Piaget and
Kohlberg were both explicit that they were not studying
children’s moral motivations or behaviour, but only their
judgements, indeed typically judgements about other
people’s interactions from a third-party perspective. Much
of the work in social domain theory championed by Turiel
(1983), though coming from a somewhat different theoretical
perspective, also focused on children’s judgements about
third parties’ interactions.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315642758},
Key = {fds366595}
}
@article{fds351578,
Author = {Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How to Compare Across Species.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {27},
Number = {12},
Pages = {1670-1672},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616671336},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797616671336},
Key = {fds351578}
}
@article{fds320786,
Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Early Emergence of Guilt-Motivated Prosocial
Behavior.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1772-1782},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12628},
Abstract = {Guilt serves vital prosocial functions: It motivates
transgressors to make amends, thus restoring damaged
relationships. Previous developmental research on guilt has
not clearly distinguished it from sympathy for a victim or a
tendency to repair damage in general. The authors tested 2-
and 3-year-old children (N = 62 and 64, respectively) in a
2 × 2 design, varying whether or not a mishap caused harm
to someone and whether children themselves caused that
mishap. Three-year-olds showed greatest reparative behavior
when they had caused the mishap and it caused harm, thus
showing a specific effect of guilt. Two-year-olds repaired
more whenever harm was caused, no matter by whom, thus
showing only an effect of sympathy. Guilt as a distinct
motivator of prosocial behavior thus emerges by at least
3 years.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12628},
Key = {fds320786}
}
@article{fds320787,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Grossmann, T and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young Children Want to See Others Get the Help They
Need.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1703-1714},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12633},
Abstract = {Children's instrumental helping has sometimes been
interpreted as a desire to complete action sequences or to
restore the physical order of things. Two-year-old children
(n = 51) selectively retrieved for an adult the object he
needed rather than one he did not (but which equally served
to restore the previous order of things), and those with
greater internal arousal (i.e., pupil dilation) were faster
to help. In a second experiment (n = 64), children's
arousal increased when they witnessed an adult respond
inappropriately to another adult's need. This was not the
case in a nonsocial control condition. These findings
suggest that children's helping is not aimed at restoring
the order of things but rather at seeing another person's
need fulfilled.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12633},
Key = {fds320787}
}
@article{fds320784,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How chimpanzees cooperate: If dominance is artificially
constrained.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {113},
Number = {44},
Pages = {E6728-E6729},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1614378113},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1614378113},
Key = {fds320784}
}
@article{fds351579,
Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of past interactions in great apes' communication
about absent entities.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {130},
Number = {4},
Pages = {351-357},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000042},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that great apes can use the former
location of an entity to communicate about it. In this study
we built on these findings to investigate the
social-cognitive foundations of great apes' communicative
abilities. We tested whether great apes (n = 35) would
adjust their requests for absent entities to previous
interactions they had with their interlocutor. We
manipulated the apes' experience with respect to the
interlocutor's knowledge about the previous content of the
now-empty location as well as their experience with the
interlocutor's competence to provide additional food items.
We found that apes adjusted their requests to both of these
aspects but failed to integrate them with one another. These
results demonstrate a surprising amount of flexibility in
great apes' communicative abilities while at the same time
suggesting some important limitations in their social
communicative skills. (PsycINFO Database
Record},
Doi = {10.1037/com0000042},
Key = {fds351579}
}
@article{fds351580,
Author = {Brandt, S and Buttelmann, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children's understanding of first- and third-person
perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief
tasks.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {151},
Pages = {131-143},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004},
Abstract = {De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and
others have claimed that children come to understand false
belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for
representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic
attitude toward that proposition. In the current study,
English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were
asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with
a first- or third-person subject of the propositional
attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or
"The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box",
respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding
of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that
4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both
third-person propositional attitude constructions and false
belief than their younger peers. No significant
developmental differences were found for first-person
propositional attitude constructions. The older children
also showed a better understanding of their own false
beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition,
regression analyses suggest that the older children's
comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related
to their understanding of third-person propositional
attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need
to take a closer look at the propositional attitude
constructions that are supposed to support children's
false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand
their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this
may affect both their use and understanding of propositional
attitude constructions and their performance in various
types of false-belief tasks.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004},
Key = {fds351580}
}
@article{fds320788,
Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act
according to false beliefs.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {354},
Number = {6308},
Pages = {110-114},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf8110},
Abstract = {Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are
able to understand that others' actions are driven not by
reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those
beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans
many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed
experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We
use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for
human infants) to show that three species of great apes
reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a
location where he falsely believes an object to be, even
though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer
there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at
least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false
beliefs.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.aaf8110},
Key = {fds320788}
}
@article{fds320789,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {In Memoriam: Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915–2016]},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {155},
Pages = {iii-iv},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.013},
Key = {fds320789}
}
@article{fds321683,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Butler, LP and Heinz, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social
Norm.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {27},
Number = {10},
Pages = {1360-1370},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616661182},
Abstract = {Human social life depends heavily on social norms that
prescribe and proscribe specific actions. Typically, young
children learn social norms from adult instruction. In the
work reported here, we showed that this is not the whole
story: Three-year-old children are promiscuous normativists.
In other words, they spontaneously inferred the presence of
social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate
such a norm in either language or behavior. And children of
this age even went so far as to enforce these self-inferred
norms when third parties "broke" them. These results suggest
that children do not just passively acquire social norms
from adult behavior and instruction; rather, they have a
natural and proactive tendency to go from "is" to "ought."
That is, children go from observed actions to prescribed
actions and do not perceive them simply as guidelines for
their own behavior but rather as objective normative rules
applying to everyone equally.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797616661182},
Key = {fds321683}
}
@article{fds351581,
Author = {Over, H and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do young children accept responsibility for the negative
actions of ingroup members?},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {24-32},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.004},
Abstract = {This study investigated whether young children accept
responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members.
Five-year-old children watched a transgressor break someone
else's valued possession. Depending on condition, this
transgressor either belonged to the same group as the child
or a different group from the child. Coding of children's
nonverbal behaviour indicated that they displayed more signs
of guilt (but not other negative emotions) when the
transgressor belonged to their own group than the other
group. Furthermore, when the transgressor belonged to their
own group, children were more likely to say that their own
group should apologise for the damage and that they
themselves should try to repair the broken object.
Children's connections to their groups are thus so profound
that they appear to feel responsible for the negative
actions of their group members even when they had no
personal involvement in the harm those actions
caused.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.004},
Key = {fds351581}
}
@article{fds351582,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Language in a New Key.},
Journal = {Scientific American},
Volume = {315},
Number = {5},
Pages = {70-75},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1116-70},
Doi = {10.1038/scientificamerican1116-70},
Key = {fds351582}
}
@article{fds351583,
Author = {Hardecker, S and Schmidt, MFH and Roden, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's behavioral and emotional responses to
different social norm violations.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {364-379},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.012},
Abstract = {From an early age, children can talk meaningfully about
differences between moral and conventional norms. But does
their understanding of these differences manifest itself in
their actual behavioral and emotional reactions to norm
violations? And do children discriminate between norm
violations that affect either themselves or a third party?
Two studies (N=224) were conducted in which children
observed conventional game rule violations and moral
transgressions that either disadvantaged themselves directly
or disadvantaged an absent third party. Results revealed
that 3- and 5-year-olds evaluated both conventional and
moral transgressions as normative breaches and protested
against them. However, 5-year-olds also clearly
discriminated these types of transgressions along further
dimensions in that (a) they tattled largely on the moral
violation and less on the conventional violation and (b)
they showed stronger emotional reactions to moral violations
compared to conventional violations. The 3-year-olds'
responses to moral and conventional transgressions, however,
were less discriminatory, and these younger children
responded rather similarly to both kinds of violations.
Importantly, most children intervened both as victims of the
transgression and as unaffected third parties alike,
providing strong evidence for their agent-neutral
understanding of social norms.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.012},
Key = {fds351583}
}
@article{fds320790,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Jerome Seymour Bruner [1915-2016].},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {43},
Number = {5},
Pages = {967-968},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000916000374},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000916000374},
Key = {fds320790}
}
@article{fds351584,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers affect others' reputations through prosocial
gossip.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {34},
Number = {3},
Pages = {447-460},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12143},
Abstract = {Providing evaluative information to others about absent
third parties helps them to identify cooperators and avoid
cheaters. Here, we show that 5-year-olds, but not
3-year-olds, reliably engage in such prosocial gossip. In an
experimental setting, 5-year-old children spontaneously
offered relevant reputational information to guide a peer
towards a cooperative partner. Three-year-old children
offered such evaluative information only rarely, although
they still showed a willingness to inform in a
non-evaluative manner. A follow-up study revealed that one
component involved in this age difference is children's
developing ability to provide justifications. The current
results extend previous work on young children's tendency to
manage their own reputation by showing that preschoolers
also influence others' reputations via gossip.},
Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12143},
Key = {fds351584}
}
@article{fds323256,
Author = {Vaish, A and Herrmann, E and Markmann, C and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {153},
Pages = {43-51},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011},
Abstract = {Large-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals
requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such
enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free
ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution
is that enforcers receive benefits relative to
non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes
functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not
4-year-old) children judged enforcers of norms more
positively, preferred enforcers, and distributed more
resources to enforcers than to non-enforcers. The ability to
sustain not only first-order but also second-order
cooperation thus emerges quite early in human ontogeny,
providing a viable solution to the problem of higher-order
cooperation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011},
Key = {fds323256}
}
@article{fds340136,
Author = {Melis, A and Grocke, P and Kalbitz, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {One for you, one for me: Humans' unique turn-taking
skills},
Journal = {Psychological Science},
Volume = {27},
Number = {7},
Pages = {987-996},
Publisher = {Association for Psychological Science},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616644070},
Abstract = {Long-term collaborative relationships require that any
jointly produced resources be shared in mutually
satisfactory ways. Prototypically, this sharing involves
partners dividing up simultaneously available resources, but
sometimes the collaboration makes a resource available to
only one individual, and any sharing of resources must take
place across repeated instances over time. Here, we show
that beginning at 5 years of age, human children stabilize
cooperation in such cases by taking turns across instances
of obtaining a resource. In contrast, chimpanzees do not
take turns in this way, and so their collaboration tends to
disintegrate over time. Alternating turns in obtaining a
collaboratively produced resource does not necessarily
require a prosocial concern for the other, but rather
requires only a strategic judgment that partners need
incentives to continue collaborating. These results suggest
that human beings are adapted for thinking strategically in
ways that sustain long-term cooperative relationships and
that are absent in their nearest primate
relatives.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797616644070},
Key = {fds340136}
}
@article{fds323257,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Rapp, DJ and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children (sometimes) do the right thing even when
their peers do not},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {39},
Pages = {86-92},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004},
Abstract = {Children must sometimes decide between conforming to peer
behavior and doing what is right. While research shows that
children have a strong inclination to act prosocially and to
help conspecifics in need, many studies also demonstrate
that children tend to adopt peer behavior. In two studies (N
= 96), we investigated whether children would conform to an
antisocial majority or, whether they would do the right
thing even under peer pressure. Results show that if a
recipient is in need, 5-year-old children act prosocially in
two different contexts even when there is a strong selfish
incentive not to. However, once the severity of the
recipient's need is reduced, children conform to the
antisocial group. The current studies suggest that
children's prosocial motivation sometimes wins out against
more selfish drives.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.04.004},
Key = {fds323257}
}
@article{fds351585,
Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Extrinsic Rewards Diminish Costly Sharing in
3-Year-Olds.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1192-1203},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12534},
Abstract = {Two studies investigated the influence of external rewards
and social praise in young children's fairness-related
behavior. The motivation of ninety-six 3-year-olds' to
equalize unfair resource allocations was measured in three
scenarios (collaboration, windfall, and dictator game)
following three different treatments (material reward,
verbal praise, and neutral response). In all scenarios,
children's willingness to engage in costly sharing was
negatively influenced when they had received a reward for
equal sharing during treatment than when they had received
praise or no reward. The negative effect of material rewards
was not due to subjects responding in kind to their
partner's termination of rewards. These results provide new
evidence for the intrinsic motivation of prosociality-in
this case, costly sharing behavior-in preschool
children.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12534},
Key = {fds351585}
}
@misc{fds330415,
Author = {Krupenye, C and Kano, F and Hirata, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Great apes anticipate actions based on agents' (false)
beliefs},
Journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {255-255},
Publisher = {ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds330415}
}
@article{fds351586,
Author = {Sánchez-Amaro, A and Duguid, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees coordinate in a snowdrift game},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {116},
Pages = {61-74},
Year = {2016},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.03.030},
Abstract = {The snowdrift game is a model for studying social
coordination in the context of competing interests. We
presented pairs of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, with a
situation in which they could either pull a weighted tray
together or pull alone to obtain food. Ultimately
chimpanzees should coordinate their actions because if no
one pulled, they would both lose the reward. There were two
experimental manipulations: the tray's weight (low or high
weight condition) and the time to solve the dilemma before
the rewards became inaccessible (40 s or 10 s). When the
costs were high (i.e. high weight condition), chimpanzees
waited longer to act. Cooperation tended to increase in
frequency across sessions. The pulling effort invested in
the task also became more skewed between subjects. The
subjects also adjusted their behaviour by changing their
pulling effort for different partners. These results
demonstrate that chimpanzees can coordinate their actions in
situations where there is a conflict of interest.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.03.030},
Key = {fds351586}
}
@article{fds351587,
Author = {Butler, LP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two- and 3-year-olds integrate linguistic and pedagogical
cues in guiding inductive generalization and
exploration.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {145},
Pages = {64-78},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.12.001},
Abstract = {Young children can in principle make generic inferences
(e.g., "doffels are magnetic") on the basis of their own
individual experience. Recent evidence, however, shows that
by 4 years of age children make strong generic inferences on
the basis of a single pedagogical demonstration with an
individual (e.g., an adult demonstrates for the child that a
single "doffel" is magnetic). In the current experiments, we
extended this to look at younger children, investigating how
the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are integrated
with other aspects of inductive inference during early
development. We found that both 2- and 3-year-olds used
pedagogical cues to guide such generic inferences, but only
so long as the "doffel" was linguistically labeled. In a
follow-up study, 3-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, continued
to make this generic inference even if the word "doffel" was
uttered incidentally and non-referentially in a context
preceding the pedagogical demonstration, thereby simply
marking the opportunity to learn about a culturally
important category. By 3 years of age, then, young children
show a remarkable ability to flexibly combine different
sources of culturally relevant information (e.g., linguistic
labeling, pedagogy) to make the kinds of generic inferences
so central in human cultural learning.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.12.001},
Key = {fds351587}
}
@article{fds351588,
Author = {Zeidler, H and Herrmann, E and B M Haun and D and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Taking Turns or Not? Children's Approach to Limited Resource
Problems in Three Different Cultures.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {3},
Pages = {677-688},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12505},
Abstract = {Some problems of resource distribution can be solved on
equal terms only by taking turns. We presented such a
problem to 168 pairs of 5- to 10-year-old children from one
Western and two non-Western societies (German, Samburu,
Kikuyu). Almost all German pairs solved the problem by
taking turns immediately, resulting in an equal distribution
of resources throughout the game. In the other groups, one
child usually monopolized the resource in Trial 1 and
sometimes let the partner monopolize it in Trial 2,
resulting in an equal distribution in only half the dyads.
These results suggest that turn-taking is not a natural
strategy uniformly across human cultures, but rather that
different cultures use it to different degrees and in
different contexts.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12505},
Key = {fds351588}
}
@article{fds351589,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cultural Learning Redux.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {3},
Pages = {643-653},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12499},
Abstract = {M. Tomasello, A. Kruger, and H. Ratner (1993) proposed a
theory of cultural learning comprising imitative learning,
instructed learning, and collaborative learning. Empirical
and theoretical advances in the past 20 years suggest
modifications to the theory; for example, children do not
just imitate but overimitate in order to identify and
affiliate with others in their cultural group, children
learn from pedagogy not just episodic facts but the generic
structure of their cultural worlds, and children
collaboratively co-construct with those in their culture
normative rules for doing things. In all, human children do
not just culturally learn useful instrumental activities and
information, they conform to the normative expectations of
the cultural group and even contribute themselves to the
creation of such normative expectations.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12499},
Key = {fds351589}
}
@article{fds351590,
Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Differing views: Can chimpanzees do Level 2
perspective-taking?},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {555-564},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7},
Abstract = {Although chimpanzees understand what others may see, it is
unclear whether they understand how others see things (Level
2 perspective-taking). We investigated whether chimpanzees
can predict the behavior of a conspecific which is holding a
mistaken perspective that differs from their own. The
subject competed with a conspecific over two food sticks.
While the subject could see that both were the same size, to
the competitor one appeared bigger than the other. In a
previously established game, the competitor chose one stick
in private first and the subject chose thereafter, without
knowing which of the sticks was gone. Chimpanzees and
6-year-old children chose the 'riskier' stick (that looked
bigger to the competitor) significantly less in the game
than in a nonsocial control. Children chose randomly in the
control, thus showing Level 2 perspective-taking skills; in
contrast, chimpanzees had a preference for the 'riskier'
stick here, rendering it possible that they attributed their
own preference to the competitor to predict her choice. We
thus run a follow-up in which chimpanzees did not have a
preference in the control. Now, they also chose randomly in
the game. We conclude that chimpanzees solved the task by
attributing their own preference to the other, while
children truly understood the other's mistaken
perspective.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7},
Key = {fds351590}
}
@misc{fds359905,
Author = {Quick, AE and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Mixed NPs in German-English and German-Russian bilingual
children},
Pages = {127-146},
Booktitle = {Cognitive Perspectives on Bilingualism},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781614515852},
Abstract = {Both cross-linguistic priming methodologies and research on
codemixed utterances have been concerned with the nature of
the underlying syntactic representations of bilinguals. The
present paper investigated code-mixing at the
morphosyntactic level (NP) by comparing German-English (G-E)
and German- Russian (G-R) bilingual children between the
ages of 3;6 and 5;6. Using a language priming paradigm and a
monolingual interlocutor in each language, we attempted to
elicit mixed NPs from these children. Results showed that
G-E bilingual children produced mixed NPs significantly more
often than G-R bilinguals, providing support for the
importance of structural similarity in this type of mixing.
A second finding was that children who were reported as
code-mixing at home were significantly more likely to
provide answers while children who did not code-mix remained
silent. Explanations in terms of individual differences
and/or balanced competence are discussed.},
Key = {fds359905}
}
@article{fds351591,
Author = {Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {German Children’s Use of Word Order and Case Marking to
Interpret Simple and Complex Sentences: Testing Differences
Between Constructions and Lexical Items},
Journal = {Language Learning and Development},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {156-182},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2015.1052448},
Abstract = {ABSTRACT: Children and adults follow cues such as case
marking and word order in their assignment of semantic roles
in simple transitives (e.g., the dog chased the cat). It has
been suggested that the same cues are used for the
interpretation of complex sentences, such as transitive
relative clauses (RCs) (e.g., that’s the dog that chased
the cat) (Bates, Devescovi, & D’Amico, 1999). We used a
pointing paradigm to test German-speaking 3-, 4-, and
6-year-old children’s sensitivity to case marking and word
order in their interpretation of simple transitives and
transitive RCs. In Experiment 1, case marking was ambiguous.
The only cue available was word order. In Experiment 2, case
was marked on lexical NPs or demonstrative pronouns. In
Experiment 3, case was marked on lexical NPs or personal
pronouns. Whereas the younger children mainly followed word
order, the older children were more likely to base their
interpretations on the more reliable case-marking cue. In
most cases, children from both age groups were more likely
to use these cues in their interpretation of simple
transitives than in their interpretation of transitive RCs.
Finally, children paid more attention to nominative case
when it was marked on first-person personal pronouns than
when it was marked on third-person lexical NPs or
demonstrative pronouns, such as der Löwe ‘the-NOM lion’
or der ‘he-NOM.’ They were able to successfully
integrate this case-marking cue in their sentence processing
even when it appeared late in the sentence. We discuss four
potential reasons for these differences across development,
constructions, and lexical items. (1) Older children are
relatively more sensitive to cue reliability. (2) Word order
is more reliable in simple transitives than in transitive
RCs. (3) The processing of case marking might initially be
item-specific. (4) The processing of case marking might
depend on its saliency and position in the
sentence.},
Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2015.1052448},
Key = {fds351591}
}
@article{fds323843,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The ontogeny of cultural learning},
Journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
Volume = {8},
Pages = {1-4},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008},
Abstract = {All primates engage in one or another form of social
learning. Humans engage in cultural learning. From very
early in ontogeny human infants and young children do not
just learn useful things from others, they conform to others
in order to affiliate with them and to identify with the
cultural group. The cultural group normatively expects such
conformity, and adults actively instruct children so as to
ensure it. Young children learn from this instruction how
the world is viewed and how it works in their culture. These
special forms of cultural learning enable powerful and
species-unique processes of cumulative cultural
evolution.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008},
Key = {fds323843}
}
@article{fds323258,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Hardecker, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers understand the normativity of cooperatively
structured competition.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {143},
Pages = {34-47},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014},
Abstract = {Human institutional practices often involve competition
within a cooperative structure of mutually accepted rules.
In a competitive game, for instance, we not only expect
adherence to the rules of the game but also expect an
opponent who tries to win and, thus, follows a rational
game-playing strategy. We had 3- and 5-year-olds (N=48) play
for a prize against an opponent (a puppet) who played either
rationally (trying to win) or irrationally (helping the
children to win) while either following or breaking the
rules of the game. Both age groups performed costly protest
against an opponent who followed the rules but played
irrationally by helping the children to win. When facing a
rule-breaking opponent, 3-year-olds protested only the rule
breaches of an irrational opponent but not irrational play.
Five-year-olds also protested the rule breaches of a
rational opponent, but in contrast to the 3-year-olds, they
protested irrational behavior even in the context of rule
breaches. Moreover, many children, in particular
3-year-olds, refrained from protesting. These findings
suggest that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, fully
understand the dual-level normative structure of
cooperatively regulated competition.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.014},
Key = {fds323258}
}
@article{fds323259,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Mietzsch, T and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young Children Understand the Role of Agreement in
Establishing Arbitrary Norms-But Unanimity Is
Key.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {87},
Number = {2},
Pages = {612-626},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12510},
Abstract = {Human cultural groups value conformity to arbitrary norms
(e.g., rituals, games) that are the result of collective
"agreement." Ninety-six 3-year-olds had the opportunity to
agree upon arbitrary norms with puppets. Results revealed
that children normatively enforced these novel norms only on
a deviator who had actually entered into the agreement (not
on dissenting or ignorant individuals). Interestingly, any
dissent during the norm-setting process (even if a majority
of 90% preferred one course of action) prevented children
from seeing a norm as established for anyone at all. These
findings suggest that even young children understand
something of the role of agreement in establishing mutually
binding social norms, but that their notion of norm
formation may be confined to conditions of
unanimity.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12510},
Key = {fds323259}
}
@article{fds351592,
Author = {Köymen, B and Mammen, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers use common ground in their justificatory
reasoning with peers.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {52},
Number = {3},
Pages = {423-429},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000089},
Abstract = {In the context of joint decision-making, we investigated
whether preschoolers alter the informativeness of their
justifications depending on the common ground that they
share with their partner. Pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N =
146) were introduced to a novel animal with unique
characteristics (e.g., eating rocks). In the common ground
condition, the children learned about the animal together.
In the one-expert condition, one learned about it, the other
was naïve. In the two-experts condition, children learned
about it separately. Later, the pairs had to decide together
on 3 items that the novel animal might need. Both age groups
referred to the unique characteristics of the animal in
their justifications more in the 2 conditions without common
ground than in the common ground condition. Thus,
preschoolers begin to use common ground flexibly in their
justifications and reason-giving in peer
interactions.},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0000089},
Key = {fds351592}
}
@article{fds351593,
Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Comprehension of iconic gestures by chimpanzees and human
children.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {142},
Pages = {1-17},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.09.001},
Abstract = {Iconic gestures-communicative acts using hand or body
movements that resemble their referent-figure prominently in
theories of language evolution and development. This study
contrasted the abilities of chimpanzees (N=11) and
4-year-old human children (N=24) to comprehend novel iconic
gestures. Participants learned to retrieve rewards from
apparatuses in two distinct locations, each requiring a
different action. In the test, a human adult informed the
participant where to go by miming the action needed to
obtain the reward. Children used the iconic gestures (more
than arbitrary gestures) to locate the reward, whereas
chimpanzees did not. Some children also used arbitrary
gestures in the same way, but only after they had previously
shown comprehension for iconic gestures. Over time,
chimpanzees learned to associate iconic gestures with the
appropriate location faster than arbitrary gestures,
suggesting at least some recognition of the iconicity
involved. These results demonstrate the importance of
iconicity in referential communication.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.09.001},
Key = {fds351593}
}
@book{fds320791,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {A Natural History of Human Morality},
Pages = {180 pages},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780674088641},
Abstract = {Michael Tomasello offers the most detailed account to date
of the evolution of human moral psychology.},
Key = {fds320791}
}
@article{fds322246,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Svetlova, M and Johe, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children's developing understanding of legitimate reasons
for allocating resources unequally},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {37},
Pages = {42-52},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001},
Abstract = {Recent research on distributive justice suggests that young
children prefer equal distributions. But sometimes unequal
distributions are justified, such as when some individuals
deserve more than others based on merit, need, or
agreed-upon rules. When and how do children start
incorporating such factors in their distributive decisions?
Three-, 5-, and 8-year-old children (N= 72) had the
opportunity to allocate several items to two individuals.
One individual was neutral and the other provided a reason
why she should be favored. Three of these reasons were
legitimate (based on merit, need, or agreed-upon rules)
whereas a fourth was idiosyncratic ("I just want more."). We
found that with age, children's equality preference
diminished and their acceptance of various reasons for
privileged treatment increased. It was not until 8 years,
however, that they differentiated between legitimate and
idiosyncratic reasons for inequality. These findings suggest
that children's sense of distributive justice develops from
an early equality preference to a more flexible
understanding of the basic normative reasons that inequality
may, in some cases, be just.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.11.001},
Key = {fds322246}
}
@article{fds323260,
Author = {Vogelsang, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Giving Is Nicer than Taking: Preschoolers Reciprocate Based
on the Social Intentions of the Distributor.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e0147539},
Publisher = {Public Library of Science (PLoS)},
Editor = {di Pellegrino, G},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147539},
Abstract = {Recent research has found that even preschoolers give more
resources to others who have previously given resources to
them, but the psychological bases of this reciprocity are
unknown. In our study, a puppet distributed resources
between herself and a child by taking some from a pile in
front of the child or else by giving some from a pile in
front of herself. Although the resulting distributions were
identical, three- and five-year-olds reciprocated less
generously when the puppet had taken rather than given
resources. This suggests that children's judgments about
resource distribution are more about the social intentions
of the distributor and the social framing of the
distributional act than about the amount of resources
obtained. In order to rule out that the differences in the
children's reciprocal behavior were merely due to
experiencing gains and losses, we conducted a follow-up
study. Here, three- and-five year olds won or lost resources
in a lottery draw and could then freely give or take
resources to/from a puppet, respectively. In this study,
they did not respond differently after winning vs. losing
resources.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0147539},
Key = {fds323260}
}
@article{fds351594,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Precís of a natural history of human thinking},
Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-64},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0041},
Abstract = {A précis of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human
Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).},
Doi = {10.1515/jso-2015-0041},
Key = {fds351594}
}
@article{fds351596,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response to commentators},
Journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {117-123},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0042},
Abstract = {This paper is a reply to the comments by Henrike Moll,
Glenda Satne, Ladislav Koreň and Michael Schmitz on Michael
Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard
University Press, 2014).},
Doi = {10.1515/jso-2015-0042},
Key = {fds351596}
}
@article{fds351597,
Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {What Is a Group? Young Children's Perceptions of Different
Types of Groups and Group Entitativity.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0152001},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0152001},
Abstract = {To date, developmental research on groups has focused mainly
on in-group biases and intergroup relations. However, little
is known about children's general understanding of social
groups and their perceptions of different forms of group. In
this study, 5- to 6-year-old children were asked to evaluate
prototypes of four key types of groups: an intimacy group
(friends), a task group (people who are collaborating), a
social category (people who look alike), and a loose
association (people who coincidently meet at a tram stop).
In line with previous work with adults, the vast majority of
children perceived the intimacy group, task group, and
social category, but not the loose association, to possess
entitativity, that is, to be a 'real group.' In addition,
children evaluated group member properties, social
relations, and social obligations differently in each type
of group, demonstrating that young children are able to
distinguish between different types of in-group relations.
The origins of the general group typology used by adults
thus appear early in development. These findings contribute
to our knowledge about children's intuitive understanding of
groups and group members' behavior.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0152001},
Key = {fds351597}
}
@article{fds351598,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The effects of being watched on resource acquisition in
chimpanzees and human children.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {147-151},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0920-y},
Abstract = {Animals react in many different ways to being watched by
others. In the context of cooperation, many theories
emphasize reputational effects: Individuals should cooperate
more if other potential cooperators are watching. In the
context of competition, individuals might want to show off
their strength and prowess if other potential competitors
are watching. In the current study, we observed chimpanzees
and human children in three experimental conditions
involving resource acquisition: Participants were either in
the presence of a passive observer (observed condition), an
active observer who engaged in the same task as the
participant (competition condition), or in the presence of
but not directly observed by a conspecific (mere presence
condition). While both species worked to acquire more
resources in the competition condition, children but not
chimpanzees also worked to acquire more resources in the
observer condition (compared to the mere presence
condition). These results suggest evolutionary continuity
with regard to competition-based observer effects, but an
additional observer effect in young children, potentially
arising from an evolutionary-based concern for cooperative
reputation.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-015-0920-y},
Key = {fds351598}
}
@misc{fds351595,
Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Grammar},
Pages = {38-50},
Booktitle = {The Curated Reference Collection in Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Psychology},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128093245},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.05819-3},
Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young
children must master the grammatical constructions of their
language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical
issues in the field and trace the developmental path
children follow from talking in single-unit
“holophrases” to using complex, abstract constructions.
We describe the development of children’s initial skills
with word order, case marking, and morphology as abstract
elements in early constructions, and we discuss the level of
abstraction characteristic of young children’s grammatical
constructions at different stages of development and in some
different languages of the world. Finally, we consider the
learning processes that enable young children both to
acquire and to abstract across grammatical
constructions.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.05819-3},
Key = {fds351595}
}
@article{fds351599,
Author = {Bohn, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Communication about absent entities in great apes and human
infants.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {145},
Pages = {63-72},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.009},
Abstract = {There is currently debate about the extent to which
non-linguistic beings such as human infants and great apes
are capable of absent reference. In a series of experiments
we investigated the flexibility and specificity of great
apes' (N=36) and 12 month-old infants' (N=40) requests for
absent entities. Subjects had the choice between requesting
visible objects directly and using the former location of a
depleted option to request more of these now-absent
entities. Importantly, we systematically varied the quality
of the present and absent options. We found that great apes
as well as human infants flexibly adjusted their requests
for absent entities to these contextual variations and only
requested absent entities when the visible option was of
lower quality than the absent option. These results suggest
that the most basic cognitive capacities for absent
reference do not depend on language and are shared by humans
and their closest living relatives.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.009},
Key = {fds351599}
}
@article{fds351600,
Author = {Ulber, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How 18- and 24-month-old peers divide resources among
themselves.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {140},
Pages = {228-244},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.009},
Abstract = {Young children are often considered "selfish" with resources
because they are reluctant to give up things already in
their possession (e.g., as in dictator games). In the
current two studies, we presented pairs of 18- and
24-month-old toddlers with various situations involving
resources that no one possessed ahead of time. We observed
very few instances of individuals attempting to monopolize
the resources; rather, the pair peaceably divided them such
that each child got something. Equal divisions--even
involving one child sacrificing his or her own resources to
establish equality-were especially pronounced when children
were acting together jointly even in the absence of active
collaboration. Children's divisions were also influenced by
cues to ownership such as a spatial pre-division of
resources and resources marked by color (and originally
spatially associated with one individual). These results
suggest that young children are not selfish, but instead
rather generous, with resources when they are dividing them
among themselves.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.009},
Key = {fds351600}
}
@article{fds351601,
Author = {Grocke, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Procedural justice in children: Preschoolers accept unequal
resource distributions if the procedure provides equal
opportunities.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {140},
Pages = {197-210},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.008},
Abstract = {When it is not possible to distribute resources equitably to
everyone, people look for an equitable or just procedure. In
the current study, we investigated young children's sense of
procedural justice. We tested 32 triads of 5-year-olds in a
new resource allocation game. Triads were confronted with
three unequal reward packages and then agreed on a procedure
to allocate them among themselves. To allocate the rewards,
they needed to use a "wheel of fortune." Half of the groups
played with a fair wheel (where each child had an equal
chance of obtaining each reward package), and the other half
played with an unfair wheel. We analyzed children's
interactions when using the wheel and conducted an interview
with each child after the game was over. Children using the
unfair wheel often decided to change the rules of the game,
and they also rated it as an unfair procedure in the
interview. In contrast, children who played with the fair
wheel were mostly accepting of both the outcome and the
procedure. Overall, we found that children as young as
preschool age are already sensitive not only to distributive
justice but to procedural justice as well.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.07.008},
Key = {fds351601}
}
@article{fds323261,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Misch, A and Hernandez-Lloreda, V and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Uniquely human self-control begins at school
age.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {18},
Number = {6},
Pages = {979-993},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12272},
Abstract = {Human beings have remarkable skills of self-control, but the
evolutionary origins of these skills are unknown. Here we
compare children at 3 and 6 years of age with one of humans'
two nearest relatives, chimpanzees, on a battery of
reactivity and self-control tasks. Three-year-old children
and chimpanzees were very similar in their abilities to
resist an impulse for immediate gratification, repeat a
previously successful action, attend to a distracting noise,
and quit in the face of repeated failure. Six-year-old
children were more skillful than either 3-year-olds or
chimpanzees at controlling their impulses. These results
suggest that humans' most fundamental skills of self-control
- as part of the overall decision-making process - are a
part of their general great ape heritage, and that their
species-unique skills of self-control begin at around the
age at which many children begin formal schooling.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12272},
Key = {fds323261}
}
@article{fds351602,
Author = {Butler, LP and Schmidt, MFH and Bürgel, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength
of normative inferences.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {476-488},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12108},
Abstract = {Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as
conveying generic, kind-relevant information. But, in some
contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional
action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic,
regardless of whether this action was pedagogically
demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be
necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless
be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the
child relies more strongly. This study addresses this
tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning
with that on social learning and inductive inference.
Three-year-old children learned about a novel artefact from
either a pedagogical or non-pedagogical demonstration, and
then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel
ways. Although children protested normatively in both
conditions (e.g., 'No, not like that'), they persisted
longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of
repeated non-conformity by the new actors. This finding
suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are
created equal, but rather they depend - at least for their
strength - on the nature of the acquisition
process.},
Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12108},
Key = {fds351602}
}
@article{fds351603,
Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The effects of collaboration and minimal-group membership on
children's prosocial behavior, liking, affiliation, and
trust.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {139},
Pages = {161-173},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.05.008},
Abstract = {Recent theoretical work has highlighted potential links
between interpersonal collaboration and group membership in
the evolution of human sociality. Here we compared the
effects of collaboration and minimal-group membership on
young children's prosocial behavior (i.e., helping and
resource allocation), liking, affiliation, and trust. In a
design that matched as closely as possible these two ways of
connecting with others, we showed that 5-year-olds' behavior
was affected similarly by collaboration and minimal-group
membership; both increased children's preference for their
partners on multiple dimensions and produced overall effects
of a similar magnitude. In contrast, 3.5-year-olds did not
have a strong preference for either collaborators or minimal
in-group members. Thus, both collaboration and minimal-group
membership are similarly effective in their influence on
children's prosocial behavior and social
preferences.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.05.008},
Key = {fds351603}
}
@article{fds361386,
Title = {Michael Tomasello: Award for Distinguished Scientific
Contributions.},
Journal = {The American psychologist},
Volume = {70},
Number = {8},
Pages = {680-682},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039789},
Abstract = {The APA Awards for Distinguished Scientific Contributions
are presented to persons who, in the opinion of the
Committee on Scientific Awards, have made distinguished
theoretical or empirical contributions to basic research in
psychology. One of the 2015 award winners is Michael
Tomasello, who received this award for "outstanding
empirical and theoretical contributions to understanding
what makes the human mind unique. Michael Tomasello's
pioneering research on the origins of social cognition has
led to revolutionary insights in both developmental
psychology and primate cognition." Tomasello's award
citation, biography, and a selected bibliography are
presented here.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0039789},
Key = {fds361386}
}
@article{fds351604,
Author = {Grosse, K and Call, J and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Differences in the Ability of Apes and Children to Instruct
Others Using Gestures},
Journal = {Language Learning and Development},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {310-330},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2014.955246},
Abstract = {In all human cultures, people gesture iconically. However,
the evolutionary basis of iconic gestures is unknown. In
this study, chimpanzees and bonobos, and 2- and 3-year-old
children, learned how to operate two apparatuses to get
rewards. Then, at test, only a human adult had access to the
apparatuses, and participants could instruct her about how
to obtain the rewards. Children frequently produced
appropriate iconic gestures, but with the exception of one
human-raised chimpanzee, great apes did not gesture
iconically. However, chimpanzees pointed to a reward outside
the apparatus in another experimental condition, showing
their motivation and ability to communicate with the human
to request it. They also manipulated a duplicate apparatus
in appropriate ways, though it was unclear if they did this
to communicate with the human. Although great apes may have
some of the prerequisite skills involved, iconic gestures
come naturally to humans in a way that they do not for great
apes.},
Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2014.955246},
Key = {fds351604}
}
@article{fds351605,
Author = {Cameron-Faulkner, T and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The relationship between infant holdout and gives, and
pointing},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {5},
Pages = {576-586},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12085},
Abstract = {We provide an analysis of holdout and giving (Ho&G)
behaviours in prelinguistic infants and investigate their
relationship with index finger pointing. The frequency of
Ho&Gs at 10 and 11 months along with the length of the
following social interaction correlated with index finger
pointing at 12 months. We conclude that Ho&Gs are a
precursor to index finger pointing and that this provides
support for social-pragmatic approaches to communicative
development.},
Doi = {10.1111/infa.12085},
Key = {fds351605}
}
@article{fds351606,
Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees strategically manipulate what others can
see.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1069-1076},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0875-z},
Abstract = {Humans often strategically manipulate the informational
access of others to their own advantage. Although
chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, it is
unclear whether they can strategically manipulate others'
visual access. In this study, chimpanzees were given the
opportunity to save food for themselves by concealing it
from a human competitor and also to get more food for
themselves by revealing it to a human cooperator. When
knowing that a competitor was approaching, chimpanzees kept
more food hidden (left it covered) than when expecting a
cooperator to approach. When the experimenter was already at
the location of the hidden food, they actively revealed less
food to the competitor than to the cooperator. They did not
actively hide food (cover up food in the open) from the
competitor, however. Chimpanzees thus strategically
manipulated what another could see in order to maximize
their payoffs and showed their ability to plan for future
situations.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-015-0875-z},
Key = {fds351606}
}
@article{fds351607,
Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children use shared experience to interpret definite
reference.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {42},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1146-1157},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000914000555},
Abstract = {We investigated whether children at the ages of two and
three years understand that a speaker's use of the definite
article specifies a referent that is in common ground
between speaker and listener. An experimenter and a child
engaged in joint actions in which the experimenter chose one
of three similar objects of the same category to perform an
action. In subsequent interactions children were asked to
get 'the X' or 'a X'. When children were instructed with the
definite article they chose the shared object significantly
more often than when they were instructed with the
indefinite article in which case children's choice was at
chance. The findings show that in their third year children
use shared experiences to interpret the speaker's
communicative intention underlying her referential choice.
The results are discussed with respect to children's
representation of linguistic categories and the role of
joint action for establishing common ground.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000914000555},
Key = {fds351607}
}
@article{fds359906,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Schulze, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children’s level of word knowledge predicts their
exclusion of familiar objects as referents of novel
words},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
Volume = {6},
Year = {2015},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01200},
Abstract = {When children are learning a novel object label, they tend
to exclude as possible referents familiar objects for which
they already have a name. In the current study, we wanted to
know if children would behave in this same way regardless of
how well they knew the name of potential referent objects,
specifically, whether they could only comprehend it or they
could both comprehend and produce it. Sixty-six monolingual
German-speaking 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children participated
in two experimental sessions. In one session the familiar
objects were chosen such that their labels were in the
children’s productive vocabularies, and in the other
session the familiar objects were chosen such that their
labels were only in the children’s receptive vocabularies.
Results indicated that children at all three ages were more
likely to exclude a familiar object as the potential
referent of the novel word if they could comprehend and
produce its name rather than comprehend its name only.
Indeed, level of word knowledge as operationalized in this
way was a better predictor than was age. These results are
discussed in the context of current theories of word
learning by exclusion.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01200},
Key = {fds359906}
}
@article{fds323262,
Author = {Schäfer, M and Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Fair Is Not Fair Everywhere.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1252-1260},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2015},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615586188},
Abstract = {Distributing the spoils of a joint enterprise on the basis
of work contribution or relative productivity seems natural
to the modern Western mind. But such notions of merit-based
distributive justice may be culturally constructed norms
that vary with the social and economic structure of a group.
In the present research, we showed that children from three
different cultures have very different ideas about
distributive justice. Whereas children from a modern Western
society distributed the spoils of a joint enterprise
precisely in proportion to productivity, children from a
gerontocratic pastoralist society in Africa did not take
merit into account at all. Children from a partially
hunter-gatherer, egalitarian African culture distributed the
spoils more equally than did the other two cultures, with
merit playing only a limited role. This pattern of results
suggests that some basic notions of distributive justice are
not universal intuitions of the human species but rather
culturally constructed behavioral norms.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797615586188},
Key = {fds323262}
}
@article{fds351608,
Author = {Theakston, AL and Ibbotson, P and Freudenthal, D and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Productivity of Noun Slots in Verb Frames.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {39},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1369-1395},
Year = {2015},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12216},
Abstract = {Productivity is a central concept in the study of language
and language acquisition. As a test case for exploring the
notion of productivity, we focus on the noun slots of verb
frames, such as __want__, __see__, and __get__. We develop a
novel combination of measures designed to assess both the
flexibility and creativity of use in these slots. We do so
using a rigorously controlled sample of child speech and
child directed speech from three English-speaking children
between the ages of 2-3 years and their caregivers. We find
different levels of creativity and flexibility between the
adult and child samples for some measures, for some slots,
and for some developmental periods. We discuss these
differences in the context of verb frame semantics,
conventionality versus creativity and child errors, and draw
some tentative conclusions regarding developmental changes
in children's early grammatical representations.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12216},
Key = {fds351608}
}
@article{fds351609,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Focusing and shifting attention in human children (Homo
sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {129},
Number = {3},
Pages = {268-274},
Year = {2015},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039384},
Abstract = {Humans often must coordinate co-occurring activities, and
their flexible skills for doing so would seem to be uniquely
powerful. In 2 studies, we compared 4- and 5-year-old
children and one of humans' nearest relatives, chimpanzees,
in their ability to focus and shift their attention when
necessary. The results of Study 1 showed that 4-year-old
children and chimpanzees were very similar in their ability
to monitor two identical devices and to sequentially switch
between the two to collect a reward, and that they were less
successful at doing so than 5-year-old children. In Study 2,
which required subjects to alternate between two different
tasks, one of which had rewards continuously available
whereas the other one only occasionally released rewards, no
species differences were found. These results suggest that
chimpanzees and human children share some fundamental
attentional control skills, but that such abilities continue
to develop during human ontogeny, resulting in the uniquely
human capacity to succeed at complex multitasking.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0039384},
Key = {fds351609}
}
@article{fds359907,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Novel paradigms to measure variability of behavior in early
childhood: posture, gaze, and pupil dilation},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
Volume = {6},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00858},
Abstract = {A central challenge of investigating the underlying
mechanisms of and the individual differences in young
children’s behavior is the measurement of the internal
physiological mechanism and the involved expressive
emotions. Here, we illustrate two paradigms that assess
concurrent indicators of both children’s social perception
as well as their emotional expression. In one set of
studies, children view situations while their eye movements
are mapped onto a live scene. In these studies, children’s
internal arousal is measured via changes in their pupil
dilation by using eye tracking technology. In another set of
studies, we measured children’s emotional expression via
changes in their upper-body posture by using depth sensor
imaging technology. Together, these paradigms can provide
new insights into the internal mechanism and outward
emotional expression involved in young children’s
behavior.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00858},
Key = {fds359907}
}
@article{fds323263,
Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The goggles experiment: Can chimpanzees use self-experience
to infer what a competitor can see?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {105},
Pages = {211-221},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028},
Abstract = {In two experiments, we investigated whether chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes, can use self-experience to infer what another
sees. Subjects first gained self-experience with the visual
properties of an object (either opaque or see-through). In a
subsequent test phase, a human experimenter interacted with
the object and we tested whether chimpanzees understood that
the experimenter experienced the object as opaque or as
see-through. Crucially, in the test phase, the object seemed
opaque to the subject in all cases (while the experimenter
could see through the one that they had experienced as
see-through before), such that she had to use her previous
self-experience with the object to correctly infer whether
the experimenter could or could not see when looking at the
object. Chimpanzees did not attribute their previous
self-experience with the object to the experimenter in a
gaze-following task (experiment 1); however, they did so
successfully in a competitive context (experiment 2). We
conclude that chimpanzees successfully used their
self-experience to infer what the competitor sees. We
discuss our results in relation to the well-known 'goggles
experiment' and address alternative explanations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028},
Key = {fds323263}
}
@article{fds351610,
Author = {Köymen, B and Schmidt, MFH and Rost, L and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Teaching versus enforcing game rules in preschoolers' peer
interactions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {135},
Pages = {93-101},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.02.005},
Abstract = {Children use normative language in two key contexts: when
teaching others and when enforcing social norms. We
presented pairs of 3- and 5-year-old peers (N=192) with a
sorting game in two experimental conditions (in addition to
a third baseline condition). In the teaching condition, one
child was knowledgeable, whereas the other child was
ignorant and so in need of instruction. In the enforcement
condition, children learned conflicting rules so that each
child was making mistakes from the other's point of view.
When teaching rules to an ignorant partner, both age groups
used generic normative language ("Bunnies go here"). When
enforcing rules on a rule-breaking partner, 3-year-olds used
normative utterances that were not generic and aimed at
correcting individual behavior ("No, this goes there"),
whereas 5-year-olds again used generic normative language,
perhaps because they discerned that instruction was needed
in this case as well. Young children normatively correct
peers differently depending on their assessment of what
their wayward partners need to bring them back into
line.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2015.02.005},
Key = {fds351610}
}
@article{fds351618,
Author = {Kanngiesser, P and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Late Emergence of the First Possession Heuristic: Evidence
From a Small-Scale Culture},
Journal = {Child Development},
Volume = {86},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1282-1289},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12365},
Abstract = {Western preschool children often assign ownership based on
first possession and some theorists have proposed that this
judgment might be an early emerging, innate bias. Five- to
9-year-olds (n = 112) from a small-scale group in Kenya
(Kikuyu) watched videotaped interactions of two women
passing an object. The object's starting position and the
women's gestures were varied. Use of the first possession
heuristic increased with age, and 8- to 9-year-olds
performed similarly to German 5-year-olds (n = 24). Starting
position and gestures had no effect. A control study
confirmed that 5-year-old Kikuyus (n = 20) understood the
video material. The findings reveal that the first
possession heuristic follows different developmental
trajectories cross-culturally and stress the role of
children's sociocultural environment.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12365},
Key = {fds351618}
}
@article{fds351611,
Author = {Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Restorative Justice in Children.},
Journal = {Current biology : CB},
Volume = {25},
Number = {13},
Pages = {1731-1735},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.014},
Abstract = {An important, and perhaps uniquely human, mechanism for
maintaining cooperation against free riders is third-party
punishment. Our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, will
not punish third parties even though they will do so when
personally affected. Until recently, little attention has
been paid to how punishment and a sense of justice develop
in children. Children respond to norm violations. They are
more likely to share with a puppet that helped another
individual as opposed to one who behaved harmfully, and they
show a preference for seeing a harmful doll rather than a
victim punished. By 6 years of age, children will pay a cost
to punish fictional and real peers, and the threat of
punishment will lead preschoolers to behave more generously.
However, little is known about what motivates a sense of
justice in children. We gave 3- and 5-year-old children--the
youngest ages yet tested--the opportunity to remove items
and prevent a puppet from gaining a reward for second- and
third-party violations (experiment 1), and we gave
3-year-olds the opportunity to restore items (experiment 2).
Children were as likely to engage in third-party
interventions as they were when personally affected, yet
they did not discriminate among the different sources of
harm for the victim. When given a range of options,
3-year-olds chose restoration over removal. It appears that
a sense of justice centered on harm caused to victims
emerges early in childhood and highlights the value of
third-party interventions for human cooperation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.014},
Key = {fds351611}
}
@article{fds323264,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children use salience to solve coordination
problems.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {495-501},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12224},
Abstract = {Humans are routinely required to coordinate with others.
When communication is not possible, adults often achieve
this by using salient cues in the environment (e.g. going to
the Eiffel Tower, as an obvious meeting point). To explore
the development of this capacity, we presented dyads of 3-,
5-, and 8-year-olds (N = 144) with a coordination problem:
Two balls had to be inserted into the same of four boxes to
obtain a reward. Identical pictures were attached to three
boxes whereas a unique--and thus salient--picture was
attached to the fourth. Children either received one ball
each, and so had to choose the same box (experimental
condition), or they received both balls and could get the
reward independently (control condition). In all cases,
children could neither communicate nor see each other's
choices. Children were significantly more likely to choose
the salient option in the experimental condition than in the
control condition. However, only the two older age groups
chose the salient box above chance levels. This study is the
first to show that children from at least age 5 can solve
coordination problems by converging on a salient
solution.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12224},
Key = {fds323264}
}
@article{fds351612,
Author = {Grünloh, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young Children’s Intonational Marking of New, Given and
Contrastive Referents},
Journal = {Language Learning and Development},
Volume = {11},
Number = {2},
Pages = {95-127},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2014.889530},
Abstract = {In the current study we investigate whether 2- and
3-year-old German children use intonation productively to
mark the informational status of referents. Using a
story-telling task, we compared children’s and adults’
intonational realization via pitch accent (H*, L* and
de-accentuation) of New, Given, and Contrastive referents.
Both children and adults distinguished these elements with
different pitch accents. Adults, however, de-accented Given
information much more often than the children, especially
the younger children. Since a failure to de-accent Given
information may be a characteristic of caregiver speech, in
a second study we tested how caregivers talking to their
young children realize Given and New referents. In this
discourse situation, the caregivers quite often failed to
de-accent Given information, raising the possibility that
the younger children were simply reproducing the pitch
accents they had heard adults using.},
Doi = {10.1080/15475441.2014.889530},
Key = {fds351612}
}
@article{fds351613,
Author = {Plötner, M and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children show the bystander effect in helping
situations.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {499-506},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615569579},
Abstract = {Much research in social psychology has shown that otherwise
helpful people often fail to help when bystanders are
present. Research in developmental psychology has shown that
even very young children help and that the presence of
others can actually increase helping in some cases. In the
current study, in contrast, 5-year-old children helped an
experimenter at very high levels when they were alone but
helped significantly less often in the presence of
bystanders who were potentially available to help. In
another condition designed to elucidate the mechanism
underlying the effect, children's helping was not reduced
when bystanders were present but confined behind a barrier
and thus unable to help (a condition that has not been run
in previous studies with adults). Young children thus show
the bystander effect, and it is due not to social
referencing or shyness to act in front of others but,
rather, to a sense of a diffusion of responsibility.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797615569579},
Key = {fds351613}
}
@article{fds351614,
Author = {Moore, R and Mueller, B and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Two-year-old children but not domestic dogs understand
communicative intentions without language, gestures, or
gaze.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {232-242},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12206},
Abstract = {Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and
infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden inside. Great
apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly,
domestic dogs do. However, whether children and dogs
understand these communicative acts in the same way is not
yet known. To test this possibility, an experimenter did not
point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either
bucket, but instead lifted and shook one via a centrally
pulled rope. She did this either intentionally or
accidentally, and did or did not address her act to the
subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but
not dogs understood the experimenter's act in intentional
conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no
difference to children's success, it actually hindered dogs'
performance. We conclude that while human children may be
capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide
variety actions, so long as these actions are performed
intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this
respect. Their understanding of communicative intention may
be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative
intent, including gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and
vocalizations. This may be because humans have come under
selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with
absent interlocutors - where bodily co-presence is not
possible.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12206},
Key = {fds351614}
}
@article{fds351615,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Conforming to coordinate: children use majority information
for peer coordination.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {136-147},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12078},
Abstract = {Humans are constantly required to coordinate their behaviour
with others. As this often relies on everyone's convergence
on the same strategy (e.g., driving on the left side of the
road), a common solution is to conform to majority
behaviour. In this study, we presented 5-year-old children
with a coordination problem: To retrieve some rewards, they
had to choose the same of four options as a peer partner--in
reality a stooge--whose decision they were unable to see.
Before making a choice, they watched a video showing how
other children from their partner's peer group had behaved;
a majority chose the same option and a minority chose a
different one. In a control condition, children watched the
same video but could then retrieve the reward irrespective
of their partner's choice (i.e., no coordination was
necessary). Children followed the majority more often when
coordination was required. Moreover, conformers mostly
justified their choices by referring to the majority from
the video demonstration. This study is the first to show
that young children are able to strategically coordinate
decisions with peers by conforming to the
majority.},
Doi = {10.1111/bjdp.12078},
Key = {fds351615}
}
@article{fds351616,
Author = {Schulze, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {18-month-olds comprehend indirect communicative
acts.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {136},
Pages = {91-98},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.036},
Abstract = {From soon after their first birthdays young children are
able to make inferences from a communicator's referential
act (e.g., pointing to a container) to her overall social
goal for communication (e.g., to inform that a searched-for
toy is inside; see Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005;
Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012). But in
such cases the inferential distance between referential act
and communicative intention is still fairly close, as both
container and searched-for toy lie in the direction of the
pointing gesture. In the current study we tested 18- and
26-month-old children in a situation in which referential
act and communicative goal were more distant: In the midst
of a game, the child needed a certain toy. The experimenter
then held up a key (that they knew in common ground could be
used to open a container) to the child ostensively. In two
control conditions the experimenter either inadvertently
moved the key and so drew the child's attention to it
non-ostensively or else held up the key for her own
inspection intentionally but non-communicatively. Children
of both ages took only the ostensive showing of the key, not
the accidental moving or the non-ostensive but intentional
inspection of the key, as an indirect request to take the
key and open the container to retrieve the toy inside. From
soon after they start acquiring language young children thus
are able to infer a communicator's social goal for
communication not only from directly-referential acts, but
from more indirect communicative acts as
well.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.036},
Key = {fds351616}
}
@article{fds323266,
Author = {Rossano, F and Fiedler, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Preschoolers' understanding of the role of communication and
cooperation in establishing property rights.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {51},
Number = {2},
Pages = {176-184},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038493},
Abstract = {Property as a social "agreement" comprises both a
communicative component, in which someone makes a claim that
she is entitled to some piece of property, and a cooperative
component, in which others in the community respect that
claim as legitimate. In the current study, preschool
children were (a) given the opportunity to mark some objects
as "theirs" (to claim them in the face of other fictitious
children who would supposedly enter the room later); and (b)
confronted with stickers in various spatial arrangements
(e.g., piled up neatly vs. scattered), told that a
fictitious child had previously chosen some for herself but
had to suddenly leave the room, and then invited first to
choose some stickers for themselves and second to identify
which stickers had already been claimed by the fictitious
child. Five-year-olds but not 3-year-olds were skillful in
both of these tasks, demonstrating an understanding of the
crucial role of communication in asserting property claims
and the crucial role of cooperation in respecting
them.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0038493},
Key = {fds323266}
}
@article{fds351617,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees trust conspecifics to engage in low-cost
reciprocity.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {282},
Number = {1801},
Pages = {20142803},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.2803},
Abstract = {Many of humans' most important social interactions rely on
trust, including most notably among strangers. But little is
known about the evolutionary roots of human trust. We
presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a modified
version of the human trust game--trust in reciprocity--in
which subjects could opt either to obtain a small but safe
reward on their own or else to send a larger reward to a
partner and trust her to reciprocate a part of the reward
that she could not access herself. In a series of three
studies, we found strong evidence that in interacting with a
conspecific, chimpanzees show spontaneous trust in a novel
context; flexibly adjust their level of trust to the
trustworthiness of their partner and develop patterns of
trusting reciprocity over time. At least in some contexts
then, trust in reciprocity is not unique to humans, but
rather has its evolutionary roots in the social interactions
of humans' closest primate relatives.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2014.2803},
Key = {fds351617}
}
@article{fds323265,
Author = {Grueneisen, S and Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {"I know you don't know I know…" children use second-order
false-belief reasoning for peer coordination.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {86},
Number = {1},
Pages = {287-293},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12264},
Abstract = {Numerous studies have investigated children's abilities to
attribute mental states, but few have examined their ability
to recruit these abilities in social interactions. Here,
6-year-olds (N = 104) were tested on whether they can use
first- and second-order false-belief understanding to
coordinate with peers. Children adjusted their decisions in
a coordination game in response to either their partner's
erroneous belief or their partner's erroneous belief about
their own belief-a result that contrasts with previous
findings on the use of higher order "theory of mind" (TOM)
reasoning at this age. Six-year-olds are thus able to use
their higher order TOM capacities for peer coordination,
which marks an important achievement in becoming competent
social collaborators.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12264},
Key = {fds323265}
}
@article{fds351619,
Author = {Moore, R and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Production and Comprehension of Gestures between Orang-Utans
(Pongo pygmaeus) in a Referential Communication
Game.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {10},
Number = {6},
Pages = {e0129726},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0129726},
Abstract = {Orang-utans played a communication game in two studies
testing their ability to produce and comprehend requestive
pointing. While the 'communicator' could see but not obtain
hidden food, the 'donor' could release the food to the
communicator, but could not see its location for herself.
They could coordinate successfully if the communicator
pointed to the food, and if the donor comprehended his
communicative goal and responded pro-socially. In Study 1,
one orang-utan pointed regularly and accurately for peers.
However, they responded only rarely. In Study 2, a human
experimenter played the communicator's role in three
conditions, testing the apes' comprehension of points of
different heights and different degrees of ostension. There
was no effect of condition. However, across conditions one
donor performed well individually, and as a group
orang-utans' comprehension performance tended towards
significance. We explain this on the grounds that
comprehension required inferences that they found difficult
- but not impossible. The finding has valuable implications
for our thinking about the development of pointing in
phylogeny.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0129726},
Key = {fds351619}
}
@article{fds351620,
Author = {Melis, AP and Floedl, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Non-egalitarian allocations among preschool peers in a
face-to-face bargaining task.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0120494},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0120494},
Abstract = {In face-to-face bargaining tasks human adults almost always
agree on an equal split of resources. This is due to
mutually recognized fairness and equality norms. Early
developmental studies on sharing and equality norms found
that egalitarian allocations of resources are not common
before children are 5 or 6 years old. However, recent
studies have shown that in some face-to face collaborative
situations, or when recipients express their desires,
children at much younger ages choose equal allocations. We
investigated the ability of 3.5 and 5-year-olds to negotiate
face-to-face, whether to collaborate to obtain an equal or
an unequal distribution of rewards. We hypothesized that the
face-to-face interaction and interdependency between
partners would facilitate egalitarian outcomes at both ages.
In the first experiment we found that 5-year-olds were more
egalitarian than 3.5-year-olds, but neither of the age
classes shared equally. In the second experiment, in which
we increased the magnitude of the inequality, we found that
children at both ages mostly agreed on the unequal
distribution. These results show that communication and
face-to-face interactions are not sufficient to guarantee
equal allocations at 3-5 years of age. These results add to
previous findings suggesting that in the context of
non-collaboratively produced resources it is only after 5
years of age that children use equality norms to allocate
resources.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0120494},
Key = {fds351620}
}
@article{fds321684,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call,,
J},
Title = {Restorative justice in young children},
Journal = {Current Biology},
Volume = {25},
Pages = {1-5},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds321684}
}
@article{fds351621,
Author = {Haun, DBM and Rekers, Y and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children conform to the behavior of peers; other great apes
stick with what they know.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {25},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2160-2167},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797614553235},
Abstract = {All primates learn things from conspecifics socially, but it
is not clear whether they conform to the behavior of these
conspecifics--if conformity is defined as overriding
individually acquired behavioral tendencies in order to copy
peers' behavior. In the current study, chimpanzees,
orangutans, and 2-year-old human children individually
acquired a problem-solving strategy. They then watched
several conspecific peers demonstrate an alternative
strategy. The children switched to this new, socially
demonstrated strategy in roughly half of all instances,
whereas the other two great-ape species almost never
adjusted their behavior to the majority's. In a follow-up
study, children switched much more when the peer
demonstrators were still present than when they were absent,
which suggests that their conformity arose at least in part
from social motivations. These results demonstrate an
important difference between the social learning of humans
and great apes, a difference that might help to account for
differences in human and nonhuman cultures.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797614553235},
Key = {fds351621}
}
@article{fds351622,
Author = {Duguid, S and Wyman, E and Bullinger, AF and Herfurth-Majstorovic, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in
a Stag Hunt game.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {281},
Number = {1796},
Pages = {20141973},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1973},
Abstract = {Much of human cooperation takes place in mutualistic
contexts in which the main challenge for individuals is how
to coordinate decisions. In the current studies, we compared
the abilities of chimpanzees and young children to
coordinate with a partner in two versions of a Stag Hunt
game. When risks were low (the hare was of low value) and
information was cheap (the partner's behaviour was readily
observable), partners of both species were able to
successfully coordinate on the higher value stag more than
90% of the time. By contrast, when the risks were raised and
observing the partner was more difficult, the chimpanzees
became less successful, whereas the children compensated,
and so remained highly successful, by communicating more
often and more specifically. This pattern of results is
consistent with the hypothesis that humans evolved unique
skills of coordination and communication in the context of
especially risky coordination problems.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2014.1973},
Key = {fds351622}
}
@article{fds351623,
Author = {Karg, K and Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {All great ape species (Gorilla gorilla, Pan paniscus, Pan
troglodytes, Pongo abelii) and two-and-a-half-year-old
children (Homo sapiens) discriminate appearance from
reality.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {128},
Number = {4},
Pages = {431-439},
Year = {2014},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037385},
Abstract = {Nonhuman great apes and human children were tested for an
understanding that appearance does not always correspond to
reality. Subjects were 29 great apes (bonobos [Pan
paniscus], chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes], gorillas [Gorilla
gorilla], and orangutans [Pongo abelii]) and 24 2½-year-old
children. In our task, we occluded portions of 1 large and 1
small food stick such that the size relations seemed
reversed. Subjects could then choose which one they wanted.
There was 1 control condition and 2 experimental conditions
(administered within subjects). In the control condition
subjects saw only the apparent stick sizes, whereas in the 2
experimental conditions they saw the true stick sizes as
well (the difference between them being what the subjects
saw first: the apparent or the real stick sizes). All great
ape species and children successfully identified the bigger
stick, despite its smaller appearance, in the experimental
conditions, but not in the control. We discuss these results
in relation to the understanding of object permanence and
conservation, and exclude reversed reward contingency
learning as an explanation.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0037385},
Key = {fds351623}
}
@article{fds351624,
Author = {Köymen, B and Rosenbaum, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Reasoning during joint decision-making by preschool
peers},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {74-85},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.09.001},
Abstract = {Reasoning with a peer to make a joint decision involves
making a proposal (e.g., "Polar bears go here") and
justifying it with relevant facts (e.g., "This is ice")
based on common ground assumptions or warrants (e.g., polar
bears need ice). Twenty-four dyads of 3- and 5-year-olds
built a zoo with toy items that were either conventional
(e.g., animals, cages) or unconventional (e.g., piano). For
conventional items, both participants in both age groups
used justifications that relied on implicit warrants (e.g.,
stating only the fact "This is ice", assuming that both
partners know that polar bears need ice). For unconventional
items, they more often articulated the warrant explicitly,
arguably to create the necessary common ground.
Five-year-olds made warrants explicit more often, produced
more justifications, and reached mutual agreement more often
than did 3-year-olds. These results suggest that
preschoolers can reason with one another appropriately,
specifically in justifying their proposals based on
appropriate common ground assumptions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.09.001},
Key = {fds351624}
}
@article{fds351625,
Author = {Köymen, B and Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children create partner-specific referential pacts
with peers.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {50},
Number = {10},
Pages = {2334-2342},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037837},
Abstract = {In 2 studies, we investigated how peers establish a
referential pact to call something, for example, a cushion
versus a pillow (both equally felicitous). In Study 1, pairs
of 4- and 6-year-old German-speaking peers established a
referential pact for an artifact, for example, a woman's
shoe, in a referential communication task. Six-year-olds,
but not 4-year-olds, continued to use these same expressions
with the same partner (even when they were overinformative)
but shifted to simpler expressions, for example, shoe, with
a new partner. In Study 2, both age groups were successful
in establishing such partner-specific referential pacts with
a peer when using a proper name. These results suggest that
even preschool children appreciate something of the
conventional nature of linguistic expressions, with
significant flexibility emerging between ages 4 and
6.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0037837},
Key = {fds351625}
}
@article{fds351626,
Author = {Tennie, C and Walter, V and Gampe, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Limitations to the cultural ratchet effect in young
children.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {126},
Pages = {152-160},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.006},
Abstract = {Although many animal species show at least some evidence of
cultural transmission, broadly defined, only humans show
clear evidence of cumulative culture. In the current study,
we investigated whether young children show the "ratchet
effect," an important component of cumulative culture--the
ability to accumulate efficient modifications across
generations. We tested 16 diffusion chains--altogether
consisting of 80 children--to see how they solved an
instrumental task (i.e., carrying something from one
location to another). We found that when the chain was
seeded with an inefficient way of solving the task,
4-year-olds were able to innovate and transmit these
innovations so as to reach a more efficient solution.
However, when it started out with relatively efficient
solutions already (i.e., the ones that children in a control
condition discovered for themselves), there were no further
techniques invented and/or transmitted beyond that. Thus,
young children showed the ratchet effect to a limited
extent, accumulating efficient modifications but not going
beyond the inventive level of the individual.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.006},
Key = {fds351626}
}
@article{fds351627,
Author = {Bullinger, AF and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) instrumentally help but do not
communicate in a mutualistic cooperative
task.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {128},
Number = {3},
Pages = {251-260},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035645},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees cooperate in a variety of contexts, but
communicating to influence and regulate cooperative
activities is rare. It is unclear whether this reflects
chimpanzees' general inability or whether they have found
other means to coordinate cooperative activities. In the
present study chimpanzees could help a partner play her role
in a mutually beneficial food-retrieval task either by
transferring a needed tool (transfer condition) or by
visually or acoustically communicating the hiding-location
of the needed tool (communication condition). Overall,
chimpanzees readily helped their partner by delivering the
needed tool, but none of them communicated the hiding
location of the tool to their partner reliably across
trials. These results demonstrate that although chimpanzees
can coordinate their cooperative activities by
instrumentally helping their partner in her role, they do
not readily use communication with their partner for this
same end.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0035645},
Key = {fds351627}
}
@article{fds351628,
Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children create iconic gestures to inform
others.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {50},
Number = {8},
Pages = {2049-2060},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037224},
Abstract = {Much is known about young children's use of deictic gestures
such as pointing. Much less is known about their use of
other types of communicative gestures, especially iconic or
symbolic gestures. In particular, it is unknown whether
children can create iconic gestures on the spot to inform
others. Study 1 provided 27-month-olds with the opportunity
to inform a novice how to perform a task. The majority of
children created appropriate iconic gestures, and they did
so significantly more than in a control condition in which
the need to inform someone was removed. In Study 2, some of
the 21-month-olds tested also created novel iconic gestures
but to a lesser extent. Results are discussed in relation to
children's symbolic, linguistic, and social-cognitive
development.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0037224},
Key = {fds351628}
}
@article{fds351629,
Author = {Austin, K and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of denial.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {50},
Number = {8},
Pages = {2061-2070},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037179},
Abstract = {Although a fair amount is known about young children's
production of negation, little is known about their
comprehension. Here, we focus on arguably the most complex
basic form, denial, and how young children understand
denial, when it is expressed in response to a question with
gesture, single word, or sentence. One hundred twenty-six
children in 3 age groups (Ms = 1 year 9 months, 2 years 0
months, and 2 years 4 months) witnessed an adult look into 1
of 2 buckets and then, in response to a question about
whether the toy was in there, communicate either something
positive (positive head nod, "yes," "it is in this bucket")
or negative (negative head shake, "No," "It's not in this
bucket"). The youngest children did not search differently
in response to any of the communicative cues (nor in
response to an additional cue using both gesture and single
word). Children at 2 years 0 months searched at above-chance
levels only in response to the negative word and negative
sentence. Children at 2 years 4 months were successful with
all 3 types of cues in both positive and negative
modalities, with the exception of the positive sentence.
Young children thus seem to understand the denial of a
statement before they understand its affirmation, and they
understand linguistic means of expressing denial before they
understand gestural means.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0037179},
Key = {fds351629}
}
@article{fds351630,
Author = {Moné, Y and Monnin, D and Kremer, N},
Title = {The oxidative environment: a mediator of interspecies
communication that drives symbiosis evolution.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {281},
Number = {1785},
Pages = {20133112},
Year = {2014},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.3112},
Abstract = {Symbiotic interactions are ubiquitous in nature and play a
major role in driving the evolution of life. Interactions
between partners are often mediated by shared signalling
pathways, which strongly influence both partners' biology
and the evolution of the association in various
environments. As an example of 'common language', the
regulation of the oxidative environment plays an important
role in driving the evolution of symbiotic associations.
Such processes have been occurring for billions of years,
including the increase in Earth's atmospheric oxygen and the
subsequent evolution of mitochondria. The effect of reactive
oxygen species and reactive nitrogen species (RONS) has been
characterized functionally, but the molecular dialogue
between partners has not been integrated within a broader
evolutionary context yet. Given the pleiotropic role of RONS
in cell-cell communication, development and immunity, but
also their associated physiological costs, we discuss here
how their regulation can influence the establishment, the
maintenance and the breakdown of various symbiotic
associations. By synthesizing recent developments in redox
biology, we aim to provide an interdisciplinary
understanding of the influence of such mediators of
interspecies communication on the evolution and stability of
symbioses, which in turn can shape ecosystems and play a
role in health and disease.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2013.3112},
Key = {fds351630}
}
@article{fds351631,
Author = {Köymen, B and Lieven, E and Engemann, DA and Rakoczy, H and Warneken,
F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's norm enforcement in their interactions with
peers.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {85},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1108-1122},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12178},
Abstract = {This study investigates how children negotiate social norms
with peers. In Study 1, 48 pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N =
96) and in Study 2, 48 pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds (N = 96)
were presented with sorting tasks with conflicting
instructions (one child by color, the other by shape) or
identical instructions. Three-year-olds differed from older
children: They were less selective for the contexts in which
they enforced norms, and they (as well as the older children
to a lesser extent) used grammatical constructions
objectifying the norms ("It works like this" rather than
"You must do it like this"). These results suggested that
children's understanding of social norms becomes more
flexible during the preschool years.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12178},
Key = {fds351631}
}
@article{fds351632,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The communicative contexts of grammatical aspect use in
English.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {41},
Number = {3},
Pages = {705-723},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000913000135},
Abstract = {In many of the world's languages grammatical aspect is used
to indicate how events unfold over time. In English,
activities that are ongoing can be distinguished from those
that are completed using the morphological marker -ing.
Using naturalistic observations of two children in their
third year of life, we quantify the availability and
reliability of the imperfective form in the communicative
context of the child performing actions. On average, 30% of
verbal descriptions refer to child actions that are grounded
in the here-and-now. Of these utterances, there are two
features of the communicative context that reliably map onto
the functions of the imperfective, namely, that events are
construed as ongoing and from within. The findings are
discussed with reference to how the context in which a child
hears aspectual language may limit the degrees of freedom on
what these constructions mean.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000913000135},
Key = {fds351632}
}
@article{fds320792,
Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Differences in the early cognitive development of children
and great apes.},
Journal = {Developmental psychobiology},
Volume = {56},
Number = {3},
Pages = {547-573},
Year = {2014},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/dev.21125},
Abstract = {There is very little research comparing great ape and human
cognition developmentally. In the current studies we
compared a cross-sectional sample of 2- to 4-year-old human
children (n=48) with a large sample of chimpanzees and
bonobos in the same age range (n=42, hereafter: apes) on a
broad array of cognitive tasks. We then followed a group of
juvenile apes (n=44) longitudinally over 3 years to track
their cognitive development in greater detail. In skills of
physical cognition (space, causality, quantities), children
and apes performed comparably at 2 years of age, but by 4
years of age children were more advanced (whereas apes
stayed at their 2-year-old performance levels). In skills of
social cognition (communication, social learning, theory of
mind), children out-performed apes already at 2 years, and
increased this difference even more by 4 years. Patterns of
development differed more between children and apes in the
social domain than the physical domain, with support for
these patterns present in both the cross-sectional and
longitudinal ape data sets. These results indicate key
differences in the pattern and pace of cognitive development
between humans and other apes, particularly in the early
emergence of specific social cognitive capacities in
humans.},
Doi = {10.1002/dev.21125},
Key = {fds320792}
}
@article{fds351633,
Author = {van der Goot, MH and Tomasello, M and Liszkowski,
U},
Title = {Differences in the nonverbal requests of great apes and
human infants.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {85},
Number = {2},
Pages = {444-455},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12141},
Abstract = {This study investigated how great apes and human infants use
imperative pointing to request objects. In a series of three
experiments (infants, N = 44; apes, N = 12), subjects were
given the opportunity to either point to a desired object
from a distance or else to approach closer and request it
proximally. The apes always approached close to the object,
signaling their request through instrumental actions. In
contrast, the infants quite often stayed at a distance,
directing the experimenters' attention to the desired object
through index-finger pointing, even when the object was in
the open and they could obtain it by themselves. Findings
distinguish 12-month-olds' imperative pointing from
ontogenetic and phylogenetic earlier forms of ritualized
reaching.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12141},
Key = {fds351633}
}
@article{fds351634,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Over, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Eighteen-month-olds understand false beliefs in an
unexpected-contents task.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {119},
Pages = {120-126},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.10.002},
Abstract = {Recent studies suggest that infants understand that others
can have false beliefs. However, most of these studies have
used looking time measures, and the few that have used
behavioral measures are all based on the change-of-location
paradigm, leading to claims that infants might use
behavioral rules instead of mental state understanding to
pass these tests. We investigated infants' false-belief
reasoning using a different paradigm. In this
unexpected-contents helping task, 18-month-olds were
familiarized with boxes for blocks that contained blocks.
When an experimenter subsequently reached for a box for
blocks that now contained a spoon, infants based their
choice of whether to give her a spoon or a block on her true
or false belief about which object the block box contained.
These results help to demonstrate the flexibility of
infants' false-belief understanding.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.10.002},
Key = {fds351634}
}
@book{fds321686,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {A Natural History of Human Thinking},
Pages = {1-192},
Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780674724778},
Abstract = {Tool-making or culture, language or religious belief: ever
since Darwin, thinkers have struggled to identify what
fundamentally differentiates human beings from other
animals. In this much-anticipated book, Michael Tomasello
weaves his twenty years of comparative studies of humans and
great apes into a compelling argument that cooperative
social interaction is the key to our cognitive uniqueness.
Once our ancestors learned to put their heads together with
others to pursue shared goals, humankind was on an
evolutionary path all its own. Tomasello argues that our
prehuman ancestors, like today’s great apes, were social
beings who could solve problems by thinking. But they were
almost entirely competitive, aiming only at their individual
goals. As ecological changes forced them into more
cooperative living arrangements, early humans had to
coordinate their actions and communicate their thoughts with
collaborative partners. Tomasello’s “shared
intentionality hypothesis” captures how these more
socially complex forms of life led to more conceptually
complex forms of thinking. In order to survive, humans had
to learn to see the world from multiple social perspectives,
to draw socially recursive inferences, and to monitor their
own thinking via the normative standards of the group. Even
language and culture arose from the preexisting need to work
together. What differentiates us most from other great apes,
Tomasello proposes, are the new forms of thinking engendered
by our new forms of collaborative and communicative
interaction. A Natural History of Human Thinking is the most
detailed scientific analysis to date of the connection
between human sociality and cognition.},
Key = {fds321686}
}
@article{fds351635,
Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Discourse particles and belief reasoning: The case of German
doch},
Journal = {Journal of Semantics},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-133},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/fft001},
Abstract = {Discourse particles typically express the attitudes of
interlocutors with respect to the propositional content of
an utterance - for example, marking whether or not a speaker
believes the content of the proposition that she uttered. In
German, the particle doch - which has no direct English
translation - is commonly used to correct a belief that is
thought to be common ground among those present. We asked
whether German adults and 5-year-olds are able to infer that
a speaker who utters doch intends to be understood in this
way. Sixty-four children (4;9-5;3 years) and twenty-four
adults participated in a comprehension task in which a
speaker explicitly expressed either a positive belief or a
negative belief. Subsequently, in both conditions, the
speaker checked the truth of her previous belief and
corrected her belief with doch. In both the group of adults
and the group of children, polarity of the speaker's belief
affected hearers' interpretations of the speaker's
utterance. In a third condition we investigated whether
participants could also perform the more difficult task of
interpreting the speaker's utterance with doch while
inferring the speaker's belief. Whereas adults showed a
similar performance as in the explicit belief conditions,
children showed limited abilities in keeping track of the
speaker's belief. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford
University Press. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/jos/fft001},
Key = {fds351635}
}
@article{fds351636,
Author = {Liebal, K and Vaish, A and Haun, D and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Correction: Does sympathy motivate prosocial behaviour in
great apes? (PLoS ONE)},
Journal = {PLoS ONE},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/annotation/1fe9c2b8-84dd-44c4-a4ba-b62e0460b513},
Doi = {10.1371/annotation/1fe9c2b8-84dd-44c4-a4ba-b62e0460b513},
Key = {fds351636}
}
@book{fds351638,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction to the classic edition},
Pages = {vii-xiii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725911},
Key = {fds351638}
}
@book{fds351639,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction: A cognitive-functional perspective on
language structure},
Pages = {xiv-xxix},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725911},
Key = {fds351639}
}
@book{fds351640,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional
approaches to language structure, volume ii classic
edition},
Pages = {1-278},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725935},
Abstract = {From the point of view of psychology and cognitive science,
much of modern linguistics is too formal and mathematical to
be of much use. The New Psychology of Language volumes broke
new ground by introducing functional and cognitive
approaches to language structure in terms already familiar
to psychologists, thus defining the next era in the
scientific study of language. The Classic Edition volumes
re-introduce some of the most important cognitive and
functional linguists working in the field. They include a
new introduction by Michael Tomasello in which he reviews
what has changed since the volumes were first published and
highlights the fundamental insights of the original authors.
The New Psychology of Language volumes are a must-read for
anyone interested in understanding how cognitive and
functional linguistics has become the thriving perspective
on the scientific study of language that it is
today.},
Key = {fds351640}
}
@book{fds351641,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction to the classic edition},
Pages = {vii-xiii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725935},
Key = {fds351641}
}
@book{fds351642,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional
approaches to language structure, volume I classic
edition},
Pages = {1-268},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725911},
Abstract = {From the point of view of psychology and cognitive science,
much of modern linguistics is too formal and mathematical to
be of much use. The New Psychology of Language volumes broke
new ground by introducing functional and cognitive
approaches to language structure in terms already familiar
to psychologists, thus defining the next era in the
scientific study of language. The Classic Edition volumes
re-introduce some of the most important cognitive and
functional linguists working in the field. They include a
new introduction by Michael Tomasello in which he reviews
what has changed since the volumes first published and
highlights the fundamental insights of the original authors.
The New Psychology of Language volumes are a must-read for
anyone interested in understanding how cognitive and
functional linguistics has become the thriving perspective
on the scientific study of language that it is
today.},
Key = {fds351642}
}
@book{fds351643,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction: Some surprises for psychologists},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848725935},
Key = {fds351643}
}
@article{fds321685,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The ultra-social animal},
Journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {187-194},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2015},
Abstract = {In evolutionary perspective, what is most remarkable about
human sociality is its many and diverse forms of
cooperation. Here, I provide an overview of some recent
research, mostly from our laboratory, comparing human
children with their nearest living relatives, the great
apes, in various tests of collaboration, prosocial behavior,
conformity, and group-mindedness (e.g., following and
enforcing social norms). This is done in the context of a
hypothetical evolutionary scenario comprising two ordered
steps: a first step in which early humans began
collaborating with others in unique ways in their everyday
foraging and a second step in which modern humans began
forming cultural groups. Humans' unique forms of sociality
help to explain their unique forms of cognition and
morality. © 2014.},
Doi = {10.1002/ejsp.2015},
Key = {fds321685}
}
@article{fds351637,
Author = {Liebal, K and Vaish, A and Haun, D and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Does sympathy motivate prosocial behaviour in great
apes?},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e84299},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0084299},
Abstract = {Prosocial behaviours such as helping, comforting, or sharing
are central to human social life. Because they emerge early
in ontogeny, it has been proposed that humans are prosocial
by nature and that from early on empathy and sympathy
motivate such behaviours. The emerging question is whether
humans share these abilities to feel with and for someone
with our closest relatives, the great apes. Although several
studies demonstrated that great apes help others, little is
known about their underlying motivations. This study
addresses this issue and investigates whether four species
of great apes (Pongo pygmaeus, Gorilla gorilla, Pan
troglodytes, Pan paniscus) help a conspecific more after
observing the conspecific being harmed (a human experimenter
steals the conspecific's food) compared to a condition where
no harming occurred. Results showed that in regard to the
occurrence of prosocial behaviours, only orangutans, but not
the African great apes, help others when help is needed,
contrasting prior findings on chimpanzees. However, with the
exception of one population of orangutans that helped
significantly more after a conspecific was harmed than when
no harm occurred, prosocial behaviour in great apes was not
motivated by concern for others.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0084299},
Key = {fds351637}
}
@article{fds351644,
Author = {Nitzschner, M and Kaminski, J and Melis, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Side matters: Potential mechanisms underlying dogs'
performance in a social eavesdropping paradigm},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {90},
Pages = {263-271},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.01.035},
Abstract = {Social eavesdropping is the gathering of information by
observing interactions between other individuals. Previous
studies have claimed that dogs, Canis familiaris, are able
to use information obtained via social eavesdropping, that
is, preferring a generous over a selfish human donor.
However, in these studies the side was constant between the
demonstrations and the dogs' choices, not controlling for
potential location biases. In the crucial control condition
of our experiments, the donors swapped places in half of the
trials before the dogs chose. We found that first choice
behaviour as well as the time dogs interacted with the
generous donor were influenced by location (side). In a
second experiment the subject's owner interacted with the
two donors. Again, the result of the side control revealed
that the critical factor was location (side) not person. The
results of these experiments provide no evidence for social
eavesdropping in dogs and show the importance of critical
control conditions. © 2014 The Association for the Study of
Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.01.035},
Key = {fds351644}
}
@article{fds351645,
Author = {Vogelsang, M and Jensen, K and Kirschner, S and Tennie, C and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods
game},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
Volume = {5},
Number = {JUL},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00729},
Abstract = {Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals
often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This
"tragedy of the commons" has been demonstrated
experimentally in adults with the public goods game.
Contributions to a public good decline over time due to
free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about
how children behave when confronted with this social
dilemma. Forty-eight preschoolers were tested using a novel
non-verbal procedure and simplified choices more appropriate
to their age than standard economic approaches. The rate of
cooperation was initially very low and rose in the second
round for the girls only. Children were affected by their
previous outcome, as they free rode more after experiencing
a lower outcome compared to the other group members. © 2014
Vogelsang, Jensen, Kirschner, Tennie and
Tomasello.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00729},
Key = {fds351645}
}
@article{fds351646,
Author = {Warneken, F and Steinwender, J and Hamann, K and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's planning in a collaborative problem-solving
task},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {48-58},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.003},
Abstract = {One important component of collaborative problem solving is
the ability to plan one's own action in relation to that of
a partner. We presented 3- and 5-year-old peer pairs with
two different tool choice situations in which they had to
choose complementary tools with which to subsequently work
on a collaborative problem-solving apparatus. In the
bidirectional condition, exemplars of the two necessary
tools appeared in front of each child. In the unidirectional
condition, one child had to choose between two different
tools first, while the other child had only one tool
available. Thus, both conditions required close attention to
the actions of the partner, but the unidirectional condition
additionally required the anticipation of the partner's
constrained tool choice. Five-year-olds were proficient
planners in both conditions, whereas 3-year-olds did not
consistently make the correct choice. However, 3-year-olds
who had first experienced the unidirectional condition chose
the correct tool at an above-chance level. Moreover,
communication during the tool choice led to greater success
among 3-year-olds, but not among 5-year-olds. These results
provide the first experimental evidence that between 3 and 5
years of age children develop the ability to plan the
division of labor in a collaborative task. We discuss our
findings regarding planning for a collaborative task in
relation to prior research on planning abilities for
individual problem-solving that appear to undergo
developmental change between 3 and 5 years of age. © 2014
Elsevier Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.003},
Key = {fds351646}
}
@article{fds351647,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M},
Title = {Dueling dualists : Commentary on carpendale, atwood, and
kettner},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {56},
Number = {6},
Pages = {401-405},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000357237},
Doi = {10.1159/000357237},
Key = {fds351647}
}
@article{fds351648,
Author = {Göckeritz, S and Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's creation and transmission of social
norms},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {81-95},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.01.003},
Abstract = {Children's lives are governed by social norms. Since Piaget,
however, it has been assumed that they understand very
little about how norms work. Recent studies in which
children enforce social norms indicate a richer
understanding, but children are still relating to
pre-existing adult norms. In this study, triads of
5-year-olds worked on an instrumental task without adult
guidance. Children spontaneously created social norms
regarding how the game "should" be played. They transmitted
these with special force (using more generic and objective
language) to novices, suggesting that young children
understand to some degree, the conventional nature and
special force of social norms in binding all who would
participate. © 2014 Elsevier Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.01.003},
Key = {fds351648}
}
@article{fds351649,
Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two- and 3-Year-Olds Know What Others Have and Have Not
Heard},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {12-21},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2012.710865},
Abstract = {Recent studies have established that even infants can
determine what others know based on previous visual
experience. In the current study, we investigated whether 2-
and 3-year-olds know what others know based on previous
auditory experience. A child and an adult heard the sound of
one object together, but only the child heard the sound of
another (target) object. When later the sounds of both
objects were played simultaneously, the adult reacted with
surprise and excitement ("Oh, listen, what is that?"). In
response, both 24- and 36-month-olds directed the adult's
attention to the target more often than chance and more
often than in a control condition in which the adult had
heard neither sound. These results indicate that by 24
months of age, children's understanding of others' knowledge
and ignorance is not limited to the visual domain but
extends across perceptual domains. © 2014 Taylor and
Francis Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2012.710865},
Key = {fds351649}
}
@article{fds351650,
Author = {Hertel, A and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Generalize or personalize--do dogs transfer an acquired rule
to novel situations and persons?},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {9},
Number = {7},
Pages = {e102666},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0102666},
Abstract = {Recent studies have raised the question of whether dogs,
like human infants, comprehend an established rule as
generalizable, normative knowledge or rather as episodic
information, existing only in the immediate situation. In
the current study we tested whether dogs disobeyed a
prohibition to take a treat (i) in the presence of the
communicator of the ban, (ii) after a temporary absence of
the communicator, and (iii) in the presence of a novel
person. Dogs disobeyed the rule significantly more often
when the communicator left the room for a moment or when
they were faced with a new person, than when she stayed
present in the room. These results indicate that dogs
"forget" a rule as soon as the immediate human context
becomes disrupted.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0102666},
Key = {fds351650}
}
@article{fds351651,
Author = {Tempelmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do domestic dogs learn words based on humans' referential
behaviour?},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e91014},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0091014},
Abstract = {Some domestic dogs learn to comprehend human words, although
the nature and basis of this learning is unknown. In the
studies presented here we investigated whether dogs learn
words through an understanding of referential actions by
humans rather than simple association. In three studies,
each modelled on a study conducted with human infants, we
confronted four word-experienced dogs with situations
involving no spatial-temporal contiguity between the word
and the referent; the only available cues were referential
actions displaced in time from exposure to their referents.
We found that no dogs were able to reliably link an object
with a label based on social-pragmatic cues alone in all the
tests. However, one dog did show skills in some tests,
possibly indicating an ability to learn based on
social-pragmatic cues.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0091014},
Key = {fds351651}
}
@article{fds351652,
Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Familiar verbs are not always easier than novel verbs: how
German pre-school children comprehend active and passive
sentences.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {38},
Number = {1},
Pages = {128-151},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12066},
Abstract = {Many studies show a developmental advantage for transitive
sentences with familiar verbs over those with novel verbs.
It might be that once familiar verbs become entrenched in
particular constructions, they would be more difficult to
understand (than would novel verbs) in non-prototypical
constructions. We provide support for this hypothesis
investigating German children using a forced-choice pointing
paradigm with reversed agent-patient roles. We tested active
transitive verbs in study 1. The 2-year olds were better
with familiar than novel verbs, while the 2½-year olds
pointed correctly for both. In study 2, we tested passives:
2½-year olds were significantly below chance for familiar
verbs and at chance for novel verbs, supporting the
hypothesis that the entrenchment of the familiar verbs in
the active transitive voice was interfering with
interpreting them in the passive voice construction. The
3½-year olds were also at chance for novel verbs but above
chance with familiar verbs. We interpret this as reflecting
a lessening of the verb-in-construction entrenchment as the
child develops knowledge that particular verbs can occur in
a range of constructions. The 4½-year olds were above
chance for both familiar and novel verbs. We discuss our
findings in terms of the relative entrenchment of lexical
and syntactic information and to interference between
them.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12066},
Key = {fds351652}
}
@article{fds351653,
Author = {Hamann, K and Bender, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Meritocratic sharing is based on collaboration in
3-year-olds.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {121-128},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032965},
Abstract = {The present study investigated young preschoolers'
proportional allocation of rewards in 2 different work
contexts. We presented 32 pairs of 3.5-year-old peers with a
collaborative task to obtain rewards by pulling ropes. In
order to establish differences in work input, 1 child's rope
was not immediately accessible but had to be retrieved from
the apparatus by means of a specific tool, while the other
child had no such additional work to do. The result of the
game was that 1 individual received 1 toy and the other
received 3 toys. In the Deserving condition, the working
child received the 3 toys (thus work and reward matched),
whereas in the Undeserving condition, the other child
received the 3 toys (he or she was overpaid, and the working
child was underpaid). Another 32 dyads participated in a
noncollaborative, parallel work task, again in a Deserving
condition and an Undeserving condition. On average, children
with 3 toys shared with their partner more in the
Undeserving condition than in the Deserving condition after
collaboration but not in a parallel work setup. These
results suggest that young children take merit into account
in distributing resources at a much younger age than
previously believed and that peer collaboration is an
especially facilitative context for children's attention to
norms of fairness.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0032965},
Key = {fds351653}
}
@article{fds351654,
Author = {Bannard, C and Klinger, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How selective are 3-year-olds in imitating novel linguistic
material?},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {49},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2344-2356},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032062},
Abstract = {In 3 studies we explored when 3-year-olds would imitate
novel words in utterances produced by adult speakers. Child
and experimenter took turns in requesting objects from a
game master. The experimenter always went first and always
preceded the object's familiar name with a novel adjective
(e.g., "the dilsige duck"). In the first 2 experiments, we
found that children were more likely to reproduce the
adjective when there were 2 different instances of the same
object present in the situation than when there was only 1
or when there were 2 objects of different types present.
Thus, children seemed to be sensitive to the descriptive and
contrastive function of the adjectives in determining which
parts of the utterances to reproduce. Nonetheless,
replication of even redundant material was over 50%,
suggesting a strategy of somewhat blind copying. In the 3rd
experiment, we found that children were less likely to
reproduce a redundant adjective when the speaker indicated
gesturally that he did not intend to produce it than when he
clearly produced it intentionally. We distinguish insightful
imitation (the copying of a speaker's goal and means when
motivated by insight into why those particular means were
chosen) and blind imitation (the copying of a speaker's goal
and means with no awareness of why those specific means were
chosen) from mimicry. We explore the roles that these modes
of imitation might play in language development.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0032062},
Key = {fds351654}
}
@article{fds351655,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children understand and defend the entitlements of
others.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {116},
Number = {4},
Pages = {930-944},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.013},
Abstract = {Human social life is structured by social norms creating
both obligations and entitlements. Recent research has found
that young children enforce simple obligations against norm
violators by protesting. It is not known, however, whether
they understand entitlements in the sense that they will
actively object to a second party attempting to interfere in
something that a third party is entitled to do-what we call
counter-protest. In two studies, we found that 3-year-old
children understand when a person is entitled to do
something, and so they actively defend this person's
entitlement against unjustified interference from second
parties. In some cases, they even enforce second-order
entitlements, for example, in the case of ownership where an
owner is entitled to entitle others to use the owner's
property.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.013},
Key = {fds351655}
}
@article{fds320793,
Author = {Grosse, G and Scott-Phillips, TC and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Three-year-olds hide their communicative intentions in
appropriate contexts.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {49},
Number = {11},
Pages = {2095-2101},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032017},
Abstract = {Human cooperative communication involves both an informative
intention that the recipient understands the content of the
signal and also a (Gricean) communicative intention that the
recipient recognizes that the speaker has an informative
intention. The degree to which children understand this
2-layered nature of communication is the subject of some
debate. One phenomenon that would seem to constitute clear
evidence of such understanding is hidden authorship, in
which informative acts are produced but with the
communicative intent behind them intentionally hidden. In
this study, 3- and 5-year-old children were told that an
adult was seeking a toy but wanted to find it on her own.
Children of both ages often did something to make the toy
easier for the adult to see while at the same time
concealing their actions in some way. This suggests that by
the age of 3, children are able to separate the multiple
layers of intentionality involved in human cooperative
communication.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0032017},
Key = {fds320793}
}
@article{fds351656,
Author = {Schulze, C and Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {3-year-old children make relevance inferences in indirect
verbal communication.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {84},
Number = {6},
Pages = {2079-2093},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12093},
Abstract = {Three studies investigated 3-year-old children's ability to
determine a speaker's communicative intent when the
speaker's overt utterance related to that intent only
indirectly. Studies 1 and 2 examined children's
comprehension of indirectly stated requests (e.g., "I find
Xs good" can imply, in context, a request for X; N = 32).
Study 3 investigated 3- and 4-year-old children's and
adults' (N = 52) comprehension of the implications of a
speaker responding to an offer by mentioning an action's
fulfilled or unfulfilled precondition (e.g., responding to
an offer of cereal by stating that we have no milk implies
rejection of the cereal). In all studies, 3-year-old
children were able to make the relevance inference necessary
to integrate utterances meaningfully into the ongoing
context.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12093},
Key = {fds351656}
}
@article{fds351657,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Over, H and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children care more about their reputation with ingroup
members and potential reciprocators.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {16},
Number = {6},
Pages = {952-958},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.12086},
Abstract = {Human cooperation depends on individuals caring about their
reputation, and so they sometimes attempt to manage them
strategically. Here we show that even 5-year-old children
strategically manage their reputation. In an experimental
setting, children shared significantly more resources with
an anonymous recipient when (1) the child watching them
could reciprocate later, and (2) the child watching them was
an ingroup rather than an outgroup member (as established by
minimal group markers). This study is not only the first to
show that young children selectively invest in their
reputation with specific individuals, but also the first to
show that we care more about our reputation with ingroup
than with outgroup members.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.12086},
Key = {fds351657}
}
@article{fds351658,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, recognize successful actions,
but fail toimitate them},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {86},
Number = {4},
Pages = {755-761},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.07.015},
Abstract = {Cultural transmission, by definition, involves some form of
social learning. Chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates
clearly engage in some forms of social learning enabling
some types of cultural transmission, but there is
controversy about whether they copy the actual bodily
actions of demonstrators. In this study chimpanzees
recognized when a human actor was using particular bodily
actions that had led to successful problem solving in the
past. But then when it was their turn to solve the problem,
they did not reproduce the human actor's bodily actions
themselves, even though they were clearly capable of
producing the movements. These results help us identify more
precisely key reasons for the differences in the social
learning and cultural transmission of humans and other
primates. © 2013 The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.07.015},
Key = {fds351658}
}
@article{fds351659,
Author = {Wittig, M and Jensen, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Five-year-olds understand fair as equal in a mini-ultimatum
game.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {116},
Number = {2},
Pages = {324-337},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.004},
Abstract = {In studies of children's resource distribution, it is almost
always the case that "fair" means an equal amount for all.
In the mini-ultimatum game, players are confronted with
situations in which fair does not always mean equal, and so
the recipient of an offer needs to take into account the
alternatives the proposer had available to her or him.
Because of its forced-choice design, the mini-ultimatum game
measures sensitivity to unfair intentions in addition to
unfair outcomes. In the current study, we gave a
mini-ultimatum game to 5-year-old children, allowing us to
determine the nature of fairness sensitivity at a period
after false belief awareness is typically passed and before
formal schooling begins. The only situation in which
responders rejected offers was when the proposer could have
made an equal offer. But unlike adults, they did not employ
more sophisticated notions of fairness that take into
account the choices facing the proposer. Proposers, in their
turn, were also not adult-like in that they had a very poor
understanding that responders would reject unequal offers
when an equal one was available. Thus, preschool children
seem to understand "fair=equal" in this task, but not much
more, and they are not yet skillful at anticipating what
others will find fair beyond 50/50 splits.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.004},
Key = {fds351659}
}
@article{fds351660,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The emergence of contingent reciprocity in young
children.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {116},
Number = {2},
Pages = {338-350},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.002},
Abstract = {Contingent reciprocity is important in theories of the
evolution of human cooperation, but it has been very little
studied in ontogeny. We gave 2- and 3-year-old children the
opportunity to either help or share with a partner after
that partner either had or had not previously helped or
shared with the children. Previous helping did not influence
children's helping. In contrast, previous sharing by the
partner led to greater sharing in 3-year-olds but not in
2-year-olds. These results do not support theories claiming
either that reciprocity is fundamental to the origins of
children's prosocial behavior or that it is irrelevant.
Instead, they support an account in which children's
prosocial behavior emerges spontaneously but is later
mediated by reciprocity.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.002},
Key = {fds351660}
}
@article{fds351661,
Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Non-verbal communication enables children's coordination in
a "Stag Hunt" game},
Journal = {European Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {10},
Number = {5},
Pages = {597-610},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2012.726469},
Abstract = {This study assessed the role of non-verbal communication in
4-year-old children's decisions to coordinate with others.
During a "Stag Hunt" game, the child and an adult
individually and continually collected low-value prizes
(hares). Occasionally, an alternative option of collecting a
high-value prize (stag) cooperatively with the adult arose,
but entailed a risk: a lone attempt on this prize by either
player would leave that player empty handed. Children
coordinated with the adult to obtain the high-value prize
more often when that adult made mutual eye contact and
smiled at them than when she attended to the prizes only.
This suggests that neither verbal nor gestural communication
are necessary for coordination: Minimal, non-verbal
communication enables children's coordination with others
towards joint goals. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis
Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/17405629.2012.726469},
Key = {fds351661}
}
@article{fds351662,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Uebel, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Being mimicked increases prosocial behavior in 18-month-old
infants.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {84},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1511-1518},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12083},
Abstract = {Most previous research on imitation in infancy has focused
on infants' learning of instrumental actions on objects.
This study focused instead on the more social side of
imitation, testing whether being mimicked increases
prosocial behavior in infants, as it does in adults (van
Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004).
Eighteen-month-old infants (N = 48) were either mimicked
or not by an experimenter; then either that experimenter or
a different adult needed help. Infants who had previously
been mimicked were significantly more likely to help both
adults than infants who had not been mimicked. Thus, even in
infancy, mimicry has positive social consequences: It
promotes a general prosocial orientation toward
others.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.12083},
Key = {fds351662}
}
@article{fds351663,
Author = {Graf, E and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Subject and object omission in children's early transitive
constructions: A discourse-pragmatic approach},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {36},
Number = {3},
Pages = {701-727},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716413000477},
Abstract = {This paper investigates discourse effects on the provision
of both subjects and objects and investigates whether
pragmatic discourse features govern the realization/omission
of both constituents alike. In an elicitation study, we
examined how the discourse-pragmatic feature contrast, as
applied to the subject, verb, or object of a transitive
utterance affected the provision of elements in the
remainder of the sentence when all elements were previously
introduced. The results showed that 3.5-year-old children
were more likely to realize a contrasted argument with a
lexical noun but more likely to omit the argument when it
was not part of a contrast, regardless of its subject or
object status. This suggests that contrast presents a
unifying discourse feature for argument omission in language
development.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0142716413000477},
Key = {fds351663}
}
@article{fds351664,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The attention-grammar interface: Eye-gaze cues structural
choice in children and adults},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {24},
Number = {3},
Pages = {457-481},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cog-2013-0020},
Abstract = {We investigated whether children (3- and 4-year-olds) and
adults can use the active passive alternation - essentially
a choice of subject - in a way that is consistent with the
eye-gaze of the speaker. Previous work suggests the function
of the subject position can be grounded in attentional
mechanisms (Tomlin 1995, 1997). Eye-gaze is one powerful
source of directing attention that we know adults and young
children are sensitive to; furthermore, we know adults are
more likely to look at the subject of their sentence than
any other character (Gleitman et al. 2007; Griffin and Bock
2000). We demonstrate that older children and adults are
able to use speaker-gaze to choose a felicitous subject when
describing a scene with both agent-focused and patient
focused cues. Integrating attentional and grammatical
information in this way allows children to limit the degrees
of freedom on what the function of certain linguistic
constructions might be.},
Doi = {10.1515/cog-2013-0020},
Key = {fds351664}
}
@article{fds351665,
Author = {Halina, M and Rossano, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The ontogenetic ritualization of bonobo gestures.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {4},
Pages = {653-666},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-013-0601-7},
Abstract = {Great apes communicate with gestures in flexible ways. Based
on several lines of evidence, Tomasello and colleagues have
posited that many of these gestures are learned via
ontogenetic ritualization-a process of mutual anticipation
in which particular social behaviors come to function as
intentional communicative signals. Recently, Byrne and
colleagues have argued that all great ape gestures are
basically innate. In the current study, for the first time,
we attempted to observe the process of ontogenetic
ritualization as it unfolds over time. We focused on one
communicative function between bonobo mothers and infants:
initiation of "carries" for joint travel. We observed 1,173
carries in ten mother-infant dyads. These were initiated by
nine different gesture types, with mothers and infants using
many different gestures in ways that reflected their
different roles in the carry interaction. There was also a
fair amount of variability among the different dyads,
including one idiosyncratic gesture used by one infant. This
gestural variation could not be attributed to sampling
effects alone. These findings suggest that ontogenetic
ritualization plays an important role in the origin of at
least some great ape gestures.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-013-0601-7},
Key = {fds351665}
}
@article{fds351666,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children sympathize less in response to unjustified
emotional distress.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {49},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1132-1138},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029501},
Abstract = {Three-year-old children saw an adult displaying the exact
same distress in 3 different conditions: (a) the adult's
distress was appropriate to a genuine harm, (b) the adult's
distress was an overreaction to a minor inconvenience, and
(c) there was no apparent cause for the adult's distress.
Children who witnessed the adult being appropriately upset
showed concern for him, intervened on his behalf, and
checked on him when he later expressed distress out of their
view. Children who did not know the cause for the adult's
distress responded similarly. In contrast, children who
witnessed the adult overreacting to an inconvenience showed
lower rates of intervening and checking. The degree of
children's concern across conditions was correlated with the
latency of their helping behavior toward the adult later.
These results suggest that from an early age, young
children's sympathy and prosocial behavior are not automatic
responses to emotional displays but, rather, involve taking
into account whether the displayed distress is
justified.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0029501},
Key = {fds351666}
}
@article{fds351667,
Author = {Schmerse, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Error patterns in young German children's
wh-questions.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {40},
Number = {3},
Pages = {656-671},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000912000104},
Abstract = {In this article we report two studies: a detailed
longitudinal analysis of errors in wh-questions from six
German-learning children (age 2 ; 0-3 ; 0) and an analysis
of the prosodic characteristics of wh-questions in German
child-directed speech. The results of the first study
demonstrate that German-learning children frequently omit
the initial wh-word. A lexical analysis of wh-less questions
revealed that children are more likely to omit the wh-word
was ('what') than other wh-words (e.g. wo 'where'). In the
second study, we performed an acoustic analysis of sixty
wh-questions that one mother produced during her child's
third year of life. The results show that the wh-word was is
much less likely to be accented than the wh-word wo,
indicating a relationship between children's omission of
wh-words and the stress patterns associated with
wh-questions. The findings are discussed in the light of
discourse-pragmatic and metrical accounts of omission
errors.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000912000104},
Key = {fds351667}
}
@article{fds351668,
Author = {Moore, R and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Three-year-olds understand communicative intentions without
language, gestures, or gaze},
Journal = {Interaction Studies},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {62-80},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.14.1.05moo},
Abstract = {The communicative interactions of very young children almost
always involve language (based on conventions), gesture
(based on bodily deixis or iconicity) and directed gaze. In
this study, ninety-six children (3;0 years) were asked to
determine the location of a hidden toy by understanding a
communicative act that contained none of these familiar
means. A light-and-sound mechanism placed behind the hiding
place and illuminated by a centrally placed switch was used
to indicate the location of the toy. After a communicative
training session, an experimenter pressed the switch either
deliberately or accidentally, and with or without ostension
(in the form of eye contact and child-directed speech). In
no condition did she orient towards the hiding place. When
the switch was pressed intentionally, children used the
light-and-sound cue to find the toy - and tended to do so
even in the absence of ostensive eye contact. When the
experimenter pressed the switch accidentally, children
searched randomly - demonstrating that they were tracking
her communicative intent, and not merely choosing on the
basis of salience. The absence of an effect of ostension
contradicts research that ostension helps children to
interpret the communicative intentions underlying unfamiliar
signs. We explain this by concluding that while it may play
a role in establishing a communicative interaction, it is
not necessary for sustaining one; and that even with a
highly novel communicative act - involving none of the means
of communication on which children typically rely -
three-year-olds can comprehend the communicative intentions
behind an intentionally produced act. © John Benjamins
Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1075/is.14.1.05moo},
Key = {fds351668}
}
@article{fds351669,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Parental Presence and Encouragement Do Not Influence Helping
in Young Children},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {345-368},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00120.x},
Abstract = {Young children begin helping others with simple instrumental
problems from soon after their first birthdays. In previous
observations of this phenomenon, both naturalistic and
experimental, children's parents were in the room and could
potentially have influenced their behavior. In the two
current studies, we gave 24-month-old children the
opportunity to help an unfamiliar adult obtain an
out-of-reach object when the parent (or a friendly female
adult) (i) was present but passive, (ii) was present and
highlighted the problem for the child, (iii) was present and
actively encouraged the child to help, (iv) was present and
ordered the child to help, or (v) was absent from the room.
The children helped at relatively high levels and equally
under all these treatment conditions. There was also no
differential effect of treatment condition on children's
helping in a subsequent test phase in which no parent was
present, and children had to disengage from a fun activity
to help. Young children's helping behavior is not
potentiated or facilitated by parental behavior in the
immediate situation, suggesting that it is spontaneous and
intrinsically motivated. Copyright © International Society
on Infant Studies (ISIS).},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00120.x},
Key = {fds351669}
}
@article{fds351670,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Keckeisen, M and Pitsch, A and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Domestic dogs conceal auditory but not visual information
from others.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {351-359},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0576-9},
Abstract = {A number of studies have shown that dogs are sensitive to a
human's perspective, but it remains unclear whether they use
an egocentric strategy to assess what humans perceive. We
investigated whether dogs know what a human can see and
hear, even when the dogs themselves are unable to see the
human. Dogs faced a task in which forbidden food was placed
in a tunnel that they could retrieve by using their paw.
Whereas the dogs could not see the experimenter during their
food retrieval attempts, the experimenter could potentially
see the dog's paw. In the first experiment, dogs could
choose between an opaque and a transparent side of the
tunnel, and in the second experiment, they could choose
between a silent and a noisy approach to the tunnel. The
results showed that dogs preferred a silent approach to
forbidden food but they did not hide their approach when
they could not see a human present. We conclude that dogs
probably rely on what they themselves can perceive when they
assess what the human can see and hear.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0576-9},
Key = {fds351670}
}
@article{fds351671,
Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzee responders still behave like rational
maximizers.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {110},
Number = {20},
Pages = {E1837},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1303627110},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1303627110},
Key = {fds351671}
}
@article{fds351672,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Pitsch, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Dogs steal in the dark.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-394},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0579-6},
Abstract = {All current evidence of visual perspective taking in dogs
can possibly be explained by dogs reacting to certain
stimuli rather than understanding what others see. In the
current study, we set up a situation in which contextual
information and social cues are in conflict. A human always
forbade the dog from taking a piece of food. The part of the
room being illuminated was then varied, for example, either
the area where the human was seated or the area where the
food was located was lit. Results show that dogs steal
significantly more food when it is dark compared to when it
is light. While stealing forbidden food the dog's behaviour
also depends on the type of illumination in the room.
Illumination around the food, but not the human, affected
the dogs' behaviour. This indicates that dogs do not take
the sight of the human as a signal to avoid the food. It
also cannot be explained by a low-level associative rule of
avoiding illuminated food which dogs actually approach
faster when they are in private. The current finding
therefore raises the possibility that dogs take into account
the human's visual access to the food while making their
decision to steal it.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0579-6},
Key = {fds351672}
}
@article{fds351673,
Author = {Scheider, L and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Do domestic dogs interpret pointing as a
command?},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {361-372},
Year = {2013},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0577-8},
Abstract = {Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication
flexibly, particularly the pointing gesture. Here, we
examine whether dogs interpret pointing informatively, that
is, as simply providing information, or rather as a command,
for example, ordering them to move to a particular location.
In the first study a human pointed toward an empty cup. In
one manipulation, the dog either knew or did not know that
the designated cup was empty (and that the other cup
actually contained the food). In another manipulation, the
human (as authority) either did or did not remain in the
room after pointing. Dogs ignored the human's gesture if
they had better information, irrespective of the authority's
presence. In the second study, we varied the level of
authority of the person pointing. Sometimes this person was
an adult, and sometimes a young child. Dogs followed
children's pointing just as frequently as they followed
adults' pointing (and ignored the dishonest pointing of
both), suggesting that the level of authority did not affect
their behavior. Taken together these studies suggest that
dogs do not see pointing as an imperative command ordering
them to a particular location. It is still not totally
clear, however, if they interpret it as informative or in
some other way.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0577-8},
Key = {fds351673}
}
@article{fds351674,
Author = {Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) strategic helping in a
collaborative task.},
Journal = {Biology letters},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {20130009},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2013.0009},
Abstract = {Many animal species cooperate, but the underlying proximate
mechanisms are often unclear. We presented chimpanzees with
a mutualistic collaborative food-retrieval task requiring
complementary roles, and tested subjects' ability to help
their partner perform her role. For each role, subjects
required a different tool, and the tools were not
interchangeable. We gave one individual in each dyad both
tools, and measured subjects' willingness to transfer a tool
to their partner as well as which tool (correct versus
incorrect) they transferred. Most subjects helped their
partner and transferred the tool the partner needed. Thus,
chimpanzees not only coordinate different roles, but they
also know which particular action the partner needs to
perform. These results add to previous findings suggesting
that many of chimpanzees' limitations in collaboration are,
perhaps, more motivational than cognitive.},
Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2013.0009},
Key = {fds351674}
}
@article{fds351675,
Author = {Moll, H and Meltzoff, AN and Merzsch, K and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Taking versus confronting visual perspectives in preschool
children.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {49},
Number = {4},
Pages = {646-654},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028633},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that 3-year-olds can take other
people's visual perspectives not only when they perceive
different things (Level 1) but even when they see the same
thing differently (Level 2). One hypothesis is that
3-year-olds are good perspective takers but cannot confront
different perspectives on the same object (Perner, Stummer,
Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). In 2 studies using color filters,
3-year-olds were unable to judge in what color they and an
adult saw the same picture. This was the case irrespective
of whether children replied verbally (pilot study) or by
pointing to color samples (main study). However, 3-year-olds
readily took an adult's perspective by determining which of
2 objects an adult referred to as being a certain color,
independently from how the children saw the objects (main
study). Taken together, these results suggest that
preschoolers' difficulty is not so much taking perspectives
as it is directly confronting another's view with their
own-an ability that seems to be acquired between 4 and 5
years of age.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0028633},
Key = {fds351675}
}
@article{fds351676,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Bös, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) coordinate their actions in
a problem-solving task.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {273-285},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0571-1},
Abstract = {Cooperative hunting is a cognitively challenging activity
since individuals have to coordinate movements with a
partner and at the same time react to the prey. Domestic
dogs evolved from wolves, who engage in cooperative hunting
regularly, but it is not clear whether dogs have kept their
cooperative hunting skills. We presented pairs of dogs with
a reward behind a fence with two openings in it. A sliding
door operated by the experimenter could block one opening
but not both simultaneously. The dogs needed to coordinate
their actions, so that each was in front of a different
opening, if one of them was to cross through and get food.
All 24 dog pairs solved the problem. In study 1, we
demonstrated that dogs understood how the apparatus worked.
In study 2, we found that, although the performance of the
pairs did not depend on the divisibility of the reward,
pairs were quicker at coordinating their actions when both
anticipated rewards. However, the dogs did not monitor one
another, suggesting that their solutions were achieved by
each individual attempting to maximize for
itself.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0571-1},
Key = {fds351676}
}
@article{fds351677,
Author = {Salomo, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's ability to answer different types of
questions.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {40},
Number = {2},
Pages = {469-491},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000912000050},
Abstract = {Young children answer many questions every day. The extent
to which they do this in an adult-like way - following
Grice's Maxim of Quantity by providing the requested
information, no more no less - has been studied very little.
In an experiment, we found that two-, three- and
four-year-old children are quite skilled at answering
argument-focus questions and predicate-focus questions with
intransitives in which their response requires only a single
element. But predicate-focus questions for transitives -
requiring both the predicate and the direct object - are
difficult for children below four years of age. Even more
difficult for children this young are sentence-focus
questions such as "What's happening?", which give the child
no anchor in given information around which to structure
their answer. In addition, in a corpus study, we found that
parents ask their children predicate-focus and
sentence-focus questions very infrequently, thus giving
children little experience with them.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000912000050},
Key = {fds351677}
}
@article{fds351678,
Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of cultural common
ground.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {31},
Number = {Pt 1},
Pages = {88-96},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.2012.02080.x},
Abstract = {Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying
the common ground they have with others, based both on
personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground
that all members of the group share. We introduced 3- and
5-year-old children to a culturally well-known object and a
novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, 'What
is that?', either as a request for information or in a
recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both
3- and 5-year-olds assumed she was asking about the novel
object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5-year-olds
assumed she was referring to the culturally well-known
object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to
understand that they share cultural common ground with other
members of their group.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.2012.02080.x},
Key = {fds351678}
}
@article{fds320794,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Keupp, S and Hare, B and Vaish, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Direct and indirect reputation formation in nonhuman great
apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo
pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {127},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-75},
Year = {2013},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028929},
Abstract = {Humans make decisions about when and with whom to cooperate
based on their reputations. People either learn about others
by direct interaction or by observing third-party
interactions or gossip. An important question is whether
other animal species, especially our closest living
relatives, the nonhuman great apes, also form reputations of
others. In Study 1, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and
2.5-year-old human children experienced a nice experimenter
who tried to give food/toys to the subject and a mean
experimenter who interrupted the food/toy giving. In studies
2 and 3, nonhuman great apes and human children could only
passively observe a similar interaction, in which a nice
experimenter and a mean experimenter interacted with a third
party. Orangutans and 2.5-year-old human children preferred
to approach the nice experimenter rather than the mean one
after having directly experienced their respective
behaviors. Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human
children also took into account experimenter actions toward
third parties in forming reputations. These studies show
that the human ability to form direct and indirect
reputation judgment is already present in young children and
shared with at least some of the other great
apes.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0028929},
Key = {fds320794}
}
@article{fds351679,
Author = {Melis, AP and Altrichter, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Allocation of resources to collaborators and free-riders in
3-year-olds.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {114},
Number = {2},
Pages = {364-370},
Year = {2013},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2012.08.006},
Abstract = {Recent studies have shown that in situations where resources
have been acquired collaboratively, children at around 3
years of age share mostly equally. We investigated
3-year-olds' sharing behavior with a collaborating partner
and a free-riding partner who explicitly expressed her
preference not to collaborate. Children shared more equally
with the collaborating partner than with the free rider.
These results suggest that young children are sensitive to
the contributions made by others to a collaborative effort
(and possibly their reasons for not collaborating) and
distribute resources accordingly.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2012.08.006},
Key = {fds351679}
}
@article{fds351680,
Author = {Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees predict that a competitor's preference will
match their own.},
Journal = {Biology letters},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {20120829},
Year = {2013},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2012.0829},
Abstract = {The ability to predict how another individual will behave is
useful in social competition. Chimpanzees can predict the
behaviour of another based on what they observe her to see,
hear, know and infer. Here we show that chimpanzees act on
the assumption that others have preferences that match their
own. All subjects began with a preference for a box with a
picture of food over one with a picture of nothing, even
though the pictures had no causal relation to the contents.
In a back-and-forth food competition, chimpanzees then
avoided the box with the picture of food when their
competitor had chosen one of the boxes before
them-presumably on the assumption that the competitor shared
their own preference for it and had already chosen it.
Chimpanzees predicted that their competitor's preference
would match their own and adjusted their behavioural
strategies accordingly.},
Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2012.0829},
Key = {fds351680}
}
@article{fds321687,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Vaish, A},
Title = {Origins of human cooperation and morality},
Journal = {Annual Review of Psychology},
Volume = {64},
Number = {1},
Pages = {231-255},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812},
Abstract = {From an evolutionary perspective, morality is a form of
cooperation. Cooperation requires individuals either to
suppress their own self-interest or to equate it with that
of others. We review recent research on the origins of human
morality, both phylogenetic (research with apes) and
ontogenetic (research with children). For both time frames
we propose a two-step sequence: first a second-personal
morality in which individuals are sympathetic or fair to
particular others, and second an agent-neutral morality in
which individuals follow and enforce group-wide social
norms. Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of
skills and motives for cooperating with others, and the
ontogeny of these skills and motives unfolds in part
naturally and in part as a result of sociocultural contexts
and interactions. © 2013 by Annual Reviews. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812},
Key = {fds321687}
}
@article{fds351682,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A New Look at Children's Prosocial Motivation},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-90},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00130.x},
Abstract = {Young children routinely behave prosocially, but what is
their motivation for doing so? Here, we review three studies
which show that young children (1) are intrinsically
motivated rather than motivated by extrinsic rewards; (2)
are more inclined to help those for whom they feel sympathy;
and (3) are not so much motivated to provide help themselves
as to see the person helped (as can be seen in changes of
their sympathetic arousal, as measured by pupil dilation, in
different circumstances). Young children's prosocial
behavior is thus intrinsically motivated by a concern for
others' welfare, which has its evolutionary roots in a
concern for the well-being of those with whom one is
interdependent. © International Society on Infant Studies
(ISIS).},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00130.x},
Key = {fds351682}
}
@article{fds351683,
Author = {Bullinger, AF and Burkart, JM and Melis, AP and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Bonobos, Pan paniscus, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and
marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, prefer to feed
alone},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {85},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-60},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.10.006},
Abstract = {Many primates share food, but the motives behind this food
sharing are mostly not known. We investigated individuals'
preference to feed either alone or together with a tolerant
partner. Subjects (chimpanzees who are highly competitive
around food, bonobos who are more tolerant around food and
common marmosets who are cooperative breeders and share food
actively with some partners) were tested with a door-opening
paradigm. In a 2 × 2 design with the factors 'food' and
'partner', subjects had the opportunity to eat piles of
sharable food, if present, and/or to open the door, thereby
allowing the partner, if present, to join the subject. While
food had a main effect on the subject's behaviour, the
presence of the partner did not. Individuals of all species
opened the door much more often if there was no food
available. These results suggest that regardless of their
differing social organizations, chimpanzees, bonobos and
marmosets do not voluntarily co-feed, but do not mind having
company if there is no food present. © 2012 The Association
for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.10.006},
Key = {fds351683}
}
@article{fds351684,
Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Three-year-olds' understanding of the consequences of joint
commitments.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {8},
Number = {9},
Pages = {e73039},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0073039},
Abstract = {Here we investigate the extent of children's understanding
of the joint commitments inherent in joint activities.
Three-year-old children either made a joint commitment to
assemble a puzzle with a puppet partner, or else the child
and puppet each assembled their own puzzle. Afterwards,
children who had made the joint commitment were more likely
to stop and wait for their partner on their way to fetch
something, more likely to spontaneously help their partner
when needed, and more likely to take over their partner's
role when necessary. There was no clear difference in
children's tendency to tattle on their partner's cheating
behavior or their tendency to distribute rewards equally at
the end. It thus appears that by 3 years of age making a
joint commitment to act together with others is beginning to
engender in children a "we"-intentionality which holds
across at least most of the process of the joint activity
until the shared goal is achieved, and which withstands at
least some of the perturbations to the joint activity
children experience.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0073039},
Key = {fds351684}
}
@article{fds351685,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Can domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use referential
emotional expressions to locate hidden food?},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {137-145},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0560-4},
Abstract = {Although many studies have investigated domestic dogs'
(Canis familiaris) use of human communicative cues, little
is known about their use of humans' emotional expressions.
We conducted a study following the general paradigm of
Repacholi in Dev Psychol 34:1017-1025, (1998) and tested
four breeds of dogs in the laboratory and another breed in
the open air. In our study, a human reacted emotionally
(happy, neutral or disgust) to the hidden contents of two
boxes, after which the dog was then allowed to choose one of
the boxes. Dogs tested in the laboratory distinguished
between the most distinct of the expressed emotions
(Happy-Disgust condition) by choosing appropriately, but
performed at chance level when the two emotions were less
distinct (Happy-Neutral condition). The breed tested in the
open air passed both conditions, but this breed's differing
testing setup might have been responsible for their success.
Although without meaningful emotional expressions, when
given a choice, these subjects chose randomly, their
performance did not differ from that in the experimental
conditions. Based on the findings revealed in the
laboratory, we suggest that some domestic dogs recognize
both the directedness and the valence of some human
emotional expressions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0560-4},
Key = {fds351685}
}
@misc{fds367354,
Author = {Bara, BG and Chater, N and Tomasello, M and Varley,
R},
Title = {Symposium Communicative Intentions in the
Mind/Brain},
Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics -
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2013},
Pages = {65-66},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831891},
Key = {fds367354}
}
@misc{fds367355,
Author = {Call, J and Goldin-Meadow, S and Hobaiter, C and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Language and Gesture Evolution},
Journal = {Cooperative Minds: Social Interaction and Group Dynamics -
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society, CogSci 2013},
Pages = {57-58},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780976831891},
Key = {fds367355}
}
@misc{fds351681,
Author = {Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The early ontogeny of human cooperation and
morality},
Pages = {279-298},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Moral Development, Second Edition},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848729599},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203581957},
Abstract = {The seminal work in the modern study of children’s moral
development is Piaget’s (1932/1997) The Moral Judgment of
the Child. As is well known, Piaget claimed that before the
age of 8 or 9 years children make moral judgments based only
on a respect for authority and the social norms emanating
from this authority-and so they are not really autonomous
moral agents. But, as is also well known, Piaget focused
exclusively on the explicit moral judgments that children
were capable of formulating in language. Kohlberg’s
extension of Piaget’s framework (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg,
1987; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976) also asked children to express
their reasoned moral judgments linguistically, and also
found that preschool children were essentially premoral
(i.e., preconventional).},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203581957},
Key = {fds351681}
}
@article{fds351686,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Melis, AP and Tennie, C and Wyman, E and Herrmann,
E},
Title = {Two key steps in the evolution of human cooperation: The
interdependence Hypothesis},
Journal = {Current Anthropology},
Volume = {53},
Number = {6},
Pages = {673-692},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/668207},
Abstract = {Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus
mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans'
species-unique forms of cooperation-as well as their
species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social
life-all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social
selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became
obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were
interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest
in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they
evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not
possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and
they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters).
In a second step, these new collaborative skills and
motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as
modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part
of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural
conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by
collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set
of these marking individuals as members of a particular
cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became
ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals
became ever more interdependent. © 2012 by The Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/668207},
Key = {fds351686}
}
@article{fds351687,
Author = {Kaiser, I and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Theft in an ultimatum game: chimpanzees and bonobos are
insensitive to unfairness.},
Journal = {Biology letters},
Volume = {8},
Number = {6},
Pages = {942-945},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2012.0519},
Abstract = {Humans, but not chimpanzees, punish unfair offers in
ultimatum games, suggesting that fairness concerns evolved
sometime after the split between the lineages that gave rise
to Homo and Pan. However, nothing is known about fairness
concerns in the other Pan species, bonobos. Furthermore,
apes do not typically offer food to others, but they do
react against theft. We presented a novel game, the
ultimatum theft game, to both of our closest living
relatives. Bonobos and chimpanzee 'proposers' consistently
stole food from the responders' portions, but the responders
did not reject any non-zero offer. These results support the
interpretation that the human sense of fairness is a derived
trait.},
Doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2012.0519},
Key = {fds351687}
}
@article{fds351688,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Why be nice? Better not think about it.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {16},
Number = {12},
Pages = {580-581},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.006},
Abstract = {Are people more likely to be cooperative if they must act
quickly or if they have more time to mull it over? The
results of a recent series of studies suggest that peoples'
initial impulse is to cooperate, but that with more time and
reflection they become more selfish.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.006},
Key = {fds351688}
}
@article{fds351689,
Author = {Schneider, A-C and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How chimpanzees solve collective action problems.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {279},
Number = {1749},
Pages = {4946-4954},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1948},
Abstract = {We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective
action situations, in which action was necessary for reward
but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to
the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We
found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which
group size was small, there was a positive relationship
between rank and action with more dominant individuals
volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward
was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate
action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group
resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and
appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios,
when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary
(experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging.
There was highly significant variability in the action rates
of different individuals as well as between dyads,
suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the
individual personalities and personal relationships present
in the group.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2012.1948},
Key = {fds351689}
}
@article{fds351690,
Author = {Matthews, D and Behne, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Origins of the human pointing gesture: a training
study.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {15},
Number = {6},
Pages = {817-829},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01181.x},
Abstract = {Despite its importance in the development of children's
skills of social cognition and communication, very little is
known about the ontogenetic origins of the pointing gesture.
We report a training study in which mothers gave children
one month of extra daily experience with pointing as
compared with a control group who had extra experience with
musical activities. One hundred and two infants of 9, 10, or
11 months of age were seen at the beginning, middle, and end
of this one-month period and tested for declarative pointing
and gaze following. Infants'ability to point with the index
finger at the end of the study was not affected by the
training but was instead predicted by infants' prior ability
to follow the gaze direction of an adult. The frequency with
which infants pointed indexically was also affected by
infant gaze following ability and, in addition, by maternal
pointing frequency in free play, but not by training. In
contrast, infants' ability to monitor their partner's gaze
when pointing, and the frequency with which they did so, was
affected by both training and maternal pointing frequency in
free play. These results suggest that prior social cognitive
advances, rather than adult socialization of pointing per
se, determine the developmental onset of indexical pointing,
but socialization processes such as imitation and adult
shaping subsequently affect both infants' ability to monitor
their interlocutor's gaze while they point and how
frequently infants choose to point.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01181.x},
Key = {fds351690}
}
@article{fds351691,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Schütte, S and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Great apes infer others' goals based on context.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {15},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1037-1053},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0528-4},
Abstract = {In previous studies claiming to demonstrate that great apes
understand the goals of others, the apes could potentially
have been using subtle behavioral cues present during the
test to succeed. In the current studies, we ruled out the
use of such cues by making the behavior of the experimenter
identical in the test phase of both the experimental and
control conditions; the only difference was the preceding
"context." In the first study, apes interpreted a human's
ambiguous action as having the underlying goal of opening a
box, or not, based on that human's previous actions with
similar boxes. In the second study, chimpanzees learned that
when a human stood up she was going to go get food for them,
but when a novel, unexpected event happened, they changed
their expectation-presumably based on their understanding
that this new event led the human to change her goal. These
studies suggest that great apes do not need concurrent
behavioral cues to infer others' goals, but can do so from a
variety of different types of cues-even cues displaced in
time.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0528-4},
Key = {fds351691}
}
@misc{fds351692,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cognitive Linguistics and First Language
Acquisition},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780199738632},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.013.0041},
Abstract = {This article reviews some of the best-known and most
interesting work on language acquisition from within the
framework of functional-cognitive linguistics, particularly
those on meaning and conceptualization as well as usage and
grammar (grammatical constructions). Although the term is
often used more narrowly, the article calls this general
theoretical approach "usage-based" to emphasize the
assumption common to all functional and cognitive approaches
that linguistic structure emerges from use, both
historically and ontogenetically. This is as opposed to the
dominant view in the field of language acquisition today in
which "core" grammatical competence is innately given, and
all that develops is peripheral skills involving the
lexicon, pragmatics, information processing, and the like.
The article discusses meaning and conceptualization in child
language, focusing on image schemas and word meanings as
well as social cognition, perspective-taking, and culture.
It also considers usage and grammar in child language,
including usage-based syntax.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.013.0041},
Key = {fds351692}
}
@misc{fds351693,
Author = {Wyman, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The ontogenetic origins of human cooperation},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780198568308},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198568308.013.0017},
Abstract = {This article suggests that the ontogenesis of shared
intentionality depends on the developmentally primitive
phenomenon of 'joint attention'. This is the ability of the
infant to understand that they and other individuals can
attend to the same object and each other's attention
simultaneously and provides a shared, interpersonal frame in
which young infants can share experience with others. This
article compares the skills and motivations involved in
shared intentionality between humans and chimpanzees. It
also emphasises a marked difference in their joint attention
abilities. It suggests that this may explain various
differences in social-cognitive skills between the two
species, and proposes that the phylogenesis of joint
attention may account for the evolution of complex forms of
cooperation and uniquely human cultural practices.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198568308.013.0017},
Key = {fds351693}
}
@article{fds351694,
Author = {Hepach, R and Vaish, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children are intrinsically motivated to see others
helped.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {23},
Number = {9},
Pages = {967-972},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612440571},
Abstract = {Young children help other people, but it is not clear why.
In the current study, we found that 2-year-old children's
sympathetic arousal, as measured by relative changes in
pupil dilation, is similar when they themselves help a
person and when they see that person being helped by a third
party (and sympathetic arousal in both cases is different
from that when the person is not being helped at all). These
results demonstrate that the intrinsic motivation for young
children's helping behavior does not require that they
perform the behavior themselves and thus "get credit" for
it, but rather requires only that the other person be
helped. Thus, from an early age, humans seem to have genuine
concern for the welfare of others.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797612440571},
Key = {fds351694}
}
@article{fds351695,
Author = {Riedl, K and Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {No third-party punishment in chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {109},
Number = {37},
Pages = {14824-14829},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1203179109},
Abstract = {Punishment can help maintain cooperation by deterring
free-riding and cheating. Of particular importance in
large-scale human societies is third-party punishment in
which individuals punish a transgressor or norm violator
even when they themselves are not affected. Nonhuman
primates and other animals aggress against conspecifics with
some regularity, but it is unclear whether this is ever
aimed at punishing others for noncooperation, and whether
third-party punishment occurs at all. Here we report an
experimental study in which one of humans' closest living
relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), could punish an
individual who stole food. Dominants retaliated when their
own food was stolen, but they did not punish when the food
of third-parties was stolen, even when the victim was
related to them. Third-party punishment as a means of
enforcing cooperation, as humans do, might therefore be a
derived trait in the human lineage.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1203179109},
Key = {fds351695}
}
@article{fds351696,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on
the violator's group affiliation.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {124},
Number = {3},
Pages = {325-333},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.004},
Abstract = {To become cooperative members of their cultural groups,
developing children must follow their group's social norms.
But young children are not just blind norm followers, they
are also active norm enforcers, for example, protesting and
correcting when someone plays a conventional game the
"wrong" way. In two studies, we asked whether young children
enforce social norms on all people equally, or only on
ingroup members who presumably know and respect the norm. We
looked at both moral norms involving harm and conventional
game norms involving rule violations. Three-year-old
children actively protested violation of moral norms equally
for ingroup and outgroup individuals, but they enforced
conventional game norms for ingroup members only. Despite
their ingroup favoritism, young children nevertheless hold
ingroup members to standards whose violation they tolerate
from outsiders.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.004},
Key = {fds351696}
}
@article{fds351697,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Semantics of the transitive construction: prototype effects
and developmental comparisons.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {36},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1268-1288},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01249.x},
Abstract = {This paper investigates whether an abstract linguistic
construction shows the kind of prototype effects
characteristic of non-linguistic categories, in both adults
and young children. Adapting the prototype-plus-distortion
methodology of Franks and Bransford (1971), we found that
whereas adults were lured toward false-positive recognition
of sentences with prototypical transitive semantics, young
children showed no such effect. We examined two main
implications of the results. First, it adds a novel data
point to a growing body of research in cognitive linguistics
and construction grammar that shows abstract linguistic
categories can behave in similar ways to non-linguistic
categories, for example, by showing graded membership of a
category. Thus, the findings lend psychological validity to
the existing cross-linguistic evidence for prototypical
transitive semantics. Second, we discuss a possible
explanation for the fact that prototypical sentences were
processed differently in adults and children, namely, that
children's transitive semantic network is not as
interconnected or cognitively coherent as
adults'.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01249.x},
Key = {fds351697}
}
@article{fds351698,
Author = {Behne, T and Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Twelve-month-olds' comprehension and production of
pointing.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {30},
Number = {Pt 3},
Pages = {359-375},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02043.x},
Abstract = {This study explored whether infants aged 12 months already
recognize the communicative function of pointing gestures.
Infants participated in a task requiring them to comprehend
an adult's informative pointing gesture to the location of a
hidden toy. They mostly succeeded in this task, which
required them to infer that the adult was attempting to
direct their attention to a location for a reason - because
she wanted them to know that a toy was hidden there. Many of
the infants also reversed roles and produced appropriate
pointing gestures for the adult in this same game, and
indeed there was a correlation such that comprehenders were
for the most part producers. These findings indicate that by
12 months of age infants are beginning to show a
bidirectional understanding of communicative
pointing.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02043.x},
Key = {fds351698}
}
@article{fds351699,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young Children Enforce Social Norms},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {21},
Number = {4},
Pages = {232-236},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721412448659},
Abstract = {Social norms have played a key role in the evolution of
human cooperation, serving to stabilize prosocial and
egalitarian behavior despite the self-serving motives of
individuals. Young children's behavior mostly conforms to
social norms, as they follow adult behavioral directives and
instructions. But it turns out that even preschool children
also actively enforce social norms on others, often using
generic normative language to do so. This behavior is not
easily explained by individualistic motives; it is more
likely a result of children's growing identification with
their cultural group, which leads to prosocial motives for
preserving its ways of doing things. © The Author(s)
2012.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721412448659},
Key = {fds351699}
}
@article{fds351700,
Author = {Gampe, A and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Eighteen-month-olds learn novel words through
overhearing},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {32},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-397},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723711433584},
Abstract = {The prototypical word learning situation in western,
middle-class cultures is dyadic: an adult addresses a child
directly, ideally in a manner sensitive to their current
focus of attention. But young children also seem to learn
many of their words in polyadic situations through
overhearing. Extending the previous work of Akhtar and
colleagues, in the current two studies we gave 18-month-old
infants opportunities to acquire novel words through
overhearing in situations that were a bit more complex: they
did not socially interact with the adult who used the new
word before the word learning situation began, and the way
the adult used the new word was less transparent in that it
was neither a naming nor a directive speech act. In both
studies, infants learned words equally well (and above
chance) whether they were directly addressed or had to
eavesdrop on two adults. Almost from the beginning, young
children employ diverse learning strategies for acquiring
new words. © 2011 The Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1177/0142723711433584},
Key = {fds351700}
}
@article{fds351701,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not
about the same object at the same time.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {48},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1124-1132},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025915},
Abstract = {Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance
versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to
determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive
one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus
"the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the
same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object
(e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really
was by selecting one of two items that represented this
object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular
eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not
in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young
children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which
may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic
theory of mind tasks.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0025915},
Key = {fds351701}
}
@article{fds351702,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How two word-trained dogs integrate pointing and
naming.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {15},
Number = {4},
Pages = {657-665},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0494-x},
Abstract = {Two word-trained dogs were presented with acts of reference
in which a human pointed, named objects, or simultaneously
did both. The question was whether these dogs would assume
co-reference of pointing and naming and thus pick the
pointed-to object. Results show that the dogs did indeed
assume co-reference of pointing and naming in order to
determine the reference of a spoken word, but they did so
only when pointing was not in conflict with their previous
word knowledge. When pointing and a spoken word conflicted,
the dogs preferentially fetched the object by name. This is
not surprising since they are trained to fetch objects by
name. However, interestingly, in these conflict conditions,
the dogs fetched the named objects only after they had
initially approached the pointed-to object. We suggest that
this shows that the word-trained dogs interpret pointing as
a spatial directive, which they integrate into the fetching
game, presumably assuming that pointing is relevant to
finding the requested object.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-012-0494-x},
Key = {fds351702}
}
@article{fds351703,
Author = {Haun, DBM and Rekers, Y and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Majority-biased transmission in chimpanzees and human
children, but not orangutans.},
Journal = {Current biology : CB},
Volume = {22},
Number = {8},
Pages = {727-731},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006},
Abstract = {Cultural transmission is a key component of human evolution.
Two of humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees and
orangutans, have also been argued to transmit behavioral
traditions across generations culturally [1-3], but how much
the process might resemble the human process is still in
large part unknown. One key phenomenon of human cultural
transmission is majority-biased transmission: the increased
likelihood for learners to end up not with the most frequent
behavior but rather with the behavior demonstrated by most
individuals. Here we show that chimpanzees and human
children as young as 2 years of age, but not orangutans, are
more likely to copy an action performed by three
individuals, once each, than an action performed by one
individual three times. The tendency to acquire the
behaviors of the majority has been posited as key to the
transmission of relatively safe, reliable, and productive
behavioral strategies [4-7] but has not previously been
demonstrated in primates.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006},
Key = {fds351703}
}
@article{fds351704,
Author = {Fletcher, GE and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Differences in cognitive processes underlying the
collaborative activities of children and
chimpanzees},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {136-153},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.02.003},
Abstract = {We compared the performance of 3- and 5-year-old children
with that of chimpanzees in two tasks requiring
collaboration via complementary roles. In both tasks,
children and chimpanzees were able to coordinate two
complementary roles with peers and solve the problem
cooperatively. This is the first experimental demonstration
of the coordination of complementary roles in chimpanzees.
In the second task, neither species was skillful at waiting
for a partner to be positioned appropriately before
beginning (although children did hesitate significantly
longer when the partner was absent). The main difference
between species in both tasks was in children's, but not
chimpanzees', ability to profit from experience as a
collaborator in one role when later reversing roles. This
difference suggests that as they participate in a
collaboration, young children integrate both roles into a
single " birds-eye-view" representational format in a way
that chimpanzees do not. © 2012 Elsevier
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.02.003},
Key = {fds351704}
}
@article{fds351705,
Author = {Matthews, D and Butcher, J and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Two- and four-year-olds learn to adapt referring expressions
to context: effects of distracters and feedback on
referential communication.},
Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {184-210},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01181.x},
Abstract = {Children often refer to things ambiguously but learn not to
from responding to clarification requests. We review and
explore this learning process here. In Study 1, eighty-four
2- and 4-year-olds were tested for their ability to request
stickers from either (a) a small array with one dissimilar
distracter or (b) a large array containing similar
distracters. When children made ambiguous requests, they
received either general feedback or specific questions about
which of two options they wanted. With training, children
learned to produce more complex object descriptions and did
so faster in the specific feedback condition. They also
tended to provide more information when requesting stickers
from large arrays. In Study 2, we varied only distracter
similarity during training and then varied array size in a
generalization test. Children found it harder to learn in
this case. In the generalization test, 4-year-olds were more
likely to provide information (a) when it was needed because
distracters were similar to the target and (b) when the
array size was greater (regardless of need for information).
We discuss how clear cues to potential ambiguity are needed
for children to learn to tailor their referring expression
to context and how several cues of heuristic value (e.g.,
more distracters > say more) can promote the efficiency of
communication while language is developing. Finally, we
consider whether it would be worthwhile drawing on the human
learning process when developing algorithms for the
production of referring expressions.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01181.x},
Key = {fds351705}
}
@misc{fds351706,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Do chimpanzees know what others see-or only what they are
looking at?},
Booktitle = {Rational Animals?},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780198528272},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0017},
Abstract = {This chapter examines the distinction between two approaches
in interpreting the behaviour in non-human animals. It
explains the 'boosters' interpret behaviour in
psychologically rich ways while 'scoffers' prefer
psychologically lean interpretations. It compares richer and
leaner interpretations of recent data from four experimental
paradigms concerning whether chimpanzees know what others
can or cannot see and argues that the 'booster' hypothesis
is better supported by the experimental results.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0017},
Key = {fds351706}
}
@misc{fds351707,
Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M and Meyer, S},
Title = {Linguistic Communication and Social Understanding},
Booktitle = {Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780195159912},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0012},
Abstract = {This chapter explores the early stages of pragmatic language
acquisition before taking up the issue of syntax and
semantics. It suggests that the relation between language
and theory of mind is different depending on which aspect of
social understanding is at issue. In particular, it argues
that an appreciation of other persons as intentional
agents-the first level of social understanding-is a
prerequisite for language acquisition. The chapter presents
evidence from a training study aimed at developing
false-belief reasoning to show that both conversation about
deceptive objects and training on the syntax of
complementation (in the absence of deceptive objects)
promote three-year-olds' falsebelief understanding. The
largest training effect occurred in a condition that
combined conversation and complements. The fact that
manipulating the deceptive objects without any conversation
about them was ineffective leads to the conclusion that
language is a necessary condition for children to make
progress in their understanding of false beliefs, lending
support to the claim that language plays a causal role in
the ontogeny of social understanding.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0012},
Key = {fds351707}
}
@article{fds351708,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Schulz, L and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How dogs know when communication is intended for
them.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {15},
Number = {2},
Pages = {222-232},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01120.x},
Abstract = {Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication in a
way that other animal species do not. But little is known
about the specific cues they use to determine when human
communication is intended for them. In a series of four
studies, we confronted both adult dogs and young dog puppies
with object choice tasks in which a human indicated one of
two opaque cups by either pointing to it or gazing at it. We
varied whether the communicator made eye contact with the
dog in association with the gesture (or whether her back was
turned or her eyes were directed at another recipient) and
whether the communicator called the dog's name (or the name
of another recipient). Results demonstrated the importance
of eye contact in human-dog communication, and, to a lesser
extent, the calling of the dog's name--with no difference
between adult dogs and young puppies--which are precisely
the communicative cues used by human infants for identifying
communicative intent. Unlike human children, however, dogs
did not seem to comprehend the human's communicative gesture
when it was directed to another human, perhaps because dogs
view all human communicative acts as directives for the
recipient.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01120.x},
Key = {fds351708}
}
@article{fds351709,
Author = {Theakston, AL and Maslen, R and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The acquisition of the active transitive construction in
English: A detailed case study},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {91-128},
Year = {2012},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cog-2012-0004},
Abstract = {In this study, we test a number of predictions concerning
children's knowledge of the transitive Subject-Verb-Object
(SVO) construction between two and three years on one child
(Thomas) for whom we have densely collected data. The data
show that the earliest SVO utterances reflect earlier use of
those same verbs, and that verbs acquired before 2;7 show an
earlier move towards adultlike levels of use in the SVO
construction and in object argument complexity than later
acquired verbs. There is not a close relation with the input
in the types of subject and object referents used, nor a
close adherence to Preferred Argument Structure (PAS) before
2;7, but both early and late acquired verbs show a
simultaneous move towards PAS patterns in selection of
referent type at 2;9. The event semantics underpinning early
transitive utterances do not straightforwardly fit prototype
(high or inalienable) notions of transitivity, but rather
may reflect sensitivity to animacy and intentionality in a
way that mirrors the input. We conclude that children's
knowledge of the transitive construction continues to
undergo significant development between 2;0 and 3;0,
reflecting the gradual abstraction and integration of the
SVO and VO constructions, verb semantics, discourse
pragmatics, and the interactions between these factors.
These factors are considered in the context of a prototype
for the transitive construction. © Walter de
Gruyter.},
Doi = {10.1515/cog-2012-0004},
Key = {fds351709}
}
@article{fds351711,
Author = {Nitzschner, M and Melis, AP and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Dogs (Canis familiaris) evaluate humans on the basis of
direct experiences only.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {7},
Number = {10},
Pages = {e46880},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0046880},
Abstract = {Reputation formation is a key component in the social
interactions of many animal species. An evaluation of
reputation is drawn from two principal sources: direct
experience of an individual and indirect experience from
observing that individual interacting with a third party. In
the current study we investigated whether dogs use direct
and/or indirect experience to choose between two human
interactants. In the first experiment, subjects had direct
interaction either with a "nice" human (who played with,
talked to and stroked the dog) or with an "ignoring"
experimenter who ignored the dog completely. Results showed
that the dogs stayed longer close to the "nice" human. In a
second experiment the dogs observed a "nice" or "ignoring"
human interacting with another dog. This indirect
experience, however, did not lead to a preference between
the two humans. These results suggest that the dogs in our
study evaluated humans solely on the basis of direct
experience.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0046880},
Key = {fds351711}
}
@article{fds351712,
Author = {Bannard, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Can we dissociate contingency learning from social learning
in word acquisition by 24-month-olds?},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {7},
Number = {11},
Pages = {e49881},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049881},
Abstract = {We compared 24-month-old children's learning when their
exposure to words came either in an interactive (coupled)
context or in a nonsocial (decoupled) context. We measured
the children's learning with two different methods: one in
which they were asked to point to the referent for the
experimenter, and the other a preferential looking task in
which they were encouraged to look to the referent. In the
pointing test, children chose the correct referents for
words encountered in the coupled condition but not in the
decoupled condition. In the looking time test, however, they
looked to the targets regardless of condition. We explore
the explanations for this and propose that the different
response measures are reflecting two different kinds of
learning.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0049881},
Key = {fds351712}
}
@article{fds351713,
Author = {Rossano, F and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {One-year-old infants follow others' voice
direction.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {23},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1298-1302},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612450032},
Abstract = {We investigated 1-year-old infants' ability to infer an
adult's focus of attention solely on the basis of her voice
direction. In Studies 1 and 2, 12- and 16-month-olds watched
an adult go behind a barrier and then heard her verbally
express excitement about a toy hidden in one of two boxes at
either end of the barrier. Even though they could not see
the adult, infants of both ages followed her voice direction
to the box containing the toy. Study 2 showed that infants
could do this even when the adult was positioned closer to
the incorrect box while she vocalized toward the correct one
(and thus ruled out the possibility that infants were merely
approaching the source of the sound). In Study 3, using the
same methods as in Study 2, we found that chimpanzees
performed the task at chance level. Our results show that
infants can determine the focus of another person's
attention through auditory information alone-a useful skill
for establishing joint attention.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797612450032},
Key = {fds351713}
}
@article{fds351714,
Author = {Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Five-year olds, but not chimpanzees, attempt to manage their
reputations.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {7},
Number = {10},
Pages = {e48433},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048433},
Abstract = {Virtually all theories of the evolution of cooperation
require that cooperators find ways to interact with one
another selectively, to the exclusion of cheaters. This
means that individuals must make reputational judgments
about others as cooperators, based on either direct or
indirect evidence. Humans, and possibly other species, add
another component to the process: they know that they are
being judged by others, and so they adjust their behavior in
order to affect those judgments - so-called impression
management. Here, we show for the first time that already
preschool children engage in such behavior. In an
experimental study, 5-year-old human children share more and
steal less when they are being watched by a peer than when
they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same
whether they are being watched by a groupmate or not. This
species difference suggests that humans' concern for their
own self-reputation, and their tendency to manage the
impression they are making on others, may be unique to
humans among primates.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0048433},
Key = {fds351714}
}
@article{fds351715,
Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Untrained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) fail
to imitate novel actions.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {7},
Number = {8},
Pages = {e41548},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0041548},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>Social learning research in apes has
focused on social learning in the technical (problem
solving) domain - an approach that confounds action and
physical information. Successful subjects in such studies
may have been able to perform target actions not as a result
of imitation learning but because they had learnt some
technical aspect, for example, copying the movements of an
apparatus (i.e., different forms of emulation
learning).<h4>Methods</h4>Here we present data on action
copying by non-enculturated and untrained chimpanzees when
physical information is removed from demonstrations. To
date, only one such study (on gesture copying in a begging
context) has been conducted--with negative results. Here we
have improved this methodology and have also added
non-begging test situations (a possible confound of the
earlier study). Both familiar and novel actions were used as
targets. Prior to testing, a trained conspecific
demonstrator was rewarded for performing target actions in
view of observers. All but one of the tested chimpanzees
already failed to copy familiar actions. When retested with
a novel target action, also the previously successful
subject failed to copy--and he did so across several
contexts.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Chimpanzees do not seem to copy
novel actions, and only some ever copy familiar ones. Due to
our having tested only non-enculturated and untrained
chimpanzees, the performance of our test subjects speak more
than most other studies of the general (dis-)ability of
chimpanzees to copy actions, and especially novel
actions.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0041548},
Key = {fds351715}
}
@article{fds351716,
Author = {Kirchhofer, KC and Zimmermann, F and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Dogs (Canis familiaris), but not chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), understand imperative pointing.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {e30913},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030913},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees routinely follow the gaze of humans to outside
targets. However, in most studies using object choice they
fail to use communicative gestures (e.g. pointing) to find
hidden food. Chimpanzees' failure to do this may be due to
several difficulties with this paradigm. They may, for
example, misinterpret the gesture as referring to the opaque
cup instead of the hidden food. Or perhaps they do not
understand informative communicative intentions. In
contrast, dogs seem to be skilful in using human
communicative cues in the context of finding food, but as of
yet there is not much data showing whether they also use
pointing in the context of finding non-food objects. Here we
directly compare chimpanzees' (N = 20) and dogs' (N = 32)
skills in using a communicative gesture directed at a
visible object out of reach of the human but within reach of
the subject. Pairs of objects were placed in view of and
behind the subjects. The task was to retrieve the object the
experimenter wanted. To indicate which one she desired, the
experimenter pointed imperatively to it and directly
rewarded the subject for handing over the correct one. While
dogs performed well on this task, chimpanzees failed to
identify the referent. Implications for great apes' and
dogs' understanding of human communicative intentions are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0030913},
Key = {fds351716}
}
@article{fds351717,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Hamann, K},
Title = {Collaboration in young children.},
Journal = {Quarterly journal of experimental psychology
(2006)},
Volume = {65},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-12},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2011.608853},
Abstract = {Humans accomplish much of what they do in collaboration with
others. In ontogeny, children's earliest abilities to
collaborate develop in two basic steps. First, 1- and
2-year-olds learn to form with others joint goals and joint
attention--which include an understanding of the individual
roles and perspectives involved. Second, as they approach
their third birthdays, children's collaborative interactions
with others take on a more normative dimension involving
obligations to the partner. In addition, their cognitive
abilities to conceptualize simultaneously both their own
role and perspective along with those of the other develop
considerably as well. This form of collaborative interaction
is underlain by species-unique skills and motivations for
shared intentionality that make possible, ultimately, such
things as complex cultural institutions.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470218.2011.608853},
Key = {fds351717}
}
@article{fds351718,
Author = {Warneken, F and Gräfenhain, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Collaborative partner or social tool? New evidence for young
children's understanding of joint intentions in
collaborative activities.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {54-61},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01107.x},
Abstract = {Some children's social activities are structured by joint
goals. In previous research, the criterion used to determine
this was relatively weak: if the partner stopped
interacting, did the child attempt to re-engage her? But
re-engagement attempts could easily result from the child
simply realizing that she needs the partner to reach her own
goal in the activity (social tool explanation). In two
experiments, 21- and 27-month-old children interacted with
an adult in games in which they either did or did not
physically need the partner to reach a concrete goal.
Moreover, when the partner stopped interacting, she did so
because she was either unwilling to continue (breaking off
from the joint goal) or unable to continue (presumably still
maintaining the joint goal). Children of both age groups
encouraged the recalcitrant partner equally often whether
she was or was not physically needed for goal attainment. In
addition, they did so more often when the partner was unable
to continue than when she was unwilling to continue. These
findings suggest that young children do not just view their
collaborative partners as mindless social tools, but rather
as intentional, cooperative agents with whom they must
coordinate intentional states.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01107.x},
Key = {fds351718}
}
@article{fds351719,
Author = {Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's developing commitments to joint
goals.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1},
Pages = {137-145},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01695.x},
Abstract = {This study investigated young children's commitment to a
joint goal by assessing whether peers in collaborative
activities continue to collaborate until all received their
rewards. Forty-eight 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children worked
on an apparatus dyadically. One child got access to her
reward early. For the partner to benefit as well, this child
had to continue to collaborate even though there was no
further reward available to her. The study found that
3.5-year-olds, but not 2.5-year-olds, eagerly assisted their
unlucky partner. They did this less readily in a
noncollaborative control condition. A second study confirmed
that 2.5-year-old children understood the task structure.
These results suggest that children begin to appreciate the
normative dimensions of collaborative activities during the
3rd year of life.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01695.x},
Key = {fds351719}
}
@article{fds351720,
Author = {Grosse, G and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-old children differentiate test questions from
genuine questions.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-204},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000760},
Abstract = {Children are frequently confronted with so-called 'test
questions'. While genuine questions are requests for missing
information, test questions ask for information obviously
already known to the questioner. In this study we explored
whether two-year-old children respond differentially to one
and the same question used as either a genuine question or
as a test question based on the situation (playful game
versus serious task) and attitude (playful ostensive cues
versus not). Results indicated that children responded to
questions differently on the basis of the situation but not
the expressed attitude of the questioner. Two-year-old
children thus understand something of the very special
communicative intentions behind test questions.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000760},
Key = {fds351720}
}
@misc{fds351710,
Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Gräfenhain, M and Liebal, K and Liszkowski, U and Moll, H and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Warneken,
F and Wyman, E},
Title = {Cultural learning and cultural creation},
Pages = {65-101},
Booktitle = {Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account
of Development},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780203809587},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203809587},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203809587},
Key = {fds351710}
}
@misc{fds375279,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Analogical mapping in construction learning},
Pages = {21-22},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Encyclopedia of Second Language
Acquisition},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415877510},
Key = {fds375279}
}
@article{fds351721,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Methodological challenges in the study of primate
cognition},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {334},
Number = {6060},
Pages = {1227-1228},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1213443},
Abstract = {Laboratory studies of primate cognition face the problem
that captive populations of a species are not always
comparable, and generalizations to natural populations are
never certain. Studies of primate cognition in the field
face the problem that replications are expensive and
difficult, and again different populations are not always
comparable. To help remedy these problems, we recommend the
creation of data banks where primary data and videotapes may
be deposited (perhaps as a requirement of publication) to
facilitate cross-examination, replication, and, eventually,
the pooling of data across investigators.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1213443},
Key = {fds351721}
}
@article{fds351722,
Author = {Bullinger, AF and Wyman, E and Melis, AP and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Coordination of Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a Stag Hunt
Game},
Journal = {International Journal of Primatology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1296-1310},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10764-011-9546-3},
Abstract = {Group-living animals frequently face situations in which
they must coordinate individual and sometimes conflicting
goals. We assessed chimpanzees' ability to coordinate in a
Stag Hunt game. Dyads were confronted with a situation in
which each individual was already foraging on a low-value
food (hare) when a high-value food (stag) appeared that
required collaboration for retrieval, with a solo attempt to
get the stag resulting in a loss of both options. In one
condition visibility between partners was open whereas in
the other it was blocked by a barrier. Regardless of
condition, dyads almost always (91%) coordinated to choose
the higher valued collaborative option. Intentional
communication or monitoring of the partner's behavior before
decision making-characteristic of much human
coordination-were limited. Instead, all dyads adopted a
leader-follower strategy in which one partner took the risk
of going first, presumably predicting that this would induce
the other to join in (sometimes communicating if she was
slow to do so). These results show that humans' closest
primate relatives do not use complex communication to
coordinate but most often use a less cognitively complex
strategy that achieves the same end. © 2011 Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10764-011-9546-3},
Key = {fds351722}
}
@article{fds320795,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Cissewski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {A comparison of temperament in nonhuman apes and human
infants.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {14},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1393-1405},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x},
Abstract = {The adaptive behavior of primates, including humans, is
often mediated by temperament. Human behavior likely differs
from that of other primates in part due to temperament. In
the current study we compared the reaction of bonobos,
chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human infants to
novel objects and people - as a measure of their
shyness-boldness, a key temperamental trait. Human children
at the age of 2.5 years avoided novelty of all kinds far
more than the other ape species. This response was most
similar to that seen in bonobos and least like that of
chimpanzees and orangutans. This comparison represents a
first step in characterizing the temperamental profiles of
species in the hominoid clade, and these findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that human temperament has
evolved since our lineage diverged from the other apes in
ways that likely have broad effects on behavior. These
findings also provide new insights into how species
differences in ecology may shape differences in
temperament.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01082.x},
Key = {fds320795}
}
@article{fds351723,
Author = {Bullinger, AF and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, prefer individual over
collaborative strategies towards goals},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {82},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1135-1141},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.08.008},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees engage in a number of group activities, but it
is still unclear to what extent they prefer mutualistic
collaborative strategies over individual strategies to
achieve their goals. In one experiment, we gave chimpanzees
the choice between pulling a platform to within reach either
individually or collaboratively with a tolerant partner,
both strategies having equivalent payoffs. Overall,
chimpanzees preferred the individual option, and this
preference was independent of the type of reward for which
they were working (food or tool). In a second experiment,
chimpanzees switched to the collaboration option as soon as
the payoff was increased for this option. These results
suggest that chimpanzees prefer to work alone in
foraging-like situations and choose collaboration only if it
maximizes their reward. These results thus make a strong
case for the hypothesis that differences between humans' and
chimpanzees' collaboration are to a great extent due to
motivational differences. © 2011 The Association for the
Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.08.008},
Key = {fds351723}
}
@article{fds351724,
Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Children aged 2 ; 1 use transitive syntax to make a
semantic-role interpretation in a pointing
task.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {38},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1109-1123},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000747},
Abstract = {The current study used a forced choice pointing paradigm to
examine whether English children aged 2 ; 1 can use abstract
knowledge of the relationship between word order position
and semantic roles to make an active behavioural decision
when interpreting active transitive sentences with novel
verbs, when the actions are identical in the target and foil
video clips. The children pointed significantly above chance
with novel verbs but only if the final trial was excluded.
With familiar verbs the children pointed consistently above
chance. Children aged 2 ; 7 did not show these tiring
effects and their performance in the familiar and novel verb
conditions was always equivalent.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000747},
Key = {fds351724}
}
@article{fds351725,
Author = {Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Conformity to peer pressure in preschool
children.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {82},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1759-1767},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01666.x},
Abstract = {Both adults and adolescents often conform their behavior and
opinions to peer groups, even when they themselves know
better. The current study investigated this phenomenon in 24
groups of 4 children between 4;2 and 4;9 years of age.
Children often made their judgments conform to those of 3
peers, who had made obviously erroneous but unanimous public
judgments right before them. A follow-up study with 18
groups of 4 children between 4;0 and 4;6 years of age
revealed that children did not change their "real" judgment
of the situation, but only their public expression of it.
Preschool children are subject to peer pressure, indicating
sensitivity to peers as a primary social reference group
already during the preschool years.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01666.x},
Key = {fds351725}
}
@article{fds351726,
Author = {Rossano, F and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of violations of property
rights.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {121},
Number = {2},
Pages = {219-227},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007},
Abstract = {The present work investigated young children's normative
understanding of property rights using a novel methodology.
Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in
which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself,
and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who
owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a
third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old
children protested frequently when their own object was
involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a
third party's object was involved than when the actor was
acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest
around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the
normative dimensions of property rights.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007},
Key = {fds351726}
}
@article{fds351727,
Author = {Rekers, Y and Haun, DBM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children, but not chimpanzees, prefer to
collaborate.},
Journal = {Current biology : CB},
Volume = {21},
Number = {20},
Pages = {1756-1758},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.066},
Abstract = {Human societies are built on collaborative activities.
Already from early childhood, human children are skillful
and proficient collaborators. They recognize when they need
help in solving a problem and actively recruit collaborators
[1, 2]. The societies of other primates are also to some
degree cooperative. Chimpanzees, for example, engage in a
variety of cooperative activities such as border patrols,
group hunting, and intra- and intergroup coalitionary
behavior [3-5]. Recent studies have shown that chimpanzees
possess many of the cognitive prerequisites necessary for
human-like collaboration. Chimpanzees have been shown to
recognize when they need help in solving a problem and to
actively recruit good over bad collaborators [6, 7].
However, cognitive abilities might not be all that differs
between chimpanzees and humans when it comes to cooperation.
Another factor might be the motivation to engage in a
cooperative activity. Here, we hypothesized that a key
difference between human and chimpanzee collaboration-and so
potentially a key mechanism in the evolution of human
cooperation-is a simple preference for collaborating (versus
acting alone) to obtain food. Our results supported this
hypothesis, finding that whereas children strongly prefer to
work together with another to obtain food, chimpanzees show
no such preference.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.066},
Key = {fds351727}
}
@article{fds351728,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Neumann, M and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Dogs, Canis familiaris, communicate with humans to request
but not to inform},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {82},
Number = {4},
Pages = {651-658},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.06.015},
Abstract = {Dogs are especially skilful at comprehending human
communicative signals. This raises the question of whether
they are also able to produce such signals flexibly,
specifically, whether they helpfully produce indicative
('showing') behaviours to inform an ignorant human. In
experiment 1, dogs indicated the location of an object more
frequently when it was something they wanted themselves than
when it was something the human wanted. There was some
suggestion that this might be different when the human was
their owner. So in experiment 2 we investigated whether dogs
could understand when the owner needed helpful information
to find a particular object (out of two) that they needed.
They did not. Our findings, therefore, do not support the
hypothesis that dogs communicate with humans to inform them
of things they do not know. © 2011 The Association for the
Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.06.015},
Key = {fds351728}
}
@article{fds351729,
Author = {Pettersson, H and Kaminski, J and Herrmann, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Understanding of human communicative motives in domestic
dogs},
Journal = {Applied Animal Behaviour Science},
Volume = {133},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {235-245},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2011.05.008},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees find it easier to locate food when a human
prohibits them from going to a certain location than when
she indicates that location helpfully. Human children, in
contrast, use the cooperative gesture more readily. The
question here was whether domestic dogs are more like
chimpanzees, in this regard, or more like human children. In
our first study we presented 40 dogs with two communicative
contexts. In the cooperative context the experimenter
informed the subject where food was hidden by pointing
helpfully (with a cooperative tone of voice). In the
competitive context the experimenter extended her arm
towards the correct location in a prohibitive manner, palm
of hand out (uttering a forbidding command in a prohibitive
tone of voice). Dogs were successful in the cooperative
condition (P=0.005) but chose randomly in the competitive
condition (P=0.221). The second study independently varied
the two characteristics of the communicative gesture (the
gesture itself and the tone of voice). In addition to
replicating dogs' better performance with the cooperative
gestures, this study suggests that tone of voice and context
had more effect than type of gesture. In the context of food
acquisition, domestic dogs, like human children, seem more
prepared to use human gestures when they are given
cooperatively. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.applanim.2011.05.008},
Key = {fds351729}
}
@article{fds351730,
Author = {Melis, AP and Schneider, AC and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, share food in the same way
after collaborative and individual food acquisition},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {82},
Number = {3},
Pages = {485-493},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.05.024},
Abstract = {We investigated the hypothesis that patterns of chimpanzee
food sharing are influenced by whether individuals
contributed to its acquisition collaboratively. In two
experiments we exposed pairs of captive chimpanzees to food
acquisition/sharing situations in which we manipulated (1)
whether or not the two individuals had worked together
collaboratively to retrieve the food and (2) the proximity
of the individuals to the food at the moment of retrieval.
The first experiment resembled a scramble competition
scenario, with nonmonopolizable food. Proximity of
individuals to the food when it arrived was the major
variable affecting amount obtained by subordinates. Whether
or not the food was obtained via collaboration had no
effect. The second experiment resembled a contest
competition scenario, as the food was a single large piece
of fruit that could be more readily monopolized. In this
scenario, dominants obtained more food than subordinates,
the amount of food obtained by 'noncaptors' was affected by
their proximity to the food when it arrived, and again
previous collaboration had no effect. These results suggest
that in many food acquisition situations first-arriver and
first-possessor chimpanzees, as well as dominants in
general, have a significant advantage in food acquisition,
but being a collaborator brings no extra benefits. © 2011
The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.05.024},
Key = {fds351730}
}
@article{fds351731,
Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of markedness in non-verbal
communication.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {38},
Number = {4},
Pages = {888-903},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000383},
Abstract = {Speakers often anticipate how recipients will interpret
their utterances. If they wish some other, less obvious
interpretation, they may 'mark' their utterance (e.g. with
special intonations or facial expressions). We investigated
whether two- and three-year-olds recognize when adults mark
a non-verbal communicative act--in this case a pointing
gesture--as special, and so search for a not-so-obvious
referent. We set up the context of cleaning up and then
pointed to an object. Three-year-olds inferred that the
adult intended the pointing gesture to indicate that object,
and so cleaned it up. However, when the adult marked her
pointing gesture (with exaggerated facial expression) they
took the object's hidden contents or a hidden aspect of it
as the intended referent. Two-year-olds' appreciation of
such marking was less clear-cut. These results demonstrate
that markedness is not just a linguistic phenomenon, but
rather something concerning the pragmatics of intentional
communication more generally.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000383},
Key = {fds351731}
}
@article{fds351732,
Author = {Salomo, D and Graf, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The role of perceptual availability and discourse context in
young children's question answering.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {38},
Number = {4},
Pages = {918-931},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000910000395},
Abstract = {Three- and four-year-old children were asked predicate-focus
questions ('What's X doing?') about a scene in which an
agent performed an action on a patient. We varied: (i)
whether (or not) the preceding discourse context, which
established the patient as given information, was available
for the questioner; and (ii) whether (or not) the patient
was perceptually available to the questioner when she asked
the question. The main finding in our study differs from
those of previous studies since it suggests that children
are sensitive to the perceptual context at an earlier age
than they are to previous discourse context if they need to
take the questioner's perspective into account. Our finding
indicates that, while children are in principle sensitive to
both factors, young children rely on perceptual availability
when a conflict arises.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000910000395},
Key = {fds351732}
}
@article{fds351733,
Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's responses to guilt displays.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {47},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1248-1262},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0024462},
Abstract = {Displaying guilt after a transgression serves to appease the
victim and other group members, restore interpersonal
relationships, and indicate the transgressors' awareness of
and desire to conform to the group's norms. We investigated
whether and when young children are sensitive to these
functions of guilt displays. In Study 1, after 4- and
5-year-old children watched videos of transgressors either
displaying guilt (without explicitly apologizing) or not
displaying guilt, 5-year-olds appropriately inferred that
the victim would be madder at the unremorseful transgressor
and would prefer the remorseful transgressor. They also said
that they would prefer to interact with the remorseful
transgressor, judged the unremorseful transgressor to be
meaner, and, in a distribution of resources task, gave more
resources to the remorseful transgressor. The 4-year-olds
did not draw any of these inferences and distributed the
resources equally. However, Study 2 showed that 4-year-olds
were able to draw appropriate inferences about transgressors
who explicitly apologized versus those who did not
apologize. Thus, 4-year-olds seem to know the appeasement
functions that explicit apologies serve but only when
children have reached the age of 5 years do they seem to
grasp the emotions that apologies stand for, namely, guilt
and remorse, and the appeasement functions that displaying
these emotions serve.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0024462},
Key = {fds351733}
}
@article{fds351734,
Author = {Mersmann, D and Tomasello, M and Call, J and Kaminski, J and Taborsky,
M},
Title = {Simple Mechanisms Can Explain Social Learning in Domestic
Dogs (Canis familiaris)},
Journal = {Ethology},
Volume = {117},
Number = {8},
Pages = {675-690},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.2011.01919.x},
Abstract = {Recent studies have suggested that domestic dogs (Canis
familiaris) engage in highly complex forms of social
learning. Here, we critically assess the potential
mechanisms underlying social learning in dogs using two
problem-solving tasks. In a classical detour task, the test
dogs benefited from observing a demonstrator walking around
a fence to obtain a reward. However, even inexperienced dogs
did not show a preference for passing the fence at the same
end as the demonstrator. Furthermore, dogs did not need to
observe a complete demonstration by a human demonstrator to
pass the task. Instead, they were just as successful in
solving the problem after seeing a partial demonstration by
an object passing by at the end of the fence. In contrast to
earlier findings, our results suggest that stimulus
enhancement (or affordance learning) might be a powerful
social learning mechanism used by dogs to solve such detour
problems. In the second task, we examined whether naïve
dogs copy actions to solve an instrumental problem. After
controlling for stimulus enhancement and other forms of
social influence (e.g. social facilitation and observational
conditioning), we found that dogs' problem solving was not
influenced by witnessing a skilful demonstrator (either an
unknown human, a conspecific or the dog's owner). Together,
these results add to evidence suggesting that social
learning may often be explained by relatively simple (but
powerful) mechanisms. © 2011 Blackwell Verlag
GmbH.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1439-0310.2011.01919.x},
Key = {fds351734}
}
@article{fds351735,
Author = {Callaghan, T and Moll, H and Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Liszkowski,
U and Behne, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Early social cognition in three cultural
contexts.},
Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development},
Volume = {76},
Number = {2},
Pages = {vii-142},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00603.x},
Abstract = {The influence of culture on cognitive development is well
established for school age and older children. But almost
nothing is known about how different parenting and
socialization practices in different cultures affect
infants' and young children's earliest emerging cognitive
and social-cognitive skills. In the current monograph, we
report a series of eight studies in which we systematically
assessed the social-cognitive skills of 1- to 3-year-old
children in three diverse cultural settings. One group of
children was from a Western, middle-class cultural setting
in rural Canada and the other two groups were from
traditional, small-scale cultural settings in rural Peru and
India.In a first group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old
children's most basic social-cognitive skills for
understanding the intentions and attention of others:
imitation, helping, gaze following, and communicative
pointing.Children's performance in these tasks was mostly
similar across cultural settings. In a second group of
studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's skills in
participating in interactive episodes of collaboration and
joint attention.Again in these studies the general finding
was one of cross-cultural similarity. In a final pair of
studies, we assessed 2- to 3-year-old children's skills
within two symbolic systems (pretense and pictorial). Here
we found that the Canadian children who had much more
experience with such symbols showed skills at an earlier
age.Our overall conclusion is that young children in all
cultural settings get sufficient amounts of the right kinds
of social experience to develop their most basic
social-cognitive skills for interacting with others and
participating in culture at around the same age. In
contrast, children's acquisition of more culturally specific
skills for use in practices involving artifacts and symbols
is more dependent on specific learning experiences.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00603.x},
Key = {fds351735}
}
@article{fds351737,
Author = {Stumper, B and Bannard, C and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {"Frequent frames" in German child-directed speech: a limited
cue to grammatical categories.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {35},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1190-1205},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01187.x},
Abstract = {Mintz (2003) found that in English child-directed speech,
frequently occurring frames formed by linking the preceding
(A) and succeeding (B) word (A_x_B) could accurately predict
the syntactic category of the intervening word (x). This has
been successfully extended to French (Chemla, Mintz, Bernal,
& Christophe, 2009). In this paper, we show that, as for
Dutch (Erkelens, 2009), frequent frames in German do not
enable such accurate lexical categorization. This can be
explained by the characteristics of German including a less
restricted word order compared to English or French and the
frequent use of some forms as both determiner and pronoun in
colloquial German. Finally, we explore the relationship
between the accuracy of frames and their potential utility
and find that even some of those frames showing high
token-based accuracy are of limited value because they are
in fact set phrases with little or no variability in the
slot position.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01187.x},
Key = {fds351737}
}
@article{fds351736,
Author = {Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Greenberg, JR and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Collaboration encourages equal sharing in children but not
in chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {476},
Number = {7360},
Pages = {328-331},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature10278},
Abstract = {Humans actively share resources with one another to a much
greater degree than do other great apes, and much human
sharing is governed by social norms of fairness and equity.
When in receipt of a windfall of resources, human children
begin showing tendencies towards equitable distribution with
others at five to seven years of age. Arguably, however, the
primordial situation for human sharing of resources is that
which follows cooperative activities such as collaborative
foraging, when several individuals must share the spoils of
their joint efforts. Here we show that children of around
three years of age share with others much more equitably in
collaborative activities than they do in either windfall or
parallel-work situations. By contrast, one of humans' two
nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),
'share' (make food available to another individual) just as
often whether they have collaborated with them or not. This
species difference raises the possibility that humans'
tendency to distribute resources equitably may have its
evolutionary roots in the sharing of spoils after
collaborative efforts.},
Doi = {10.1038/nature10278},
Key = {fds351736}
}
@article{fds351738,
Author = {Krajewski, G and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {How polish children switch from one case to another when
using novel nouns: Challenges for models of inflectional
morphology},
Journal = {Language and Cognitive Processes},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4-6},
Pages = {830-861},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01690965.2010.506062},
Abstract = {The two main models of children's acquisition of
inflectional morphology-the Dual-Mechanism approach and the
usage-based (schema-based) approach-have both been applied
mainly to languages with fairly simple morphological
systems. Here we report two studies of 2-3-year-old Polish
children's ability to generalise across case-inflectional
endings on nouns. In the first study, we found that the
morphological form in which children first encounter a noun
in Polish has a strong effect on their ability to produce
other forms of that same noun. In the second study, we found
that this effect is different depending on the target form
to which children are switching. Similarity between
inflectional endings played a crucial role in facilitating
the task, whereas the simple frequency of either source or
target forms was not a decisive factor in either study.
These findings undermine Dual-Mechanism models that posit
all-ornone acquisition of abstract morphological rules, and
they also present serious challenges for usage-based models,
in which frequency typically plays a key role. © 2010
Psychology Press.},
Doi = {10.1080/01690965.2010.506062},
Key = {fds351738}
}
@article{fds351739,
Author = {Grünloh, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {German children use prosody to identify participant roles in
transitive sentences},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {393-419},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2011.015},
Abstract = {Most studies examining children's understanding of
transitive sentences focus on the morphosyntactic properties
of the construction and ignore prosody. But adults use
prosody in many different ways to interpret ambiguous
sentences. In two studies we investigated whether 5-year-old
German children use prosody to determine participant roles
in object-first (OVS) sentences with novel verbs (i.e.,
whether they use prosodic marking to overrule word order as
a cue). Results showed that children identify participant
roles better in this atypically ordered construction when
sentences are realized with the marked, OVS-typical
intonational pattern, especially in combination with case
marking (Study 1). In a second study, we embedded these
sentences into an appropriate discourse context. The results
show that, even in the absence of any case marking, children
understand participant roles when they are realized with the
appropriate intonational pattern. These findings demonstrate
that young children can use intonation to help identify
participant roles in transitive sentences, at least in
marked constructions such as the German object-first (OVS)
construction. © 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG,
Berlin/New York.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2011.015},
Key = {fds351739}
}
@article{fds351740,
Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Social Engagement Leads 2-Year-Olds to Overestimate Others'
Knowledge},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {248-265},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2010.00044.x},
Abstract = {Previous research has found that young children recognize an
adult as being acquainted with an object most readily when
the child and adult have previously engaged socially with
that object together. In the current study, we tested the
hypothesis that such social engagement is so powerful that
it can sometimes lead children to overestimate what has been
shared. After having shared two objects with an adult in
turn, 2-year-old children played with a third object the
adult could not see. In three out of four conditions, the
adult remained co-present and/or communicated to the child
while she played with the third object. Children falsely
perceived the adult as being acquainted with the third
object when she remained co-present (whether or not she also
communicated) but not when she clearly terminated the
interaction by disengaging and leaving. These results
suggest that when young children are engaged with a
co-present person they tend to overestimate the other's
knowledge. © International Society on Infant Studies
(ISIS).},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2010.00044.x},
Key = {fds351740}
}
@article{fds351741,
Author = {Schmidt, MFH and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children attribute normativity to novel actions
without pedagogy or normative language.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {530-539},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.x},
Abstract = {Young children interpret some acts performed by adults as
normatively governed, that is, as capable of being performed
either rightly or wrongly. In previous experiments, children
have made this interpretation when adults introduced them to
novel acts with normative language (e.g. 'this is the way it
goes'), along with pedagogical cues signaling culturally
important information, and with social-pragmatic marking
that this action is a token of a familiar type. In the
current experiment, we exposed children to novel actions
with no normative language, and we systematically varied
pedagogical and social-pragmatic cues in an attempt to
identify which of them, if either, would lead children to
normative interpretations. We found that young 3-year-old
children inferred normativity without any normative language
and without any pedagogical cues. The only cue they used was
adult social-pragmatic marking of the action as familiar, as
if it were a token of a well-known type (as opposed to
performing it, as if inventing it on the spot). These
results suggest that - in the absence of explicit normative
language - young children interpret adult actions as
normatively governed based mainly on the intentionality
(perhaps signaling conventionality) with which they are
performed.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.x},
Key = {fds351741}
}
@article{fds366596,
Author = {Brandt, S and Verhagen, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {German children's productivity with simple transitive and
complement-clause constructions: Testing the effects of
frequency and variability},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {325-357},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2011.013},
Abstract = {The development of abstract schemas and productive rules in
language is affected by both token and type frequencies.
High token frequencies and surface similarities help to
discover formal and functional commonalities between
utterances and categorize them as instances of the same
schema. High type frequencies and diversity help to develop
slots in these schemas, which allow the production and
comprehension of novel utterances. In the current study we
looked at both token and type frequencies in two related
constructions in German child-directed speech: simple
transitive and complement-clause constructions. Both
constructions contain high frequency verbs, which
potentially support the development of verb-specific
schemas. However, only the frequent verbs in the transitive
constructions occur with a variety of subject types, which
also supports the development of a slot in the subject
position. We then used an elicited production task to
compare 4- and 5-year-old German-speaking children's
productivity with simple transitive constructions and
complement-clause constructions. The children were prompted
to change the subjects of high and low frequency simple
transitive verbs, such as essen 'eat' and naschen 'nibble',
mental-state complement-taking verbs, such as denken 'think'
and vermuten 'presume', and communication complement-taking
verbs, such as sagen 'say' and berichten 'report'. In
accordance with earlier findings, children had less
difficulty producing new utterances with high frequency
transitive verbs than with low frequency transitive verbs.
For the other verb classes, however, we found either reverse
frequency effects or no frequency effects. For these verb
classes, children's productivity can be determined by
diversity rather than simple token frequency. We discuss how
token frequency interacts with diversity, discourse
function, semantic complexity, and syntactic complexity. ©
2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New
York.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2011.013},
Key = {fds366596}
}
@article{fds351742,
Author = {Jorschick, L and Endesfelder Quick and A and Glässer, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {German-English-speaking children's mixed NPs with 'correct'
agreement},
Journal = {Bilingualism},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {173-183},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1366728910000131},
Abstract = {Previous research has reported that bilingual children
sometimes produce mixed noun phrases with 'correct' gender
agreement- A s in der dog (der being a masculine determiner
in German and the German word for dog, hund, being masculine
as well). However, these could obviously be due to chance or
to the indiscriminate use of a default determiner. In the
current study, we established with high statistical
reliability that each of three German-English bilingual
children, of 2-4 years of age, produced such mixed NPs with
'correct' agreement at significantly greater than chance
levels. Also noteworthy was the fact that all three children
produced such NPs with German determiners and English nouns
much more frequently than the reverse. These findings
provide a solid statistical foundation for further studies
into the phenomenon of mixed noun phrases with 'correct'
gender agreement.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1366728910000131},
Key = {fds351742}
}
@article{fds351743,
Author = {Vaish, A and Missana, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral
transgressions.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {29},
Number = {Pt 1},
Pages = {124-130},
Year = {2011},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151010x532888},
Abstract = {We investigated children's moral behaviour in situations in
which a third party was harmed (the test case for possession
of agent-neutral moral norms). A 3-year-old and two puppets
each created a picture or clay sculpture, after which one
puppet left the room. In the Harm condition, the remaining
(actor) puppet then destroyed the absent (recipient)
puppet's picture or sculpture. In a Control condition, the
actor acted similarly but in a way that did not harm the
recipient. Children protested during the actor's actions,
and, upon the recipient's return, tattled on the actor and
behaved prosocially towards the recipient more in the Harm
than in the Control condition. This is the first study to
show that children as young as 3 years of age actively
intervene in third-party moral transgressions.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151010x532888},
Key = {fds351743}
}
@article{fds351744,
Author = {Schmelz, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees know that others make inferences.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {108},
Number = {7},
Pages = {3077-3079},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1000469108},
Abstract = {If chimpanzees are faced with two opaque boards on a table,
in the context of searching for a single piece of food, they
do not choose the board lying flat (because if food was
under there it would not be lying flat) but, rather, they
choose the slanted one- presumably inferring that some
unperceived food underneath is causing the slant. Here we
demonstrate that chimpanzees know that other chimpanzees in
the same situation will make a similar inference. In a
back-and-forth foraging game, when their competitor had
chosen before them, chimpanzees tended to avoid the slanted
board on the assumption that the competitor had already
chosen it. Chimpanzees can determine the inferences that a
conspecific is likely to make and then adjust their
competitive strategies accordingly.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1000469108},
Key = {fds351744}
}
@article{fds351745,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Nitzschner, M and Wobber, V and Tennie, C and Bräuer,
J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do dogs distinguish rational from irrational
acts?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {81},
Number = {1},
Pages = {195-203},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.10.001},
Abstract = {Range et al. (2007, Current Biology, 17, 868-872) found that
dogs, Canis familiaris, copy others' means to achieve a goal
more often when those means are the rational solution to a
problem than when they are irrational. In our first
experiment, we added a further control condition and failed
to replicate this result, suggesting that dogs in the
previous study may have been distracted in the irrational
condition rather than selectively attending to the
irrational nature of the action. In a second experiment, the
demonstrator used an unusual means (an extended leg) to
communicate the location of food, either rationally (her
hands were occupied) or irrationally (she could have used
her hand). Dogs succeeded in finding the food irrespective
of whether the leg action was rational or irrational. Our
results suggest that dogs do not distinguish rational from
irrational acts, instead simply being proficient at
monitoring human behavioural patterns. © 2010 The
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.10.001},
Key = {fds351745}
}
@article{fds351746,
Author = {Melis, AP and Warneken, F and Jensen, K and Schneider, AC and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain food and non-food
items},
Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences},
Volume = {278},
Number = {1710},
Pages = {1405-1413},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1735},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) sometimes help both humans and
conspecifics in experimental situations in which immediate
selfish benefits can be ruled out. However, in several
experiments, chimpanzees have not provided food to a
conspecific even when it would cost them nothing, leading to
the hypothesis that prosociality in the food-provisioning
context is a derived trait in humans. Here, we show that
chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain both food and non-food
items-given that the donor cannot get the food herself.
Furthermore, we show that the key factor eliciting
chimpanzees' targeted helping is the recipients' attempts to
either get the food or get the attention of the potential
donor. The current findings add to the accumulating body of
evidence that humans and chimpanzees share the motivation
and skills necessary to help others in situations in which
they cannot selfishly benefit. Humans, however, show
prosocial motives more readily and in a wider range of
contexts. © 2010 The Royal Society.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2010.1735},
Key = {fds351746}
}
@article{fds351747,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Individual differences in social, cognitive, and
morphological aspects of infant pointing},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {16-29},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2010.10.001},
Abstract = {Little is known about the origins of the pointing gesture.
We sought to gain insight into its emergence by
investigating individual differences in the pointing of
12-month-old infants in two ways. First, we looked at
differences in the communicative and interactional uses of
pointing and asked how different hand shapes relate to point
frequency, accompanying vocalizations, and mothers'
pointing. Second, we looked at differences in
social-cognitive skills of point comprehension and imitation
and tested whether these were related to infants' own
pointing. Infants' and mothers' spontaneous pointing
correlated with one another, as did infants' point
production and comprehension. In particular, infants'
index-finger pointing had a profile different from simple
whole-hand pointing. It was more frequent, it was more often
accompanied by vocalizations, and it correlated more
strongly with comprehension of pointing (especially to
occluded referents). We conclude that whole-hand and
index-finger pointing differ qualitatively and suggest that
it is index-finger pointing that first embodies infants'
understanding of communicative intentions. © 2011 Elsevier
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2010.10.001},
Key = {fds351747}
}
@article{fds351749,
Author = {Warneken, F and Lohse, K and Melis, AP and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children share the spoils after collaboration},
Journal = {Psychological Science},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {267-273},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610395392},
Abstract = {Egalitarian behavior is considered to be a species-typical
component of human cooperation. Human adults tend to share
resources equally, even if they have the opportunity to keep
a larger portion for themselves. Recent experiments have
suggested that this tendency emerges fairly late in human
ontogeny, not before 6 or 7 years of age. Here we show that
3-year-old children share mostly equally with a peer after
they have worked together actively to obtain rewards in a
collaboration task, even when those rewards could easily be
monopolized. These findings contrast with previous findings
from a similar experiment with chimpanzees, who tended to
monopolize resources whenever they could. The potentially
species-unique tendency of humans to share equally emerges
early in ontogeny, perhaps originating in collaborative
interactions among peers. © The Author(s)
2011.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797610395392},
Key = {fds351749}
}
@article{fds351750,
Author = {Scheider, L and Grassmann, S and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs use contextual information and tone of voice
when following a human pointing gesture.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {6},
Number = {7},
Pages = {e21676},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021676},
Abstract = {Domestic dogs are skillful at using the human pointing
gesture. In this study we investigated whether dogs take
contextual information into account when following pointing
gestures, specifically, whether they follow human pointing
gestures more readily in the context in which food has been
found previously. Also varied was the human's tone of voice
as either imperative or informative. Dogs were more
sustained in their searching behavior in the 'context'
condition as opposed to the 'no context' condition,
suggesting that they do not simply follow a pointing gesture
blindly but use previously acquired contextual information
to inform their interpretation of that pointing gesture.
Dogs also showed more sustained searching behavior when
there was pointing than when there was not, suggesting that
they expect to find a referent when they see a human point.
Finally, dogs searched more in high-pitched informative
trials as opposed to the low-pitched imperative trials,
whereas in the latter dogs seemed more inclined to respond
by sitting. These findings suggest that a dog's response to
a pointing gesture is flexible and depends on the context as
well as the human's tone of voice.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0021676},
Key = {fds351750}
}
@article{fds351751,
Author = {Bullinger, AF and Zimmermann, F and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Different social motives in the gestural communication of
chimpanzees and human children.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {58-68},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00952.x},
Abstract = {Both chimpanzees and human infants use the pointing gesture
with human adults, but it is not clear if they are doing so
for the same social motives. In two studies, we presented
chimpanzees and human 25-month-olds with the opportunity to
point for a hidden tool (in the presence of a non-functional
distractor). In one condition it was clear that the tool
would be used to retrieve a reward for the pointing subject
(so the pointing was selfish or 'for-me'), whereas in the
other condition it was clear that the tool would be used to
retrieve the reward for the experimenter (so the pointing
was helpful or 'for-you'). The chimpanzees pointed reliably
only when they themselves benefited, whereas the human
children pointed reliably no matter who benefited. These
results are interpreted as evidence for the especially
cooperative nature of human communication.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00952.x},
Key = {fds351751}
}
@misc{fds320796,
Author = {Wobber, V and Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Wrangham, R and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Species differences in the rate of cognitive ontogeny among
humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos},
Journal = {AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY},
Volume = {144},
Pages = {313-314},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds320796}
}
@misc{fds351752,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Human Culture in Evolutionary Perspective},
Volume = {1},
Booktitle = {Advances in Culture and Psychology},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780195380392},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380392.003.0001},
Abstract = {Many animal species live in complex social groups, some of
whom transmit information across generations "culturally".
Humans' uniquely cultural way of life began with this kind
of social organization but then acquired novel
characteristics as a result of biological adaptations for
interacting with other persons in species-unique forms of
cooperative activity, including collaborative
problem-solving, cooperative communication, and instructed
learning. These more cooperative, cultural ways of doing
things have as their psychological foundation various skills
and motivations for shared intentionality.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380392.003.0001},
Key = {fds351752}
}
@article{fds351753,
Author = {Grosse, G and Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {21-Month-olds understand the cooperative logic of
requests},
Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics},
Volume = {42},
Number = {12},
Pages = {3377-3383},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.05.005},
Abstract = {Human communication rests on a basic assumption of partner
cooperativeness, including even requesting. In the current
study, an adult made an ambiguous request for an object to
21-month-old infants, with one potential referent being
right in front of her and the other being across the room.
In a normal situation (Hands-Free), infants interpreted the
request as referring to the distant object-the one the adult
needed help fetching. In contrast, in a situation in which
the adult was constrained so that fetching either object
herself would be difficult (Hands-Occupied), infants
selected the far object much less often. These results
suggest that infants just beginning to acquire language
already understand something of the cooperative logic of
requests. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2010.05.005},
Key = {fds351753}
}
@article{fds351754,
Author = {Greenberg, JR and Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzee helping in collaborative and noncollaborative
contexts},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {80},
Number = {5},
Pages = {873-880},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.008},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, help others in a variety of
contexts. Some researchers have claimed that this only
occurs when food is not involved and the recipient actively
solicits help. In the current study, however, we found that
chimpanzees often helped conspecifics obtain food in a
pulling task with no solicitation whatsoever, in a situation
in which, based on past experience, the conspecific's desire
for the food was apparent. We also assessed whether the
collaborative context of the situation impacted helping
rates. Specifically, we compared how often both partners
obtained rewards when one partner needed the help of the
other, who had already received a reward for free (helping
without collaboration), and when one partner needed the
other's help after they had already begun collaborating
(helping during collaboration). Partners provided assistance
significantly more often in both of these helping conditions
than in a control condition in which partners could provide
unneeded help. However, unlike human children who have been
tested in a similar task, chimpanzees did not help their
partner more during (than without) collaboration. These
results suggest that chimpanzees' helping behaviour is more
robust than previously believed, but at the same time may
have different evolutionary roots from the helping behaviour
of humans. © 2010 The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.008},
Key = {fds351754}
}
@article{fds351755,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Prosodic stress on a word directs 24-month-olds' attention
to a contextually new referent},
Journal = {Journal of Pragmatics},
Volume = {42},
Number = {11},
Pages = {3098-3105},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.04.019},
Abstract = {From the very beginning of language acquisition, young
children are sensitive to what is given versus what is new
in their discourse with others. Here we ask whether
24-month-olds use this skill to interpret prosodic
highlighting as an invitation to focus their attention on
what is new in the situation. Using an eye-tracking
methodology, we compared children's visual fixation of
referents that were given versus those that were new in the
situation when the prosodic highlighting of their
corresponding word varied. Results showed that 24-month-old
children looked longer to the referents of prosodically
stressed words when those referents were new to the context.
Neither stress of the word alone nor newness of the referent
alone was sufficient to induce children to focus their
attention on the target referent. These results suggest that
from an early age children understand at least one important
communicative function of prosodic stress. © 2010 Elsevier
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.pragma.2010.04.019},
Key = {fds351755}
}
@article{fds351756,
Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children selectively avoid helping people with harmful
intentions.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {81},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1661-1669},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01500.x},
Abstract = {Two studies investigated whether young children are
selectively prosocial toward others, based on the others'
moral behaviors. In Study 1 (N = 54), 3-year-olds watched 1
adult (the actor) harming or helping another adult. Children
subsequently helped the harmful actor less often than a
third (previously neutral) adult, but helped the helpful and
neutral adults equally often. In Study 2 (N = 36),
3-year-olds helped an actor who intended but failed to harm
another adult less often than a neutral adult, but helped an
accidentally harmful and a neutral adult equally often.
Children's prosocial behavior was thus mediated by the
intentions behind the actor's moral behavior, irrespective
of outcome. Children thus selectively avoid helping those
who cause--or even intend to cause--others
harm.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01500.x},
Key = {fds351756}
}
@article{fds351757,
Author = {Grosse, G and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Infants communicate in order to be understood.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {46},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1710-1722},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020727},
Abstract = {Infants intentionally communicate with others from before
their 1st birthday. But there is some question about how
they understand the communicative process. Do they
understand that for their request to work the recipient must
both understand the request and be cooperatively disposed to
fulfill it? On the basis of the study by Shwe and Markman
(1997), we developed a new paradigm that tested whether and
how 18-, 24-, and 30-month-old children repair a failed
request. Children at all ages repaired their requests in the
case of a misunderstanding even if they had obtained the
requested object already. They also repaired differently
depending on the precise reason for the communicative
failure (e.g., misunderstanding the referent versus the
communicative intent) and did not repair in the case of
correct understanding, even if they did not get the
requested object. Thus, from very early in their
communicative careers, young children operate with a basic
understanding of the mental and cooperative nature of human
communication.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0020727},
Key = {fds351757}
}
@article{fds351758,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Hamann, K and Warneken, F and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Bigger knows better: young children selectively learn rule
games from adults rather than from peers.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {Pt 4},
Pages = {785-798},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151009x479178},
Abstract = {Preschoolers' selective learning from adult versus peer
models was investigated. Extending previous research,
children from age 3 were shown to selectively learn simple
rule games from adult rather than peer models. Furthermore,
this selective learning was not confined to preferentially
performing certain acts oneself, but more specifically had a
normative dimension to it: children understood the way the
adult demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as
the normatively appropriate/correct one. This was indicated
in their spontaneous normative interventions (protest,
critique, etc.) in response to third party acts deviating
from the one demonstrated by the adult model. Various
interpretations of these findings are discussed in the
broader context of the development of children's social
cognition and cultural learning.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151009x479178},
Key = {fds351758}
}
@article{fds351759,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Infant cognition},
Journal = {Current Biology},
Volume = {20},
Number = {20},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.001},
Abstract = {Until fairly recently, young infants were thought to be as
cognitively incompetent as they were morally innocent. They
were epistemological 'tabulae rasae', helpless 'bundles of
reflexes' who spent all of their time sleeping, crying and
sucking. In the famous words of William James, infants lived
in "one great blooming, buzzing confusion". © 2010 Elsevier
Ltd. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.001},
Key = {fds351759}
}
@article{fds351761,
Author = {Liebal, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Infants' use of shared experience in declarative
pointing},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {5},
Pages = {545-556},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00028.x},
Abstract = {In this study, we asked whether 14- and 18-month-old infants
use the experiences they have previously shared with others
when deciding what to point to for them declaratively. After
sharing a particular type of referent with an adult in an
excited manner, 18-month-olds subsequently found a picture
of that type of referent more worthy of declarative pointing
than some other picture-but only for that adult, not for a
different adult. Mixed results were found with
14-month-olds. We thus show that by 18 months, infants
accurately track their shared experiences with specific
individuals and use this to make communicative decisions.
These results also demonstrate that infants sometimes use
declarative pointing to indicate not totally "new" things,
as in the classic formulation, but things which are "old" in
the sense that "we" should recognize them as similar to
something we have previously shared. © International
Society on Infant Studies (ISIS).},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00028.x},
Key = {fds351761}
}
@article{fds351762,
Author = {Kirschner Sebastian and S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint music making promotes prosocial behavior in 4-year-old
children},
Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
Volume = {31},
Number = {5},
Pages = {354-364},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004},
Abstract = {Humansw are the only primates that make music. But the
evolutionary origins and functions of music are unclear.
Given that in traditional cultures music making and dancing
are often integral parts of important group ceremonies such
as initiation rites, weddings or preparations for battle,
one hypothesis is that music evolved into a tool that
fosters social bonding and group cohesion, ultimately
increasing prosocial in-group behavior and cooperation. Here
we provide support for this hypothesis by showing that joint
music making among 4-year-old children increases subsequent
spontaneous cooperative and helpful behavior, relative to a
carefully matched control condition with the same level of
social and linguistic interaction but no music. Among other
functional mechanisms, we propose that music making,
including joint singing and dancing, encourages the
participants to keep a constant audiovisual representation
of the collective intention and shared goal of vocalizing
and moving together in time - thereby effectively satisfying
the intrinsic human desire to share emotions, experiences
and activities with others. © 2010 Elsevier
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004},
Key = {fds351762}
}
@article{fds351763,
Author = {Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Development ofword order in german complement-clause
constructions: Effects of input frequencies, lexical items,
and discourse function},
Journal = {Language},
Volume = {86},
Number = {3},
Pages = {583-610},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2010.0010},
Abstract = {We investigate the development of word order in German
children's spontaneous production of complement clauses.
From soon after their second birthday, young German children
use both verb-final complements with complementizers and
verb-second complements without complementizers. By their
third birthday they use both kinds of complement clauses
with a variety of complement-taking verbs. Early in
development, however, verb-final complements and verbsecond
complements are used with separate sets of complement-taking
verbs, and they are used with separate sets of item-specific
main-clause phrases. For example, initially phrases such as
'I want to see' were used exclusively with verb-final
complements, whereas phrases such as 'do you see' and 'you
have to say' were used exclusively with verb-second
complements. Only later in development-when specific
complement-taking verbs were used with both verb-second and
verbfinal complements, with a greater variety of main-clause
phrases, and when specific main-clause phrases were used
with both verb-second and verb-final complements-was there
evidence for structural links between these various,
item-based, complement-clause constructions.},
Doi = {10.1353/lan.2010.0010},
Key = {fds351763}
}
@misc{fds351760,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {What Chimpanzees Know about Seeing, Revisited: An
Explanation of the Third Kind},
Booktitle = {Joint Attention Communication and Other Minds: Issues in
Philosophy and Psychology},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780199245635},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0003},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees follow the gaze of conspecifics and humans
-follow it past distractors and behind barriers, 'check
back' with humans when gaze following does not yield
interesting sights, use gestures appropriately depending on
the visual access of their recipient, and select different
pieces of food depending on whether their competitor has
visual access to them. Taken together, these findings make a
strong case for the hypothesis that chimpanzees have some
understanding of what other individuals can and cannot see.
However, chimpanzees do not seem nearly so skillful in the
Gesture Choice and Object Choice experimental paradigms.
Neither behavioral conditioning nor theory of mind
explanations can account for these results satisfactorily.
Instead this chapter proposes the idea that chimpanzees have
the cognitive skills to recall, represent, categorize, and
reason about the behavior and perception of others, but not
their intentional or mental states, because they do not know
that others have such states since they cannot make a link
to their own. Human beings began their own evolutionary
trajectory with these same skills, but then at some point in
their evolution (probably quite recently) they began to
understand that their own experience could serve as some
kind of model for that of other persons. This allowed for
even better prediction and control of the behavior of others
and better communication and cooperation with them as well,
and so it was an adaptation with immediate adaptive
consequences that ensured its survival.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0003},
Key = {fds351760}
}
@article{fds320798,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Differences in the cognitive skills of bonobos and
chimpanzees.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {5},
Number = {8},
Pages = {e12438},
Year = {2010},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012438},
Abstract = {While bonobos and chimpanzees are both genetically and
behaviorally very similar, they also differ in significant
ways. Bonobos are more cautious and socially tolerant while
chimpanzees are more dependent on extractive foraging, which
requires tools. The similarities suggest the two species
should be cognitively similar while the behavioral
differences predict where the two species should differ
cognitively. We compared both species on a wide range of
cognitive problems testing their understanding of the
physical and social world. Bonobos were more skilled at
solving tasks related to theory of mind or an understanding
of social causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at
tasks requiring the use of tools and an understanding of
physical causality. These species differences support the
role of ecological and socio-ecological pressures in shaping
cognitive skills over relatively short periods of
evolutionary time.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0012438},
Key = {fds320798}
}
@misc{fds351764,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Language Development},
Pages = {239-257},
Booktitle = {The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive
Development, Second edition},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781405191166},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444325485.ch9},
Doi = {10.1002/9781444325485.ch9},
Key = {fds351764}
}
@article{fds351765,
Author = {Seed, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Primate cognition.},
Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {407-419},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01099.x},
Abstract = {As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of
animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about
primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years.
Building on the recognition that the physical and social
worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose
many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of
research have established that the most basic cognitive
skills and mental representations that humans use to
navigate those worlds are already possessed by other
primates. There may be differences between humans and other
primates, however, in more complex cognitive skills, such as
reasoning about relations, causality, time, and other minds.
Of special importance, the human primate seems to possess a
species-unique set of adaptations for "cultural
intelligence," which are broad reaching in their effects on
human cognition.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01099.x},
Key = {fds351765}
}
@article{fds351766,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {What's in a manner of speaking? Children's sensitivity to
partner-specific referential precedents.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {749-760},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019657},
Abstract = {Do young children form "referential pacts"? If a person has
referred to an object with a certain term (e.g., the horse),
will children expect this person to use this term in the
future but allow others to use a different expression (e.g.,
the pony)? One hundred twenty-eight children between 3 and 5
years old co-operated with an experimenter (E1) to move toys
to new locations on a shelf. E1 established referential
terms for all toys in a warm-up game. Then, either the
original partner, E1, or a new partner, E2, played a second
game with the same toys. In this game, the experimenters
referred to toys using either their original terms from the
warm-up game or new terms. Children were slower to react to
new terms than old, and this difference in reaction times
was greater in the original partner condition (but only on
the first trial). Children sometimes protested at the use of
new terms, doing so regardless of their interlocutor's
identity. We contrast these findings with those for adults
and discuss their implications for the debate regarding the
nature of referential pacts.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0019657},
Key = {fds351766}
}
@article{fds351767,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Herrmann, E},
Title = {Ape and human cognition: What's the difference?},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-8},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721409359300},
Abstract = {Humans share the vast majority of their cognitive skills
with other great apes. In addition, however, humans have
also evolved a unique suite of cognitive skills and
motivations-collectively referred to as shared
intentionality-for living collaboratively, learning
socially, and exchanging information in cultural groups. ©
The Author(s) 2010.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721409359300},
Key = {fds351767}
}
@article{fds351768,
Author = {Melis, AP and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {36-month-olds conceal visual and auditory information from
others.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {479-489},
Year = {2010},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00892.x},
Abstract = {By three years of age, children are skilled at assessing
under which circumstances others can see things. However,
nothing is known about whether they can use this knowledge
to guide their own deceptive behaviour. Here we investigated
3-year-olds' ability to strategically inhibit or conceal
forbidden actions that a nearby adult experimenter could see
or hear. In the first experiment, children were more likely
to disobey the adult when she did not have visual access to
their activities than they were when she was looking at
them. In the second experiment, in which the adult could
never see the child, children refrained from making noise
when engaging in a prohibited action that the adult might
hear. These results suggest that by three years of age
children use their knowledge of others' perceptual states to
decide whether it is safe to commit a transgression and,
moreover, actively conceal perceptual cues that could reveal
to others their ongoing transgression.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00892.x},
Key = {fds351768}
}
@article{fds351779,
Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Evidence for emulation in chimpanzees in social settings
using the floating peanut task.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {5},
Number = {5},
Pages = {e10544},
Year = {2010},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010544},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>It is still unclear which observational
learning mechanisms underlie the transmission of difficult
problem-solving skills in chimpanzees. In particular, two
different mechanisms have been proposed: imitation and
emulation. Previous studies have largely failed to control
for social factors when these mechanisms were
targeted.<h4>Methods</h4>In an attempt to resolve the
existing discrepancies, we adopted the 'floating peanut
task', in which subjects need to spit water into a tube
until it is sufficiently full for floating peanuts to be
grasped. In a previous study only a few chimpanzees were
able to invent the necessary solution (and they either did
so in their first trials or never). Here we compared success
levels in baseline tests with two experimental conditions
that followed: 1) A full model condition to test whether
social demonstrations would be effective, and 2) A social
emulation control condition, in which a human experimenter
poured water from a bottle into the tube, to test whether
results information alone (present in both experimental
conditions) would also induce successes. Crucially, we
controlled for social factors in both experimental
conditions. Both types of demonstrations significantly
increased successful spitting, with no differences between
demonstration types. We also found that younger subjects
were more likely to succeed than older ones. Our analysis
showed that mere order effects could not explain our
results.<h4>Conclusion</h4>The full demonstration condition
(which potentially offers additional information to
observers, in the form of actions), induced no more
successes than the emulation condition. Hence, emulation
learning could explain the success in both conditions. This
finding has broad implications for the interpretation of
chimpanzee traditions, for which emulation learning may
perhaps suffice.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0010544},
Key = {fds351779}
}
@misc{fds351769,
Author = {Golinkoff, RM and Hirsh-Pasek, K and Bloom, L and Smith, LB and Woodward, AL and Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M and Hollich,
G},
Title = {Counterpoint commentary},
Booktitle = {Becoming a Word Learner: A Debate on Lexical
Acquisition},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780195130324},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.007},
Abstract = {This chapter contains the authors' reactions to the previous
chapters and stresses the similarities and differences
between these theoretical views. It discusses that part of
the debate concerns whether the first words are more like
the indexical signs of most nonhumans or like the symbols of
the human 4-year-old. It argues that although there are
marked contrasts between the views, the work of all the
authors focuses on a central issue: an understanding of how
infants break the language barrier by learning
words.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.007},
Key = {fds351769}
}
@misc{fds351770,
Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Social Nature of Words and Word Learning},
Booktitle = {Becoming a Word Learner: A Debate on Lexical
Acquisition},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780195130324},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.005},
Abstract = {This chapter describes research findings from the
social-pragmatic approach. It discusses that Nameera Akhtar
and Michael Tomasello's dramatic findings demonstrate how
word learning occurs in some fairly complex, nonostensive
situations amid the flow of social interaction. It states
that current models of word learning, as suggested by Akhtar
and Tomasello, undervalue the role of social interaction. It
explains that because language has social goals as its
ultimate purpose, social interactions are the outcome of
word learning.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130324.003.005},
Key = {fds351770}
}
@misc{fds351771,
Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Are Nouns Easier to Learn Than Verbs? Three Experimental
Studies},
Booktitle = {Action Meets Word: How Children Learn Verbs},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780195170009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170009.003.0013},
Abstract = {A current controversy in the study of word learning is
whether it is conceptually easier to learn nouns as compared
to verbs early in development. This chapter describes three
experiments which address the noun-verb question in
different ways. In the first experiment, researchers asked
how many times (and on how many days) does a 2-yearold need
to hear a word to be able to learn it, and does this differ
for nouns and verbs? This second study investigates
whether-when nouns and verbs are presented in comparable
sentence contexts, controlling the number of exposures, and
presenting a dynamic event in both the noun and verb
conditions-nouns are easier to learn than are verbs. In
Study 3, researchers compared children's ability to learn
intransitive and transitive verbs and their ability to
understand verbs for self-action as opposed to other action,
to determine whether some of these verb and referent types
are learned more quickly than are others.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170009.003.0013},
Key = {fds351771}
}
@article{fds351772,
Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The influence of frequency and semantic similarity on how
children learn grammar},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-101},
Year = {2010},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723709350525},
Abstract = {Lexically based learning and semantic analogy may both play
a role in the learning of grammar. To investigate this,
5-year-old German children were trained on a miniature
language (nominally English) involving two grammatical
constructions, each of which was associated with a different
semantic verb class. Training was followed by elicited
production and grammaticality judgement tests with trained
verbs and a generalization test, involving untrained verbs.
In the trained verbs judgement test the children were above
chance at associating particular verbs with the
constructions in which they had heard them. They did this
significantly more often with verbs which they had heard
especially frequently in particular constructions,
indicating lexically based learning. There was also an
interaction between frequency and semantic class (or the
particular verbs). In the generalization judgement test the
children were at chance overall. In the elicited production
generalization test 75% of the children used the same
construction for all items.},
Doi = {10.1177/0142723709350525},
Key = {fds351772}
}
@article{fds320799,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Call, J and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The structure of individual differences in the cognitive
abilities of children and chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {102-110},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797609356511},
Abstract = {Most studies of animal cognition focus on group performance
and neglect individual differences and the correlational
structure of cognitive abilities. Moreover, no previous
studies have compared the correlational structure of
cognitive abilities in nonhuman animals and humans. We
compared the structure of individual differences of 106
chimpanzees and 105 two-year-old human children using 15
cognitive tasks that posed problems about the physical or
social world. We found a similar factor of spatial cognition
for the two species. But whereas the chimpanzees had only a
single factor in addition to spatial cognition, the children
had two distinct additional factors: one for physical
cognition and one for social cognition. These findings, in
combination with previous research, support the proposal
that humans share many cognitive skills with nonhuman apes,
especially for dealing with the physical world, but in
addition have evolved some specialized skills of social
cognition.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797609356511},
Key = {fds320799}
}
@article{fds351748,
Author = {Ibbotson, P and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The role of pronoun frames in early comprehension of
transitive constructions in English},
Journal = {Language Learning and Development},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {24-39},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441003732914},
Abstract = {Case marking in English in available only on some pronouns
and only in some cases. It is unknown whether young children
acquiring English nevertheless make use of this highly
restricted marking as a cue to sentence interpretation. The
current study therefore examined how 2- and 3-year-old
English children use case-marked pronoun frames and
constructional word order cues (actives versus passives) to
understand agent-patient relations in transitive sentences
containing novel verbs. In a pointing comprehension test,
2-year-olds used pronoun frames containing two case-marked
pronouns to help them interpret grammatical sentences, both
actives and passives, but they were unable to assign agent
patient relationships in any consistent way with
ungrammatical pronoun frames. Threeyear- olds also used
pronoun frames to interpret grammatical active and passive
sentences (with either one or two case-marked pronouns) but
varied in their interpretation of ungrammatical sentences
according to pronoun frame. These results suggest that the
role of case-marked pronouns has been underestimated in
English language acquisition, and that even very young
English children use multiple cues to comprehend transitive
sentences. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/15475441003732914},
Key = {fds351748}
}
@article{fds351775,
Author = {Kidd, E and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Lexical frequency and exemplar-based learning effects in
language acquisition: evidence from sentential
complements},
Journal = {Language Sciences},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {132-142},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2009.05.002},
Abstract = {Usage-based approaches to language acquisition argue that
children acquire the grammar of their target language using
general-cognitive learning principles. The current paper
reports on an experiment that tested a central assumption of
the usage-based approach: argument structure patterns are
connected to high frequency verbs that facilitate
acquisition. Sixty children (N = 60) aged 4- and 6-years
participated in a sentence recall/lexical priming experiment
that manipulated the frequency with which the target verbs
occurred in the finite sentential complement construction in
English. The results showed that the children performed
better on sentences that contained high frequency verbs.
Furthermore, the children's performance suggested that their
knowledge of finite sentential complements relies most
heavily on one particular verb - think, supporting arguments
made by Goldberg [Goldberg, A.E., 2006. Constructions at
Work: The Nature of Generalization in Language. Oxford
University Press, Oxford], who argued that skewed input
facilitates language learning. Crown Copyright ©
2009.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.langsci.2009.05.002},
Key = {fds351775}
}
@article{fds351776,
Author = {Salomo, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's sensitivity to new and given information
when answering predicate-focus questions},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {101-115},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S014271640999018X},
Abstract = {In two studies we investigated 2-year-old children's answers
to predicate-focus questions depending on the preceding
context. Children were presented with a successive series of
short video clips showing transitive actions (e.g., frog
washing duck) in which either the action (action-new) or the
patient (patient-new) was the changing, and therefore new,
element. During the last scene the experimenter asked the
question (e.g., What's the frog doing now?). We found that
children expressed the action and the patient in the
patient-new condition but expressed only the action in the
action-new condition. These results show that children are
sensitive to both the predicate-focus question and newness
in context. A further finding was that children expressed
new patients in their answers more often when there was a
verbal context prior to the questions than when there was
not. © 2009 Cambridge University Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S014271640999018X},
Key = {fds351776}
}
@article{fds351777,
Author = {Chan, A and Meints, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's comprehension of English SVO word order
revisited: Testing the same children in act-out and
intermodal preferential looking tasks},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {30-45},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.10.002},
Abstract = {Act-out and intermodal preferential looking (IPL) tasks were
administered to 67 English children aged 2-0, 2-9 and 3-5 to
assess their comprehension of canonical SVO transitive word
order with both familiar and novel verbs. Children at 3-5
and at 2-9 showed evidence of comprehending word order in
both verb conditions and both tasks, although children at
2-9 performed better with familiar than with novel verbs in
the act-out task. Children at 2-0 showed no evidence of
comprehending word order in either task with novel verbs;
with familiar verbs they showed competence in the IPL task
but not in the act-out task. The difference in performance
for familiar and novel verbs from the same children at 2-0,
on the IPL task, and at 2-9, on the act-out task, is
consistent with the hypothesis that early
linguistic/cognitive representations are graded in strength,
with early representations still weak and very task
dependent. However, these representations also become more
abstract with development, as indicated by the familiarity
effect even in the more sensitive IPL task. © 2009 Elsevier
Inc. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.10.002},
Key = {fds351777}
}
@article{fds351778,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children follow pointing over words in interpreting
acts of reference.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {252-263},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00871.x},
Abstract = {Adults refer young children's attention to things in two
basic ways: through the use of pointing (and other deictic
gestures) and words (and other linguistic conventions). In
the current studies, we referred young children (2- and
4-year-olds) to things in conflicting ways, that is, by
pointing to one object while indicating linguistically (in
some way) a different object. In Study 1, a novel word was
put into competition with a pointing gesture in a mutual
exclusivity paradigm; that is, with a known and a novel
object in front of the child, the adult pointed to the known
object (e.g. a cup) while simultaneously requesting 'the
modi'. In contrast to the findings of Jaswal and Hansen
(2006), children followed almost exclusively the pointing
gesture. In Study 2, when a known word was put into
competition with a pointing gesture - the adult pointed to
the novel object but requested 'the car'- children still
followed the pointing gesture. In Study 3, the referent of
the pointing gesture was doubly contradicted by the lexical
information - the adult pointed to a known object (e.g. a
cup) but requested 'the car'- in which case children
considered pointing and lexical information equally strong.
Together, these findings suggest that in disambiguating acts
of reference, young children at both 2 and 4 years of age
rely most heavily on pragmatic information (e.g. in a
pointing gesture), and only secondarily on lexical
conventions and principles.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00871.x},
Key = {fds351778}
}
@article{fds352505,
Author = {Whiten, A and McGrew, WC and Aiello, LC and Boesch, C and Boyd, R and Byrne, RW and Dunbar, RIM and Matsuzawa, T and Silk, JB and Tomasello,
M and van Schaik, CP and Wrangham, R},
Title = {Studying extant species to model our past.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {327},
Number = {5964},
Pages = {410},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.327.5964.410-a},
Doi = {10.1126/science.327.5964.410-a},
Key = {fds352505}
}
@misc{fds351773,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {On the Different Origins of Symbols and Grammar},
Booktitle = {Language Evolution},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199244843},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244843.003.0006},
Abstract = {This chapter emphasises the role of psychology in language
evolution, but claims that it was the separate evolution of
capacities for using symbols and grammar (that is, syntactic
structure) that distinguishes human communication from the
communication of other primates. It suggests that there was
no specific biological adaptation for linguistic
communication. Rather, there was an adaptation for a broader
kind of complex social cognition that enabled human culture
and, as a special case of that, human symbolic
communication. A crucial part of this adaptation was an
evolved ability to recognise other individuals as
intentional agents whose attention and behaviour could be
shared and manipulated. The capacity for grammar
subsequently developed, and became refined through processes
of grammaticalisation occurring across generations - but
with no additional biological adaptations. In support of
this perspective, psychological data from the study of
language development in young children and from comparisons
with the linguistic, social, and mental capacities of
nonhuman primates are presented. More generally, this
chapter sees the origin and emergence of language as merely
one part in the much larger process of the evolution of
human culture.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244843.003.0006},
Key = {fds351773}
}
@misc{fds351774,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Moll, H},
Title = {The gap is social: Human shared intentionality and
culture},
Pages = {331-349},
Booktitle = {Mind the Gap: Tracing the Origins of Human
Universals},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783642027246},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_16},
Abstract = {Human beings share many cognitive skills with their nearest
primate relatives, especially those for dealing with the
physical world of objects (and categories and quantities of
objects) in space and their causal interrelations. But
humans are, in addition, biologically adapted for cultural
life in ways that other primates are not. Specifically,
humans have evolved unique motivations and cognitive skills
for understanding other persons as cooperative agents with
whom one can share emotions, experience, and collaborative
actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and
skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of
age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in
various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional
activities. Participation in such activities leads humans to
construct during ontogeny, perspectival and dialogical
cognitive representations.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_16},
Key = {fds351774}
}
@article{fds320797,
Author = {Hare, B and Rosati, AG and Kaminski, J and Braeuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The domestication hypothesis for dogs' skills with human
communication: A response to Udell et al. (2008) and Wynne
et al. (2008)},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {79},
Number = {2},
Pages = {e1-e6},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.031},
Key = {fds320797}
}
@article{fds320800,
Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees coordinate in a negotiation game},
Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
Volume = {30},
Number = {6},
Pages = {381-392},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003},
Abstract = {A crucially important aspect of human cooperation is the
ability to negotiate to cooperative outcomes when interests
over resources conflict. Although chimpanzees and other
social species may negotiate conflicting interests regarding
travel direction or activity timing, very little is known
about their ability to negotiate conflicting preferences
over food. In the current study, we presented pairs of
chimpanzees with a choice between two cooperative tasks-one
with equal payoffs (e.g., 5-5) and one with unequal payoffs
(higher and lower than in the equal option, e.g., 10-1).
This created a conflict of interests between partners with
failure to work together on the same cooperative task
resulting in no payoff for either partner. The chimpanzee
pairs cooperated successfully in as many as 78-94% of the
trials across experiments. Even though dominant chimpanzees
preferred the unequal option (as they would obtain the
largest payoff), subordinate chimpanzees were able to get
their way (the equal option) in 22-56% of trials across
conditions. Various analyses showed that subjects were both
strategic and also cognizant of the strategies used by their
partners. These results demonstrate that one of our two
closest primate relatives, the chimpanzee, can settle
conflicts of interest over resources in mutually satisfying
ways-even without the social norms of equity, planned
strategies of reciprocity, and the complex communication
characteristic of human negotiation. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003},
Key = {fds320800}
}
@article{fds351780,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the
normative directions of fit of different speech
acts.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {113},
Number = {2},
Pages = {205-212},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.013},
Abstract = {Young children use and comprehend different kinds of speech
acts from the beginning of their communicative development.
But it is not clear how they understand the conventional and
normative structure of such speech acts. In particular,
imperative speech acts have a world-to-word direction of
fit, such that their fulfillment means that the world must
change to fit the word. In contrast, assertive speech acts
have a word-to-world direction of fit, such that their
fulfillment means that the word must fit the world truly. In
the current study, 3-year-olds understood this difference
explicitly, as they directed their criticisms selectively to
actors when they did not follow the imperatives of the
speaker, but to speakers when they did not describe an
actor's actions correctly. Two-year-olds criticized
appropriately in the case of imperatives, but showed a more
ambiguous pattern in the case of assertions. These findings
identify another domain in which children's normative
understanding of human activity emerges around the third
year of life.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.013},
Key = {fds351780}
}
@article{fds351781,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Tempelmann, S and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs comprehend human communication with iconic
signs.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {6},
Pages = {831-837},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00815.x},
Abstract = {A key skill in early human development is the ability to
comprehend communicative intentions as expressed in both
nonlinguistic gestures and language. In the current studies,
we confronted domestic dogs (some of whom knew many human
'words') with a task in which they had to infer the intended
referent of a human's communicative act via iconic
signs--specifically, replicas and photographs. Both trained
and untrained dogs successfully used iconic replicas to
fetch the desired item, with many doing so from the first
trial. Dogs' ability to use photographs in this same
situation was less consistent. Because simple matching to
sample in experimental contexts typically takes hundreds of
trials (and because similarity between iconic sign and
target item did not predict success), we propose that dogs'
skillful performance in the current task reflects important
aspects of the comprehension of human communicative
intentions.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00815.x},
Key = {fds351781}
}
@article{fds351782,
Author = {Bannard, C and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Modeling children's early grammatical knowledge.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {106},
Number = {41},
Pages = {17284-17289},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0905638106},
Abstract = {Theories of grammatical development differ in how much
abstract knowledge they attribute to young children. Here,
we report a series of experiments using a computational
model to evaluate the explanatory power of child grammars
based not on abstract rules but on concrete words and
phrases and some local abstractions associated with these
words and phrases. We use a Bayesian procedure to extract
such item-based grammars from transcriptions of 28+ h of
each of two children's speech at 2 and 3 years of age. We
then use these grammars to parse all of the unique multiword
utterances from transcriptions of separate recordings of
these same children at each of the two ages. We found that
at 2 years of age such a model had good coverage and
predictive fit, with the children showing radically limited
productivity. Furthermore, adding expert-annotated parts of
speech to the induction procedure had little effect on
coverage, with the exception of the category of noun. At age
3, the children's productivity sharply increased and the
addition of a verb and a noun category markedly improved the
model's performance.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0905638106},
Key = {fds351782}
}
@article{fds351783,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Universal grammar is dead},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {470-471},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990744},
Abstract = {The idea of a biologically evolved, universal grammar with
linguistic content is a myth, perpetuated by three spurious
explanatory strategies of generative linguists. To make
progress in understanding human linguistic competence,
cognitive scientists must abandon the idea of an innate
universal grammar and instead try to build theories that
explain both linguistic universals and diversity and how
they emerge. © 2009 Cambridge University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09990744},
Key = {fds351783}
}
@article{fds320801,
Author = {Wobber, V and Hare, B and Koler-Matznick, J and Wrangham, R and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Breed differences in domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris)
comprehension of human communicative signals},
Journal = {Interaction Studies},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {206-224},
Publisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company},
Editor = {Matsuzawa, T},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.10.2.06wob},
Abstract = {Recent research suggests that some human-like social skills
evolved in dogs (Canis familiaris) during domestication as
an incidental by-product of selection for "tame" forms of
behavior. It is still possible, however, that the social
skills of certain dog breeds came under direct selection
that led to further increases in social problem solving
ability. To test this hypothesis, different breeds of
domestic dogs were compared for their ability to use various
human communicative behaviors to find hidden food. We found
that even primitive breeds with little human contact were
able to use communicative cues. Further, "working" dogs
(shepherds and huskies: thought to be bred intentionally to
respond to human cooperative communicative signals) were
more skilled at using gestural cues than were non-working
breeds (basenji and toy poodles: not thought to have been
bred for their cooperative-communicative ability). This
difference in performance existed regardless of whether the
working breeds were more or less genetically wolf-like.
These results suggest that subsequent to initial
domesticating selection giving rise to cue-following skills,
additional selection on communicative abilities in certain
breeds has produced substantive differences in those breeds'
abilities to follow cues. © John Benjamins Publishing
Company.},
Doi = {10.1075/is.10.2.06wob},
Key = {fds320801}
}
@article{fds351784,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Society need not be selfish},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {461},
Number = {7260},
Pages = {41},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/461041a},
Doi = {10.1038/461041a},
Key = {fds351784}
}
@article{fds351785,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Varieties of altruism in children and chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {13},
Number = {9},
Pages = {397-402},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.008},
Abstract = {Recent empirical research has shed new light on the
perennial question of human altruism. A number of recent
studies suggest that from very early in ontogeny young
children have a biological predisposition to help others
achieve their goals, to share resources with others and to
inform others of things helpfully. Humans' nearest primate
relatives, such as chimpanzees, engage in some but not all
of these behaviors: they help others instrumentally, but
they are not so inclined to share resources altruistically
and they do not inform others of things helpfully. The
evolutionary roots of human altruism thus appear to be much
more complex than previously supposed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.008},
Key = {fds351785}
}
@article{fds351786,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Stracke, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds exclude novel objects as potential referents
of novel words based on pragmatics.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {112},
Number = {3},
Pages = {488-493},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.010},
Abstract = {Many studies have established that children tend to exclude
objects for which they already have a name as potential
referents of novel words. In the current study we asked
whether this exclusion can be triggered by social-pragmatic
context alone without pre-existing words as blockers.
Two-year-old children watched an adult looking at a novel
object while saying a novel word with excitement. In one
condition the adult had not seen the object beforehand, and
so the children interpreted the adult's utterance as
referring to the gazed-at object. In another condition the
adult and child had previously played jointly with the
gazed-at object. In this case, children less often assumed
that the adult was referring to the object but rather they
searched for an alternative referent--presumably because
they inferred that the gazed-at object was old news in their
common ground with the adult and so not worthy of excited
labeling. Since this inference based on exclusion is highly
similar to that underlying the Principle of Contrast/Mutual
Exclusivity, we propose that this principle is not purely
lexical but rather is based on children's understanding of
how and why people direct one another's attention to things
either with or without language.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.010},
Key = {fds351786}
}
@article{fds351787,
Author = {Krachun, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance
from reality?},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {112},
Number = {3},
Pages = {435-450},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.012},
Abstract = {A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that
how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested
appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a
small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of
the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing
lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the
smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component
adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as
several components designed to rule out alternative
explanations. There were large individual differences in
performance, with some chimpanzees' responses suggesting
they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In
contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency
control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test
did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule.
Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens
test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study
constitutes the first direct investigation of
appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the
first cross-species comparison of this capacity.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.012},
Key = {fds351787}
}
@article{fds351788,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Kaminski, J},
Title = {Behavior. Like infant, like dog.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {325},
Number = {5945},
Pages = {1213-1214},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1179670},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1179670},
Key = {fds351788}
}
@article{fds351789,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do great apes use emotional expressions to infer
desires?},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {688-698},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00802.x},
Abstract = {Although apes understand others' goals and perceptions,
little is known about their understanding of others'
emotional expressions. We conducted three studies following
the general paradigm of Repacholi and colleagues (1997,
1998). In Study 1, a human reacted emotionally to the hidden
contents of two boxes, after which the ape was allowed to
choose one of the boxes. Apes distinguished between two of
the expressed emotions (happiness and disgust) by choosing
appropriately. In Studies 2 and 3, a human reacted either
positively or negatively to the hidden contents of two
containers; then the ape saw him eating something. When
given a choice, apes correctly chose the container to which
the human had reacted negatively, based on the inference
that the human had just eaten the food to which he had
reacted positively - and so the other container still had
food left in it. These findings suggest that great apes
understand both the directedness and the valence of some
human emotional expressions, and can use this understanding
to infer desires.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00802.x},
Key = {fds351789}
}
@article{fds351790,
Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of joint commitments.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {45},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1430-1443},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016122},
Abstract = {When adults make a joint commitment to act together, they
feel an obligation to their partner. In 2 studies, the
authors investigated whether young children also understand
joint commitments to act together. In the first study, when
an adult orchestrated with the child a joint commitment to
play a game together and then broke off from their joint
activity, 3-year-olds (n = 24) reacted to the break
significantly more often (e.g., by trying to re-engage her
or waiting for her to restart playing) than when she simply
joined the child's individual activity unbidden.
Two-year-olds (n = 24) did not differentiate between these 2
situations. In the second study, 3- and 4-year-old children
(n = 30 at each age) were enticed away from their activity
with an adult. Children acknowledged their leaving (e.g., by
looking to the adult or handing her the object they had been
playing with) significantly more often when they had made a
joint commitment to act together than when they had not. By
3 years of age, children thus recognize both when an adult
is committed and when they themselves are committed to a
joint activity.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0016122},
Key = {fds351790}
}
@article{fds351791,
Author = {Brandt, S and Kidd, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The discourse bases of relativization: An investigation of
young German and English-speaking children's comprehension
of relative clauses},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {539-570},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.024},
Abstract = {In numerous comprehension studies, across different
languages, children have performed worse on object relatives
(e.g., the dog that the cat chased) than on subject
relatives (e.g., the dog that chased the cat). One possible
reason for this is that the test sentences did not exactly
match the kinds of object relatives that children typically
experience. Adults and children usually hear and produce
object relatives with inanimate heads and pronominal
subjects (e.g., the car that we bought last year) (cf. Kidd
et al., Language and Cognitive Processes 22: 860-897, 2007).
We tested young 3-year old German- and English-speaking
children with a referential selection task. Children from
both language groups performed best in the condition where
the experimenter described inanimate referents with object
relatives that contained pronominal subjects (e.g., Can you
give me the sweater that he bought?). Importantly, when the
object relatives met the constraints identified in spoken
discourse, children understood them as well as subject
relatives, or even better. These results speak against a
purely structural explanation for children's difficulty with
object relatives as observed in previous studies, but rather
support the usage-based account, according to which
discourse function and experience with language shape the
representation of linguistic structures. © 2009 by Walter
de Gruyter GmbH.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.024},
Key = {fds351791}
}
@article{fds351792,
Author = {Kirjavainen, M and Theakston, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {'I want hold Postman Pat': An investigation into the
acquisition of infinitival marker 'to'},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {29},
Number = {3},
Pages = {313-339},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723709105312},
Abstract = {Infinitival-to omission errors (e.g., *I want hold Postman
Pat) are produced by many English-speaking children early in
development. This article aims to explain these omissions by
investigating the emergence of infinitival-to, and its
production/omission in obligatory contexts. A series of
corpus analyses were conducted on the naturalistic data from
one to 13 children between the ages of approximately 2;0 and
3;1 testing three hypotheses from two theoretical
viewpoints. The data suggest that the errors are associated
with different verb sequences (e.g., going-to and going-X)
and their frequencies in the language to which children are
exposed. The article concludes that these constructions
compete for output when children are producing those verbs
and that this supports the usage-based/constructivist
account of the omission errors. Copyright © 2009 The
Author(s).},
Doi = {10.1177/0142723709105312},
Key = {fds351792}
}
@article{fds351793,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Pronoun co-referencing errors: Challenges for generativist
and usage-based accounts},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {599-626},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.026},
Abstract = {This study tests accounts of co-reference errors whereby
children allow "Mama Bear" and "her" to co-refer in
sentences like "Mama Bear is washing her" (Chien and Wexler,
Language Acquisition 1: 225-295, 1990). 63 children aged
4;6, 5;6 and 6;6 participated in a truth-value judgment task
augmented with a sentence production component. There were
three major finding: 1) contrary to predictions of most
generativist accounts, children accepted co-reference even
in cases of bound anaphora e.g., "Every girl is washing her"
2) contrary to Thornton and Wexler (Principle B, VP Ellipsis
and Interpretation in Child Grammar, The MIT Press, 1999),
errors did not appear to occur because children understood
referring expressions to be denoting the same person in
different guises 3) contrary to usage-based accounts, errors
were less likely in sentences that contained lower as
opposed to higher frequency verbs. Error rates also differed
significantly according to pronoun type ("him", "her",
"them"). These challenging results are discussed in terms of
possible processing explanations. © 2009 by Walter de
Gruyter GmbH.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.026},
Key = {fds351793}
}
@article{fds351794,
Author = {Lieven, E and Salomo, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-old children's production of multiword utterances:
A usage-based analysis},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {481-507},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.022},
Abstract = {Children generate novel utterances from the outset of
multiword speech. In this study, we apply a usage-based
method called 'traceback' to the multiword utterances of
four two-year-olds to see how closely related these
utterances are to their previous utterances. Data was
collected from the age of 2;0 until 6 weeks later on a
relatively dense sampling schedule. We attempted to match
each novel multiword utterance in a two-hour corpus to
lexical strings and schemas that the child had said before.
Matches were found for between 78-92 percent of all
multiword utterances. Between 62-91 percent of the slots in
schemas created by these tracebacks were for referring
expressions and were filled with nouns or noun phrases. For
one child, recording continued throughout his third year and
we compared his data at MLUs matched with the other three
children to investigate developmental changes. We found
that, with increasing MLU, and developmentally, children
were less repetitive within sessions, the tracebacks
required a wider range of semantic slots and the material
placed in these slots increased in complexity. © 2009 by
Walter de Gruyter GmbH.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.022},
Key = {fds351794}
}
@article{fds351795,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The roots of human altruism.},
Journal = {British journal of psychology (London, England :
1953)},
Volume = {100},
Number = {Pt 3},
Pages = {455-471},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000712608x379061},
Abstract = {Human infants as young as 14 to 18 months of age help others
attain their goals, for example, by helping them to fetch
out-of-reach objects or opening cabinets for them. They do
this irrespective of any reward from adults (indeed external
rewards undermine the tendency), and very likely with no
concern for such things as reciprocation and reputation,
which serve to maintain altruism in older children and
adults. Humans' nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees, also
help others instrumentally without concrete rewards. These
results suggest that human infants are naturally altruistic,
and as ontogeny proceeds and they must deal more
independently with a wider range of social contexts,
socialization and feedback from social interactions with
others become important mediators of these initial
altruistic tendencies.},
Doi = {10.1348/000712608x379061},
Key = {fds351795}
}
@article{fds351796,
Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of cumulative
culture.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {364},
Number = {1528},
Pages = {2405-2415},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0052},
Abstract = {Some researchers have claimed that chimpanzee and human
culture rest on homologous cognitive and learning
mechanisms. While clearly there are some homologous
mechanisms, we argue here that there are some different
mechanisms at work as well. Chimpanzee cultural traditions
represent behavioural biases of different populations, all
within the species' existing cognitive repertoire (what we
call the 'zone of latent solutions') that are generated by
founder effects, individual learning and mostly
product-oriented (rather than process-oriented) copying.
Human culture, in contrast, has the distinctive
characteristic that it accumulates modifications over time
(what we call the 'ratchet effect'). This difference results
from the facts that (i) human social learning is more
oriented towards process than product and (ii) unique forms
of human cooperation lead to active teaching, social
motivations for conformity and normative sanctions against
non-conformity. Together, these unique processes of social
learning and cooperation lead to humans' unique form of
cumulative cultural evolution.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2009.0052},
Key = {fds351796}
}
@article{fds351797,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding
in an active helping paradigm.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {112},
Number = {2},
Pages = {337-342},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006},
Abstract = {Recently, several studies have claimed that soon after their
first birthday infants understand others' false beliefs.
However, some have questioned these findings based on
criticisms of the looking-time paradigms used. Here we
report a new paradigm to test false belief understanding in
infants using a more active behavioral response: helping.
Specifically, the task was for infants to help an adult
achieve his goal - but to determine that goal infants had to
take into account what the adult believed (i.e., whether or
not he falsely believed there was a toy inside a box).
Results showed that by 18 months of age infants successfully
took into account the adult's belief in the process of
attempting to determine his goal. Results for 16-month-olds
were in the same direction but less clear. These results
represent by far the youngest age of false belief
understanding in a task with an active behavioral
measure.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006},
Key = {fds351797}
}
@article{fds351798,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs are sensitive to a human's
perspective},
Journal = {Behaviour},
Volume = {146},
Number = {7},
Pages = {979-998},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853908X395530},
Abstract = {We investigated dogs' ability to take the visual perspective
of humans. In the main study, each of two toys was placed on
the dog's side of two small barriers (one opaque, one
transparent). In experimental conditions, a human sat on the
opposite side of the barriers, such that she could see only
the toy behind the transparent barrier. The experimenter
then told the dog to 'Bring it here!' (without designating
either toy in any way). In the Back Turned control E also
sat on the opposite side but with her back turned so that
she could see neither toy, and in the Same Side control she
sat on the same side as the dog such that she could see both
toys. When toys were differentiable dogs approached the toy
behind the transparent barrier in experimental as compared
to back turned and same side condition. Dogs did not
differentiate between the two control conditions. In a
second study dogs were not sensitive to what a human had or
had not seen in the immediate past. These results suggest
that, even in the absence of overt behavioural cues, dogs
are sensitive to others visual access, even if that differs
from their own. © 2009 BRILL.},
Doi = {10.1163/156853908X395530},
Key = {fds351798}
}
@article{fds351799,
Author = {Krachun, C and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and
apes.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {521-535},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00793.x},
Abstract = {A nonverbal false belief task was administered to children
(mean age 5 years) and two great ape species: chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Because apes
typically perform poorly in cooperative contexts, our task
was competitive. Two versions were run: in both, a human
competitor witnessed an experimenter hide a reward in one of
two containers. When the competitor then left the room
(version A) or turned around (version B), the experimenter
switched the locations of the containers. The competitor
returned and reached with effort, but unsuccessfully,
towards the incorrect container. Children displayed an
understanding of the competitor's false belief by correctly
choosing the other container to find the reward. Apes did
not. However, in version A (but not version B), apes looked
more often at the unchosen container in false belief trials
than in true belief control trials, possibly indicating some
implicit or uncertain understanding that needs to be
investigated further.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00793.x},
Key = {fds351799}
}
@article{fds351800,
Author = {Matsui, T and Rakoczy, H and Miura, Y and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Understanding of speaker certainty and false-belief
reasoning: a comparison of Japanese and German
preschoolers.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {602-613},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00812.x},
Abstract = {It has been repeatedly shown that when asked to identify a
protagonist's false belief on the basis of his false
statement, English-speaking 3-year-olds dismiss the
statement and fail to attribute to him a false belief. In
the present studies, we tested 3-year-old Japanese children
in a similar task, using false statements accompanied by
grammaticalized particles of speaker (un)certainty, as in
everyday Japanese utterances. The Japanese children were
directly compared with same-aged German children, whose
native language does not have grammaticalized epistemic
concepts. Japanese children profited from the explicit
statement of the protagonist's false belief when it was
marked with the attitude of certainty in a way that German
children did not - presumably because Japanese but not
German children must process such marking routinely in their
daily discourse. These results are discussed in the broader
context of linguistic and theory of mind
development.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00812.x},
Key = {fds351800}
}
@article{fds351801,
Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children understand multiple pretend identities in
their object play.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {Pt 2},
Pages = {385-404},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151008x322893},
Abstract = {This set of studies examined the ability of 3-year-olds to
conceptualize multiple pretend identities with objects.
Rather than relying on verbal response measures, as has been
done in the past, children's creative and inferential
pretend actions were used as indicators of their
understanding. The common structure to all four studies was
that children were confronted with one pretend scenario,
moved to a second pretend scenario and then back again to
the first. Children proficiently tailored their pretence to
an object whose pretend identity changed between scenarios
despite being less able to name each identity. Thus, using
an inferential action methodology, these studies provide
early and particularly convincing evidence that children can
track the multiple pretend identities of
objects.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151008x322893},
Key = {fds351801}
}
@article{fds351802,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Brosche, N and Warneken, F and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young children's understanding of the context-relativity of
normative rules in conventional games.},
Journal = {The British journal of developmental psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {Pt 2},
Pages = {445-456},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151008x337752},
Abstract = {We investigated young children's awareness of the
context-relative rule structure of simple games. Two
contexts were established in the form of spatial locations.
Familiar objects were used in their conventional way at
location 1, but acquired specific functions in a rule game
at location 2. A third party then performed the conventional
act at either of the two locations, constituting a mistake
at location 2 (experimental condition), but appropriate at
location 1 (control condition). Three-year-olds (but not
2-year-olds) systematically distinguished the two
conditions, spontaneously intervening with normative protest
against the third party act in the experimental, but not in
the control condition. Young children thus understand
context-specific rules even when the context marking is
non-linguistic. These results are discussed in the broader
context of the development of social cognition and cultural
learning.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151008x337752},
Key = {fds351802}
}
@article{fds351803,
Author = {Chan, A and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's understanding of the agent-patient relations in
the transitive construction: Cross-linguistic comparisons
between Cantonese, German, and English},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {267-300},
Year = {2009},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/COGL.2009.015},
Abstract = {Cantonese-, German-, and English-speaking children aged 2;6,
3,6, and 4,6 acted out transitive sentences containing novel
verbs in three conditions: (1) agent and patient were cued
redundantly by both word order and animacy; (2) agent and
patient were marked only with word order; and (3) agent and
patient were cued in conflicting ways with word order and
animacy. All three age groups in all three languages
comprehended the redundantly cued sentences. When word order
was the only cue, English children showed the earliest
comprehension at 2;6, then German, and then Cantonese
children at 3;6. When the cues conflicted, none of the 2;6
children in any language comprehended in adult-like ways,
whereas all of the children at 3;6 and 4;6 preferred word
order over animacy (but with some cross-linguistic
differences in performance as well). When animacy contrast
changed across sentence types, Cantonese children
comprehended the sentences differently at all three age
levels, German children did so at the two younger ages, and
English children only at the youngest age. The findings
correspond well with the informativeness of word order in
the three languages, suggesting that children's learning of
the syntactic marking of agent-patient relations is strongly
influenced by nature of the language they hear around them.
© 2009 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH.},
Doi = {10.1515/COGL.2009.015},
Key = {fds351803}
}
@article{fds351804,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Schäfer, M and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Prelinguistic infants, but not chimpanzees, communicate
about absent entities.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {20},
Number = {5},
Pages = {654-660},
Year = {2009},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02346.x},
Abstract = {One of the defining features of human language is
displacement, the ability to make reference to absent
entities. Here we show that prelinguistic, 12-month-old
infants already can use a nonverbal pointing gesture to make
reference to absent entities. We also show that
chimpanzees-who can point for things they want humans to
give them-do not point to refer to absent entities in the
same way. These results demonstrate that the ability to
communicate about absent but mutually known entities depends
not on language, but rather on deeper social-cognitive
skills that make acts of linguistic reference possible in
the first place. These nonlinguistic skills for displaced
reference emerged apparently only after humans' divergence
from great apes some 6 million years ago.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02346.x},
Key = {fds351804}
}
@article{fds351805,
Author = {Wyman, E and Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Normativity and context in young children's pretend
play},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {146-155},
Year = {2009},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.01.003},
Abstract = {In two studies 3-year-olds' understanding of the
context-specificity of normative rules was investigated
through games of pretend play. In the first study, children
protested against a character who joined a pretend game but
treated the target object according to its real function.
However, they did not protest when she performed the same
action without having first joined the game. In the second
study, children protested when the character mixed up an
object's pretend identities between two different pretend
games. However, they did not protest when she performed the
same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the
studies show that young children see the pretence-reality
distinction, and the distinction between different pretence
identities, as normative. More generally, the results of
these studies demonstrate young children's ability to
enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so
context-specifically. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.01.003},
Key = {fds351805}
}
@article{fds351806,
Author = {Vaish, A and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Sympathy through affective perspective taking and its
relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {45},
Number = {2},
Pages = {534-543},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014322},
Abstract = {In most research on the early ontogeny of sympathy, young
children are presented with an overtly distressed person and
their responses are observed. In the current study, the
authors asked whether young children could also sympathize
with a person to whom something negative had happened but
who was expressing no emotion at all. They showed 18- and
25-month-olds an adult either harming another adult by
destroying or taking away her possessions (harm condition)
or else doing something similar that did not harm her
(neutral condition). The "victim" expressed no emotions in
either condition. Nevertheless, in the harm as compared with
the neutral condition, children showed more concern and
subsequent prosocial behavior toward the victim. Moreover,
children's concerned looks during the harmful event were
positively correlated with their subsequent prosocial
behavior. Very young children can sympathize with a victim
even in the absence of overt emotional signals, possibly by
some form of affective perspective taking.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0014322},
Key = {fds351806}
}
@article{fds351807,
Author = {Colombi, C and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M and Young, G and Warneken, F and Rogers, SJ},
Title = {Examining correlates of cooperation in autism: Imitation,
joint attention, and understanding intentions.},
Journal = {Autism : the international journal of research and
practice},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {143-163},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1362361308098514},
Abstract = {The goal of the current study was to examine the
contribution of three early social skills that may provide a
foundation for cooperative performance in autism: (1)
imitation, (2) joint attention, and (3) understanding of
other people's intentions regarding actions on objects.
Fourteen children with autistic disorder (AD) and 15
children with other developmental disabilities (DDs) matched
on non-verbal developmental age (AD, mean 27.7, SD 9.8; DD,
mean 33.4, SD 11.1) and verbal developmental age (AD, mean
21.5, SD 12.3; DD, mean 28.4, SD 11.0) participated in the
study. Children with autism showed poorer performance on
imitation and joint attention measures, but not on the
intentionality task. Multiple regression analyses showed
that imitation skills and joint attention contributed
independently to cooperation, above and beyond the
understanding of intentions of actions on
objects.},
Doi = {10.1177/1362361308098514},
Key = {fds351807}
}
@article{fds351808,
Author = {Liebal, K and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Infants use shared experience to interpret pointing
gestures.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {264-271},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00758.x},
Abstract = {We investigated whether 1-year-old infants use their shared
experience with an adult to determine the meaning of a
pointing gesture. In the first study, after two adults had
each shared a different activity with the infant, one of the
adults pointed to a target object. Eighteen- but not
14-month-olds responded appropriately to the pointing
gesture based on the particular activity they had previously
shared with that particular adult. In the second study,
14-month-olds were successful in a simpler procedure in
which the pointing adult either had or had not shared a
relevant activity with the infant prior to the pointing.
Infants just beginning to learn language thus already show a
complex understanding of the pragmatics of cooperative
communication in which shared experience with particular
individuals plays a crucial role.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00758.x},
Key = {fds351808}
}
@article{fds351809,
Author = {Kirschner, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint drumming: social context facilitates synchronization
in preschool children.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {102},
Number = {3},
Pages = {299-314},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2008.07.005},
Abstract = {The human capacity to synchronize body movements to an
external acoustic beat enables uniquely human behaviors such
as music making and dancing. By hypothesis, these first
evolved in human cultures as fundamentally social
activities. We therefore hypothesized that children would
spontaneously synchronize their body movements to an
external beat at earlier ages and with higher accuracy if
the stimulus was presented in a social context. A total of
36 children in three age groups (2.5, 3.5, and 4.5 years)
were invited to drum along with either a human partner, a
drumming machine, or a drum sound coming from a speaker.
When drumming with a social partner, children as young as
2.5 years adjusted their drumming tempo to a beat outside
the range of their spontaneous motor tempo. Moreover,
children of all ages synchronized their drumming with higher
accuracy in the social condition. We argue that drumming
together with a social partner creates a shared
representation of the joint action task and/or elicits a
specific human motivation to synchronize movements during
joint rhythmic activity.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2008.07.005},
Key = {fds351809}
}
@article{fds351810,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Are apes inequity averse? New data on the token-exchange
paradigm.},
Journal = {American journal of primatology},
Volume = {71},
Number = {2},
Pages = {175-181},
Year = {2009},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20639},
Abstract = {Recent studies have produced mixed evidence about inequity
aversion in nonhuman primates. Brosnan et al. [Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological
Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] found inequity aversion in
chimpanzees and argued that effort is crucial, if subjects
are to evaluate how they are rewarded in comparison to a
competitor for an identical performance. In this study we
investigated inequity aversion with chimpanzees, bonobos and
orangutans, using the method of Brosnan et al. [Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological
Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] after introducing some
methodological improvements. Subjects always received a
less-preferred food in exchange for a token, whereas the
competitor received either the same type of food for their
token (equity) or a more favored food for it (inequity).
Apes did not refuse more of the less-preferred food when a
competitor had received the more favored food. Thus, with an
improved methodology we failed to reproduce the findings of
Brosnan et al. [Proceedings of the Royal Society of London.
Series B. Biological Sciences 272:253-258, 2005] that apes
show inequity aversion.},
Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20639},
Key = {fds351810}
}
@article{fds351812,
Author = {Gräfenhain, M and Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {One-year-olds' understanding of nonverbal gestures directed
to a third person},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1},
Pages = {23-33},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.10.001},
Abstract = {We investigated whether infants comprehend others' nonverbal
communicative intentions directed to a third person, in an
'overhearing' context. An experimenter addressed an
assistant and indicated a hidden toy's location by either
gazing ostensively or pointing to the location for her. In a
matched control condition, the experimenter performed
similar behaviors (absent-minded gazing and extended index
finger) but did not communicate ostensively with the
assistant. Infants could then search for the toy.
Eighteen-month-old infants were skillful in using both
communicative cues to find the hidden object, whereas
14-month-olds performed above chance only with the pointing
cue. Neither age group performed above chance in the control
condition. This study thus shows that by 14-18 months of
age, infants are beginning to monitor and comprehend some
aspects of third party interactions. © 2008 Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.10.001},
Key = {fds351812}
}
@article{fds351813,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's selective learning of rule games from
reliable and unreliable models},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1},
Pages = {61-69},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.07.004},
Abstract = {We investigated preschoolers' selective learning from models
that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable.
Replicating previous research, children from 4 years
selectively learned novel words from reliable over
unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children
also selectively learned other kinds of acts - novel games -
from reliable actors. More important, - and novel to this
study, this selective learning was not just based on a
preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a
normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a
reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better
one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as
indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their
spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest,
critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the
one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the
broader context of the development of children's social
cognition and cultural learning. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.07.004},
Key = {fds351813}
}
@article{fds351814,
Author = {Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Infants appreciate the social intention behind a pointing
gesture: Commentary on "Children's understanding of
communicative intentions in the middle of the second year of
life" by T. Aureli, P. Perucchini and M.
Genco},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1},
Pages = {13-15},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.09.004},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.09.004},
Key = {fds351814}
}
@article{fds351815,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Brandt, S},
Title = {Flexibility in the semantics and syntax of children's early
verb use.},
Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {113-126},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2009.00523.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2009.00523.x},
Key = {fds351815}
}
@misc{fds351811,
Author = {Jensen, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Punishment},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {800-805},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780080453378},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-045337-8.00106-6},
Abstract = {Animals can use punishment as a means to change the behavior
of others. Punishment can be done for selfish ends with no
regard for how the target of the act is affected. On the
other extreme, it can benefit others in a society and be
motivated by its effects on others. Altruistic punishment,
third-party punishment, and norm enforcement are special
cases of punishment that can maintain cooperation, and these
may not have analogs in animals other than humans. More
socially sophisticated forms of punishment will require more
flexible and complex cognitive processes. Of particular
interest are social (other-regarding) preferences, since
these may have allowed the evolution of the large-scale
nonkin cooperation seen only in humans. However, little is
known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying punishment
in other animals.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-045337-8.00106-6},
Key = {fds351811}
}
@article{fds351816,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Collective intentionality and cultural development},
Journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie},
Volume = {56},
Number = {3},
Pages = {401-410},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2008.0031},
Doi = {10.1524/dzph.2008.0031},
Key = {fds351816}
}
@article{fds351817,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they
believe.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {109},
Number = {2},
Pages = {224-234},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010},
Abstract = {There is currently much controversy about which, if any,
mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates
understand. In the current two studies we tested both
chimpanzees' and human children's understanding of both
knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same
experimental paradigm involving competition with a
conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children
understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees
understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After
ruling out various alternative explanations of these and
related findings, we conclude that in at least some
situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible
explanations for their failure in the highly similar false
belief task are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010},
Key = {fds351817}
}
@article{fds351818,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in
20-month-olds.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {44},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1785-1788},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013860},
Abstract = {The current study investigated the influence of rewards on
very young children's helping behavior. After 20-month-old
infants received a material reward during a treatment phase,
they subsequently were less likely to engage in further
helping during a test phase as compared with infants who had
previously received social praise or no reward at all. This
so-called overjustification effect suggests that even the
earliest helping behaviors of young children are
intrinsically motivated and that socialization practices
involving extrinsic rewards can undermine this
tendency.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0013860},
Key = {fds351818}
}
@article{fds351819,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Assessing the validity of ape-human comparisons: a reply to
Boesch (2007).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {122},
Number = {4},
Pages = {449-452},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.122.4.449},
Abstract = {Boesch (2007) criticizes research comparing ape and human
cognition on the basis of both internal and external
validity. The authors show here that most of those
criticisms are not valid because: (i) most threats to
internal validity (e.g., conspecific experimenters for
humans but not apes) are controlled for experimentally; (ii)
externally, there is no empirical evidence that captive apes
have fewer cognitive skills than wild apes and indeed some
evidence (especially from human-raised apes) that they have
more; and (iii) externally, there is no empirical evidence
that Western middle-class children have different cognitive
skills from other children at very early ages in basic
cognitive domains. Although difficult, with appropriate
methodological care, experimental cross-species comparisons
may be validly made.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.122.4.449},
Key = {fds351819}
}
@article{fds351820,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Twelve-month-olds communicate helpfully and appropriately
for knowledgeable and ignorant partners.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {108},
Number = {3},
Pages = {732-739},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.013},
Abstract = {In the current study we investigated whether 12-month-old
infants gesture appropriately for knowledgeable versus
ignorant partners, in order to provide them with needed
information. In two experiments we found that in response to
a searching adult, 12-month-olds pointed more often to an
object whose location the adult did not know and thus needed
information to find (she had not seen it fall down just
previously) than to an object whose location she knew and
thus did not need information to find (she had watched it
fall down just previously). These results demonstrate that,
in contrast to classic views of infant communication,
infants' early pointing at 12 months is already premised on
an understanding of others' knowledge and ignorance, along
with a prosocial motive to help others by providing needed
information.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.013},
Key = {fds351820}
}
@misc{fds351821,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {First steps toward a usage-based theory of language
acquisition},
Pages = {439-458},
Booktitle = {Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings},
Year = {2008},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9783110190847},
Key = {fds351821}
}
@article{fds351822,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Warneken, F},
Title = {Human behaviour: Share and share alike.},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {454},
Number = {7208},
Pages = {1057-1058},
Year = {2008},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/4541057a},
Doi = {10.1038/4541057a},
Key = {fds351822}
}
@article{fds351823,
Author = {Dabrowska, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Rapid learning of an abstract language-specific category:
Polish children's acquisition of the instrumental
construction.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {533-558},
Year = {2008},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000908008660},
Abstract = {Rapid acquisition of linguistic categories or constructions
is sometimes regarded as evidence of innate knowledge. In
this paper, we examine Polish children's early understanding
of an idiosyncratic, language-specific construction
involving the instrumental case - which could not be due to
innate knowledge. Thirty Polish-speaking children aged 2 ; 6
and 3 ; 2 participated in a elicited production experiment
with novel verbs that were demonstrated as taking nouns in
the instrumental case as patients. Children heard the verbs
in sentences with either masculine or feminine nouns (which
take different endings in the instrumental case), and were
tested with new nouns of the same and of the opposite
gender. In both age groups, a substantial majority of
children succeeded in generalizing from one gendered form of
the instrumental case to the other (especially to the
masculine), thus indicating that they have some kind of
abstract understanding of the instrumental case in this
construction. This relatively early abstract knowledge of an
idiosyncratic construction casts doubt on the view that
early acquisition requires innate linguistic
knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000908008660},
Key = {fds351823}
}
@article{fds351824,
Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Young German children's early syntactic competence: a
preferential looking study.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {575-582},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00703.x},
Abstract = {Using a preferential looking methodology with novel verbs,
Gertner, Fisher and Eisengart (2006) found that 21-month-old
English children seemed to understand the syntactic marking
of transitive word order in an abstract, verb-general way.
In the current study we tested whether young German children
of this same age have this same understanding. Following
Gertner et al. (2006), one group of German children was
tested only after they had received a training/practice
phase containing transitive sentences with familiar verbs
and the exact same nouns as those used at test. A second
group was tested after a training/practice phase consisting
only of familiar verbs, without the nouns used at test. Only
the group of children with the training on full transitive
sentences was successful in the test. These findings suggest
that for children this young to succeed in this test of
syntactic understanding, they must first have some kind of
relevant linguistic experience immediately prior to
testing--which raises the question of the nature of
children's linguistic representations at this early point in
development.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00703.x},
Key = {fds351824}
}
@article{fds351825,
Author = {Dittmar, M and Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {German children's comprehension of word order and case
marking in causative sentences.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {79},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1152-1167},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01181.x},
Abstract = {Two comprehension experiments were conducted to investigate
whether German children are able to use the grammatical cues
of word order and word endings (case markers) to identify
agents and patients in a causative sentence and whether they
weigh these two cues differently across development.
Two-year-olds correctly understood only sentences with both
cues supporting each other--the prototypical form.
Five-year-olds were able to use word order by itself but not
case markers. Only 7-year-olds behaved like adults by
relying on case markers over word order when the two cues
conflicted. These findings suggest that prototypical
instances of linguistic constructions with redundant
grammatical marking play a special role in early
acquisition, and only later do children isolate and weigh
individual grammatical cues appropriately.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01181.x},
Key = {fds351825}
}
@article{fds351826,
Author = {Chang, F and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Automatic evaluation of syntactic learners in
typologically-different languages},
Journal = {Cognitive Systems Research},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3},
Pages = {198-213},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.10.002},
Abstract = {Human syntax acquisition involves a system that can learn
constraints on possible word sequences in
typologically-different human languages. Evaluation of
computational syntax acquisition systems typically involves
theory-specific or language-specific assumptions that make
it difficult to compare results in multiple languages. To
address this problem, a bag-of-words incremental generation
(BIG) task with an automatic sentence prediction accuracy
(SPA) evaluation measure was developed. The BIG-SPA task was
used to test several learners that incorporated n-gram
statistics which are commonly found in statistical
approaches to syntax acquisition. In addition, a novel
Adjacency-Prominence learner, that was based on
psycholinguistic work in sentence production and syntax
acquisition, was also tested and it was found that this
learner yielded the best results in this task on these
languages. In general, the BIG-SPA task is argued to be a
useful platform for comparing explicit theories of syntax
acquisition in multiple languages. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.10.002},
Key = {fds351826}
}
@article{fds351827,
Author = {Tennie, C and Hedwig, D and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {An experimental study of nettle feeding in captive
gorillas.},
Journal = {American journal of primatology},
Volume = {70},
Number = {6},
Pages = {584-593},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20532},
Abstract = {Mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) in Karisoke,
Rwanda, feed on the stinging nettle Laportea alatipes by
means of elaborate processing skills. Byrne [e.g.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
Series B, Biological Sciences 358:529-536, 2003] has claimed
that individuals acquire these skills by means of the
so-called program-level imitation, in which the overall
sequence of problem-solving steps (not the precise actions)
is reproduced. In this study we present western lowland
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) with highly similar
nettles. Twelve gorillas in three different groups
(including also one nettle-naïve gorilla) used the same
program-level technique as wild mountain gorillas (with
differences mainly on the action level). Chimpanzees,
orangutans, and bonobos did not show these program-level
patterns, nor did the gorillas when presented with a plant
similar in structural design but lacking stinging defenses.
We conclude that although certain aspects (i.e. single
actions) of this complex skill may be owing to social
learning, at the program level gorilla nettle feeding
derives mostly from genetic predispositions and individual
learning of plant affordances.},
Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20532},
Key = {fds351827}
}
@article{fds351828,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Rational tool use and tool choice in human infants and great
apes.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {79},
Number = {3},
Pages = {609-626},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01146.x},
Abstract = {G. Gergely, H. Bekkering, and I. Király (2002) showed that
14-month-old infants imitate rationally, copying an adult's
unusual action more often when it was freely chosen than
when it was forced by some constraint. This suggests that
infants understand others' intentions as rational choices of
action plans. It is important to test whether apes also
understand others' intentions in this way. In each of the
current 3 studies, a comparison group of 14-month-olds used
a tool more often when a demonstrator freely chose to use it
than when she had to use it, but apes generally used the
tool equally often in both conditions (orangutans were an
exception). Only some apes thus show an understanding of
others' intentions as rational choices of action
plans.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01146.x},
Key = {fds351828}
}
@article{fds351829,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years
later.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {187-192},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010},
Abstract = {On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff's seminal
paper asking whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, we
review recent evidence that suggests in many respects they
do, whereas in other respects they might not. Specifically,
there is solid evidence from several different experimental
paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and
intentions of others, as well as the perception and
knowledge of others. Nevertheless, despite several seemingly
valid attempts, there is currently no evidence that
chimpanzees understand false beliefs. Our conclusion for the
moment is, thus, that chimpanzees understand others in terms
of a perception-goal psychology, as opposed to a
full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010},
Key = {fds351829}
}
@article{fds351830,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The sources of normativity: young children's awareness of
the normative structure of games.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {875-881},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.44.3.875},
Abstract = {In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old
children's awareness of the normative structure of
conventional games. In the target conditions, an
experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule game.
After the child and the experimenter had played for a while,
a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd experimenter), asked to
join in, and then performed an action that constituted a
mistake in the game. In control conditions, the puppet
performed the exact same action as in the experimental
conditions, but the context was different such that this act
did not constitute a mistake. Children's normative responses
to the puppet's acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching)
were scored. Both age groups performed more normative
responses in the target than in the control conditions, but
the 3-year-olds did so on a more explicit level. These
studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even
very young children have some grasp of the normative
structure of conventional activities.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.44.3.875},
Key = {fds351830}
}
@article{fds351831,
Author = {Brandt, S and Diessel, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The acquisition of German relative clauses: a case
study.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {35},
Number = {2},
Pages = {325-348},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000907008379},
Abstract = {This paper investigates the development of relative clauses
in the speech of one German-speaking child aged 2 ; 0 to 5 ;
0. The earliest relative clauses we found in the data occur
in topicalization constructions that are only a little
different from simple sentences: they contain a single
proposition, express the actor prior to other participants,
assert new information and often occur with main-clause word
order. In the course of the development, more complex
relative constructions emerge, in which the relative clause
is embedded in a fully-fledged main clause. We argue that
German relative clauses develop in an incremental fashion
from simple non-embedded sentences that gradually evolve
into complex sentence constructions.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000907008379},
Key = {fds351831}
}
@article{fds351832,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Albrecht, K and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Infants' visual and auditory communication when a partner is
or is not visually attending.},
Journal = {Infant behavior & development},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-167},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2007.10.011},
Abstract = {In the current study we investigated infants' communication
in the visual and auditory modalities as a function of the
recipient's visual attention. We elicited pointing at
interesting events from thirty-two 12-month olds and
thirty-two 18-month olds in two conditions: when the
recipient either was or was not visually attending to them
before and during the point. The main result was that
infants initiated more pointing when the recipient's visual
attention was on them than when it was not. In addition,
when the recipient did not respond by sharing interest in
the designated event, infants initiated more repairs
(repeated pointing) than when she did, again, especially
when the recipient was visually attending to them.
Interestingly, accompanying vocalizations were used
intentionally and increased in both experimental conditions
when the recipient did not share attention and interest.
However, there was little evidence that infants used their
vocalizations to direct attention to their gestures when the
recipient was not attending to them.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.infbeh.2007.10.011},
Key = {fds351832}
}
@article{fds351833,
Author = {Riedel, J and Schumann, K and Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The early ontogeny of human-dog communication},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {75},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1003-1014},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.08.010},
Abstract = {Although dogs, Canis familiaris, are skilful at responding
to human social cues, the role of ontogeny in the
development of these abilities has not been systematically
examined. We studied the ability of very young dog puppies
to follow human communicative cues and successfully find
hidden food. In the first experiment we compared 6-, 8-, 16-
and 24-week-old puppies in their ability to use pointing
gestures or a marker as a cue. The results showed that
puppies, independent of age, could use all human
communicative cues provided; only their success at using the
marker cue increased with age. In the second and third
experiments we investigated the flexibility of the puppies'
understanding by reducing the degree to which they could use
local enhancement to solve these problems. Here, subjects
could not simply approach the hand of the experimenter and
follow its direction to the correct location because cups
were placed next to the dog instead of next to the
experimenter. Six-week-old puppies readily used all of the
human communicative cues provided. These findings support
the hypothesis that domestication played a critical role in
shaping the ability of dogs to follow human-given cues. ©
2007 The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.08.010},
Key = {fds351833}
}
@misc{fds351834,
Author = {Kruger, AC and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cultural Learning and Learning Culture},
Pages = {353-372},
Booktitle = {The Handbook of Education and Human Development: New Models
of Learning, Teaching and Schooling},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780631211860},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/b.9780631211860.1998.00018.x},
Abstract = {The universals and cultural variations of human development
have been the focus of fruitful study by anthropologists for
decades. In recent years psychologists also have directed
their attention, long overdue, to understanding development
in cultural context. There are striking differences among
psychologists, however, in the approaches they take to
culture and development. Most markedly, Cole (1989)
distinguishes two very different theoretical perspectives on
cultural psychology and its approach to human development.
In one perspective the focus is on culture as a collective
enterprise (e.g., Gauvain, in press: Shweder, 1990; Super
and Harkness, 1986). There is no need in this view for
focusing on the individual development of individual
children since all important forms of learning are socially
distributed; children simply become more skillful over time
at participating in various collective activities (Lave and
Wenger, 1991). Indeed, in some versions of this more
sociological view of cultural psychology the focus on the
cultural collective is so strong that there is really no
justification for reference to the development of
individuals at all: "Individual, interpersonal, and
sociocultural processes constitute each other and cannot be
separated" (Rogoff, Chavajay, and Matusov, 1993, p.
533).},
Doi = {10.1111/b.9780631211860.1998.00018.x},
Key = {fds351834}
}
@misc{fds351835,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Pages = {477-487},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Cognitive Science},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780631218517},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch37},
Abstract = {A central goal of cognitive science is to understand how
human beings comprehend, produce, and acquire natural
languages. Throughout the brief history of modern cognitive
science, the linguistic theory that has been most prominent
in this endeavor is generative grammar as espoused by Noam
Chomsky and colleagues. Generative grammar is a theoretical
approach that seeks to describe and explain natural language
in terms of its mathematical form, using formal languages
such as propositional logic and automata theory. The most
fundamental distinction in generative grammar is therefore
the formal distinction between semantics and syntax. The
semantics of a linguistic proposition are the objective
conditions under which it may truthfully be stated, and the
syntax of that proposition is the mathematical structure of
its linguistic elements and relations irrespective of their
semantics.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781405164535.ch37},
Key = {fds351835}
}
@article{fds320803,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernández-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response [3]},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {319},
Number = {5863},
Pages = {569},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds320803}
}
@article{fds320804,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernandez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Comparing social skills of children and apes -
Response},
Journal = {SCIENCE},
Volume = {319},
Number = {5863},
Pages = {570-570},
Publisher = {AMER ASSOC ADVANCEMENT SCIENCE},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds320804}
}
@article{fds351836,
Author = {Liebal, K and Colombi, C and Rogers, SJ and Warneken, F and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Helping and cooperation in children with
autism.},
Journal = {Journal of autism and developmental disorders},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {224-238},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0381-5},
Abstract = {Helping and cooperation are central to human social life.
Here, we report two studies investigating these social
behaviors in children with autism and children with
developmental delay. In the first study, both groups of
children helped the experimenter attain her goals. In the
second study, both groups of children cooperated with an
adult, but fewer children with autism performed the tasks
successfully. When the adult stopped interacting at a
certain moment, children with autism produced fewer attempts
to re-engage her, possibly indicating that they had not
formed a shared goal/shared intentions with her. These
results are discussed in terms of the prerequisite cognitive
and motivational skills and propensities underlying social
behavior.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10803-007-0381-5},
Key = {fds351836}
}
@article{fds351837,
Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response [6]},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {319},
Number = {5861},
Pages = {284},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds351837}
}
@article{fds320802,
Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do chimpanzees reciprocate received favours?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {951-962},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014},
Abstract = {Reciprocal interactions observed in animals may persist
because individuals keep careful account of services
exchanged with each group member. To test whether
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, possess the cognitive skills
required for this type of contingency-based reciprocity, we
gave chimpanzees the choice of cooperating with a
conspecific who had helped them previously or one who had
not helped them in two different experimental tasks. In the
first experiment, one of the partners preferentially
recruited the subjects to cooperate in a mutualistic task,
while the other potential partner never chose to cooperate
with the subject, but rather chose a different partner. In
the second experiment, one of the partners altruistically
helped the subjects to reach food, while the other partner
never helped the subject, but rather took the food himself.
In both experiments there was some evidence that the
chimpanzees increased the amount they cooperated with or
helped the partner who had been more helpful towards them
compared to their baseline behaviour towards the same
individual (or in a control condition). However, in both
experiments this effect was relatively weak and subjects did
not preferentially favour the individual who had favoured
them over the one who had not in either experiment. Although
taken together, these experiments provide some support for
the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of contingent
reciprocity, they also suggest that models of immediate
reciprocation and detailed accounts of recent exchanges
(e.g. Tit for Tat) may not play a large role in guiding the
social decisions of chimpanzees. © 2008 The Association for
the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.05.014},
Key = {fds320802}
}
@article{fds351838,
Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Grammar},
Volume = {1-3},
Pages = {38-50},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development,
Three-Volume Set},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780123704603},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6},
Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young
children must master the grammatical constructions of their
language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical
issues in the field and trace the developmental path
children follow from talking in single-unit 'holophrases' to
using complex, abstract constructions. We describe the
development of children's initial skills with word order,
case marking, and morphology as abstract elements in early
constructions, and we discuss the level of abstraction
characteristic of young children's grammatical constructions
at different stages of development and in some different
languages of the world. Finally, we consider the learning
processes that enable young children both to acquire and to
abstract across grammatical constructions.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6},
Key = {fds351838}
}
@article{fds351840,
Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Graded representations in the acquisition of English and
German transitive constructions},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {48-66},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.11.002},
Abstract = {English and German children aged 2 years 4 months and 4
years heard both novel and familiar verbs in sentences whose
form was grammatical, but which mismatched the event they
were watching (e.g., 'The frog is pushing the lion', when
the lion was actually the 'agent' or 'doer' of the pushing).
These verbs were then elicited in new sentences. All
children mostly corrected the familiar verb (i.e., they used
the agent as the grammatical subject), but there were
cross-linguistic differences among the two-year-olds
concerning the novel verb. When English 2-year-olds used the
novel verb they mostly corrected. However, their most
frequent response was to avoid using the novel verb
altogether. German 2-year-olds corrected the novel verb
significantly more often than their English counterparts,
demonstrating more robust verb-general representations of
agent- and patient-marking. These findings provide support
for a 'graded representations' view of development, which
proposes that grammatical representations may be
simultaneously abstract but 'weak'. © 2007 Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.11.002},
Key = {fds351840}
}
@article{fds351841,
Author = {Moll, H and Richter, N and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Fourteen-month-olds know what "we" have shared in a special
way},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {90-101},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15250000701779402},
Abstract = {People often express excitement to each other when
encountering an object that they have shared together
previously in some special way. This study investigated
whether 14-month-old infants know precisely what they have
and have not shared in a special way (and with whom). In the
experimental condition an adult and infant shared an object
(the target) excitedly because it unexpectedly reappeared in
several places. They then shared 2 other objects (the
distractors) in a more normal fashion. Later, the adult
reacted excitedly to a tray containing all 3 objects and
then made an ambiguous request for the infant to hand "it"
to her. There were 2 control conditions. In 1 of them, a
different adult, who knew none of the 3 objects, made the
ambiguous request. In the other control condition, the adult
who made the request had previously experienced the objects
only alone, while the infant looked on unengaged. Infants in
the experimental condition chose the target object more
often than the distractors and more often than they chose it
in either control condition. These results demonstrate that
14-month-old infants can identify which one of a set of
objects "we" - and not just I or you alone - have had a
special experience with in the past.},
Doi = {10.1080/15250000701779402},
Key = {fds351841}
}
@article{fds351842,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Behavioral cues that great apes use to forage for hidden
food.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {117-128},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0095-2},
Abstract = {We conducted three studies to examine whether the four great
ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans)
are able to use behavioral experimenter-given cues in an
object-choice task. In the subsequent experimental
conditions subjects were presented with two eggs, one of
which contained food and the other did not. In Study 1 the
experimenter examined both eggs by smelling or shaking them,
but only made a failed attempt to open (via biting) the egg
containing food. In a control condition, the experimenter
examined and attempted to open both eggs, but in reverse
order to control for stimulus enhancement. The apes
significantly preferred the egg that was first examined and
then bitten, but had no preference in a baseline condition
in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we investigated
whether the apes could extend this ability to cues not
observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull apart the
egg), as well as whether they made this discrimination based
on the function of the action the experimenter performed.
Subjects significantly preferred eggs presented with this
novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a novel
but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes did not
interpret human actions as cues to food-location when they
already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus, great apes were
able to use a variety of experimenter-given cues associated
with foraging actions to locate hidden food and thereby were
partially sensitive to the general purpose underlying these
actions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0095-2},
Key = {fds351842}
}
@article{fds351843,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in
a competitive situation.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {175-178},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0097-0},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and
cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a
general understanding the perceptions of others? In a study
by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two
pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to
approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant
could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the
visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to
the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are
sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards
being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not
take what the competitor had heard into account, despite
being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the
noise.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0097-0},
Key = {fds351843}
}
@article{fds351844,
Author = {Tolar, TD and Lederberg, AR and Gokhale, S and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The development of the ability to recognize the meaning of
iconic signs.},
Journal = {Journal of deaf studies and deaf education},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {225-240},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/deafed/enm045},
Abstract = {Early developmental psychologists viewed iconic
representation as cognitively less complex than other forms
of symbolic thought. It is therefore surprising that iconic
signs are not acquired more easily than arbitrary signs by
young language learners. One explanation is that children
younger than 3 years have difficulty interpreting iconicity.
The current study assessed hearing children's ability to
interpret the meaning of iconic signs. Sixty-six 2.5- to
5-year-olds who had no previous exposure to signs were
required to match iconic signs to pictures of referents.
Whereas few of the 2.5-year-olds recognized the meaning of
the iconic signs consistently, more than half of the
3.0-year-olds and most of 3.5-year-olds performed above
chance. Thus, the ability to recognize the meaning of iconic
signs gradually develops during the preschool years.
Implications of these findings for sign language
development, receptive signed vocabulary tests, and the
development of the ability to interpret iconic symbols are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1093/deafed/enm045},
Key = {fds351844}
}
@misc{fds351839,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cultural transmission: A view from chimpanzees and human
infants},
Pages = {33-47},
Booktitle = {Cultural Transmission: Psychological, Developmental, Social,
and Methodological Aspects},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521880435},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804670.004},
Abstract = {Introduction Primates are highly social beings. They begin
their lives clinging to their mother and nursing, and they
spend their next few months, or even years, still in
proximity to her. Adult primates live in close-knit social
groups, for the most part, in which members individually
recognize one another and form various types of long-term
social relationships (Tomasello & Call, 1994, 1997). As
primates, human beings follow this same pattern, of course,
but they also have unique forms of sociality that may be
characterized as “ultrasocial” or, in more common
parlance, “cultural” (Tomasello, Krüger, & Ratner,
1993). The forms of sociality that are mostly clearly unique
to human beings emerge in their ontogeny at approximately 9
months of age - what I have called the 9-month
social-cognitive revolution (Tomasello, 1995). This is the
age at which infants typically begin to engage in the kinds
of joint-attentional interactions in which they master the
use of cultural artifacts, including tools and language, and
become fully active participants in all types of cultural
rituals, scripts, and games. In this chapter, my goals are
to (1) characterize the primate and human forms of sociality
and cultural transmission, and (2) characterize in more
detail the ontogeny of human cultural propensities.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511804670.004},
Key = {fds351839}
}
@misc{fds368904,
Author = {Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {CHILDREN’S FIRST LANGUAGE ACQUISITION FROM A USAGE-BASED
PERSPECTIVE1},
Pages = {168-196},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language
Acquisition},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780203938560},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203938560-16},
Abstract = {There are, however, major debates as to what they bring to
this language learning: do they come with innate,
specifically syntactic skills or, rather, with more general
cognitive and interactive skills? In this chapter, we will
argue for the latter and suggest that children’s language
development can be explained in terms of species-specific
learning and intentional communication. We argue that the
child learns language from actual “usage events,” i.e.
from particular utterances in particular contexts, and
builds up increasingly complex and abstract linguistic
representations from these.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203938560-16},
Key = {fds368904}
}
@misc{fds376753,
Author = {Matthews, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Grammar},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {V2-38-V2-50},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development,
Three-Volume Set},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780123704603},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6},
Abstract = {To acquire competence with a natural language, young
children must master the grammatical constructions of their
language(s). In this article we outline the main theoretical
issues in the field and trace the developmental path
children follow from talking in single-unit
‘holophrases’ to using complex, abstract constructions.
We describe the development of children’s initial skills
with word order, case marking, and morphology as abstract
elements in early constructions, and we discuss the level of
abstraction characteristic of young children’s grammatical
constructions at different stages of development and in some
different languages of the world. Finally, we consider the
learning processes that enable young children both to
acquire and to abstract across grammatical
constructions.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-012370877-9.00073-6},
Key = {fds376753}
}
@article{fds351845,
Author = {Moll, H and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Fourteen-month-olds know what others experience only in
joint engagement.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {10},
Number = {6},
Pages = {826-835},
Year = {2007},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00615.x},
Abstract = {We investigated how 14-month-old infants know what others
know. In two studies, an infant played with each of two
objects in turn while an experimenter was present. Then the
experimenter left the room, and the infant played with a
third object with an assistant. The experimenter returned,
faced all three objects, and said excitedly 'Look! Can you
give it to me?' In Study 1, the experimenter experienced
each of the first two toys in episodes of joint visual
engagement (without manipulation) with the infant. In
response to her excited request infants gave the
experimenter the object she did not know, thus demonstrating
that they knew which ones she knew. In Study 2, infants
witnessed the experimenter jointly engage around each of the
experienced toys with the assistant, from a third-person
perspective. In response to her request, infants did not
give the experimenter the object she had not experienced. In
combination with other studies, these results suggest that
to know what others have experienced 14-month-old infants
must do more than just perceive others perceiving something;
they must engage with them actively in joint
engagement.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00615.x},
Key = {fds351845}
}
@article{fds351846,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How toddlers and preschoolers learn to uniquely identify
referents for others: a training study.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {78},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1744-1759},
Year = {2007},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01098.x},
Abstract = {This training study investigates how children learn to refer
to things unambiguously. Two hundred twenty-four children
aged 2.6, 3.6, and 4.6 years were pre- and posttested for
their ability to request stickers from a dense array.
Between test sessions, children were assigned to a training
condition in which they (a) asked for stickers from an
adult, (b) responded to an adult's requests for stickers,
(c) observed 1 adult ask another for stickers, or (d) heard
model descriptions of stickers. All conditions yielded
improvements in referring strategies, with condition (a)
being most effective. Four-year-olds additionally
demonstrated learning effects in a transfer task. These
results suggest that young children's communication skills
develop best in response to feedback about their own
attempts at reference.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01098.x},
Key = {fds351846}
}
@article{fds351847,
Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees are rational maximizers in an ultimatum
game.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {318},
Number = {5847},
Pages = {107-109},
Year = {2007},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1145850},
Abstract = {Traditional models of economic decision-making assume that
people are self-interested rational maximizers. Empirical
research has demonstrated, however, that people will take
into account the interests of others and are sensitive to
norms of cooperation and fairness. In one of the most robust
tests of this finding, the ultimatum game, individuals will
reject a proposed division of a monetary windfall, at a cost
to themselves, if they perceive it as unfair. Here we show
that in an ultimatum game, humans' closest living relatives,
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), are rational maximizers and
are not sensitive to fairness. These results support the
hypothesis that other-regarding preferences and aversion to
inequitable outcomes, which play key roles in human social
organization, distinguish us from our closest living
relatives.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1145850},
Key = {fds351847}
}
@article{fds366597,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees really know what others can see in a competitive
situation.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {10},
Number = {4},
Pages = {439-448},
Year = {2007},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-007-0088-1},
Abstract = {Chimpanzee's perspective-taking abilities are currently
disputed. Here we show that in some food competition
contexts, subordinate chimpanzees do take the visual
perspective of dominant individuals, preferentially
targeting a hidden piece of the food that the dominant
cannot see over a piece that is visible to both individuals.
However, the space where the animals compete is critical in
determining whether subjects demonstrate this skill. We
suggest that competition intensity, as mediated by these
spatial factors, may play an important role in determining
the strategy chimpanzees utilize in competitive contexts.
Since some strategies may not require visual perspective
taking in order to be successful, chimpanzees may not always
demonstrate this skill. Differences in spatial arrangement
may therefore account for the conflicting results of past
studies.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-007-0088-1},
Key = {fds366597}
}
@article{fds320805,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Call, J and Hernàndez-Lloreda, MV and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition:
the cultural intelligence hypothesis.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {317},
Number = {5843},
Pages = {1360-1366},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1146282},
Abstract = {Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their
nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence
hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a
species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging
early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging
knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by
giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large
numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives,
chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human
children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the
cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the
hypothesis that humans simply have more "general
intelligence," we found that the children and chimpanzees
had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the
physical world but that the children had more sophisticated
cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing
with the social world.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1146282},
Key = {fds320805}
}
@article{fds351848,
Author = {Kidd, E and Brandt, S and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Object relatives made easy: A cross-linguistic comparison of
the constraints influencing young children's processing of
relative clauses},
Journal = {Language and Cognitive Processes},
Volume = {22},
Number = {6},
Pages = {860-897},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01690960601155284},
Abstract = {We present the results from four studies, two corpora and
two experimental, which suggest that English- and
German-speaking children (3;1-4;9 years) use multiple
constraints to process and produce object relative clauses.
Our two corpora studies show that children produce object
relatives that reflect the distributional and discourse
regularities of the input. Specifically, the results show
that when children produce object relatives they most often
do so with (a) an inanimate head noun, and (b) a pronominal
relative clause subject. Our experimental findings show that
children use these constraints to process and produce this
construction type. Moreover, when children were required to
repeat the object relatives they most often use in
naturalistic speech, the subject-object asymmetry in
processing of relative clauses disappeared. We also report
cross-linguistic differences in children's rate of
acquisition which reflect properties of the input language.
Overall, our results suggest that children are sensitive to
the same constraints on relative clause processing as
adults.},
Doi = {10.1080/01690960601155284},
Key = {fds351848}
}
@article{fds351849,
Author = {Grassmann, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds use primary sentence accent to learn new
words.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {34},
Number = {3},
Pages = {677-687},
Year = {2007},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000907008021},
Abstract = {German children aged 2;1 heard a sentence containing a nonce
noun and a nonce verb (Der Feks miekt). Either the noun or
the verb was prosodically highlighted by increased pitch,
duration and loudness. Independently, either the object or
the action in the ongoing referential scene was the new
element in the situation. Children learned the nonce noun
only when it was both highlighted prosodically and the
object in the scene was referentially new. They did not
learn the nonce verb in any condition. These results suggest
that from early in linguistic development, young children
understand that prosodic salience in a sentence indicates
referential newness.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000907008021},
Key = {fds351849}
}
@article{fds351850,
Author = {Jensen, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees are vengeful but not spiteful.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {104},
Number = {32},
Pages = {13046-13050},
Year = {2007},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0705555104},
Abstract = {People are willing to punish others at a personal cost, and
this apparently antisocial tendency can stabilize
cooperation. What motivates humans to punish noncooperators
is likely a combination of aversion to both unfair outcomes
and unfair intentions. Here we report a pair of studies in
which captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) did not inflict
costs on conspecifics by knocking food away if the outcome
alone was personally disadvantageous but did retaliate
against conspecifics who actually stole the food from them.
Like humans, chimpanzees retaliate against personally
harmful actions, but unlike humans, they are indifferent to
simply personally disadvantageous outcomes and are therefore
not spiteful.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.0705555104},
Key = {fds351850}
}
@article{fds325191,
Author = {Warneken, F and Hare, B and Melis, AP and Hanus, D and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young
children.},
Journal = {PLoS biology},
Volume = {5},
Number = {7},
Pages = {e184},
Year = {2007},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184},
Abstract = {People often act on behalf of others. They do so without
immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even
toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed
that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology
not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives,
such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few
experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have
produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report
experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms
of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and
repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two
comparative studies, semi-free ranging chimpanzees helped an
unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants,
irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the
helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study,
chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to
food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a
newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These
results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of
altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human
altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence
suggested.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184},
Key = {fds325191}
}
@article{fds351851,
Author = {Buttelmann, D and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Enculturated chimpanzees imitate rationally.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {10},
Number = {4},
Pages = {F31-F38},
Year = {2007},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00630.x},
Abstract = {Human infants imitate others' actions 'rationally': they
copy a demonstrator's action when that action is freely
chosen, but less when it is forced by some constraint
(Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002). We investigated
whether enculturated chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) also
imitate rationally. Using Gergely and colleagues' (2002)
basic procedure, a human demonstrator operated each of six
apparatuses using an unusual body part (he pressed it with
his forehead or foot, or sat on it). In the Hands Free
condition he used this unusual means even though his hands
were free, suggesting a free choice. In the Hands Occupied
condition he used the unusual means only because his hands
were occupied, suggesting a constrained or forced choice.
Like human infants, chimpanzees imitated the modeled action
more often in the Hands Free than in the Hands Occupied
condition. Enculturated chimpanzees thus have some
understanding of the rationality of others' intentional
actions, and use this understanding when imitating
others.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00630.x},
Key = {fds351851}
}
@article{fds351852,
Author = {Okamoto-Barth, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Great apes' understanding of other individuals' line of
sight.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {462-468},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01922.x},
Abstract = {Previous research has shown that many social animals follow
the gaze of other individuals. However, knowledge about how
this skill differs between species and whether it shows a
relationship with genetic distance from humans is still
fragmentary. In the present study of gaze following in great
apes, we manipulated the nature of a visual obstruction and
the presence/absence of a target. We found that bonobos,
chimpanzees, and gorillas followed gaze significantly more
often when the obstruction had a window than when it did
not, just as human infants do. Additionally, bonobos and
chimpanzees looked at the experimenter's side of a
windowless obstruction more often than the other species.
Moreover, bonobos produced more double looks when the
barrier was opaque than when it had a window, indicating an
understanding of what other individuals see. The most
distant human relatives studied, orangutans, showed few
signs of understanding what another individual saw. Instead,
they were attracted to the target's location by the target's
presence, but not by the experimenter's gaze. Great apes'
perspective-taking skills seem to have increased in the
evolutionary lineage leading to bonobos, chimpanzees, and
humans.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01922.x},
Key = {fds351852}
}
@article{fds351853,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {French children's use and correction of weird word orders: a
constructivist account.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {381-409},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030500090600794x},
Abstract = {Using the weird word order methodology (Akhtar, 1999), we
investigated children's understanding of SVO word order in
French, a language with less consistent argument ordering
patterns than English. One hundred and twelve French
children (ages 2; 10 and 3; 9) heard either high or low
frequency verbs modelled in either SOV or VSO order (both
ungrammatical). Results showed that: (1) children were more
likely to adopt a weird word order if they heard lower
frequency verbs, suggesting gradual learning; (2) children
in the high frequency conditions tended to correct the
ungrammatical model they heard to the closest grammatical
alternative, suggesting different models activated different
grammatical schemas; and (3) children were less likely to
express the object of a transitive verb than were English
children in an equivalent study, suggesting object
expression is more difficult to master in French, perhaps
because of its inconsistency in the input. These findings
are discussed in the context of a usage-based model of
language acquisition.},
Doi = {10.1017/s030500090600794x},
Key = {fds351853}
}
@article{fds351854,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Liszkowski, U},
Title = {A new look at infant pointing.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {78},
Number = {3},
Pages = {705-722},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01025.x},
Abstract = {The current article proposes a new theory of infant pointing
involving multiple layers of intentionality and shared
intentionality. In the context of this theory, evidence is
presented for a rich interpretation of prelinguistic
communication, that is, one that posits that when
12-month-old infants point for an adult they are in some
sense trying to influence her mental states. Moreover,
evidence is also presented for a deeply social view in which
infant pointing is best understood--on many levels and in
many ways--as depending on uniquely human skills and
motivations for cooperation and shared intentionality (e.g.,
joint intentions and attention with others). Children's
early linguistic skills are built on this already existing
platform of prelinguistic communication.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01025.x},
Key = {fds351854}
}
@article{fds366598,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll,
H},
Title = {Understanding of intentions, shared intentions: The origins
of cultural thinking},
Journal = {Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle},
Volume = {62},
Number = {1},
Pages = {61-105},
Year = {2007},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/MPSzle.62.2007.1.4},
Abstract = {We propose that the crucial difference between human
cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with
shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality.
Participation in such activities requires not only
especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural
learning, but also a unique motivation to share
psychological states with others and unique forms of
cognitive representation for doing so. The result of
participating in these activities is species-unique forms of
cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from
the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the
construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the
establishment of social institutions. In support of this
proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and
some children with autism) understand the basics of
intentional action, but they still do not participate in
activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared
intentionality). Human children's skills of shared
intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months
of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: 1. the
general ape line of understanding others as animate,
goal-directed, and intentional agents; and 2. a
species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and
activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is
children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive
representations, which enable them to participate in earnest
in the collectivity that is human cognition.},
Doi = {10.1556/MPSzle.62.2007.1.4},
Key = {fds366598}
}
@misc{fds351855,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence
hypothesis.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {362},
Number = {1480},
Pages = {639-648},
Year = {2007},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.2000},
Abstract = {Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed
that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was
social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social
dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates
and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and
teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in
general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond
that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by,
or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present
paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence
hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great
apes with those of young human children in several domains
of activity involving cooperation and communication with
others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in
cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads
children to construct uniquely powerful forms of
perspectival cognitive representation.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2006.2000},
Key = {fds351855}
}
@article{fds325192,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Lehmann, H and Call,
J},
Title = {Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great
apes and human infants: the cooperative eye
hypothesis.},
Journal = {Journal of human evolution},
Volume = {52},
Number = {3},
Pages = {314-320},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001},
Abstract = {As compared with other primates, humans have especially
visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that
this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for
conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in
close-range joint attentional and communicative
interactions, which would seem to imply especially
cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current
study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye
hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great
apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked"
to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes
closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed
gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head
direction (although eye direction played some role as well).
In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye
direction in these same situations. These results
demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in
gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes
evolved a new social function in human evolution, most
likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social
interactions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jhevol.2006.10.001},
Key = {fds325192}
}
@article{fds351856,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12
months of age.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {F1-F7},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x},
Abstract = {There is currently controversy over the nature of
1-year-olds' social-cognitive understanding and motives. In
this study we investigated whether 12-month-old infants
point for others with an understanding of their knowledge
states and with a prosocial motive for sharing experiences
with them. Declarative pointing was elicited in four
conditions created by crossing two factors: an adult partner
(1) was already attending to the target event or not, and
(2) emoted positively or neutrally. Pointing was also coded
after the event had ceased. The findings suggest that
12-month-olds point to inform others of events they do not
know about, that they point to share an attitude about
mutually attended events others already know about, and that
they can point (already prelinguistically) to absent
referents. These findings provide strong support for a
mentalistic and prosocial interpretation of infants'
prelinguistic communication.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x},
Key = {fds351856}
}
@article{fds351857,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How 14- and 18-month-olds know what others have
experienced.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {43},
Number = {2},
Pages = {309-317},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.2.309},
Abstract = {Fourteen- and 18-month-old infants observed an adult
experiencing each of 2 objects (experienced objects) and
then leaving the room; the infant then played with a 3rd
object while the adult was gone (unexperienced object). The
adult interacted with the 2 experienced objects in 1 of 3
ways: by (a) sharing them with the infant in an episode of
joint engagement, (b) actively manipulating and inspecting
them on his or her own as the infant watched (individual
engagement), or (c) looking at them from a distance as the
infant played with them (onlooking). As evidenced in a
selection task, infants of both ages knew which objects had
been experienced by the adult in the joint engagement
condition, only the 18-month-olds knew this in the
individual engagement condition, and infants at neither age
knew this in the onlooking condition. These results suggest
that infants are 1st able to determine what adults know
(have experienced) on the basis of their direct, triadic
engagements with them.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.43.2.309},
Key = {fds351857}
}
@article{fds351858,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Reference and attitude in infant pointing.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-20},
Year = {2007},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000906007689},
Abstract = {We investigated two main components of infant declarative
pointing, reference and attitude, in two experiments with a
total of 106 preverbal infants at 1;0. When an experimenter
(E) responded to the declarative pointing of these infants
by attending to an incorrect referent (with positive
attitude), infants repeated pointing within trials to
redirect E's attention, showing an understanding of E's
reference and active message repair. In contrast, when E
identified infants' referent correctly but displayed a
disinterested attitude, infants did not repeat pointing
within trials and pointed overall in fewer trials, showing
an understanding of E's unenthusiastic attitude about the
referent. When E attended to infants' intended referent AND
shared interest in it, infants were most satisfied, showing
no message repair within trials and pointing overall in more
trials. These results suggest that by twelve months of age
infant declarative pointing is a full communicative act
aimed at sharing with others both attention to a referent
and a specific attitude about that referent.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000906007689},
Key = {fds351858}
}
@article{fds351859,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {"This way!", "No! That way!"-3-year olds know that two
people can have mutually incompatible desires},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {47-68},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.002},
Abstract = {In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute
about whether children come to understand the subjectivity
of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4),
or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are
understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds'
understanding of situations in which two persons have
mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies.
Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at
ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in
simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent
emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though
they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these
results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young
children come to understand the subjective nature of desires
before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of
beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are
discussed in light of conceptual change and
information-processing accounts of theory of mind
development. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.002},
Key = {fds351859}
}
@article{fds351860,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {271-294},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2007.tb00227.x},
Abstract = {Two experiments investigated the proclivity of 14-month-old
infants (a) to altruistically help others toward individual
goals, and (b) to cooperate toward a shared goal. The
infants helped another person by handing over objects the
other person was unsuccessfully roaching for, but did not
help reliably in situations involving more complex goals.
When a programmed adult partner interrupted a joint
cooperative activity at specific moments, infants sometimes
tried to reengage the adult, perhaps indicating that they
understood the interdependency of actions toward a shared
goal. However, as compared to 18- and 24-month-olds, their
skills in behaviorally coordinating their actions with a
social partner remained rudimentary. Results are integrated
into a model of cooperative activities as they develop over
the 2nd year of life. Copyright © 2007, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7078.2007.tb00227.x},
Key = {fds351860}
}
@article{fds351861,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M},
Title = {Shared intentionality.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {121-125},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x},
Abstract = {We argue for the importance of processes of shared
intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We
look briefly at four important social-cognitive skills and
how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each
case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of
the skill -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of
chimpanzees -- and then at a version based on shared
intentionality -- as exemplified most clearly in the
behavior of human 1- and 2-year-olds. We thus see the
following transformations: gaze following into joint
attention, social manipulation into cooperative
communication, group activity into collaboration, and social
learning into instructed learning. We conclude by
highlighting the role that shared intentionality may play in
integrating more biologically based and more culturally
based theories of human development.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x},
Key = {fds351861}
}
@article{fds351862,
Author = {Schwier, C and van Maanen, C and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Rational imitation in 12-month-old infants},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {303-311},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327078in1003_6},
Abstract = {Gergely, Bekkering, and Király (2002) demonstrated that
14-month-old infants engage in "rational imitation." To
investigate the development and flexibility of this skill,
we tested 12-month-olds on a different but analogous task.
Infants watched as an adult made a toy animal use a
particular action to get to an endpoint. In 1 condition
there was a barrier that prevented a more straightforward
action and so gave the actor no choice but to use the
demonstrated action. In the other condition there was no
barrier, so the actor had a free choice to use the
demonstrated action or not. Twelve-month-olds showed the
same pattern of results as in Gergely and colleagues' study:
They copied the particular action demonstrated more often
when the adult freely chose to use the action than when she
was forced to use it. Twelve-month-olds, too, thus show an
understanding of others' intentions as rational choices and
can use this understanding in cultural learning contexts.
Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15327078in1003_6},
Key = {fds351862}
}
@article{fds351863,
Author = {Tennie, C and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Push or pull: Imitation vs. emulation in great apes and
human children},
Journal = {Ethology},
Volume = {112},
Number = {12},
Pages = {1159-1169},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.2006.01269.x},
Abstract = {All four species of great apes and young human children
(12-24 mo of age) were administered an imitation task
designed to distinguish between results learning (emulation)
and action learning (imitation). Some subjects were exposed
to a demonstrator either pushing or pulling a door to open a
box, whereas others simply saw the door of the box opening
itself in one of the two directions (the ghost control).
Most of the apes successfully opened the box in both
experimental conditions, as well as in a baseline condition,
but without being influenced either by the demonstrator's
actions or by the door's motions. In contrast, human
children over 12 mo of age were influenced by the
demonstration: the 18-mo-olds were influenced by the
demonstrator's actions, and the 24-mo-olds were influenced
both by the demonstrator's actions and by the door's motions
in the ghost control. These results provide support for the
hypothesis that human children have a greater propensity
than great apes for focusing either on a demonstrator's
action or on the result of their action, as needed, in
social learning situations. © 2006 The Authors.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1439-0310.2006.01269.x},
Key = {fds351863}
}
@article{fds366599,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Are apes really inequity averse?},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {273},
Number = {1605},
Pages = {3123-3128},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3693},
Abstract = {Brosnan et al. (Brosnan, S. F. Schiff, H. C. & de Waal, F.
B. M. 2005 Tolerance for inequity may increase with social
closeness in chimpanzees. Proc. R. Soc. B272, 253-258) found
that chimpanzees showed increased levels of rejection for
less-preferred food when competitors received better food
than themselves and postulated as an explanation inequity
aversion. In the present study, we extended these findings
by adding important control conditions, and we investigated
whether inequity aversion could also be found in the other
great ape species and whether it would be influenced by
subjects' relationship with the competitor. In the present
study, subjects showed a pattern of food rejection opposite
to the subjects of the above study by Brosnan et al. (2005).
Our apes ignored fewer food pieces and stayed longer in
front of the experimenter when a conspecific received better
food than themselves. Moreover, chimpanzees begged more
vigorously when the conspecific got favoured food. The most
plausible explanation for these results is the food
expectation hypothesis - seeing another individual receive
high-quality food creates the expectation of receiving the
same food oneself - and not inequity aversion.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2006.3693},
Key = {fds366599}
}
@article{fds351864,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Goats' behaviour in a competitive food paradigm: Evidence
for perspective taking?},
Journal = {Behaviour},
Volume = {143},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1341-1356},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853906778987542},
Abstract = {Many mammalian species are highly social, creating
intra-group competition for such things as food and mates.
Recent research with nonhuman primates indicates that in
competitive situations individuals know what other
individuals can and cannot see, and they use this knowledge
to their advantage in various ways. In the current study, we
extended these findings to a non-primate species, the
domestic goat, using the conspecific competition paradigm
developed by Hare et al. (2000). Like chimpanzees and some
other nonhuman primates, goats live in fission-fusion
societies, form coalitions and alliances, and are known to
reconcile after fights. In the current study, a dominant and
a subordinate individual competed for food, but in some
cases the subordinate could see things that the dominant
could not. In the condition where dominants could only see
one piece of food but subordinates could see both,
subordinates' preferences depended on whether they received
aggression from the dominant animal during the experiment.
Subjects who received aggression preferred the hidden over
the visible piece of food, whereas subjects who never
received aggression significantly preferred the visible
piece. By using this strategy, goats who had not received
aggression got significantly more food than the other goats.
Such complex social interactions may be supported by
cognitive mechanisms similar to those of chimpanzees. We
discuss these results in the context of current issues in
mammalian cognition and socio-ecology. © Brill Academic
Publishers 2006.},
Doi = {10.1163/156853906778987542},
Key = {fds351864}
}
@article{fds351865,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense
acts.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {9},
Number = {6},
Pages = {557-564},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00533.x},
Abstract = {Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their
understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action
form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending
to perform an action and trying to perform that action -
were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to
some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses
that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds
of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves
performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas
after the trying models they properly performed the action
or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are
discussed in the light of recent debates about children's
developing understanding of pretense and theory of
mind.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00533.x},
Key = {fds351865}
}
@article{fds325195,
Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by
hiding.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {101},
Number = {3},
Pages = {495-514},
Year = {2006},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011},
Abstract = {There is little experimental evidence that any non-human
species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate
the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g.,
manipulating what another sees). We show here that
chimpanzees, one of humans' two closest primate relatives,
sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others.
Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel
tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to
approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the
human's view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so).
These findings not only corroborate previous work showing
that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but
also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are
skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether
others can or cannot see them.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011},
Key = {fds325195}
}
@article{fds351866,
Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Exemplar-learning and schematization in a usage-based
account of syntactic acquisition},
Journal = {Linguistic Review},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {275-290},
Year = {2006},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/TLR.2006.011},
Abstract = {The early phases of syntactic acquisition are characterized
by many input frequency and item effects, which argue
against theories assuming innate access to classical
syntactic categories. In formulating an alternative view, we
consider both prototype and exemplar-learning models of
categorization. We argue for a 'hybrid' usage-based view in
which acquisition depends on exemplar learning and
retention, out of which permanent abstract schemas gradually
emerge and are immanent across the summed similarity of
exemplar collections. These schemas are graded in strength
depending on the number of exemplars and the degree to which
semantic similarity is reinforced by phonological, lexical,
and distributional similarity. © Walter de Gruyter
2006.},
Doi = {10.1515/TLR.2006.011},
Key = {fds351866}
}
@article{fds351867,
Author = {Moll, H and Koring, C and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Infants determine others' focus of attention by pragmatics
and exlusion},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {411-430},
Year = {2006},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0703_9},
Abstract = {In the studies presented here, infants' understanding of
others' attention was assessed when gaze direction cues were
not diagnostic. Fourteen-, 18- and 24-month-olds witnessed
an adult look to the side of an object and express
excitement. In 1 experimental condition this object was new
for the adult because she was not present while the child
and someone else played with it earlier. Children responded
to this as if they assumed that the adult was excited about
this new object as a whole. In the other condition the
object was one with which the infant and this adult had just
previously played for a minute. In this case children
appeared to assume that the adult could not be excited about
this object in itself. They responded either by attending to
a specific part of the object or, more frequently, by
looking around the room for another object. These results
suggest that 1-year-olds can determine what others are
attending to based on a pragmatic assessment of what is new
and what is old for them combined with a form of reasoning
by exclusion. Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0703_9},
Key = {fds351867}
}
@article{fds351868,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Level I perspective-taking at 24 months of
age},
Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {24},
Number = {3},
Pages = {603-613},
Year = {2006},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151005X55370},
Abstract = {The current study sought to determine the age at which
children first engage in Level I visual perspective-taking,
in which they understand that the content of what another
person sees in a situation may sometimes differ from what
they see. An adult entered the room searching for an object.
One candidate object was out in the open, whereas another
was visible for the child but behind an occluder from the
adults perspective. When asked to help the adult find the
sought-for object, 24-month-old children, but not
18-month-old children, handed him the occluded object
(whereas in a control condition they showed no preference
for the occluded toy). We argue that the performance of the
24-month-olds requires Level I visual perspective-taking
skills and that this is the youngest age at which these
skills have been demonstrated. © 2006 The British
Psychological Society.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151005X55370},
Key = {fds351868}
}
@article{fds351869,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Apes' and children's understanding of cooperative and
competitive motives in a communicative situation.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {9},
Number = {5},
Pages = {518-529},
Year = {2006},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00519.x},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus)
(Study 1) and 18- and 24-month-old human children (Study 2)
participated in a novel communicative task. A human
experimenter (E) hid food or a toy in one of two opaque
containers before gesturing towards the reward's location in
one of two ways. In the Informing condition, she attempted
to help the subject find the hidden object by simply
pointing to the correct container. In the Prohibiting
condition, E held out her arm toward the correct container
(palm out) and told the subject firmly 'Don't take this
one.' As in previous studies, the apes were at chance in the
Informing condition. However, they were above chance in the
new Prohibiting condition. Human 18-month-olds showed this
same pattern of results, whereas 24-month-olds showed the
opposite pattern: they were better in the Informing
condition than in the Prohibiting condition. In our
interpretation, success in the Prohibiting condition
requires subjects to understand E's goal toward them and
their behavior, and then to make an inference (she would
only prohibit if there were something good in there).
Success in the Informing condition requires subjects to
understand a cooperative communicative motive - which
apparently apes and young infants find difficult.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00519.x},
Key = {fds351869}
}
@article{fds325194,
Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Engineering cooperation in chimpanzees: tolerance
constraints on cooperation},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {72},
Number = {2},
Pages = {275-286},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2006},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018},
Abstract = {The cooperative abilities of captive chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes, in experiments do not match the sophistication
that might be predicted based on their naturally occurring
cooperative behaviours. This discrepancy might partly be
because in previous experiments potential chimpanzee
cooperators were partnered without regard to their social
relationship. We investigated the ability of chimpanzee
dyads to solve a physical task cooperatively in relation to
their interindividual tolerance levels. Pairs that were most
capable of sharing food outside the test were also able to
cooperate spontaneously (by simultaneously pulling two
ropes) to obtain food. In contrast, pairs that were less
inclined to share food outside of the test were unlikely to
cooperate. Furthermore, previously successful subjects
stopped cooperating when paired with a less tolerant
partner, even when the food rewards were presented in a
dispersed and divisible form to reduce competition between
subjects. These results show that although chimpanzees are
capable of spontaneous cooperation in a novel instrumental
task, tolerance acts as a constraint on their ability to
solve such cooperative problems. This finding highlights the
importance of controlling such social constraints in future
experiments on chimpanzee cooperation, and suggests that the
evolution of human-like cooperative skills might have been
preceded by the evolution of a more egalitarian social
system and a more human-like temperament. © 2006 The
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.018},
Key = {fds325194}
}
@article{fds351870,
Author = {Ambridge, B and Rowland, CF and Theakston, AL and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Comparing different accounts of inversion errors in
children's non-subject wh-questions: 'What experimental data
can tell us?'.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {519-557},
Year = {2006},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000906007513},
Abstract = {This study investigated different accounts of children's
acquisition of non-subject wh-questions. Questions using
each of 4 wh-words (what, who, how and why), and 3
auxiliaries (BE, DO and CAN) in 3sg and 3pl form were
elicited from 28 children aged 3;6-4;6. Rates of
noninversion error (Who she is hitting?) were found not to
differ by wh-word, auxiliary or number alone, but by lexical
auxiliary subtype and by wh-word+lexical auxiliary
combination. This finding counts against simple rule-based
accounts of question acquisition that include no role for
the lexical subtype of the auxiliary, and suggests that
children may initially acquire wh-word + lexical auxiliary
combinations from the input. For DO questions,
auxiliary-doubling errors (What does she does like?) were
also observed, although previous research has found that
such errors are virtually non-existent for positive
questions. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000906007513},
Key = {fds351870}
}
@article{fds351871,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Striano, T and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {12- and 18-month-olds point to provide information for
others},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {173-187},
Year = {2006},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2},
Abstract = {Classically, infants are thought to point for 2 main
reasons: (a) They point imperatively when they want an adult
to do something for them (e.g., give them something;
"Juice!"), and (b) they point declaratively when they want
an adult to share attention with them to some interesting
event or object ("Look!"). Here we demonstrate the existence
of another motive for infants' early pointing gestures: to
inform another person of the location of an object that
person is searching for. This informative motive for
pointing suggests that from very early in ontogeny humans
conceive of others as intentional agents with informational
states and they have the motivation to provide such
information communicatively. Copyright © 2006, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2},
Key = {fds351871}
}
@article{fds366600,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T},
Title = {The role of experience and discourse in children's
developing understanding of pretend play
actions},
Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {305-335},
Year = {2006},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151005X36001},
Abstract = {The present work investigated the development of an explicit
understanding of pretend play actions. Study I revealed a
long décalage between earlier implicit understanding of
pretence as an intentional activity and a later more
explicit understanding. Study 2 was a training study. It
tested for two factors - systematic pretence experience and
explicit pretence discourse - that may be important in
development from early implicit to later explicit pretence
understanding. Two training groups of 3.5-year-old children
received the same pretence experiences involving systematic
contrasts between pretending, really performing and trying
to perform actions. In the 'explicit' group, these
experiences were talked about with explicit 'pretend to' and
'pretend that' language. In the 'implicit' group no such
discourse was used, but only implicit discourse in talking
about pretence versus real actions. The two training groups
were compared with a control group that received functional
play experience. After training, only the explicit group
showed improvement in their explicit pretence understanding.
In none of the groups was there any transfer to tasks
tapping mental state understanding, false belief (FB) and
appearance-reality, (A-R). The findings are discussed in the
context of current theories about the developmental
relations between pretence, discourse, and mental state
understanding. © 2006 The British Psychological
Society.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151005X36001},
Key = {fds366600}
}
@article{fds351873,
Author = {Melis, AP and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory
information from others.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {120},
Number = {2},
Pages = {154-162},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.120.2.154},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) competed with a human for
food. The human sat inside a booth, with 1 piece of food to
her left and 1 to her right, which she could retract from
her chimpanzee competitor's reach as needed. In Experiment
1, chimpanzees could approach either side of the booth
unseen but then had to reach through 1 of 2 tunnels (1
clear, 1 opaque) for the food. In Experiment 2, both tunnels
were clear and the human was looking away, but 1 of the
tunnels made a loud noise when it was opened. Chimpanzees
preferentially reached through the opaque tunnel in the
first study and the silent tunnel in the second,
successfully concealing their taking of the food from the
human competitor in both cases. These results suggest that
chimpanzees can, in some circumstances, actively manipulate
the visual and auditory perception of others by concealing
information from them.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.120.2.154},
Key = {fds351873}
}
@article{fds351874,
Author = {Warneken, F and Chen, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cooperative activities in young children and
chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {77},
Number = {3},
Pages = {640-663},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00895.x},
Abstract = {Human children 18-24 months of age and 3 young chimpanzees
interacted in 4 cooperative activities with a human adult
partner. The human children successfully participated in
cooperative problem-solving activities and social games,
whereas the chimpanzees were uninterested in the social
games. As an experimental manipulation, in each task the
adult partner stopped participating at a specific point
during the activity. All children produced at least one
communicative attempt to reengage him, perhaps suggesting
that they were trying to reinstate a shared goal. No
chimpanzee ever made any communicative attempt to reengage
the partner. These results are interpreted as evidence for a
uniquely human form of cooperative activity involving shared
intentionality that emerges in the second year of
life.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00895.x},
Key = {fds351874}
}
@article{fds325193,
Author = {Jensen, K and Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {What's in it for me? Self-regard precludes altruism and
spite in chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {273},
Number = {1589},
Pages = {1013-1021},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3417},
Abstract = {Sensitivity to fairness may influence whether individuals
choose to engage in acts that are mutually beneficial,
selfish, altruistic, or spiteful. In a series of three
experiments, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could pull a rope
to access out-of-reach food while concomitantly pulling
another piece of food further away. In the first study, they
could make a choice that solely benefited themselves
(selfishness), or both themselves and another chimpanzee
(mutualism). In the next two experiments, they could choose
between providing food solely for another chimpanzee
(altruism), or for neither while preventing the other
chimpanzee from receiving a benefit (spite). The main result
across all studies was that chimpanzees made their choices
based solely on personal gain, with no regard for the
outcomes of a conspecific. These results raise questions
about the origins of human cooperative behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2005.3417},
Key = {fds325193}
}
@article{fds351875,
Author = {Ambridge, B and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The distributed learning effect for children's acquisition
of an abstract syntactic construction},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {174-193},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.09.003},
Abstract = {In many cognitive domains, learning is more effective when
exemplars are distributed over a number of sessions than
when they are all presented within one session. The present
study investigated this distributed learning effect with
respect to English-speaking children's acquisition of a
complex grammatical construction. Forty-eight children aged
3;6-5;10 (Experiment 1) and 72 children aged 4;0-5;0
(Experiment 2) were given 10 exposures to the construction
all in one session (massed), or on a schedule of two trials
per day for 5 days (distributed-pairs), or one trial per day
for 10 days (distributed). Children in both the
distributed-pairs and distributed conditions learnt the
construction better than children in the massed condition,
as evidenced by productive use of this construction with a
verb that had not been presented during training.
Methodological and theoretical implications of this finding
are discussed, with particular reference to single-process
accounts of language acquisition. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.09.003},
Key = {fds351875}
}
@article{fds351876,
Author = {Kidd, E and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Examining the role of lexical frequency in the acquisition
and processing of sentential complements},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {93-107},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.01.006},
Abstract = {We present empirical data showing that the relative
frequency with which a verb normally appears in a syntactic
construction predicts young children's ability to remember
and repeat sentences instantiating that construction.
Children aged 2;10-5;8 years were asked to repeat
grammatical and ungrammatical sentential complement
sentences (e.g., 'I think + S'). The sentences contained
complement-taking verbs (CTVs) used with differing
frequencies in children's natural speech. All children
repeated sentences containing high frequency CTVs (e.g.,
think) more accurately than those containing low frequency
CTVs (e.g., hear), and made more sophisticated corrections
to ungrammatical sentences containing high frequency CTVs.
The data suggest that, like adults, children are sensitive
to lexico-constructional collocations. The implications for
language acquisition are discussed. © 2006 Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.01.006},
Key = {fds351876}
}
@article{fds351877,
Author = {Herrmann, E and Melis, AP and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Apes' use of iconic cues in the object-choice
task.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {118-130},
Year = {2006},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0013-4},
Abstract = {In previous studies great apes have shown little ability to
locate hidden food using a physical marker placed by a human
directly on the target location. In this study, we
hypothesized that the perceptual similarity between an
iconic cue and the hidden reward (baited container) would
help apes to infer the location of the food. In the first
two experiments, we found that if an iconic cue is given in
addition to a spatial/indexical cue - e.g., picture or
replica of a banana placed on the target location - apes
(chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas) as a group
performed above chance. However, we also found in two
further experiments that when iconic cues were given on
their own without spatial/indexical information (iconic cue
held up by human with no diagnostic spatial/indexical
information), the apes were back to chance performance. Our
overall conclusion is that although iconic information helps
apes in the process of searching hidden food, the poor
performance found in the last two experiments is due to
apes' lack of understanding of the informative (cooperative)
communicative intention of the experimenter.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-005-0013-4},
Key = {fds351877}
}
@article{fds325196,
Author = {Melis, AP and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {311},
Number = {5765},
Pages = {1297-1300},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1123007},
Abstract = {Humans collaborate with non-kin in special ways, but the
evolutionary foundations of these collaborative skills
remain unclear. We presented chimpanzees with collaboration
problems in which they had to decide when to recruit a
partner and which potential partner to recruit. In an
initial study, individuals recruited a collaborator only
when solving the problem required collaboration. In a second
study, individuals recruited the more effective of two
partners on the basis of their experience with each of them
on a previous day. Therefore, recognizing when collaboration
is necessary and determining who is the best collaborative
partner are skills shared by both chimpanzees and humans, so
such skills may have been present in their common ancestor
before humans evolved their own complex forms of
collaboration.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1123007},
Key = {fds325196}
}
@article{fds351878,
Author = {Warneken, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Altruistic helping in human infants and young
chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {311},
Number = {5765},
Pages = {1301-1303},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1121448},
Abstract = {Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals,
even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the
person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviors
(toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with
some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human.
Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of
age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help
others to achieve their goals in a variety of different
situations. This requires both an understanding of others'
goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we
demonstrate similar though less robust skills and
motivations in three young chimpanzees.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1121448},
Key = {fds351878}
}
@article{fds351879,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Kaminski, J and Riedel, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social
dog, causal ape.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {120},
Number = {1},
Pages = {38-47},
Year = {2006},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38},
Abstract = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the
genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In
each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for
subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or
physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies
of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the
authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful
in using human communicative cues such as the pointing
gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using
physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise
when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the
2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape
hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes'
adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs'
adaptations, during the domestication process, for
cooperative communication with humans.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38},
Key = {fds351879}
}
@article{fds351872,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The effect of perceptual availability and prior discourse on
young children's use of referring expressions},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {403-422},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0142716406060334},
Abstract = {Choosing appropriate referring expressions requires
assessing whether a referent is "available" to the addressee
either perceptually or through discourse. In Study 1, we
found that 3- and 4-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, chose
different referring expressions (noun vs. pronoun) depending
on whether their addressee could see the intended referent
or not. In Study 2, in more neutral discourse contexts than
previous studies, we found that 3- and 4-year-olds clearly
differed in their use of referring expressions according to
whether their addressee had already mentioned a referent.
Moreover, 2-year-olds responded with more naming
constructions when the referent had not been mentioned
previously. This suggests that, despite early
social-cognitive developments, (a) it takes time to master
the given/new contrast linguistically, and (b) children
understand the contrast earlier based on discourse, rather
than perceptual context. © 2006 Cambridge University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0142716406060334},
Key = {fds351872}
}
@article{fds351880,
Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Gestural communication of orangutans (pongo
pygmaeus)},
Journal = {Gesture},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-38},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/gest.6.1.02lie},
Abstract = {This study represents a systematic investigation of the
communicative repertoire of Sumatran orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus abelii), with a focus on intentional signals in two
groups of captive orangutans. The goal was to analyze the
signal repertoire with respect to (1) the number and
frequency of signals (gestures, facial expressions, and
actions), (2) the variability of individual repertoires as a
function of group, age class, and sex, and (3) the
flexibility of use in terms of ‘means-end dissociation’
and ‘audience effects’ and to interpret the findings in
terms of the ecology, social structure and socio-cognitive
skills of orangutans. The results show that orangutans use a
remarkable number of signals including tactile and visual
gestures as well as several more complex actions, though few
facial expressions and no auditory gestures were observed.
One third of signals were used within a play context,
followed by one fourth of interactions in the context of
ingestion. Although the repertoire included several visual
gestures, most of the signals produced were tactile gestures
and they were used particularly in the contexts of
affiliation and agonism, whereas visual gestures dominated
in the context of grooming, ingestion and sexual behavior.
Individual repertoires showed a remarkable degree of
variability as a function of age and group affiliation.
Orangutans used their signals flexibly in several functional
contexts and adjusted the signal they used depending on the
attentional state of the recipient, similar to findings of
other great ape species and gibbons. Thus, the communicative
behavior of orangutans is characterized by a variable and
flexible use of signals possibly reflecting their highly
variable social structure and their sophisticated
socio-cognitive skills, with the dominance of tactile
gestures corresponding to the arboreal nature of this
species. © 2006 John Benjamins Publishing
Company.},
Doi = {10.1075/gest.6.1.02lie},
Key = {fds351880}
}
@article{fds351881,
Author = {Riedel, J and Buttelmann, D and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to
locate hidden food.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {27-35},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0256-0},
Abstract = {Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate
hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested
domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at
pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand
and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of
the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find
the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual
access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either
the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing.
Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the
marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a
communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the
dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than
to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand
boosted performance when it appeared together with the
marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the
hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the
marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups.
In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect
on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of
marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect
on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not
differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the
marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a
genuine communicative cue quite independently from the
experimenter's actions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-005-0256-0},
Key = {fds351881}
}
@article{fds351882,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Beyond formalities: The case of language
acquisition},
Journal = {Linguistic Review},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2-4},
Pages = {183-197},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.183},
Abstract = {Generative grammar retained from American structural
linguistics the 'formal' approach, which basically effaces
the semantic and pragmatic dimensions of grammar. This
creates serious problems for an account of language
acquisition, most especially the problem of how to link
universal grammar to some particular language (the linking
problem). Parameters do not help the situation, as they
depend on a prior linking of the lexical and functional
categories of a language to universal grammar. In contrast,
usage-based accounts of language acquisition do not posit an
innate universal grammar and so have no linking problem. And
if children's cognitive and social skills are conceptualized
in the right way, there is no poverty of the stimulus in
this approach either. In general, the only fully adequate
accounts of language acquisition are those that give a
prominent role to children's comprehension of communicative
function in everything from words to grammatical morphemes
to complex syntactic constructions. © Walter de
Gruyter.},
Doi = {10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.183},
Key = {fds351882}
}
@article{fds351883,
Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {German-speaking children's productivity with syntactic
constructions and case morphology: Local cues act
locally},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {103-125},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0142723705049120},
Abstract = {It has been proposed that children acquiring case-marking
languages might be quicker to acquire certain constructions
than children acquiring word order languages, because the
cues involved in grammatical morphology are more 'local',
whereas word order is an inherently distributed cue (Slobin,
1982). In the current studies using nonce nouns and verbs,
we establish that German-speaking children are not
productive with passive and active transitive sentence-level
constructions at an earlier age than English-speaking
children; the majority of children learning both languages
are not productive until after their third birthdays. In
contrast, in the second and third studies reported here, the
majority of German-speaking children were productive with
nominative and accusative case marking inside NPs before
their third birthdays - and these are of course the very
same case markers centrally involved in passive and active
transitive constructions. We conclude from these results
that, whereas for some functions mastering local cues is all
that is required, and this is fairly simple, in other cases,
such as the case marking involved in sentence-level
syntactic constructions, the mastery of local cues is only
one part of the process of forming complex analogical
relationships among utterances. Copyright © 2005 SAGE
Publications.},
Doi = {10.1177/0142723705049120},
Key = {fds351883}
}
@article{fds351884,
Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A new look at the acquisition of relative
clauses},
Journal = {Language},
Volume = {81},
Number = {4},
Pages = {882-906},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2005.0169},
Abstract = {This study reconsiders the acquisition of relative clauses
based on data from two sentence-repetition tasks. Using
materials modeled on the relative constructions of
spontaneous child speech, we asked four-year-old English-
and German-speaking children to repeat six different types
of relative clauses. Although English and German relative
clauses are structurally very different, the results were
similar across studies: intransitive subject relatives
caused fewer errors than transitive subject relatives and
direct object relatives, which in turn caused fewer errors
than indirect object relatives and oblique relatives;
finally, genitive relatives caused by far the most problems.
Challenging previous analyses in which the acquisition of
relative clauses has been explained by the varying distance
between filler and gap, we propose a multifactorial analysis
in which the acquisition process is determined primarily by
the similarity between the various types of relative clauses
and their relationship to simple sentences.},
Doi = {10.1353/lan.2005.0169},
Key = {fds351884}
}
@article{fds351885,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M and Striano, T},
Title = {Role reversal imitation and language in typically developing
infants and children with autism},
Journal = {Infancy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {253-278},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327078in0803_4},
Abstract = {Three types of role reversal imitation were investigated in
typically developing 12-and 18-month-old infants and in
children with autism and other developmental delays. Many
typically developing infants at both ages engaged in each of
the 2 types of dyadic, body-oriented role reversal
imitation: self-self reversals, in which the adult acted on
herself and the child then acted on himself, and other-other
reversals, in which the adult acted on the child and the
child then acted back on the adult. However, 12-month-olds
had more difficulty than 18-month-olds with triadic,
object-mediated role reversals involving interactions around
objects. There was little evidence of any type of role
reversal imitation in children with autism. Positive
relations were found between role reversal imitation and
various measures of language development for 18-month-olds
and children with autism. Copyright © 2005, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15327078in0803_4},
Key = {fds351885}
}
@article{fds352506,
Author = {Riches, NG and Tomasello, M and Conti-Ramsden,
G},
Title = {Verb learning in children with SLI: frequency and spacing
effects.},
Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research :
JSLHR},
Volume = {48},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1397-1411},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2005/097)},
Abstract = {<h4>Purpose</h4>This study explored the effect of frequency
(number of presentations), and spacing (period between
presentations) on verb learning in children with specific
language impairment (SLI). Children learn words more
efficiently when presentations are frequent and
appropriately spaced, and this study investigated whether
children with SLI likewise benefit. Given that these
children demonstrate greater frequency dependence and rapid
forgetting of recently acquired words, an investigation of
frequency and spacing in this population is especially
warranted.<h4>Method</h4>Twenty-four children with SLI (mean
age 5;6 [years;months]) and 24 language-matched control
children (mean age 3;4) were taught novel verbs during play
sessions. In a repeated measures design, 4 experimental
conditions combined frequency (12 or 18 presentations) and
spacing (all presentations in 1 session, or spread over 4
days). Comprehension and production probes were administered
after the final session and 1 week later.<h4>Results</h4>Although
the children with SLI benefited significantly from frequent
and widely spaced presentations, there were no significant
effect in the control group. The language-impaired children
showed rapid forgetting.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The frequency
and spacing of presentations crucially affect the verb
learning of children with SLI. A training regimen
characterized by appropriately spaced intervals and moderate
repetition will optimally benefit lexical
learning.},
Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2005/097)},
Key = {fds352506}
}
@article{fds351886,
Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {One-year-olds comprehend the communicative intentions behind
gestures in a hiding game.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {6},
Pages = {492-499},
Year = {2005},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00440.x},
Abstract = {This study explored infants' ability to infer communicative
intent as expressed in non-linguistic gestures. Sixty
children aged 14, 18 and 24 months participated. In the
context of a hiding game, an adult indicated for the child
the location of a hidden toy by giving a communicative cue:
either pointing or ostensive gazing toward the container
containing the toy. To succeed in this task children had to
do more than just follow the point or gaze to the target
container. They also had to infer that the adult's behaviour
was relevant to the situation at hand - she wanted to inform
them that the toy was inside the container toward which she
gestured. Children at all three ages successfully used both
types of cues. We conclude that infants as young as 14
months of age can, in some situations, interpret an adult
behaviour as a relevant communicative act done for
them.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00440.x},
Key = {fds351886}
}
@article{fds351887,
Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's sensitivity to listener knowledge and
perceptual context in choosing referring
expressions},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {541-558},
Year = {2005},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716405050290},
Abstract = {Speakers use different types of referring expressions
depending on what the listener knows or is attending to; for
example, they use pronouns for objects that are already
present in the immediate discourse or perceptual context. In
a first study we found that 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children
are strongly influenced by their interlocutor's knowledge of
a referent as expressed in her immediately preceding
utterance. Specifically, when they are asked a question
about a target object ("Where is the broom?"), they tend to
use null references or pronouns to refer to that object ("On
the shelf" or "It's on the shelf"); in contrast, when they
are asked more general questions ("What do we need?") or
contrast questions ("Do we need a mop?") that reveal no
knowledge of the target object they tend to use lexical
nouns ("A broom" or "No, a broom"). In a second study we
found that children at around their second birthday are not
influenced by immediately preceding utterances in this same
way. Finally, in a third study we found that 2.5- and
3.5-year-old children's choice of referring expressions is
very little influenced by the physical arrangements of
objects in the perceptual context, whether it is absent or
needs to be distinguished from a close-by alternative, when
they request a target object from a silent adult. These
results are discussed in terms of children's emerging
understanding of the knowledge and attentional states and
other persons. © 2005 Cambridge University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0142716405050290},
Key = {fds351887}
}
@article{fds351888,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll,
H},
Title = {In search of the uniquely human},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {721-727},
Year = {2005},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05540123},
Abstract = {As Bruner so eloquently points out, and Gauvain echoes,
human beings are unique in their "locality." Individual
groups of humans develop their own unique ways of
symbolizing and doing things - and these can be very
different from the ways of other groups, even those living
quite nearby. Our attempt in the target article was to
propose a theory of the social-cognitive and
social-motivational bases of humans' ability and propensity
to live in this local, that is, this cultural, way - which
no other species does - focusing on such things as the
ability to collaborate and to create shared material and
symbolic artifacts. © 2005 Cambridge University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X05540123},
Key = {fds351888}
}
@article{fds351889,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Behne, T and Moll,
H},
Title = {Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of
cultural cognition.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {675-691},
Year = {2005},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000129},
Abstract = {We propose that the crucial difference between human
cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with
shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality.
Participation in such activities requires not only
especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural
learning, but also a unique motivation to share
psychological states with others and unique forms of
cognitive representation for doing so. The result of
participating in these activities is species-unique forms of
cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from
the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the
construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the
establishment of social institutions. In support of this
proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and
some children with autism) understand the basics of
intentional action, but they still do not participate in
activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared
intentionality). Human children's skills of shared
intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months
of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the
general ape line of understanding others as animate,
goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a
species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and
activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is
children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive
representations, which enable them to participate in earnest
in the collectivity that is human cognition.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x05000129},
Key = {fds351889}
}
@article{fds325197,
Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Human-like social skills in dogs?},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {9},
Pages = {439-444},
Year = {2005},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003},
Abstract = {Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social
and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest
primate relatives. For example, they use human social and
communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find
hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see
in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid
species suggest that these unusual social skills have a
heritable component and initially evolved during
domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating
fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in
chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar
process may have been an important catalyst leading to the
evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The
study of convergent evolution provides an exciting
opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary
processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and
communication.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003},
Key = {fds325197}
}
@article{fds351890,
Author = {Call, J and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Copying results and copying actions in the process of social
learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children
(Homo sapiens).},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {151-163},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0237-8},
Abstract = {There is currently much debate about the nature of social
learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they
can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the
environmental effects of these actions using their own
preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study,
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo
sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open
a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different
experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1)
action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without
actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube,
without showing any actions); (3) both of these components
(in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these
components (in a baseline condition). In the first three
conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the
tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects'
behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they
opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same
location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the
demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas
chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of
the demonstrations (emulation), human children often
reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because
the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure
that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the
understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the
implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees'
understanding of others' intentions are also
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0237-8},
Key = {fds351890}
}
@article{fds351891,
Author = {Kemp, N and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's knowledge of the "determiner" and
"adjective" categories.},
Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research :
JSLHR},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {592-609},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2005/041)},
Abstract = {Children's understanding of the grammatical categories of
"determiner" and "adjective" was examined using 2 different
methodologies. In Experiment 1, children heard novel nouns
combined with either a or the. Few 2-year-olds, but nearly
all 3- and 4-year-olds, subsequently produced the novel
nouns with a different determiner from the modeled
combination. Experiment 2 used a priming methodology.
Children age 2, 3, 4, and 6 years repeated descriptions of
pictures, before describing target pictures themselves. When
the primes consisted of a varied determiner + noun, all age
groups produced more determiner + noun descriptions. When
the primes consisted of a determiner + adjective + noun,
2-year-olds showed no priming. Three- to 6-year-olds showed
item-specific priming, but only 6-year-olds (and to a
limited extent 4-year-olds) showed both item-specific and
structural priming. These results suggest that children
build an understanding of determiners and adjectives
gradually, perhaps from individual lexical items, over a
number of years, and that pragmatic correctness may be
attained particularly late.},
Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2005/041)},
Key = {fds351891}
}
@article{fds351892,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {All great ape species follow gaze to distant locations and
around barriers.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {119},
Number = {2},
Pages = {145-154},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.119.2.145},
Abstract = {Following the gaze direction of conspecifics is an adaptive
skill that enables individuals to obtain useful information
about the location of food, predators, and group mates. In
the current study, the authors compared the gaze-following
skills of all 4 great ape species. In the 1st experiment, a
human either looked to the ceiling or looked straight ahead.
Individuals from all species reliably followed the human's
gaze direction and sometimes even checked back when they
found no target. In a 2nd experiment, the human looked
behind some kind of barrier. Results showed that individuals
from all species reliably put themselves in places from
which they could see what the experimenter was looking at
behind the barrier. These results support the hypothesis
that great apes do not just orient to a target that another
is oriented to, but they actually attempt to take the visual
perspective of the other.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.119.2.145},
Key = {fds351892}
}
@article{fds351893,
Author = {Behne, T and Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Unwilling versus unable: infants' understanding of
intentional action.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {41},
Number = {2},
Pages = {328-337},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.41.2.328},
Abstract = {Infants experienced a female adult handling them toys.
Sometimes, however, the transaction failed, either because
the adult was in various ways unwilling to give the toy
(e.g., she teased the child with it or played with it
herself) or else because she was unable to give it (e.g.,
she accidentally dropped it). Infants at 9, 12, and 18
months of age reacted with more impatience (e.g., reaching,
looking away) when the adult was unwilling to give them the
toy than when she was simply unable to give it.
Six-month-olds, in contrast, showed no evidence of this
differentiation. Because infants' behavioral responses were
appropriately adapted to different kinds of intentional
actions, and because the adult's actions sometimes produced
results that did not match her goal (when having accidents
or failed attempts), these findings provide especially rich
evidence that infants first begin to understand
goal-directed action at around 9 months of
age.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.41.2.328},
Key = {fds351893}
}
@article{fds351894,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Riedel, J and Call, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic goats, Capra hircus, follow gaze direction and use
social cues in an object choice task},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {69},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-18},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.008},
Abstract = {Gaze following is a basic social cognitive skill with many
potential benefits for animals that live in social groups.
At least five primate species are known to follow the gaze
of conspecifics, but there have been no studies on gaze
following in other mammals. We investigated whether domestic
goats can use the gaze direction of a conspecific as a cue
to find food. They were able to do this, at a level
comparable to that of primates. In a second experiment, we
tested goats' ability to use gaze and other communicative
cues given by a human in a so-called object choice
situation. An experimenter hid food out of sight of the
subject under one of two cups. After baiting the cup the
experimenter indicated the location of the food to the
subject by using different cues. The goats used
communicative cues (touching and pointing) but not gaze by
itself. Since domestic dogs are very skilled in this task,
whereas wolves are not, one hypothesis is that the use of
communicative cues in the object choice task is a
side-effect of domestication. © 2004 The Association for
the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.008},
Key = {fds351894}
}
@article{fds351895,
Author = {Matthews, D and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The role of frequency in the acquisition of English word
order},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {121-136},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2004.08.001},
Abstract = {Akhtar [Akhtar, N. (1999). Acquiring basic word order:
Evidence for data-driven learning of syntactic structure.
Journal of Child Language, 26, 339-356] taught children
novel verbs in ungrammatical word orders. Her results
suggested that the acquisition of canonical word order is a
gradual, data-driven process. The current study adapted this
methodology, using English verbs of different frequencies,
to test whether children's use of word order as a
grammatical marker depends upon the frequency of the lexical
items being ordered. Ninety-six children in two age groups
(2;9 and 3;9) heard either high frequency, medium frequency
or low frequency verbs that were modeled in SOV order.
Children aged 2;9 who heard low frequency verbs were
significantly more likely to adopt the weird word order than
those who heard higher frequency verbs. Children aged 3;9
preferred to use SVO order regardless of verb frequency.
Furthermore, the younger children reverted to English word
order using more arguments as verb frequency increased and
used more pronouns than their older counterparts. This
suggests that the ability to use English word order develops
from lexically specific schemas formed around frequent,
distributionally regular items (e.g. verbs, pronouns) into
more abstract, productive schemas as experience of the
language is accrued. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2004.08.001},
Key = {fds351895}
}
@article{fds351896,
Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The gestural communication of apes},
Journal = {Gesture},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {41-56},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/gest.5.1-2.05pik},
Abstract = {Gestural communication of nonhuman primates may allow
insight into the evolutionary scenario of human
communication given the flexible use and learning of
gestures as opposed to vocalizations. This paper provides an
overview of the work on the gestural communication of apes
with the focus on their repertoire, learning mechanisms, and
the flexibility of gesture use during interactions with
conspecifics. Although there is a variation between the
species in the types and numbers of gestures performed, the
influence of ecology, social structure and cognitive skills
on their gestural repertoires is relatively restricted. As
opposed to humans, apes do not use their gestures
referentially nor do their gestures show the symbolic or
conventionalized features of human gestural communication.
However, since the gestural repertoires of apes are
characterized by a high degree of individual variability and
flexibility of use as opposed to their vocalizations it
seems plausible that the gestures were the modality within
which symbolic communication first evolved.},
Doi = {10.1075/gest.5.1-2.05pik},
Key = {fds351896}
}
@article{fds351897,
Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Particle placement in early child language: A multifactorial
analysis},
Journal = {Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {89-112},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cllt.2005.1.1.89},
Abstract = {Recent studies of the English verb particle construction
have shown that particle placement varies with a variety of
linguistic features, which seem to influence the speaker's
choice of a particular position. The current study
investigates whether children's use of the particle varies
with the same features as in adult language. Using corpus
data from two English-speaking children, we conducted a
multifactorial analysis of six linguistic variables that are
correlated with particle placement in adult language. Our
analysis reveals significant associations between the
position of the particle and two of the six variables, the
NP type of the direct object and the meaning of the
particle, suggesting that children as young as two years of
age process at least some of the features that motivate
particle placement in adult speakers. © Walter de
Gruyter.},
Doi = {10.1515/cllt.2005.1.1.89},
Key = {fds351897}
}
@article{fds351898,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Carpenter, M},
Title = {The emergence of social cognition in three young
chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development},
Volume = {70},
Number = {1},
Pages = {vii-132},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00324.x},
Abstract = {We report a series of 10 studies on the social-cognitive
abilities of three young chimpanzees. The studies were all
ones previously conducted with human infants. The
chimpanzees were 1-5 years of age, had been raised mostly by
humans, and were tested mostly directly by a familiar human
experimenter. First, in a longitudinal investigation with
repeated measurements from a social-cognitive test battery,
the three young chimpanzees were similar in many ways to
human infants; the major difference was a total lack of
attempts to share attention with others either in joint
attentional interactions or through declarative gestures.
Second, in imitation-based tests of the understanding of
intentional action, the chimpanzees, like human infants,
showed an understanding of failed attempts and accidents;
but they did not pay attention to the behavioral style of
the actor or the actor's reasons for choosing a particular
behavioral means. Third, in tests of their understanding of
visual perception, the chimpanzees followed the gaze
direction of a human to an out-of-sight location behind a
barrier and gestured more to a human who could see them than
to one who could not; but they showed no understanding that
perceivers can focus their attention on one thing, or one
aspect of a thing, within their perceptual fields for a
reason. Finally, in tests of joint intentions and joint
attention, the chimpanzees showed no ability to either
reverse roles with a partner in a collaborative interaction
or to set up a joint attentional framework for understanding
the communicative intentions behind a pointing gesture.
Taken together, these findings support the idea that the
early ontogeny of human social cognition comprises two
distinct trajectories, each with its own evolutionary
history: one for understanding the basics of goal-directed
action and perception, common to all apes, and another for
sharing psychological states with others in collaborative
acts involving joint intentions and attention, unique to the
human species.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00324.x},
Key = {fds351898}
}
@article{fds351899,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy actions in terms of
goals.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {F13-F20},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00385.x},
Abstract = {In the context of an imitation game, 12- and 18-month-old
infants saw an adult do such things as make a toy mouse hop
across a mat (with sound effects). In one condition (House),
the adult ended by placing the mouse in a toy house, whereas
in another condition (No House) there was no house present
at the final location. Infants at both ages usually simply
put the mouse in the house (ignoring the hopping motion and
sound effects) in the House condition, presumably because
they interpreted the adult's action in terms of this final
goal and so ignored the behavioral means. In contrast,
infants copied the adult's action (both the hopping motion
and the sound effects) when no house was present, presumably
because here infants saw the action itself as the adult's
only goal. From very early, infants' social learning is
flexible: infants focus on and copy either the end or the
means of an adult action as required by the
context.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00385.x},
Key = {fds351899}
}
@article{fds351900,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T},
Title = {On tools and toys: how children learn to act on and pretend
with 'virgin objects'.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {57-73},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00393.x},
Abstract = {The focus of the present study was the role of cultural
learning in infants' acquisition of pretense actions with
objects. In three studies, 18- and 24-month-olds (n = 64)
were presented with novel objects, and either pretense or
instrumental actions were demonstrated with these. When
children were then allowed to act upon the objects
themselves, qualitatively similar patterns of cultural
(imitative) learning both of pretend and of instrumental
actions were observed, suggesting that both types of actions
can be acquired in similar ways through processes of
cultural learning involving one or another form of
collective intentionality. However, both absolute imitation
rates and creativity were lower in pretense compared to
instrumental actions, suggesting that the collective
intentionality that constitutes pretense is especially
difficult for children to comprehend. An additional analysis
of children's gazes to the experimenter during their actions
revealed that 24-month-olds looked more often to the
experimenter during pretense actions than during
instrumental actions - suggesting that pretense is
culturally learned in a similar fashion as practical
actions, but that young children understand pretense as a
more inherently social, intersubjective activity.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00393.x},
Key = {fds351900}
}
@article{fds351901,
Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Gestural communication in subadult bonobos (Pan paniscus):
repertoire and use.},
Journal = {American journal of primatology},
Volume = {65},
Number = {1},
Pages = {39-61},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20096},
Abstract = {This article aims to provide an inventory of the
communicative gestures used by bonobos (Pan paniscus), based
on observations of subadult bonobos and descriptions of
gestural signals and similar behaviors in wild and captive
bonobo groups. In addition, we focus on the underlying
processes of social cognition, including learning mechanisms
and flexibility of gesture use (such as adjustment to the
attentional state of the recipient). The subjects were seven
bonobos, aged 1-8 years, living in two different groups in
captivity. Twenty distinct gestures (one auditory, eight
tactile, and 11 visual) were recorded. We found individual
differences and similar degrees of concordance of the
gestural repertoires between and within groups, which
provide evidence that ontogenetic ritualization is the main
learning process involved. There is suggestive evidence,
however, that some form of social learning may be
responsible for the acquisition of special gestures.
Overall, the present study establishes that the gestural
repertoire of bonobos can be characterized as flexible and
adapted to various communicative circumstances, including
the attentional state of the recipient. Differences from and
similarities to the other African ape species are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20096},
Key = {fds351901}
}
@article{fds351902,
Author = {Namy, LL and Campbell, AL and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The changing role of iconicity in non-verbal symbol
learning: A U-shaped trajectory in the acquisition of
arbitrary gestures},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-57},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0501_3},
Abstract = {This article reports 2 experiments examining the changing
role of iconicity in symbol learning and its implications
regarding the mechanisms supporting symbol-to-referent
mapping. Experiment 1 compared 18- and 26-month-olds'
mapping of iconic gestures (e.g., hopping gesture for a
rabbit) vs. arbitrary gestures (e.g., dropping motion for a
rabbit). Experiment 2 replicated this comparison with
4-year-olds. All ages successfully mapped iconic gestures.
Eighteen-month-olds and 4-year-olds but not 26-month-olds
mapped arbitrary gestures, revealing a U-shaped
developmental function. These findings imply that (a) there
is no advantage for iconicity in early symbol learning and
(b) the range of symbols mapped becomes more restricted at
26 months, re-emerging more flexibly during the preschool
years. We argue that the decline in arbitrary gesture
learning is a function of developing appreciation of
communicative conventions. We propose that the re-emergence
of arbitrary gestures at 4 years is driven by a wider range
of symbolic experiences, and enhanced sensitivity to others'
communicative intent. Copyright © 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15327647jcd0501_3},
Key = {fds351902}
}
@article{fds351903,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two hypotheses about primate cognition},
Journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {585-601},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds351903}
}
@article{fds351904,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {What kind of evidence could refute the UG hypothesis?:
Commentary on Wunderlich},
Journal = {Studies in Language},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {642-645},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sl.28.3.13tom},
Doi = {10.1075/sl.28.3.13tom},
Key = {fds351904}
}
@article{fds351905,
Author = {Liebal, K and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Use of gesture sequences in chimpanzees.},
Journal = {American journal of primatology},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4},
Pages = {377-396},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20087},
Abstract = {Gestural communication in a group of 19 captive chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) was observed, with particular attention
paid to gesture sequences (combinations). A complete
inventory of gesture sequences is reported. The majority of
these sequences were repetitions of the same gestures, which
were often tactile gestures and often occurred in play
contexts. Other sequences combined gestures within a
modality (visual, auditory, or tactile) or across
modalities. The emergence of gesture sequences was ascribed
to a recipient's lack of responsiveness rather than a
premeditated combination of gestures to increase the
efficiency of particular gestures. In terms of audience
effects, the chimpanzees were sensitive to the attentional
state of the recipient, and therefore used visually-based
gestures mostly when others were already attending, as
opposed to tactile gestures, which were used regardless of
whether the recipient was attending or not. However, the
chimpanzees did not use gesture sequences in which the first
gesture served to attract the recipient's visual attention
before they produced a second gesture that was
visually-based. Instead, they used other strategies, such as
locomoting in front of the recipient, before they produced a
visually-based gesture.},
Doi = {10.1002/ajp.20087},
Key = {fds351905}
}
@article{fds351906,
Author = {Maslen, RJC and Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {A dense corpus study of past tense and plural
overregularization in English.},
Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research :
JSLHR},
Volume = {47},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1319-1333},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2004/099)},
Abstract = {In the "blocking-and-retrieval-failure" account of
overregularization (OR; G. F. Marcus, 1995; G. F. Marcus et
al., 1992), the claim that a symbolic rule generates regular
inflection is founded on pervasively low past tense OR rates
and the lack of a substantive difference between past tense
and plural OR rates. Evidence of extended periods of OR in
the face of substantial correct input (M. Maratsos, 2000)
and of an initial period in which nouns are more likely to
be overregularized than verbs (V. A. Marchman, K. Plunkett,
& J. Goodman, 1997) casts doubt on the blocking account and
suggests instead an interplay between type and token
frequency effects that is more consistent with usage-based
approaches (e.g., J. Bybee, 1995; K. Köpcke, 1998; K.
Plunkett & V. Marchman, 1993). However, previous
naturalistic studies have been limited by data that account
for only 1-2% of child speech. The current study reports
analyses of verb and noun ORs in a dense naturalistic corpus
(1 child, 2;00.12-3;11.06 [years;months.days]) that captures
8-10% of child speech and input. The data show (a) a marked
difference in verb and noun OR rates; (b) evidence of a
relationship between relative regular/irregular type
frequencies and the onset and rate of past tense and plural
ORs; (c) substantial OR periods for some verbs and nouns
despite hundreds of correct tokens in child speech and
input; and (d) a strong negative correlation between input
token frequencies and OR rates for verbs and nouns. The
implications of these findings for blocking and other
accounts of OR are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2004/099)},
Key = {fds351906}
}
@article{fds351907,
Author = {Bräuer, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Visual perspective taking in dogs (Canis familiaris) in the
presence of barriers},
Journal = {Applied Animal Behaviour Science},
Volume = {88},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {299-317},
Year = {2004},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2004.03.004},
Abstract = {Previous studies have shown that dogs have developed a
special sensitivity to the communicative signals and
attentional states of humans. The aim of the current study
was to further investigate what dogs know about the visual
perception of humans and themselves. In the first two
experiments we investigated whether dogs were sensitive to
the properties of barriers as blocking the visual access of
humans. We presented dogs with a situation in which a human
forbade them to take a piece of food, but the type and
orientation of the barrier allowed the dog to take the food
undetected in some conditions. Dogs differentiated between
effective and ineffective barriers, based on their
orientation or the particular features of the barriers such
as size or the presence of window. In the third study we
investigated whether dogs know about what they themselves
have seen. We presented subjects with two boxes and placed
food in one of them. In the Seen condition the location of
the food was shown to the dogs while in the Unseen condition
dogs were prevented from seeing the destination of the food.
Before selecting one of the boxes by pressing a lever, dogs
had the opportunity to seek extra information regarding the
contents of the boxes, which would be particularly useful in
the condition in which they had not seen where the food was
hidden. Dogs rarely used the opportunity to seek information
about the contents of the box before making their choice in
any condition. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting
that dogs have access to what they themselves have seen,
which contrasts with the positive evidence about visual
perspective taking in others from the first two experiments
and previous studies. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.applanim.2004.03.004},
Key = {fds351907}
}
@article{fds351908,
Author = {Kaminski, J and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Body orientation and face orientation: two factors
controlling apes' behavior from humans.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {216-223},
Year = {2004},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0214-2},
Abstract = {A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive
ability to detect when they are being watched by other
individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to
make this determination is unknown. There is particular
controversy in the case of the great apes because different
studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we
presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a
situation in which they had to request food from a human
observer who was in one of various attentional states. She
either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes
closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room.
In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's
body and face orientation so that the observer could have
her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from
the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more
behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not
only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter
as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face
orientation separately. These results suggest that body and
face orientation encode two different types of information.
Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual
access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition
to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and
face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded
to the state of the observer's eyes.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0214-2},
Key = {fds351908}
}
@article{fds351909,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes
revisited.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {213-215},
Year = {2004},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0227-x},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-004-0227-x},
Key = {fds351909}
}
@article{fds325198,
Author = {Call, J and Hare, B and Carpenter, M and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of
human intentional action.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {488-498},
Year = {2004},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x},
Abstract = {Understanding the intentional actions of others is a
fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An
important question is therefore whether other animal
species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees,
also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we
show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training)
behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling
or unable to give them food Chimpanzees produced more
behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an
unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter
These data together with other recent studies on
chimpanzees' knowledge about others' visual perception show
that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and
perceptions of others than previously demonstrated},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x},
Key = {fds325198}
}
@article{fds325199,
Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in
cooperative cognitive tasks},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {68},
Number = {3},
Pages = {571-581},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2004},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011},
Abstract = {In a series of four experiments, chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes, were given two cognitive tasks, an object
choice task and a discrimination task (based on location),
each in the context of either cooperation or competition. In
both tasks chimpanzees performed more skilfully when
competing than when cooperating, with some evidence that
competition with conspecifics was especially facilitatory in
the discrimination location task. This is the first study to
demonstrate a facilitative cognitive effect for competition
in a single experimental paradigm. We suggest that
chimpanzee cognitive evolution is best understood in its
socioecological context. © 2004 The Association for the
Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011},
Key = {fds325199}
}
@article{fds351910,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Syntax or semantics? Response to Lidz et
al.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {93},
Number = {2},
Pages = {139-140},
Year = {2004},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2003.09.015},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2003.09.015},
Key = {fds351910}
}
@book{fds351911,
Author = {Slobin, DI and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xv-xxiv},
Year = {2004},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781410611192},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781410611192},
Doi = {10.4324/9781410611192},
Key = {fds351911}
}
@article{fds351912,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The pragmatics of primate communication},
Journal = {Psychologie Francaise},
Volume = {49},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-218},
Year = {2004},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2003.11.006},
Abstract = {Pragmatics is about how individuals use their inventory of
semiotic devices, the strategic choices they make, in
particular acts of communication. An interesting question is
the degree to which other animal species, especially our
nearest primate relatives, employ pragmatic strategies in
their vocal and gestural communication. Based on a review of
the evidence, it is concluded in this essay that primate
communication displays almost none of the pragmatic
dimensions that characterize human linguistic communication.
The most fundamental reason is that nonhuman animal
communication does not really take place on the mental or
intersubjective plane at all. It is directed at the behavior
and emotional states of others, not at their attentional or
mental states. © 2004 Publié par Elsvier SAS pour
Société française de psychologie.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.psfr.2003.11.006},
Key = {fds351912}
}
@article{fds351913,
Author = {Liszkowski, U and Carpenter, M and Henning, A and Striano, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and
interest.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {297-307},
Year = {2004},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x},
Abstract = {Infants point for various motives. Classically, one such
motive is declarative, to share attention and interest with
adults to events. Recently, some researchers have questioned
whether infants have this motivation. In the current study,
an adult reacted to 12-month-olds' pointing in different
ways, and infants' responses were observed. Results showed
that when the adult shared attention and interest (i.e
alternated gaze and emoted), infants pointed more frequently
across trials and tended to prolong each point--presumably
to prolong the satisfying interaction. However, when the
adult emoted to the infant alone or looked only to the
event, infants pointed less across trials and repeated
points more within trials--presumably in an attempt to
establish joint attention. Results suggest that
12-month-olds point declaratively and understand that others
have psychological states that can be directed and
shared.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x},
Key = {fds351913}
}
@article{fds351914,
Author = {Rakoczy, H and Tomasello, M and Striano, T},
Title = {Young children know that trying is not pretending: a test of
the "behaving-as-if" construal of children's early concept
of pretense.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {40},
Number = {3},
Pages = {388-399},
Year = {2004},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.3.388},
Abstract = {In 3 studies, young children were tested for their
understanding of pretend actions. In Studies 1 and 2, pairs
of superficially similar behaviors were presented to 26- and
36-month-old children in an imitation game. In one case the
behavior was marked as trying (signs of effort), and in the
other case as pretending (signs of playfulness).
Three-year-olds, and to some degree 2-year-olds, performed
the real action themselves (or tried to really perform it)
after the trying model, whereas after the pretense model,
they only pretended. Study 3 ruled out a simple mimicking
explanation by showing that children not only imitated
differentially but responded differentially with appropriate
productive pretending to pretense models and with
appropriate productive tool use to trying models. The
findings of the 3 studies demonstrate that by 2 to 3 years
of age, children have a concept of pretense as a specific
type of intentional activity.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.40.3.388},
Key = {fds351914}
}
@article{fds351915,
Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Training 2;6-year-olds to produce the transitive
construction: the role of frequency, semantic similarity and
shared syntactic distribution.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {48-55},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00322.x},
Abstract = {Childers and Tomasello (2001) found that training 2
1/2-year-olds on the English transitive construction greatly
improves their performance on a post-test in which they must
use novel verbs in that construction. In the current study,
we replicated Childers and Tomasello's finding, but using a
much lower frequency of transitive verbs and models in
training. We also used novel verbs that were of a different
semantic class to our training verbs, demonstrating that
semantic homogeneity is not crucial for generalization. We
also replicated the finding that 4-year-olds are
significantly more productive than 2 1/2-year-olds with the
transitive construction, with the new finding that this is
also true for verbs of emission. In addition, 'shared
syntactic distribution' of novel verb and training verbs was
found to have no observable effect on the number of 2
1/2-year-olds who were productive in the
post-test.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00322.x},
Key = {fds351915}
}
@article{fds351916,
Author = {Moll, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {12- and 18-month-old infants follow gaze to spaces behind
barriers.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {F1-F9},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00315.x},
Abstract = {Infants follow the gaze direction of others from the middle
of the first year of life. In attempting to determine how
infants understand the looking behavior of adults, a number
of recent studies have blocked the adult's line of sight in
some way (e.g. with a blindfold or with a barrier). In
contrast, in the current studies an adult looked behind a
barrier which blocked the child's line of sight. Using two
different control conditions and several different barrier
types, 12- and 18-month-old infants locomoted a short
distance in order to gain the proper viewing angle to follow
an experimenter's gaze to locations behind barriers. These
results demonstrate that, contra Butterworth, even
12-month-old infants can follow gaze to locations outside of
their current field of view. They also add to growing
evidence that 12-month-olds have some understanding of the
looking behaviors of others as an act of
seeing.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00315.x},
Key = {fds351916}
}
@article{fds351917,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Stahl, D},
Title = {Sampling children's spontaneous speech: How much is
enough?},
Journal = {Journal of Child Language},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {101-121},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305000903005944},
Abstract = {There has been relatively little discussion in the field of
child language acquisition about how best to sample from
children's spontaneous speech, particularly with regard to
quantitative issues. Here we provide quantitative
information designed to help researchers make decisions
about how best to sample children's speech for particular
research questions (and/or how confident to be in existing
analyses). We report theoretical analyses in which the major
parameters are: (1) the frequency with which a phenomenon
occurs in the real world, and (2) the temporal density with
which a researcher samples the child's speech. We look at
the influence of these two parameters in using spontaneous
speech samples to estimate such things as: (a) the
percentage of the real phenomenon actually captured, (b) the
probability of capturing at least one target in any given
sample, (c) the confidence we can have in estimating the
frequency of occurrence of a target from a given sample, and
(d) the estimated age of emergence of a target structure. In
addition, we also report two empirical analyses of
relatively infrequent child language phenomena, in which we
sample in different ways from a relatively dense corpus (two
children aged 2;0 to 3;0) and compare the different results
obtained. Implications of these results for various issues
in the study of child language acquisition are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0305000903005944},
Key = {fds351917}
}
@article{fds351918,
Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {To move or not to move: How apes adjust to the attentional
state of others},
Journal = {Interaction Studies},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Pages = {199-219},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.5.2.03lie},
Abstract = {A previous observational study suggested that when faced
with a partner with its back turned, chimpanzees tend to
move around to the front of a non-attending partner and then
gesture-rather than gesturing once to attract attention and
then again to convey a specific intent.We investigated this
preference experimentally by presenting six orangutans, five
gorillas, nine chimpanzees, and four bonobos with a food
begging situation in which we varied the body orientation of
an experimenter (E) with respect to the subject (front vs.
back) and the location of the food (in front or behind E).
These manipulations allowed us to measure whether subjects
preferred to move around to face E or to use signals to
attract her attention before they begged for food. Results
showed that all species moved around to face E and then
produced visual gestures, instead of using tactile/ auditory
gestures behind E to call her attention. Species differences
were apparent particularly when the food and E were in
different locations. Unlike gorillas and orangutans,
chimpanzees and bonobos (from genus Pan) produced their
gestures in front of E in all conditions, including that in
which subjects had to leave the food behind to communicate
with her. Implications of these results are discussed in the
context of the evolution of social cognition in great apes.
© John Benjamins Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1075/is.5.2.03lie},
Key = {fds351918}
}
@article{fds351919,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Learning through others},
Journal = {Daedalus},
Volume = {133},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-58},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/001152604772746693},
Doi = {10.1162/001152604772746693},
Key = {fds351919}
}
@article{fds351920,
Author = {Liebal, K and Pika, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Social communication in siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus):
use of gestures and facial expressions.},
Journal = {Primates; journal of primatology},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-57},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10329-003-0063-7},
Abstract = {The current study represents the first systematic
investigation of the social communication of captive
siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus). The focus was on
intentional signals, including tactile and visual gestures,
as well as facial expressions and actions. Fourteen
individuals from different groups were observed and the
signals used by individuals were recorded. Thirty-one
different signals, consisting of 12 tactile gestures, 8
visual gestures, 7 actions, and 4 facial expressions, were
observed, with tactile gestures and facial expressions
appearing most frequently. The range of the signal
repertoire increased steadily until the age of six, but
declined afterwards in adults. The proportions of the
different signal categories used within communicative
interactions, in particular actions and facial expressions,
also varied depending on age. Group differences could be
traced back mainly to social factors or housing conditions.
Differences in the repertoire of males and females were most
obvious in the sexual context. Overall, most signals were
used flexibly, with the majority performed in three or more
social contexts and almost one-third of signals used in
combination with other signals. Siamangs also adjusted their
signals appropriately for the recipient, for example, using
visual signals most often when the recipient was already
attending (audience effects). These observations are
discussed in the context of siamang ecology, social
structure, and cognition.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10329-003-0063-7},
Key = {fds351920}
}
@article{fds351921,
Author = {Savage, C and Lieven, E and Theakston, A and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Testing the abstractness of children's linguistic
representations: Lexical and structural priming of syntactic
constructions in young children},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {6},
Number = {5},
Pages = {557-567},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00312},
Abstract = {The current studies used a priming methodology to assess the
abstractness of children's early syntactic constructions. In
the main study, 3-, 4- and 6-year-old children were asked to
describe a prime picture by repeating either an active or a
passive sentence, and then they were left to their own
devices to describe a target picture. For half the children
at each age, the prime sentences they repeated had high
lexical overlap with the sentence they were likely to
produce for the target, whereas for the other half there was
very low lexical overlap between prime and target. The main
result was that 6-year-old children showed both lexical and
structural priming for both the active transitive and
passive constructions, whereas 3- and 4-year-old children
showed lexical priming only. This pattern of results would
seem to indicate that 6-year-old children have relatively
abstract representations of these constructions, whereas 3-
and 4-year-old children have as an integral part of their
representations certain specific lexical items, especially
pronouns and some grammatical morphemes. In a second study
it was found that children did not need to repeat the prime
out loud in order to be primed - suggesting that the priming
effect observed concerns not just peripheral production
mechanisms but underlying linguistic representations common
to comprehension and production. These results support the
view that young children develop abstract linguistic
representations gradually during the preschool
years.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00312},
Key = {fds351921}
}
@article{fds351922,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Haberl, K},
Title = {Understanding attention: 12- and 18-month-olds know what is
new for other persons.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {39},
Number = {5},
Pages = {906-912},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.39.5.906},
Abstract = {Infants at 12 and 18 months of age played with 2 adults and
2 new toys. For a 3rd toy, however, 1 of the adults left the
room while the child and the other adult played with it.
This adult then returned, looked at all 3 toys aligned on a
tray, showed great excitement ("Wow! Cool!"), and then
asked, "Can you give it to me?' To retrieve the toy the
adult wanted, infants had to (a) know that people attend to
and get excited about new things and (b) identify what was
new for the adult even though it was not new for them.
Infants at both ages did this successfully, lending support
to the hypothesis that 1-year-old infants possess a genuine
understanding of other persons as intentional and
attentional agents.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.39.5.906},
Key = {fds351922}
}
@article{fds351923,
Author = {Call, J and Bräuer, J and Kaminski, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are sensitive to the
attentional state of humans.},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {117},
Number = {3},
Pages = {257-263},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.117.3.257},
Abstract = {Twelve domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were given a series
of trials in which they were forbidden to take a piece of
visible food. In some trials, the human continued to look at
the dog throughout the trial (control condition), whereas in
others, the human (a) left the room, (b) turned her back,
(c) engaged in a distracting activity, or (d) closed her
eyes. Dogs behaved in clearly different ways in most of the
conditions in which the human did not watch them compared
with the control condition, in which she did. In particular,
when the human looked at them, dogs retrieved less food,
approached it in a more indirect way, and sat (as opposed to
laid down) more often than in the other conditions. Results
are discussed in terms of domestic dogs' social-cognitive
skills and their unique evolutionary and ontogenetic
histories.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.117.3.257},
Key = {fds351923}
}
@article{fds351924,
Author = {Theakston, AL and Lieven, EVM and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of the input in the acquisition of third person
singular verbs in English.},
Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research :
JSLHR},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {863-877},
Year = {2003},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2003/067)},
Abstract = {During the early stages of language acquisition, children
pass through a stage of development when they produce both
finite and nonfinite verb forms in finite contexts (e.g.,
"it go there," "it goes there"). Theorists who assume that
children operate with an abstract understanding of tense and
agreement marking from the beginnings of language use tend
to explain this phenomenon in terms of either performance
limitations in production (e.g., V. Valian, 1991) or the
optional use of finite forms in finite contexts due to a
lack of knowledge that tense and agreement marking is
obligatory (the optional infinitive hypothesis; K. Wexler,
1994, 1996). An alternative explanation, however, is that
children's use of nonfinite forms is based on the presence
of questions in the input ("Where does it go?") where the
grammatical subject is immediately followed by a nonfinite
verb form. To compare these explanations, 2 groups of 24
children aged between 2 years 6 months and 3 years were
exposed to 6 known and 3 novel verbs produced in either
declaratives or questions or in both declaratives and
questions. The children were then questioned to elicit use
of the verbs in either finite or nonfinite contexts. The
results show that for novel verbs, the children's patterns
of verb use were closely related to the patterns of verb use
modeled in the language to which they were exposed. For
known verbs, there were no differences in the children's use
of individual verbs, regardless of the specific patterns of
verb use modeled in the language they heard. The
implications of these findings for theories of early verb
use are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1044/1092-4388(2003/067)},
Key = {fds351924}
}
@article{fds351925,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N},
Title = {What paradox? A response to Naigles (2002).},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {88},
Number = {3},
Pages = {317-323},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00048-9},
Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00048-9},
Key = {fds351925}
}
@article{fds351926,
Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of language in the development of false belief
understanding: a training study.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {74},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1130-1144},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00597},
Abstract = {The current study used a training methodology to determine
whether different kinds of linguistic interaction play a
causal role in children's development of false belief
understanding. After 3 training sessions, 3-year-old
children improved their false belief understanding both in a
training condition involving perspective-shifting discourse
about deceptive objects (without mental state terms) and in
a condition in which sentential complement syntax was used
(without deceptive objects). Children did not improve in a
condition in which they were exposed to deceptive objects
without accompanying language. Children showed most
improvement in a condition using both perspective-shifting
discourse and sentential complement syntax, suggesting that
each of these types of linguistic experience plays an
independent role in the ontogeny of false belief
understanding.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00597},
Key = {fds351926}
}
@article{fds351927,
Author = {Pika, S and Liebal, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Gestural communication in young gorillas (Gorilla gorilla):
gestural repertoire, learning, and use.},
Journal = {American journal of primatology},
Volume = {60},
Number = {3},
Pages = {95-111},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajp.10097},
Abstract = {In the present study we investigated the gestural
communication of gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). The subjects
were 13 gorillas (1-6 years old) living in two different
groups in captivity. Our goal was to compile the gestural
repertoire of subadult gorillas, with a special focus on
processes of social cognition, including attention to
individual and developmental variability, group variability,
and flexibility of use. Thirty-three different gestures (six
auditory, 11 tactile, and 16 visual gestures) were recorded.
We found idiosyncratic gestures, individual differences, and
similar degrees of concordance between and within groups, as
well as some group-specific gestures. These results provide
evidence that ontogenetic ritualization is the main learning
process involved, but some form of social learning may also
be responsible for the acquisition of special gestures. The
present study establishes that gorillas have a multifaceted
gestural repertoire, characterized by a great deal of
flexibility with accommodations to various communicative
circumstances, including the attentional state of the
recipient. The possibility of assigning Seyfarth and
Cheney's [1997] model for nonhuman primate vocal development
to the development of nonhuman primate gestural
communication is discussed.},
Doi = {10.1002/ajp.10097},
Key = {fds351927}
}
@article{fds326035,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
Title = {Chimpanzees versus humans: It's not that
simple},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {6},
Pages = {239-240},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4},
Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00107-4},
Key = {fds326035}
}
@article{fds351928,
Author = {Lieven, E and Behrens, H and Speares, J and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Early syntactic creativity: a usage-based
approach.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {30},
Number = {2},
Pages = {333-370},
Year = {2003},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000903005592},
Abstract = {The aim of the current study was to determine the degree to
which a sample of one child's creative utterances related to
utterances that the child previously produced. The
utterances to be accounted for were all of the intelligible,
multi-word utterances produced by the child in a single hour
of interaction with her mother early in her third year of
life (at age 2;1.11). We used a high-density database
consisting of 5 hours of recordings per week together with a
maternal diary for the previous 6 weeks. Of the 295
multi-word utterances on tape, 37% were 'novel' in the sense
that they had not been said in their entirety before. Using
a morpheme-matching method, we identified the way(s) in
which each novel utterance differed from its closest match
in the preceding corpus. In 74% of the cases we required
only one operation to match the previous utterance and the
great majority of these consisted of the substitution of a
word (usually a noun) into a previous utterance or schema.
Almost all the other single-operation utterances involved
adding a word onto the beginning or end of a previous
utterance. 26% of the novel, multi-word utterances required
more than one operation to match the closest previous
utterance, although many of these only involved a
combination of the two operations seen for the
single-operation utterances. Some others were, however, more
complex to match. The results suggest that the relatively
high degree of creativity in early English child language
could be at least partially based upon entrenched schemas
and a small number of simple operations to modify them. We
discuss the implications of these results for the interplay
in language production between strings registered in memory
and categorial knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000903005592},
Key = {fds351928}
}
@article{fds325200,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
Title = {Chimpanzees understand psychological states - The question
is which ones and to what extent},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {153-156},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4},
Abstract = {New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are
needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal
species understand about the psychological states of others.
Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things
about what others do and do not see, or have and have not
seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about
others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in
competitive situations. They clearly do not have a
human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is
to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are
similar and different.},
Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00035-4},
Key = {fds325200}
}
@article{fds351929,
Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children extend both words and non-verbal actions to novel
exemplars},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {185-190},
Year = {2003},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00270},
Abstract = {Markson and Bloom (1997) found that some learning processes
involved in children's acquisition of a new word are also
involved in their acquisition of a new fact. They argued
that these findings provided evidence against a
domain-specific system for word learning. However, Waxman
and Booth (2000) found that whereas children quite readily
extend newly learned words to novel exemplars within a
category, they do not do this with newly learned facts. They
therefore argued that because children did not extend some
facts in a principled way, word learning and fact learning
may result from different domain-specific processes. In the
current study, we argue that facts are a poor comparison in
this argument since facts vary in whether they are tied to
particular individuals. A more appropriate comparison is a
conventional non-verbal action on an object - 'what we do
with things like this' - since they are routinely
generalized categorically to new objects. Our study shows
that 2 1/2-year-old children extend novel non-verbal actions
to new objects in the same way that they extend novel words
to new objects. The findings provide support for the view
that word learning represents a unique configuration of more
general learning processes.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00270},
Key = {fds351929}
}
@article{fds366601,
Author = {Lohmann, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Language and social understanding: Commentary on Nelson et
al.},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {46},
Number = {1},
Pages = {47-50},
Year = {2003},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000067778},
Doi = {10.1159/000067778},
Key = {fds366601}
}
@article{fds326346,
Author = {Hare, B and Addessi, E and Call, J and Tomasello, M and Visalberghi,
E},
Title = {Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do
and do not see?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {65},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-142},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2002.2017},
Abstract = {Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which
two individuals competed over food. When given a choice
between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or
hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to
retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the
hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the
dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was
monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the
piece of food that it approached. To test between these
alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head
start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of
food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant
entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes,
subordinates that were given a head start did not
preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first.
Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the
hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what
another individual does or does not see. We compare our
results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same
paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social
cognition. © 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2002.2017},
Key = {fds326346}
}
@article{fds351930,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Rakoczy, H},
Title = {What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared
to collective intentionality},
Journal = {Mind and Language},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {121-147},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00217},
Abstract = {It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social
cognition of humans from that of other animals is the
belief-desire psychology of four-year-old children and
adults (so-called theory of mind). We argue here that this
is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human
social cognition. The first step is one year old children's
understanding of persons as intentional agents, which
enables skills of cultural learning and shared
intentionality. This initial step is 'the real thing' in the
sense that it enables young children to participate in
cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with
a conventional/normative/reflective dimension - for example,
linguistic communication and pretend play - thus
inaugurating children's understanding of things mental.
Understanding beliefs and participating in collective
intentionality at four years of age - enabling the
comprehension of such things as money and marriage - results
from several years of engagement with other persons in
perspective-shifting and reflective discourse containing
propositional attitude constructions.},
Doi = {10.1111/1468-0017.00217},
Key = {fds351930}
}
@article{fds351931,
Author = {Cameron-Faulkner, T and Lieven, E and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {A construction based analysis of child directed
speech},
Journal = {Cognitive Science},
Volume = {27},
Number = {6},
Pages = {843-873},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.06.001},
Abstract = {The child directed speech of twelve English-speaking mothers
was analyzed in terms of utterance-level constructions.
First, the mothers' utterances were categorized in terms of
general constructional categories such as Wh-questions,
copulas and transitives. Second, mothers' utterances within
these categories were further specified in terms of the
initial words that framed the utterance, item-based phrases
such as Are you ..., I'll ..., It's ..., Let's ..., What did
.... The findings were: (i) overall, only about 15% of all
maternal utterances had SVO form (most were questions,
imperatives, copulas, and fragments); (ii) 51% of all
maternal utterances began with one of 52 item-based phrases,
mostly consisting of two words or morphemes (45% began with
one of just 17 words); and (iii) children used many of these
same item-based phrases, in some cases at a rate that
correlated highly with their own mother's frequency of use.
We suggest that analyses of adult-child linguistic
interaction should take into account not just general
constructional categories, but also the item-based
constructions that adults and children use and the frequency
with which they use them. © 2003 Cognitive Science Society,
Inc. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.06.001},
Key = {fds351931}
}
@article{fds351932,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Things are what they do: Katherine Nelson's functional
approach to language and cognition},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-19},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327647JCD0301_2},
Abstract = {This article attempts to summarize Katherine Nelson's
theoretical and empirical contributions to the ontogenetic
study of language and cognition. Nelson's approach has
consistently emphasized the function of language and
linguistic concepts in children's larger conceptual and
social lives and, conversely, how children's emerging
understanding of the function of linguistic symbols in
larger conceptual and social structures makes language
acquisition possible in the first place. This approach has
led to an especially fruitful body of theoretical and
empirical work. Copyright © 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/S15327647JCD0301_2},
Key = {fds351932}
}
@article{fds325201,
Author = {Hare, B and Brown, M and Williamson, C and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {The domestication of social cognition in
dogs.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {298},
Number = {5598},
Pages = {1634-1636},
Year = {2002},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1072702},
Abstract = {Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks
in which they must read human communicative signals
indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we
found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show
these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few
weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do
show these skills. These findings suggest that during the
process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set
of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to
communicate with humans in unique ways.},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1072702},
Key = {fds325201}
}
@article{fds351933,
Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds learn novel nouns, verbs, and conventional
actions from massed or distributed exposures.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {38},
Number = {6},
Pages = {967-978},
Year = {2002},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.38.6.967},
Abstract = {Two-year-old children were taught either 6 novel nouns, 6
novel verbs, or 6 novel actions over 1 month. In each
condition, children were exposed to some items in massed
presentations (on a single day) and some in distributed
presentations (over the 2 weeks). Children's comprehension
and production was tested at 3 intervals after training. In
comprehension, children learned all types of items in all
training conditions at all retention intervals. For
production, the main findings were that (a) production was
better for nonverbal actions than for either word type, (b)
children produced more new nouns than verbs, (c) production
of words was better following distributed than massed
exposure, and (d) time to testing (immediate, 1 day, 1 week)
did not affect retention. A follow-up study showed that the
most important timing variable was the number of different
days of exposure, with more days facilitating production.
Results are discussed in terms of 2 key issues: (a) the
domain-generality versus domain-specificity of processes of
word learning and (b) the relative ease with which children
learn nouns versus verbs.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.38.6.967},
Key = {fds351933}
}
@article{fds351934,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A new false belief test for 36-month-olds},
Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {393-420},
Year = {2002},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151002320620316},
Abstract = {We report two studies that suggest that some 36-month-old
(and younger) children understand others' false beliefs. In
the false belief conditions, children and two adults (E1 and
E2) watched as an object was put into a container. E1 left
the room, and E2 switched that object with another. E1
returned, expressed her desire for the object, and struggled
to open the container (without succeeding). She spied both
objects across the room and said to the child. 'Oh, there it
is. Can you get it for me?' In other conditions, the object
was not switched or E1 witnessed the switch. Other
variations included using a novel word for the object and
removing the 'pull of the real'. Measures of children's
latency and uncertainty were taken to determine whether
those who were correct on the false belief tasks were
guessing (luckily) or truly understanding. Results showed
that between one-third and almost two-thirds of children
took account of the adult's false belief when deciding which
object the adult was requesting. We compare this task with
other implicit and explicit tasks. We also conclude that
certain task demands (e.g. the pull of the real) in
traditional theory of mind assessments are
unnecessary.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151002320620316},
Key = {fds351934}
}
@article{fds351935,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Understanding "prior intentions" enables two-year-olds to
imitatively learn a complex task.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {73},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1431-1441},
Year = {2002},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00481},
Abstract = {This study investigated children's understanding of others'
intentions in a social learning context. Specifically, it
investigated whether knowing an adult's prior intention
before the adult gives a demonstration influences what
children learn from the demonstration. In the five main
experimental conditions, ninety-six 2-year-old children
watched as an experimenter (E) pulled out a pin and opened
the door of a box. Children in two No Prior Intention
conditions saw this demonstration alone or paired with an
irrelevant action. Children in three Prior Intention
conditions knew what E was trying to do before the
demonstration: they first saw E either attempt
unsuccessfully to open the door, or visit and open several
other containers, or they first saw that the door opened.
Children opened the box themselves more often in each of
these three conditions than in the two No Prior Intention
conditions, even though children in all five conditions saw
the exact same demonstration of how to open the
box.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00481},
Key = {fds351935}
}
@article{fds351936,
Author = {Wittek, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {German children's productivity with tense morphology: the
Perfekt (present perfect).},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {29},
Number = {3},
Pages = {567-589},
Year = {2002},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000902005147},
Abstract = {Two nonce-word studies examined German-speaking children's
productivity with the Perfekt (present perfect) from 2;6 to
3;6. The German Perfekt consists of the past participle of
the main verb and an inflected form of an auxiliary (either
haben 'have' or sein 'be'). In Study 1, nonce verbs were
either introduced in the infinitival form, and children
(seventy-two children, aged 2;6 to 3;6) were tested on their
ability to produce the Perfekt, or introduced in the
Perfekt, and children were tested on their ability to
produce the infinitive. In Study 2 twenty-four children aged
3;6 were given the past participle form of nonce verbs to
see if they could supply the appropriate auxiliary (based
mainly on verb semantics). The results were that many
children as young as 2;6 used past participles productively
(more than used infinitival forms productively), but all
children had much difficulty in supplying both auxiliaries
appropriately. The current findings suggest that mastery of
the Perfekt construction as a whole does not take place
before the age of four and that frequency of exposure is an
important factor in determining the age at which children
acquire grammatical constructions.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000902005147},
Key = {fds351936}
}
@article{fds351937,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Abbot-Smith, K},
Title = {A tale of two theories: response to Fisher.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {83},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-214},
Year = {2002},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00172-x},
Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00172-x},
Key = {fds351937}
}
@article{fds351938,
Author = {Childers, JB and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of pronouns in young children's acquisition of the
English transitive construction.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {37},
Number = {6},
Pages = {739-748},
Year = {2001},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.37.6.739},
Abstract = {Two studies investigating the linguistic representations
underlying English-speaking 2 1/2-year-olds' production of
transitive utterances are reported. The first study was a
training study in which half the children heard utterances
with full nouns as agent and patient, and half the children
heard utterances with both pronouns (i.e., He's [verb]-ing
it) and also full nouns. In subsequent testing, only
children who had been trained with pronouns and nouns were
able to produce a transitive utterance creatively with a
nonce verb. The second study reported an analogous set of
findings, but in comprehension. Together, the results of
these 2 studies suggest that English-speaking children build
many of their early linguistic constructions around certain
specific lexical or morphological items and patterns,
perhaps especially around particular pronoun
configurations.},
Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.37.6.739},
Key = {fds351938}
}
@article{fds351939,
Author = {Campbell, AL and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The acquisition of English dative constructions},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {253-267},
Year = {2001},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716401002065},
Abstract = {We analyzed the three main types of English dative
constructions - the double-object dative, the to dative, and
the for dative - in the spontaneous speech of seven children
from the age of 1;6 to 5;0. The main findings were as
follows. First, the double-object dative was acquired by
most of the children before either of the prepositional
datives; this was attributed to the greater frequency with
which children heard this construction with individual
verbs. Second, the verbs children used with these
constructions were not only the adult prototypical ones, but
also a number of the less prototypical ones; again, this was
very likely due to their frequency and saliency in the
language children heard. Third, no support was found for
Ninio's (1999) analysis of the emergence of constructions in
terms of a single "pathbreaking" verb; rather, children
began using the double-object dative with many different
verbs and did not follow the trajectory proposed by Ninio
(i.e., a single verb is used for some months before an
"explosion" of new verbs is introduced in the construction).
Finally, most of the verbs initially used in the three
dative constructions were first used in other constructions
(e.g., a simple transitive); this was even true for some
obligatory datives, such as give and show. The current
results provide a starting point for determining the
underlying representations for the different kinds of dative
constructions and for explicating how children understand
the interrelations among these and other
constructions.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0142716401002065},
Key = {fds351939}
}
@article{fds325202,
Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {61},
Number = {1},
Pages = {139-151},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518},
Abstract = {We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a
subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food,
which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side
of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not
seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved
elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control
conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the
same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting
procedure and could monitor the visual access of their
dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive
to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they
should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food
that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what
they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either
uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In
experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their
behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who
witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant
individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating
their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed
what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose
consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which
dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen
hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely
to be due to the changed nature of the competition under
these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive
skills. These findings suggest that at least in some
situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees
know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not
know), and that they use this information to devise
effective social-cognitive strategies. © 2001 The
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1518},
Key = {fds325202}
}
@article{fds325570,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Fogleman, T},
Title = {The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, Pan
troglodytes, and rhesus macaques, Macaca
mulatta},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {61},
Number = {2},
Pages = {335-343},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1598},
Abstract = {Primates follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to
outside objects. We followed the ontogeny of this
social-cognitive skill for two species: rhesus macaques and
chimpanzees, in the first two experiments, using both a
cross-sectional and a longitudinal design, we exposed
individuals of different ages to a human looking in a
specified direction. Rhesus infants first began reliably to
follow the direction of this gaze at the end of the early
infancy period, at about 5.5 months of age. Chimpanzees did
not reliably follow human gaze until 3-4 years; this
corresponds to the latter part of the late infancy period
for this species. In the third experiment we exposed
individuals of the same two species to a human repeatedly
looking to the same location (with no special object at that
location) to see if subjects would learn to ignore the
looks. Only adults of the two species diminished their
gaze-following behaviour over trials. This suggests that in
the period between infancy and adulthood individuals of both
species come to integrate their gaze-following skills with
their more general social-cognitive knowledge about other
animate beings and their behaviour, and so become able to
deploy their gaze-following skills in a more flexible
manner. © 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.2000.1598},
Key = {fds325570}
}
@article{fds351940,
Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Development of Relative Clauses in Spontaneous Child
Speech},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {131-151},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.2001.006},
Abstract = {This study examines the development of relative clauses in
the speech of four English-speaking children between 1;9 and
5;2 years of age. It is shown that the earliest relative
clauses occur in presentational constructions that express a
single proposition in two finite clauses. Starting from such
simple sentences, children gradually learn the use of more
complex constructions in which the relative clause modifes
the noun of a full-edged main clause. Five factors are
considered that might contribute to the development of
relative clauses in spontaneous child speech: (1) the
ambient language, (2) the formulaic character of the main
clause, (3) the information structure of the whole
utterance, (4) the communicative function of presentational
relatives, and (5) the limited processing capacity of young
children. © 2001, 2000 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1515/cogl.2001.006},
Key = {fds351940}
}
@article{fds351941,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {First steps toward a usage-based theory of language
acquisition},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {61-82},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.2001.012},
Abstract = {Usage-based models of language focus on the specific
communicative events in which people learn and use language.
In these models, the psycholinguistic units with which
individuals operate are determined not by theoretical fiat
but by observation of actual language use in actual
communicative events. This data-based approach make these
models especially congenial for the analysis of children's
language, since children do not learn and use the same units
as adults. In this paper I employ a usage-based model of
language to argue for five fundamental facts about child
language acquisition: (1) the primary psycholinguistic unit
of child language acquisition is the utterance, which has as
its foundation the expression and understanding of
communicative intentions; (2) early in their language
development children are attempting to reproduce not adult
words but whole adult utterances; (3) children's earliest
utterances are almost totally concrete in the sense that
they are instantiations of item-based schemas or
constructions; (4) abstractions result from children
generalizing across the type variation they observe at
particular “slots” in otherwise recurrent tokens of the
same utterance; and (5) children create novel utterances for
themselves via usage-based syntactic operations in which
they begin with an utterance-level schema and then modify
that schema for the exigencies of the particular
communicative situation (usage event) at hand. © 2001, 2000
by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1515/cogl.2001.012},
Key = {fds351941}
}
@article{fds351942,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cultural Transmission:A View from Chimpanzees and Human
Infants},
Journal = {Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {135-146},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002002},
Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways
that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by
the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate
modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The
key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand
other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This
species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human
ontogeny at around 1 year of age as infants begin to engage
with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional
activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and
gestural communication. Young children–s joint attentional
skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of
cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language,
discourse skills, tool use practices, and many other
conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural
learning allow human beings to pool their cognitive
resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in
ways that are unique in the animal kingdom. © 2015, Sage
Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/0022022101032002002},
Key = {fds351942}
}
@article{fds351943,
Author = {Diessel, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The acquisition of finite complement clauses in English: A
corpus-based analysis},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {97-142},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.12.2.97},
Abstract = {This article examines the development of finite complement
clauses in the speech of seven English-speaking children
aged 1;2 to 5;2.It shows that in most of children's complex
utterances that seem to include a finite complement clause,
the main clause does not express a full proposition; rather,
it functions as an epistemic marker, attention getter, or
marker of illocutionary force. The whole construction thus
contains only a single proposition expressed by the apparent
complement clause. As children grow older, some of the
“main clauses” become more substantial and new
complement-taking verbs emerge that occur with truly
embedded complement clauses. However, since the use of these
constructions is limited to only a few verbs, we argue that
they are not yet licensed by a general schema or rule;
rather, they are “constructional islands” organized
around individual verbs. © 2001, Walter de Gruyter. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1515/cogl.12.2.97},
Key = {fds351943}
}
@article{fds351944,
Author = {Pika, S and Tomasello, M},
Title = {'Separating the wheat from the chaff': A novel food
processing technique in captive Gorillas (Gorilla g.
gorilla)},
Journal = {Primates},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {167-170},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02558144},
Abstract = {Observation of a novel food processing technique is reported
for captive zoo gorillas (Gorilla g. gorilla). It is similar
in function to that of Japanese macaques' wheat placer
mining behaviour and consists of puffing/blowing air with
the mouth onto a mixture of oat grains and chaff in order to
separate out the oat grains. Three females in two of four
groups regularly use this behaviour. Other individuals in
these groups or individuals of the two other groups in the
same zoo do not use it. However, a very similar behaviour
has been observed in three other individuals in a gorilla
group of another zoo. The existence of this technique in
spatially separated groups implies that multiple individuals
have invented it for themselves. The possible role of social
transmission is still to be investigated.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02558144},
Key = {fds351944}
}
@article{fds351945,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Could we please lose the mapping metaphor,
please?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {24},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1119-1120},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01390131},
Abstract = {Although Bloom gives more credit to social cognition (mind
reading) than do most other theorists of word learning, he
does not go far enough. He still relies fundamentally on a
learning process of association (or mapping), neglecting the
joint attentional and cultural learning skills from which
linguistic communication emerges at one year of
age.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x01390131},
Key = {fds351945}
}
@article{fds351946,
Author = {Abbot-Smith, K and Lieven, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {What preschool children do and do not do with ungrammatical
word orders},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {679-692},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(01)00054-5},
Abstract = {Akhtar [J. Child Lang. 26 (1999) 339.] found that when
4-year-old English-speaking children hear novel verbs in
transitive utterances with ungrammatical word orders (e.g.,
Elmo the tree meeked), they correct them to canonical SVO
order almost all of the time. However, when 3-year-olds and
older 2-year-olds hear these same utterances, they waver
between correcting and using the ungrammatical ordering. In
the current study, we adapted this task for children at 2;4,
using an intransitive construction. The major finding was
that children corrected the noncanonical word order less
than half as often as Akhtar's 2-year-old subjects who were
approximately 4 months older. At the same time, however,
children showed in several ways that they had some implicit
understanding of canonical SV order; for example, they used
the novel verb which they heard used in grammatical word
order more often than the novel verb which they heard in
ungrammatical word order, and they consistently used
pronouns and the progressive -s auxiliary in appropriate
ways. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body
of theory and research suggesting that the ontogenetic
emergence of linguistic categories and schemas is a gradual
process, as is the emergence of categories in other domains
of cognitive development. © 2001 Elsevier Science
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(01)00054-5},
Key = {fds351946}
}
@article{fds366602,
Author = {Striano, T and Tomasello, M and Rochat, P},
Title = {Social and object support for early symbolic
play},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {4},
Number = {4},
Pages = {442-455},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00186},
Abstract = {In this study we sought to determine the degree to which
2-to 3-year-old children use objects symbolically in the
relative absence of adult symbolic actions or linguistic
descriptions, and how the nature of objects influences
symbolic play. Results revealed a dramatic increase in
children's creative symbolic productions between 2 and 3
years of age, with the tendency to produce symbolic actions
influenced to an equal degree by adult symbolic action
models and verbal directions. Children of all ages were
heavily influenced by the nature of the object to be used as
a symbol, with the youngest children using only replica
objects as symbols. In a second study, we examined
children's looks to an adult as they engaged in different
kinds of activities with objects. The main finding was that
children looked to the adult immediately after performing a
symbolic action more often than if they performed an
instrumental action. We argue for the essentially social
nature of symbolic play, both in terms of how children learn
to use objects as symbols and in terms of the reasons they
do so.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00186},
Key = {fds366602}
}
@article{fds325203,
Author = {Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cues to food location that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris)
of different ages do and do not use},
Journal = {Animal Cognition},
Volume = {3},
Number = {2},
Pages = {107-112},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710000070},
Abstract = {The results of three experiments are reported. In the main
study, a human experimenter presented domestic dogs (Canis
familiaris) with a variety of social cues intended to
indicate the location of hidden food. The novel findings of
this study were: (1) dogs were able to use successfully
several totally novel cues in which they watched a human
place a marker in front of the target location; (2) dogs
were unable to use the marker by itself with no behavioral
cues (suggesting that some form of human behavior directed
to the target location was a necessary part of the cue); and
(3) there were no significant developments in dogs' skills
in these tasks across the age range 4 months to 4 years
(arguing against the necessity of extensive learning
experiences with humans). In a follow- up study, dogs did
not follow human gaze into "empty space" outside of the
simulated foraging context. Finally, in a small pilot study,
two arctic wolves (Canis lupus) were unable to use human
cues to locate hidden food. These results suggest the
possibility that domestic dogs have evolved an adaptive
specialization for using human-produced directional cues in
a goal-directed (especially foraging) context. Exactly how
they understand these cues is still an open question. ©
Springer-Verlag 2000.},
Doi = {10.1007/s100710000070},
Key = {fds325203}
}
@article{fds351947,
Author = {Call, J and Agnetta, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cues that chimpanzees do and do not use to find hidden
objects},
Journal = {Animal Cognition},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {23-34},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100710050047},
Abstract = {Chimpanzees follow conspecific and human gaze direction
reliably in some situations, but very few chimpanzees
reliably use gaze direction or other communicative signals
to locate hidden food in the object-choice task. Three
studies aimed at exploring factors that affect chimpanzee
performance in this task are reported. In the first study,
vocalizations and other noises facilitated the performance
of some chimpanzees (only a minority). In the second study,
various behavioral cues were given in which a human
experimenter either touched, approached, or actually lifted
and looked under the container where the food was hidden.
Each of these cues led to enhanced performance for only a
very few individuals. In the third study - a replication
with some methodological improvements of a previous
experiment - chimpanzees were confronted with two
experimenters giving conflicting cues about the location of
the hidden food, with one of them (the knower) having
witnessed the hiding process and the other (the guesser)
not. In the crucial test in which a third experimenter did
the hiding, no chimpanzee found the food at above chance
levels. Overall, in all three studies, by far the best
performers were two individuals who had been raised in
infancy by humans. It thus seems that while chimpanzees are
very good at "behavior reading" of various sorts, including
gaze following, they do not understand the communicative
intentions (informative intentions) behind the looking and
gesturing of others - with the possible exception of
enculturated chimpanzees, who still do not understand the
differential significance of looking and gesturing done by
people who have different knowledge about states of affairs
in the world. © Springer-Verlag 2000.},
Doi = {10.1007/s100710050047},
Key = {fds351947}
}
@article{fds351948,
Author = {Campbell, AL and Brooks, P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Factors affecting young children's use of pronouns as
referring expressions.},
Journal = {Journal of speech, language, and hearing research :
JSLHR},
Volume = {43},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1337-1349},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jslhr.4306.1337},
Abstract = {Most studies of children's use of pronouns have focused
either on the morphology of personal pronouns or on the
anaphoric use of pronouns by older children. The current two
studies investigated factors affecting children's choice of
pronouns as referring expressions-in contrast with their use
of full nouns and null references. In the first study it was
found that 2.5- and 3.5-year-old children did not use
pronouns differentially whether the adult (a) modeled a
pronoun or a noun for the target object or (b) did or did
not witness the target event (although there was evidence
that they did notice and take account of the adult's
witnessing in other ways). In the second study it was found
that children of this same age (a) do not use pronouns to
avoid unfamiliar or difficult nouns but (b) do use pronouns
differently depending on the immediately preceding discourse
of the experimenter (whether they were asked a specific
question such as "What did X do?" or a general question such
as "What happened?"). In the case of specific questions,
children prefer to use a null reference but use some
pronouns as well (almost never using full nouns); in the
case of the generic questions, children use pronouns even
more often (and use nouns more as well). This finding was
corroborated by some new analyses of children's use of
pronouns in specific discourse situations in previously
published studies. These findings suggest that children's
choice of pronouns as referring expressions in early
language development is influenced more by the immediately
preceding discourse than other kinds of factors.},
Doi = {10.1044/jslhr.4306.1337},
Key = {fds351948}
}
@article{fds351949,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Erratum: (Trends in Cognitive Sciences (April) 4:4
(156-163))},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {4},
Number = {5},
Pages = {186},
Year = {2000},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01481-9},
Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01481-9},
Key = {fds351949}
}
@article{fds351950,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The item-based nature of children's early syntactic
development},
Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {4},
Number = {4},
Pages = {156-163},
Year = {2000},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01462-5},
Abstract = {Recent research using both naturalistic and experimental
methods has found that the vast majority of young children's
early language is organized around concrete, item-based
linguistic schemas. From this beginning, children then
construct more abstract and adult-like linguistic
constructions, but only gradually and in piecemeal fashion.
These new data present significant problems for nativist
accounts of children's language development that use
adult-like linguistic categories, structures and formal
grammars as analytical tools. Instead, the best account of
these data is provided by a usage-based model in which
children imitatively learn concrete linguistic expressions
from the language they hear around them, and then - using
their general cognitive and social-cognitive skills -
categorize, schematize and creatively combine these
individually learned expressions and structures. Copyright
(C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01462-5},
Key = {fds351950}
}
@article{fds351951,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do young children have adult syntactic competence?},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {74},
Number = {3},
Pages = {209-253},
Year = {2000},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00069-4},
Abstract = {Many developmental psycholinguists assume that young
children have adult syntactic competence, this assumption
being operationalized in the use of adult-like grammars to
describe young children's language. This "continuity
assumption" has never had strong empirical support, but
recently a number of new findings have emerged - both from
systematic analyses of children's spontaneous speech and
from controlled experiments - that contradict it directly.
In general, the key finding is that most of children's early
linguistic competence is item based, and therefore their
language development proceeds in a piecemeal fashion with
virtually no evidence of any system-wide syntactic
categories, schemas, or parameters. For a variety of
reasons, these findings are not easily explained in terms of
the development of children's skills of linguistic
performance, pragmatics, or other "external" factors. The
framework of an alternative, usage-based theory of child
language acquisition - relying explicitly on new models from
Cognitive-Functional Linguistics - is presented.},
Doi = {10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00069-4},
Key = {fds351951}
}
@article{fds325204,
Author = {Hare, B and Call, J and Agnetta, B and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not
see},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {59},
Number = {4},
Pages = {771-785},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377},
Abstract = {We report a series of experiments on social problem solving
in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a
subordinate and a dominant individual were put into
competition over two pieces of food. In all experiments
dominants obtained virtually all of the foods to which they
had good visual and physical access. However, subordinates
were successful quite often in three situations in which
they had better visual access to the food than the dominant,
for example, when the food was positioned so that only the
subordinate (and not the dominant) could see it. In some
cases, the subordinate might have been monitoring the
behaviour of the dominant directly and simply avoided the
food that the dominant was moving towards (which just
happened to be the one it could see). In other cases,
however, we ruled out this possibility by giving
subordinates a small headstart and forcing them to make
their choice (to go to the food that both competitors could
see, or the food that only they could see) before the
dominant was released into the area. Together with other
recent studies, the present investigation suggests that
chimpanzees know what conspecifics can and cannot see, and,
furthermore, that they use this knowledge to devise
effective social-cognitive strategies in naturally occurring
food competition situations. (C)2000 The Association for the
Study of Animal Behaviour.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1377},
Key = {fds325204}
}
@article{fds351952,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Culture and cognitive development},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {37-40},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00056},
Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways
that other primates are not. The difference can be clearly
seen when the social learning skills of humans and their
nearest primate relatives are systematically compared. The
human adaptation for culture begins to make itself manifest
in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as human infants
come to undestrand other persons as intentional agents like
the self and so engage in joint attentional interactions
with them. This understanding then enables young children
(a) to employ some uniquely powerful forms of cultural
learning to acquire the accumulated wisdom of their
cultures, especially as embodied in language, and also (b)
to comprehend their worlds in some uniquely powerful ways
involving perspectivally based symbolic representations.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8721.00056},
Key = {fds351952}
}
@article{fds351953,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Primate cognition: Introduction to the issue},
Journal = {Cognitive Science},
Volume = {24},
Number = {3},
Pages = {351-361},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2403_1},
Abstract = {I introduce the special issue by: (1) outlining something of
the relationship between mainstream cognitive science and
the study of nonhuman primate cognition; (2) providing a
brief overview of the scientific study of primate cognition
and how the papers of this special issue fit into that
scientific paradigm; and (3) explicating my own views about
the relationship between nonhuman primate cognition and
human cognition. © 2000 Cognitive Science Society,
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1207/s15516709cog2403_1},
Key = {fds351953}
}
@article{fds351954,
Author = {Bellagamba, F and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Re-enacting intended acts: Comparing 12- and
18-month-olds},
Journal = {Infant Behavior and Development},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-282},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(99)00002-8},
Abstract = {The current study was a replication and extension of a study
of infant imitative learning by Meltzoff (1995). Unlike the
18-month-old infants in that study (and other 18-month-olds
in the current study), the 12-month-olds in this study did
not frequently imitate unsuccessful goal-directed actions.
Also, both 12- and 18-month-old infants reproduced actions
more often when they observed the entire action and its
result than when they observed the result only. © 1999
ABLEX Publishing Corporation.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0163-6383(99)00002-8},
Key = {fds351954}
}
@article{fds351955,
Author = {Behrens, H and Tomasello, M},
Title = {And what about the Chinese?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {22},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1014},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X99222224},
Abstract = {We discuss other recent studies on the acquisition of the
German plural that do not support the dual-mechanism model.
The attested overgeneralizations are not by default only,
nor completely random, but predictable from subregularities
based on the grammatical gender and the phonology of the
noun. In addition, the dual-mechanism model creates a number
of problems for acquisition (theory) rather than solving
existing ones.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X99222224},
Key = {fds351955}
}
@article{fds351956,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Striano, T and Rochat, P},
Title = {Do young children use objects as symbols?},
Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {563-584},
Year = {1999},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151099165483},
Abstract = {Much of young children's symbolic play is heavily scaffolded
by adult symbolic action models, which children may imitate,
and by adult verbal scripts. The current studies attempted
to evaluate 18-35-month-old children's symbolic skills in
the absence of such scaffolding. In a study of symbol
comprehension, children were tested for their ability to
comprehend an adult's use of either a replica object or an
associated gesture to communicate which object in an array
she wanted. In a study of symbol production, children were
given some objects that afforded symbolic manipulations, but
without adult symbolic action models or verbal scripts. The
results of the two studies converged to suggest that
children below 2 years of age have symbolic skills with
gestures, but not with objects. It was also found that while
children at 26 months were able to use an object as a symbol
for another object, they had difficulties when the symbol
had another conventional use (e.g. a drinking cup used as a
hat). The findings are discussed in terms of DeLoache's dual
representation model, and a modification of that model is
proposed.},
Doi = {10.1348/026151099165483},
Key = {fds351956}
}
@article{fds351957,
Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M and Dodson, K and Lewis,
LB},
Title = {Young children's overgeneralizations with fixed transitivity
verbs.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {70},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1325-1337},
Year = {1999},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00097},
Abstract = {The present study examined English-speaking children's
tendency to make argument structure overgeneralization
errors (e.g., I disappeared it). Children were exposed to
several English verbs of fixed transitivity (exclusively
intransitive or exclusively transitive) and then asked
questions that encouraged them to overgeneralize usage of
the verbs. Seventy-two children (24 in each of three age
groups: 3, 4/5, and 8 years of age) experienced four actions
performed by puppets. Each action had two verbs of similar
meaning associated with it in the context of the
experimental action: one more familiar to young children and
one less familiar. Children at all ages were more likely to
overgeneralize usage of verbs that were less familiar to
them, supporting the hypothesis that children's usage of
verbs in particular construction types becomes entrenched
over time. As children solidly learn the transitivity status
of particular verbs, they become more reluctant to use those
verbs in other argument structure constructions.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00097},
Key = {fds351957}
}
@article{fds351958,
Author = {Visalberghi, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Causal understanding in primates in physical and
psychological domain},
Journal = {Sistemi Intelligenti},
Volume = {11},
Number = {2},
Pages = {307-331},
Year = {1999},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1422/3515},
Doi = {10.1422/3515},
Key = {fds351958}
}
@article{fds351959,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A nonverbal false belief task: the performance of children
and great apes.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {70},
Number = {2},
Pages = {381-395},
Year = {1999},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00028},
Abstract = {A nonverbal task of false belief understanding was given to
4- and 5-year-old children (N = 28) and to two species of
great ape: chimpanzees and orangutans (N = 7). The task was
embedded in a series of finding games in which an adult (the
hider) hid a reward in one of two identical containers, and
another adult (the communicator) observed the hiding process
and attempted to help the participant by placing a marker on
the container that she believed to hold the reward. An
initial series of control trials ensured that participants
were able to use the marker to locate the reward, follow the
reward in both visible and invisible displacements, and
ignore the marker when they knew it to be incorrect. In the
crucial false belief trials, the communicator watched the
hiding process and then left the area, at which time the
hider switched the locations of the containers. When the
communicator returned, she marked the container at the
location where she had seen the reward hidden, which was
incorrect. The hider then gave the subject the opportunity
to find the sticker. Successful performance required
participants to reason as follows: the communicator placed
the marker where she saw the reward hidden; the container
that was at that location is now at the other location; so
the reward is at the other location. Children were also
given a verbal false belief task in the context of this same
hiding game. The two main results of the study were: (1)
children's performance on the verbal and nonverbal false
belief tasks were highly correlated (and both fit very
closely with age norms from previous studies), and (2) no
ape succeeded in the nonverbal false belief task even though
they succeeded in all of the control trials indicating
mastery of the general task demands.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8624.00028},
Key = {fds351959}
}
@article{fds325205,
Author = {Itakura, S and Agnetta, B and Hare, B and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Chimpanzee use of human and conspecific social cues to
locate hidden food},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {448-456},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00089},
Abstract = {Two studies are reported in which chimpanzees attempted to
use social cues to locate hidden food in one of two possible
hiding places. In the first study four chimpanzees were
exposed to a local enhancement cue (the informant approached
and looked to the location where food was hidden and then
remained beside it) and a gaze/point cue (the informant
gazed and manually pointed towards the location where the
food was hidden). Each cue was given by both a human
informant and a chimpanzee informant. In the second study 12
chimpanzees were exposed to a gaze direction cue in
combination with a vocal cue (the human informant gazed to
the hiding location and produced one of two different
vocalizations: a 'food-bark' or a human word-form). The
results were: (i) all subjects were quite skillful with the
local enhancement cue, no matter who produced it; (ii) few
subjects were skillful with the gaze/point cue, no matter
who produced it (most of these being individuals who had
been raised in infancy by humans); and (iii) most subjects
were skillful when the human gazed and vocalized at the
hiding place, with little difference between the two types
of vocal cue. Findings are discussed in terms of
chimpanzees' apparent need for additional cues, over and
above gaze direction cues, to indicate the presence of
food.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00089},
Key = {fds325205}
}
@article{fds325571,
Author = {Hare, B and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use human and conspecific
social cues to locate hidden food},
Journal = {Journal of Comparative Psychology},
Volume = {113},
Number = {2},
Pages = {X173-X177},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0735-7036.113.2.173},
Abstract = {Ten domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different breeds and
ages were exposed to 2 different social cues indicating the
location of hidden food, each provided by both a human
informant and a conspecific informant (for a total of 4
different social cues). For the local enhancement cue the
informant approached the location where food was hidden and
then stayed beside it. For the gaze and point cue, the
informant stood equidistant between 2 hiding locations and
bodily oriented and gazed toward the 1 in which food was
hidden (the human informant also pointed). Eight of the 10
subjects, including the one 6-month-old juvenile, were above
chance with 2 or more cues. Results are discussed in terms
of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes by means of
which dogs come to use social cues to locate
food.},
Doi = {10.1037//0735-7036.113.2.173},
Key = {fds325571}
}
@article{fds326036,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Hare, B and Agnetta, B},
Title = {Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, follow gaze direction
geometrically},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {58},
Number = {4},
Pages = {769-777},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1192},
Abstract = {Two experiments on chimpanzee gaze following are reported.
In the first, chimpanzee subjects watched as a human
experimenter looked around various types of barriers. The
subjects looked around each of the barriers more when the
human had done so than in a control condition (in which the
human looked-in another direction). In the second
experiment, chimpanzees watched as a human looked towards
the back of their cage. As they turned to follow the human's
gaze a distractor-object was presented. The chimpanzees
looked at the distractor while still following the human's
gaze to the back of the cage. These two experiments
effectively disconfirm the low-level model of chimpanzee
gaze following in which it is claimed that upon seeing
another animate being's gaze direction chimpanzees simply
turn in that direction and look around for something
interesting. Rather, they support the hypothesis that
chimpanzees follow the gaze direction of other animate
beings geometrically to specific locations, in much the same
way as human infants. The degree to which chimpanzees have a
mentalistic interpretation of the gaze and/or visual
experience of others is still an open question.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1999.1192},
Key = {fds326036}
}
@article{fds351960,
Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M},
Title = {How children constrain their argument structure
constructions},
Journal = {Language},
Volume = {75},
Number = {4},
Pages = {720-738},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/417731},
Abstract = {We tested two hypotheses about how English-speaking children
learn to avoid making argument structure errors such as
Don't giggle me. The first is that children base their usage
of verbs on membership in narrow-range semantic classes
(Pinker 1989). The second is that children make use of
indirect negative evidence in the form of alternative
expressions that preempt tendencies to overgeneralize.
Ninety-six children (32 each at 2.5, 4.5, and 6/7 years of
age) were introduced to two nonce verbs, one as a transitive
verb and one as an intransitive verb. One verb was from a
semantic class that can be used both transitively and
intransitively while the other was from a fixed transitivity
class. Half of the children were given preempting
alternatives with both verbs; for example, they heard a verb
in a simple transitive construction (as in Ernie's meeking
the car) and then they also heard it in a passive
construction - which enabled them to answer the question
'What's happening with the car?' with It's getting meeked
(rather than generalizing to the intransitive construction
with It's meeking). We found empirical support for the
constraining role of verb classes and of preemption, but
only for children 4.5 years of age and older. Results are
discussed in terms of a model of syntactic development in
which children begin with lexically specific linguistic
constructions and only gradually learn to differentiate
verbs as lexical items from argument structure constructions
as abstract linguistic entities.},
Doi = {10.2307/417731},
Key = {fds351960}
}
@article{fds351961,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The human adaptation for culture},
Journal = {Annual Review of Anthropology},
Volume = {28},
Pages = {509-529},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509},
Abstract = {Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways
that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by
the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate
modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The
key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand
other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This
species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human
ontogeny at approximately 1 year of age, as infants begin to
engage with other persons in various kinds of joint
attentional activities involving gaze following, social
referencing, and gestural communication. Young children's
joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely
powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the
acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool-use
practices, and other conventional activities. These novel
forms of cultural learning allow human beings to, in effect,
pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and
over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal
kingdom.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509},
Key = {fds351961}
}
@article{fds351962,
Author = {Brooks, PJ and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children learn to produce passives with nonce
verbs.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {35},
Number = {1},
Pages = {29-44},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.35.1.29},
Abstract = {Younger and older children (mean ages = 2 years 11 months
and 3 years 5 months) learned 2 nonce verbs in a full
passive or active transitive construction. When asked
patient-focused questions encouraging passive-voice replies
(e.g., "What happened to the ball?") or agent-focused
questions encouraging active-voice replies (e.g., "What did
Elmo do?"), children used a variety of strategies to meet
the demands of the questions, usually without changing the
construction in which the verb occurred. In Study 2 in which
passive and active constructions were primed, 40% of the
almost 3-year-old children used an active-introduced verb in
a passive construction and 35% used a passive-introduced
verb in an active transitive construction when discourse
demands encouraged them to do so. Thus, before their 3rd
birthdays, some children have an understanding of the
passive and active transitive constructions general enough
to support productive usages with newly learned
verbs.},
Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.35.1.29},
Key = {fds351962}
}
@article{fds351963,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Brooks, PJ and Stern, E},
Title = {Learning to produce passive utterances through
discourse},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {18},
Number = {53},
Pages = {223-237},
Year = {1998},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272379801805306},
Abstract = {Two studies of English-speaking children's acquisition of
the passive construction are reported. In the first study
children at 3.0 and 3.5 years of age were taught to produce
full passive utterances with a nonce verb through rich
discourse interaction. All the older children learned to
produce a passive with the nonce verb, whereas only
two-thirds of the younger children learned to do this - and
they needed three times as many adult utterances to do so.
In the second study, also using a nonce verb, some
3.0-year-old children were given rich discourse interactions
containing truncated passives, passive questions, and by
phrases - all of which added up to a full passive - but they
never heard a full passive utterance as a whole. Other
children were given only models of full passive utterances
with no discourse scaffolding. Only children who heard full
passive utterances produced them. The children who
participated in rich discourse interactions produced
truncated passives (as they had heard). These results
demonstrate that children can learn to produce full passive
sentences with a nonce verb at 3 years of age, but, in
accordance with Tomasello's (1992) verb island hypothesis,
they tend to do so only within the syntactic constructions
in which they have heard adults using that verb. © Alpha
Academic.},
Doi = {10.1177/014272379801805306},
Key = {fds351963}
}
@article{fds325206,
Author = {Byrne, RW and Russon, AE},
Title = {Learning by imitation: a hierarchical approach.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5},
Pages = {667-684},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x98001745},
Abstract = {To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively
complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have
been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive
psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be
subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input
increases the activation of stored internal representations.
Imitation itself has generally been seen as a "special
faculty." This has diverted much research towards the
all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with
disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great apes,
however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized
hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at
various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct
ones: the "action level," a rather detailed and linear
specification of sequential acts, and the "program level," a
broader description of subroutine structure and the
hierarchical layout of a behavioural "program." Program
level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism,
adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and
thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test
for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe
the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas
and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing
"rehabilitation" to the wild. Representing and manipulating
relations between objects seems to be one basic building
block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that
great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans
in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some
chimpanzee behaviour previously described as "emulation" and
suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the
program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in
great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social
role, even in humans.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x98001745},
Key = {fds325206}
}
@article{fds351964,
Author = {Dodson, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Acquiring the transitive construction in English: the role
of animacy and pronouns.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {25},
Number = {3},
Pages = {605-622},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000998003535},
Abstract = {Twenty-four children between 2;5 and 3;1 were taught two
nonce verbs. Each verb was used multiple times by an adult
experimenter to refer to a highly transitive action
involving a mostly animate agent (including the child
herself) and a patient of varying animacy. One of the verbs
was modelled in the Two-Participants condition in which the
experimenter said: 'Look. Big Bird is dopping the boat'. The
other verb was modelled in the No-Participant condition in
which the experimenter named the Two-Participants but did
not use them as arguments of the novel verb: 'Look what Big
Bird is doing to the boat. It's called keefing'. It was
found that whereas many children produced transitive
sentences with the Two-Participants verb, only children
close to 3;0 produced transitive sentences with the
No-Participant verb. This age is somewhat younger than
previous studies in which young children were asked to
produce transitive sentences with two lexical nouns for the
two animate participants. Also, re-analyses of previously
published studies in which children learned novel verbs in
sentence frames without arguments found that the few
transitive sentences produced by children under 2;6 involved
either I or me as subject. One hypothesis is thus that as
young children in the third year of life begin to construct
a more abstract and verb-general transitive construction,
this construction initially contains only certain types of
participants expressed in only certain kinds of linguistic
forms.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000998003535},
Key = {fds351964}
}
@article{fds351965,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),
and human children (Homo sapiens).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {112},
Number = {2},
Pages = {192-206},
Year = {1998},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.112.2.192},
Abstract = {This study investigates the understanding of others'
intentions in 2- and 3-year-old children, chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). During
training, subjects learned to use a discriminative cue to
select a baited box. During testing, the experimenter placed
a marker on top of the baited box to inform the subject of
the reward's location. However, the experimenter also
accidentally dropped the marker on top of an unbaited box,
so that during any given trial the experimenter marked 2
boxes, 1 intentionally and 1 accidentally. All 3 species
preferentially selected the box the experimenter had marked
intentionally (especially during the initial trials), with
3-year-old children presenting the most robust results.
These findings suggest that subjects understood something
about the experimenter's intentions. The authors speculate
that understanding of others' intentions may precede the
understanding of others' beliefs both at the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic levels.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.112.2.192},
Key = {fds351965}
}
@article{fds351966,
Author = {Visalberghi, E and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Primate causal understanding in the physical and
psychological domains},
Journal = {Behavioural Processes},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {189-203},
Year = {1998},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0376-6357(97)00076-4},
Abstract = {Evidence for primates' understanding of causality is
presented and discussed. Understanding causality requires
the organism to understand not just that two events are
associated with one another in space and time, but also that
there is some 'mediating force' that binds the two events to
one another which may be used to predict or control those
events (e.g. a physical force such as gravity or a
psychological force such as an intention). In the physical
domain, studies of tool use indicate that capuchin monkeys
do not have a causal understanding of the functioning of
tools in terms of the physical forces involved, but rather
they learn to associate aspects of their own behavior with
the results it produces. Apes show some possible signs of
understanding the causal relations involved in tool use in
the sense that they may employ various forms of foresight in
approaching novel tasks, perhaps involving an understanding
of physical forces-although not to the extent of human
children. In the psychological domain, nonhuman primates
understand conspecifics as animate beings that generate
their own behavior and, thus, they appreciate that to
manipulate conspecifics communicative signals, and not
physical activities, are required. However, there is very
little evidence that nonhuman primates of any species
understand others as psychological beings with intentions
and other psychological states that mediate their behavioral
interactions with the world-as human children begin to do
sometime during their second year of life. More research,
using a wider range of problem-solving situations, is needed
if we are to become more precise in our understanding of how
primates understand the causal structure of the world around
them.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0376-6357(97)00076-4},
Key = {fds351966}
}
@article{fds326347,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Hare, B},
Title = {Five primate species follow the visual gaze of
conspecifics},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {55},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1063-1069},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1997.0636},
Abstract = {Individuals from five primate species were tested
experimentally for their ability to follow the visual gaze
of conspecifics to an outside object. Subjects were from
captive social groups of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, sooty
mangabeys, Cercocebus atys torquatus, rhesus macaques,
Macaca mulatta, stumptail macaques, M. arctoides, and
pigtail macaques, M. nemestrina. Experimental trials
consisted of an experimenter inducing one individual to look
at food being displayed, and then observing the reaction of
another individual (the subject) that was looking at that
individual (not the food). Control trials consisted of an
experimenter displaying the food in an identical manner when
the subject was alone. Individuals from all species reliably
followed the gaze of conspecifics, looking to the food about
80% of the time in experimental trials, compared with about
20% of the time in control trials. Results are discussed in
terms of both the proximate mechanisms that might be
involved and the adaptive functions that might be served by
gaze-following.},
Doi = {10.1006/anbe.1997.0636},
Key = {fds326347}
}
@article{fds351967,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Reference: Intending that others jointly
attend},
Journal = {Pragmatics and Cognition},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {229-243},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.6.1-2.12tom},
Abstract = {My approach to reference focuses on naturally occuring
processes of communication, and in particular on
children’s earliest referential activities. I begin by
describing three different kinds of child gesture –
ritualizations, deictics, and symbolic gestures – and then
proceed to examine young children’s early word learning.
The account focuses on the joint attentional situations in
which young children learn their earliest gestures and
linguistic symbols and on the social-cognitive and cultural
learning processes involved in the different cases. © 1998
John Benjamins Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1075/pc.6.1-2.12tom},
Key = {fds351967}
}
@article{fds351968,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Brooks, PJ},
Title = {Young Children'S earliest transitive and intransitive
constructions},
Journal = {Cognitive Linguistics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {379-396},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogl.1998.9.4.379},
Abstract = {Much of children's early syntactic development can be seen
as the acquisition of sentence-level constructions that
correspond to relatively complex events and states of
affairs. The ctirrent study was an attempt to determine the
relative concreteness (verb-specificity) or abstractness
(verb-generality) of such constructions for children just
beginning to produce large numbers of multi-word utterances.
Sixteen children at 2.0 years of age and sixteen children at
2.5 years of age participated (all English speaking). Each
child was taught two novel verbsfor a highly transitive
action: one in a transitive construction (Ernie is tamming
the car) and one in an intransitive construction (with
patient as subject: The ball is meeking). They were then
given o p rtunities to use their newly learned verbs, in
many cases in discourse situations that encouraged use of
the “opposite” construction (i.e., agentand
patient-focused questions). Results showed that 2.0-year-old
children almost never produced an utterance using a novel
verb in anything other t an the construction in which it had
been modeled. Children at 2.5 years of age were somewhat
more productive, but still the large majority of these
children avoided using the experimental verbs in nonmodeled
constructions. These results suggest that when
English-speaking children produce simple transitive and
intransitive utterances in their spontaneous speech, they
are doing so on a verb-specific basis (verb Island
constructions), schematizing more abstract constructions
only later as they discover patterns that apply across many
such lexically specific constructions. © 1998, Walter de
Gruyter. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1515/cogl.1998.9.4.379},
Key = {fds351968}
}
@article{fds351969,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Response to commentators},
Journal = {Journal of Child Language},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {485-491},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305000998003511},
Doi = {10.1017/S0305000998003511},
Key = {fds351969}
}
@article{fds351970,
Author = {Ashley, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cooperative problem-solving and teaching in
preschoolers},
Journal = {Social Development},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {143-163},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00059},
Abstract = {The current study investigated the ontogenetic origins of
children's skills of cooperative problem-solving in a task
involving two complementary roles. Participants were peer
dyads of 24, 30, 36, and 42 months of age. Primary dyads
were initially presented with an instrumental problem whose
solution required them to cooperate by coordinating two
complementary actions. To further investigate their
understanding of the task, these same dyads were then
presented with the same problem but with roles reversed.
Finally, after each of these primary participants had
demonstrated proficiency in both roles, each was separately
paired with a naive peer and given the opportunity to teach
the naive partner the task. A clear ontogenetic trend
emerged. Even with adult assistance, 24-month-old children
never became independently proficient at the task.
Thirty-and 36-month-old children became proficient mostly
independently, but only relatively slowly and without
demonstrating extensive amounts of behavioral coordination
or the use of explicitly directive language to facilitate
coordination. Although they did show evidence of recognizing
when a peer was new to the task, children of this age
engaged in little explicit teaching of naive peers. In
contrast, 42-month-old children mastered the task much more
quickly than the other children, responded much more quickly
and accurately when their roles were reversed, coordinated
both their actions and language in the task to a much
greater extent, and engaged in more explicit teaching of
naive peers. Results are discussed in terms of the
developing social cognitive skills that enable children from
2 to 4 years of age to understand other persons as mental
agents with whom they may share mental perspectives.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-9507.00059},
Key = {fds351970}
}
@article{fds351971,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Fourteen- through 18-month-old infants differentially
imitate intentional and accidental actions},
Journal = {Infant Behavior and Development},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {315-330},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90009-1},
Abstract = {This study explored infants' ability to discriminate
between, and their tendency to reproduce, the accidental and
intentional actions of others. Twenty 14- through
18-month-olds watched an adult perform a series of two-step
actions on objects that made interesting results occur. Some
of the modeled actions were marked vocally as intentional
("There!"), some were marked vocally as accidental
("Woops!"). Following each demonstration, infants were given
a chance to make the result occur themselves. Overall,
infants imitated almost twice as many of the adult's
intentional actions as her accidental ones. Infants before
age 18 months thus may understand something about the
intentions of other persons. This understanding represents
infants' first step toward adult-like social cognition and
underlies their acquisition of language and other cultural
skills. © 1998 Ablex Publishing Corporation.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90009-1},
Key = {fds351971}
}
@article{fds351972,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Uniquely primate, uniquely human},
Journal = {Developmental Science},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-16},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00002},
Abstract = {Two hypotheses about primate cognition are proposed. First,
it is proposed that primates, but not other mammals,
understand categories of relations among external entities.
In the physical domain primates have special skills in tasks
such as oddity, transitivity, and relation matching that
require facility with relational categories; in the social
domain primates have special skills in understanding the
third-party social relationships that hold among other
individuals in their groups. Second, it is proposed that
humans, but not other primates, understand the causal and
intentional relations that hold among external entities. In
the physical domain only humans understand causal forces as
mediating the connection between sequentially ordered
events; in the social domain only humans understand the
behavior of others as intentionally directed and controlled
by desired outcomes. Both these uniquely primate and these
uniquely human cognitive skills are hypothesized to have
their origins in adaptations for negotiating complex social
interactions.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-7687.00002},
Key = {fds351972}
}
@article{fds351973,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Nagell, K and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative
competence from 9 to 15 months of age.},
Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development},
Volume = {63},
Number = {4},
Pages = {i-143},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1166214},
Abstract = {At around 1 year of age, human infants display a number of
new behaviors that seem to indicate a newly emerging
understanding of other persons as intentional beings whose
attention to outside objects may be shared, followed into,
and directed in various ways. These behaviors have mostly
been studied separately. In the current study, we
investigated the most important of these behaviors together
as they emerged in a single group of 24 infants between 9
and 15 months of age. At each of seven monthly visits, we
measured joint attentional engagement, gaze and point
following, imitation of two different kinds of actions on
objects, imperative and declarative gestures, and
comprehension and production of language. We also measured
several nonsocial-cognitive skills as a point of comparison.
We report two studies. The focus of the first study was the
initial emergence of infants' social-cognitive skills and
how these skills are related to one another developmentally.
We found a reliable pattern of emergence: Infants progressed
from sharing to following to directing others' attention and
behavior. The nonsocial skills did not emerge predictably in
this developmental sequence. Furthermore, correlational
analyses showed that the ages of emergence of all pairs of
the social-cognitive skills or their components were
inter-related. The focus of the second study was the social
interaction of infants and their mothers, especially with
regard to their skills of joint attentional engagement
(including mothers' use of language to follow into or direct
infants' attention) and how these skills related to infants'
early communicative competence. Our measures of
communicative competence included not only language
production, as in previous studies, but also language
comprehension and gesture production. It was found that two
measures--the amount of time infants spent in joint
engagement with their mothers and the degree to which
mothers used language that followed into their infant's
focus of attention--predicted infants' earliest skills of
gestural and linguistic communication. Results of the two
studies are discussed in terms of their implications for
theories of social-cognitive development, for theories of
language development, and for theories of the process by
means of which human children become fully participating
members of the cultural activities and processes into which
they are born.},
Doi = {10.2307/1166214},
Key = {fds351973}
}
@article{fds366603,
Author = {Boesch, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Chimpanzee and human cultures},
Journal = {Current Anthropology},
Volume = {39},
Number = {5},
Pages = {591-614},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/204785},
Abstract = {Culture has traditionally been attributed only to human
beings. Despite growing evidence of behavioral diversity in
wild chimpanzee populations, most anthropologists and
psychologists still deny culture to this animal species. We
argue here that culture is not monolithic but a set of
processes. These processes show much diversity both in the
social norms and models that determine which individuals
will be exposed to particular cultural variants and what
cultural variants will be present in the population and in
the social learning mechanisms that determine the fidelity
of transmission of the variants over time. Recognition of
the diversity of these processes is important because it
affects cultural dissemination, cultural evolution, and the
complexity of cultural artifacts. A comparison of chimpanzee
and human cultures shows many deep similarities, thus
suggesting that they share evolutionary roots. Two possible
differences between the two species are discussed. First,
thanks to indirect means of transmission such as language,
cultural dissemination is possible over greater stretches of
time and space in humans than in chimpanzees. Second, human
cultures rely more intensively than chimpanzee cultures on
cumulative cultural evolution through the ratchet effect,
which allows the accumulation of modifications over time and
produces more elaborate cultural artifacts. © 1998 by The
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/204785},
Key = {fds366603}
}
@article{fds351974,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Gluckman, A},
Title = {Comprehension of novel communicative signs by apes and human
children.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {68},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1067-1080},
Year = {1997},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01985.x},
Abstract = {Forty-eight young children (2.5 and 3.0 years old) and 9
great apes (6 chimpanzees and 3 orangutans) participated in
a hiding-finding game. An adult human experimenter (the
Hider) hid a reward in 1 of 3 opaque containers aligned on a
wooden plank. Another adult experimenter (the Communicator)
attempted to help the subject find the reward by giving 1 of
3 types of communicative sign: (1) Pointing, for which she
placed her hand directly above the correct container with
index finger oriented down; (2) Marker, for which she placed
a small wooden block on top of the correct container; and
(3) Replica, for which she held up a perceptually identical
duplicate of the correct container. At both ages, children
were above chance in this finding game with all 3 types of
communicative sign, with Pointing being easiest (because
they knew it prior to the experiment), Marker being next
easiest, and Replica being most difficult. In contrast, no
ape was above chance for any of the communicative signs that
it did not know before the experiment (some had been trained
in the use of the marker previously, and one knew pointing),
nor was group performance above chance for any of the signs,
despite the fact that apes experienced three times as many
trials as children on each sign. Our explanation of these
results is that young children understand the communicative
intentions of other persons--although they may have more
difficulty comprehending the exact nature of those
intentions in some cases--whereas apes treat the behavioral
signs of others as predictive cues only (signals). This may
be because apes do not perceive and understand the
communicative intentions of others, at least not in a
human-like way.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01985.x},
Key = {fds351974}
}
@article{fds351975,
Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's productivity with word order and verb
morphology.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {6},
Pages = {952-965},
Year = {1997},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.33.6.952},
Abstract = {Four studies examined English-speaking children's
productivity with word order and verb morphology. Two- and
3-year-olds were taught novel transitive verbs with
experimentally controlled argument structures. The younger
children neither used nor comprehended word order with these
verbs; older children comprehended and used word order
correctly to mark agents and patients of the novel verbs.
Children as young as 2 years 1 month added -ing but not -ed
to verb stems; older children were productive with both
inflections. These studies demonstrate that the present
progressive inflection is used productively before the
regular past tense marker and suggest that productivity with
word order may be independent of developments in verb
morphology. The findings are discussed in terms of M.
Tomasello's (1992a) Verb Island hypothesis and M. Rispoli's
(1991) notion of the mosaic acquisition of grammatical
relations.},
Doi = {10.1037//0012-1649.33.6.952},
Key = {fds351975}
}
@article{fds351976,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N and Dodson, K and Rekau,
L},
Title = {Differential productivity in young children's use of nouns
and verbs.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {373-387},
Year = {1997},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000997003085},
Abstract = {A fundamental question of child language acquisition is
children's productivity with newly learned forms. The
current study addressed this question experimentally with
children just beginning to combine words. Ten children
between 1;6 and 1;11 were taught four new words, two nouns
and two verbs, over multiple sessions. All four words were
modelled in minimal syntactic contexts. The experimenter
gave children multiple opportunities to produce the words
and made attempts to elicit morphological endings (plural
for nouns, past tense for verbs). Overall, children combined
the novel nouns productively with already known words much
more often than they did the novel verbs-by many orders of
magnitude. Several children also pluralized a newly learned
noun, whereas none of them formed a past tense with a newly
learned verb. A follow-up study using a slightly different
methodology confirmed the finding of limited syntactic
productivity with verbs. Hypotheses accounting for this
asymmetry in the early use of nouns and verbs are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000997003085},
Key = {fds351976}
}
@article{fds351977,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Camaioni, L},
Title = {A comparison of the gestural communication of apes and human
infants;},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1},
Pages = {7-24},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278540},
Abstract = {The naturally occurring gestures of chimpanzees and
prelinguistic human infants are compared. Considered as
special cases are apes raised by humans as they gesture to
humans, and children with autism. Overall, the most
important differences between the gestures of typically
developing children and the gestures of individuals from the
other three groups concern: (1) their predominant use of
triadic, distal gestures; (2) their extensive use of
declarative gestures, and (3) their use of imitative
learning in acquiring some gestures (symbolic or
referential), which implies that the gestures are understood
as bi-directional communicative conventions. These
differences all derive from the uniquely human form of
social cognition (i.e., knowledge of other minds) that first
emerges during the 2nd year of life and that enables human
infants to understand other persons as intentional agents
with whom they may share experience. Implications for the
origins and evolution of human culture and language are
discussed. © 1997 S. Karger AG, Basel.},
Doi = {10.1159/000278540},
Key = {fds351977}
}
@article{fds351978,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Strosberg, R and Akhtar, N},
Title = {Eighteen-month-old children learn words in non-ostensive
contexts.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {157-176},
Year = {1996},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900010138},
Abstract = {Previous studies have demonstrated that children aged 2;0
can learn new words in a variety of non-ostensive contexts.
The current two studies were aimed at seeing if this was
also true of children just beginning to learn words at 1;6.
In the first study an adult interacted with 48 children. She
used a nonce word to announce her intention to find an
object ('Let's find the gazzer'), picked up and rejected an
object with obvious disappointment, and then gleefully found
the target object (using no language). Children learned the
new word as well in this condition as in a condition in
which the adult found the object immediately. In the second
study the adult first played several rounds of a finding
game with each of 60 children, in which it was first
established that one of several novel objects was always in
a very distinctive hiding place (a toy barn). The adult then
used a nonce word to announce her intention to find an
object ('Let's find the toma') and then proceeded to the
barn. In the key condition the barn was mysteriously
'locked'; the child thus never saw the target object after
the nonce word was introduced. Children learned the new word
as well in this condition as in a condition in which the
adult found the object immediately. The results of these two
studies suggest that from very early in language acquisition
children learn words not through passive, associative
processes, but rather through active attempts to understand
adult behaviour in a variety of action and discourse
contexts.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900010138},
Key = {fds351978}
}
@article{fds351979,
Author = {Akhtar, N and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds learn words for absent objects and
actions},
Journal = {British Journal of Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-93},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1996.tb00695.x},
Abstract = {Two studies of word learning in 24-month-old children are
reported, one involving an object word (Study 1) and one
involving an action word (Study 2). In both studies,
non-verbal scripts of playing with novel objects/actions in
particular ways were established before the child was
exposed to any language models. Following this pre-training,
children heard an experimenter announce her intention to
either find an object or perform an action. In the referent
condition, children then saw the intended referent (object
or action) immediately after hearing the language model.
Children in the absent referent condition experienced the
same non-verbal scripts and language models, but never saw
the referent object or action after hearing the language
model: at the appropriate juncture in the script they were
told that the toy barn in which the target object had been
previously located was 'locked', or that the toy character
who had previously performed the target action was missing.
Comparisons with two control conditions indicated that
children were able to learn words for a novel object and a
novel action in both the referent and absent referent
conditions and, moreover, that learning was equivalent in
these two conditions. These results show quite clearly that
early lexical acquisition does not depend on temporal
contiguity between word and referent - or indeed any
perceptual pairing between word and referent at all - but
rather it relies on children's active understandings of a
speaker's referential intentions in particular discourse
contexts.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-835x.1996.tb00695.x},
Key = {fds351979}
}
@article{fds351980,
Author = {Akhtar, N and Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The Role of Discourse Novelty in Early Word
Learning},
Journal = {Child Development},
Volume = {67},
Number = {2},
Pages = {635-645},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01756.x},
Abstract = {2 studies of word learning are reported. In Study 1,
24-month-old children and 2 adults played with 3 nameless
objects. These objects were placed in a clear box along with
a novel nameless object. The adults then displayed
excitement about the contents of the box and modeled a new
word. Comparison with a control condition indicated
significant learning of the new word for the novel object.
Study 2 followed the same procedure with one difference; the
children played with the novel object while the adults were
absent. Thus, at the time of the language model the target
object was novel only to the adults, not to the children.
Again subjects displayed significant learning of the new
word. This last finding suggests that 24-month-old children
understand that adults use language for things that are
novel to the discourse context and that this novelty is
determined from the speaker's point of view.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01756.x},
Key = {fds351980}
}
@article{fds351981,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The child's contribution to culture: A commentary on
Toomela},
Journal = {Culture and Psychology},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {307-318},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9600200306},
Abstract = {Toomela (1996) has emphasized the psychological dimensions
of the process by which human children become participants
in cultures. I support his arguments with observations of
chimpanzees, which are similar to humans in some ways but
still do not live culturally, and of human infants both
before and after they have the capacity to participate fully
in cultural activities. Toomela also proposes a new account
of the process of internalization in which language plays
the central role. I disagree somewhat with this account,
arguing that whereas language is the most powerful human
artifact potentiating internalization, other artifacts -
both material and symbolic - may serve the same function if
children are introduced to them in social interactions in
which others have intentions toward their intentional states
- and they know this. The central theoretical point of
Toomela's paper is that a comprehensive account of the human
species as a cultural species must focus not only on the
cultural collective, but also on individuals and their
psychological capacities.},
Doi = {10.1177/1354067X9600200306},
Key = {fds351981}
}
@article{fds351982,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Piagetian and Vygotskian Approaches to Language
Acquisition},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {39},
Number = {5},
Pages = {269-276},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278478},
Abstract = {Both Piaget and Vygotsky were centrally concerned with the
ontogenetic relationships between language, cognition, and
social life. Recently, researchers have drawn on their
observations and hypotheses to establish much closer links
between these phenomena than either theorist ever imagined.
In investigating the cognitive bases of early language, very
close links have been established between specific cognitive
achievements and the acquisition of certain types of early
words, for example between object permanence development and
the acquisition of words for disappearance and between means
ends development and the acquisition of words for
success/failure. In investigating the social bases of early
language, close links have been established between the
quantity and quality of joint attentional social
interactions in which a child and an adult engage and the
child’s early word learning skills. Despite their seminal
contributions to the study of early language development
along these two lines, neither Piaget nor Vygotsky fully
appreciated the skills of social cognition that underlie the
acqusition of language. © 1996 S. Karger AG,
Basel.},
Doi = {10.1159/000278478},
Key = {fds351982}
}
@article{fds351983,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Use of social information in the problem solving of
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo
sapiens).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {109},
Number = {3},
Pages = {308-320},
Year = {1995},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.109.3.308},
Abstract = {Fourteen juvenile and adult orangutans and 24 3- and
4-year-old children participated in 4 studies on imitative
learning in a problem-solving situation. In all studies a
simple to operate apparatus was used, but its internal
mechanism was hidden from subjects to prevent individual
learning. In the 1st study, orangutans observed a human
demonstrator perform 1 of 4 actions on the apparatus and
obtain a reward; they subsequently showed no signs of
imitative learning. Similar results were obtained in a 2nd
study in which orangutan demonstrators were used. Similar
results were also obtained in a 3rd study in which a human
encouraged imitation from an orangutan that had previously
been taught to mimic arbitrary human actions. In a 4th
study, human 3- and 4-year-old children learned the task by
means of imitation.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.109.3.308},
Key = {fds351983}
}
@article{fds351984,
Author = {Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint Attention and Imitative Learning in Children,
Chimpanzees, and Enculturated Chimpanzees},
Journal = {Social Development},
Volume = {4},
Number = {3},
Pages = {217-237},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1995.tb00063.x},
Abstract = {In this study we compared the nature of the joint
attentional interactions that occurred as chimpanzees and
human children engaged with a human experimenter (E).
Subjects were three chimpanzees raised mostly with
conspecifics (mother‐reared), three chimpanzees raised in
a human‐like cultural environment (encultur‐ated), and
six 18‐month‐old human children. Of particular interest
were possible differences between the two groups of
chimpanzees that might have resulted from their different
ontogenetic histories. Observations were made as subjects
participated in an imitative learning task involving a
number of novel objects. Variables coded were such things as
subjects' looks to the object, looks to E, the coordination
of such looks in periods of joint engagement with E, and
gestural attempts to direct E's attention or behavior
(declaratives and imperatives). Results showed that
encultur‐ated chimpanzees were most similar to human
children in social interactions involv‐ing objects, for
example, in their attention to the object in compliance with
E's request, their joint attentional interactions during
less structured periods, and their use of declarative
gestures to direct E's attention to objects. They were not
similar to children, but rather resembled their
mother‐reared conspecifics, in the duration of their looks
to E's face. A positive relation between subjects' joint
attentional skills and their imitative learning skills was
found for both chimpanzee and human sub‐jects. It is
concluded that a human‐like sociocultural environment is
an essential component in the development of human‐like
social‐cognitive and joint attentional skills for
chimpanzees, and perhaps for human beings as well Copyright
© 1995, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1995.tb00063.x},
Key = {fds351984}
}
@article{fds351985,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Commentary},
Journal = {Human Development},
Volume = {38},
Number = {1},
Pages = {46-52},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000278298},
Doi = {10.1159/000278298},
Key = {fds351985}
}
@article{fds351986,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Akhtar, N},
Title = {Two-year-olds use pragmatic cues to differentiate reference
to objects and actions},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {201-224},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0885-2014(95)90009-8},
Abstract = {Previous studies have found that children can use
social-pragmatic cues to determine "which one" of several
objects or "which one' of several actions an adult intends
to indicate with a novel word. The current studies attempted
to determine whether children can also use such cues to
determine "what kind" of referent, object, or action, an
adult intends to indicate. In the first study, 27-month-old
children heard an adult use a nonce word in conjunction with
a nameless object while it was engaged in a nameless action.
The discourse situation leading into this naming event was
manipulated so that in one condition the target action was
the one new element in the discourse context at the time of
the naming event, and in another condition the target object
was the one new element. Results showed that children
learned the new word for whichever element was new to the
discourse context. The second study followed this same
general method, but in this case children in one condition
watched as an adult engaged in preparatory behaviors that
indicated her desire that the child perform the action
before she produced the novel word, whereas children in
another condition saw no such preparation. Results showed
that children who saw the action preparation learned the new
word for the action, whereas children who saw no preparation
learned the new word for the object. These two studies
demonstrate the important role of social-pragmatic
information in early word learning, and suggest that if
there is a Whole Object assumption in early lexical
acquisition, it is an assumption that may be very easily
overridden. © 1995.},
Doi = {10.1016/0885-2014(95)90009-8},
Key = {fds351986}
}
@article{fds351987,
Author = {Byrnl, RW and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Do rats ape?},
Journal = {Animal Behaviour},
Volume = {50},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1417-1420},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0003-3472(95)80056-5},
Doi = {10.1016/0003-3472(95)80056-5},
Key = {fds351987}
}
@misc{fds351988,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Understanding the self as social agent},
Volume = {112},
Pages = {449-460},
Booktitle = {Advances in Psychology},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4115(05)80024-X},
Abstract = {This chapter discusses the early development of the
understanding of self as social agent in the human species,
and briefly discusses its ontogenetic and phylogenetic
origins. The chapter outlines the canonical developmental
sequence, focusing especially on the social-cognitive
revolution that occurs at around the infant's first
birthday. The chapter also focuses on the early ontogeny of
self and investigates in more detail the ontogenetic
processes that might lead to the social-cognitive
revolution. The process of understanding one's self as a
social agent involves: 1) an early identification with but
differentiation from others in the first 6–8 months of
life; 2) a clear demonstration of intentionality toward the
world in one's own behavior; 3) the combination of these two
developments leading to an understanding of others as
intentional agents at 9–12 months; and 4) the application
of that understanding when others regard the self. This is
the developmental foundation for the uniquely human version
of self-concept in which the self is understood as a social
agent in the midst of other social agents, all of whom are
regarding one another simultaneously. © 1995 Elsevier
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0166-4115(05)80024-X},
Key = {fds351988}
}
@article{fds351989,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Production and comprehension of referential pointing by
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {108},
Number = {4},
Pages = {307-317},
Year = {1994},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.108.4.307},
Abstract = {We report 3 studies of the referential pointing of 2
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Chantek was raised in an
enculturated environment; Puti, raised in a nursery, had a
more typical captive life. In Experiment 1, flexibility of
pointing behavior was investigated by requiring subjects to
point in novel circumstances (for an out-of-sight tool, not
food). In Experiment 2, we investigated the orangutans'
comprehension of the significance of a human point in
helping them to locate food. In Experiment 3, we
investigated whether these pointing subjects comprehended
that a human recipient must be looking for the point to
achieve its attention-directing goal. In all experiments the
enculturated orangutan showed better understanding of
pointing than the captive orangutan. This finding is
consistent with recent studies that have found differences
in the cognitive and social-cognitive abilities of apes that
have had different types of experience with
humans.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.108.4.307},
Key = {fds351989}
}
@article{fds351990,
Author = {Call, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The social learning of tool use by orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus)},
Journal = {Human Evolution},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {297-313},
Year = {1994},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02435516},
Abstract = {Very little is known about the social learning of orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus), especially in the context of
problem-solving situations such as tool use. Sixteen
orangutans were presented with a rake-like tool and
desirable but out-of-reach food. Eight subjects observed a
human demonstrator use the tool in one way, while another
eight observed the demonstrator use the tool in another way.
Subjects behaved identically in the two experimental
conditions, showing no effect of the type of demonstration
observed. Analysis of individual learning curves suggested
that a large component of individual trial-and-error
learning was at work, even for two subjects who received
additional trials with an orangutan demonstrator. This
pattern of results suggests that subjects were paying
attention to the general functional relations in the task
and to the results obtained by the demonstrator, but not to
the actual methods of tool use demonstrated. It is concluded
that subjects in both conditions were employing emulation
learning, not imitative learning. © 1994 International
Institute for the Study of Man.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02435516},
Key = {fds351990}
}
@article{fds351991,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Mervis, CB},
Title = {THE INSTRUMENT IS GREAT, BUT MEASURING COMPREHENSION IS
STILL A PROBLEM},
Journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development},
Volume = {59},
Number = {5},
Pages = {174-179},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.1994.tb00186.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5834.1994.tb00186.x},
Key = {fds351991}
}
@article{fds351992,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC and Ratner, HH},
Title = {The role of emotions in cultural learning},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {782-784},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00037195},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00037195},
Key = {fds351992}
}
@article{fds351993,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J and Nagell, K and Olguin, R and Carpenter,
M},
Title = {The learning and use of gestural signals by young
chimpanzees: A trans-generational study},
Journal = {Primates},
Volume = {35},
Number = {2},
Pages = {137-154},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02382050},
Abstract = {Observations of chimpanzee gestural communication are
reported. The observations represent the third longitudinal
time point of an ongoing study of the Yerkes Primate Center
Field Station chimpanzee group. In contrast to observations
at the first two time points, the current observations are
of a new generation of infants and juveniles. There were two
questions. The first concerned how young chimpanzees used
their gestures, with special focus on the flexibility or
intentionality displayed. It was found that youngsters quite
often used the same gesture in different contexts, and
different gestures in the same context. In addition, they
sometimes used gestures in combinations in a single social
encounter, these combinations did not convey intentions that
could not be conveyed by the component gestures, however. It
was also found that individuals adjusted their choice of
signals depending on the attentional state of the recipient.
The second question was how chimpanzees acquired their
gestural signals. In general, it was found that there was
little consistency in the use of gestures among individuals,
especially for non-play gestures, with much individual
variability both within and across generations. There were
also a number of idiosyncratic gestures used by single
individuals at each time point. It was concluded from these
results that youngsters were not imitatively learning their
communicatory gestures from conspecifics, but rather that
they were individually conventionalizing them with each
other. Implications of these findings for the understanding
of chimpanzee communication and social learning are
discussed. © 1994 Japan Monkey Centre.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02382050},
Key = {fds351993}
}
@article{fds351994,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Barton, M},
Title = {Learning Words in Nonostensive Contexts},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {30},
Number = {5},
Pages = {639-650},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.30.5.639},
Abstract = {Four word learning studies with 24-month-old children are
reported. In Studies 1 and 2, an adult used a novel word to
announce her intention to perform an action or to find an
object. It was found that a knowledge of what action or
object was impending-established through scripted events
before the word's introduction-was not necessary for
children to learn the words. Studies 3 and 4 focused on what
word learning cues children might be using in these
contexts. In Study 3, it was found that children learned a
novel verb for an intentional and not an accidental action.
In Study 4, it was found that children learned a novel noun
for an object the adult was searching for, not ones she had
rejected while searching. Because none of the best-known
constraints on lexical acquisition could have helped them in
these contexts, it was concluded that children were relying
on social-pragmatic cues to learn the new
words.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.30.5.639},
Key = {fds351994}
}
@article{fds366604,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Call, J},
Title = {Social cognition of monkeys and apes},
Journal = {American Journal of Physical Anthropology},
Volume = {37},
Number = {19 S},
Pages = {273-305},
Year = {1994},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.1330370610},
Abstract = {This paper reviews what is known about the social cognition
of monkeys and great apes. The literature reviewed is
divided into three main content areas: (1) social
interaction, including knowledge of individuals, knowledge
of social relationships, alliance formation, and
cooperation; (2) communication, including alarm calls, calls
for recruiting allies, gestures, and the “language”
skills of human‐raised apes; and (3) social learning,
including the “cultural transmission” of
food‐preparation behaviors, the social learning of tool
use, and the social learning of vocal and gestural
communication. Contrary to the hypotheses of a number of
recent investigators, we find no compelling differences in
the social cognition of monkeys and great apes. It is
possible that differences in the social behavior of these
two classes of primate are due to processes of nonsocial
cognition, and it is possible that the social behavior of
apes is more strongly influenced by human interaction and
training.© 1994 Wiley‐Liss, Inc. Copyright © 1994
Wiley‐Liss, Inc., A Wiley Company},
Doi = {10.1002/ajpa.1330370610},
Key = {fds366604}
}
@article{fds351995,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Savage-Rumbaugh, S and Kruger,
AC},
Title = {Imitative learning of actions on objects by children,
chimpanzees, and enculturated chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {64},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1688-1705},
Year = {1993},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb04207.x},
Abstract = {In this study we compared the abilities of chimpanzees and
human children to imitatively learn novel actions on
objects. Of particular interest were possible differences
between chimpanzees raised mostly with conspecifics
(mother-reared) and chimpanzees raised in a human-like
cultural environment (enculturated). Subjects were thus 3
enculturated and 3 mother-reared chimpanzees, along with 8
18-month-old and 8 30-month-old human children. Each subject
was tested over a 2-day period with 16 novel objects. The
introduction of each object was preceded by a baseline
period in which the subject's natural proclivities toward
the object were determined. For 12 objects, a human
experimenter demonstrated first a simple and then a complex
novel action, instructing the subject in each case to "Do
what I do" (chimpanzees were prepared for the task
behaviorally as well). For the other 4 objects,
demonstration of a single action took place on the first day
and the subject's opportunity to imitate was delayed until
the second day, 48 hours later. Actions that a subject
produced in baseline were excluded from further analysis.
For each analyzed action, the subject's behavior was scored
as to whether it successfully reproduced (1) the end result
of the demonstrated action, and (2) the behavioral means
used by the demonstrator. Results showed that in immediate
imitation the mother-reared chimpanzees were much poorer
imitators than the enculturated chimpanzees and the human
children, who did not differ from one another. Surprisingly,
on the delay trials, the enculturated chimpanzees
significantly outperformed the other 3 groups. We conclude
from these results that a human-like sociocultural
environment is an essential component in the development of
human-like social-cognitive and imitative learning skills
for chimpanzees, and perhaps for human beings as
well.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb04207.x},
Key = {fds351995}
}
@article{fds351996,
Author = {Nagell, K and Olguin, RS and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Processes of social learning in the tool use of chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo
sapiens).},
Journal = {Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. :
1983)},
Volume = {107},
Number = {2},
Pages = {174-186},
Year = {1993},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.107.2.174},
Abstract = {Common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 2-year-old human
children (Homo sapiens) were presented with a rakelike tool
and a desirable but out-of-reach object. One group of
subjects observed a human demonstrator use the tool in one
way, and another group observed a demonstrator use the tool
in another way. Children in both cases did what the model
did. Chimpanzee subjects, however, behaved identically in
the 2 model conditions. Both groups performed better than
subjects who saw no demonstration. This pattern of results
suggest that the chimpanzees were paying attention to the
general functional relations in the task and to the results
obtained by the demonstrator but not to the actual methods
of tool use demonstrated. Human children were focused on the
demonstrator's actual methods of tool use (her behavior).
The different social learning processes used by the 2
species have implications for their different forms of
social organization.},
Doi = {10.1037/0735-7036.107.2.174},
Key = {fds351996}
}
@article{fds351997,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {It's imitation, not mimesis},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {16},
Number = {4},
Pages = {771-772},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032921},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00032921},
Key = {fds351997}
}
@article{fds351998,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Olguin, R},
Title = {Twenty-three-month-old children have a grammatical category
of noun},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {8},
Number = {4},
Pages = {451-464},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(05)80004-8},
Abstract = {This study investigated experimentally the nature and
development of children's early productivity with nouns,
both in verb-argument structure and with plural morphology.
Eight 20- to 26-month-old boys and girls were, in the
context of playing a game over a several week period,
exposed to four novel nouns, modeled in experimentally
controlled ways. The question was whether, when, and in what
ways the children would become productive with these nouns
in their spontaneous speech, going beyond the particular
linguistic forms they had heard. In terms of verb-argument
structure, 7 of the 8 children used their nouns in
productive argument roles, that is, in semantic roles they
had not heard them used in. Five of the 8 children used the
plural morpheme productively with the novel nouns as well.
Implications for theories of grammatical category formation
are discussed. © 1993, Ablex Publishing Corporation, 355
Chestnut Street, Norwood, New Jersey 07648. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(05)80004-8},
Key = {fds351998}
}
@article{fds351999,
Author = {Olguin, R and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Twenty-five-month-old children do not have a grammatical
category of verb},
Journal = {Cognitive Development},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {245-272},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(93)80001-A},
Abstract = {This study investigated experimentally the nature and
development of children's early productivity with
verb-argument structure and verb morphology. Twenty-two to
25-month-old boys and girls were, in the context of playing
a game over a several week period, exposed to eight novel
verbs modeled with experimentally controlled argument
structures and verb inflections. The question was whether,
when, and in what ways the children would become productive
with these verbs in their spontaneous speech, going beyond
the particular linguistic forms they had heard. In terms of
verb-argument structure, the results showed that children
most often followed the surface structure of the model,
regardless of the argument they were trying to express.
Thus, when children had heard an argument expressed for a
verb, they almost always marked that argument correctly in
their own utterances; when they had not heard an argument
expressed for a particular verb, their correct marking
dropped to chance levels. The children showed no signs of
productive verb morphology, but they did use the newly
learned verbs in some creative ways involving noun-like uses
and the appending of locatives. Results are discussed in
terms of Tomasello's (1992) Verb Island hypothesis. © 1993
Ablex Publishing Corporation.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0885-2014(93)80001-A},
Key = {fds351999}
}
@article{fds352000,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC and Ratner, HH},
Title = {Cultural learning},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {495-552},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0003123x},
Abstract = {This target article presents a theory of human cultural
learning. Cultural learning is identified with those
instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or
perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original
learning process and in the resulting cognitive product.
Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during
human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and
collaborative learning - in that order. Evidence is provided
that this progression arises from the developmental ordering
of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes
involved. Imitative learning relies on a concept of
intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking.
Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and
involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking
(intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a
concept of reflective agent and involves integrated
perspective-taking reflective intersubjectivity). A
comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild
and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for
these correlations between social cognition and cultural
learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of
social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission
of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible
in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the
psychological basis for cultural evolution.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x0003123x},
Key = {fds352000}
}
@article{fds352001,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Kruger, AC},
Title = {Joint attention on actions: acquiring verbs in ostensive and
non-ostensive contexts.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {311-333},
Year = {1992},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900011430},
Abstract = {Two studies of verb learning are reported. The focus of both
studies was on children in their second year of life
learning verbs in various pragmatic contexts. Of particular
interest was the comparison of ostensive contexts--in which
word and referent were simultaneously present in the child's
perceptual field--to non-ostensive contexts. In a
naturalistic study of 24 children at 1;3 and 1;9, it was
found that mothers modelled verbs for their children most
often BEFORE the referent action actually occurred. Over 60%
of maternal verbs were used to refer to actions that mothers
wished children to perform or that they were anticipating
their performing (IMPENDING actions). Some verbs were also
used to refer to current actions (ONGOING actions) or
actions that had just been completed (COMPLETED actions).
Children responded with comprehension most often to
impending models. Impending and completed models, but not
ongoing models, were correlated with children's verb
vocabularies at 1;9. The second study was a lexical training
study of 48 two-year-olds. Children learned to produce a
novel verb best when it was modelled in the impending
condition. They learned to comprehend it equally well in the
impending and completed conditions. Children showed no signs
of superior learning in the ostensive (ongoing) learning
context. Results of the two studies are discussed in terms
of the different learning processes involved in acquiring
nouns and verbs, and, more broadly, in terms of a
social-pragmatic view of language acquisition in which the
ostensive teaching paradigm is but one of many contexts in
which children learn to establish a joint attentional focus
with mature language users.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900011430},
Key = {fds352001}
}
@article{fds352002,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The social bases of language acquisition},
Journal = {Social Development},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-87},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x},
Abstract = {A language is composed of conventional symbols shaped by
their social‐communicative functions. Children acquire
these symbols, both lexical and syntactic, in the context of
culturally constituted event structures that make salient
these functions. In the acquisition process children rely on
cultural learning skills (i.e., imitative learning). These
skills emanate from their ability to participate
intersubjectively with adults in cultural activities (i.e.,
joint attention), which underlies their ability to
understand the ways adults are using particular pieces of
language. The development of communicative competence as a
whole, including not only lexical and syntactic skills but
also various pragmatic skills, depends largely on feedback
about communicative efficacy that children receive from
different interactants. This feedback is used by children to
make further inferences about the conventional functional
significance of particular linguistic expressions. This
social‐pragmatic view of language acquisition obviates the
need for a priori, specifically linguistic, format
constraints on the language acquisition process. Copyright
© 1992, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x},
Key = {fds352002}
}
@article{fds352003,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Author's response: On defining language: Replies to Shatz
and Ninio},
Journal = {Social Development},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {159-162},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00121.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00121.x},
Key = {fds352003}
}
@article{fds352004,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cognitive ethology comes of age},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {168-169},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00068163},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00068163},
Key = {fds352004}
}
@article{fds352005,
Author = {SECULES, T and HERRON, C and TOMASELLO, M},
Title = {The Effect of Video Context on Foreign Language
Learning},
Journal = {The Modern Language Journal},
Volume = {76},
Number = {4},
Pages = {480-490},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4781.1992.tb05396.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-4781.1992.tb05396.x},
Key = {fds352005}
}
@article{fds352006,
Author = {Mannle, S and Barton, M and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Two-year-olds' conversations with their mothers and
preschool-aged siblings},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {12},
Number = {34},
Pages = {57-71},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272379201203404},
Abstract = {The pragmatics of sibling-infant and mother-infant
conversations were compared. Sixteen children, 22 to 26
months of age, were videotaped for 15 minutes in dyadic
interaction with their mothers and for 15 minutes in dyadic
interaction with their preschool-aged siblings.
Sibling-infant and mother-infant conversations were compared
on three dimensions: quantitative characteristics,
conversational style and conversational repair of potential
breakdowns. Compared with mothers and infants, siblings and
infants talked less and had shorter conversations. On an
individual level, siblings asked fewer questions of the
infants and issued more directives to them than did the
mothers. Moreover, siblings failed to repair disruptions in
conversations almost twice as often as mothers. The infants'
conversational behaviours, however, did not differ when
interacting with the siblings as opposed to the mothers.
These results indicate that preschool-aged siblings are not
yet adept at making the kinds of pragmatic adjustments in
their speech that scaffold infants in their early
conversational interactions. It is suggested that the
experience later- born infants have with less responsive
siblings may be valuable preparation for interacting with
strangers, especially peers, who share many characteristics
with siblings. © 1992, Sage Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/014272379201203404},
Key = {fds352006}
}
@article{fds352007,
Author = {Barton, ME and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint Attention and Conversation in Mother‐Infant‐Sibling
Triads},
Journal = {Child Development},
Volume = {62},
Number = {3},
Pages = {517-529},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01548.x},
Abstract = {The current study investigated the general nature of joint
attentional and conversational interaction in
mother‐infant‐sibling triads. 9 19‐month‐old infants
and 9 24‐month‐old infants were videotaped during 20 min
of free play with their mothers and preschool‐aged
siblings around a common activity. Analyses revealed that
even 19‐month‐old infants were capable of participating
in triadic interactions and conversations, and that the
proportional frequency of both these measures increased with
age. Triadic conversations were nearly 3 times longer and
elicited nearly twice as many infant turns per conversation
as dyadic conversations. Infants were more likely to join
into an ongoing conversational topic than to initiate one
themselves, and they were more likely to take a turn in
those conversations if they were in a joint attentional
state with the speaker. Infants were just as likely to
respond to a comment or request directed to another person
as they were to one directed to themselves, indicating
reliable comprehension of language not addressed to them.
These results suggest that the mother‐infant‐sibling
interactive context differs in important ways from the
mother‐infant dyadic context and that it is a richer
language learning environment than previously supposed.
Copyright © 1991, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01548.x},
Key = {fds352007}
}
@article{fds352008,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Objects are analogous to words, not phonemes or grammatical
categories},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {575-576},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00071466},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00071466},
Key = {fds352008}
}
@article{fds352009,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C},
Title = {A Reply to Beck and Eubank},
Journal = {Studies in Second Language Acquisition},
Volume = {13},
Number = {4},
Pages = {513-517},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0272263100010317},
Abstract = {Beck and Eubank (1991) criticize our recent SSLA article
(Tomasello & Herron, 1989) on both theoretical and
methodological grounds. While we appreciate their attempt to
discuss and clarify important issues—and while they do
make several sound and very interesting points—in a number
of cases they seriously misrepresent our study. We will
attempt to address the criticisms in roughly the order in
which they were raised. © 1991, Cambridge University Press.
All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0272263100010317},
Key = {fds352009}
}
@article{fds352010,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Conti-Ramsden, G and Ewert, B},
Title = {Young children's conversations with their mothers and
fathers: differences in breakdown and repair.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-130},
Year = {1990},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900013131},
Abstract = {In this study we compared the conversations of mothers and
fathers with their children at 1; 3 and 1; 9, with special
attention to breakdown-repair sequences. We found that,
overall, children and secondary caregiver fathers
experienced more communicative breakdowns than did children
and primary caregiver mothers. More specifically, fathers
requested clarification of their children more often than
did mothers, and they most often used a non-specific query
(e.g. What?). Mothers used more specific queries (e.g. Put
it where?) and were involved in more 'looped' sequences
involving multiple requests for clarification. Fathers also
failed to acknowledge child utterances more often than did
mothers. After a father non-acknowledgement, children tended
not to persist and when they did they often received further
non-acknowledgements; the dyad did not often return to the
child's original topic. After a maternal
non-acknowledgement, on the other hand, children persisted
and the dyad more often returned to its previous topic. The
results are interpreted as support for the Bridge Hypothesis
which claims that fathers present children with
communicative challenges that help prepare them for
communication with less familiar adults.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900013131},
Key = {fds352010}
}
@article{fds366605,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Gust, DA and Evans, A},
Title = {Peer interaction in infant chimpanzees.},
Journal = {Folia primatologica; international journal of
primatology},
Volume = {55},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33-40},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000156495},
Abstract = {The peer interactions of 6 infant chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) ranging in age from 18 to 50 months were
observed in a seminatural context. The infants and their
mothers lived as members of a captive social group at the
Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center. An analysis of
contact initiations between infants indicated that the most
preferred peer interactant was the youngest and the least
preferred was the oldest infant. Infants also initiated more
interactions with the offspring of adults that had the
closest relationships with both themselves and their
mothers. These results indicate that a number of factors may
influence the peer affiliations of infant chimpanzees,
including the age of the infant and the mother's social
relationships.},
Doi = {10.1159/000156495},
Key = {fds366605}
}
@article{fds352011,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C},
Title = {Feedback for language transfer errors the garden path
technique},
Journal = {Studies in Second Language Acquisition},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {385-395},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0272263100008408},
Abstract = {In this study we compared two methods for correcting
language transfer errors in the foreign language classroom.
Thirty-two English-speaking college students enrolled in two
sections of an introductory French course served as
subjects. Eight commonly encountered English-to-French
transfer errors were identified and randomly assigned to one
of two teaching conditions for one class section; each error
was assigned to the opposite condition for the other
section. In both teaching conditions students began by
translating English sentences into French. The sentences
were such that an L1 (first language) transfer strategy
produced correct translations (e.g., using savoir for some
uses of “to know”). A sentence for which the transfer
would not produce an adequate translation (e.g., a sentence
requiring connaître) was then introduced in one of two
ways. In one condition—what we have termed the Garden Path
condition—students were given the new sentence and asked
to translate as before. Their inevitable transfer error was
then immediately corrected by the teacher. In the control
condition students were simply given the correct French form
and told that it differed from the English pattern (they
were not given the opportunity to commit a transfer error).
Student learning of the non-transferable form was assessed
three times throughout the course of the semester, and at
all time points performance was better in the Garden Path
condition. We interpreted this finding as support for a
cognitive comparison model of second language acquisition.
© 1989, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0272263100008408},
Key = {fds352011}
}
@article{fds352012,
Author = {Snow, CE and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Data on language input: Incomprehensible omission
indeed!},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {357-358},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049104},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00049104},
Key = {fds352012}
}
@article{fds352013,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Cognition as cause},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {607-608},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00073738},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00073738},
Key = {fds352013}
}
@article{fds352014,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Gust, D and Frost, GT},
Title = {A longitudinal investigation of gestural communication in
young chimpanzees},
Journal = {Primates},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-50},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02381209},
Abstract = {A longitudinal study of chimpanzee gestural communication is
reported. Subjects were seven 5- to 8-year-old members of a
semi-natural group at the Yerkes Field Station. These were
the same individuals observed by Tomasello et al. (1985)
four years previously. Nearly identical operational
definitions and observational procedures were used in the
two studies. Longitudinal comparisons between the two
observation periods revealed that the development of
chimpanzee gestural communication is best characterized as a
series of ontogenetic adaptations: as particular social
functions (e.g., nursing, playing, grooming, etc.) arise,
decline, or change, gestural communication follows suit.
Most gestures seem to be conventionalized by individuals in
direct social interaction with conspecifics. Some gestures
may be learned by "second-person imitation"-an individual
copying a behavior directed to it by another individual. No
evidence was found for "third-person imitation"-an
individual copying a gesture used between two other
individuals. Implications for the concept of chimpanzee
"culture" are discussed. © 1989 Japan Monkey
Centre.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02381209},
Key = {fds352014}
}
@article{fds352015,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Mannle, S and Werdenschlag, L},
Title = {The effect of previously learned words on the child's
acquisition of words for similar referents.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {15},
Number = {3},
Pages = {505-515},
Year = {1988},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900012538},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900012538},
Key = {fds352015}
}
@article{fds352016,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Herron, C},
Title = {Down the Garden Path: Inducing and correcting
overgeneralization errors in the foreign language
classroom},
Journal = {Applied Psycholinguistics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3},
Pages = {237-246},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0142716400007827},
Abstract = {In this study we compared two methods for teaching
grammatical exceptions in the foreign language classroom.
Thirty-nine students in two sections of an introductory
college French course served as subjects. Eight target
structures, exemplifying –exceptions to a rule,– were
randomly assigned to one of two teaching conditions for a
section taught in the spring; each structure was assigned to
the opposite teaching condition for a section taught the
following fall. In one condition we simply taught the
students the exception as an exception. In the other –
what we called the Garden Path condition – we presented
canonical exemplars encouraging students to induce the rule;
we then asked them to generate the form (which we knew to be
an exception) and then corrected their resulting
overgeneralization error. Analysis of subsequent formal
testing showed that students learned the exception better in
the Garden Path condition and that this advantage persisted
throughout the semesterlong course. We hypothesized that
this technique helped students to focus attention both on
the rule and on the features of the particular structure
that marked it as an exception. © 1988, Cambridge
University Press. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0142716400007827},
Key = {fds352016}
}
@article{fds352017,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Snow, CE},
Title = {Well-fed organisms still need feedback},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {475-476},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058568},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00058568},
Key = {fds352017}
}
@article{fds352018,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {The role of joint attentional processes in early language
development},
Journal = {Language Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {69-88},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0388-0001(88)90006-X},
Abstract = {In this paper I examine the role of joint attentional
processes in the child's early lexical acquisition and
conversational interaction. In both cases I conclude that
relatively extended periods of adult-child joint attentional
focus on nonlinguistic entities, perhaps as manifest in
routines, scaffold the child's early language development.
On the other hand, adult directiveness - whether of child
behavior/attention or of the dyad's conversational topic -
has a negative effect on early language development. For
both lexical acquisition and conversational interaction some
findings from experimental studies are available to
supplement conclusions based on correlational evidence.
Based on these findings, I propose a developmental sequence
of joint attentional processes in early language development
and discuss the role of adults in the child's passage
through this sequence. © 1988.},
Doi = {10.1016/0388-0001(88)90006-X},
Key = {fds352018}
}
@article{fds352019,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Davis-Dasilva, M and Camak, L and Bard,
K},
Title = {Observational learning of tool-use by young
chimpanzees},
Journal = {Human Evolution},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {175-183},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02436405},
Abstract = {In the current study two groups of young chimpanzees (4-6
and 8-9 years old) were given a T-bar and a food item that
could only be reached by using the T-bar. Experimental
subjects were given the opportunity to observe an adult
using the stick as a tool to obtain the food; control
subjects were exposed to the adult but were given no
demonstration. Subjects in the older group did not learn to
use the tool. Subjects in the younger group who were exposed
to the demonstrator learned to use the stick as a tool much
more readily than those who were not. None of the subjects
demonstrated an ability to imitatively copy the
demonstrator's precise behavioral strategies. More than
simple stimulus enhancement was involved, however, since
both groups manipulated the T-bar, but only experimental
subjects used it in its function as a tool. Our findings
complement naturalistic observations in suggesting that
chimpanzee tool-use is in some sense «culturally
transmitted» - though perhaps not in the same sense as
social-conventional behaviors for which precise copying of
conspecifics is crucial. © 1987 Editrice II
Sedicesimo.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02436405},
Key = {fds352019}
}
@article{fds352507,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Learning to use prepositions: a case study.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-98},
Year = {1987},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900012745},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900012745},
Key = {fds352507}
}
@article{fds352020,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Why the left hand?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {286-287},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00047919},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00047919},
Key = {fds352020}
}
@article{fds352021,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ},
Title = {Joint attention and early language.},
Journal = {Child development},
Volume = {57},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1454-1463},
Year = {1986},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1986.tb00470.x},
Abstract = {This paper reports 2 studies that explore the role of joint
attentional processes in the child's acquisition of
language. In the first study, 24 children were videotaped at
15 and 21 months of age in naturalistic interaction with
their mothers. Episodes of joint attentional focus between
mother and child--for example, joint play with an
object--were identified. Inside, as opposed to outside,
these episodes both mothers and children produced more
utterances, mothers used shorter sentences and more
comments, and dyads engaged in longer conversations. Inside
joint episodes maternal references to objects that were
already the child's focus of attention were positively
correlated with the child's vocabulary at 21 months, while
object references that attempted to redirect the child's
attention were negatively correlated. No measures from
outside these episodes related to child language. In an
experimental study, an adult attempted to teach novel words
to 10 17-month-old children. Words referring to objects on
which the child's attention was already focused were learned
better than words presented in an attempt to redirect the
child's attentional focus.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8624.1986.tb00470.x},
Key = {fds352021}
}
@article{fds352022,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ},
Title = {Object permanence and relational words: a lexical training
study.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {495-505},
Year = {1986},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030500090000684x},
Doi = {10.1017/s030500090000684x},
Key = {fds352022}
}
@article{fds352023,
Author = {Kruger, AC and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Transactive Discussions With Peers and Adults},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {5},
Pages = {681-685},
Year = {1986},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.22.5.681},
Abstract = {Piaget hypothesized that peer and adult-child discussions of
moral dilemmas are qualitatively different. He asserted that
children are more likely to use reasoning when interacting
with peers. To test this hypothesis, the present study
compared the interactive styles of child-child and
adult-child dyads engaged in discussions of moral dilemmas,
focusing on the use of logical operations (transacts).
Forty-eight female subjects, ages 7 and 11 years, were
paired with either a female agemate or their mother.
Children used transacts in a higher proportion of their
conversational turns when interacting with peers than when
interacting with mothers. Subjects produced proportionally
more transactive responses when interacting with mothers
because mothers produced proportionally more requests for
idea clarification than did peer partners. Self-generated
transacts, on the other hand, were produced proportionally
more often with peers. Furthermore, when paired with peers,
children produced transactive statements that operated on
the partner's logic more often, rather than clarifying their
own logic. These results support Piaget's contention that
moral discussions with peers feature a more spontaneous use
of reasoning than do discussions with adults. © 1986
American Psychological Association.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.22.5.681},
Key = {fds352023}
}
@article{fds352024,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Mannle, S and Kruger, AC},
Title = {Linguistic Environment of 1- to 2-Year-Old
Twins},
Journal = {Developmental Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-176},
Year = {1986},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.22.2.169},
Abstract = {The current study investigated differences in the language
learning environments of singletons and twins, with special
reference to pragmatic factors that might be expected to
differ in dyadic and triadic interactive situations. Six
twin pairs and 12 singleton children (all firstborn) were
observed in natural interactions with their mothers, once at
15 months of age and again at 21 months of age. Twins were
lower than singletons on all measures of language
development. The language learning environments of the two
groups differed as well. Although twin mothers spoke and
interacted with their children as much as singleton mothers
when twins were analyzed together, when analyzed from the
point of view of the individual twin child, twin children
received less speech directed specifically to them,
participated in fewer and shorter episodes of joint
attentional focus, and had fewer and shorter conversations
with their mothers. In addition, twin mothers were more
directive in their interactional styles. Correlational
analyses indicated that variation of these language learning
environment factors for the sample as a whole, as well as
variation for some of these factors within the twin group
itself, was related to early language growth. It is proposed
that both the quantitative and qualitative differences
observed in the language learning environments of singletons
and twins derive from the nature of the triadic situation
and that these differences have important effects on the
child's early language development. © 1986 American
Psychological Association.},
Doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.22.2.169},
Key = {fds352024}
}
@article{fds352025,
Author = {Anselmi, D and Tomasello, M and Acunzo, M},
Title = {Young children's responses to neutral and specific
contingent queries.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {135-144},
Year = {1986},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900000349},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900000349},
Key = {fds352025}
}
@article{fds352026,
Author = {Evans, A and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Evidence for social referencing in young chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes).},
Journal = {Folia primatologica; international journal of
primatology},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {49-54},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000156263},
Abstract = {A captive chimpanzee group was observed in order to
determine the extent to which the social interactions of the
infants and juveniles (18-50 months) were affected by their
mothers' relationships with other adult group members. It
was found that the young chimpanzees initiated more
interactions with adults who interacted more with their
mothers. A vast majority of those interactions occurred at
significant distances from the mother. It is argued that
these data imply a social-cognitive ability in young
chimpanzees closely related to the human infant's ability to
use its mother in 'social referencing'.},
Doi = {10.1159/000156263},
Key = {fds352026}
}
@article{fds352027,
Author = {Tomasello, M and George, BL and Kruger, AC and Jeffrey, M and Farrar, and Evans, A},
Title = {The development of gestural communication in young
chimpanzees},
Journal = {Journal of Human Evolution},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {175-186},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2484(85)80005-1},
Abstract = {Plooij (Action, Gesture and Symbol, Academic Press 1978;
Before Speech, C.U.P. 1979) described some
intentionally-produced communicatory gestures used by
one-year-old chimpanzees on the Gombe Stream Reserve. The
current study investigated the use of this type of gesture
at later developmental periods. Subjects were five infant
and juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) living in a
semi-natural group at the Yerkes Regional Primate Center
Field Station. On the basis of naturalistic observations,
three stages in the development of communicatory gestures
were determined: (1) One-year-old infants used some
gestures, but only in an immature form and only with their
mothers or with peers; (2) Two-year-olds produced more
gestures which were clearly intentional and conventional
(they waited for a response), and they directed them to all
group members; (3) Three-year-olds used a wider variety of
gestures, and they supplemented them with a
"gaze-alternation" behavior which indicated even more
clearly the goal of the communication. Many of the gestures
used by infants and juveniles were not used by adults, thus
indicating a significance confined to specific developmental
periods. This contradicts the commonly-held assumption (e.g.
Van Lawick-Goodall, 1967) that the developmental process is
one in which young chimpanzees come gradually to learn a
pre-existing set of adult communicatory gestures. From this
and other evidence, it is argued that, while some of the
gestures are learned observationally, many are learned
through a process of "direct convention-alization" between
animals, and others rely on both of these processes. © 1985
Academic Press Inc. (London) Limited.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0047-2484(85)80005-1},
Key = {fds352027}
}
@article{fds352028,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ},
Title = {Cognitive bases of lexical development: object permanence
and relational words.},
Journal = {Journal of child language},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {477-493},
Year = {1984},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900005900},
Doi = {10.1017/s0305000900005900},
Key = {fds352028}
}
@article{fds352029,
Author = {Tomasello, M and Farrar, MJ and Dines, J},
Title = {Children's speech revisions for a familiar and an unfamiliar
adult.},
Journal = {Journal of speech and hearing research},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {359-363},
Year = {1984},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jshr.2703.359},
Abstract = {Initial characterizations of the communicative abilities of
preschoolers stressed their egocentric nature. Recently,
however, even 2-year-olds have been observed to adjust their
speech appropriately in situations in which the listener
provides feedback by signaling noncomprehension. The current
study had an adult signal noncomprehension to the requests
of 2-year-old Stage I and Stage II children. Each child
interacted with a familiar (mother) and an unfamiliar adult.
The children repeated their requests about one third of the
time and revised them about two thirds of the time. Stage I
children elaborated their requests significantly more often
than Stage II children. The familiarity of the adult
listener had no effect on the way Stage II children revised
their requests, but the Stage I children's revisions
contained novel lexical items more often when they were
interacting with the unfamiliar adult. Both of these
findings may have resulted from the fact that the more
conversationally skilled Stage II children relied on
verbal-conversational cues, which were the same for both
adult interactants in this situation. The Stage I children
may have been less aware of these conversational cues,
relying on general social cues such as familiarity of the
interactant. The results are discussed in terms of the
potential role of different types of adults in the language
acquisition process.},
Doi = {10.1044/jshr.2703.359},
Key = {fds352029}
}
@article{fds352030,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Young children's coordination of gestural and linguistic
reference},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {5},
Number = {15},
Pages = {199-209},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378400501503},
Abstract = {The current study investigated the relationship between
young children's linguistic and nonlinguistic communicative
strategies. Twenty-three children, 20-44 months of age,
served as subjects. In a naturalistic setting, an adult gave
signs of noncomprehension (a contingent query) to each of
the child's object references. The child's original
linguistic reference and use of gestures were recorded and
compared to his/her subsequent linguistic and gestural
responses to the adult query. Results showed that the
children used gestures more often with pronouns than with
nouns: either to clarify a linguistic reference from the
original utterance or to supplement a linguistic response to
the adult query. This would imply that two- to three-year-
old children are aware of the communicative principle that
pronouns 'need' gestures more than nouns, and more
generally, that they are capable of coordinating their
linguistic and nonlinguistic communi cative strategies. ©
1984, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/014272378400501503},
Key = {fds352030}
}
@article{fds352031,
Author = {George, BL and Tomasello, M},
Title = {The effect of variation in sentence length on young
children's attention and comprehension},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {5},
Number = {14},
Pages = {115-127},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378400501403},
Abstract = {The effect of sentence length on children's attention and
com prehension was studied. Twenty-five two- to
five-year-olds were placed into three groups, High, Middle,
and Low, based on their mean length of utterance (MLU).
Subsequently, each child watched three videotaped stories,
each having the same number of words but a different MLU.
The time the child spent gazing at the monitor was measured.
Comprehension was measured by a picture choice task. Results
indicated that the High group attended most to the Long
Level, comprehended obvious content best at the Long Level,
and comprehended subtle content best at the Medium Level;
the Low group attended most to the Medium Level and
comprehended little. It was concluded that both input level
and child level differentially affect attention and
comprehension. © 1984, Sage Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/014272378400501403},
Key = {fds352031}
}
@article{fds352032,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Joint attention and lexical acquisition style},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {4},
Number = {12},
Pages = {197-211},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014272378300401202},
Abstract = {Recent research has documented systematic individual
differences in early lexical development. The current study
investigated the relation ship of these differences to
differences in the way mothers and children regulate each
other's attentional states. Mothers of 6 one-year-olds kept
diary records and were videotaped with their children at
monthly intervals as well. Language measures from the diary
were related to measures of attention manipulation and
maintenance derived from a coding of the videotaped
interactions. Results showed that when mothers initiated
interactions by directing their child's attention, rather
than by following into it, their child learned fewer object
labels and more personal-social words. Dyads who maintained
sustained bouts of joint attentional focus had children with
larger vocabularies overall. It was concluded that the way
mothers and children regulate each other's attention is an
important factor in children's early lexical development. ©
1983, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/014272378300401202},
Key = {fds352032}
}
%% VAKARELOV, ORLIN K
@article{fds305560,
Author = {Vakarelov, OK},
Title = {Pre-cognitive Semantic Information},
Journal = {Knowledge, Technology and Policy},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {193-226},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1874-6314},
Key = {fds305560}
}
@article{fds305561,
Author = {Vakarelov, OK},
Title = {The Cognitive Agent: Overcoming Informational
Limits},
Journal = {Adaptive Behavior},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {83-100},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds305561}
}
@article{fds296431,
Author = {Vakarelov, O},
Title = {From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical
Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic
Information},
Journal = {Minds and Machines},
Volume = {24},
Number = {3},
Pages = {327-351},
Year = {2014},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0924-6495},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-013-9318-2},
Doi = {10.1007/s11023-013-9318-2},
Key = {fds296431}
}
@article{fds296430,
Author = {Vakarelov, O},
Title = {The Information Medium},
Journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {47-65},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {2210-5433},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-011-0016-9},
Doi = {10.1007/s13347-011-0016-9},
Key = {fds296430}
}
@article{fds296429,
Author = {OSCAR Project, and Vakarelov, O},
Title = {An objectivist argument for thirdism},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {68},
Number = {298},
Pages = {149-155},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00730.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00730.x},
Key = {fds296429}
}
%% Wong, David B.
@article{fds371900,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
Mencius},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {Yang, X and Chong, K-C},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9783031276200},
Abstract = {This book is about the philosophical, historical, and
interpretative aspects of Mencius.},
Key = {fds371900}
}
@book{fds371901,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Moral Relativism and Pluralism},
Pages = {143 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781009044301},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781009043496},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The argument for metaethical relativism, the view
that there is no single true or most justified morality, is
that it is part of the best explanation of the most
difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view
features a comparison between traditions that highly value
relationship and community and traditions that highly value
personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held
that moralities are best understood as emerging from human
culture in response to the need to promote and regulate
interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational
coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the
conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and
most justified moralities that accomplish these functions.
The normative implications of this form of metaethical
relativism are explored, with specific focus on female
genital cutting and abortion.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/9781009043496},
Key = {fds371901}
}
@article{fds373974,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT},
Pages = {125-136},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781032252391},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003282242-15},
Abstract = {This chapter will use responsibility as a “bridge”
concept between the Confucian and Western moral and
political traditions. A key feature of the concept lies in
its root meaning “to respond.” Confucian thought focuses
on how the responder is entrusted and relied upon to
respond, to answer to, the needs and to the vulnerability of
the one to whom response is due. Confucian thought focuses
on how to cultivate the qualities enabling such
responsiveness. Another overlapping meaning of
responsibility with Chinese concepts is that of “being
held to answer for what one has done or is required to
do.” One might be faulted or blamed, or credited and
praised, for responding appropriately or not to the needs
and vulnerabilities of others. An important strand of
Confucian thought distributes responsibility in the sense of
“being held to answer for” not only to the direct agent
of the act in question but to others who have the most
control over the conditions that shape the choices of the
direct agent. Finally, another strand of Confucian thought
implies that responsibility can outrun whatever is under the
individual’s control.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003282242-15},
Key = {fds373974}
}
@article{fds370613,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
Mencius},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {517-538},
Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
Abstract = {One of the most intriguing features of the Mencius lies in
its claims about the path to goodness: they are eloquently
defended but also articulated in ambiguous ways. It is clear
that a major role for feeling or emotion is envisaged, but
is the relevant sort of feeling to be contrasted with
reflection and reasoning? Or are these things intertwined
and implicated in one another? I support the second answer
and disagree both with those who take as primary the role of
a kind of feeling that is largely untouched by reflection
and reasoning and with those on the other extreme who hold
that reasoning has an independent and in some ways a primary
role in realizing goodness. Though my position has in broad
outlines remained constant, it has evolved over time in
important specifics. I will set out what I am thinking
now.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
Key = {fds370613}
}
@book{fds371902,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Metaphors and Analogies in Classical Chinese Thought: The
Governance of the Individual, the State, and
Society},
Publisher = {Research Center for Chinese Subjectivity in Taiwan and
Chengchi University Press,},
Editor = {Marchal, K and Wang, H},
Year = {2023},
Abstract = {Chinese edition of a series of five lectures delivered at
the National Chengchi University},
Key = {fds371902}
}
@article{fds371903,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Mind (Heart-Mind) in Chinese Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {The Metaphysics Research Lab},
Editor = {Zalta, EN and Nodelman, U},
Year = {2023},
Abstract = {The role of the concept of mind (heart-mind) in classical
Chinese philosophy},
Key = {fds371903}
}
@article{fds371904,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Constructive Skepticism in the Zhuangzi},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {Chong, K-C},
Year = {2022},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9783030923310},
Abstract = {This comprehensive collection brings out the rich and deep
philosophical resources of the Zhuangzi.},
Key = {fds371904}
}
@article{fds367408,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Constructive Skepticism in the Zhuangzi},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {639-660},
Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92331-0_27},
Abstract = {In this essay I further develop an interpretation of the
Zhuangzi 莊子 as an enactment of “constructive
skepticism” (previously articulated in Wong 2005, 2009,
2017). This is not a declarative skepticism that makes a
claim about the state of human knowledge or the lack of it,
such as the claim that there is no knowledge or that nothing
of importance can be known. It is a stance questioning
claims made by others or by oneself to be in possession of
knowledge. By saying the text is an “enactment” of
constructive skepticism, I mean that it interrogates claims
to know and of the human pretense to knowledge in general,
but that it does not deny we have any knowledge. This
interrogation is constructive because is intended to get the
audience to look in the world for what is not revealed in
what it purportedly “knows.” Construing the Zhuangzi’s
skepticism as constructive in this way helps to reconcile it
with the positive claims about the nature of the world and
how to live that are also made in the text.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-92331-0_27},
Key = {fds367408}
}
@article{fds355608,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Constructive skepticism and being a mirror in the
Zhuangzi},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {53-70},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0440102007},
Abstract = {The Zhuangzi text deploys two epistemic themes to accomplish
its ends of combatting human pretensions to know the world
and to prompting us to rediscover the world through fresh
eyes. To get us to shed our arrogant dispositions it applies
a constructive skepticism to whatever it is that human
beings claim to know. To point towards a more constructive
relationship with Nature, it articulates the stance of being
a mirror to nature. This essay will explain how the text
does this and relates its conceptions of skepticism and
being as mirror to relevant contemporary
science.},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-0440102007},
Key = {fds355608}
}
@article{fds355609,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Relational and autonomous selves},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {419-432},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03104001},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03104001},
Key = {fds355609}
}
@article{fds355610,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Identifying with nature in early Daoism},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {36},
Number = {4},
Pages = {568-584},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03604008},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03604008},
Key = {fds355610}
}
@article{fds355611,
Author = {Hourdequin, M and Wong, DB},
Title = {A relational approach to environmental ethics},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {19-33},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03201002},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03201002},
Key = {fds355611}
}
@article{fds357914,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Universalism versus love with distinctions: An ancient
debate revived},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3},
Pages = {251-272},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0160304002},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-0160304002},
Key = {fds357914}
}
@article{fds371906,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {PRACTICAL REASONING IN EARLY CHINESE PHILOSOPHY},
Pages = {113-125},
Booktitle = {ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL REASON},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {978-1-138-19592-9},
Key = {fds371906}
}
@article{fds371905,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Perspectives on Human Personhood and the Self from the
Zhuangzi},
Pages = {245-263},
Booktitle = {HUMAN BEINGS OR HUMAN BECOMINGS?},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {978-1-4384-8183-8},
Key = {fds371905}
}
@article{fds350400,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Soup, harmony, and disagreement},
Journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {139-155},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.46},
Abstract = {Is the ancient Confucian ideal of he, 'harmony,' a viable
ideal in pluralistic societies composed of people and groups
who subscribe to different ideals of the good and moral
life? Is harmony compatible with accepting, even
encouraging, difference and the freedom to think
differently? I start with seminal characterizations of
harmony in Confucian texts and then aim to chart ways
harmony and freedom can be compatible and even mutually
supportive while recognizing the constant possibility of
conflict between them. I shall point out how the Confucian
notion of harmony resonates with the Indian King Asoka's
project of promoting religious pluralism. Along the way, I
will make some comments of a 'meta' nature about the kind of
interpretation I am offering of harmony in the Confucian
texts and the use to which I am putting this interpretation
by setting it in the context of societies that in important
respects are quite different from the ones from which
concepts of harmony originally emerged.},
Doi = {10.1017/apa.2018.46},
Key = {fds350400}
}
@article{fds351338,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Comparative Ethics: Chinese and Western},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Zalta, EN},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds351338}
}
@article{fds351337,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Why Forgiveness is So Elusive},
Pages = {193-225},
Booktitle = {The Natural Method: Essays on Mind, Ethics, and Self in
Honor of Owen Flanagan},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Nahmias, E and Polger, T and Zhao, W},
Year = {2020},
Abstract = {Discussion of how forgiveness has been conceived across
history and culture.},
Key = {fds351337}
}
@article{fds365503,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Comparative Ethics: Chinese and Western Fall 2020
Edition},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Zalta, EN},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds365503}
}
@article{fds350332,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Michael Ing, The Vulernability of
Integrity},
Journal = {Dao: a journal of comparative philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {4},
Pages = {641-646},
Publisher = {Springer (part of Springer Nature)},
Year = {2019},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-019-09695-y},
Doi = {10.1007/s11712-019-09695-y},
Key = {fds350332}
}
@article{fds366399,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Commentary on "Is it Good to Cooperate?"},
Journal = {Current Anthropology},
Volume = {60},
Number = {1},
Pages = {62-63},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds366399}
}
@article{fds351339,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Moral Ambivalence},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Kusch, M},
Year = {2019},
Key = {fds351339}
}
@article{fds366400,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Hiding the World in the World: A Case for Cosmopolitanism
Based in the Zhuangzi},
Pages = {15-33},
Booktitle = {Philosophies of Place: An Intercultural Conversation},
Publisher = {University of Hawai'i Press},
Editor = {Herschock, P and Ames, RT},
Year = {2019},
Abstract = {Human relations to place cannot be easily or simply
characterized. As a species, we have long been both settled
and mobile, with some rooted in place and others more
migratory. Mobility is not a new feature of human life;
however, economic globalization and technologies that
facilitate rapid movement from place to place have increased
the pressures and opportunities to move. Some argue that
greater mobility, in combination with the homogenization of
places through the spread of chain stores and multinational
corporations, has created a problematic placelessness for
many persons and societies. This paper draws on classical
Confucianism and the early Daoist thought of Zhuangzi to
explore questions of place and mobility in the contemporary
world.},
Key = {fds366400}
}
@article{fds345880,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Relativism and pluralism in moral epistemology},
Pages = {316-328},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138816121},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-17},
Abstract = {Moral universalists hold that there is a single true or most
justified morality. Moral relativists deny universalism
holding instead that there can be a plurality of true or
equally justified moralities insofar as two contradictory
moral claims can both be correct or valid. This chapter
explores the prospects for defending a modest version of
moral relativism-a version opposed to the extreme view that
any morality, no matter its content, is as true or justified
as any other. The strategy for defending modest moral
relativism is to bring to bear work in the human sciences in
understanding the kind of thing a morality is and the
functions it serves in the lives of those who accept it. The
chapter argues that in light of these various functions,
there is a variety of ways a morality can serve these
functions equally well and so a plurality of true or equally
justified moralities.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315719696-17},
Key = {fds345880}
}
@article{fds336431,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Dialogue in the Work of Michael Krausz},
Pages = {67-74},
Booktitle = {Interpretation, Relativism, and Identity: Essays on the
Philosophy of Michael Krausz},
Publisher = {Lexington Books},
Editor = {Koggel, CM and Ritivoi, AD},
Year = {2018},
Key = {fds336431}
}
@article{fds338219,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Chinese Ethics (substantive revision)},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Zalta, E},
Year = {2018},
Key = {fds338219}
}
@article{fds366401,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Confucian and Daoist Traditions on Love},
Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Martin, A},
Year = {2018},
Abstract = {This chapter is about Confucian and Daoist views of love in
the classical age (6th - 3rd c. B.C.E.). For the Confucians,
love is the core of a central moral virtue. Family love is
the foundation for developing an inclusive love for all
human beings. Whether family love has priority over
inclusive love when they conflict was an issue of contention
between Confucians and their critics, and it is an issue
that resonates to this day. Mencius defended the priority of
family love by arguing that love must be guided by
appropriate distinctions between its various recipients. For
the Daoists, love as compassion for all creatures is a
treasure of the Daoist sage and arises from attunement to
the primordial formless source of all that exists. Daoists
conceived Confucian distinctions, and all distinctions of
language, as too rigid and coarse to properly guide love,
and instead proposed that love should be a relatively
unmediated response to the immediate presence of the
recipient. Both Confucian and Daoist traditions are
concerned to reconcile human beings with the loss of loved
ones, but they have seemingly incompatible approaches to
doing this. In this chapter I argue that one can rather
regard these approaches as complementary: that it may be
appropriate to emphasize one over the other in a given
situation; or to synthesize the approaches so as to
incorporate the strengths and to avoid the weaknesses of
each.},
Key = {fds366401}
}
@article{fds331105,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {"Making an Effort to Understand"},
Journal = {The Ultimate Guide from Philosophy Now},
Number = {One: Ethics},
Publisher = {Anja Publications},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {This was first published in Philosophy Now magazine,
included in their "bookazine" as The Ultimate Guide" to
philosophy, issue one: ethics.},
Key = {fds331105}
}
@article{fds329486,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Responses to Snow, Miller, and Seok},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {16},
Number = {4},
Pages = {577-584},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-017-9579-1},
Doi = {10.1007/s11712-017-9579-1},
Key = {fds329486}
}
@article{fds331106,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {"Moral Sentimentalism in Early Confucian
Thought"},
Pages = {230-249},
Booktitle = {Ethical Sentimentalism New Perspectives},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Debes, R and Stueber, K},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9781108618762},
Abstract = {Sentimentalism. in. Early. Confucian. Thought. David. B.
Wong. This essay is an exploration of what Mencius (fourth
century BCE) and Xunzi (fourth and third centuries BCE) in
the classical Confucian tradition have to say about
cultivating goodness in persons.1 One of the benefits of
such an exploration is that it can help us go outside
well-worn Humean and Kantian grooves of thinking about the
relationship between reason on the one hand and desire and
emotion on the other hand.},
Key = {fds331106}
}
@article{fds327009,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {The Excitement of Crossing Boundaries},
Journal = {Journal of World Philosophies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {Summer 2017},
Pages = {149-155},
Publisher = {Indiana University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {I describe my intellectual influences},
Key = {fds327009}
}
@article{fds326694,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {DIgnity in Confucian and Buddhist Thought},
Booktitle = {Dignity A History},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Debes, R},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9780190677541},
Abstract = {In this volume, leading scholars across a range of
disciplines attempt to answer such questions by clarifying
the presently murky history of "dignity," from
classical Greek thought through the Middle Ages and
Enlightenment to the present ...},
Key = {fds326694}
}
@article{fds341032,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Constructive Skepticism and Being a Mirror in the
Zhuangzi},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {53-70},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6253.12320},
Abstract = {The Zhuangzi text deploys two epistemic themes to accomplish
its ends of combatting human pretensions to know the world
and to prompting us to rediscover the world through fresh
eyes. To get us to shed our arrogant dispositions it applies
a constructive skepticism to whatever it is that human
beings claim to know. To point towards a more constructive
relationship with Nature, it articulates the stance of being
a mirror to nature. This essay will explain how the text
does this and relates its conceptions of skepticism and
being as mirror to relevant contemporary
science.},
Doi = {10.1111/1540-6253.12320},
Key = {fds341032}
}
@article{fds323835,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Institutional structures and idealism of
character},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-36},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2017.0003},
Doi = {10.1353/pew.2017.0003},
Key = {fds323835}
}
@article{fds350617,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Reflection dignity in confucian and Buddhist
thought},
Pages = {67-72},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199385997},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385997.003.0004},
Abstract = {"Dignity" in the Western tradition typically connotes the
inherent and unearned worth that entitles each person to
respectful attitudes and treatment. Confucian and Buddhist
thought contains concepts that overlap with this concept,
making possible a three-way dialogue. Confucianism
forthrightly asserts the special value of the individual,
but that special value lies in one's capacities to connect
with others and to create a truly worthwhile life of
relationships. Correspondingly, if one fails to develop
these capacities, one may lose one's dignity. A possible
basis in Buddhism for human dignity lies in the
distinctively human capability for "awakening." However,
this capability involves realizing that one's individuality
is not as real or as important as one thought it was, and
that this is the key to being free from the suffering that
any being, human or animal, should be free
from.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385997.003.0004},
Key = {fds350617}
}
@article{fds325363,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Xunzi's Metaethics},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {139-164},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Hutton, EL},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9789401777452},
Abstract = {such a famous classical master living shortly before
unification by Qin in 221 BCE .7 More surprising (and no
less significant) are the number of indirect citations of
Xunzi's work in Han essays and poems. But evidence of
Xunzi's influence does ...},
Key = {fds325363}
}
@article{fds320490,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Pages = {16-33},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism},
Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781118657607},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Abstract = {In this chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics
should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet
naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two
fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism
allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics
is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to
pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics
both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why
nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical
naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes
the essence of Duke naturalism.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Key = {fds320490}
}
@book{fds296517,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {MORAL RELATIVISM},
Pages = {471-474},
Publisher = {University of California Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138936478},
Abstract = {Argument for the thesis that there is no single true
morality.},
Key = {fds296517}
}
@article{fds323836,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Foundations for Moral Relativism, by J. David
Velleman.},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {125},
Number = {497},
Pages = {284-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv166},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzv166},
Key = {fds323836}
}
@article{fds300135,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Review of Families of Virtue: Confucian and Western Views of
Childhood Development by Erin M. Cline},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Review},
Year = {2015},
Month = {November},
url = {https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/62729-families-of-virtue-confucian-and-western-views-on-childhood-development/},
Key = {fds300135}
}
@article{fds300095,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of
Compassion},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-194},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1540-3009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-015-9438-x},
Abstract = {Metaphors of adorning, crafting, water flowing downward, and
growing sprouts appear in the Analects (Lunyu 論語), the
Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), and the Xunzi 荀子. They express
and guide thinking about what there is in human nature to
cultivate and how it is to be cultivated. The craft metaphor
seems to imply that our nature is of the sort that must be
disciplined and reshaped to achieve goodness, while the
adorning, water, and sprout metaphors imply that human
nature has an inbuilt directionality toward the ethical that
should be protected or nurtured. I argue that all the
metaphors capture different aspects of human nature and how
one must work with these aspects. There is much in
contemporary psychology and neuroscience to suggest that the
early Confucians were on the right track. It is also argued
that they point to a fruitful conception of ethical
development that is relational and holistic.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11712-015-9438-x},
Key = {fds300095}
}
@article{fds300096,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Responses to Commentators},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {225-233},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1540-3009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-015-9439-9},
Abstract = {Responses to commentary on my essay "Early Confucian
Philosophy and the Development of Compassion" by Neil Levy,
Kwong-Loi Shun, Edward Slingerland, and Richard
Shweder.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11712-015-9439-9},
Key = {fds300096}
}
@article{fds355607,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Conserving Nature; Preserving Identity},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {42},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {176-196},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Inc.},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0420102012},
Abstract = {There are two broad approaches to environmental ethics. The
"conservationist"approach on which we should conserve the
environment when it is in our interest to do so and the
"preservationist"approach on which we should preserve the
environment even when it is not in our interest to do so. We
propose a new "relational"approach that tells us to preserve
nature as part of what makes us who we are or could be.
Drawing from Confucian and Daoist texts, we argue that human
identities are, or should be, so intimately tied to nature
that human interests evolve in relationship to
nature.},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-0420102012},
Key = {fds355607}
}
@article{fds226511,
Title = {"Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of
Compassion"},
Journal = {Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy},
Volume = {14 (2015)},
Pages = {157-194},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
Abstract = {derived from lectures delivered at Chinese University of
Hong Kong, 2012. With commentaries by Neil Levy, Kwong-loi
Shun, Richard Shweder, and Edward Slingerland. And my
responses to them.},
Key = {fds226511}
}
@article{fds305569,
Author = {Hassoun, NJ and Wong, DB},
Title = {Conserving Nature; Preserving Identity},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {42},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {176-196},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING INC},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6253.12189},
Abstract = {There are two broad approaches to environmental ethics. The
“conservationist” approach on which we should conserve
the environment when it is in our interest to do so and the
“preservationist” approach on which we should preserve
the environment even when it is not in our interest to do
so. We propose a new “relational” approach that tells us
to preserve nature as part of what makes us who we are or
could be. Drawing from Confucian and Daoist texts, we argue
that human identities are, or should be, so intimately tied
to nature that human interests evolve in relationship to
nature.},
Doi = {10.1111/1540-6253.12189},
Key = {fds305569}
}
@article{fds226442,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"On Learning What Happiness Is"},
Journal = {Philosophical Topics: Special Issue on
Happiness},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {81-101},
Year = {2015},
Abstract = {I explore conceptions of happiness in classical Chinese
philosophers Mengzi and Zhuangzi. In choosing to frame my
question with the word ‘happiness’, I am guided by the
desire to draw some comparative lessons for Western
philosophy. “Happiness” has been a central concept in
Western ethics, and especially in Aristotelian and
utilitarian ethics. The early Chinese concept most relevant
to discussion of Mengzi and Zhuangzi concerns a specific
form of happiness designated by the word le, which is best
rendered as “contentment.” For both Mengzi and Zhuangzi,
there is a reflective dimension of happiness that consists
in acceptance of the inevitable transformations of life and
death, though these two thinkers chart very different paths
to such acceptance. Mengzi holds that it lies in
identification with a moral cause much larger than the self.
Zhuangzi is profoundly skeptical about the viability of such
a path to contentment. He instead offers identification with
a world that transcends human good and evil, and a way to
live in the present that can be deeply satisfying. One
interesting outcome of both their discussions of achieving
happiness is that both come to question the importance of
happiness as a personal goal.},
Key = {fds226442}
}
@article{fds296480,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Growing Virtue: The Theory and Science of Developing
Compassion from a Mencian Perspective},
Pages = {23-58},
Booktitle = {The Philosophical Challenge from China},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Bruya, B},
Year = {2015},
Abstract = {This paper is a development of earlier attempts of mine to
interpret what conception of the moral development of
natural compassion is contained in the Mencius. I bring
crucial features of this conception into dialogue with
contemporary science on the development of
empathy.},
Key = {fds296480}
}
@article{fds305563,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Confucian Perspectives on Pluralism, Gender Relations, and
the Family},
Booktitle = {The Politics of Affective Relations: East Asia and
Beyond},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Lexington Books},
Editor = {Chaihark, H and Chaibong, H and Bell, D},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Both Confucianism and feminist philosophy have recognized in
a way that standard liberal views have not the relevance of
family relationships for the moral quality of a society, I
explore strengths and problems for their
approaches.},
Key = {fds305563}
}
@article{fds305567,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Cultivating the Self with Others},
Pages = {171-198},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Analects},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Oberding, A},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Discusses the contemporary relevance of the moral psychology
in the Analects.},
Key = {fds305567}
}
@article{fds305564,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Rights and Community in Confucianism},
Pages = {31-48},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and
Community},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Shun, K-L and Wong, DB},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Rights to speech and dissent have a basis in the Confucian
tradition, but not in the value of autonomy. Rather, they
have a basis in the value of speech and dissent to the
communal good.},
Key = {fds305564}
}
@article{fds296505,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Integrating philosophy with anthropology in an approach to
morality},
Journal = {Anthropological Theory},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {336-355},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Editor = {Cassaniti, JL and Hickman, JR},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1463-4996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1463499614534554},
Abstract = {Philosophy and anthropology need to integrate their accounts
of what a morality is. I identify three desiderata that an
account of morality should satisfy: (1) it should recognize
significant diversity and variation in the major kinds of
value, (2) it should specify a set of criteria for what
counts as a morality, and (3) it should indicate the basis
for distinguishing between more or less justifiable
moralities, or true and false moralities. I will discuss why
these three desiderata are hard to satisfy at the same time,
and why they are controversial. Anthropologists and
philosophers will differ on which ones they are inclined to
reject. I argue that all three should be accepted and can be
satisfied. © The Author(s) 2014.},
Doi = {10.1177/1463499614534554},
Key = {fds296505}
}
@article{fds368887,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Cultivating the Self in Concert with Others},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {171-197},
Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7113-0_10},
Abstract = {The Analects is a series of glimpses into how Confucius and
his students engaged in their projects of moral
self-cultivation. This chapter seeks to describe the way in
which the outlines of a moral psychology arises from the
text and how the text poses issues that came to be central
to the Chinese philosophical tradition. It will be argued
that the text provides exemplars of moral self-cultivation,
that it makes emotion central to virtue and therefore makes
emotional self-cultivation a central focus of moral
development, that it highlights the relational nature of
moral cultivation as a process that is conducted with
others, that it raises difficult and crucial issues about
the relation between intuitive and affective styles of
action on the one hand and on the other hand action based on
deliberation and reflection, and that it has some useful
approaches to the problem of situationism that has recently
been raised for virtue ethics.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-7113-0_10},
Key = {fds368887}
}
@article{fds226443,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Reconciling the Tension between Similarity and Difference
in Critical Hermeneutics"},
Pages = {165-183},
Booktitle = {The Agon of Interpretations: Essays Toward a Critical
Intercultural Hermeneutics},
Publisher = {University of Toronto Press},
Editor = {Ming Xie},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Practicing critical hermeneutics throws us into the tension
between two requirements: first, to construe others as being
like us; and second, to open ourselves to ways they may
differ fundamentally from us and pose challenges to our
treasured truths. In this essay I analyze the nature of this
tension (with reference to Davidson's and Gadamer's
philosophies of interpretation) and propose a way of
reconciling them. I shall argue that the embrace of
difference is in fact necessary for interpreting others to
be like us. To plausibly interpret others as being like us,
we need sufficient diversity within the “us.” Further, I
shall argue that whom we decide to include in the “us”
depends on relations of power. Throughout this argument, my
illustrative cases will draw from the relationship between
China and the West. I will refer to what it takes for
“us” in the West to understand some central features of
Confucian ethics. I will refer to efforts of contemporary
Chinese thinkers to “translate” the concept of rights
from the West.},
Key = {fds226443}
}
@article{fds223683,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Xunzi as Moral Craftsman"},
Pages = {19-32},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophy in the Age of Globalization, v. 3,
Hawaii Conference},
Publisher = {Contemporary Philosophy in the Age of Globalization},
Editor = {Takahiro Nakajima and Tomokazu Baba},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Opening paragraph:I have been exploring the possibilities
that early Chinese philosophy offers for fresh thinking
about the development of ethical excellence. Today I discuss
the possibilities suggested by the Xunzi's conception of how
human beings should go about transforming their emotions and
desires. This conception allots a crucial role for the
individual's reflection on why and how to go about
transforming oneself, but that reflection prompts one to
enter into relationships and ritual practices with others.
This relational conception provides illuminating correction
to the intellectualist and individualist bias we often see
in contemporary philosophical approaches to understanding
moral development in the West. I shall also suggest that
some forms of scientific inquiry reinforce and support the
methods suggested by the Xunzi. I highlight the value of
these methods as they contrast with dominant ways of
thinking about the respective roles of reflection and
emotion in Western moral philosophy.},
Key = {fds223683}
}
@article{fds227253,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Chinese Philosophy: The Beginnings of Morality"},
Journal = {Philosopher's Magazine},
Volume = {65},
Number = {2},
Pages = {76-83},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds227253}
}
@article{fds296479,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {The Different Faces of Love in a Good Life},
Pages = {97-126},
Booktitle = {Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character: Engaging Joel J.
Kupperman},
Publisher = {SUNY Press},
Editor = {Chengyang Li and Peimin Ni},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds296479}
}
@article{fds296481,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Response to Blum, Response to Geisz and Sadler, Response to
Hansen, Response to Gowans, Response to Bloomfield and
Massey, Response to Huang},
Pages = {183-278},
Booktitle = {Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy: David Wong and his
Critics},
Publisher = {SUNY Press},
Editor = {Xiao, Y and Huang, Y},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {This is a book of commentaries on my book Natural
Moralities, and includes my responses to the commentators.
Present in press, awaiting proofs.},
Key = {fds296481}
}
@article{fds219608,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Cultivating the Self with Others"},
Pages = {171-198},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Analects},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Amy Oberding},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Discusses the contemporary relevance of the moral psychology
in the Analects.},
Key = {fds219608}
}
@article{fds300097,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {On learning what happiness is},
Journal = {Philosophical Topics},
Volume = {41},
Number = {1},
Pages = {81-101},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Editor = {Minar, E},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0276-2080},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20134114},
Abstract = {I explore conceptions of happiness in classical Chinese
philosophers Mengzi and Zhuangzi. In choosing to frame my
question with the word 'happiness', I am guided by the
desire to draw some comparative lessons for Western
philosophy. 'Happiness' has been a central concept in
Western ethics, and especially in Aristotelian and
utilitarian ethics. The early Chinese concept most relevant
to discussion of Mengzi and Zhuangzi concerns a specific
form of happiness designated by the word le, which is best
rendered as 'contentment'. For both Mengzi and Zhuangzi,
there is a reflective dimension of happiness that consists
in acceptance of the inevitable transformations of life and
death, though these two thinkers chart very different paths
to such acceptance. Mengzi holds that it lies in
identification with a moral cause much larger than the self.
Zhuangzi is profoundly skeptical about the viability of such
a path to contentment. He instead offers identification with
a world that transcends human good and evil, and a way to
live in the present that can be deeply satisfying. One
interesting outcome of both their discussions of achieving
happiness is that both come to question the importance of
happiness as a personal goal.},
Doi = {10.5840/philtopics20134114},
Key = {fds300097}
}
@article{fds371631,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {MORAL RELATIVITY AND TOLERANCE},
Pages = {141-153},
Booktitle = {Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary
Readings},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415217125},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203134436-16},
Abstract = {From David B. Wong, Moral Relativity, Berkeley CA:
University of California Press, 1984, pp. 160–61,
165–75, 180–90, and 232–34.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203134436-16},
Key = {fds371631}
}
@article{fds216078,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Chinese Ethics" (5 year update in 2013)},
Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-chinese/},
Key = {fds216078}
}
@article{fds296475,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Relativism, Moral},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {LaFollette, H},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296475}
}
@article{fds296476,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Morality, Definition of},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {LaFollette, H},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296476}
}
@article{fds296477,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Mencius},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {LaFollette, H},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds296477}
}
@article{fds296523,
Author = {Hassoun, N and Wong, D},
Title = {Sustaining Cultures in the Face of Globalization},
Journal = {Culture and Dialogue},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {73-98},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Arguments for the preservation of culture are based on an
extremely problematic essentialist conception of culture as
a fixed entity with an essence. The inadequacy of the
essentialist conception has received increasing recognition,
but an adequate positive conception has yet to take its
place. This paper reframes the debate about cultural
preservation by proposing a new conception of culture as
conversation. The new conception acknowledges the fluidity
and internal contestation that occurs within actual cultures
and the agency of a culture’s members in creating,
transmitting, and revising that culture. We make this new
conception our basis for proposing that a proper concern for
the value of a culture should be realized in enabling its
members to sustain it, not to preserve some pre-existing
essence. Adopting the more viable notion of culture also
changes our conception of what needs to be done to sustain
it and allows us to acknowledge and better deal with the
complex arguments for and against sustaining
culture.},
Key = {fds296523}
}
@article{fds336432,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Chinese translation of ’Reasons and Analogical Reasoning
in the Mengzi’ previously published in
2002},
Journal = {The Journal of Chinese Philosophy and Culture},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {1-33},
Publisher = {Research Centre for Chinese Philosophy and Culture,
CUHK},
Editor = {Xiaogan, L},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds336432}
}
@article{fds296474,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Agreement / Disagreement},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Politics. Methods, Tools,
Topics},
Publisher = {Ashgate},
Editor = {Besussi, A},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296474}
}
@article{fds296478,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Reconciling the Tension between Similarity and Difference in
Critical Hermeneutics},
Booktitle = {The Agon of Interpretations: Essays Toward a Critical
Intercultural Hermeneutics},
Publisher = {University of Toronto Press},
Editor = {Xie, M},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Practicing critical hermeneutics throws us into the tension
between two requirements: first, to construe others as being
like us; and second, to open ourselves to ways they may
differ fundamentally from us and pose challenges to our
treasured truths. In this essay I analyze the nature of this
tension (with reference to Davidson’s and Gadamer’s
philosophies of interpretation) and propose a way of
reconciling them. I shall argue that the embrace of
difference is in fact necessary for interpreting others to
be like us. To plausibly interpret others as being like us,
we need sufficient diversity within the “us.” Further, I
shall argue that whom we decide to include in the “us”
depends on relations of power. Throughout this argument, my
illustrative cases will draw from the relationship between
China and the West. I will refer to what it takes for
“us” in the West to understand some central features of
Confucian ethics. I will refer to efforts of contemporary
Chinese thinkers to “translate” the concept of rights
from the West.},
Key = {fds296478}
}
@article{fds296472,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Agon and He: Contest and Harmony},
Pages = {163-180},
Booktitle = {Ethics in Early China},
Publisher = {Hong Kong University Press},
Editor = {Fraser, C and Robins, D and Leary, TO},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
Abstract = {I discuss the value of agon or contest in Greek thought and
the value of he or harmony in Chinese thought. I argue that
these values, often thought to be mutually exclusive,
actually imply one another.},
Key = {fds296472}
}
@article{fds296473,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Complexity and Simplicity in Ancient Greek and Chinese
Thought},
Pages = {259-277},
Booktitle = {How should we live? Comparing Ethics in Ancient China and
Greco-Roman Antquity},
Publisher = {DeGruyter},
Address = {Berlin},
Editor = {Schilling, D and King, R},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
Abstract = {This paper was read at a conference on ethics in ancient
China and Greek and Roman antiquity held at the University
of Munich. Aristotle, the Analects, the Daodejing, and the
Zhuangzi are discussed in relation to the values of
complexity and simplicity. It might be thought that
Aristotle values complexity and not simplicity, while the
Daoist texts value simplicity and not complexity, but the
texts reveal something far more complex.},
Key = {fds296473}
}
@article{fds350618,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Complexity and simplicity in aristotle and early daoist
thought},
Pages = {259-277},
Booktitle = {How Should One Live?: Comparing Ethics in Ancient China and
Greco-Roman Antiquity},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9783110252873},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110252897},
Doi = {10.1515/9783110252897},
Key = {fds350618}
}
@article{fds296471,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Confucian Political Philosophy},
Pages = {771-788},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the History of Political
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Klosko, G},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds296471}
}
@article{fds296520,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Relativist Explanations of Interpersonal and Group
Disagreement},
Pages = {411-429},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Relativism},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781405190213},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444392494.ch21},
Abstract = {Some relativists might hold, in light of the pervasiveness
of disagreement even within groups that largely agree on
morality, that the truth - conditions for a moral judgment
refer to the moral reasons and norms accepted by the
individual speaker. Others might hold, in light of their
conception of moralities as social constructions that help
to structure human cooperative life, that the truth -
conditions refer to the moral reasons and norms accepted by
the speaker's group. A case is made here that choosing
between speaker and speaker's group relativism is too
simplistic a way to resolve the issue because there are
several independent respects in which the truth - conditions
of a moral judgment could be said to be speaker - or group -
relative and some respects in which they are not so relative
at all. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781444392494.ch21},
Key = {fds296520}
}
@article{fds300101,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Kupperman, Joel J., Six Myths about the Good Life: Thinking
about What Has Value},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {107-109},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2011},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1540-3009},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000290674900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11712-010-9196-8},
Key = {fds300101}
}
@article{fds296524,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Making an Effort to Understand},
Journal = {Philosophy Now, special issue on the new
amorality},
Number = {82},
Pages = {24-27},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296524}
}
@article{fds296469,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {How Are Moral Conversions Possible?},
Pages = {41-70},
Booktitle = {In Search of Goodness},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, R},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {I examine three cases of moral conversion: the fictional
case of the Staasi agent in East Germany as depicted in the
film, "The Lives of Others," Oskar Schindler, and a leader
of the Ku Klux Klan who joined with a militant black
activist in the effort to desegregate schools in North
Carolina. I weave reflections on these people with
theoretical and empirical work on the nature of emotion and
its relation to cognitive capacities to formulate some
speculations on the nature of moral conversion.},
Key = {fds296469}
}
@article{fds296468,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Pluralism and Ambivalence},
Pages = {254-267},
Booktitle = {Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology},
Publisher = {Columbia University Press},
Editor = {Krausz, M},
Year = {2010},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds296468}
}
@article{fds336433,
Author = {Wong, D and Yang, TX},
Title = {Translation of "Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right"
into Chinese},
Booktitle = {Chinese Philosophy in the English Speaking
World},
Publisher = {Renmin University Press},
Editor = {Jiang, X},
Year = {2010},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds336433}
}
@article{fds296503,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Reasonable Disagreement by Christopher
McMahon},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
Volume = {online},
Publisher = {University of Notre Dame Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296503}
}
@article{fds296521,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Identifying with nature in early Daoism},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {36},
Number = {4},
Pages = {568-584},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Editor = {Nicholas Bunnin and Chung-Ying Cheng},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0301-8121},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2009.01542.x},
Abstract = {Daoism, and the <i>Zhuangzi</i> in particular, calls upon us
to identify with the whole of nature and to transcend (in
part) our identification with humanity. How is this
psychologically possible? An answer is put
forward.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2009.01542.x},
Key = {fds296521}
}
@article{fds296525,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral
Motivation},
Journal = {Philosophical Issues (metaethics issue of
Nous)},
Volume = {19},
Pages = {343-367},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {In some recent work I have developed a theory of moral
reasons and their relation to the agent’s motivations. The
theory is naturalistic in its approach, meaning that it
seeks to integrate a conception of what moral reasons are
and how they motivate with the best and most relevant
science we currently have. I here develop my theory of moral
reasons in relation to some of the most recent work in
psychology on the nature of emotion and the ways in which it
both underpins and undermines cognition. While the results
in these fields are still evolving and to a degree
speculative, there is enough there that ought to command the
attention of philosophers with a naturalistic bent, and to
challenge philosophers who do not possess such a bent. I
also apply my theory of moral reasons to a real life case in
which emotionally charged cognition changes a person’s
motivations.},
Key = {fds296525}
}
@article{fds296467,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Cultural Pluralism and Moral Identity},
Pages = {79-105},
Booktitle = {Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral
Psychology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Narvaez, D and Lapsley, D},
Year = {2009},
Abstract = {I develop a new "conversational" conception of culture that
accommodates the characteristics of fluidity and internal
diversity of values that have been highlighted by
cosmopolitan and postmodern critics of the the essentialist
conception of culture. I then draw out implications for the
kinds of moral identities that can arise in fluid and
internally diverse cultures. I argue that internal
consistency and stability of moral identities are not
necessarily healthy characteristics of moral identity given
a realistic conception of culture.},
Key = {fds296467}
}
@article{fds296502,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of François Jullien, Vital Nourishment: Departing
from Happiness},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296502}
}
@article{fds296526,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Constructing normative objectivity in ethics},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {237-266},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0265-0525},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052508080096},
Abstract = {I defend a naturalistic explanation of moral reasons that
does not make them merely hypothetical imperatives but
rather capable of entering into the constitution of selfhood
and agency. Moral reasons play a crucial role in making
cooperation possible by shaping and reinforcing the diverse
and potentially conflicting array of human motivations so
that they are better suited for cooperative
life.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052508080096},
Key = {fds296526}
}
@article{fds296489,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Chinese Ethics},
Editor = {Zalta, EN},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {URL = .},
Key = {fds296489}
}
@article{fds336434,
Author = {Wong, D and Rovensky, TJ},
Title = {Translation into Czech of "Rights and Community in
Confucianism," originally published in Confucian Ethics: a
Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community},
Booktitle = {An Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights: The Western,
Islamic and Confucian Perspectives},
Publisher = {Publishing House Filosofia},
Editor = {Hrubec, M},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds336434}
}
@article{fds336435,
Author = {Wong, D and Haimin, TW},
Title = {Translation into Chinese of "Comparative Philosophy: Chinese
and Western" originally in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Philosophy},
Publisher = {Renmin University Press},
Editor = {Yu, J},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds336435}
}
@article{fds376408,
Author = {Wong, D and Haimin, TW},
Title = {Translation into Chinese of "Comparative Philosophy: Chinese
and Western" originally in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Philosophy},
Publisher = {Renmin University Press},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds376408}
}
@article{fds296527,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Moral Reasons: Internal and External},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {72 (2006)},
Number = {3},
Pages = {536-558},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000245711400002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Addresses the question of whether moral reasons stem from
existing desires of the agent, from the nature of practical
rationality or from outside the agent herself.},
Key = {fds296527}
}
@article{fds296464,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {If We Are Not by Ourselves, If We Are Not
Strangers},
Pages = {331-349},
Booktitle = {Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry
Rosemont, Jr.},
Publisher = {Association of Chinese Philosophers in America},
Editor = {Littlejohn, R and Chandler, M},
Year = {2007},
Abstract = {This article continues development of the theme that
Confucian ethics both recognizes and the relational nature
of human identity and furthermore prizes relational
identities that are also morally autonomous. I explore the
formation of morally autonomous identities within the
context of student-teacher relationships.},
Key = {fds296464}
}
@article{fds296487,
Author = {D.B. Wong and Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology: v.1, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds296487}
}
@article{fds296488,
Author = {D.B. Wong and Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {"What is the Nature of Morality?" A Response to Casebeer,
Railton, and Ruse},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {45-52},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, v.1, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds296488}
}
@book{fds300098,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic
Relativism},
Pages = {1-304},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195305395},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195305396.001.0001},
Abstract = {To be called a relativist, especially a moral relativist, is
to be condemned as someone who holds that "anything goes".
Frequently the term is part of a dichotomy: either accept
relativism or accept universalism: the view that only one
true morality exists. This book defends a new version of
relativism that is both an alternative to, and fits between,
universalism and relativism as usually defined. Pluralistic
relativism does accord with one aspect of relativism as
usually defined: there is no single true morality. Beyond
that, it is argued that there can be a plurality of true
moralities, moralities that exist across different
traditions and cultures, all of which address facets of the
same problem: how we are to live well together. A
comparative and naturalistic approach is applied to the
understanding of moralities, with discussion of a wide array
of positions and texts within the Western canon as well as
in Chinese philosophy, and drawing on not only philosophy,
but also psychology, evolutionary theory, history, and
literature in making a case for the importance of pluralism
in moral life and in establishing the virtues of acceptance
and accommodation. A central theme is that there is no
single value or principle or ordering of values and
principles that offers a uniquely true path for human
living, but variations according to different contexts that
carry within them a common core of human values. We should
thus be modest about our own morality, learn from other
approaches, and accommodate different practices in our
pluralistic society.},
Doi = {10.1093/0195305396.001.0001},
Key = {fds300098}
}
@article{fds296528,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Attachment and Detachment in Daoism, Buddhism, and
Stoicism},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {V},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-219},
Year = {2006},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {Both Buddhism and Stoicism would appear to recommend the
complete elimination of emotional attachment to others. The
promise is release from the suffering that arises from loss
or anticipated loss of others dear to the self, as
emphasized by Buddhism, and tranquility and release from the
tumult of wrenching passion as emphasized by Stoicism. Yet
it is not so clear what kind of detachment Buddhism and
Stoicism recommend. For example, on Martha Nussbaum’s
interpretation, Stoicism bids us to extirpate special
feeling for others. On Lawrence Becker’s interpretation,
Stoicism bids us to cultivate resilience, to
“encapsulate” special feeling so that the loss of its
object has a limited effect on our lives. In this essay I
argue that detachment as resilience is more desirable than
detachment as extirpation. The cost of eliminating special
feeling for others simply deprives too much value from human
life, and arguably deprives life of much of its humanness.
We would be better off preserving special feeling while
achieving a kind of equilibrium that is not destroyed by
loss. It is a challenge, however, to conceive how this could
be possible. How could one continue to hold others close to
one’s heart without making oneself extremely vulnerable to
their loss? Can the strong and deep feelings we have for
particular others really be encapsulated in the way Becker
suggests? I suggest that the Zhuangzi, which also recommends
a kind of detachment, has the most promising suggestions as
to what attachment conducive to resilience would feel like
in a genuinely human life.},
Key = {fds296528}
}
@article{fds305710,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Moral reasons: Internal and external},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH},
Volume = {72},
Number = {3},
Pages = {536-558},
Year = {2006},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000245711400002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds305710}
}
@article{fds296501,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch’ien
Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on
Science and Confucian Ethics by Donald J.
Munro},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Studies},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {447-54.},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds296501}
}
@article{fds296462,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Where Charity Begins},
Booktitle = {Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive
Engagement},
Publisher = {Brill Academic Publishers},
Editor = {Mou, B},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {This paper discusses Davidson’s guiding principle for the
interpretation of what others believe, desire, and value.
Davidson holds that we use ourselves as models for
understanding others, and since we regard our own beliefs as
true, our own desires as the rational ones to have, and our
own values as the right ones, we must apply a principle of
"charity" and regard others as holding much the same
beliefs, values and desires. I criticize this principle,
pointing out that the "we" who hold certain beliefs, desires
and values comprehends considerable diversity, and that it
is this diversity that enables us to comprehend a range of
different ways of being human. I then inquire as to how we
regard a range of different beliefs, desires and values as
being normal for human beings.},
Key = {fds296462}
}
@article{fds296463,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Evil and the Morality of Conviction},
Booktitle = {Naming Evil Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Grant, R},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {This essay is about the moral psychology of those who do
evil as they wage war upon evil. My focus is the “morality
of conviction” that simplifies and polarizes for the sake
of meaning, certitude and decisiveness. My primary example
will be the downward spiral dance between those Islamists
who invoke fundamentalist views to motivate and justify
terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its allies (many who hold
radical fundamentalist views, of course, deny that attacks
on civilians are justified), and those in the U.S. who
oppose them but are fundamentally alike in misperceiving the
motivations of the other side. By saying they fundamentally
alike in this respect, I am not saying that what is done on
both sides is morally equivalent all things considered, nor
do I want to say that the fact of one’s actions being
somewhat or even a lot less worse than those on the other
side constitutes a good excuse for those actions. A final
qualification to make clear at the outset is that the
perception of the other side as malignantly evil is but one
motivating factor for the terrorist attacks and the U.S.
response, and there is no claim here for the primacy of this
perception as a motivating factor. The assumption of this
paper, however, is that it was and continues to be a
significant factor in the readiness to use violence without
the usual acknowledged constraints.},
Key = {fds296463}
}
@article{fds296522,
Author = {Hourdequin, M and Wong, DB},
Title = {A relational approach to environmental ethics},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {19-33},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0301-8121},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2005.00172.x},
Abstract = {The Chinese self is often said to be relational. We discuss
how this is true and the implications for a different
approach to environmental ethics that offers an alternative
to the standard positions that the environment has intrinsic
value independent of human beings and that the environment
has value only in relation to human interests.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2005.00172.x},
Key = {fds296522}
}
@article{fds296529,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right},
Journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {91-107},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Spring},
Abstract = {Perhaps the primary interpretive problem in interpreting the
Daoist text Zhuangzi is that it alternates between skeptical
questioning of purported knowledge claims and apparent
advocacy of a certain way of life. I offer an interpretation
of the kind of skepticism embodied by the Zhuangzi that
makes perfect sense of the accompanying advocacy of a dao or
way.},
Key = {fds296529}
}
@article{fds296530,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Relational and Autonomous Selves},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {419-432},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2004.00163.x},
Abstract = {I discuss the way that the Chinese self could truly be said
to be relational and argue that this sense of relationality
is compatible with a significant form of moral autonomy that
is highly valued in Confucianism. It is in fact a kind of
autonomy free of questionable assumptions about the
exemption of human beings from the laws of
nature.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2004.00163.x},
Key = {fds296530}
}
@article{fds296461,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Rights and Community in Confucianism},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and
Community},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Shun, K-L and Wong, DB},
Year = {2004},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {This paper argues that there is a basis in the Confucian
moral tradition for defending a right to dissent and to free
speech, but that this right would be defended on a
"communal" ground that such a right would help to promote
the common good, rather than an "autonomy" ground that
individuals have an interest in expressing themselves that
must be defended against the interests of the community. I
argue that rights that are grounded in either the common
good or the good of individual autonomy are dependent on
certain forms of community for their defense and
realization.},
Key = {fds296461}
}
@book{fds29466,
Author = {Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong},
Title = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy
and Community},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {A collection of comparative essays on Chinese and Western
philosophy with special focus on the topics of individual
rights and moral psychology.},
Key = {fds29466}
}
@article{fds38167,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Rights and Community in Confucianism"},
Pages = {31-48},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy
and Community},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Rights to speech and dissent have a basis in the Confucian
tradition, but not in the value of autonomy. Rather, they
have a basis in the value of speech and dissent to the
communal good.},
Key = {fds38167}
}
@article{fds38168,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Confucian Perspectives on Pluralism, Gender Relations,
and the Family"},
Booktitle = {The Politics of Affective Relations: East Asia and
Beyond},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Lexington Books},
Editor = {Hahm Chaihark and Hahm Chaibong and Daniel Bell},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Both Confucianism and feminist philosophy have recognized in
a way that standard liberal views have not the relevance of
family relationships for the moral quality of a society, I
explore strengths and problems for their
approaches.},
Key = {fds38168}
}
@book{fds296518,
Author = {Shun, KL and Wong, DB},
Title = {Confucian ethics: A comparative study of self, autonomy, and
community},
Volume = {9780521792172},
Pages = {1-228},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521792172},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606960},
Abstract = {The Chinese ethical tradition has often been thought to
oppose Western views of the self as autonomous and possessed
of individual rights with views that emphasize the
centrality of relationship and community to the self. The
essays in this collection discuss the validity of that
contrast as it concerns Confucianism, the single most
influential Chinese school of thought. Alasdair MacIntyre,
the single most influential philosopher to articulate the
need for dialogue across traditions, contributes a
concluding essay of commentary. This is the only
consistently philosophical collection on Asia and human
rights and could be used in courses on comparative ethics,
political philosophy, and Asian area studies.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511606960},
Key = {fds296518}
}
@article{fds300094,
Author = {Shun, KL and Wong, DB},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {9780521792172},
Pages = {1-8},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and
Community},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521792172},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606960.001},
Abstract = {East-West comparative ethics has drawn increased attention
in recent years, especially comparative discussion of
Confucian ethics and Western thought. Such interest stems in
part from a growing concern with the political systems of
Asian countries, which are often viewed as informed by
Confucian values. Critics of such systems accuse them of a
form of authoritarianism that is at odds with Western
democratic ideals. Defenders of such systems reject the
imposition of Western political ideals. Some argue that such
systems are characterized by a democracy of a distinctively
Asian kind, and some even argue that Western notions of
rights and democracy are inapplicable to Asian political
structures. Underlying this rejection of Western political
ideals is the view that values espoused by Asian ethical and
political traditions, and more specifically the Confucian
tradition, are radically different from and no less
respectable than those of Western traditions, a view that
has led to a growing interest in the “Asian values”
debate. The interest in comparative ethics also stems in
part from a concern to understand Asian ethical traditions
as a way to unravel philosophical presuppositions behind
Western ethical traditions. Setting the different traditions
alongside each other helps to put in sharper focus the
presuppositions that shape the development of each, thereby
preparing the ground for a comparative evaluation and
possible synthesis. The Confucian tradition, with its long
history, rich content, and extensive influence on Asian
communities, has drawn much attention in such comparative
discussions.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511606960.001},
Key = {fds300094}
}
@article{fds296459,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Cultural Relativism},
Booktitle = {Online Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Eolss Publishers},
Editor = {Ethics, RCEFT and division, J},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://www.eolss.net/},
Abstract = {A discussion of different kinds of relativism that involve
cultural difference, an assessment of the arguments for and
against each kind, and discussion of the normative
implications for these relativisms with special reference to
issues of cultural conflict, development, and gender
equality.},
Key = {fds296459}
}
@article{fds296460,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Dwelling in Humanity or Free and Easy Wandering?},
Pages = {400-415},
Booktitle = {Technology and Cultural Values: On the Edge of the Third
Millenium},
Publisher = {Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press},
Editor = {Hershock, PD and Stepaniants, M and Ames, RT},
Year = {2003},
Abstract = {About the Chinese philosophers Zhuangzi and Xunzi, and the
way that the dialectic between them on questions of
universalism and relativism bears on the dilemmas of value
commitment for contemporary liberals in the
West.},
Key = {fds296460}
}
@article{fds48842,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi"},
Booktitle = {Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi},
Publisher = {Hackett Publishing Company},
Editor = {Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds48842}
}
@article{fds296531,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Crossing Cultures in Moral Psychology},
Journal = {Philosophy Today},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {7-10},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296531}
}
@article{fds296500,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Fieldwork in Familiar Places by Michele
Moody-Adams},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {63},
Pages = {716-720},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296500}
}
@article{fds296455,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi},
Booktitle = {Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi},
Publisher = {Hackett Publishing Company},
Editor = {Liu, X and Ivanhoe, PJ},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296455}
}
@article{fds296456,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {“Comparative Philosophy”},
Pages = {51-58},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Cua, A},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296456}
}
@article{fds296457,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Mo Tzu},
Pages = {453-461},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Cua, A},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296457}
}
@article{fds296486,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi},
Pages = {187-220},
Booktitle = {Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi},
Publisher = {Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296486}
}
@article{fds305568,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Entry on Cultural Relativism},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds305568}
}
@article{fds300099,
Author = {Wong, DB and Moody-Adams, MM},
Title = {Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, &
Philosophy},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {63},
Number = {3},
Pages = {716-716},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {2001},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000173249800017&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/3071168},
Key = {fds300099}
}
@article{fds296452,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {"Comparative Ethics" and "Mo Tzu"},
Series = {2nd},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296452}
}
@article{fds296453,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {“Moral Relativism” revised version},
Series = {2nd},
Pages = {1164-1168},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296453}
}
@article{fds296454,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {“Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western”},
Series = {Online, continuous},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Stanford University},
Editor = {Zalta, EN},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comparphil-chiwes/},
Key = {fds296454}
}
@article{fds296450,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Fragmentation in Civil Society and the Good},
Booktitle = {Civility},
Publisher = {Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press},
Editor = {Rouner, L},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296450}
}
@article{fds374910,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Through the moral maze: Searching for absolute values in a
pluralistic world - Kane,R},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY},
Volume = {47},
Number = {188},
Pages = {413-415},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds374910}
}
@article{fds296497,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Robert Kane’s Beyond the Moral Maze: Searching
for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {47},
Pages = {413-415},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds296497}
}
@article{fds296498,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Richard Garner’s Beyond Morality},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {57},
Pages = {721-725},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds296498}
}
@article{fds296496,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Integrity and Moral Relativism by Samuel
Fleischacker},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {104},
Pages = {882-883},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296496}
}
@article{fds296514,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {On Care and Justice in the Family},
Journal = {Contemporary Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {21-24},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296514}
}
@article{fds296495,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of The Conception of Value by Paul
Grice},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {45-47},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296495}
}
@article{fds374912,
Author = {Wong, DB and Thomas, L},
Title = {Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character.},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {101},
Number = {3},
Pages = {695-695},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1992},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2186083},
Doi = {10.2307/2186083},
Key = {fds374912}
}
@article{fds374911,
Author = {Wong, D and Allinson, RE},
Title = {Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical
Roots},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {42},
Number = {3},
Pages = {527-527},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1992},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1399277},
Doi = {10.2307/1399277},
Key = {fds374911}
}
@article{fds296513,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Coping with Moral Conflict and Ambiguity},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {102},
Pages = {763-784},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds296513}
}
@article{fds296493,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Understanding the Chinese Mind: the Philosophical
Roots ed. by Robert Allinson},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {527-530},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds296493}
}
@article{fds296494,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character by
Lawrence Thomas},
Journal = {Philosophical Review},
Volume = {101},
Pages = {695-697},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds296494}
}
@article{fds296438,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {"Comparative Ethics," "Mo Tzu," and "Moral
Relativism"},
Pages = {185-859},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {New York & London: Garland Press},
Editor = {Becker, L},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds296438}
}
@article{fds296485,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Commentary on Sayre-Mccord's "being a realist about
relativism"},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {61},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {177-186},
Year = {1991},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00385840},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00385840},
Key = {fds296485}
}
@article{fds296512,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {"Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in
Mencius?" and a reply to a commentary by Craig
Ihara},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {31-58},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296512}
}
@article{fds296492,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review of Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in
Ethics by Edmund Pincoffs},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {85},
Pages = {116-120},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296492}
}
@article{fds296511,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {A Relativist Alternative to Anti-Realism},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {87},
Pages = {617-618},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296511}
}
@article{fds296491,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {"MacIntyre and the Commensurability of Traditions,"
(critical notice of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by
Alasdair MacIntyre},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {31},
Pages = {7-14},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296491}
}
@article{fds296490,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Review essay on Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by
Bernard Williams},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {721-732},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296490}
}
@article{fds296510,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Universalism versus Love with Distinctions: An Ancient
Debate Revived},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {252-272},
Year = {1989},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.1989.tb00437.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.1989.tb00437.x},
Key = {fds296510}
}
@article{fds296509,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {ON MORAL REALISM WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1 S},
Pages = {95-113},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01599.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01599.x},
Key = {fds296509}
}
@article{fds296508,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Taoism and the Problem of Equal Respect},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {165-183},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296508}
}
@article{fds296507,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Cartesian Deduction},
Journal = {Philosophy Research Archives},
Volume = {8},
Pages = {1-19},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds296507}
}
@article{fds296506,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Leibniz’s Theory of Relations},
Journal = {Philosophical Review},
Volume = {89},
Pages = {241-256},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296506}
}
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