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| Philosophy : Publications since January 2023List all publications in the database. :recent first alphabetical combined listing:%% , Ásta @article{fds365121, Author = {Ásta}, Title = {Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff, Butler, and Roth}, Journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {31}, Number = {1}, Pages = {310-318}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12744}, Abstract = {The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu Roth.}, Doi = {10.1111/ejop.12744}, Key = {fds365121} } @article{fds373903, Author = {Ásta}, Title = {What are Sex and Gender and what Do We Want them to Be?}, Journal = {Metaphysics}, Volume = {6}, Number = {1}, Pages = {37-44}, Publisher = {Ubiquity Press, Ltd.}, Year = {2023}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/met.118}, Doi = {10.5334/met.118}, Key = {fds373903} } %% Atkins, Jed W. @article{fds376120, Author = {Atkins, JW}, Title = {John Rawls’s Theology of Liberal Toleration}, Journal = {American Political Thought}, Volume = {13}, Number = {1}, Pages = {56-82}, Year = {2024}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728210}, Abstract = {Scholarship has shown that John Rawls’s theological education at Princeton shaped his later theory of justice but has overlooked a similar impact on his account of toleration, which was also derived from the original position in ATheory of Justice. Drawing on a variety of published and unpublished works, I argue that in the account of toleration in A Theory of Justice the original position takes the place previously occupied by God in His roles as “father of all” and “just judge.” Paying attention to the theological origins of Rawls’s view of toleration in liberal Protestantism explains why he thought that the Western concept of the separation of church and state follows logically from the original position, even though his insistence on this point subjected his thought to internal inconsistency and external criticism. Acknowledging these limitations opens to liberal political theorists an avenue for increased institutional flexibility that Rawls prematurely closed.}, Doi = {10.1086/728210}, Key = {fds376120} } %% Brading, Katherine A. @article{fds371353, Author = {Brading, K}, Title = {Du Châtelet and the philosophy of physics}, Pages = {519-532}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European Philosophy}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9781138212756}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-45}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-45}, Key = {fds371353} } @article{fds376144, Author = {Brading, K}, Title = {Celebrating Emmy Noether}, Journal = {Physics Today}, Volume = {76}, Number = {8}, Pages = {48-49}, Publisher = {AIP Publishing}, Year = {2023}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/pt.3.5293}, Abstract = {<jats:p>The Philosophy and Physics of Noether’s Theorems: A Centenary Volume, James Read and Nicholas J. Teh, eds.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1063/pt.3.5293}, Key = {fds376144} } %% Buchanan, Allen E. @misc{fds371632, Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R}, Title = {Evolving Measures of Moral Success}, Pages = {270-294}, Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical Implications}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190096168}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012}, Key = {fds371632} } @misc{fds372449, Author = {Barrett, J and Buchanan, A}, Title = {Social Experimentation in an Unjust World}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {127-152}, Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 9}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780198877639}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005}, Abstract = {There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation as a means of promoting social progress, including progress in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We then identify four challenges: the information problem (experiments may not yield relevant information), the selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks). Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all four problems, rendering social experimentation a less reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its value.}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005}, Key = {fds372449} } %% Conitzer, Vincent @article{fds375182, Author = {Tewolde, E and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V and Goldberg, PW}, Title = {The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games}, Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, Volume = {2023-August}, Pages = {2878-2887}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781956792034}, Abstract = {We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative solution concepts to ex-ante optimality. One equilibrium concept uses generalized double halving (GDH) as a belief system and evidential decision theory (EDT), and another one uses generalized thirding (GT) as a belief system and causal decision theory (CDT). Our findings relate those three solution concepts of a game to solution concepts of a polynomial maximization problem: global optima, optimal points with respect to subsets of variables and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points. Based on these correspondences, we are able to settle various complexity-theoretic questions on the computation of such strategies. For ex-ante optimality and (EDT,GDH)-equilibria, we obtain NP-hardness and inapproximability, and for (CDT,GT)-equilibria we obtain CLS-completeness results.}, Key = {fds375182} } @article{fds375183, Author = {Kovařík, V and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V}, Title = {Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players}, Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, Volume = {2023-August}, Pages = {2800-2807}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781956792034}, Abstract = {Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI agent (for example because its source code is known), which allows others to accurately predict the agent's actions. This could lower the bar for trust and cooperation. In this paper, we formalize games in which one player can simulate another at a cost. We first derive some basic properties of such games and then prove a number of results for them, including: (1) introducing simulation into generic-payoff normal-form games makes them easier to solve; (2) if the only obstacle to cooperation is a lack of trust in the possibly-simulated agent, simulation enables equilibria that improve the outcome for both agents; and however (3) there are settings where introducing simulation results in strictly worse outcomes for both players.}, Key = {fds375183} } @article{fds375181, Author = {Jecmen, S and Yoon, M and Conitzer, V and Shah, NB and Fang, F}, Title = {A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review}, Journal = {ACM Web Conference 2023 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2023}, Pages = {3816-3826}, Year = {2023}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9781450394161}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583424}, Abstract = {In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to provide "bids"on each submitted paper that express their interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to compute a high-quality assignment of reviewers to papers. However, this process has been exploited by malicious reviewers who strategically bid in order to unethically manipulate the paper assignment, crucially undermining the peer review process. For example, these reviewers may aim to get assigned to a friend's paper as part of a quid-pro-quo deal. A critical impediment towards creating and evaluating methods to mitigate this issue is the lack of any publicly-available data on malicious paper bidding. In this work, we collect and publicly release a novel dataset to fill this gap, collected from a mock conference activity where participants were instructed to bid either honestly or maliciously. We further provide a descriptive analysis of the bidding behavior, including our categorization of different strategies employed by participants. Finally, we evaluate the ability of each strategy to manipulate the assignment, and also evaluate the performance of some simple algorithms meant to detect malicious bidding. The performance of these detection algorithms can be taken as a baseline for future research on detecting malicious bidding.}, Doi = {10.1145/3543507.3583424}, Key = {fds375181} } @article{fds375180, Author = {Conitzer, V and Oesterheld, C}, Title = {Foundations of Cooperative AI}, Journal = {Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023}, Volume = {37}, Pages = {15359-15367}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9781577358800}, Abstract = {AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with disastrous consequences. As AI gets to control more of our world, these interactions will become more common and have higher stakes. As AI becomes more advanced, these interactions will become more sophisticated, and game theory will provide the tools for analyzing these interactions. However, AI agents are in some ways unlike the agents traditionally studied in game theory, introducing new challenges as well as opportunities. We propose a research agenda to develop the game theory of highly advanced AI agents, with a focus on achieving cooperation.}, Key = {fds375180} } @article{fds375179, Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V}, Title = {Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation}, Journal = {EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation}, Pages = {1161-1186}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, ISBN = {9798400701047}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597665}, Abstract = {We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE), which runs in time polynomial in the size of the game, as well as the number of bits required to encode each input number. (2) We give an efficient algorithm for approximately computing an optimal extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) up to machine precision, i.e., the algorithm achieves approximation error ϵ in time polynomial in the size of the game, as well as log(1/ϵ).Our algorithm for SEFCE is the first polynomial-time algorithm for equilibrium computation with commitment in such a general class of stochastic games. Existing algorithms for SEFCE typically make stronger assumptions such as no chance moves, and are designed for extensive-form games in the less succinct tree form. Our algorithm for approximately optimal EFCE is, to our knowledge, the first algorithm that achieves 3 desiderata simultaneously: approximate optimality, polylogarithmic dependency on the approximation error and compatibility with stochastic games in the more succinct graph form. Existing algorithms achieve at most 2 of these desiderata, often also relying on additional technical assumptions.}, Doi = {10.1145/3580507.3597665}, Key = {fds375179} } @article{fds375178, Author = {Oesterheld, C and Demski, A and Conitzer, V}, Title = {A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality}, Journal = {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS}, Volume = {379}, Pages = {421-440}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.33}, Abstract = {The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical claims. This assumption is unrealistic when, for example, we offer bets on remote digits of π or when an agent faces a computationally intractable planning problem. Furthermore, the assumption of logical omniscience creates contradictions in cases where the environment can contain descriptions of the agent itself. Importantly, strategic interactions as studied in game theory are decision problems in which a rational agent is predicted by its environment (the other players). In this paper, we develop a theory of rational decision making that does not assume logical omniscience. We consider agents who repeatedly face decision problems (including ones like betting on digits of π or games against other agents). The main contribution of this paper is to provide a sensible theory of rationality for such agents. Roughly, we require that a boundedly rational inductive agent tests each efficiently computable hypothesis infinitely often and follows those hypotheses that keep their promises of high rewards. We then prove that agents that are rational in this sense have other desirable properties. For example, they learn to value random and pseudo-random lotteries at their expected reward. Finally, we consider strategic interactions between different agents and prove a folk theorem for what strategies bounded rational inductive agents can converge to.}, Doi = {10.4204/EPTCS.379.33}, Key = {fds375178} } %% De Brigard, Felipe @article{fds365621, Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Irving, Z and Nadelhoffer, T and De Brigard, F}, Title = {Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General}, Volume = {152}, Number = {1}, Pages = {120-138}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001262}, Abstract = {Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived <i>mental</i> <i>control</i>, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others' mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (<i>N</i> = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/xge0001262}, Key = {fds365621} } @article{fds372917, Author = {Uddin, LQ and Betzel, RF and Cohen, JR and Damoiseaux, JS and De Brigard, F and Eickhoff, SB and Fornito, A and Gratton, C and Gordon, EM and Laird, AR and Larson-Prior, L and McIntosh, AR and Nickerson, LD and Pessoa, L and Pinho, AL and Poldrack, RA and Razi, A and Sadaghiani, S and Shine, JM and Yendiki, A and Yeo, BTT and Spreng, RN}, Title = {Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale brain network nomenclature.}, Journal = {Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.)}, Volume = {7}, Number = {3}, Pages = {864-905}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/netn_a_00323}, Abstract = {Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning to confront the challenges associated with developing a taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping (OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide recommendations on points of consensus, identify open questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g., default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We summarize survey results and provide initial considerations and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective piece includes a selective review of challenges to this enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks; (3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4) consideration of network affiliations of subcortical structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information. We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive and network neuroscience communities to adopt.}, Doi = {10.1162/netn_a_00323}, Key = {fds372917} } @article{fds369341, Author = {Boone, T and Van Rooy and N and De Brigard and F}, Title = {Not Every Thing Must Go.}, Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience}, Volume = {35}, Number = {3}, Pages = {376-379}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01931}, Abstract = {In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic brain networks are associated, not with traditional psychological categories, but with behavioral functions characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately believe that although much revision to cognitive neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical proposals may be counterproductive.}, Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_01931}, Key = {fds369341} } @article{fds371448, Author = {De Brigard and F}, Title = {"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.}, Journal = {Topics in cognitive science}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677}, Abstract = {The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory" is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.}, Doi = {10.1111/tops.12677}, Key = {fds371448} } @article{fds369853, Author = {Murray, S and Bermúdez, JP and De Brigard and F}, Title = {Moralization and self-control strategy selection.}, Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review}, Volume = {30}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1586-1595}, Year = {2023}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7}, Abstract = {To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment, people use self-control. The process model of self-control outlines different strategies for managing the onset and experience of temptation. However, little is known about the decision-making factors underlying strategy selection. Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2, people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be significantly more effective relative to attentional distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These results indicate that moralization informs decision-making processes related to self-control strategy selection.}, Doi = {10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7}, Key = {fds369853} } @article{fds374206, Author = {Morales-Torres, R and De Brigard and F}, Title = {On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.}, Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences}, Volume = {46}, Pages = {e370}, Year = {2023}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23000134}, Abstract = {Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?}, Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x23000134}, Key = {fds374206} } @article{fds373975, Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and Murray, S and Brockmole, JR and De Brigard, F and Nuthmann, A}, Title = {A computational modeling approach to investigating mind wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene viewing.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {242}, Pages = {105624}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624}, Abstract = {Research on gaze control has long shown that increased visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are associated with longer fixation durations. More recently, though, longer durations have also been linked to mind wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward better understanding the relationship between fixation durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran simulations using an established random-walk model for saccade timing and programming and assessed which model parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations associated with mind wandering compared to attentive viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best described as an increase in the variability of the fixation-generating process, leading to more variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past research showed that increased processing demands increased the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing demands modulate fixation durations through different mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by which these changes were generated.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624}, Key = {fds373975} } @article{fds373542, Author = {Miceli, K and Morales-Torres, R and Khoudary, A and Faul, L and Parikh, N and De Brigard and F}, Title = {Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in episodic counterfactual thinking.}, Journal = {Hippocampus}, Volume = {34}, Number = {1}, Pages = {2-6}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23583}, Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However, the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study, we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus. Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty alone can account for these results, and instead suggest possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus during the construction of plausible and implausible ECT.}, Doi = {10.1002/hipo.23583}, Key = {fds373542} } @article{fds376061, Author = {Niemi, L and Washington, N and Workman, C and Arcila-Valenzuela, M and De Brigard and F}, Title = {The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge: An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice}, Journal = {Acta Psychologica}, Volume = {244}, Year = {2024}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157}, Abstract = {According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice, baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with marginalized social identities is a central driver of prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized social group membership predicts these responses. We conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback (invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all three studies, on average, affective responses to discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback. Participants who shared their knowledge reported more negative affect after discrediting feedback than participants who shared their feelings. There were consistent individual differences, including a twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback, suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of knowledge.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157}, Key = {fds376061} } %% Eva, Benjamin E. @article{fds374145, Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R}, Title = {Comparative opinion loss}, Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, Volume = {107}, Number = {3}, Pages = {613-637}, Year = {2023}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921}, Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader class of normative theories than has been previously recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the comparative confidence framework to develop a novel understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not saddled with the inevitability of rational opinion loss.}, Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921}, Key = {fds374145} } %% Farahany, Nita A. @book{fds365011, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {The Battle for Your Brain: Defending the Right to Think Freely in the Age of Neurotechnology}, Publisher = {St. Martin's Press}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds365011} } @misc{fds369820, Author = {Farahany, NA and Corbyn, Z}, Title = {We Need a New Human Right to Cognitive Liberty}, Journal = {The Guardian}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds369820} } @misc{fds368813, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {A Round-Up of 2022 Neurotechnology Advances}, Journal = {Volokh Conspiracy}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds368813} } @misc{fds369927, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {Provide a Résumé, Cover Letter and Access to Your Brain? The Creepy Race to Read Workers’ Minds}, Journal = {Los Angeles Times}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds369927} } @misc{fds370153, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {TikTok Is Part of China’s Cognitive Warfare Campaign}, Journal = {Guardian}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds370153} } @misc{fds370151, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {This Is the Battle for Your Brain at Work}, Journal = {Fast Company}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds370151} } @misc{fds371554, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {'Cognitive Liberty' Is the Human Right We Need to Talk About}, Journal = {Time}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds371554} } @misc{fds373700, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {Human Values in a Digital Age}, Journal = {Science}, Volume = {382}, Number = {6670}, Pages = {523}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds373700} } @misc{fds376318, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {Congress Is Right to Want to Curtail Tiktok’s Power and Influence}, Journal = {The Guardian}, Year = {2024}, Key = {fds376318} } @article{fds375515, Author = {Farahany, NA}, Title = {Neurotech at Work}, Booktitle = {The Year in Tech, 2024: The Insights You Need From Harvard Business Review}, Publisher = {Harvard Business Review Press}, Year = {2024}, Key = {fds375515} } %% Grant, Ruth W. @article{fds372670, Author = {Grant, RW and Katzenstein, S and Kennedy, C}, Title = {How Could They Let This Happen? Cover Ups, Complicity, and the Problem of Accountability}, Journal = {Res Publica}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w}, Abstract = {Sexual abuse by clergymen, poisoned water, police brutality—these cases each involve two wrongs: the abuse itself and the attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Our focus is this second wrong—the cover up. Cover ups are accountability failures, and they share common strategies for thwarting accountability whatever the abuse and whatever the institution. We find that cover ups often succeed even when accountability mechanisms are in place. Hence, improved institutions will not be sufficient to prevent accountability failures. Accountability mechanisms are tools that people must be willing to use in good faith. They fail when people are complicit. What explains complicity? We identify certain human proclivities and features of modern organizations that lead people to become complicit in the wrongdoing of others. If we focus exclusively on the design of institutions, we will fail to constrain the perpetrators of wrongdoing. Understanding complicity is key to understanding accountability failures.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w}, Key = {fds372670} } %% Hawkins, Jennifer @article{fds371502, Author = {Hawkins, J}, Title = {Affect, Values and Problems Assessing Decision-Making Capacity.}, Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB}, Pages = {1-12}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273}, Abstract = {The dominant approach to assessing decision-making capacity in medicine focuses on determining the extent to which individuals possess certain core cognitive abilities. Critics have argued that this model delivers the wrong verdict in certain cases where patient values that are the product of mental disorder or disordered affective states undermine decision-making without undermining cognition. I argue for a re-conceptualization of what it is to possess the capacity to make medical treatment decisions. It is, I argue, <i>the ability to track one's own personal interests at least as well as most people can</i>. Using this idea, I demonstrate that it is possible to craft a solution for the problem cases-one that neither alters existing criteria in dangerous ways (e.g. does not open the door to various kinds of abuse) nor violates the spirit of widely accepted ethical constraints on decision-making assessment.}, Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273}, Key = {fds371502} } %% Hazelwood, Caleb @article{fds369252, Author = {Hazelwood, C}, Title = {Reciprocal causation and biological practice}, Journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, Volume = {38}, Number = {1}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2023}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0}, Abstract = {Arguments for an extended evolutionary synthesis often center on the concept of “reciprocal causation.” Proponents argue that reciprocal causation is superior to standard models of evolutionary causation for at least two reasons. First, it leads to better scientific models with more predictive power. Second, it more accurately represents the causal structure of the biological world. Simply put, proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis argue that reciprocal causation is empirically and explanatorily apt relative to competing causal frameworks. In this paper, I present quantitative survey data from faculty members in biology departments at universities across the United States to evaluate this claim. The survey data indicate that a majority of the participants do not agree (i.e., most either disagree or neither agree nor disagree) that the concept of reciprocal causation confers a larger advantage on research practices. However, a majority of the participants agree that the causal framework of the extended evolutionary synthesis more accurately represents the structure of the biological world. These results demonstrate that the explanatory merits of a conceptual framework and its practical utility can come apart in interesting and informative ways.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0}, Key = {fds369252} } @article{fds370035, Author = {Hazelwood, C}, Title = {Review of Charles H. Pence’sThe Causal Structure of Natural Selection- Charles H. Pence, The Causal Structure of Natural Selection. Elements in the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2021), 75 pp. $22.00 (paperback).}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {90}, Number = {3}, Pages = {750-753}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.53}, Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.53}, Key = {fds370035} } @article{fds372667, Author = {Hazelwood, C}, Title = {Newton's “law-first” epistemology and “matter-first” metaphysics}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {101}, Pages = {40-47}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005}, Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005}, Key = {fds372667} } @article{fds373380, Author = {Hazelwood, C}, Title = {An Emerging Dilemma for Reciprocal Causation}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Pages = {1-43}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.124}, Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Among advocates and critics of the “extended evolutionary synthesis” (EES), “reciprocal causation” refers to the view that adaptive evolution is a bidirectional phenomenon, whereby organisms and environments impinge on each other through processes of niche construction and natural selection. I argue that reciprocal causation is incompatible with the view that natural selection is a metaphysically emergent causal process. The emergent character of selection places reciprocal causation on the horns of dilemma, and neither horn can rescue it. I conclude that proponents of the EES must abandon the claim that the process of natural selection features in cycles of reciprocal causation.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.124}, Key = {fds373380} } %% Hoover, Kevin D. @article{fds360551, Author = {Hoover, KD}, Title = {The struggle for the soul of macroeconomics}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, Volume = {30}, Number = {2}, Pages = {80-89}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281}, Abstract = {Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking, and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission position, some DSGE modelers would essentially straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet critical framework.}, Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281}, Key = {fds360551} } @article{fds373365, Author = {Hoover, KD and Svorenčík, A}, Title = {Who Runs the AEA?}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, Volume = {61}, Number = {3}, Pages = {1127-1171}, Year = {2023}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221667}, Abstract = {The leadership structure of the American Economic Association is documented using a biographical database covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional affiliations by education and employment. The structure is strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored: that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing concentration are also investigated.}, Doi = {10.1257/jel.20221667}, Key = {fds373365} } %% Janiak, Andrew @article{fds374560, Author = {Janiak, A}, Title = {A Tale of Two Forces: Metaphysics and its Avoidance in Newton’s Principia}, Volume = {343}, Pages = {223-242}, Booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11}, Abstract = {Isaac Newton did more than any other early modern figure to revolutionize natural philosophy, but he was often wary of other aspects of philosophy. He had an especially vexed relationship with metaphysics. As recent scholarship has highlighted, he often denounced metaphysical discussions, especially those in the Scholastic tradition (Levitin 2016). He insisted that he himself was not engaging with the aspect of philosophy that played such a prominent role in the work of his predecessors, especially Descartes, and his critics, especially Leibniz. However, in the Principia and the Opticks, along with correspondence and unpublished manuscripts, Newton expressed views about the gravity of bodies and the power of substances that place his thought squarely within the metaphysical tradition he sought to avoid. Alas, his famous reluctance to engage in disputes left even Newton’s supporters confused about his metaphysical ideas.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11}, Key = {fds374560} } @article{fds371295, Author = {Gessell, B and Janiak, A}, Title = {Physics and optics: Agnesi, Bassi, Du Châtelet}, Pages = {174-186}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European Philosophy}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9781138212756}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-17}, Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-17}, Key = {fds371295} } %% Kushnir, Tamar @article{fds363275, Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T}, Title = {When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e13257}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13257}, Abstract = {Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.13257}, Key = {fds363275} } @article{fds372714, Author = {Carpenter, E and Siegel, A and Urquiola, S and Liu, J and Kushnir, T}, Title = {Being me in times of change: Young children's reflections on their lives during the COVID-19 pandemic}, Journal = {Children and Society}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/chso.12790}, Abstract = {Research from the perspective of parents, educators and mental health professionals has documented the negative impacts of pandemic isolation on children, but few studies have sought children's own perspectives on this difficult year. The current study aims to provide a first-person perspective on children's psychological health by asking children directly about their experiences of isolating at home. We interviewed 28 seven- to eleven-year-olds in early days of lockdowns with follow-ups 6 months later. Children answered questions about family, school, friendships and feelings about the changes in their lives during lockdown. Children's reflections showed resilience, adaptability, positive appraisals and an ability to maintain meaningful social connections. This data underscores the value of including children's narratives to better understand the pandemic's lasting effects on their lives.}, Doi = {10.1111/chso.12790}, Key = {fds372714} } @article{fds369077, Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T}, Title = {Rational learners and parochial norms.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {233}, Pages = {105366}, Year = {2023}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366}, Abstract = {Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366}, Key = {fds369077} } @article{fds370243, Author = {Flanagan, T and Wong, G and Kushnir, T}, Title = {The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive technologies.}, Journal = {Developmental psychology}, Volume = {59}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1017-1031}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0001524}, Abstract = {Children are developing alongside interactive technologies that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear if children's beliefs about the agency of these household technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced, humanoid robots used in lab research. This study investigated 4-11-year-old children's (<i>N</i> = 127, <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 7.50, <i>SD</i><sub>age</sub> = 2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these technologies were organized into three distinct clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features for each technology type, but the extent to which they did so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift in children's understanding of technologies' limitations. Importantly, there were systematic differences between Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).}, Doi = {10.1037/dev0001524}, Key = {fds370243} } @article{fds369144, Author = {Heck, IA and Kushnir, T and Kinzler, KD}, Title = {Building representations of the social world: Children extract patterns from social choices to reason about multi-group hierarchies.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {4}, Pages = {e13366}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13366}, Abstract = {How do children learn about the structure of the social world? We tested whether children would extract patterns from an agent's social choices to make inferences about multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of individuals from different groups. Across pairwise selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred" and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York) used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made inferences about groups' relative social but not physical power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies through the patterns they observe over time in people's group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive social choices between multiple groups to reason about groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern of an agent's positive social choices to guide their reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking about groups' relative social but not physical power. Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent prefers) and societal level (which groups are privileged).}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.13366}, Key = {fds369144} } @article{fds372600, Author = {Kushnir, T and Katz, T and Stegall, J}, Title = {A Review of “Becoming Human”}, Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development}, Volume = {24}, Number = {4}, Pages = {620-622}, Publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, Year = {2023}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207}, Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207}, Key = {fds372600} } @article{fds372785, Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and cost affects this tendency.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {237}, Pages = {105764}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance their reputations through communicative acts. In the experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to inform a social partner that they had helped him in his absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to protest when another individual was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we replicated the prosocial condition but with a new manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even 4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost as a moderating factor.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Key = {fds372785} } @article{fds376647, Author = {Weisman, K and Ghossainy, ME and Williams, AJ and Payir, A and Lesage, KA and Reyes-Jaquez, B and Amin, TG and Anggoro, FK and Burdett, ERR and Chen, EE and Coetzee, L and Coley, JD and Dahl, A and Dautel, JB and Davis, HE and Davis, EL and Diesendruck, G and Evans, D and Feeney, A and Gurven, M and Jee, BD and Kramer, HJ and Kushnir, T and Kyriakopoulou, N and McAuliffe, K and McLaughlin, A and Nichols, S and Nicolopoulou, A and Rockers, PC and Shneidman, L and Skopeliti, I and Srinivasan, M and Tarullo, AR and Taylor, LK and Yu, Y and Yucel, M and Zhao, X and Corriveau, KH and Richert, RA and Developing Belief Network}, Title = {The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network.}, Journal = {PloS one}, Volume = {19}, Number = {3}, Pages = {e0292755}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0292755}, Abstract = {The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0292755}, Key = {fds376647} } @article{fds375236, Author = {Finiasz, Z and Gelman, SA and Kushnir, T}, Title = {Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {244}, Pages = {105707}, Year = {2024}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707}, Abstract = {Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, M<sub>age</sub> = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707}, Key = {fds375236} } %% McShea, Daniel W. @article{fds370659, Author = {McShea, DW}, Title = {Evolutionary Success: Standards of Value}, Pages = {17-39}, Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical Implications}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190096168}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002}, Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002}, Key = {fds370659} } @article{fds370848, Author = {McShea, DW}, Title = {Evolutionary trends and goal directedness.}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {201}, Number = {5}, Pages = {178}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9}, Abstract = {The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal directed, that teleological considerations play no part in our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that, to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level fields that direct entities contained within them to behave persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a goal-directed trajectory following perturbations (persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points (plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with guidance provided by the external "food field," the chemical gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an "ecological field." Trends directed by selection-generated boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible implications for our thinking about evolutionary directionality in the history of life are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9}, Key = {fds370848} } @article{fds368096, Author = {Keenan, JP and McShea, DW}, Title = {Synergies Among Behaviors Drive the Discovery of Productive Interactions}, Journal = {Biological Theory}, Volume = {18}, Number = {1}, Pages = {43-62}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2}, Abstract = {When behaviors assemble into combinations, then synergies have a central role in the discovery of productive patterns of behavior. In our view—what we call the Synergy Emergence Principle (SEP)—synergies are dynamic attractors, drawing interactions toward greater returns as they happen, in the moment. This Principle offers an alternative to the two conventionally acknowledged routes to discovery: directed problem solving, involving forethought and planning; and the complete randomness of trial and error. Natural selection has a role in the process, in humans favoring the maintenance and improvement of certain key underlying capabilities, such as prosocial helping and episodic foresight, but selection is not required for discovery by synergy (which occurs too rapidly for selection anyway). Here we discuss the consequences of the SEP for the evolution in humans of key synergies such as tool usage and interactions that reward cooperation, show how discovery by synergy and the selection of synergy-supporting abilities formed a positive feedback loop, and show how synergies can combine, forming clusters and packages that are the core of institutions and cultures. Finally, clusters and packages represent an intermediate level of organization above the individual and below whole society, with consequences for our understanding of the major transitions in evolution.}, Doi = {10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2}, Key = {fds368096} } @article{fds369050, Author = {McShea, DW}, Title = {Four reasons for scepticism about a human major transition in social individuality.}, Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences}, Volume = {378}, Number = {1872}, Pages = {20210403}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0403}, Abstract = {The 'major transitions in evolution' are mainly about the rise of hierarchy, new individuals arising at ever higher levels of nestedness, in particular the eukaryotic cell arising from prokaryotes, multicellular individuals from solitary protists and individuated societies from multicellular individuals. Some lists include human societies as a major transition, but based on a comparison with the non-human transitions, there are reasons for scepticism. (i) The foundation of the major transitions is hierarchy, but the cross-cutting interactions in human societies undermine hierarchical structure. (ii) Natural selection operates in three modes-stability, growth and reproductive success-and only the third produces the complex adaptations seen in fully individuated higher levels. But human societies probably evolve mainly in the stability and growth modes. (iii) Highly individuated entities are marked by division of labour and commitment to morphological differentiation, but in humans differentiation is mostly behavioural and mostly reversible. (iv) As higher-level individuals arise, selection drains complexity, drains parts, from lower-level individuals. But there is little evidence of a drain in humans. In sum, a comparison with the other transitions gives reasons to doubt that human social individuation has proceeded very far, or if it has, to doubt that it is a transition of the same sort. This article is part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions'.}, Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0403}, Key = {fds369050} } @article{fds366835, Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW}, Title = {Resolving teleology's false dilemma}, Journal = {Biological Journal of the Linnean Society}, Volume = {139}, Number = {4}, Pages = {415-432}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2023}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blac058}, Abstract = {This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism.}, Doi = {10.1093/biolinnean/blac058}, Key = {fds366835} } @article{fds374935, Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW}, Title = {Goal Directedness and the Field Concept}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Pages = {1-10}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.121}, Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>A long-standing problem in understanding goal-directed systems has been the insufficiency of mechanistic explanations to make sense of them. This article offers a solution to this problem. It begins by observing the limitations of mechanistic decompositions when it comes to understanding physical fields. We argue that introducing the field concept, as it has been developed in <jats:italic>field theory</jats:italic>, alongside mechanisms is able to provide an account of goal directedness in the sciences.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.121}, Key = {fds374935} } %% Moi, Toril @article{fds371699, Author = {Moi, T}, Title = {Acknowledging Hanna Pitkin: A Belated Discovery of a Kindred Spirit}, Journal = {Polity}, Volume = {55}, Number = {3}, Pages = {479-487}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725254}, Doi = {10.1086/725254}, Key = {fds371699} } %% Neander, Karen @article{fds219963, Author = {K.L. Neander}, Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"}, Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics}, Editor = {Justine Kingsbury}, Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation, content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.}, Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems can have the function to produce one thing in response to another. This has consequences for the kind of teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have contents that are determined by the functions of sensory systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper further explores these implications and offers a teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory representations. It further offers a solution to the problem of distal content.}, Key = {fds219963} } %% Pickford, Henry @article{fds371498, Author = {Pickford, H}, Title = {Life, Logic, Style: On Late Wittgenstein}, Pages = {168-193}, Booktitle = {Wittgenstein and Literary Studies}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2023}, ISBN = {9781108978163}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108973687}, Abstract = {In addition to explaining what "literary Wittgensteinianism" is, it provides a point of entry into the chapters of this volume by explaining the basic difference between the "early" and "late" Wittgenstein and how each has opened up novel ...}, Doi = {10.1017/9781108973687}, Key = {fds371498} } @article{fds369172, Author = {Pickford, HW}, Title = {Adorno and the categories of resistance}, Journal = {Constellations}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12652}, Doi = {10.1111/1467-8675.12652}, Key = {fds369172} } %% Richardson, Kevin A @article{fds370868, Author = {Richardson, K}, Title = {Derivative Indeterminacy}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5}, Abstract = {Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its source in the way the world is (rather than how it is represented or known). There are two questions we could ask about indeterminacy. First: does it exist? Second: is indeterminacy derivative? I focus on the second question. Specifically, I argue that (at least some) metaphysical indeterminacy can be derivative, where this roughly means that facts about indeterminacy are metaphysically grounded in facts about what is determinate.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5}, Key = {fds370868} } @article{fds370224, Author = {Richardson, K}, Title = {Exclusion and Erasure: Two Types of Ontological Opression}, Journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {9}, Publisher = {University of Michigan Library}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2279}, Doi = {10.3998/ergo.2279}, Key = {fds370224} } @article{fds371117, Author = {Richardson, K}, Title = {Critical social ontology}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {201}, Number = {6}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0}, Abstract = {Critical social ontology is any study of social ontology that is done in order to critique ideology or end social injustice. The goal of this paper is to outline what I call the fundamentality approach to critical social ontology. On the fundamentality approach, social ontologists are in the business of distinguishing between appearances and (fundamental) reality. Social reality is often obscured by the acceptance of ideology, where an ideology is a distorted system of beliefs that leads people to promote or accept widespread social injustices. Social reality is also obscured in cases where ordinary thought and language simply is not perspicuous enough to represent the social objects, kinds, and structures that are central to understanding social injustice. In both cases, I argue that the critical social ontologist will benefit from using the tools and concepts of fundamental metaphysics.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0}, Key = {fds371117} } @article{fds367526, Author = {Richardson, K}, Title = {The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial}, Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, Volume = {107}, Number = {1}, Pages = {192-207}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2023}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12916}, Abstract = {According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial.}, Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12916}, Key = {fds367526} } @article{fds369854, Author = {Richardson, K}, Title = {Social construction and indeterminacy}, Journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, Volume = {65}, Number = {1}, Pages = {37-52}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2024}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12299}, Abstract = {An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the social world is constructed.}, Doi = {10.1111/phib.12299}, Key = {fds369854} } %% Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter @article{fds370405, Author = {Simmons, C and Helming, K and Musholt, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Title = {Where is the golden mean of intellectual humility? Comments on Ballantyne}, Journal = {Journal of Positive Psychology}, Volume = {18}, Number = {2}, Pages = {240-243}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227}, Abstract = {In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way ‘to manage evidence … in seeking truth.’ However, not every way of managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood as a ‘golden mean’ or ‘middle path’ between extremes of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of locating the golden mean.}, Doi = {10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227}, Key = {fds370405} } @article{fds372262, Author = {McKee, P and Kim, HE and Tang, H and Everett, JAC and Chituc, V and Gibea, T and Marques, LM and Boggio, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Title = {Does it matter who harmed whom? A cross-cultural study of moral judgments about harm by and to insiders and outsiders}, Journal = {Current Psychology}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3}, Abstract = {This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims across six countries: the United States of America (N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania (N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea (N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect, where moral violations committed by outsider agents are generally considered more morally wrong than the same violations done by insider agents. We also found support for an insider victim effect where moral violations that were committed against an insider victim generally were seen as more morally wrong than when the same violations were committed against an outsider, and this effect held across all countries. These findings provide evidence that the insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these identities with collectivism, psychological closeness, and type of harm (emotional or physical) are more complex than what is suggested by previous literature.}, Doi = {10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3}, Key = {fds372262} } @article{fds372817, Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Title = {Dahl’s Definition of Morality}, Journal = {Psychological Inquiry}, Volume = {34}, Number = {2}, Pages = {106-109}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853}, Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853}, Key = {fds372817} } @article{fds374251, Author = {Boggio, PS and Rêgo, GG and Everett, JAC and Vieira, GB and Graves, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W}, Title = {Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US, and Brazil}, Journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637}, Abstract = {Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral psychological research has largely followed in this vein, focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness, manipulating whether the person doing the action was a friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e., conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are judged differently according to who committed them and according to the political ideology of the judges. We discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and the black sheep effect.}, Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637}, Key = {fds374251} } @article{fds372776, Author = {Hopp, FR and Amir, O and Fisher, JT and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Weber, R}, Title = {Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical activation modulated by political ideology.}, Journal = {Nature human behaviour}, Volume = {7}, Number = {12}, Pages = {2182-2198}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8}, Abstract = {Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.}, Doi = {10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8}, Key = {fds372776} } @article{fds375504, Author = {Earp, BD and Porsdam Mann and S and Allen, J and Salloch, S and Suren, V and Jongsma, K and Braun, M and Wilkinson, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Rid, A and Wendler, D and Savulescu, J}, Title = {A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically Desirable.}, Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB}, Pages = {1-14}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402}, Abstract = {When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's (former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the <i>Personalized</i> Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently 'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies.}, Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402}, Key = {fds375504} } %% Sreenivasan, Gopal @article{fds375846, Author = {Sreenivasan, G}, Title = {Courage, Consistency, and Other Conundra}, Journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy}, Volume = {18}, Number = {1}, Pages = {281-296}, Year = {2024}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1}, Abstract = {I am very grateful to Rachel Barney and Christian Miller for their helpful and challenging comments on my book, Emotion and Virtue (Princeton, 2020). My response aims first to clarify and then to fortify my position on some of the many excellent points they raise in this symposium.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1}, Key = {fds375846} } %% Stern, Reuben E @article{fds371706, Author = {Stern, R and Eva, B}, Title = {Anti-reductionist Interventionism}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {74}, Number = {1}, Pages = {241-267}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/714792}, Abstract = {Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward’s interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter, who argues that the causal exclusion argument is vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs). Since the interventionist conception of causation relies crucially on CBNs for its foundations, Gebharter’s argument appears to cast significant doubt on interventionism’s anti-reductionist credentials. In the present article, we both (1) demonstrate that Gebharter’s CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies on some unmotivated and philosophically significant assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use Bayesian networks to develop a general theory of causal inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the foundation for an anti-reductionist interventionist account of causation.1}, Doi = {10.1086/714792}, Key = {fds371706} } @article{fds367761, Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R}, Title = {Comparative opinion loss}, Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, Volume = {107}, Number = {3}, Pages = {613-637}, Year = {2023}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921}, Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader class of normative theories than has been previously recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the comparative confidence framework to develop a novel understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not saddled with the inevitability of rational opinion loss.}, Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921}, Key = {fds367761} } %% Summers, Jesse S @article{fds373672, Author = {Dasgupta, J and Lockwood Estrin and G and Summers, J and Singh, I}, Title = {Cognitive Enhancement and Social Mobility: Skepticism from India}, Journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, Volume = {14}, Number = {4}, Pages = {341-351}, Publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723}, Doi = {10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723}, Key = {fds373672} } %% Tomasello, Michael @article{fds362755, Author = {Hepach, R and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Gerdemann, SC and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation underlying helping in early childhood.}, Journal = {Developmental science}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {e13253}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253}, Abstract = {We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-, and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an individual or watch as another person provided help. Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging, we measured children's positive emotions through changes in postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual and watching another person help was equally rewarding; 5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive emotions following helping were greater when an audience was watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional, strategic motivation to improve their reputation by helping.}, Doi = {10.1111/desc.13253}, Key = {fds362755} } @article{fds365125, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a theory.}, Journal = {Animal cognition}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {25-35}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0}, Abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal, there existed only a few conflicting findings about great apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others, and they use this knowledge to their advantage in competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past 25 years of research on great ape social cognition and metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are evolutionarily related.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0}, Key = {fds365125} } @article{fds371813, Author = {Wolf, W and Thielhelm, J and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for faces with white sclera.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {225}, Pages = {105532}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532}, Abstract = {The cooperative eye hypothesis posits that human eye morphology evolved to facilitate cooperation. Although it is known that young children prefer stimuli with eyes that contain white sclera, it is unknown whether white sclera influences children's perception of a partner's cooperativeness specifically. In the current studies, we used an online methodology to present 5-year-old children with moving three-dimensional face models in which facial morphology was manipulated. Children found "alien" faces with human eyes more cooperative than faces with dark sclera (Study 2) but not faces with enlarged irises (Study 1). For more human-like faces (Study 3), children found human eyes more cooperative than either enlarged irises or dark sclera and found faces with enlarged irises cuter (but not more cooperative) than eyes with dark sclera. Together, these results provide strong support for the cooperative eye hypothesis.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532}, Key = {fds371813} } @misc{fds371506, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Having Intentions, Understanding Intentions, and Understanding Communicative Intentions}, Pages = {63-75}, Booktitle = {Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and Self-Control}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780805831412}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003417927-5}, Abstract = {This chapter looks at a major cause and a major consequence of the 9-month social-cognitive revolution; and both of these also concern infant intentionality. It argues that young children’s understanding of other persons as intentional agents results in large part from newly emerging forms of intentionality in their own sensory-motor actions. The chapter explores young children’s understanding of a special type of intention that emerges directly on the heels of the 9-month revolution, namely, communicative intentions. Intentional agents have goals and make active choices among behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents also make active choices about what they pay attention to in pursuing those goals. ntentional agents have goals and make active choices among behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents also make active choices about what they pay attention to in pursuing those goals.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781003417927-5}, Key = {fds371506} } @article{fds367773, Author = {Colle, L and Grosse, G and Behne, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Just teasing! - Infants' and toddlers' understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on social bonding.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Volume = {231}, Pages = {105314}, Year = {2023}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314}, Abstract = {The current study investigates infants' and toddlers' understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an especially interesting test case to inform us about young children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions. In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and 18-month-old infants' ability to understand and differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age, infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old children in closely matched purely playful and teasing situations. We also investigated potential social effects of teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence. Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers, additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from superficially similar but serious behavior and from around 18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers are able to process a complex social intention like teasing. Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler intention understanding abilities.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314}, Key = {fds367773} } @article{fds368903, Author = {Schäfer, M and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children's consideration of collaboration and merit when making sharing decisions in private.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {228}, Pages = {105609}, Year = {2023}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609}, Abstract = {Young children share equally when they acquire resources through collaboration with a partner, yet it is unclear whether they do so because in such contexts resources are encountered as common and distributed in front of the recipient or because collaboration promotes a sense of work-based fairness. In the current studies, 5- and 8-year-old children from Germany (N = 193) acquired resources either by working individually alongside or by collaborating with a peer. After finding out that the partner's container was empty, they decided in private whether they wanted to donate some resources to the peer. When both partners had worked with equal efforts (Study 1), children shared more after collaboration than after individual work. When one partner had worked with much more effort than the other (Study 2), children shared more with a harder-working partner than with a less-working partner independently of whether they had collaborated or worked individually. Younger children were more generous than older children, in particular after collaboration. These findings support the view that collaboration promotes a genuine sense of fairness in young children, but they also indicate that merit-based notions of fairness in the context of work may develop independently of collaboration, at least by the beginning of middle childhood and in Western societies.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609}, Key = {fds368903} } @article{fds370629, Author = {Benozio, A and House, BR and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Apes reciprocate food positively and negatively.}, Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences}, Volume = {290}, Number = {1998}, Pages = {20222541}, Year = {2023}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2541}, Abstract = {Reciprocal food exchange is widespread in human societies but not among great apes, who may view food mainly as a target for competition. Understanding the similarities and differences between great apes' and humans' willingness to exchange food is important for our models regarding the origins of uniquely human forms of cooperation. Here, we demonstrate in-kind food exchanges in experimental settings with great apes for the first time. The initial sample consisted of 13 chimpanzees and 5 bonobos in the control phases, and the test phases included 10 chimpanzees and 2 bonobos, compared with a sample of 48 human children aged 4 years. First, we replicated prior findings showing no spontaneous food exchanges in great apes. Second, we discovered that when apes believe that conspecifics have 'intentionally' transferred food to them, positive reciprocal food exchanges (food-for-food) are not only possible but reach the same levels as in young children (approx. 75-80%). Third, we found that great apes engage in negative reciprocal food exchanges (no-food for no-food) but to a lower extent than children. This provides evidence for reciprocal food exchange in great apes in experimental settings and suggests that while a potential mechanism of <i>fostering</i> cooperation (via positive reciprocal exchanges) may be shared across species, a stabilizing mechanism (via negative reciprocity) is not.}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2022.2541}, Key = {fds370629} } @article{fds373982, Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M}, Title = {A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social Bonding.}, Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science}, Pages = {17456916231201795}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17456916231201795}, Abstract = {Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are unique to the species. These involve various kinds of interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding have no explanation for why humans should have these unique bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and communicative activities that both depend on and create shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation toward them and because the shared representations created during such interactions make subsequent cooperative interactions easier and more effective.}, Doi = {10.1177/17456916231201795}, Key = {fds373982} } @article{fds370890, Author = {Vasil, J and Moore, C and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with young English-speaking children’s production of pronouns}, Journal = {First Language}, Volume = {43}, Number = {5}, Pages = {516-538}, Year = {2023}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01427237231169398}, Abstract = {Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use. We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking children’s first-person plural, first-person singular, second-person, third-person plural, and third-person singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0 compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp. pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were used more often as children aged. These findings suggest that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.}, Doi = {10.1177/01427237231169398}, Key = {fds370890} } @article{fds374236, Author = {Tomasello, M}, Title = {Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans and Other Great Apes.}, Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)}, Volume = {34}, Number = {4}, Pages = {588-604}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0}, Abstract = {Humans share with other mammals and primates many social motivations and emotions, but they are also much more cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i) 'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me' (e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment); (iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt); and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group biases). The existence of these species-typical and species-universal motivations and emotions provides compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative activities in the human species.}, Doi = {10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0}, Key = {fds374236} } @article{fds374400, Author = {Vasil, J and Price, D and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Thought and language: Effects of group-mindedness on young children's interpretation of exclusive we.}, Journal = {Child development}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.14049}, Abstract = {The current study investigated whether age-related changes in the conceptualization of social groups influences interpretation of the pronoun we. Sixty-four 2- and 4-year-olds (N = 29 female, 50 White-identifying) viewed scenarios in which it was ambiguous how many puppets performed an activity together. When asked who performed the activity, a speaker puppet responded, "We did!" In one condition, the speaker was near one and distant from another puppet, implying a dyadic interpretation of we. In another condition, the speaker was distant from both, thus pulling for a group interpretation. In the former condition, 2- and 4-year-olds favored the dyadic interpretation. In the latter condition, only 4-year-olds favored the group interpretation. Age-related conceptual development "expands" the set of conceivable plural person referents.}, Doi = {10.1111/cdev.14049}, Key = {fds374400} } @article{fds374171, Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M}, Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and cost affects this tendency.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {237}, Pages = {105764}, Year = {2024}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance their reputations through communicative acts. In the experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to inform a social partner that they had helped him in his absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to protest when another individual was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we replicated the prosocial condition but with a new manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even 4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost as a moderating factor.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764}, Key = {fds374171} } @article{fds374401, Author = {Winter Née Grocke and P and Tomasello, M}, Title = {From what I want to do to what we decided to do: 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, honor their agreements with peers.}, Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology}, Volume = {239}, Pages = {105811}, Year = {2024}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811}, Abstract = {Sometimes we have a personal preference but we agree with others to follow a different course of action. In this study, 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 160) expressed a preference for playing a game one way and were then confronted with peers who expressed a different preference. The experimenter then either got the participants to agree with the peers explicitly or just shrugged her shoulders and moved on. The children were then left alone to play the game unobserved. Only the older children stuck to their agreement to play the game as the peers wished. These results suggest that by 5 years of age children's sense of commitment to agreements is strong enough to override their personal preferences.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811}, Key = {fds374401} } %% Wong, David B. @book{fds371902, Author = {Wong, D}, Title = {Metaphors and Analogies in Classical Chinese Thought: The Governance of the Individual, the State, and Society}, Publisher = {Research Center for Chinese Subjectivity in Taiwan and Chengchi University Press,}, Editor = {Marchal, K and Wang, H}, Year = {2023}, Abstract = {Chinese edition of a series of five lectures delivered at the National Chengchi University}, Key = {fds371902} } @article{fds371903, Author = {Wong, DB}, Title = {Mind (Heart-Mind) in Chinese Philosophy}, Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Publisher = {The Metaphysics Research Lab}, Editor = {Zalta, EN and Nodelman, U}, Year = {2023}, Abstract = {The role of the concept of mind (heart-mind) in classical Chinese philosophy}, Key = {fds371903} } @article{fds373974, Author = {Wong, DB}, Title = {RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT}, Pages = {125-136}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781032252391}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003282242-15}, Abstract = {This chapter will use responsibility as a “bridge” concept between the Confucian and Western moral and political traditions. A key feature of the concept lies in its root meaning “to respond.” Confucian thought focuses on how the responder is entrusted and relied upon to respond, to answer to, the needs and to the vulnerability of the one to whom response is due. Confucian thought focuses on how to cultivate the qualities enabling such responsiveness. Another overlapping meaning of responsibility with Chinese concepts is that of “being held to answer for what one has done or is required to do.” One might be faulted or blamed, or credited and praised, for responding appropriately or not to the needs and vulnerabilities of others. An important strand of Confucian thought distributes responsibility in the sense of “being held to answer for” not only to the direct agent of the act in question but to others who have the most control over the conditions that shape the choices of the direct agent. Finally, another strand of Confucian thought implies that responsibility can outrun whatever is under the individual’s control.}, Doi = {10.4324/9781003282242-15}, Key = {fds373974} } @article{fds370613, Author = {Wong, DB}, Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the Mencius}, Volume = {18}, Pages = {517-538}, Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26}, Abstract = {One of the most intriguing features of the Mencius lies in its claims about the path to goodness: they are eloquently defended but also articulated in ambiguous ways. It is clear that a major role for feeling or emotion is envisaged, but is the relevant sort of feeling to be contrasted with reflection and reasoning? Or are these things intertwined and implicated in one another? I support the second answer and disagree both with those who take as primary the role of a kind of feeling that is largely untouched by reflection and reasoning and with those on the other extreme who hold that reasoning has an independent and in some ways a primary role in realizing goodness. Though my position has in broad outlines remained constant, it has evolved over time in important specifics. I will set out what I am thinking now.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26}, Key = {fds370613} } @book{fds371901, Author = {Wong, DB}, Title = {Moral Relativism and Pluralism}, Pages = {143 pages}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781009044301}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781009043496}, Abstract = {<jats:p>The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1017/9781009043496}, Key = {fds371901} } @article{fds371900, Author = {Wong, DB}, Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the Mencius}, Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Editor = {Yang, X and Chong, K-C}, Year = {2023}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9783031276200}, Abstract = {This book is about the philosophical, historical, and interpretative aspects of Mencius.}, Key = {fds371900} } | |
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