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Philosophy : Publications since January 2023

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%% , Ásta   
@article{fds365121,
   Author = {Ásta},
   Title = {Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff, Butler, and
             Roth},
   Journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {310-318},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12744},
   Abstract = {The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda
             Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu
             Roth.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ejop.12744},
   Key = {fds365121}
}

@article{fds373903,
   Author = {Ásta},
   Title = {What are Sex and Gender and what Do We Want them to
             Be?},
   Journal = {Metaphysics},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {37-44},
   Publisher = {Ubiquity Press, Ltd.},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/met.118},
   Doi = {10.5334/met.118},
   Key = {fds373903}
}


%% Atkins, Jed W.   
@article{fds376120,
   Author = {Atkins, JW},
   Title = {John Rawls’s Theology of Liberal Toleration},
   Journal = {American Political Thought},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {56-82},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728210},
   Abstract = {Scholarship has shown that John Rawls’s theological
             education at Princeton shaped his later theory of justice
             but has overlooked a similar impact on his account of
             toleration, which was also derived from the original
             position in ATheory of Justice. Drawing on a variety of
             published and unpublished works, I argue that in the account
             of toleration in A Theory of Justice the original position
             takes the place previously occupied by God in His roles as
             “father of all” and “just judge.” Paying attention
             to the theological origins of Rawls’s view of toleration
             in liberal Protestantism explains why he thought that the
             Western concept of the separation of church and state
             follows logically from the original position, even though
             his insistence on this point subjected his thought to
             internal inconsistency and external criticism. Acknowledging
             these limitations opens to liberal political theorists an
             avenue for increased institutional flexibility that Rawls
             prematurely closed.},
   Doi = {10.1086/728210},
   Key = {fds376120}
}


%% Brading, Katherine A.   
@article{fds371353,
   Author = {Brading, K},
   Title = {Du Châtelet and the philosophy of physics},
   Pages = {519-532},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
             Philosophy},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781138212756},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-45},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-45},
   Key = {fds371353}
}

@article{fds376144,
   Author = {Brading, K},
   Title = {Celebrating Emmy Noether},
   Journal = {Physics Today},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {8},
   Pages = {48-49},
   Publisher = {AIP Publishing},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/pt.3.5293},
   Abstract = {<jats:p>The Philosophy and Physics of Noether’s Theorems:
             A Centenary Volume, James Read and Nicholas J. Teh,
             eds.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1063/pt.3.5293},
   Key = {fds376144}
}


%% Buchanan, Allen E.   
@misc{fds371632,
   Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
   Title = {Evolving Measures of Moral Success},
   Pages = {270-294},
   Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
             Implications},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190096168},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
   Key = {fds371632}
}

@misc{fds372449,
   Author = {Barrett, J and Buchanan, A},
   Title = {Social Experimentation in an Unjust World},
   Volume = {9},
   Pages = {127-152},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume
             9},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780198877639},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
   Abstract = {There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation
             as a means of promoting social progress, including progress
             in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in
             favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to
             resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially
             valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We
             then identify four challenges: the information problem
             (experiments may not yield relevant information), the
             selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments
             may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information
             generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and
             the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks).
             Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all
             four problems, rendering social experimentation a less
             reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe
             injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is
             not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that
             we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing
             conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be
             progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation
             a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we
             must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its
             value.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
   Key = {fds372449}
}


%% Conitzer, Vincent   
@article{fds375182,
   Author = {Tewolde, E and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V and Goldberg,
             PW},
   Title = {The Computational Complexity of Single-Player
             Imperfect-Recall Games},
   Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
             Intelligence},
   Volume = {2023-August},
   Pages = {2878-2887},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781956792034},
   Abstract = {We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect
             recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the
             Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural
             equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative
             solution concepts to ex-ante optimality. One equilibrium
             concept uses generalized double halving (GDH) as a belief
             system and evidential decision theory (EDT), and another one
             uses generalized thirding (GT) as a belief system and causal
             decision theory (CDT). Our findings relate those three
             solution concepts of a game to solution concepts of a
             polynomial maximization problem: global optima, optimal
             points with respect to subsets of variables and
             Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points. Based on these
             correspondences, we are able to settle various
             complexity-theoretic questions on the computation of such
             strategies. For ex-ante optimality and (EDT,GDH)-equilibria,
             we obtain NP-hardness and inapproximability, and for
             (CDT,GT)-equilibria we obtain CLS-completeness
             results.},
   Key = {fds375182}
}

@article{fds375183,
   Author = {Kovařík, V and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players},
   Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
             Intelligence},
   Volume = {2023-August},
   Pages = {2800-2807},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781956792034},
   Abstract = {Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from
             traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One
             such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI
             agent (for example because its source code is known), which
             allows others to accurately predict the agent's actions.
             This could lower the bar for trust and cooperation. In this
             paper, we formalize games in which one player can simulate
             another at a cost. We first derive some basic properties of
             such games and then prove a number of results for them,
             including: (1) introducing simulation into generic-payoff
             normal-form games makes them easier to solve; (2) if the
             only obstacle to cooperation is a lack of trust in the
             possibly-simulated agent, simulation enables equilibria that
             improve the outcome for both agents; and however (3) there
             are settings where introducing simulation results in
             strictly worse outcomes for both players.},
   Key = {fds375183}
}

@article{fds375181,
   Author = {Jecmen, S and Yoon, M and Conitzer, V and Shah, NB and Fang,
             F},
   Title = {A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer
             Review},
   Journal = {ACM Web Conference 2023 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web
             Conference, WWW 2023},
   Pages = {3816-3826},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9781450394161},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583424},
   Abstract = {In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to
             provide "bids"on each submitted paper that express their
             interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment
             algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to
             compute a high-quality assignment of reviewers to papers.
             However, this process has been exploited by malicious
             reviewers who strategically bid in order to unethically
             manipulate the paper assignment, crucially undermining the
             peer review process. For example, these reviewers may aim to
             get assigned to a friend's paper as part of a quid-pro-quo
             deal. A critical impediment towards creating and evaluating
             methods to mitigate this issue is the lack of any
             publicly-available data on malicious paper bidding. In this
             work, we collect and publicly release a novel dataset to
             fill this gap, collected from a mock conference activity
             where participants were instructed to bid either honestly or
             maliciously. We further provide a descriptive analysis of
             the bidding behavior, including our categorization of
             different strategies employed by participants. Finally, we
             evaluate the ability of each strategy to manipulate the
             assignment, and also evaluate the performance of some simple
             algorithms meant to detect malicious bidding. The
             performance of these detection algorithms can be taken as a
             baseline for future research on detecting malicious
             bidding.},
   Doi = {10.1145/3543507.3583424},
   Key = {fds375181}
}

@article{fds375180,
   Author = {Conitzer, V and Oesterheld, C},
   Title = {Foundations of Cooperative AI},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
             Intelligence, AAAI 2023},
   Volume = {37},
   Pages = {15359-15367},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781577358800},
   Abstract = {AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with
             disastrous consequences. As AI gets to control more of our
             world, these interactions will become more common and have
             higher stakes. As AI becomes more advanced, these
             interactions will become more sophisticated, and game theory
             will provide the tools for analyzing these interactions.
             However, AI agents are in some ways unlike the agents
             traditionally studied in game theory, introducing new
             challenges as well as opportunities. We propose a research
             agenda to develop the game theory of highly advanced AI
             agents, with a focus on achieving cooperation.},
   Key = {fds375180}
}

@article{fds375179,
   Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with
             Extensive-Form Correlation},
   Journal = {EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on
             Economics and Computation},
   Pages = {1161-1186},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   ISBN = {9798400701047},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597665},
   Abstract = {We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form
             correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our
             main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for
             computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated
             equilibrium (SEFCE), which runs in time polynomial in the
             size of the game, as well as the number of bits required to
             encode each input number. (2) We give an efficient algorithm
             for approximately computing an optimal extensive-form
             correlated equilibrium (EFCE) up to machine precision, i.e.,
             the algorithm achieves approximation error ϵ in time
             polynomial in the size of the game, as well as log(1/ϵ).Our
             algorithm for SEFCE is the first polynomial-time algorithm
             for equilibrium computation with commitment in such a
             general class of stochastic games. Existing algorithms for
             SEFCE typically make stronger assumptions such as no chance
             moves, and are designed for extensive-form games in the less
             succinct tree form. Our algorithm for approximately optimal
             EFCE is, to our knowledge, the first algorithm that achieves
             3 desiderata simultaneously: approximate optimality,
             polylogarithmic dependency on the approximation error and
             compatibility with stochastic games in the more succinct
             graph form. Existing algorithms achieve at most 2 of these
             desiderata, often also relying on additional technical
             assumptions.},
   Doi = {10.1145/3580507.3597665},
   Key = {fds375179}
}

@article{fds375178,
   Author = {Oesterheld, C and Demski, A and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality},
   Journal = {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science,
             EPTCS},
   Volume = {379},
   Pages = {421-440},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
   Abstract = {The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical
             omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a
             decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant
             computations and determine the truth value of all relevant
             logical/mathematical claims. This assumption is unrealistic
             when, for example, we offer bets on remote digits of π or
             when an agent faces a computationally intractable planning
             problem. Furthermore, the assumption of logical omniscience
             creates contradictions in cases where the environment can
             contain descriptions of the agent itself. Importantly,
             strategic interactions as studied in game theory are
             decision problems in which a rational agent is predicted by
             its environment (the other players). In this paper, we
             develop a theory of rational decision making that does not
             assume logical omniscience. We consider agents who
             repeatedly face decision problems (including ones like
             betting on digits of π or games against other agents). The
             main contribution of this paper is to provide a sensible
             theory of rationality for such agents. Roughly, we require
             that a boundedly rational inductive agent tests each
             efficiently computable hypothesis infinitely often and
             follows those hypotheses that keep their promises of high
             rewards. We then prove that agents that are rational in this
             sense have other desirable properties. For example, they
             learn to value random and pseudo-random lotteries at their
             expected reward. Finally, we consider strategic interactions
             between different agents and prove a folk theorem for what
             strategies bounded rational inductive agents can converge
             to.},
   Doi = {10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
   Key = {fds375178}
}


%% De Brigard, Felipe   
@article{fds365621,
   Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Irving, Z and Nadelhoffer, T and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent
             wrongdoing.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
   Volume = {152},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {120-138},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001262},
   Abstract = {Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to
             what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act
             negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not
             desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do
             people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose
             that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based
             on perceived <i>mental</i> <i>control</i>, or the degree to
             which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over
             time. To acquire information about others' mental control,
             people self-project their own perceived mental control to
             anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and
             concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four
             experiments (<i>N</i> = 841), we tested whether perceptions
             of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame
             for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with
             which people can counterfactually imagine an individual
             being non-negligent mediated the relationship between
             judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated
             that perceived mental control has a strong effect on
             judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that
             first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately
             correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for
             negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical
             memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of
             forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal
             episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent
             wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for
             whom past episodes of negligence were not salient.
             Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal
             judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments
             of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role
             for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of
             responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all
             rights reserved).},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0001262},
   Key = {fds365621}
}

@article{fds372917,
   Author = {Uddin, LQ and Betzel, RF and Cohen, JR and Damoiseaux, JS and De
             Brigard, F and Eickhoff, SB and Fornito, A and Gratton, C and Gordon,
             EM and Laird, AR and Larson-Prior, L and McIntosh, AR and Nickerson, LD and Pessoa, L and Pinho, AL and Poldrack, RA and Razi, A and Sadaghiani, S and Shine, JM and Yendiki, A and Yeo, BTT and Spreng,
             RN},
   Title = {Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale
             brain network nomenclature.},
   Journal = {Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.)},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {864-905},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/netn_a_00323},
   Abstract = {Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by
             standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the
             level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning
             to confront the challenges associated with developing a
             taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The
             Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was
             formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping
             (OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide
             recommendations on points of consensus, identify open
             questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the
             service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of
             network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a
             survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain
             network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g.,
             default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and
             a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We
             summarize survey results and provide initial considerations
             and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective
             piece includes a selective review of challenges to this
             enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and
             hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks;
             (3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4)
             consideration of network affiliations of subcortical
             structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information.
             We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive
             and network neuroscience communities to adopt.},
   Doi = {10.1162/netn_a_00323},
   Key = {fds372917}
}

@article{fds369341,
   Author = {Boone, T and Van Rooy and N and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Not Every Thing Must Go.},
   Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {376-379},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
   Abstract = {In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard
             approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is
             seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with
             causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he
             advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic
             brain networks are associated, not with traditional
             psychological categories, but with behavioral functions
             characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number
             of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately
             believe that although much revision to cognitive
             neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical
             proposals may be counterproductive.},
   Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
   Key = {fds369341}
}

@article{fds371448,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.},
   Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677},
   Abstract = {The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100
             years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an
             unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's
             seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized
             cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet
             the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper,
             I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this
             theoretical term as well as an argument to question its
             scientific status by comparing it to other cases of
             theoretical terms that have either survived scientific
             change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such
             as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory"
             is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus,
             recommend its demotion from our scientific
             vocabulary.},
   Doi = {10.1111/tops.12677},
   Key = {fds371448}
}

@article{fds369853,
   Author = {Murray, S and Bermúdez, JP and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Moralization and self-control strategy selection.},
   Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1586-1595},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
   Abstract = {To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment,
             people use self-control. The process model of self-control
             outlines different strategies for managing the onset and
             experience of temptation. However, little is known about the
             decision-making factors underlying strategy selection.
             Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the
             moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise
             attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2,
             people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly
             more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to
             immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived
             temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that
             as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral
             valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be
             significantly more effective relative to attentional
             distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly
             mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These
             results indicate that moralization informs decision-making
             processes related to self-control strategy
             selection.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
   Key = {fds369853}
}

@article{fds374206,
   Author = {Morales-Torres, R and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà
             vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.},
   Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
   Volume = {46},
   Pages = {e370},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
   Abstract = {Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and
             involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar
             retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify
             three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to
             happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic
             cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How
             déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
   Key = {fds374206}
}

@article{fds373975,
   Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and Murray, S and Brockmole, JR and De
             Brigard, F and Nuthmann, A},
   Title = {A computational modeling approach to investigating mind
             wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene
             viewing.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {242},
   Pages = {105624},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
   Abstract = {Research on gaze control has long shown that increased
             visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are
             associated with longer fixation durations. More recently,
             though, longer durations have also been linked to mind
             wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention
             marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward
             better understanding the relationship between fixation
             durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran
             simulations using an established random-walk model for
             saccade timing and programming and assessed which model
             parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations
             associated with mind wandering compared to attentive
             viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best
             described as an increase in the variability of the
             fixation-generating process, leading to more
             variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past
             research showed that increased processing demands increased
             the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The
             findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing
             demands modulate fixation durations through different
             mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing
             demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation
             durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by
             which these changes were generated.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
   Key = {fds373975}
}

@article{fds373542,
   Author = {Miceli, K and Morales-Torres, R and Khoudary, A and Faul, L and Parikh,
             N and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in
             episodic counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Hippocampus},
   Volume = {34},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {2-6},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23583},
   Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining
             alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous
             research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates
             with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine
             possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to
             critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has
             explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the
             perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However,
             the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by
             perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study,
             we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging
             datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility
             modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results
             indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates
             hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is
             confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus.
             Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is
             positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior
             hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT
             plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty
             alone can account for these results, and instead suggest
             possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus
             during the construction of plausible and implausible
             ECT.},
   Doi = {10.1002/hipo.23583},
   Key = {fds373542}
}

@article{fds376061,
   Author = {Niemi, L and Washington, N and Workman, C and Arcila-Valenzuela, M and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge:
             An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice},
   Journal = {Acta Psychologica},
   Volume = {244},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
   Abstract = {According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice,
             baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with
             marginalized social identities is a central driver of
             prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may
             sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic
             stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In
             this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of
             epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional
             responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized
             social group membership predicts these responses. We
             conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total N =
             1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual
             knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings
             about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback
             (invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming
             remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social
             evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all
             three studies, on average, affective responses to
             discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting
             feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback.
             Participants who shared their knowledge reported more
             negative affect after discrediting feedback than
             participants who shared their feelings. There were
             consistent individual differences, including a
             twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after
             receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men
             compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's
             race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their
             affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback,
             suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed
             to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic
             injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of
             knowledge.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
   Key = {fds376061}
}


%% Eva, Benjamin E.   
@article{fds374145,
   Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
   Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {613-637},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
   Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
             that there exist situations in which rational agents
             inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
             as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
             imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
             treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
             inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
             mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
             loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
             class of normative theories than has been previously
             recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
             phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
             that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
             kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
             comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
             least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
             comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
             understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
             phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
             setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
             prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
             saddled with the inevitability of rational
             opinion loss.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
   Key = {fds374145}
}


%% Farahany, Nita A.   
@book{fds365011,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {The Battle for Your Brain: Defending the Right to Think
             Freely in the Age of Neurotechnology},
   Publisher = {St. Martin's Press},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds365011}
}

@misc{fds369820,
   Author = {Farahany, NA and Corbyn, Z},
   Title = {We Need a New Human Right to Cognitive Liberty},
   Journal = {The Guardian},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds369820}
}

@misc{fds368813,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {A Round-Up of 2022 Neurotechnology Advances},
   Journal = {Volokh Conspiracy},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds368813}
}

@misc{fds369927,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {Provide a Résumé, Cover Letter and Access to Your Brain?
             The Creepy Race to Read Workers’ Minds},
   Journal = {Los Angeles Times},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds369927}
}

@misc{fds370153,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {TikTok Is Part of China’s Cognitive Warfare
             Campaign},
   Journal = {Guardian},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds370153}
}

@misc{fds370151,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {This Is the Battle for Your Brain at Work},
   Journal = {Fast Company},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds370151}
}

@misc{fds371554,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {'Cognitive Liberty' Is the Human Right We Need to Talk
             About},
   Journal = {Time},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds371554}
}

@misc{fds373700,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {Human Values in a Digital Age},
   Journal = {Science},
   Volume = {382},
   Number = {6670},
   Pages = {523},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds373700}
}

@misc{fds376318,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {Congress Is Right to Want to Curtail Tiktok’s Power and
             Influence},
   Journal = {The Guardian},
   Year = {2024},
   Key = {fds376318}
}

@article{fds375515,
   Author = {Farahany, NA},
   Title = {Neurotech at Work},
   Booktitle = {The Year in Tech, 2024: The Insights You Need From Harvard
             Business Review},
   Publisher = {Harvard Business Review Press},
   Year = {2024},
   Key = {fds375515}
}


%% Grant, Ruth W.   
@article{fds372670,
   Author = {Grant, RW and Katzenstein, S and Kennedy, C},
   Title = {How Could They Let This Happen? Cover Ups, Complicity, and
             the Problem of Accountability},
   Journal = {Res Publica},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
   Abstract = {Sexual abuse by clergymen, poisoned water, police
             brutality—these cases each involve two wrongs: the abuse
             itself and the attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Our
             focus is this second wrong—the cover up. Cover ups are
             accountability failures, and they share common strategies
             for thwarting accountability whatever the abuse and whatever
             the institution. We find that cover ups often succeed even
             when accountability mechanisms are in place. Hence, improved
             institutions will not be sufficient to prevent
             accountability failures. Accountability mechanisms are tools
             that people must be willing to use in good faith. They fail
             when people are complicit. What explains complicity? We
             identify certain human proclivities and features of modern
             organizations that lead people to become complicit in the
             wrongdoing of others. If we focus exclusively on the design
             of institutions, we will fail to constrain the perpetrators
             of wrongdoing. Understanding complicity is key to
             understanding accountability failures.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
   Key = {fds372670}
}


%% Hawkins, Jennifer   
@article{fds371502,
   Author = {Hawkins, J},
   Title = {Affect, Values and Problems Assessing Decision-Making
             Capacity.},
   Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
   Pages = {1-12},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
   Abstract = {The dominant approach to assessing decision-making capacity
             in medicine focuses on determining the extent to which
             individuals possess certain core cognitive abilities.
             Critics have argued that this model delivers the wrong
             verdict in certain cases where patient values that are the
             product of mental disorder or disordered affective states
             undermine decision-making without undermining cognition. I
             argue for a re-conceptualization of what it is to possess
             the capacity to make medical treatment decisions. It is, I
             argue, <i>the ability to track one's own personal interests
             at least as well as most people can</i>. Using this idea, I
             demonstrate that it is possible to craft a solution for the
             problem cases-one that neither alters existing criteria in
             dangerous ways (e.g. does not open the door to various kinds
             of abuse) nor violates the spirit of widely accepted ethical
             constraints on decision-making assessment.},
   Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
   Key = {fds371502}
}


%% Hazelwood, Caleb   
@article{fds369252,
   Author = {Hazelwood, C},
   Title = {Reciprocal causation and biological practice},
   Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {1},
   Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
   Abstract = {Arguments for an extended evolutionary synthesis often
             center on the concept of “reciprocal causation.”
             Proponents argue that reciprocal causation is superior to
             standard models of evolutionary causation for at least two
             reasons. First, it leads to better scientific models with
             more predictive power. Second, it more accurately represents
             the causal structure of the biological world. Simply put,
             proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis argue that
             reciprocal causation is empirically and explanatorily apt
             relative to competing causal frameworks. In this paper, I
             present quantitative survey data from faculty members in
             biology departments at universities across the United States
             to evaluate this claim. The survey data indicate that a
             majority of the participants do not agree (i.e., most either
             disagree or neither agree nor disagree) that the concept of
             reciprocal causation confers a larger advantage on research
             practices. However, a majority of the participants agree
             that the causal framework of the extended evolutionary
             synthesis more accurately represents the structure of the
             biological world. These results demonstrate that the
             explanatory merits of a conceptual framework and its
             practical utility can come apart in interesting and
             informative ways.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
   Key = {fds369252}
}

@article{fds370035,
   Author = {Hazelwood, C},
   Title = {Review of Charles H. Pence’sThe Causal Structure of
             Natural Selection- Charles H. Pence, The Causal
             Structure of Natural Selection. Elements in the Philosophy
             of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2021), 75
             pp. $22.00 (paperback).},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {90},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {750-753},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.53},
   Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.53},
   Key = {fds370035}
}

@article{fds372667,
   Author = {Hazelwood, C},
   Title = {Newton's “law-first” epistemology and “matter-first”
             metaphysics},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {101},
   Pages = {40-47},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
   Key = {fds372667}
}

@article{fds373380,
   Author = {Hazelwood, C},
   Title = {An Emerging Dilemma for Reciprocal Causation},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Pages = {1-43},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.124},
   Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Among advocates
             and critics of the “extended evolutionary synthesis”
             (EES), “reciprocal causation” refers to the view that
             adaptive evolution is a bidirectional phenomenon, whereby
             organisms and environments impinge on each other through
             processes of niche construction and natural selection. I
             argue that reciprocal causation is incompatible with the
             view that natural selection is a metaphysically emergent
             causal process. The emergent character of selection places
             reciprocal causation on the horns of dilemma, and neither
             horn can rescue it. I conclude that proponents of the EES
             must abandon the claim that the process of natural selection
             features in cycles of reciprocal causation.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.124},
   Key = {fds373380}
}


%% Hoover, Kevin D.   
@article{fds360551,
   Author = {Hoover, KD},
   Title = {The struggle for the soul of macroeconomics},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {80-89},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
   Abstract = {Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was
             failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the
             dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling
             for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics
             exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking,
             and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE
             framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even
             claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent
             macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an
             old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and
             empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement
             without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles
             Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The
             earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the
             recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission
             position, some DSGE modelers would essentially
             straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic
             science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet
             critical framework.},
   Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
   Key = {fds360551}
}

@article{fds373365,
   Author = {Hoover, KD and Svorenčík, A},
   Title = {Who Runs the AEA?},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
   Volume = {61},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {1127-1171},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221667},
   Abstract = {The leadership structure of the American Economic
             Association is documented using a biographical database
             covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices
             from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional
             affiliations by education and employment. The structure is
             strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the
             leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger
             over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored:
             that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or
             that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network
             effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing
             concentration are also investigated.},
   Doi = {10.1257/jel.20221667},
   Key = {fds373365}
}


%% Janiak, Andrew   
@article{fds374560,
   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {A Tale of Two Forces: Metaphysics and its Avoidance in
             Newton’s Principia},
   Volume = {343},
   Pages = {223-242},
   Booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of
             Science},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
   Abstract = {Isaac Newton did more than any other early modern figure to
             revolutionize natural philosophy, but he was often wary of
             other aspects of philosophy. He had an especially vexed
             relationship with metaphysics. As recent scholarship has
             highlighted, he often denounced metaphysical discussions,
             especially those in the Scholastic tradition (Levitin 2016).
             He insisted that he himself was not engaging with the aspect
             of philosophy that played such a prominent role in the work
             of his predecessors, especially Descartes, and his critics,
             especially Leibniz. However, in the Principia and the
             Opticks, along with correspondence and unpublished
             manuscripts, Newton expressed views about the gravity of
             bodies and the power of substances that place his thought
             squarely within the metaphysical tradition he sought to
             avoid. Alas, his famous reluctance to engage in disputes
             left even Newton’s supporters confused about his
             metaphysical ideas.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
   Key = {fds374560}
}

@article{fds371295,
   Author = {Gessell, B and Janiak, A},
   Title = {Physics and optics: Agnesi, Bassi, Du Châtelet},
   Pages = {174-186},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
             Philosophy},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781138212756},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-17},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-17},
   Key = {fds371295}
}


%% Kushnir, Tamar   
@article{fds363275,
   Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
   Title = {When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental
             changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral
             praiseworthiness.},
   Journal = {Developmental science},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {e13257},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13257},
   Abstract = {Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral
             praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults
             recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving
             an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires.
             Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing
             in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in
             contrast with other work showing that children incorporate
             notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning.
             Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016)
             vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly
             moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving
             inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children,
             range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we
             contrasted a character who paid a personal cost
             (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a
             moral action with another who acted morally without paying a
             cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and
             9-year-old children and adults recognized the
             praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically
             or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only
             recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are
             physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically
             costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that
             paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire
             or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both
             adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct
             motivational force on actions. They further suggest that
             costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in
             judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.13257},
   Key = {fds363275}
}

@article{fds372714,
   Author = {Carpenter, E and Siegel, A and Urquiola, S and Liu, J and Kushnir,
             T},
   Title = {Being me in times of change: Young children's reflections on
             their lives during the COVID-19 pandemic},
   Journal = {Children and Society},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/chso.12790},
   Abstract = {Research from the perspective of parents, educators and
             mental health professionals has documented the negative
             impacts of pandemic isolation on children, but few studies
             have sought children's own perspectives on this difficult
             year. The current study aims to provide a first-person
             perspective on children's psychological health by asking
             children directly about their experiences of isolating at
             home. We interviewed 28 seven- to eleven-year-olds in early
             days of lockdowns with follow-ups 6 months later. Children
             answered questions about family, school, friendships and
             feelings about the changes in their lives during lockdown.
             Children's reflections showed resilience, adaptability,
             positive appraisals and an ability to maintain meaningful
             social connections. This data underscores the value of
             including children's narratives to better understand the
             pandemic's lasting effects on their lives.},
   Doi = {10.1111/chso.12790},
   Key = {fds372714}
}

@article{fds369077,
   Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T},
   Title = {Rational learners and parochial norms.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {233},
   Pages = {105366},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
   Abstract = {Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they
             apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm
             acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early
             age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are
             prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However,
             another possibility is rational learning: given the
             available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms
             in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we
             introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm
             acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In
             one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with
             children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants
             viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two
             unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of
             social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled
             group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) -
             were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of
             their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2)
             we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used
             statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or
             inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive
             regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis
             shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children
             inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a
             naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work
             highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not
             necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial
             norms.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
   Key = {fds369077}
}

@article{fds370243,
   Author = {Flanagan, T and Wong, G and Kushnir, T},
   Title = {The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the
             experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive
             technologies.},
   Journal = {Developmental psychology},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1017-1031},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0001524},
   Abstract = {Children are developing alongside interactive technologies
             that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear
             if children's beliefs about the agency of these household
             technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced,
             humanoid robots used in lab research. This study
             investigated 4-11-year-old children's (<i>N</i> = 127,
             <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 7.50, <i>SD</i><sub>age</sub> =
             2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United
             States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and
             moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa
             and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid
             robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these
             technologies were organized into three distinct
             clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving
             moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features
             for each technology type, but the extent to which they did
             so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of
             the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral
             scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift
             in children's understanding of technologies' limitations.
             Importantly, there were systematic differences between
             Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique
             characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest
             that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by
             an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database
             Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).},
   Doi = {10.1037/dev0001524},
   Key = {fds370243}
}

@article{fds369144,
   Author = {Heck, IA and Kushnir, T and Kinzler, KD},
   Title = {Building representations of the social world: Children
             extract patterns from social choices to reason about
             multi-group hierarchies.},
   Journal = {Developmental science},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e13366},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13366},
   Abstract = {How do children learn about the structure of the social
             world? We tested whether children would extract patterns
             from an agent's social choices to make inferences about
             multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1,
             4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New
             York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and
             Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of
             individuals from different groups. Across pairwise
             selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals
             from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the
             agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred"
             and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and
             the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's
             reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups
             and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to
             10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York)
             used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that
             the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D
             and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be
             "leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence
             for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to
             10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made
             inferences about groups' relative social but not physical
             power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across
             the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through
             which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies
             through the patterns they observe over time in people's
             group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in
             our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive
             social choices between multiple groups to reason about
             groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern
             of an agent's positive social choices to guide their
             reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and
             "helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in
             an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking
             about groups' relative social but not physical power.
             Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based
             hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent
             prefers) and societal level (which groups are
             privileged).},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.13366},
   Key = {fds369144}
}

@article{fds372600,
   Author = {Kushnir, T and Katz, T and Stegall, J},
   Title = {A Review of “Becoming Human”},
   Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {620-622},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
   Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
   Key = {fds372600}
}

@article{fds372785,
   Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
             cost affects this tendency.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
   Volume = {237},
   Pages = {105764},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
   Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
             their reputations through communicative acts. In the
             experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
             inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
             absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
             ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
             act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
             prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
             the act and more likely to protest when another individual
             was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
             replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
             manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
             manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
             will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
             easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
             was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
             quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
             to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
             4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
             reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
             as a moderating factor.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
   Key = {fds372785}
}

@article{fds376647,
   Author = {Weisman, K and Ghossainy, ME and Williams, AJ and Payir, A and Lesage,
             KA and Reyes-Jaquez, B and Amin, TG and Anggoro, FK and Burdett, ERR and Chen, EE and Coetzee, L and Coley, JD and Dahl, A and Dautel, JB and Davis,
             HE and Davis, EL and Diesendruck, G and Evans, D and Feeney, A and Gurven,
             M and Jee, BD and Kramer, HJ and Kushnir, T and Kyriakopoulou, N and McAuliffe, K and McLaughlin, A and Nichols, S and Nicolopoulou, A and Rockers, PC and Shneidman, L and Skopeliti, I and Srinivasan, M and Tarullo, AR and Taylor, LK and Yu, Y and Yucel, M and Zhao, X and Corriveau, KH and Richert, RA and Developing Belief
             Network},
   Title = {The development and diversity of religious cognition and
             behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children
             and parents by the Developing Belief Network.},
   Journal = {PloS one},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {e0292755},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
   Abstract = {The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers
             studying human development in diverse social-cultural
             settings, with a focus on the interplay between general
             cognitive development and culturally specific processes of
             socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle
             childhood. The current manuscript describes the study
             protocol for the network's first wave of data collection,
             which aims to explore the development and diversity of
             religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by
             three key research questions: (1) How do children represent
             and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How
             do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect
             of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural
             beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The
             protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of
             nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years,
             a comprehensive survey completed by their
             parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit
             conversations between children and caregivers. This study is
             being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to
             date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this
             manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements
             of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in
             which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse
             religious communities, and present the final,
             English-language study materials for 6 of the 39
             cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited
             for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans,
             American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
             Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously
             unaffiliated Americans.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
   Key = {fds376647}
}

@article{fds375236,
   Author = {Finiasz, Z and Gelman, SA and Kushnir, T},
   Title = {Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact
             in adults' and children's category-based
             induction.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {244},
   Pages = {105707},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
   Abstract = {Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence
             the use of information from direct observations in category
             learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and
             children integrate their observations with testimony when
             learning about the causal property of a novel category.
             Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four
             types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or
             only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed
             that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a
             causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123,
             M<sub>age</sub> = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range
             4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects
             had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims
             led both adults and children to generalize the causal
             property beyond what was observed. Adults and children
             diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that
             could be verified by observations: adults were more
             skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children
             were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that
             children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to
             misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard.
             The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult
             learners integrate information from both sources, offering
             insights into the mechanisms by which language frames
             first-hand experience.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
   Key = {fds375236}
}


%% McShea, Daniel W.   
@article{fds370659,
   Author = {McShea, DW},
   Title = {Evolutionary Success: Standards of Value},
   Pages = {17-39},
   Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
             Implications},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190096168},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
   Key = {fds370659}
}

@article{fds370848,
   Author = {McShea, DW},
   Title = {Evolutionary trends and goal directedness.},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {201},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {178},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
   Abstract = {The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal
             directed, that teleological considerations play no part in
             our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that,
             to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field
             theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered
             goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is
             consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more
             particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory
             argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level
             fields that direct entities contained within them to behave
             persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a
             goal-directed trajectory following perturbations
             (persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed
             trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points
             (plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a
             chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with
             guidance provided by the external "food field," the chemical
             gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced
             by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and
             plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an
             "ecological field." Trends directed by selection-generated
             boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal
             constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other
             words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have
             been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field
             theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are
             discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that
             evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the
             level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible
             implications for our thinking about evolutionary
             directionality in the history of life are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
   Key = {fds370848}
}

@article{fds368096,
   Author = {Keenan, JP and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Synergies Among Behaviors Drive the Discovery of Productive
             Interactions},
   Journal = {Biological Theory},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {43-62},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
   Abstract = {When behaviors assemble into combinations, then synergies
             have a central role in the discovery of productive patterns
             of behavior. In our view—what we call the Synergy
             Emergence Principle (SEP)—synergies are dynamic
             attractors, drawing interactions toward greater returns as
             they happen, in the moment. This Principle offers an
             alternative to the two conventionally acknowledged routes to
             discovery: directed problem solving, involving forethought
             and planning; and the complete randomness of trial and
             error. Natural selection has a role in the process, in
             humans favoring the maintenance and improvement of certain
             key underlying capabilities, such as prosocial helping and
             episodic foresight, but selection is not required for
             discovery by synergy (which occurs too rapidly for selection
             anyway). Here we discuss the consequences of the SEP for
             the evolution in humans of key synergies such as tool
             usage and interactions that reward cooperation, show how
             discovery by synergy and the selection of synergy-supporting
             abilities formed a positive feedback loop, and show how
             synergies can combine, forming clusters and packages that
             are the core of institutions and cultures. Finally, clusters
             and packages represent an intermediate level of organization
             above the individual and below whole society, with
             consequences for our understanding of the major transitions
             in evolution.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
   Key = {fds368096}
}

@article{fds369050,
   Author = {McShea, DW},
   Title = {Four reasons for scepticism about a human major transition
             in social individuality.},
   Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
             Series B, Biological sciences},
   Volume = {378},
   Number = {1872},
   Pages = {20210403},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
   Abstract = {The 'major transitions in evolution' are mainly about the
             rise of hierarchy, new individuals arising at ever higher
             levels of nestedness, in particular the eukaryotic cell
             arising from prokaryotes, multicellular individuals from
             solitary protists and individuated societies from
             multicellular individuals. Some lists include human
             societies as a major transition, but based on a comparison
             with the non-human transitions, there are reasons for
             scepticism. (i) The foundation of the major transitions is
             hierarchy, but the cross-cutting interactions in human
             societies undermine hierarchical structure. (ii) Natural
             selection operates in three modes-stability, growth and
             reproductive success-and only the third produces the complex
             adaptations seen in fully individuated higher levels. But
             human societies probably evolve mainly in the stability and
             growth modes. (iii) Highly individuated entities are marked
             by division of labour and commitment to morphological
             differentiation, but in humans differentiation is mostly
             behavioural and mostly reversible. (iv) As higher-level
             individuals arise, selection drains complexity, drains
             parts, from lower-level individuals. But there is little
             evidence of a drain in humans. In sum, a comparison with the
             other transitions gives reasons to doubt that human social
             individuation has proceeded very far, or if it has, to doubt
             that it is a transition of the same sort. This article is
             part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in
             light of evolutionary transitions'.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
   Key = {fds369050}
}

@article{fds366835,
   Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Resolving teleology's false dilemma},
   Journal = {Biological Journal of the Linnean Society},
   Volume = {139},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {415-432},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that the account of teleology previously
             proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical
             determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We
             suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological
             thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can
             be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted
             mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological
             ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where
             freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological
             entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not,
             it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's
             modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic
             assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and
             determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not,
             in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this,
             we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we
             see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that
             our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding
             teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical
             position regarding free will that is known in the
             contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position
             maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its
             actions are internal, when the agent itself is the
             deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that
             freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also
             that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict
             between teleology and causal determinism.},
   Doi = {10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
   Key = {fds366835}
}

@article{fds374935,
   Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Goal Directedness and the Field Concept},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Pages = {1-10},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.121},
   Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>A long-standing
             problem in understanding goal-directed systems has been the
             insufficiency of mechanistic explanations to make sense of
             them. This article offers a solution to this problem. It
             begins by observing the limitations of mechanistic
             decompositions when it comes to understanding physical
             fields. We argue that introducing the field concept, as it
             has been developed in <jats:italic>field
             theory</jats:italic>, alongside mechanisms is able to
             provide an account of goal directedness in the
             sciences.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.121},
   Key = {fds374935}
}


%% Moi, Toril   
@article{fds371699,
   Author = {Moi, T},
   Title = {Acknowledging Hanna Pitkin: A Belated Discovery of a Kindred
             Spirit},
   Journal = {Polity},
   Volume = {55},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {479-487},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725254},
   Doi = {10.1086/725254},
   Key = {fds371699}
}


%% Neander, Karen   
@article{fds219963,
   Author = {K.L. Neander},
   Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"},
   Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
   Editor = {Justine Kingsbury},
   Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation,
             content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems
             can have the function to produce one thing in response to
             another. This has consequences for the kind of
             teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made
             by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have
             contents that are determined by the functions of sensory
             systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper
             further explores these implications and offers a
             teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory
             representations. It further offers a solution to the problem
             of distal content.},
   Key = {fds219963}
}


%% Pickford, Henry   
@article{fds371498,
   Author = {Pickford, H},
   Title = {Life, Logic, Style: On Late Wittgenstein},
   Pages = {168-193},
   Booktitle = {Wittgenstein and Literary Studies},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2023},
   ISBN = {9781108978163},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108973687},
   Abstract = {In addition to explaining what &quot;literary
             Wittgensteinianism&quot; is, it provides a point of entry
             into the chapters of this volume by explaining the basic
             difference between the &quot;early&quot; and
             &quot;late&quot; Wittgenstein and how each has opened up
             novel ...},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108973687},
   Key = {fds371498}
}

@article{fds369172,
   Author = {Pickford, HW},
   Title = {Adorno and the categories of resistance},
   Journal = {Constellations},
   Publisher = {Wiley},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
   Doi = {10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
   Key = {fds369172}
}


%% Richardson, Kevin A   
@article{fds370868,
   Author = {Richardson, K},
   Title = {Derivative Indeterminacy},
   Journal = {Erkenntnis},
   Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
   Abstract = {Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its
             source in the way the world is (rather than how it is
             represented or known). There are two questions we could ask
             about indeterminacy. First: does it exist? Second: is
             indeterminacy derivative? I focus on the second question.
             Specifically, I argue that (at least some) metaphysical
             indeterminacy can be derivative, where this roughly means
             that facts about indeterminacy are metaphysically grounded
             in facts about what is determinate.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
   Key = {fds370868}
}

@article{fds370224,
   Author = {Richardson, K},
   Title = {Exclusion and Erasure: Two Types of Ontological
             Opression},
   Journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {9},
   Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2279},
   Doi = {10.3998/ergo.2279},
   Key = {fds370224}
}

@article{fds371117,
   Author = {Richardson, K},
   Title = {Critical social ontology},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {201},
   Number = {6},
   Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
   Abstract = {Critical social ontology is any study of social ontology
             that is done in order to critique ideology or end social
             injustice. The goal of this paper is to outline what I call
             the fundamentality approach to critical social ontology. On
             the fundamentality approach, social ontologists are in the
             business of distinguishing between appearances and
             (fundamental) reality. Social reality is often obscured by
             the acceptance of ideology, where an ideology is a distorted
             system of beliefs that leads people to promote or accept
             widespread social injustices. Social reality is also
             obscured in cases where ordinary thought and language simply
             is not perspicuous enough to represent the social objects,
             kinds, and structures that are central to understanding
             social injustice. In both cases, I argue that the critical
             social ontologist will benefit from using the tools and
             concepts of fundamental metaphysics.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
   Key = {fds371117}
}

@article{fds367526,
   Author = {Richardson, K},
   Title = {The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively)
             substantial},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {192-207},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12916},
   Abstract = {According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive
             just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently,
             Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of
             substantivity, many of the central questions in the
             metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it
             is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are
             multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this
             view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender.
             The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of
             substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates
             gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least
             as used in the ontology room) are referentially
             indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in
             virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a
             degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical
             substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that
             they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively,
             although not absolutely, substantial.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12916},
   Key = {fds367526}
}

@article{fds369854,
   Author = {Richardson, K},
   Title = {Social construction and indeterminacy},
   Journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
   Volume = {65},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {37-52},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12299},
   Abstract = {An increasing number of philosophers argue that
             indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that
             indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather
             than how the world is represented or known). The standard
             arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around
             the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel
             argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that
             metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of
             constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in
             the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the
             social world is constructed.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phib.12299},
   Key = {fds369854}
}


%% Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter   
@article{fds370405,
   Author = {Simmons, C and Helming, K and Musholt, K and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {Where is the golden mean of intellectual humility? Comments
             on Ballantyne},
   Journal = {Journal of Positive Psychology},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {240-243},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
   Abstract = {In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes
             intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way ‘to manage
             evidence … in seeking truth.’ However, not every way of
             managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an
             intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood
             as a ‘golden mean’ or ‘middle path’ between extremes
             of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or
             between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should
             not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean
             of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy
             in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or
             pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable
             or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and
             considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of
             locating the golden mean.},
   Doi = {10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
   Key = {fds370405}
}

@article{fds372262,
   Author = {McKee, P and Kim, HE and Tang, H and Everett, JAC and Chituc, V and Gibea,
             T and Marques, LM and Boggio, P and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {Does it matter who harmed whom? A cross-cultural study of
             moral judgments about harm by and to insiders and
             outsiders},
   Journal = {Current Psychology},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
   Abstract = {This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral
             wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying
             combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims
             across six countries: the United States of America (N =
             937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania (N = 782),
             Brazil (N = 856), South Korea (N = 1776), and China (N =
             1008). Consistent with our hypothesis we found evidence of
             an insider agent effect, where moral violations committed by
             outsider agents are generally considered more morally wrong
             than the same violations done by insider agents. We also
             found support for an insider victim effect where moral
             violations that were committed against an insider victim
             generally were seen as more morally wrong than when the same
             violations were committed against an outsider, and this
             effect held across all countries. These findings provide
             evidence that the insider versus outsider status of agents
             and victims does affect moral judgments. However, the
             interactions of these identities with collectivism,
             psychological closeness, and type of harm (emotional or
             physical) are more complex than what is suggested by
             previous literature.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
   Key = {fds372262}
}

@article{fds372817,
   Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Dahl’s Definition of Morality},
   Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
   Volume = {34},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {106-109},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
   Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
   Key = {fds372817}
}

@article{fds374251,
   Author = {Boggio, PS and Rêgo, GG and Everett, JAC and Vieira, GB and Graves, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US,
             and Brazil},
   Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
   Abstract = {Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an
             impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral
             psychological research has largely followed in this vein,
             focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral
             judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who
             is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness,
             manipulating whether the person doing the action was a
             friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings
             across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in
             Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent
             findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly
             when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when
             committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified
             agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified
             agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e.,
             conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and
             Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK
             participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are
             judged differently according to who committed them and
             according to the political ideology of the judges. We
             discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups
             dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and
             the black sheep effect.},
   Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
   Key = {fds374251}
}

@article{fds372776,
   Author = {Hopp, FR and Amir, O and Fisher, JT and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Weber, R},
   Title = {Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical
             activation modulated by political ideology.},
   Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {2182-2198},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
   Abstract = {Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements
             are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral
             foundations but where and how these foundations are
             represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs
             remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement
             task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral
             foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral
             judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms,
             reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind.
             Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each
             moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations
             distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT,
             individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated
             neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm
             that each moral foundation recruits domain-general
             mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable
             neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We
             discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable
             accounts of morality and their neurological support for
             MFT.},
   Doi = {10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
   Key = {fds372776}
}

@article{fds375504,
   Author = {Earp, BD and Porsdam Mann and S and Allen, J and Salloch, S and Suren, V and Jongsma, K and Braun, M and Wilkinson, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Rid, A and Wendler, D and Savulescu, J},
   Title = {A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted
             Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically
             Desirable.},
   Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
   Pages = {1-14},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
   Abstract = {When making substituted judgments for incapacitated
             patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the
             patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also
             agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such
             a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient
             Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use
             an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of
             individual patients from population-level data about the
             known preferences of people with similar demographic
             characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even
             if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human
             surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed
             algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's
             (former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of
             data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual
             patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual
             values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do.
             Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new
             approach: the <i>Personalized</i> Patient Preference
             Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in
             machine learning, which allow technologies including large
             language models to be more cheaply and efficiently
             'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the
             PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's
             preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions)
             that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in
             addition to being potentially more accurate at the
             individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the
             predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each
             patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review
             recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that
             suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it
             is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage
             some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the
             original PPP. We then consider various objections to our
             proposal and offer some tentative replies.},
   Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
   Key = {fds375504}
}


%% Sreenivasan, Gopal   
@article{fds375846,
   Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
   Title = {Courage, Consistency, and Other Conundra},
   Journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {281-296},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
   Abstract = {I am very grateful to Rachel Barney and Christian Miller for
             their helpful and challenging comments on my book, Emotion
             and Virtue (Princeton, 2020). My response aims first to
             clarify and then to fortify my position on some of the many
             excellent points they raise in this symposium.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
   Key = {fds375846}
}


%% Stern, Reuben E   
@article{fds371706,
   Author = {Stern, R and Eva, B},
   Title = {Anti-reductionist Interventionism},
   Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {74},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {241-267},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/714792},
   Abstract = {Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate
             that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental
             properties (and macro-level properties in general) as
             causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist
             Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of
             Woodward’s interventionist conception of causation. The
             viability of these responses has been challenged by
             Gebharter, who argues that the causal exclusion argument is
             vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs).
             Since the interventionist conception of causation relies
             crucially on CBNs for its foundations, Gebharter’s
             argument appears to cast significant doubt on
             interventionism’s anti-reductionist credentials. In the
             present article, we both (1) demonstrate that Gebharter’s
             CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies
             on some unmotivated and philosophically significant
             assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between
             CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use
             Bayesian networks to develop a general theory of causal
             inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the
             foundation for an anti-reductionist interventionist account
             of causation.1},
   Doi = {10.1086/714792},
   Key = {fds371706}
}

@article{fds367761,
   Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
   Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {613-637},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
   Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
             that there exist situations in which rational agents
             inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
             as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
             imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
             treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
             inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
             mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
             loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
             class of normative theories than has been previously
             recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
             phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
             that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
             kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
             comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
             least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
             comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
             understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
             phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
             setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
             prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
             saddled with the inevitability of rational
             opinion loss.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
   Key = {fds367761}
}


%% Summers, Jesse S   
@article{fds373672,
   Author = {Dasgupta, J and Lockwood Estrin and G and Summers, J and Singh,
             I},
   Title = {Cognitive Enhancement and Social Mobility: Skepticism from
             India},
   Journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {341-351},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
   Doi = {10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
   Key = {fds373672}
}


%% Tomasello, Michael   
@article{fds362755,
   Author = {Hepach, R and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Gerdemann, SC and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation
             underlying helping in early childhood.},
   Journal = {Developmental science},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {e13253},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253},
   Abstract = {We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator
             of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-,
             and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an
             individual or watch as another person provided help.
             Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging,
             we measured children's positive emotions through changes in
             postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual
             and watching another person help was equally rewarding;
             5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively
             helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive
             emotions following helping were greater when an audience was
             watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old
             children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be
             helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional,
             strategic motivation to improve their reputation by
             helping.},
   Doi = {10.1111/desc.13253},
   Key = {fds362755}
}

@article{fds365125,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a
             theory.},
   Journal = {Animal cognition},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {25-35},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
   Abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal,
             there existed only a few conflicting findings about great
             apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½
             decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand
             the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others,
             and they use this knowledge to their advantage in
             competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there
             existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive
             skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that
             great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their
             decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information
             to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past
             25 years of research on great ape social cognition and
             metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are
             evolutionarily related.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
   Key = {fds365125}
}

@article{fds371813,
   Author = {Wolf, W and Thielhelm, J and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for
             faces with white sclera.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
   Volume = {225},
   Pages = {105532},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
   Abstract = {The cooperative eye hypothesis posits that human eye
             morphology evolved to facilitate cooperation. Although it is
             known that young children prefer stimuli with eyes that
             contain white sclera, it is unknown whether white sclera
             influences children's perception of a partner's
             cooperativeness specifically. In the current studies, we
             used an online methodology to present 5-year-old children
             with moving three-dimensional face models in which facial
             morphology was manipulated. Children found "alien" faces
             with human eyes more cooperative than faces with dark sclera
             (Study 2) but not faces with enlarged irises (Study 1). For
             more human-like faces (Study 3), children found human eyes
             more cooperative than either enlarged irises or dark sclera
             and found faces with enlarged irises cuter (but not more
             cooperative) than eyes with dark sclera. Together, these
             results provide strong support for the cooperative eye
             hypothesis.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
   Key = {fds371813}
}

@misc{fds371506,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Having Intentions, Understanding Intentions, and
             Understanding Communicative Intentions},
   Pages = {63-75},
   Booktitle = {Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and
             Self-Control},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780805831412},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003417927-5},
   Abstract = {This chapter looks at a major cause and a major consequence
             of the 9-month social-cognitive revolution; and both of
             these also concern infant intentionality. It argues that
             young children’s understanding of other persons as
             intentional agents results in large part from newly emerging
             forms of intentionality in their own sensory-motor actions.
             The chapter explores young children’s understanding of a
             special type of intention that emerges directly on the heels
             of the 9-month revolution, namely, communicative intentions.
             Intentional agents have goals and make active choices among
             behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important,
             intentional agents also make active choices about what they
             pay attention to in pursuing those goals. ntentional agents
             have goals and make active choices among behavioral means
             for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents
             also make active choices about what they pay attention to in
             pursuing those goals.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781003417927-5},
   Key = {fds371506}
}

@article{fds367773,
   Author = {Colle, L and Grosse, G and Behne, T and Tomasello,
             M},
   Title = {Just teasing! - Infants' and toddlers' understanding of
             teasing interactions and its effect on social
             bonding.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {231},
   Pages = {105314},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
   Abstract = {The current study investigates infants' and toddlers'
             understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on
             subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of
             social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a
             slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by
             positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an
             especially interesting test case to inform us about young
             children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions.
             In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and
             18-month-old infants' ability to understand and
             differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention
             and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age,
             infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months
             they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the
             second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old
             children in closely matched purely playful and teasing
             situations. We also investigated potential social effects of
             teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence.
             Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing
             than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers,
             additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease
             than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could
             be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and
             toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from
             superficially similar but serious behavior and from around
             18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers
             are able to process a complex social intention like teasing.
             Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler
             intention understanding abilities.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
   Key = {fds367773}
}

@article{fds368903,
   Author = {Schäfer, M and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children's consideration of collaboration and merit when
             making sharing decisions in private.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
   Volume = {228},
   Pages = {105609},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
   Abstract = {Young children share equally when they acquire resources
             through collaboration with a partner, yet it is unclear
             whether they do so because in such contexts resources are
             encountered as common and distributed in front of the
             recipient or because collaboration promotes a sense of
             work-based fairness. In the current studies, 5- and
             8-year-old children from Germany (N = 193) acquired
             resources either by working individually alongside or by
             collaborating with a peer. After finding out that the
             partner's container was empty, they decided in private
             whether they wanted to donate some resources to the peer.
             When both partners had worked with equal efforts (Study 1),
             children shared more after collaboration than after
             individual work. When one partner had worked with much more
             effort than the other (Study 2), children shared more with a
             harder-working partner than with a less-working partner
             independently of whether they had collaborated or worked
             individually. Younger children were more generous than older
             children, in particular after collaboration. These findings
             support the view that collaboration promotes a genuine sense
             of fairness in young children, but they also indicate that
             merit-based notions of fairness in the context of work may
             develop independently of collaboration, at least by the
             beginning of middle childhood and in Western
             societies.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
   Key = {fds368903}
}

@article{fds370629,
   Author = {Benozio, A and House, BR and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Apes reciprocate food positively and negatively.},
   Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
   Volume = {290},
   Number = {1998},
   Pages = {20222541},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal food exchange is widespread in human societies
             but not among great apes, who may view food mainly as a
             target for competition. Understanding the similarities and
             differences between great apes' and humans' willingness to
             exchange food is important for our models regarding the
             origins of uniquely human forms of cooperation. Here, we
             demonstrate in-kind food exchanges in experimental settings
             with great apes for the first time. The initial sample
             consisted of 13 chimpanzees and 5 bonobos in the control
             phases, and the test phases included 10 chimpanzees and 2
             bonobos, compared with a sample of 48 human children aged 4
             years. First, we replicated prior findings showing no
             spontaneous food exchanges in great apes. Second, we
             discovered that when apes believe that conspecifics have
             'intentionally' transferred food to them, positive
             reciprocal food exchanges (food-for-food) are not only
             possible but reach the same levels as in young children
             (approx. 75-80%). Third, we found that great apes engage in
             negative reciprocal food exchanges (no-food for no-food) but
             to a lower extent than children. This provides evidence for
             reciprocal food exchange in great apes in experimental
             settings and suggests that while a potential mechanism of
             <i>fostering</i> cooperation (via positive reciprocal
             exchanges) may be shared across species, a stabilizing
             mechanism (via negative reciprocity) is not.},
   Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
   Key = {fds370629}
}

@article{fds373982,
   Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social
             Bonding.},
   Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the
             Association for Psychological Science},
   Pages = {17456916231201795},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17456916231201795},
   Abstract = {Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all
             primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are
             unique to the species. These involve various kinds of
             interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to
             having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic
             sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding
             have no explanation for why humans should have these unique
             bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality
             account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to
             participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and
             communicative activities that both depend on and create
             shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities
             causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to
             assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation
             toward them and because the shared representations created
             during such interactions make subsequent cooperative
             interactions easier and more effective.},
   Doi = {10.1177/17456916231201795},
   Key = {fds373982}
}

@article{fds370890,
   Author = {Vasil, J and Moore, C and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with
             young English-speaking children’s production of
             pronouns},
   Journal = {First Language},
   Volume = {43},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {516-538},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01427237231169398},
   Abstract = {Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children
             expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or
             more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this
             conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use.
             We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical
             generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking
             children’s first-person plural, first-person singular,
             second-person, third-person plural, and third-person
             singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children
             used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0
             compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp.
             pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a
             proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were
             used more often as children aged. These findings suggest
             that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at
             age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.},
   Doi = {10.1177/01427237231169398},
   Key = {fds370890}
}

@article{fds374236,
   Author = {Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans
             and Other Great Apes.},
   Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {34},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {588-604},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
   Abstract = {Humans share with other mammals and primates many social
             motivations and emotions, but they are also much more
             cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here
             I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that
             illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and
             emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other
             great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i)
             'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and
             pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me'
             (e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment);
             (iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt);
             and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group
             loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group
             biases). The existence of these species-typical and
             species-universal motivations and emotions provides
             compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative
             activities in the human species.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
   Key = {fds374236}
}

@article{fds374400,
   Author = {Vasil, J and Price, D and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Thought and language: Effects of group-mindedness on young
             children's interpretation of exclusive we.},
   Journal = {Child development},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.14049},
   Abstract = {The current study investigated whether age-related changes
             in the conceptualization of social groups influences
             interpretation of the pronoun we. Sixty-four 2- and
             4-year-olds (N = 29 female, 50 White-identifying) viewed
             scenarios in which it was ambiguous how many puppets
             performed an activity together. When asked who performed the
             activity, a speaker puppet responded, "We did!" In one
             condition, the speaker was near one and distant from another
             puppet, implying a dyadic interpretation of we. In another
             condition, the speaker was distant from both, thus pulling
             for a group interpretation. In the former condition, 2- and
             4-year-olds favored the dyadic interpretation. In the latter
             condition, only 4-year-olds favored the group
             interpretation. Age-related conceptual development "expands"
             the set of conceivable plural person referents.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cdev.14049},
   Key = {fds374400}
}

@article{fds374171,
   Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
             cost affects this tendency.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
   Volume = {237},
   Pages = {105764},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
   Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
             their reputations through communicative acts. In the
             experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
             inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
             absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
             ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
             act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
             prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
             the act and more likely to protest when another individual
             was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
             replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
             manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
             manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
             will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
             easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
             was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
             quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
             to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
             4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
             reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
             as a moderating factor.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
   Key = {fds374171}
}

@article{fds374401,
   Author = {Winter Née Grocke and P and Tomasello, M},
   Title = {From what I want to do to what we decided to do:
             5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, honor their agreements
             with peers.},
   Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
   Volume = {239},
   Pages = {105811},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
   Abstract = {Sometimes we have a personal preference but we agree with
             others to follow a different course of action. In this
             study, 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 160) expressed a
             preference for playing a game one way and were then
             confronted with peers who expressed a different preference.
             The experimenter then either got the participants to agree
             with the peers explicitly or just shrugged her shoulders and
             moved on. The children were then left alone to play the game
             unobserved. Only the older children stuck to their agreement
             to play the game as the peers wished. These results suggest
             that by 5 years of age children's sense of commitment to
             agreements is strong enough to override their personal
             preferences.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
   Key = {fds374401}
}


%% Wong, David B.   
@book{fds371902,
   Author = {Wong, D},
   Title = {Metaphors and Analogies in Classical Chinese Thought: The
             Governance of the Individual, the State, and
             Society},
   Publisher = {Research Center for Chinese Subjectivity in Taiwan and
             Chengchi University Press,},
   Editor = {Marchal, K and Wang, H},
   Year = {2023},
   Abstract = {Chinese edition of a series of five lectures delivered at
             the National Chengchi University},
   Key = {fds371902}
}

@article{fds371903,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Mind (Heart-Mind) in Chinese Philosophy},
   Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {The Metaphysics Research Lab},
   Editor = {Zalta, EN and Nodelman, U},
   Year = {2023},
   Abstract = {The role of the concept of mind (heart-mind) in classical
             Chinese philosophy},
   Key = {fds371903}
}

@article{fds373974,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT},
   Pages = {125-136},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781032252391},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003282242-15},
   Abstract = {This chapter will use responsibility as a “bridge”
             concept between the Confucian and Western moral and
             political traditions. A key feature of the concept lies in
             its root meaning “to respond.” Confucian thought focuses
             on how the responder is entrusted and relied upon to
             respond, to answer to, the needs and to the vulnerability of
             the one to whom response is due. Confucian thought focuses
             on how to cultivate the qualities enabling such
             responsiveness. Another overlapping meaning of
             responsibility with Chinese concepts is that of “being
             held to answer for what one has done or is required to
             do.” One might be faulted or blamed, or credited and
             praised, for responding appropriately or not to the needs
             and vulnerabilities of others. An important strand of
             Confucian thought distributes responsibility in the sense of
             “being held to answer for” not only to the direct agent
             of the act in question but to others who have the most
             control over the conditions that shape the choices of the
             direct agent. Finally, another strand of Confucian thought
             implies that responsibility can outrun whatever is under the
             individual’s control.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781003282242-15},
   Key = {fds373974}
}

@article{fds370613,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
             Mencius},
   Volume = {18},
   Pages = {517-538},
   Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
   Abstract = {One of the most intriguing features of the Mencius lies in
             its claims about the path to goodness: they are eloquently
             defended but also articulated in ambiguous ways. It is clear
             that a major role for feeling or emotion is envisaged, but
             is the relevant sort of feeling to be contrasted with
             reflection and reasoning? Or are these things intertwined
             and implicated in one another? I support the second answer
             and disagree both with those who take as primary the role of
             a kind of feeling that is largely untouched by reflection
             and reasoning and with those on the other extreme who hold
             that reasoning has an independent and in some ways a primary
             role in realizing goodness. Though my position has in broad
             outlines remained constant, it has evolved over time in
             important specifics. I will set out what I am thinking
             now.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
   Key = {fds370613}
}

@book{fds371901,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Moral Relativism and Pluralism},
   Pages = {143 pages},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781009044301},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781009043496},
   Abstract = {<jats:p>The argument for metaethical relativism, the view
             that there is no single true or most justified morality, is
             that it is part of the best explanation of the most
             difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view
             features a comparison between traditions that highly value
             relationship and community and traditions that highly value
             personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held
             that moralities are best understood as emerging from human
             culture in response to the need to promote and regulate
             interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational
             coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the
             conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and
             most justified moralities that accomplish these functions.
             The normative implications of this form of metaethical
             relativism are explored, with specific focus on female
             genital cutting and abortion.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781009043496},
   Key = {fds371901}
}

@article{fds371900,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
             Mencius},
   Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Editor = {Yang, X and Chong, K-C},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9783031276200},
   Abstract = {This book is about the philosophical, historical, and
             interpretative aspects of Mencius.},
   Key = {fds371900}
}


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