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| Publications of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds306215,
Title = {Moral Disagreements},
Publisher = {LuLu Press},
Editor = {Ancell, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds306215}
}
@book{fds306216,
Title = {Drugs and Addiction},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Summers, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds306216}
}
@book{fds219464,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert J. Fogelin},
Title = {Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Concise
Version},
Pages = {350},
Publisher = {Cengage},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds219464}
}
@book{fds244909,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Fogelin, RJ},
Title = {Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Complete
Version},
Pages = {494 pages},
Publisher = {Cengage},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds244909}
}
@book{fds306217,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral psychology, volume 4: Free will and moral
responsibility},
Pages = {1-474},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
Abstract = {Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will
and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that
seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In
recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology
and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral
philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays,
commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and
scientists who explain and use empirical findings from
psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new
problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The
contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as
Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga
-- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and
libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism;
naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings
show that although science does not settle the issues of
free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the
field by asking novel, profound, and important
questions.<B>Contributors</B>Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne,
Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman,
William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher
G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S.
Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris,
John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert
Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian
Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas
Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith
Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos,
Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler,
Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe.},
Key = {fds306217}
}
@book{fds349996,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0001},
Doi = {10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0001},
Key = {fds349996}
}
@book{fds306218,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Memory and Law},
Pages = {1-432},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.001.0001},
Abstract = {The legal system depends upon memory function in a number of
critical ways, including the memories of victims; the
memories of individuals who witness crimes or other critical
events; the memories of investigators, lawyers and judges
engaged in the legal process; and the memories of jurors.
How well memory works, how accurate it is, how it is
affected by various aspects of the criminal justice
system-all these are important questions. This book tackles
others as well. Can we tell when someone is reporting an
accurate memory? Can we distinguish a true memory from a
false one? Can memories be selectively enhanced, or erased?
Are memories altered by emotion, by stress, by drugs? This
book presents the current state of knowledge among cognitive
and neural scientists about memory.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.001.0001},
Key = {fds306218}
}
@book{fds343594,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds343594}
}
@book{fds376409,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Preface},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds376409}
}
@book{fds212198,
Author = {Ilina Singh and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Bioprediction of Bad Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds212198}
}
@book{fds306219,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Shannon Sullivan},
Title = {The Ethics of War and Terrorism},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sullivan, S},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306219}
}
@book{fds306220,
Author = {Kent Kiehl and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kiehl, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306220}
}
@book{fds306221,
Title = {Bioprediction, Biomarkers, and Bad Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Singh, I and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds306221}
}
@book{fds306222,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Daniel Fishman},
Title = {Mental Illness and Ethical Responsibility},
Pages = {1-299 pages},
Publisher = {Lulu Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Fishman, D},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Mental illnesses devastate individuals and families. They
also raise profound and important theoretical and practical
issues for us all. How can we tell whether someone really is
mentally ill instead of just eccentric? When people with
mental illnesses cause harm to themselves, should we
restrict their freedom and force them to accept treatment?
When people with mental illnesses cause harm to others,
should we hold them criminally responsible? Particular cases
of mental illness lead to general questions about the nature
of responsibility, the purpose of law, and essence of
personhood. All of these questions as well as several cases
studies are addressed in original essays by students who
took Ethics 200, the capstone course in the Ethics
Certificate Program of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at
Duke University in the Spring terms of 2011 and
2012.},
Key = {fds306222}
}
@book{fds197238,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Yifan Wang},
Title = {Crime and Punishment},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197238}
}
@book{fds306223,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel},
Title = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Editor = {Sinott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds306223}
}
@book{fds306224,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Title = {Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin
Libet},
Pages = {1-288},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
ISBN = {9780195381641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001},
Abstract = {We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we
consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is
thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising
experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will
occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that
produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often
claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and
moral responsibility, and to have practical implications for
criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of
further fascinating scientific research-including findings
in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by
John-Dylan Haynes-that raises novel questions about whether
conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics
respond that both commonsense views of action and
traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as
well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of
Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, this
book discusses whether our conscious choices really cause
our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for
how we view ourselves and how we should treat each
other.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001},
Key = {fds306224}
}
@book{fds244847,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244847}
}
@book{fds306225,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Vol. 1: The Evolution of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306225}
}
@book{fds306226,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306226}
}
@book{fds306227,
Title = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306227}
}
@book{fds244902,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticisms},
Pages = {1-288},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780195187724},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195187725.001.0001},
Abstract = {Moral Skepticisms provides a detailed overview of moral
epistemology, addressing such profound questions as: Are any
moral beliefs true? Are any justified? Is moral knowledge
possible? These questions lead to fundamental issues about
the nature of morality, language, metaphysics,
justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous
practical importance for controversial moral debates in
politics, law, education, and health care ethics. To help
understand these questions, Part 1 provides essential
background, clarifies the issues, and argues for a novel
contrastivist account of justified belief. Part 2 then
explores the main alternatives in moral epistemology,
including naturalism, normativism, intuitionism,
contextualism, and coherentism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues
that all of these approaches fail to rule out moral
nihilism-the view that nothing is really morally wrong or
right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory -
moderate classy Pyrrhonian moral skepticism - which
concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a
modest contrast class, but no moral beliefs can be justified
out of an unlimited contrast class, and neither contrast
class is the relevant one, so no moral belief is justified
without qualification.},
Doi = {10.1093/0195187725.001.0001},
Key = {fds244902}
}
@book{fds306229,
Title = {Perspectives on Climate Change Science, Economics, Politics,
Ethics},
Pages = {307 pages},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Howarth, R},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {9780762312719},
Abstract = {This book explores the interplay between science, economics,
politics, and ethics in understanding the challenge that
climate change poses to the international
community.},
Key = {fds306229}
}
@book{fds244848,
Author = {Craig, WL and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {God? A Debate Between a Christian and an
Atheist},
Pages = {156 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA},
Year = {2004},
ISBN = {9780195165999},
Abstract = {The book is composed of six chapters that alternate between
Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, so that each separate point can
be discussed as it arises.},
Key = {fds244848}
}
@book{fds306230,
Title = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with Reply},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds306230}
}
@book{fds306231,
Title = {The Philosophy of Law Classic and Contemporary Readings with
Commentary},
Pages = {1002 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
ISBN = {9780155008274},
Abstract = {PHILOSOPHY OF LAW examines such topics as the concept of
law, the dispute between natural law theorists and legal
positivists, the relations between law and morality,
criminal responsibility and legal punishment, rights of the
individual ...},
Key = {fds306231}
}
@book{fds306232,
Title = {Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology},
Pages = {342 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds306232}
}
@book{fds306233,
Title = {Modality, Morality and Belief Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan
Marcus},
Pages = {270 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Raffman, D and Asher, N and Marcus,
RB},
Year = {1995},
ISBN = {9780521440820},
Abstract = {This collection of original essays honours one of the most
influential philosophical pioneers of the twentieth century,
Ruth Barcan Marcus.},
Key = {fds306233}
}
@book{fds306234,
Author = {Brison, SJ},
Title = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {266 pages},
Publisher = {Westview Press},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1993},
ISBN = {9780813383941},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429501364},
Abstract = {Brings together ten of the nation's finest and most
provocative legal scholars to present their views on
constitutional interpretation. All of these papers are very
recent, and four were written especially for this
volume.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780429501364},
Key = {fds306234}
}
@book{fds244849,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244849}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds372262,
Author = {McKee, P and Kim, H-E and Tang, H and Everett, JAC and Chituc, V and Gibea,
T and Marques, LM and Boggio, P and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Does it matter who harmed whom? A cross-cultural study of
moral judgments about harm by and to insiders and
outsiders.},
Journal = {Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)},
Volume = {43},
Number = {9},
Pages = {7997-8007},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Abstract = {This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral
wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying
combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims
across six countries: the United States of America
(N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania
(N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea
(N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with
our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect,
where moral violations committed by outsider agents are
generally considered more morally wrong than the same
violations done by insider agents. We also found support for
an insider victim effect where moral violations that were
committed against an insider victim generally were seen as
more morally wrong than when the same violations were
committed against an outsider, and this effect held across
all countries. These findings provide evidence that the
insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does
affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these
identities with collectivism, psychological closeness, and
type of harm (emotional or physical) are more complex than
what is suggested by previous literature.<h4>Supplementary
information</h4>The online version contains supplementary
material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Key = {fds372262}
}
@article{fds375504,
Author = {Earp, BD and Porsdam Mann and S and Allen, J and Salloch, S and Suren, V and Jongsma, K and Braun, M and Wilkinson, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Rid, A and Wendler, D and Savulescu, J},
Title = {A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted
Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically
Desirable.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Abstract = {When making substituted judgments for incapacitated
patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the
patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also
agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such
a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient
Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use
an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of
individual patients from population-level data about the
known preferences of people with similar demographic
characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even
if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human
surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed
algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's
(former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of
data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual
patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual
values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do.
Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new
approach: the <i>Personalized</i> Patient Preference
Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in
machine learning, which allow technologies including large
language models to be more cheaply and efficiently
'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the
PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's
preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions)
that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in
addition to being potentially more accurate at the
individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the
predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each
patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review
recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that
suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it
is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage
some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the
original PPP. We then consider various objections to our
proposal and offer some tentative replies.},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Key = {fds375504}
}
@article{fds372776,
Author = {Hopp, FR and Amir, O and Fisher, JT and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Weber, R},
Title = {Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical
activation modulated by political ideology.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {7},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2182-2198},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Abstract = {Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements
are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral
foundations but where and how these foundations are
represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs
remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement
task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral
foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral
judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms,
reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind.
Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each
moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations
distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT,
individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated
neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm
that each moral foundation recruits domain-general
mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable
neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We
discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable
accounts of morality and their neurological support for
MFT.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Key = {fds372776}
}
@article{fds370405,
Author = {Simmons, C and Helming, K and Musholt, K and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Where is the golden mean of intellectual humility? Comments
on Ballantyne},
Journal = {Journal of Positive Psychology},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {240-243},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Abstract = {In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes
intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way ‘to manage
evidence … in seeking truth.’ However, not every way of
managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an
intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood
as a ‘golden mean’ or ‘middle path’ between extremes
of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or
between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should
not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean
of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy
in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or
pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable
or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and
considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of
locating the golden mean.},
Doi = {10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Key = {fds370405}
}
@article{fds372817,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Dahl’s Definition of Morality},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {106-109},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Key = {fds372817}
}
@article{fds374251,
Author = {Boggio, PS and Rêgo, GG and Everett, JAC and Vieira, GB and Graves, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US,
and Brazil},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Abstract = {Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an
impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral
psychological research has largely followed in this vein,
focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral
judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who
is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness,
manipulating whether the person doing the action was a
friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings
across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in
Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent
findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly
when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when
committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified
agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified
agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e.,
conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and
Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK
participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are
judged differently according to who committed them and
according to the political ideology of the judges. We
discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups
dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and
the black sheep effect.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Key = {fds374251}
}
@article{fds368516,
Author = {Krasich, K and Simmons, C and O'Neill, K and Giattino, CM and De
Brigard, F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mudrik, L and Woldorff,
MG},
Title = {Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked
recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual
perception.},
Journal = {Sci Rep},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22126},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Abstract = {We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory
activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact
to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants
tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually
masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed
that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with
greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that
resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously
argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious
perception. This effect, however, was not associated with
better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was
elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated
with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then
associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was
worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the
stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase
and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest
that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables
temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates
conscious perception in OSM.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Key = {fds368516}
}
@article{fds368007,
Author = {Khoudary, A and Hanna, E and O'Neill, K and Iyengar, V and Clifford, S and Cabeza, R and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations
Theory.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {491-507},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Abstract = {Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind
contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally
specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social
world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and
Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive
architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during
moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we
use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC)
analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of
foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's
cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A
mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables
that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation
violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty,
Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and
suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than
other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses
confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm
from moral foundation violations, and distinguished
individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority
is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations
were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas
moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage
the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence
for neural modularity and motivate further research on the
novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Key = {fds368007}
}
@article{fds368006,
Author = {Simmons, C and McKee, P and Antonios, I and Smith, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Bad dream frequency predicts mental health needs during the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.},
Journal = {Journal of affective disorders reports},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {100448},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jadr.2022.100448},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jadr.2022.100448},
Key = {fds368006}
}
@article{fds368308,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and McKee, P},
Title = {Certain prosocial motives limit redistribution aimed at
equality.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {119},
Number = {51},
Pages = {e2219059119},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2219059119},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2219059119},
Key = {fds368308}
}
@article{fds367258,
Author = {Yu, H and Contreras-Huerta, LS and Prosser, AMB and Apps, MAJ and Hofmann, W and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Crockett,
MJ},
Title = {Neural and Cognitive Signatures of Guilt Predict
Hypocritical Blame.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {33},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1909-1927},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09567976221122765},
Abstract = {A common form of moral hypocrisy occurs when people blame
others for moral violations that they themselves commit. It
is assumed that hypocritical blamers act in this manner to
falsely signal that they hold moral standards that they do
not really accept. We tested this assumption by
investigating the neurocognitive processes of hypocritical
blamers during moral decision-making. Participants (62 adult
UK residents; 27 males) underwent functional MRI scanning
while deciding whether to profit by inflicting pain on
others and then judged the blameworthiness of others'
identical decisions. Observers (188 adult U.S. residents;
125 males) judged participants who blamed others for making
the same harmful choice to be hypocritical, immoral, and
untrustworthy. However, analyzing hypocritical blamers'
behaviors and neural responses shows that hypocritical blame
was positively correlated with conflicted feelings, neural
responses to moral standards, and guilt-related neural
responses. These findings demonstrate that hypocritical
blamers may hold the moral standards that they apply to
others.},
Doi = {10.1177/09567976221122765},
Key = {fds367258}
}
@article{fds367869,
Author = {Kappes, A and Zohny, H and Savulescu, J and Singh, I and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wilkinson, D},
Title = {Race and resource allocation: an online survey of US and UK
adults' attitudes toward COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine
distribution.},
Journal = {BMJ open},
Volume = {12},
Number = {11},
Pages = {e062561},
Year = {2022},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2022-062561},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>This study aimed to assess US/UK adults'
attitudes towards COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine
allocation.<h4>Design</h4>Online survey including US and UK
adults, sampled to be representative for sex, age, race,
household income and employment. A total of 2580
participated (women=1289, age range=18 to 85 years, Black
American=114, BAME=138).<h4>Interventions</h4>Participants
were asked to allocate ventilators or vaccines in scenarios
involving individuals or groups with different medical risk
and additional risk factors.<h4>Results</h4>Participant race
did not impact vaccine or ventilator allocation decisions in
the USA, but did impact ventilator allocation attitudes in
the UK (<i>F</i>(4,602)=6.95, p<0.001). When a racial
minority or white patient had identical chances of survival,
14.8% allocated a ventilator to the minority patient (UK
BAME participants: 24.4%) and 68.9% chose to toss a coin.
When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower chance of
survival, 12.4% participants allocated them the ventilator
(UK BAME participants: 22.1%). For patients with identical
risk of severe COVID-19, 43.6% allocated a vaccine to a
minority patient, 7.2% chose a white patient and 49.2% chose
a coin toss. When the racial minority patient had a 10%
lower risk of severe COVID-19, 23.7% participants allocated
the vaccine to the minority patient. Similar results were
seen for obesity or male sex as additional risk factors. In
both countries, responses on the Modern Racism Scale were
strongly associated with attitudes toward race-based
ventilator and vaccine allocations (p<0.0001).<h4>Conclusions</h4>Although
living in countries with high racial inequality during a
pandemic, most US and UK adults in our survey allocated
ventilators and vaccines preferentially to those with the
highest chance of survival or highest chance of severe
illness. Race of recipient led to vaccine prioritisation in
cases where risk of illness was similar.},
Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2022-062561},
Key = {fds367869}
}
@article{fds362667,
Author = {Niso, G and Krol, LR and Combrisson, E and Dubarry, AS and Elliott, MA and François, C and Héjja-Brichard, Y and Herbst, SK and Jerbi, K and Kovic, V and Lehongre, K and Luck, SJ and Mercier, M and Mosher, JC and Pavlov, YG and Puce, A and Schettino, A and Schön, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Somon, B and Šoškić, A and Styles, SJ and Tibon, R and Vilas, MG and van Vliet, M and Chaumon,
M},
Title = {Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress
and perspectives.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {257},
Pages = {119056},
Year = {2022},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119056},
Abstract = {Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and
implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help
scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at
any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the
community for further scrutiny or utilization. For
experimental research using magneto- and
electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific
standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are
periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However,
GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light.
At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was
fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and
technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a
general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal
realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This
article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG
contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to
synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers
GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies,
pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early
pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative
and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize
misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data
acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new
tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally,
GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG
research and the resulting responsibility that scientists
have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among
other things the benefits of peer review and open access at
all stages, the need to coordinate larger international
projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's
prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we
find that current GSP tends to favor collective and
cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal
reasons.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119056},
Key = {fds362667}
}
@article{fds362973,
Author = {Mudrik, L and Arie, IG and Amir, Y and Shir, Y and Hieronymi, P and Maoz,
U and O'Connor, T and Schurger, A and Vargas, M and Vierkant, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Free will without consciousness?},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {26},
Number = {7},
Pages = {555-566},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005},
Abstract = {Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity
preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion
about how science can inform the free will debate. These
discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that
decisions might be influenced or biased by various
unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do
they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree?
Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on
decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will
in general, they provide important information about
limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We
demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy
are empirically testable and provide insight into their
bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for
future scientific-philosophical approaches.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005},
Key = {fds362973}
}
@article{fds365176,
Author = {Rehren, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How Stable are Moral Judgments?},
Journal = {Review of philosophy and psychology},
Pages = {1-27},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7},
Abstract = {Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to
investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper,
we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been
relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over
time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists
should consider stability and then surveying previous
research, we will present the results of an original
three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make
judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial
dilemmas three times, 6-8 days apart. In addition to
investigating the stability of our participants' ratings
over time, we also explored some potential explanations for
instability. To end, we will discuss these and other
potential psychological sources of moral stability (or
instability) and highlight possible philosophical
implications of our findings.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7},
Key = {fds365176}
}
@article{fds362925,
Author = {Awad, E and Levine, S and Anderson, M and Anderson, SL and Conitzer, V and Crockett, MJ and Everett, JAC and Evgeniou, T and Gopnik, A and Jamison,
JC and Kim, TW and Liao, SM and Meyer, MN and Mikhail, J and Opoku-Agyemang, K and Borg, JS and Schroeder, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Slavkovik, M and Tenenbaum,
JB},
Title = {Computational ethics.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5},
Pages = {388-405},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Abstract = {Technological advances are enabling roles for machines that
present novel ethical challenges. The study of 'AI ethics'
has emerged to confront these challenges, and connects
perspectives from philosophy, computer science, law, and
economics. Less represented in these interdisciplinary
efforts is the perspective of cognitive science. We propose
a framework - computational ethics - that specifies how the
ethical challenges of AI can be partially addressed by
incorporating the study of human moral decision-making. The
driver of this framework is a computational version of
reflective equilibrium (RE), an approach that seeks
coherence between considered judgments and governing
principles. The framework has two goals: (i) to inform the
engineering of ethical AI systems, and (ii) to characterize
human moral judgment and decision-making in computational
terms. Working jointly towards these two goals will create
the opportunity to integrate diverse research questions,
bring together multiple academic communities, uncover new
interdisciplinary research topics, and shed light on
centuries-old philosophical questions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.009},
Key = {fds362925}
}
@article{fds362974,
Author = {Simmons, C and Rehren, P and Haynes, J-D and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of
freedom.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {101},
Pages = {103318},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2022.103318},
Abstract = {Debates about freedom of will and action and their
connections with moral responsibility have raged for
centuries, but the opposing sides might disagree because
they use different concepts of freedom. Based on previous
work, we hypothesized that people who assert freedom in a
determined (D) or counterfactual-intervener (CI) scenario
assert this because they are thinking about freedom from
constraint and not about freedom from determination (in D)
or from inevitability (in CI). We also hypothesized that
people who deny that freedom in D or in CI deny this because
they are thinking about freedom from determination or from
inevitability, respectively, and not about freedom from
constraint. To test our hypotheses, we conducted two main
online studies. Study I supported our hypotheses that people
who deny freedom in D and CI are thinking about freedom from
determinism and from inevitability, respectively, but these
participants seemed to think about freedom from constraint
when they were later considering modified scenarios where
acts were not determined or inevitable. Study II
investigated a contrary bypassing hypothesis that those who
deny freedom in D denied this because they took determinism
to exclude mental causation and hence to exclude freedom
from constraint. We found that participants who took
determinism to exclude freedom generally did not deny
causation by mental states, here represented by desires and
decisions. Their responses regarding causation by desires
and decisions at most weakly mediated the relation between
determinism and freedom or responsibility among this
subgroup of our participants. These results speak against
the bypassing hypothesis and in favor of our hypothesis that
these participants were not thinking about freedom from
constraint.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2022.103318},
Key = {fds362974}
}
@article{fds362975,
Author = {Chan, L and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Wilkinson, D and Savulescu, J and Zohny, H and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Which features of patients are morally relevant in
ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.},
Journal = {BMC medical ethics},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {33},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>In the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK,
developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of
ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient
understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and
little evidence on which features of a patient the public
believe should and should not be considered in ventilator
triage.<h4>Methods</h4>Two surveys were conducted with
representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525
participants were asked in an open-ended format to provide
features they thought should and should not be considered in
allocating ventilators for COVID-19 patients when not enough
ventilators are available. In the second survey, 505
participants were presented with 30 features identified from
the first study, and were asked if these features should
count in favour of a patient with the feature getting a
ventilator, count against the patient, or neither.
Statistical tests were conducted to determine if a feature
was generally considered by participants as morally relevant
and whether its mean was non-neutral.<h4>Results</h4>In
Survey 1, the features of a patient most frequently cited as
being morally relevant to determining who would receive
access to ventilators were age, general health, prospect of
recovery, having dependents, and the severity of COVID
symptoms. The features most frequently cited as being
morally irrelevant to determining who would receive access
to ventilators are race, gender, economic status, religion,
social status, age, sexual orientation, and career. In
Survey 2, the top three features that participants thought
should count in favour of receiving a ventilator were
pregnancy, having a chance of dying soon, and having waited
for a long time. The top three features that participants
thought should count against a patient receiving a
ventilator were having committed violent crimes in the past,
having unnecessarily engaged in activities with a high risk
of COVID-19 infection, and a low chance of
survival.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The public generally agreed
with existing UK guidelines that allocate ventilators
according to medical benefits and that aim to avoid
discrimination based on demographic features such as race
and gender. However, many participants expressed potentially
non-utilitarian concerns, such as inclining to deprioritise
ventilator allocation to those who had a criminal history or
who contracted the virus by needlessly engaging in high-risk
activities.},
Doi = {10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0},
Key = {fds362975}
}
@article{fds362199,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Which Agent? Questions for Schechter},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {170-178},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.1.170},
Doi = {10.53765/20512201.29.1.170},
Key = {fds362199}
}
@article{fds366193,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Skorburg, JGA},
Title = {How AI Can Aid Bioethics},
Journal = {Journal of Practical Ethics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/jpe.1175},
Abstract = {<jats:p>This paper explores some ways in which artificial
intelligence (AI) could be used to improve human moral
judgments in bioethics by avoiding some of the most common
sources of error in moral judgment, including ignorance,
confusion, and bias. It surveys three existing proposals for
building human morality into AI: Top-down, bottom-up, and
hybrid approaches. Then it proposes a multi-step, hybrid
method, using the example of kidney allocations for
transplants as a test case. The paper concludes with brief
remarks about how to handle several complications, respond
to some objections, and extend this novel method to other
important moral issues in bioethics and beyond.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.3998/jpe.1175},
Key = {fds366193}
}
@article{fds360075,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Simmons, C},
Title = {Some common fallacies in arguments from M/EEG
data.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {245},
Pages = {118725},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118725},
Abstract = {Like all humans, M/EEG researchers commit certain fallacies
or mistakes in reasoning. This article surveys seven
well-known but still common fallacies, including reverse
inference, hasty generalization, hasty exclusion, inferring
from group to individual, inferring from correlation to
causation, affirming a disjunct, and false dichotomy. These
fallacies are illustrated with classic EEG research by Libet
and collaborators, but many researchers (not just Libet)
continue to commit them in all areas of research (not just
M/EEG). This article gives practical suggestions about how
to spot and avoid each fallacy.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118725},
Key = {fds360075}
}
@article{fds356450,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Niemi, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Making moral principles suit yourself.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1735-1741},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Abstract = {Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer
general moral principles for people to follow. These moral
principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid,
offering reliable guides for moral judgment and
decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found
consistent evidence that agreement with general moral
principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed
in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of
moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with
those very principles-relative to participants who recalled
events in which other people violated the principles. This
shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people's
willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but
not the transgressions of others. These results have
important implications for understanding the roles memory
and personal identity in moral judgment. People's commitment
to moral principles may be maintained when they recall
others' past violations, but their commitment may wane when
they recall their own violations.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Key = {fds356450}
}
@article{fds357499,
Author = {Everett, JAC and Colombatto, C and Awad, E and Boggio, P and Bos, B and Brady, WJ and Chawla, M and Chituc, V and Chung, D and Drupp, MA and Goel,
S and Grosskopf, B and Hjorth, F and Ji, A and Kealoha, C and Kim, JS and Lin,
Y and Ma, Y and Maréchal, MA and Mancinelli, F and Mathys, C and Olsen,
AL and Pearce, G and Prosser, AMB and Reggev, N and Sabin, N and Senn, J and Shin, YS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sjåstad, H and Strick, M and Sul,
S and Tummers, L and Turner, M and Yu, H and Zoh, Y and Crockett,
MJ},
Title = {Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health
crisis.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {5},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1074-1088},
Year = {2021},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01156-y},
Abstract = {Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with
public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how
leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and
non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past
research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can
both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some
people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces
trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equally
('impartial beneficence') may increase trust. In a
multi-site experiment spanning 22 countries on six
continents, participants (N = 23,929) completed
self-report (N = 17,591) and behavioural
(N = 12,638) measures of trust in leaders who endorsed
utilitarian or non-utilitarian principles in dilemmas
concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the
self-report and behavioural measures, endorsement of
instrumental harm decreased trust, while endorsement of
impartial beneficence increased trust. These results show
how support for different ethical principles can impact
trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication
during times of global crisis. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION
STATEMENT: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report
was accepted in principle on 13 November 2020. The protocol,
as accepted by the journal, can be found at
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.13247315.v1
.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-021-01156-y},
Key = {fds357499}
}
@article{fds356128,
Author = {McDonald, K and Graves, R and Yin, S and Weese, T and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Valence framing effects on moral judgments: A
meta-analysis.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {212},
Pages = {104703},
Year = {2021},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104703},
Abstract = {Valence framing effects occur when participants make
different choices or judgments depending on whether the
options are described in terms of their positive outcomes
(e.g. lives saved) or their negative outcomes (e.g. lives
lost). When such framing effects occur in the domain of
moral judgments, they have been taken to cast doubt on the
reliability of moral judgments and raise questions about the
extent to which these moral judgments are self-evident or
justified in themselves. One important factor in this debate
is the magnitude and variability of the extent to which
differences in framing presentation impact moral judgments.
Although moral framing effects have been studied by
psychologists, the overall strength of these effects pooled
across published studies is not yet known. Here we conducted
a meta-analysis of 109 published articles (contributing a
total of 146 unique experiments with 49,564 participants)
involving valence framing effects on moral judgments and
found a moderate effect (d = 0.50) among between-subjects
designs as well as several moderator variables. While we
find evidence for publication bias, statistically accounting
for publication bias attenuates, but does not eliminate,
this effect (d = 0.22). This suggests that the magnitude
of valence framing effects on moral decisions is small, yet
significant when accounting for publication
bias.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104703},
Key = {fds356128}
}
@article{fds354215,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Contrastive mental causation},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {198},
Pages = {861-883},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02506-0},
Abstract = {Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation.
Kim’s (upward) exclusion argument concludes that
non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One
classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally
relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive
to physical realization. However, this reply suggests
downward exclusion (if mental properties are causally
efficacious, their physical realizers are causally
impotent), contrary to physicalism’s assumption of
closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can
solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of
causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has
independent justification, because it is also needed to
solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property
and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect
without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when
they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This
contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts
of mental causation and is defended against
objections.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02506-0},
Key = {fds354215}
}
@article{fds355512,
Author = {McElfresh, DC and Chan, L and Doyle, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V and Borg, JS and Dickerson, JP},
Title = {Indecision Modeling},
Journal = {35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2021},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {5975-5983},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-866-4},
Abstract = {AI systems are often used to make or contribute to important
decisions in a growing range of applications, including
criminal justice, hiring, and medicine. Since these
decisions impact human lives, it is important that the AI
systems act in ways which align with human values.
Techniques for preference modeling and social choice help
researchers learn and aggregate peoples’ preferences,
which are used to guide AI behavior; thus, it is imperative
that these learned preferences are accurate. These
techniques often assume that people are willing to express
strict preferences over alternatives; which is not true in
practice. People are often indecisive, and especially so
when their decision has moral implications. The philosophy
and psychology literature shows that indecision is a
measurable and nuanced behavior—and that there are several
different reasons people are indecisive. This complicates
the task of both learning and aggregating preferences, since
most of the relevant literature makes restrictive
assumptions on the meaning of indecision. We begin to close
this gap by formalizing several mathematical indecision
models based on theories from philosophy, psychology, and
economics; these models can be used to describe (indecisive)
agent decisions, both when they are allowed to express
indecision and when they are not. We test these models using
data collected from an online survey where participants
choose how to (hypothetically) allocate organs to patients
waiting for a transplant.},
Key = {fds355512}
}
@article{fds356129,
Author = {Rehren, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral framing effects within subjects},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {34},
Number = {5},
Pages = {611-636},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328},
Abstract = {Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that
evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our
moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous
empirical work on moral framing effects has used
between-subject experimental designs. We argue that
between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately
estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly
evaluate the case from framing effects against the
reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report
results of our new within-subject study on four types of
moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of
our findings for the reliability of moral judgments.
Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral
framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328},
Key = {fds356129}
}
@article{fds354336,
Author = {Wilkinson, D and Zohny, H and Kappes, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu, J},
Title = {Which factors should be included in triage? An online survey
of the attitudes of the UK general public to pandemic triage
dilemmas.},
Journal = {BMJ open},
Volume = {10},
Number = {12},
Pages = {e045593},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045593},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>As cases of COVID-19 infections surge,
concerns have renewed about intensive care units (ICUs)
being overwhelmed and the need for specific triage protocols
over winter. This study aimed to help inform triage guidance
by exploring the views of lay people about factors to
include in triage decisions.<h4>Design, setting and
participants</h4>Online survey between 29th of May and 22nd
of June 2020 based on hypothetical triage dilemmas.
Participants recruited from existing market research panels,
representative of the UK general population. Scenarios were
presented in which a single ventilator is available, and two
patients require ICU admission and ventilation. Patients
differed in one of: chance of survival, life expectancy,
age, expected length of treatment, disability and degree of
frailty. Respondents were given the option of choosing one
patient to treat or tossing a coin to decide.<h4>Results</h4>Seven
hundred and sixty-three participated. A majority of
respondents prioritised patients who would have a higher
chance of survival (72%-93%), longer life expectancy
(78%-83%), required shorter duration of treatment (88%-94%),
were younger (71%-79%) or had a lesser degree of frailty
(60%-69%, all p<0.001). Where there was a small difference
between two patients, a larger proportion elected to toss a
coin to decide which patient to treat. A majority (58%-86%)
were prepared to withdraw treatment from a patient in
intensive care who had a lower chance of survival than
another patient currently presenting with COVID-19.
Respondents also indicated a willingness to give higher
priority to healthcare workers and to patients with young
children.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Members of the UK general public
potentially support a broadly utilitarian approach to ICU
triage in the face of overwhelming need. Survey respondents
endorsed the relevance of patient factors currently included
in triage guidance, but also factors not currently included.
They supported the permissibility of reallocating treatment
in a pandemic.},
Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045593},
Key = {fds354336}
}
@article{fds351434,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Whitehead, PS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Seli,
P},
Title = {Exposure to opposing reasons reduces negative impressions of
ideological opponents},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
Volume = {91},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Abstract = {Americans have become increasingly likely to dislike,
distrust, and derogate their ideological opponents on
contemporary social and political issues. We hypothesized
that a lack of exposure to compelling reasons, arguments,
and evidence from ideological opponents might at least
partly explain negative views of those opponents. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we found that participants assume
their ideological opponents, in comparison to their
ideological allies, are less likely to have good reasons for
their positions. Moreover, we found that the more strongly
participants believe their opponents lack good reasons for
their positions, the more likely they are to report that
those opponents lack both intellectual capabilities and
moral character. Critically, exposure to arguments favoring
their opponents' position produced more favorable
impressions of those opponents. We discuss possible
implications of these results for the role of reasons and
reasoning in political discourse, and for productive
disagreement in a functioning democracy.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Key = {fds351434}
}
@article{fds348864,
Author = {Brenner, RG and Oliveri, AN and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Levin,
ED},
Title = {Effects of sub-chronic methylphenidate on risk-taking and
sociability in zebrafish (Danio rerio).},
Journal = {Naunyn Schmiedebergs Arch Pharmacol},
Volume = {393},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1373-1381},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00210-020-01835-z},
Abstract = {Attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) is the most
common psychiatric disorder in children affecting around 11%
of children 4-17 years of age (CDC 2019). Children with
ADHD are widely treated with stimulant medications such as
methylphenidate (Ritalin®). However, there has been little
research on the developmental effects of methylphenidate on
risk-taking and sociability. We investigated in zebrafish
the potential developmental neurobehavioral toxicity of
methylphenidate on these behavioral functions. We chose
zebrafish because they provide a model with extensive
genetic tools for future mechanistic studies. We studied
whether sub-chronic methylphenidate exposure during juvenile
development causes neurobehavioral impairments in zebrafish.
Methylphenidate diminished responses to environmental
stimuli after both acute and sub-chronic dosing. In adult
zebrafish, acute methylphenidate impaired avoidance of an
approaching visual stimulus modeling a predator and
decreased locomotor response to the social visual stimulus
of conspecifics. Adult zebrafish dosed acutely with
methylphenidate demonstrated behaviors of less retreat from
threatening visual stimuli and less approach to conspecifics
compared with controls. In a sub-chronic dosing paradigm
during development, methylphenidate caused less robust
exploration of a novel tank. In the predator avoidance
paradigm, sub-chronic dosing that began at an older
age (28 dpf) decreased activity levels more than
sub-chronic dosing that began at earlier ages (14 dpf and
21 dpf). In the social shoaling task, sub-chronic
methylphenidate attenuated reaction to the social stimulus.
Acute and developmental methylphenidate exposure decreased
response to environmental cues. Additional research is
needed to determine critical mechanisms for these effects
and to see how these results may be translatable to
neurobehavioral toxicity of prescribing Ritalin® to
children and adolescents.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00210-020-01835-z},
Key = {fds348864}
}
@article{fds349181,
Author = {Freedman, R and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
Volume = {283},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Abstract = {The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a
classical problem in economics and computer science. In
kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living
kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and
donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc
weights decided on by committee and then fed into an
allocation algorithm that determines who gets what—and who
does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end
methodology for estimating weights of individual participant
profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human
subjects a list of patient attributes they consider
acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g.,
medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on).
Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient
profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their
responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney
exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the
impact of the weights in simulations and find that the
precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter
little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply.
However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there
is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients
being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261},
Key = {fds349181}
}
@article{fds349538,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How does inequality affect our sense of moral
obligation?},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {43},
Pages = {e87},
Year = {2020},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19002310},
Abstract = {Tomasello's novel and insightful theory of obligation
explains why we sometimes sense an obligation to treat each
other equally, but he has not yet explained why human
morality also allows and enables much inequality in wealth
and power. Ullman-Margalit's (1977) account of norms of
partiality suggested a different source and kind of norms
that might help to fill out Tomasello's picture.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19002310},
Key = {fds349538}
}
@article{fds373379,
Author = {Chituc, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {262-282},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2020.1719395},
Abstract = {The psychological and philosophical literature exploring the
role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that
conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases,
seems to be motivated by epistemic rather than purely social
concerns. We argue that there is strong reason to suppose
that moral conformity leads to unreliable moral judgments,
and, insofar as this is true, the prevalence of conformity
proves a problem for both humility as a moral virtue and for
some views in moral epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2020.1719395},
Key = {fds373379}
}
@article{fds348902,
Author = {Chan, L and Doyle, K and McElfresh, DC and Conitzer, V and Dickerson,
JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Artificial artificial intelligence: Measuring influence of
AI 'Assessments' on moral decision-making},
Journal = {AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI,
Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {214-220},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Abstract = {Given AI's growing role in modeling and improving
decision-making, how and when to present users with feedback
is an urgent topic to address. We empirically examined the
effect of feedback from false AI on moral decision-making
about donor kidney allocation. We found some evidence that
judgments about whether a patient should receive a kidney
can be influenced by feedback about participants' own
decision-making perceived to be given by AI, even if the
feedback is entirely random.We also discovered different
effects between assessments presented as being from human
experts and assessments presented as being from
AI.},
Doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375870},
Key = {fds348902}
}
@article{fds347180,
Author = {Amoroso, CR and Hanna, EK and LaBar, KS and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Zucker, NL},
Title = {Disgust Theory Through the Lens of Psychiatric
Medicine},
Journal = {Clinical Psychological Science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-24},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2167702619863769},
Abstract = {The elicitors of disgust are heterogeneous, which makes
attributing one function to disgust challenging. Theorists
have proposed that disgust solves multiple adaptive problems
and comprises multiple functional domains. However, theories
conflict with regard to what the domains are and how they
should be delineated. In this article, we examine clinical
evidence of aberrant disgust symptoms in the contamination
subtype of obsessive-compulsive disorder,
blood-injury-injection phobia, and posttraumatic stress
disorder to adjudicate between two prevailing theories of
disgust. We argue that the pattern of disgust sensitivities
in these psychiatric disorders sheds new light on the domain
structure of disgust. Specifically, the supported domain
structure of disgust is likely similar to an adaptationist
model of disgust, with more subdivisions of the domain of
pathogen disgust. We discuss the implications of this
approach for the prevention and treatment of psychiatric
disorders relevant to disgust.},
Doi = {10.1177/2167702619863769},
Key = {fds347180}
}
@article{fds349036,
Author = {Skorburg, JA and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer,
V},
Title = {AI Methods in Bioethics.},
Journal = {AJOB empirical bioethics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-39},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Doi = {10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206},
Key = {fds349036}
}
@article{fds366402,
Author = {Marques, LM and Clifford, S and Iyengar, V and Bonato, GV and Cabral,
PM and Dos Santos and RB and Cabeza, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Boggio,
PS},
Title = {Translation and validation of the moral foundations
vignettes (MFVs) for the portuguese language in a Brazilian
sample},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {149-158},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently
developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of
various moral foundations – enables investigators to
directly examine differences in moral judgments about
different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV
instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end,
the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the
MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in
Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation
of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV
instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5)
Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which
used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao
Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven
factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships
between the moral foundations and political ideology are
similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity
of moral judgment on individualizing foundations tended to
be significantly higher in the Sao Paulo sample, compared to
a sample from the USA. Overall, the present study provides a
Portuguese version of the MFV that performs similarly to the
original English version, enabling a broader examination of
how the moral foundations operate.},
Key = {fds366402}
}
@article{fds350333,
Author = {Freedman, R and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human
Values.},
Journal = {CoRR},
Volume = {abs/2005.09755},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds350333}
}
@article{fds342279,
Author = {Ancell, AJ and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The need for feasible compromises on conscientious
objection: response to Card.},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {45},
Number = {8},
Pages = {560-561},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
Abstract = {Robert Card criticises our proposal for managing some
conscientious objections in medicine. Unfortunately, he
severely mischaracterises the nature of our proposal, its
scope and its implications. He also overlooks the fact that
our proposal is a compromise designed for a particular
political context. We correct Card's mischaracterisations,
explain why we believe compromise is necessary and explain
how we think proposed compromises should be
evaluated.},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
Key = {fds342279}
}
@article{fds342280,
Author = {Harris, AA and Romer, AL and Hanna, EK and Keeling, LA and LaBar, KS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Strauman, TJ and Wagner, HR and Marcus, MD and Zucker, NL},
Title = {The central role of disgust in disorders of food
avoidance.},
Journal = {Int J Eat Disord},
Volume = {52},
Number = {5},
Pages = {543-553},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/eat.23047},
Abstract = {BACKGROUND: Individuals with extreme food avoidance such as
Avoidant Restrictive Food Intake Disorder (ARFID) experience
impairing physical and mental health consequences from
nutrition of insufficient variety or/and quantity.
Identifying mechanisms contributing to food avoidance is
essential to develop effective interventions. Anxiety
figures prominently in theoretical models of food avoidance;
however, there is limited evidence that repeated exposures
to foods increases approach behavior in ARFID. Studying
disgust, and relationships between disgust and anxiety, may
offer novel insights, as disgust is functionally associated
with avoidance of contamination from pathogens (as may occur
via ingestion) and is largely resistant to extinction.
METHOD: This exploratory, cross-sectional study included
data from 1,644 adults who completed an online
questionnaire. Participant responses were used to measure
ARFID classification, picky eating, sensory sensitivity,
disgust, and anxiety. Structural equation modeling tested a
measurement model of latent disgust and anxiety factors as
measured by self-reported frequency of disgust and anxiety
reactions. Mediational models were used to explore causal
ordering. RESULTS: A latent disgust factor was more strongly
related to severity of picky eating (B ≈ 0.4) and
ARFID classification (B ≈ 0.6) than the latent anxiety
factor (B ≈ 0.1). Disgust partially mediated the
association between anxiety and picky eating and fully
mediated the association between anxiety and ARFID. Models
testing the reverse causal ordering demonstrated poorer fit.
Findings suggest anxiety may be associated with food
avoidance in part due to increased disgust. CONCLUSIONS:
Disgust may play a prominent role in food avoidance.
Findings may inform novel approaches to treatment.},
Doi = {10.1002/eat.23047},
Key = {fds342280}
}
@article{fds332865,
Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {176},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1177-1201},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Abstract = {In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we
judge that people are responsible for the consequences of
their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies
to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences
of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to
hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The
level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates
judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that
the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action
does not. We argue that this result has important
implications for a long-running debate about the nature of
responsible agency.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Key = {fds332865}
}
@article{fds341882,
Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
Furniture},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-139},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some
skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the
principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not
simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments
for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to
support the claim that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Key = {fds341882}
}
@article{fds342588,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Yin, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {120-129},
Publisher = {SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo
violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical
evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral
judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly
occurs when an individual remains obstinately and
steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even
after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments
to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the
moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and
psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and
intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the
predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We
investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for
moral dumbfounding: That putatively harmless taboo
violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the
high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused
harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our
results indicate that judgments about the likelihood of
causing harm consistently and strongly predicted moral
wrongness judgments. Critically, a manipulation drawing
attention to harms that could have occurred (but did not
actually occur) systematically increased the severity of
moral wrongness judgments. Thus, many participants were
sensitive to at least one reason — the likelihood of
harm—in making their moral judgments about these kinds of
taboo violations. We discuss the implications of these
findings for rationalist and anti-rationalist models of
moral judgment and decision-making.},
Key = {fds342588}
}
@article{fds343799,
Author = {Vierkant, T and Deutschländer, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Haynes, J-D},
Title = {Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About
Deliberate Actions.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {10},
Pages = {1133},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133},
Abstract = {A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is
that a person can be held morally responsible for an action
only if they had the freedom to choose and to act otherwise.
Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary
condition for moral responsibility. However, empirical
findings suggest that this assumption might not be in line
with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study
we used surveys to show that - counter to positions held by
many philosophers - lay people consider actions to be free
when they are spontaneous rather than being based on
reasons. In contrast, responsibility is often considered to
require that someone has thought about the alternative
options. In this study we used an online survey to directly
test the degree to which lay judgements of freedom and
responsibility match. Specifically, we tested whether
manipulations of deliberation affect freedom and
responsibility judgements in the same way. Furthermore, we
also tested the dependency of these judgements on a person's
belief that their decision had consequences for their
personal life. We found that deliberation had an opposite
effect on freedom and responsibility judgements. People were
considered more free when they acted spontaneously, whereas
they were considered more responsible when they deliberated
about their actions. These results seem to suggest that
deliberating about reasons is crucially important for the
lay concept of responsibility, while for the lay notion of
freedom it is perceived to be detrimental. One way of
interpreting our findings for the interdisciplinary debate
on free will and responsibility could be to suggest that lay
beliefs match the philosophical position of
semi-compatibilism. Semi-compatibilists insist that the
metaphysical debate on the nature of free will can be
separated from the debate on conditions of responsible
agency. According to our findings the beliefs of lay people
are in line with views held by semi-compatibilists, even
though we did not test whether they endorse that position
explicitly.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133},
Key = {fds343799}
}
@article{fds346287,
Author = {McDonald, K and Yin, S and Weese, T and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?},
Journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {2 pages},
Publisher = {CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x18002662},
Abstract = {May argues that framing effects do not undermine moral
beliefs, because they affect only a minority of moral
judgments in small ways. We criticize his estimates of the
extent of framing effects on moral judgments, and then we
argue that framing effects would cause trouble for moral
judgments even if his estimates were correct.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x18002662},
Key = {fds346287}
}
@article{fds331598,
Author = {Cameron, CD and Payne, BK and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Scheffer, JA and Inzlicht, M},
Title = {Corrigendum to "Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial
modeling approach" [Cognition 158 (2017)
224-241].},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {173},
Pages = {138},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
Key = {fds331598}
}
@article{fds332751,
Author = {Kingston, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-186},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Abstract = {Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain
from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler
(joyguzzling) provides our paradigm example. We first
distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to
refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We
then review several different proposed objections to our
view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies
a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected
value, exceeds our fair share of global emissions, and
undermines political duties. We show why none of these
objections succeeds and conclude that no good reason has yet
been proposed that shows why joyguzzling violates a moral
requirement.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
Key = {fds332751}
}
@article{fds326605,
Author = {Wright, JC and Nadelhoffer, T and Thomson Ross and L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Be it ever so humble: Proposing a dual-dimension account and
measurement of humility},
Journal = {Self and Identity},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {92-125},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
Abstract = {What does it mean to be humble? We argue that humility is an
epistemically and ethically aligned state of awareness–the
experience of ourselves as a small part of a larger universe
and as one among a host of other morally relevant beings. So
conceived, humility can be operationalized and measured
along the dual dimensions of low self-focus and high
other-focus and is distinct from other related constructs
(e.g., modesty and open-mindedness). We discuss our newly
developed scale (Study 1 and 2), and provide preliminary
validation using self-report (Study 3) and behavioral
measures (Study 4), showing that humility is related to
people’s general ethical orientation (e.g., empathy,
universalism/benevolence, and civic responsibility), their
well-being (e.g., sense of autonomy, life-purpose, and
secure attachment), mature religious beliefs/practices, and
reactions to disagreement–specifically, people high in
humility sat closer and less angled away from their
conversation partner with whom they disagreed. Together,
this provides support for our new Dual-Dimension Humility
Scale.},
Doi = {10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
Key = {fds326605}
}
@article{fds339913,
Author = {Tang, H and Wang, S and Liang, Z and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Su, S and Liu, C},
Title = {Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image
Concerns in Appearing Fair.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {9},
Number = {NOV},
Pages = {2268},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
Abstract = {Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The
present research explored how individual difference measured
by social value orientations, and situations, affect
deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments,
participants made allocations between themselves and
recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where
recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1
demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and
hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair,
especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2
showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image
in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They
decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and
evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when
deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show
that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception
and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications
for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
Key = {fds339913}
}
@article{fds329190,
Author = {Stanton, SJ and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Huettel,
SA},
Title = {Neuromarketing: Ethical Implications of its Use and
Potential Misuse},
Journal = {Journal of Business Ethics},
Volume = {144},
Number = {4},
Pages = {799-811},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3059-0},
Abstract = {Neuromarketing is an emerging field in which academic and
industry research scientists employ neuroscience techniques
to study marketing practices and consumer behavior. The use
of neuroscience techniques, it is argued, facilitates a more
direct understanding of how brain states and other
physiological mechanisms are related to consumer behavior
and decision making. Herein, we will articulate common
ethical concerns with neuromarketing as currently practiced,
focusing on the potential risks to consumers and the ethical
decisions faced by companies. We argue that the most
frequently raised concerns—threats to consumer autonomy,
privacy, and control—do not rise to meaningful ethical
issues given the current capabilities and implementation of
neuromarketing research. But, we identify how potentially
serious ethical issues may emerge from neuromarketing
research practices in industry, which are largely
proprietary and opaque. We identify steps that can mitigate
associated ethical risks and thus reduce the threats to
consumers. We conclude that neuromarketing has clear
potential for positive impact on society and consumers, a
fact rarely considered in the discussion on the ethics of
neuromarketing.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10551-016-3059-0},
Key = {fds329190}
}
@article{fds327008,
Author = {Kelly, M and Ngo, L and Chituc, V and Huettel, S and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral conformity in online interactions: rational
justifications increase influence of peer opinions on moral
judgments},
Journal = {Social Influence},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {57-68},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2017.1323007},
Abstract = {Over the last decade, social media has increasingly been
used as a platform for political and moral discourse. We
investigate whether conformity, specifically concerning
moral attitudes, occurs in these virtual environments apart
from face-to-face interactions. Participants took an online
survey and saw either statistical information about the
frequency of certain responses, as one might see on social
media (Study 1), or arguments that defend the responses in
either a rational or emotional way (Study 2). Our results
show that social information shaped moral judgments, even in
an impersonal digital setting. Furthermore, rational
arguments were more effective at eliciting conformity than
emotional arguments. We discuss the implications of these
results for theories of moral judgment that prioritize
emotional responses.},
Doi = {10.1080/15534510.2017.1323007},
Key = {fds327008}
}
@article{fds326087,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {146},
Number = {6},
Pages = {884-895},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
people judge those actions that happened further in the past
to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
believed that they were very different people than they are
now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
Key = {fds326087}
}
@article{fds330527,
Author = {Medaglia, JD and Zurn, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Bassett,
DS},
Title = {Mind control as a guide for the mind},
Journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},
Volume = {1},
Number = {6},
Pages = {0119-0119},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0119},
Abstract = {The human brain is a complex network that supports mental
function. The nascent field of network neuroscience applies
tools from mathematics to neuroimaging data in the hope of
shedding light on cognitive function. A critical question
arising from these empirical studies is how to modulate a
human brain network to treat cognitive deficits or enhance
mental abilities. While historically a number of tools have
been employed to modulate mental states (such as cognitive
behavioural therapy and brain stimulation), theoretical
frameworks to guide these interventions-and to optimize them
for clinical use-are fundamentally lacking. One promising
and as yet under-explored approach lies in a subdiscipline
of engineering known as network control theory. Here, we
posit that network control fundamentally relates to mind
control, and that this relationship highlights important
areas for future empirical research and opportunities to
translate knowledge into practical domains. We clarify the
conceptual intersection between neuroanatomy, cognition, and
control engineering in the context of network neuroscience.
Finally, we discuss the challenges, ethics, and promises of
mind control.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-017-0119},
Key = {fds330527}
}
@article{fds322470,
Author = {Ancell, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While
Protecting Patient Rights.},
Journal = {Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the
international journal of healthcare ethics
committees},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-131},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000694},
Abstract = {Paradigmatic cases of conscientious objection in medicine
are those in which a physician refuses to provide a medical
service or good because doing so would conflict with that
physician's personal moral or religious beliefs. Should such
refusals be allowed in medicine? We argue that (1) many
conscientious objections to providing certain services must
be allowed because they fall within the range of freedom
that physicians have to determine which services to offer in
their practices; (2) at least some conscientious objections
to serving particular groups of patients should be allowed
because they are not invidiously discriminatory; and (3)
even in cases of invidiously discriminatory conscientious
objections, legally prohibiting individual physicians from
refusing to serve patients on the basis of such objections
is not always the best solution.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0963180116000694},
Key = {fds322470}
}
@article{fds321506,
Author = {Cameron, CD and Payne, BK and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Scheffer, JA and Inzlicht, M},
Title = {Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial modeling
approach.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {158},
Pages = {224-241},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013},
Abstract = {Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional
assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a
central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life.
Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously
measure individual differences in implicit moral
evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new
sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and
a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task
into multiple component processes. These include implicit
moral evaluations of moral transgression primes
(Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about
target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional
tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias).
Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but
not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional
Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than
non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional
Judgment was associated with increased error-related
negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral
control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an
anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional
Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across
Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with
moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong
primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated
with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with
moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and
practical applications of formal modeling for moral
psychology are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013},
Key = {fds321506}
}
@article{fds321508,
Author = {Fede, SJ and Borg, JS and Nyalakanti, PK and Harenski, CL and Cope, LM and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Koenigs, M and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Distinct neuronal patterns of positive and negative moral
processing in psychopathy.},
Journal = {Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience},
Volume = {16},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1074-1085},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-016-0454-z},
Abstract = {Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by severe and
frequent moral violations in multiple domains of life.
Numerous studies have shown psychopathy-related limbic brain
abnormalities during moral processing; however, these
studies only examined negatively valenced moral stimuli.
Here, we aimed to replicate prior psychopathy research on
negative moral judgments and to extend this work by
examining psychopathy-related abnormalities in the
processing of controversial moral stimuli and positive moral
processing. Incarcerated adult males (N = 245) completed a
functional magnetic resonance imaging protocol on a mobile
imaging system stationed at the prison. Psychopathy was
assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R). Participants were then shown words describing three
types of moral stimuli: wrong (e.g., stealing), not wrong
(e.g., charity), and controversial (e.g., euthanasia).
Participants rated each stimulus as either wrong or not
wrong. PCL-R total scores were correlated with not wrong
behavioral responses to wrong moral stimuli, and were
inversely related to hemodynamic activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex in the contrast of wrong > not wrong. In
the controversial > noncontroversial comparison, psychopathy
was inversely associated with activity in the temporal
parietal junction and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These
results indicate that psychopathy-related abnormalities are
observed during the processing of complex, negative, and
positive moral stimuli.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13415-016-0454-z},
Key = {fds321508}
}
@article{fds321507,
Author = {Fede, SJ and Harenski, CL and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W and Rao, V and Caldwell, BM and Nyalakanti, PK and Koenigs, MR and Decety, J and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl, KA},
Title = {Abnormal fronto-limbic engagement in incarcerated stimulant
users during moral processing.},
Journal = {Psychopharmacology},
Volume = {233},
Number = {17},
Pages = {3077-3087},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00213-016-4344-4},
Abstract = {<h4>Rationale</h4>Stimulant use is a significant and
prevalent problem, particularly in criminal populations.
Previous studies found that cocaine and methamphetamine use
is related to impairment in identifying emotions and
empathy. Stimulant users also have abnormal neural structure
and function of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
amygdala, and anterior (ACC) and posterior cingulate (PCC),
regions implicated in moral decision-making. However, no
research has studied the neural correlates of stimulant use
and explicit moral processing in an incarcerated
population.<h4>Objectives</h4>Here, we examine how stimulant
use affects sociomoral processing that might contribute to
antisocial behavior. We predicted that vmPFC, amygdala, PCC,
and ACC would show abnormal neural response during a moral
processing task in incarcerated methamphetamine and cocaine
users.<h4>Methods</h4>Incarcerated adult males (N = 211)
were scanned with a mobile MRI system while completing a
moral decision-making task. Lifetime drug use was assessed.
Neural responses during moral processing were compared
between users and non-users. The relationship between
duration of use and neural function was also
examined.<h4>Results</h4>Incarcerated stimulant users showed
less amygdala engagement than non-users during moral
processing. Duration of stimulant use was negatively
associated with activity in ACC and positively associated
with vmPFC response during moral processing.<h4>Conclusions</h4>These
results suggest a dynamic pattern of fronto-limbic moral
processing related to stimulant use with deficits in both
central motive and cognitive integration elements of
biological moral processes theory. This increases our
understanding of how drug use relates to moral processing in
the brain in an ultra-high-risk population.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00213-016-4344-4},
Key = {fds321507}
}
@article{fds323961,
Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
'Can'},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {283-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
Key = {fds323961}
}
@article{fds321509,
Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
"ought" implies "can".},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {20-25},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
empirical work has studied the relationships among these
concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
which states that if someone ought to do something, then
they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
"ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
of obligation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Key = {fds321509}
}
@article{fds321510,
Author = {Alexander, P and Schlegel, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies,
AL and Wheatley, T and Tse, PU},
Title = {Readiness potentials driven by non-motoric
processes.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {39},
Pages = {38-47},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.011},
Abstract = {An increase in brain activity known as the "readiness
potential" (RP) can be seen over central scalp locations in
the seconds leading up to a volitionally timed movement.
This activity precedes awareness of the ensuing movement by
as much as two seconds and has been hypothesized to reflect
preconscious planning and/or preparation of the movement.
Using a novel experimental design, we teased apart the
relative contribution of motor-related and non-motor-related
processes to the RP. The results of our experiment reveal
that robust RPs occured in the absence of movement and that
motor-related processes did not significantly modulate the
RP. This suggests that the RP measured here is unlikely to
reflect preconscious motor planning or preparation of an
ensuing movement, and instead may reflect decision-related
or anticipatory processes that are non-motoric in
nature.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.011},
Key = {fds321510}
}
@article{fds321511,
Author = {Ngo, L and Kelly, M and Coutlee, CG and Carter, RM and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Huettel, SA},
Title = {Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying
Intentionality},
Journal = {Scientific Reports},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {17390},
Publisher = {Macmillan Publishers Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep17390},
Abstract = {Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about
how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality
and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental
philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge
actions leading to negative consequences as being more
intentional than those leading to positive ones. The
implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there
is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on
converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate
that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two
distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion
drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative
consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms
leads to the denial of intentionality for positive
consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to
illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments
of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in
legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining
to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among
others.},
Doi = {10.1038/srep17390},
Key = {fds321511}
}
@article{fds244859,
Author = {Clifford, S and Iyengar, V and Cabeza, R and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus
database of scenarios based on moral foundations
theory.},
Journal = {Behavior research methods},
Volume = {47},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1178-1198},
Year = {2015},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1554-351X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-0551-2},
Abstract = {Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social
determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years.
The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played
an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality.
Moral psychology has responded by investigating how
different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety
of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a
validated set of moral violations that span the moral
domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on
judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the
moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by
developing and validating a large set of moral foundations
vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating
a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes
are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic
structure and complexity making them suitable for
neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our
vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral
violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor
analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the
extracted factors and existing measures of the moral
foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for
a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations
of moral cognition.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13428-014-0551-2},
Key = {fds244859}
}
@article{fds244874,
Author = {Summers, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Scrupulous agents},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {28},
Number = {7},
Pages = {947-966},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Abstract = {Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with
morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of
moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After
defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and
discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar
aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients:
perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral
thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and
reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain
whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2014.949005},
Key = {fds244874}
}
@article{fds303596,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Definition of Terrorism},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-120},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1468-5930},
Key = {fds303596}
}
@article{fds244858,
Author = {Schlegel, A and Alexander, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious
volition.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {196-203},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {1053-8100},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002},
Abstract = {The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most
controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to
its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in
action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes
both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing
that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious
will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP
indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both
volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling
of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate
that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying
feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural
processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the
experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still
occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated
movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a
conscious feeling of having willed those
movements.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002},
Key = {fds244858}
}
@article{fds244846,
Author = {Singh, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The DSM-5 Definition of Mental Disorder},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-31},
Publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
Key = {fds244846}
}
@article{fds244873,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {What's wrong? Moral understanding in psychopathic
offenders.},
Journal = {Journal of research in personality},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {175-181},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0092-6566},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.10.002},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jrp.2014.10.002},
Key = {fds244873}
}
@article{fds244965,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Are moral judgments unified?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {451-474},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.736075},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2012.736075},
Key = {fds244965}
}
@article{fds244876,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Mallett, J and Vincent, GM and Harenski, CL and Calhoun,
VD and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, MS and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Predictive accuracy in the neuroprediction of
rearrest.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {332-336},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1747-0919},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2014.907201},
Abstract = {A recently published study by the present authors reported
evidence that functional changes in the anterior cingulate
cortex within a sample of 96 criminal offenders who were
engaged in a Go/No-Go impulse control task significantly
predicted their rearrest following release from prison. In
an extended analysis, we use discrimination and calibration
techniques to test the accuracy of these predictions
relative to more traditional models and their ability to
generalize to new observations in both full and reduced
models. Modest to strong discrimination and calibration
accuracy were found, providing additional support for the
utility of neurobiological measures in predicting
rearrest.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2014.907201},
Key = {fds244876}
}
@article{fds244830,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Interview by Simon Cushing},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics},
Pages = {1-22},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244830}
}
@article{fds244919,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Kahn, RE and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kurzban, R and Robinson, PH and Kiehl, KA},
Title = {Subcomponents of psychopathy have opposing correlations with
punishment judgments.},
Journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {667-687},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23834639},
Abstract = {Psychopathy research is plagued by an enigma: Psychopaths
reliably act immorally, but they also accurately report
whether an action is morally wrong. The current study
revealed that cooperative suppressor effects and conflicting
subsets of personality traits within the construct of
psychopathy might help explain this conundrum. Among a
sample of adult male offenders (N = 100) who ranked deserved
punishment of crimes, Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)
total scores were not linearly correlated with deserved
punishment task performance. However, these null results
masked significant opposing associations between task
performance and factors of psychopathy: the PCL-R
Interpersonal/Affective (i.e., manipulative and callous)
factor was positively associated with task performance,
while the PCL-R Social Deviance (i.e., impulsive and
antisocial) factor was simultaneously negatively associated
with task performance. These relationships were qualified by
a significant interaction where the Interpersonal/Affective
traits were positively associated with task performance when
Social Deviance traits were high, but Social Deviance traits
were negatively associated with task performance when
Interpersonal/Affective traits were low. This interaction
helped reveal a significant nonlinear relationship between
PCL-R total scores and task performance such that
individuals with very low or very high PCL-R total scores
performed better than those with middle-range PCL-R total
scores. These results may explain the enigma of why
individuals with very high psychopathic traits, but not
other groups of antisocial individuals, usually have normal
moral judgment in laboratory settings, but still behave
immorally, especially in contexts where social deviance
traits have strong influence.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0033485},
Key = {fds244919}
}
@article{fds244921,
Author = {Schlegel, A and Alexander, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Barking up the wrong free: readiness potentials reflect
processes independent of conscious will.},
Journal = {Experimental brain research},
Volume = {229},
Number = {3},
Pages = {329-335},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23535835},
Abstract = {In the early 1980s, Libet found that a readiness potential
(RP) over central scalp locations begins on average several
hundred milliseconds before the reported time of awareness
of willing to move (W). Haggard and Eimer Exp Brain Res
126(1):128-133, (1999) later found no correlation between
the timing of the RP and W, suggesting that the RP does not
reflect processes causal of W. However, they did find a
positive correlation between the onset of the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP) and W, suggesting that the LRP
might reflect processes causal of W. Here, we report a
failure to replicate Haggard and Eimer's LRP finding with a
larger group of participants and several variations of their
analytical method. Although we did find a between-subject
correlation in just one of 12 related analyses of the LRP,
we crucially found no within-subject covariation between LRP
onset and W. These results suggest that the RP and LRP
reflect processes independent of will and consciousness.
This conclusion has significant implications for our
understanding of the neural basis of motor action and
potentially for arguments about free will and the causal
role of consciousness.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00221-013-3479-3},
Key = {fds244921}
}
@article{fds244920,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Vincent, GM and Harenski, CL and Calhoun, VD and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, MS and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Neuroprediction of future rearrest.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {110},
Number = {15},
Pages = {6223-6228},
Year = {2013},
Month = {April},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23536303},
Abstract = {Identification of factors that predict recurrent antisocial
behavior is integral to the social sciences, criminal
justice procedures, and the effective treatment of high-risk
individuals. Here we show that error-related brain activity
elicited during performance of an inhibitory task
prospectively predicted subsequent rearrest among adult
offenders within 4 y of release (N = 96). The odds that an
offender with relatively low anterior cingulate activity
would be rearrested were approximately double that of an
offender with high activity in this region, holding constant
other observed risk factors. These results suggest a
potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial
behavior.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1219302110},
Key = {fds244920}
}
@article{fds244850,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Preface},
Journal = {Memory and Law},
Pages = {xi},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-032304289-5.10056-6},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-032304289-5.10056-6},
Key = {fds244850}
}
@article{fds244959,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Miller, FG},
Title = {Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to
critics.},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {12-14},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23161616},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2012-100948},
Key = {fds244959}
}
@article{fds244960,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Miller, FG},
Title = {What makes killing wrong?},
Journal = {Journal of medical ethics},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {3-7},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22267342},
Abstract = {What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the
act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the
act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account
implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill
patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled,
because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital
organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead
donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible
with morality.},
Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2011-100351},
Key = {fds244960}
}
@article{fds219450,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Thalia Wheatley},
Title = {Are Moral Judgments Unified?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219450}
}
@article{fds219452,
Author = {Alexander Schlegel and Prescott Alexander and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies and Peter U. Tse and Thalia
Wheatley},
Title = {Barking Up the Wrong Free},
Journal = {Experimental Brain Research},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219452}
}
@article{fds219454,
Author = {Jana Schaich Borg and Rachel E. Kahn and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Kurzban and Paul H. Robinson and Kent A.
Kiehl},
Title = {Subcomponents of Psychopathy have Opposing Correlations with
Punishment Judgment},
Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {667-687},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219454}
}
@article{fds244964,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A new look
at the moral/conventional distinction.},
Journal = {Journal of abnormal psychology},
Volume = {121},
Number = {2},
Pages = {484-497},
Year = {2012},
Month = {May},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21842959},
Abstract = {A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests
that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish
between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present
study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which
109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of
psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional
transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated
healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic
Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a
forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the
present study found that total psychopathy score did not
predict performance on the task. Task performance was
explained by some individual subfacets of psychopathy and by
other variables unrelated to psychopathy, such as IQ. The
authors conclude that, contrary to earlier claims,
insufficient data exist to infer that psychopathic
individuals cannot know what is morally wrong.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0024796},
Key = {fds244964}
}
@article{fds244962,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Does Morality Have an Essence?},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {194-197},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1047-840X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000304680300016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2012.666653},
Key = {fds244962}
}
@article{fds244972,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Bibas, S and Grafton, S and Kiehl, KA and Mansfield,
A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga, M},
Title = {Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the
Stage.},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-99},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1874-5490},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000302482700009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {In this paper, our goal is to (a) survey some of the legal
contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays
a prominent role, (b) explore whether developments in
neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our
ability to predict violence, and (c) discuss whether
neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal
or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems
already associated with prediction more generally. In
"Violence Risk Assessment and the Law", we briefly examine
the role currently played by predictions of violence in
three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing
("Violence Risk Assessment and Capital Sentencing"), civil
commitment hearings ("Violence Risk Assessment and Civil
Commitment"), and "sexual predator" statutes ("Violence Risk
Assessment and Sexual Predator Statutes"). In "Clinical vs.
Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment", we briefly examine the
distinction between traditional clinical methods of
predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial
methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR) software created by John Monahan and colleagues as
part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence
[1]. In "The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy", we explore
what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural
correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific
research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some
recent advances in both data collection ("Cutting-Edge Data
Collection: Genetically Informed Neuroimaging") and data
analysis ("Cutting-Edge Data Analysis: Pattern
Classification") that we believe will play an important role
when it comes to future neuroscientific research on
violence. In "The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction", we
discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to
improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in
"The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction", we explore some
potential evidentiary ("Evidentiary Issues"), constitutional
("Constitutional Issues"), and moral ("Moral Issues") issues
that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of
violence.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12152-010-9095-z},
Key = {fds244972}
}
@article{fds244961,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and
Perils},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {7},
Number = {9},
Pages = {631-642},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00494.x},
Abstract = {Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system
for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility,
and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both
promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the
admissibility of neuroscientific evidence. © 2012 The
Authors.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00494.x},
Key = {fds244961}
}
@article{fds244963,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Wheatley, T},
Title = {The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to
Philosophy},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {95},
Number = {3},
Pages = {355-377},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2012},
ISSN = {0026-9662},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/42751157},
Doi = {10.2307/42751157},
Key = {fds244963}
}
@article{fds244968,
Author = {Parkinson, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Koralus, PE and Mendelovici, A and McGeer, V and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems
underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and
disgust.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {23},
Number = {10},
Pages = {3162-3180},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21452951},
Abstract = {Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis
of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether
"moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied
scientifically as a unified category. We tested this
assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of
moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm,
dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment
of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems
for each of the different moral areas and that these
differences were much more robust than differences in
wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest,
disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited
networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing,
affective processing, and action understanding,
respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region
activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in
comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was
also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not
to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role
that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral
decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not
a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather,
instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged
differentially depending on the type of transgression being
judged.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_00017},
Key = {fds244968}
}
@article{fds244969,
Author = {Schweitzer, NJ and Saks, MJ and Murphy, ER and Roskies, AL and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gaudet, LM},
Title = {Neuroimages as evidence in a mens rea defense: No
Impact},
Journal = {Psychology, Public Policy, and Law},
Volume = {17},
Number = {3},
Pages = {357-393},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {1076-8971},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000293926000002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Recent developments in the neuropsychology of criminal
behavior have given rise to concerns that neuroimaging
evidence (such as MRI and functional MRI [fMRI] images)
could unduly influence jurors. Across four experiments, a
nationally representative sample of 1,476 jury-eligible
participants evaluated written summaries of criminal cases
in which expert testimony was presented in support of a
mental disorder as exculpatory. The evidence varied in the
extent to which it presented neuroscientific explanations
and neuroimages in support of the expert's conclusion.
Despite suggestive findings from previous research, we found
no evidence that neuroimagery affected jurors' judgments
(verdicts, sentence recommendations, judgments of the
defendant's culpability) over and above verbal
neuroscience-based testimony. A meta-analysis of our four
experiments confirmed these findings. In addition, we found
that neuroscientific evidence was more effective than
clinical psychological evidence in persuading jurors that
the defendant's disorder reduced his capacity to control his
actions, although this effect did not translate into
differences in verdicts. © 2011 American Psychological
Association.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0023581},
Key = {fds244969}
}
@article{fds244967,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Calhoun, VD and Kiehl,
KA},
Title = {Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {6},
Number = {4},
Pages = {398-413},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21590588},
Abstract = {How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a
fundamental question of both the sciences and the
humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes
that underlie the specific conclusion that something is
morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction
between "moral deliberation," or the weighing of moral
considerations, and the formation of a "moral verdict," or
the commitment to one moral conclusion. We predict and
identify hemodynamic activity in the bilateral anterior
insula and basal ganglia that correlates with committing to
the moral verdict "this is morally wrong" as opposed to
"this is morally not-wrong," a finding that is consistent
with research from economic decision-making. Using
comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-locked
analyses, we also demonstrate that hemodynamic activity in
high-level cortical regions previously implicated in
morality--including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal
junction--correlates primarily with moral deliberation as
opposed to moral verdicts. These findings provide new
insights into what types of processes comprise the
enterprise of moral judgment, and in doing so point to a
framework for resolving why some clinical patients,
including psychopaths, may have intact moral judgment but
impaired moral behavior.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2011.559363},
Key = {fds244967}
}
@article{fds244971,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Emotion and reliability in moral psychology},
Journal = {Emotion Review},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {288-289},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Editor = {Joshua Greene},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1754-0739},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000306274600019&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based
on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate
the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of
framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under
different conditions by different people. © The Author(s)
2011.},
Doi = {10.1177/1754073911402382},
Key = {fds244971}
}
@article{fds197256,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from
Peay},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {245-248},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197256}
}
@article{fds244966,
Author = {Sinnott Armstrong and W},
Title = {Neurolaw and Consciousness Detection},
Journal = {Cortex},
Volume = {47},
Number = {10},
Pages = {1246-1247},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.021},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.021},
Key = {fds244966}
}
@article{fds244860,
Author = {Cope, L and Borg, JS and Harenski, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Lieberman, D and Nyalakanti, PK and Calhoun, VD and Kieh,
K},
Title = {Hemispheric Asymmetries During Processing of Immoral
Stimuli},
Journal = {Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience},
Volume = {2},
Number = {110},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244860}
}
@article{fds244954,
Author = {O'Hara, RE and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sinnott-Armstrong,
NA},
Title = {Wording effects in moral judgments},
Journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
Volume = {5},
Number = {7},
Pages = {547-554},
Editor = {Jonathan Baron},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1930-2975},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000285745100009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative
to compare results across studies in order to create unified
theories within the field. These efforts are potentially
undermined, however, by variations in wording used by
different researchers. The current study sought to determine
whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral
judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different
moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4
adjectives: "wrong", "inappropriate", "forbidden", or
"blameworthy". For half of the sample, these adjectives were
preceded by the adverb "morally". Results indicated that
people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or
inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that
disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when "morally"
was included. Although some wording differences emerged,
effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral
judgment with different wordings can legitimately be
compared.},
Key = {fds244954}
}
@article{fds244854,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Preface},
Journal = {Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin
Libet},
Volume = {205-208},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-2},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cma.2011.05.012},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cma.2011.05.012},
Key = {fds244854}
}
@article{fds244973,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how
moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality
and causation},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {349-350},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0140-525X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000284381100055&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a
continuum to explain how moral judgments influence
intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask
(1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they
exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3)
how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant
alternatives when applying such notions. © 2010 Cambridge
University Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X1000186X},
Key = {fds244973}
}
@article{fds244958,
Author = {May, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Hull, JG and Zimmerman,
A},
Title = {Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge
Attributions: an Empirical Study.},
Journal = {Review of philosophy and psychology},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {265-273},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1878-5158},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22558061},
Abstract = {In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge,
Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several
bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that
Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions
about these cases. Additionally, we test the empirical
claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make, regarding the
salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley. Our
data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error
nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing
knowledge to denying it. However, the raising of stakes (but
not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people
have in their attributions of knowledge. We argue that our
data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our
common-sense judgments about such cases are.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-009-0014-3},
Key = {fds244958}
}
@article{fds244974,
Author = {Miller, MB and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Young, L and King, D and Paggi,
A and Fabri, M and Polonara, G and Gazzaniga, MS},
Title = {Abnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy
patients.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {48},
Number = {7},
Pages = {2215-2220},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20188113},
Abstract = {Recent neuroimaging studies suggest lateralized cerebral
mechanisms in the right temporal parietal junction are
involved in complex social and moral reasoning, such as
ascribing beliefs to others. Based on this evidence, we
tested 3 anterior-resected and 3 complete callosotomy
patients along with 22 normal subjects on a reasoning task
that required verbal moral judgments. All 6 patients based
their judgments primarily on the outcome of the actions,
disregarding the beliefs of the agents. The similarity in
performance between complete and partial callosotomy
patients suggests that normal judgments of morality require
full interhemispheric integration of information critically
supported by the right temporal parietal junction and right
frontal processes.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.02.021},
Key = {fds244974}
}
@article{fds244949,
Author = {Belcher, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neurolaw.},
Journal = {Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive
science},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {18-22},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1939-5078},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000298171200004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Less than three decades ago, the fields of cognitive
psychology and neuroscience joined forces to form cognitive
neuroscience. More recently, neuroscience has combined with
social psychology and with economics to produce social
neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Each of these amalgamations
has been revolutionary in its own way. Neurolaw extends this
trend. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further
resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs
website.},
Doi = {10.1002/wcs.8},
Key = {fds244949}
}
@article{fds244908,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from
Peay},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244908}
}
@article{fds244970,
Author = {Walter Sinnott Armstrong},
Title = {Does Good Need God?},
Journal = {Encompass Ethics Magazine},
Volume = {Spring},
Pages = {40-43},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244970}
}
@article{fds244941,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral perception and heuristics},
Journal = {Modern Schoolman},
Volume = {86},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {327-347},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Editor = {John Greco},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0026-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000207873600007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.5840/schoolman2009863/47},
Key = {fds244941}
}
@article{fds244922,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How strong is this obligation? An argument for
consequentialism from concomitant variation},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {69},
Number = {3},
Pages = {438-442},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000268568600005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/40607654},
Key = {fds244922}
}
@article{fds244931,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {MIXED-UP META-ETHICS},
Journal = {NOUS},
Pages = {235-256},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000207925600012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244931}
}
@article{fds244937,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Précis of moral scepticisms},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {77},
Number = {3},
Pages = {789-793},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260337800012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00222.x},
Key = {fds244937}
}
@article{fds244942,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Replies to copp, timmons, and railton},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {77},
Number = {3},
Pages = {820-836},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260337800016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00226.x},
Key = {fds244942}
}
@article{fds244811,
Author = {Sinnott‐armstrong, W},
Title = {REPLIES TO DREIER AND MCNAUGHTON},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {49},
Number = {3},
Pages = {218-228},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8051},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2008.00463.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0149.2008.00463.x},
Key = {fds244811}
}
@article{fds244918,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A contrastivist manifesto},
Journal = {Social Epistemology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {257-270},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0269-1728},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691720802546120},
Abstract = {General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are
relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to
explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy
(reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief),
and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue
paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an
account of justified belief that is compatible with
reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also
provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on
suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant.
This view contrasts with contextualism, invariantism, and
Schaffer's contrastivism.},
Doi = {10.1080/02691720802546120},
Key = {fds244918}
}
@article{fds244956,
Author = {Cushman, F and Knobe, J and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {108},
Number = {1},
Pages = {281-289},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0010-0277},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18377886},
Abstract = {An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction
between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping
moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of
experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral
appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically,
morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as
actively 'doing' than as passively 'allowing'. This finding
adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral
appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We
therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view
that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping
diverse cognitive representations across multiple
domains.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.005},
Key = {fds244956}
}
@article{fds244926,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Is moral phenomenology unified?},
Journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {85-97},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1568-7759},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000264104200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral
judgment is not unified across different areas of morality
(involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or
even across different relations to harm. Common responses,
such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt
demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too
narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to
capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The
disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible
with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology
and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of
morality. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11097-007-9065-z},
Key = {fds244926}
}
@article{fds244957,
Author = {Aharoni, E and Funk, C and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Gazzaniga,
M},
Title = {Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal
responsibility? Lessons from law and neuroscience.},
Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
Volume = {1124},
Pages = {145-160},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0077-8923},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18400929},
Abstract = {Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal
responsibility? To answer this question, we must first
specify legal criteria for criminal responsibility and then
ask how neurological findings can be used to determine
whether particular defendants meet those criteria. Cognitive
neuroscience may speak to at least two familiar conditions
of criminal responsibility: intention and sanity. Functional
neuroimaging studies in motor planning, awareness of
actions, agency, social contract reasoning, and theory of
mind, among others, have recently targeted a small
assortment of brain networks thought to be instrumental in
such determinations. Advances in each of these areas bring
specificity to the problems underlying the application of
neuroscience to criminal law.},
Doi = {10.1196/annals.1440.007},
Key = {fds244957}
}
@article{fds244924,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mallon, R and McCoy, T and Hull,
JG},
Title = {Intention, temporal order, and moral judgments},
Journal = {Mind and Language},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {90-106},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252400500007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect
claims that agents' intentions affect whether acts are
morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents'
intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong,
whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects
whether acts are classified as killings. This finding
suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the
classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims
that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen
as causing effects intentionally rather than as side
effects. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00330.x},
Key = {fds244924}
}
@article{fds244875,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Brown, T and Murphy,
E},
Title = {Brain Images as Legal Evidence},
Journal = {Episteme},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {359-373},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1742-3600},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/E1742360008000452},
Abstract = {This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as
evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, which weighs probative value against the danger of
being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders.
The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research
relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the
probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility
is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to
be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments
that will directly assess how jurors are influenced by brain
images. © 2008, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.3366/E1742360008000452},
Key = {fds244875}
}
@article{fds244927,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moderate classy pyrrhonian moral scepticism},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {448-456},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000256690000005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This précis summarizes my book 'Moral Skepticisms', with
emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral
belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on
meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral
epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral
philosophers. © 2008 The Author.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.553.x},
Key = {fds244927}
}
@article{fds244929,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw},
Journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {478-488},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000256690000009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {I reply to comments by Gerry Hough, Peter Baumann and
Martijn Blaauw on my book Moral Skepticisms. The main issues
concern whether modest justifiedness is epistemic and how it
is related to extreme justifiedness; how contrastivists can
handle crazy contrast classes, indeterminacy and common
language; whether Pyrrhonian scepticism leads to paralysis
in decision-making or satisfies our desires to evaluate
beliefs as justified or not; and how contextualists can
respond to my arguments against relevance of contrast
classes. © 2008 The Author.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.561.x},
Key = {fds244929}
}
@article{fds244812,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticisms},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {49},
Number = {3},
Pages = {193-196},
Publisher = {Wiley: No OnlineOpen},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244812}
}
@article{fds244872,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {232},
Pages = {448-456},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {0031-8094},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208637},
Abstract = {This précis summarizes my book 'Moral Skepticisms', with
emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral
belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on
meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral
epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral
philosophers.},
Doi = {10.2307/40208637},
Key = {fds244872}
}
@article{fds244907,
Author = {Kranzler, HR and Li, TK},
Title = {What is addiction?},
Journal = {Alcohol Research and Health},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {93-95},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry},
Editor = {William Fulford},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1535-7414},
Abstract = {This issue of Alcohol Research & Health examines
addiction to multiple substances - that is, combined
dependence on alcohol and other drugs (AODs), including
marijuana, cocaine, and opioids. It seems fitting, then, to
begin the issue with a look at what constitutes "addiction."
The Oxford English Dictionary (pp. 24-25) traces the term
addiction to Roman law, under which addiction was a "formal
giving over by sentence of court; hence, a dedication of
person to a master." This notion of relinquishment of
control by the addicted person is the central feature of
many lay and professional definitions of the term. The study
of addictive behavior crosses several disciplines,
including, among others, behavioral neuroscience,
epidemiology, genetics, molecular biology, pharmacology,
psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. Articles in this
issue examine aspects of AOD use disorders from the
perspective of some of these varied disciplines.},
Key = {fds244907}
}
@article{fds244814,
Author = {Grafton, ST and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP and Gazzaniga, SI and Gazzaniga, MS},
Title = {Brain Scans Go Legal},
Journal = {Scientific American Mind},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {30-37},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1555-2284},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamericanmind1206-30},
Doi = {10.1038/scientificamericanmind1206-30},
Key = {fds244814}
}
@article{fds244813,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Which Evidence Law? A Response to Schauer},
Journal = {PENNumbra, The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review},
Volume = {155},
Number = {1},
Pages = {129-133},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds244813}
}
@article{fds244955,
Author = {Schaich Borg and J and Hynes, C and Van Horn and J and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Consequences, action, and intention as factors in moral
judgments: an FMRI investigation.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {803-817},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0898-929X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16768379},
Abstract = {The traditional philosophical doctrines of Consequentialism,
Doing and Allowing, and Double Effect prescribe that moral
judgments and decisions should be based on consequences,
action (as opposed to inaction), and intention. This study
uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate
how these three factors affect brain processes associated
with moral judgments. We find the following: (1) Moral
scenarios involving only a choice between consequences with
different amounts of harm elicit activity in similar areas
of the brain as analogous non-moral scenarios; (2) Compared
to analogous non-moral scenarios, moral scenarios in which
action and inaction result in the same amount of harm elicit
more activity in areas associated with cognition (such as
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and less activity in
areas associated with emotion (such as the orbitofrontal
cortex and temporal pole); (3) Compared to analogous
non-moral scenarios, conflicts between goals of minimizing
harm and of refraining from harmful action elicit more
activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal
cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas
associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and
superior frontal gyrus); (4) Compared to moral scenarios
involving only unintentional harm, moral scenarios involving
intentional harm elicit more activity in areas associated
with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and
less activity in areas associated with cognition (including
the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus). These
findings suggest that different kinds of moral judgment are
preferentially supported by distinguishable brain
systems.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn.2006.18.5.803},
Key = {fds244955}
}
@article{fds244917,
Author = {Howarth, RB and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {Advances in the Economics of Environmental
Resources},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {xi-xx},
Publisher = {Emerald (MCB UP )},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1569-3740},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05016-9},
Doi = {10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05016-9},
Key = {fds244917}
}
@article{fds244928,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {You ought to be ashamed of yourself (when you violate an
imperfect moral obligation)},
Journal = {NOUS},
Pages = {193-208},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000235231600013&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244928}
}
@article{fds244815,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation},
Journal = {San Diego Law Review},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {465-492},
Publisher = {University of San Diego},
Year = {2005},
ISSN = {0036-4037},
Key = {fds244815}
}
@article{fds244938,
Author = {SINNOTT‐ARMSTRONG, W},
Title = {Experience and Foundationalism in Audi's The Architecture
of Reason},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {181-187},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185605800010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00032.x},
Key = {fds244938}
}
@article{fds244915,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {For goodness' sake},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {41},
Number = {SUPPL.},
Pages = {83-91},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00977.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00977.x},
Key = {fds244915}
}
@article{fds244817,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture
of Reason},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {181-187},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
Key = {fds244817}
}
@article{fds244945,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Weak and Strong Judicial Review},
Journal = {Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3/4},
Pages = {381-392},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000183942400008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/3505113},
Key = {fds244945}
}
@article{fds244940,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Recusal and Bush v. Gore},
Journal = {Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {221-248},
Publisher = {Test accounts},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174360900006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1014574117133},
Key = {fds244940}
}
@article{fds244943,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Malhotra, A},
Title = {How to avoid deviance (in logic)},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {215-236},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0144-5340},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000180233500004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {We show that classical two-valued logic is included in weak
extensions of normal three-valued logics and also that
normal three-valued logics are best viewed not as deviant
logics but instead as strong extensions of classical
two-valued logic obtained by adding a modal operator and the
right axioms. This article develops a general method for
formulating the right axioms to construct a two-valued
system with theorems that correspond to all of the logical
truths of any normal three-valued logic. The extended
classical system can then express anything that can be
expressed in the three-valued logic, so there can be no
reason to abandon two-valued logic in favor of three-valued
logic. Moreover, the two-valued modal system is preferable,
because it enables us to study interactions of different
operators with different rationales. It also makes it easier
to introduce quantifiers and iteration. Nothing is lost and
much is gained by choosing the extended two-valued approach
over normal three-valued logics. © 2002 Taylor & Francis
Group, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1080/01445340210154394},
Key = {fds244943}
}
@article{fds244948,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Sparrow, D},
Title = {A light theory of color},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {110},
Number = {3},
Pages = {267-284},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000179261000004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Traditional theories locate color in primary qualities of
objects, in dispositional properties of objects, in visual
fields, or nowhere. In contrast, we argue that color is
located in properties of light. More specifically, light is
red iff there is a property P of the light that typically
interacts with normal human perceivers to give the sensation
of red. This is an error theory, because objects and visual
fields that appear red are not really red, since they lack
the properties that make light red. We show how this light
theory solves or avoids problems that afflict its
competitors. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1020608528373},
Key = {fds244948}
}
@article{fds244932,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What's in a Contrast Class?},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {62},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-84},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000173469000014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/3329072},
Key = {fds244932}
}
@article{fds244952,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder},
Journal = {Utilitas},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {342-349},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800003228},
Abstract = {If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do
X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X,
then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle
is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It
can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but
not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral
theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that
this argument fails to establish consequentialism as
understood by ‘most philosophers’, because it fails to
establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing
consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from
utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder
also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory
that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I
respond that her explanation cannot be completed without
introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories.
© 2001, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0953820800003228},
Key = {fds244952}
}
@article{fds244818,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Behnke, S},
Title = {Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder: The Vexing
Problems of Personhood and Responsibility},
Journal = {Southern California Interdisciplinary Law
Journal},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-296},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {1077-0704},
Key = {fds244818}
}
@article{fds244946,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Expressivism and Embedding},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {61},
Number = {3},
Pages = {677-677},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {2000},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000165224900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2653618},
Key = {fds244946}
}
@article{fds244936,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Behnke, S},
Title = {Responsibility in cases of multiple personality
disorder},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {34},
Number = {SUPPL. 14},
Pages = {301-323},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2000},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000165836300016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.16},
Key = {fds244936}
}
@article{fds244914,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {From 'is' to 'ought' in moral epistemology},
Journal = {Argumentation},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {159-174},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0920-427X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007861512274},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can
have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral
conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently
proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine: All
of Dahlia's beliefs are true. Dahlia believes that Bertie
morally ought to marry Madeleine. ∴ Bertie morally ought
to marry Madeleine. I argue that Nelson's universal premise
has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid
formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs
essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that
Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is
used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a
moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral
belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme
views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against
moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in
believing the conjunction of its premises without depending
on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus,
arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important
in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited. ©
2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1007861512274},
Key = {fds244914}
}
@article{fds244933,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Begging the question},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {77},
Number = {2},
Pages = {174-191},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081467900004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409912348921},
Key = {fds244933}
}
@article{fds244819,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {"MPP, RIP" RIP},
Journal = {Philosophical Papers},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {125-131},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0556-8641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568649909506596},
Doi = {10.1080/05568649909506596},
Key = {fds244819}
}
@article{fds244913,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Entrapment in the Net?},
Journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {95-104},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1388-1957},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1010059427954},
Abstract = {Internet stings to catch child molesters raise problems for
popular tests of entrapment that focus on causation,
initiative, counterfactuals, and subjective predisposition.
An objective test of entrapment works better in the context
of the Internet. The best form of objective test is
determined by consequences of drawing a line at various
places. This approach allows some Internet stings but counts
other stings as entrapment when they go too far. © 1999
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the
Netherlands.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1010059427954},
Key = {fds244913}
}
@article{fds244930,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some varieties of particularism},
Journal = {Metaphilosophy},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-12},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0026-1068},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081248900001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral
wrongness are about particular acts rather than general
principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what
makes true moral judgments true is not general principles
but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological
particularism claims that studying particular acts apart
from general principles can justify beliefs in moral
judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will
do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at
each particular decision as it arises and give up the search
for a complete moral theory. This paper raises problems for
each of these versions of particularism. © Metaphilosophy
LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-9973.00108},
Key = {fds244930}
}
@article{fds244950,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Argument for Descriptivism},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-291},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000081656600006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00868.x},
Key = {fds244950}
}
@article{fds244790,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Perspectival Theory of Law},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy},
Volume = {24},
Pages = {27-55},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {1440-4982},
Key = {fds244790}
}
@article{fds244939,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {You Can't Lose What You Ain't Never Had: A Reply to Marquis
on Abortion},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
Volume = {96},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-72},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000082721700004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/4320972},
Key = {fds244939}
}
@article{fds244953,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Nihilism and scepticism about moral obligations},
Journal = {Utilitas},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {217-236},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002053},
Abstract = {<jats:p>There are many disagreements about<jats:italic>what</jats:italic>people
have moral obligations to do, but almost everyone believes
that<jats:italic>some</jats:italic>people
have<jats:italic>some</jats:italic>moral obligations.
Moreover, there are some moral obligations in which almost
everyone believes. For example, if I promise to give a talk
at this conference, I have a moral obligation to do so. Of
course, my obligation might be overridden. Moreover, even if
my obligation were overridden, I would still
have<jats:italic>a</jats:italic>moral obligation to give a
talk at this conference.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S0953820800002053},
Key = {fds244953}
}
@article{fds244820,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Truth of Performatives},
Journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {99-107},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1994},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0967-2559},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570785},
Doi = {10.1080/09672559408570785},
Key = {fds244820}
}
@article{fds244912,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some Problems for Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
Volume = {69},
Number = {2/3},
Pages = {297-313},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4320388},
Abstract = {I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the
traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of
these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up
expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not
really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some
ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about
morality which have at most indirect connections to his
expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later
discussions of hyperscepticism (180), parochialism (203
ff.), and indirect pragmatism (224). These views could still
be developed even if he gave up expressivism. All I have
tried to show here is that he does need to give up
expressivism unless he can solve the problems that I have
raised. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.2307/4320388},
Key = {fds244912}
}
@article{fds244869,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Risks, National Defense, and Nuclear Deterrence},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {345-362},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435816},
Doi = {10.2307/40435816},
Key = {fds244869}
}
@article{fds244870,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Argument for Consequentialism},
Journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {399-421},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {1520-8583},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214254},
Doi = {10.2307/2214254},
Key = {fds244870}
}
@article{fds244821,
Author = {Donohue, L and Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {20 YEARS OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1 S},
Pages = {217-229},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {2041-6962},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00623.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00623.x},
Key = {fds244821}
}
@article{fds244822,
Author = {Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {MORAL EXPERIENCE AND JUSTIFICATION},
Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1 S},
Pages = {89-96},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0038-4283},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00614.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00614.x},
Key = {fds244822}
}
@article{fds244823,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The wrongful intentions principle},
Journal = {Philosophical Papers},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-24},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0556-8641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568649109506350},
Doi = {10.1080/05568649109506350},
Key = {fds244823}
}
@article{fds333209,
Author = {SINNOTT‐ARMSTRONG, W},
Title = {On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {115-120},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00412.x},
Abstract = {ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz
defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of
violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people,
with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a
course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue
that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring
that the harm or threat be to persons other than those
intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern
action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who know they
are terrorists from those who do not. Copyright © 1991,
Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00412.x},
Key = {fds333209}
}
@article{fds244862,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Moor, J and Fogelin, R},
Title = {A Defence of Modus Tollens},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {50},
Number = {1},
Pages = {9-16},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3328201},
Doi = {10.2307/3328201},
Key = {fds244862}
}
@article{fds244911,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Promises which cannot be kept},
Journal = {Philosophia},
Volume = {18},
Number = {4},
Pages = {399-407},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1988},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0048-3893},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02380651},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02380651},
Key = {fds244911}
}
@article{fds244910,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A resolution of a paradox of promising},
Journal = {Philosophia},
Volume = {17},
Number = {4},
Pages = {572},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1987},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0048-3893},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02381077},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02381077},
Key = {fds244910}
}
@article{fds244864,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and 'Ought and Ought Not'},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-139},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0045-5091},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231517},
Doi = {10.2307/40231517},
Key = {fds244864}
}
@article{fds244868,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {84},
Number = {5},
Pages = {263-276},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026753},
Doi = {10.2307/2026753},
Key = {fds244868}
}
@article{fds244871,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Insanity vs. Irrationality},
Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
Volume = {1},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-21},
Year = {1987},
ISSN = {0887-0373},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435648},
Doi = {10.2307/40435648},
Key = {fds244871}
}
@article{fds244863,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Moor, J and Fogelin, R},
Title = {A Defense of Modus Ponens},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {83},
Number = {5},
Pages = {296-300},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026144},
Doi = {10.2307/2026144},
Key = {fds244863}
}
@article{fds244861,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Solution to Forrester's Paradox of Gentle
Murder},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {82},
Number = {3},
Pages = {162-168},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026353},
Doi = {10.2307/2026353},
Key = {fds244861}
}
@article{fds244866,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {'Ought to Have' and 'Could Have'},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {44-48},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0003-2638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3327403},
Doi = {10.2307/3327403},
Key = {fds244866}
}
@article{fds244867,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {321-329},
Year = {1985},
ISSN = {0003-0481},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014112},
Doi = {10.2307/20014112},
Key = {fds244867}
}
@article{fds244865,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {`Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {93},
Number = {2},
Pages = {249-261},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1984},
ISSN = {0031-8108},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184585},
Doi = {10.2307/2184585},
Key = {fds244865}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds362231,
Author = {McElfresh, DC and Chan, L and Doyle, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V and Borg, JS and Dickerson, JP},
Title = {Indecision Modeling.},
Journal = {AAAI},
Pages = {5975-5983},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Year = {2021},
ISBN = {978-1-57735-866-4},
Key = {fds362231}
}
@article{fds349037,
Author = {Chan, L and Doyle, K and McElfresh, DC and Conitzer, V and Dickerson,
JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of
AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.},
Journal = {AIES},
Pages = {214-220},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Markham, AN and Powles, J and Walsh, T and Washington,
AL},
Year = {2020},
ISBN = {978-1-4503-7110-0},
Key = {fds349037}
}
@article{fds341335,
Author = {Kramer, MF and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?},
Journal = {AIES 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society},
Pages = {204-209},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Abstract = {AI systems are now or will soon be sophisticated enough to
make consequential decisions. Although this technology has
flourished, we also need public appraisals of AI systems
playing these more important roles. This article reports
surveys of preferences for and against AI systems making
decisions in various domains as well as experiments that
intervene on these preferences. We find that these
preferences are contingent on subjects' previous exposure to
computer systems making these kinds of decisions, and some
interventions designed to mimic previous exposure
successfully encourage subjects to be more hospitable to
computer systems making these weighty decisions.},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278752},
Key = {fds341335}
}
@article{fds347785,
Author = {Freedman, R and Schaich Borg and J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Dickerson, JP and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human
Values},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society},
Pages = {115-115},
Publisher = {ACM},
Editor = {Furman, J and Marchant, GE and Price, H and Rossi,
F},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781450360128},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278727},
Key = {fds347785}
}
@article{fds336427,
Author = {Freedman, R and Dickerson, JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
values},
Journal = {32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI
2018},
Pages = {1636-1643},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {McIlraith, SA and Weinberger, KQ},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577358008},
Abstract = {The efficient allocation of limited resources is a classical
problem in economics and computer science. In kidney
exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney
donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors
in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights
decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation
algorithm that determines who get what-and who does not. In
this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for
estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a
kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list
of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the
purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical
characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask
subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and
estimate weights in a principled way from their responses.
We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market
clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the
weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical
values of the weights we computed matter little, other than
the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared
to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant
effect, with certain classes of patients being
(de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
judgments.},
Key = {fds336427}
}
@article{fds336429,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Mathematics, ISAIM 2018},
Pages = {4831-4835},
Publisher = {AAAI Press},
Editor = {Singh, SP and Markovitch, S},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds336429}
}
@article{fds329371,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schaich Borg and J and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence},
Pages = {4831-4835},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds329371}
}
@article{fds336428,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Borg, JS and Deng, Y and Kramer, M},
Title = {Moral decision making frameworks for artificial
intelligence},
Journal = {AAAI Workshop - Technical Report},
Volume = {WS-17-01 - WS-17-15},
Pages = {105-109},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781577357865},
Abstract = {The generality of decision and game theory has enabled
domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a
better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can
be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a
general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision
making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we
then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In
this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this
conclusion.},
Key = {fds336428}
}
@article{fds244947,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Explanation and justification in moral epistemology},
Journal = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY,
VOL 1},
Pages = {117-127},
Publisher = {PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CTR},
Editor = {Brinkmann, K},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {1-889680-05-2},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086292600012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244947}
}
%% Papers Accepted
@article{fds197271,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {How Religion Undermines Compromise},
Booktitle = {Religion and Conflict: Empirical Perspectives},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Stephen Clarke and Russell Powell},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197271}
}
@article{fds197267,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Free Contrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Martijn Blaauw},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197267}
}
@article{fds197268,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Neil Levy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197268}
}
@article{fds197270,
Author = {Anders Sandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Julian
Savulescu},
Title = {The Memory of Jurors: Enhancing Trial Performance},
Booktitle = {Memory and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Lynn Nadel and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds197270}
}
@article{fds183866,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology},
Journal = {Emotion Review},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds183866}
}
@article{fds183867,
Author = {Lora Cope and Jana Schaich Borg and Carla Harenski and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Debra Lieberman and Prashanth K. Nyalakanti and Vince D. Calhoun and Kent Kiehl},
Title = {Unique Hemispheric Laterality During Processing of Immoral
Stimuli},
Journal = {Frontiers},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds183867}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds244935,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Why We Laugh Inside Jokes Using Humor to
Reverse-Engineer the Mind by Matthew M. Hurley,
Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams Jr. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011. 373 pp. $29.95, £22.95. ISBN
9780262015820.},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {332},
Number = {6035},
Pages = {1265-1265},
Publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0036-8075},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000291441700027&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:p>Contemplating why we find some things funny, the
authors provide cognitive and evolutionary perspectives on
humor and its importance to humans.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1206802},
Key = {fds244935}
}
@article{fds244906,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Alfred R. Mele’s Effective Intentions: The Power of
Conscious Will},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {51},
Number = {3},
Pages = {127-143},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244906}
}
@article{fds244925,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Responsibility and fault},
Journal = {LAW AND PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {103-106},
Publisher = {KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0167-5249},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000167317100005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244925}
}
@article{fds244951,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Value judgment: Improving our ethical beliefs},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH},
Volume = {60},
Number = {1},
Pages = {237-240},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {0031-8205},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084910400025&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244951}
}
@article{fds244923,
Author = {Sinnott‐Armstrong, W},
Title = {Book ReviewRuth Chang, , ed.Incommensurability,
Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. ix+303. $57.50 (cloth);
$24.95 (paper).},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {110},
Number = {1},
Pages = {190-192},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000083491100009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/233210},
Key = {fds244923}
}
@article{fds244844,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {191-193},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {1572-8447},
Key = {fds244844}
}
@article{fds244843,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality, Normativity, and Society},
Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
Volume = {105},
Number = {4},
Pages = {552-554},
Year = {1996},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds244843}
}
@article{fds244842,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Morality and Action},
Journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {193-196},
Year = {1996},
ISSN = {0967-2559},
Key = {fds244842}
}
@article{fds244841,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Structure of Justification},
Journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {45},
Number = {180},
Pages = {394-397},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1995},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1467-9213},
Key = {fds244841}
}
@article{fds244840,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Imagination},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {103},
Number = {411},
Pages = {381-384},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option
G},
Year = {1994},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1460-2113},
Key = {fds244840}
}
@article{fds244839,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Human Morality},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {235-239},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244839}
}
@article{fds244838,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Playing by the Rules},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {116-118},
Year = {1992},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244838}
}
@article{fds244837,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
Davidson},
Journal = {Nous},
Pages = {120-123},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {1468-0068},
Key = {fds244837}
}
@article{fds244836,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {30},
Number = {3},
Pages = {183-185},
Year = {1989},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1468-0149},
Key = {fds244836}
}
@article{fds244835,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Spreading the Word},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {48},
Number = {1},
Pages = {163-166},
Publisher = {Wiley: 24 months},
Year = {1987},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1933-1592},
Key = {fds244835}
}
@article{fds244834,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine,},
Volume = {75},
Number = {9},
Pages = {18-20},
Year = {1983},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds244834}
}
@article{fds244833,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Life of the Mind},
Journal = {Grolier’s Masterplots: 1979 Annual},
Pages = {196-199},
Publisher = {Grolier Enterprises},
Year = {1979},
Key = {fds244833}
}
%% Articles and Chapters
@article{fds376731,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {206-221},
Booktitle = {The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics: 2Nd Edition},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350217881},
Key = {fds376731}
}
@article{fds367687,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Cameron, CD},
Title = {Some potential philosophical lessons of implicit moral
attitudes},
Pages = {564-583},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780198871712},
Key = {fds367687}
}
@article{fds376285,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Responsibility without (Some Kinds of)
Freedom},
Pages = {91-114},
Booktitle = {Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and
Responsibility},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350188082},
Key = {fds376285}
}
@article{fds365846,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
Title = {How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever
Achieve?},
Pages = {269-289},
Booktitle = {Rethinking Moral Status},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780192894076},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0016},
Abstract = {Philosophers often argue about whether fetuses, animals, or
AI systems do or do not have moral status. We will suggest
instead that different entities have different degrees of
moral status with respect to different moral reasons in
different circumstances for different purposes. Recognizing
this variability of moral status will help to resolve some
but not all debates about the potential moral status of AI
systems in particular.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0016},
Key = {fds365846}
}
@article{fds352991,
Author = {Skorburg, JA and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Some ethics of deep brain stimulation},
Pages = {117-132},
Booktitle = {Global Mental Health and Neuroethics},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128150641},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-815063-4.00008-3},
Abstract = {Case reports about patients undergoing deep brain
stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric
disorders-including Parkinson's disease,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and treatment resistant
depression-have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics.
Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have
been at the fore. The present chapter brings these
neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research
in moral psychology. We begin in section "Clinical uses of
DBS" by reviewing the recent clinical literature on DBS. In
section "DBS and threats to identity," we consider whether
DBS poses a threat to personal identity. In section "Surveys
of judgments of identity change" we argue for engagement
with recent empirical work examining judgments of when
identity changes. We conclude in section "Some ethics of
DBS" by highlighting a range of ethical issues raised by
DBS, including various cross-cultural considerations.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-815063-4.00008-3},
Key = {fds352991}
}
@article{fds363779,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, JS},
Title = {Defining addiction: A pragmatic perspective},
Pages = {123-131},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of
Addiction},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781138909281},
Key = {fds363779}
}
@article{fds336426,
Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
Pages = {54-67},
Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
of Neuroscience},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Abstract = {In Chapter 4, the authors explore whether neuroscience
undermines morality. The authors distinguish, analyze, and
assess the main arguments for neuroscientific skepticism
about morality and argue that neuroscience does not
undermine all of our moral judgments, focusing the majority
of their attention on one argument in particular-the idea
that neuroscience and psychology might undermine moral
knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs result from
unreliable processes. They argue that the background
arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail to
adequately support it. They conclude that the overall issue
of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled, but, they
contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
together.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
Key = {fds336426}
}
@article{fds303593,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Treatment},
Pages = {161-179},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New
Perspectives},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Moseley, D and Gala, G},
Year = {2016},
ISBN = {978-0-415-70816-6},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315688725},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315688725},
Key = {fds303593}
}
@article{fds303582,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neural Lie Detection in Courts},
Booktitle = {Using Imaging to Identify Deceit: Scientific and Ethical
Questions},
Publisher = {American Academy of Arts and Sciences},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
url = {http://www.amacad.org/publications/deceit.aspx},
Key = {fds303582}
}
@article{fds303583,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Philosophy},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303583}
}
@article{fds303591,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Asking the Right Questions in Moral Psychology},
Booktitle = {The Atlas of Moral Psychology},
Publisher = {Guilford Press},
Editor = {Graham, J and Gray, K},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303591}
}
@article{fds303592,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Summers, J},
Title = {Scrupulous Judgments},
Booktitle = {Studies in Normative Ethics},
Publisher = {Oxforfd Univesity Press},
Editor = {Timmons, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303592}
}
@article{fds303594,
Author = {Summers, J and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Scrupulous Characters},
Booktitle = {Character: Perspectives from Philosophy and
Psychology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fileva, I},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303594}
}
@article{fds303595,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Disunity of Morality},
Booktitle = {Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Liao, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds303595}
}
@article{fds321512,
Author = {Strohminger, N and Caldwell, B and Cameron, D and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Implicit morality: A methodological survey},
Pages = {133-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan UK},
Year = {2014},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9781137409799},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137409805},
Doi = {10.1057/9781137409805},
Key = {fds321512}
}
@article{fds321513,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780262525473},
Key = {fds321513}
}
@article{fds244828,
Author = {Alexander, P and Schlegel, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A and Tse, PU and Wheatley, T},
Title = {Dissecting the Readiness Potential: An investigation of the
relationship between readiness potentials, conscious
willing, and action},
Pages = {205-230},
Booktitle = {Surrounding Free Will},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Mele, A},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244828}
}
@article{fds244829,
Author = {Strohminger, N and Caldwell, B and Cameron, D and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Implicit Moral Attitudes},
Pages = {133-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral
Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Editor = {Luetage, C and Rusch, H and Uhl, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244829}
}
@article{fds244831,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {30},
Pages = {131-132},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Freedom and Responsibility},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2016.1148383},
Doi = {10.1080/02691728.2016.1148383},
Key = {fds244831}
}
@article{fds244879,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Levy, N},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244879}
}
@article{fds244898,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Roskies, A},
Title = {Introduction to Neuroscience and Society},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neurosciences V},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Gazzaniga, M and Mangum, R},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244898}
}
@article{fds244899,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths},
Booktitle = {Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and
Evolution},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Bergmann, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244899}
}
@article{fds244900,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?},
Booktitle = {Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Schramme, T},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244900}
}
@article{fds336430,
Title = {Neuroscience and Society edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
and Adina Roskies},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neurosciences},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Gazzaniga, MS and Mangun, GR},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds336430}
}
@article{fds368008,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Psychology Volume 4: Free Will and Moral
Responsibility Introduction},
Pages = {XIII-+},
Booktitle = {MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL 4: FREE WILL AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY},
Year = {2014},
ISBN = {978-0-262-52547-3},
Key = {fds368008}
}
@article{fds244851,
Author = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, WP},
Title = {Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199920754},
Key = {fds244851}
}
@article{fds219457,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Free Contrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Martijn Blaauw},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219457}
}
@article{fds219458,
Author = {Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Is Psychopathy a Mental Illness?},
Booktitle = {Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nicole Vincent},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds219458}
}
@article{fds244891,
Author = {Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Do Psychopaths Make Moral Judgments?},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kiehl, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244891}
}
@article{fds244892,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Gromet, D and Goodwin, G and Eddy Nahmias and CS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Mind, the Brain, and the Law},
Booktitle = {The Future of Punishment},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nadelhoffer, T},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244892}
}
@article{fds244893,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Pickard, H},
Title = {What is Addiction?},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fulford, KWM and Davies, M and Gipps, RGT and George Graham and JZS and Stranghelllini, G and Thornton, T},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244893}
}
@article{fds244894,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How Religion Undermines Compromise},
Booktitle = {Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clark, S and Powell, R and Savulescu, J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244894}
}
@article{fds244895,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Are Moral Judgments Unified?},
Pages = {96-98},
Booktitle = {Report, Science of Morality Workshop: Disciplinary and
Interdisciplinary Approaches Now and in the
Future},
Publisher = {Sociology Program, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and
Economic Sciences, National Science Foundation,
2009},
Editor = {Hitlin, S and Stets, J},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244895}
}
@article{fds244880,
Author = {Keister, LA and McCarthy, J and Finke, R},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {23},
Pages = {xi-xvi},
Booktitle = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781780523460},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0277-2833(2012)0000023003},
Doi = {10.1108/s0277-2833(2012)0000023003},
Key = {fds244880}
}
@article{fds244889,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Case Study in Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Series = {NOMOS LII},
Pages = {194-211},
Booktitle = {Evolution and Morality},
Publisher = {New York University Press},
Editor = {Fleming, JE and Levinson, S},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244889}
}
@article{fds244890,
Author = {Sandberg, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Title = {The Memory of Jurors: Enhancing Trial Performance},
Booktitle = {Memory and Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Nadel, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244890}
}
@article{fds244896,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Free Constrastivism},
Booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge and Kegan Paul},
Editor = {Blaauw, M},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds244896}
}
@article{fds244877,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Consequentialism},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244877}
}
@article{fds244878,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244878}
}
@article{fds244884,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {An Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism},
Pages = {11-28 & 200-203-11-28 & 200-203},
Booktitle = {The New Intuitionism},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Hernandez, JG},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244884}
}
@article{fds244885,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Levy, K},
Title = {Insanity Defenses},
Pages = {299-334},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal
Law},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Deigh, J and Dolinko, D},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244885}
}
@article{fds244886,
Author = {Roskies, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Brain Images as Evidence in the Criminal
Law},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {97-114},
Booktitle = {Law and Neuroscience, Current Legal Issues},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Freeman, M},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244886}
}
@article{fds244887,
Author = {Sandberg, A and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Savulescu,
J},
Title = {Cognitive Enhancements in Court},
Pages = {273-284},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics},
Editor = {Illes, J and Federico, BSAECA and Morein-Zamir,
S},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244887}
}
@article{fds244888,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Ethics},
Pages = {261-274},
Booktitle = {The Continuum Companion to Ethics},
Publisher = {Continuum},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Miller, C},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244888}
}
@article{fds244897,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease?},
Booktitle = {Neuroscience and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Vincent, N},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244897}
}
@article{fds244881,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Lessons from Libet},
Pages = {235-246},
Booktitle = {Conscious Will and Responsibility},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Nadel, L},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244881}
}
@article{fds244882,
Author = {Harman, G and Mason, K and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Reasoning},
Booktitle = {The Moral Psychology Handbook},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Doris, J and Group, TMPR},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244882}
}
@article{fds244883,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Young, L and Cushman,
F},
Title = {Moral Intuition},
Booktitle = {The Moral Psychology Handbook},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Doris, J and Group, TMPR},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds244883}
}
@article{fds244776,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Mackie’s Internalisms},
Pages = {55-70},
Booktitle = {A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral
Error Theory},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Joyce, R and Kirchin, S},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244776}
}
@article{fds244777,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation
for Morality},
Pages = {101-115},
Booktitle = {Is Goodness without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith,
Secularism, and Ethics},
Publisher = {Rownan & Littlewfield},
Editor = {King, NL and Garcia, RK},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244777}
}
@article{fds244857,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Preventive War, What Is It Good For?},
Pages = {202-221},
Booktitle = {Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199233137},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0009},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that although Bush's preventive war in
Iraq is morally wrong, and his policy is too broad, some
exceptional preventive wars can still be morally justified.
It develops and defends a version of consequentialism about
war. It then criticizes the relevant part of the most common
deontological alternative - just war theory. Finally, all of
this theory is applied to preventive war in general and
Bush's war and policy in particular.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0009},
Key = {fds244857}
}
@article{fds244778,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Abstract + Concrete = Paradox},
Pages = {209-230},
Booktitle = {Experimental Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Knobe, J and Nichols, S},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244778}
}
@article{fds244779,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {How to Apply Generalities: Reply to Tolhurst and
Shafer-Landau},
Pages = {97-105},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244779}
}
@article{fds244780,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Framing Moral Intuitions},
Pages = {47-76},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244780}
}
@article{fds244781,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {9789400723764},
Pages = {xiii-xix},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {940072375X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2376-4},
Abstract = {This book presents a unique collection of the most relevant
perspectives in contemporary human rights philosophy.
Different intellectual traditions are brought together to
explore some of the core postmodern issues challenging
standard justifications. Widely accessible also to non
experts, contributions aim at opening new perspectives on
the state of the art of the philosophy of human rights. This
makes this book particularly suitable to human rights
experts as well as master and doctoral students. Further,
while conceived in a uniform and homogeneous way, the book
is internally organized around three central themes: an
introduction to theories of rights and their relation to
values; a set of contributions presenting some of the most
influential contemporary strategies; and finally a number of
articles evaluating those empirical challenges springing
from the implementation of human rights. This specific
set-up of the book provides readers with a stimulating
presentation of a growing and interconnecting number of
problems that post-natural law theories face today. While
most of the contributions are new and specifically conceived
for the present occasion, the volume includes also some
recently published influential essays on rights, democracy
and their political implementation.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-2376-4},
Key = {fds244781}
}
@article{fds244782,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {xiii-xviii},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0742-332220160000034025},
Doi = {10.1108/s0742-332220160000034025},
Key = {fds244782}
}
@article{fds244783,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction},
Volume = {9697},
Pages = {xi-xvii},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of
Morality},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2008},
ISBN = {9781628419313},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2231307},
Doi = {10.1117/12.2231307},
Key = {fds244783}
}
@article{fds321514,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {R. M. Hare (1919-)},
Pages = {326-333},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Analytic Philosophy},
Publisher = {Blackwell Publishers Inc.},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780631214151},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470998656.ch26},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470998656.ch26},
Key = {fds321514}
}
@article{fds244856,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi's Moral
Intuitionism},
Pages = {19-29},
Booktitle = {Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and
Epistemology of Robert Audi},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195311952},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0002},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that Audi's views on moral intuitions,
specifically concerning whether they can be justified
without being based on inference, raise a number of
questions Audi has yet to address. First, it asks, can moral
intuitions be justified without reflection? Second, does
Audi's account of reflection turn out to involve inference?
And are conclusions of reflection therefore based on
inference? Third, can conclusions of reflection be justified
without second-order beliefs concerning the reliability of
the reflection? And if not, wouldn't this also involve
inference? Fourth, can conclusions of reflection be
justified without at least an ability to infer? And if not,
wouldn't this leave the view unable to block the skeptical
regress?},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0002},
Key = {fds244856}
}
@article{fds244784,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Overcoming Christianity},
Pages = {69-79},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Anthony, LM},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds244784}
}
@article{fds244853,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Introduction to Pyrrhonian Skepticism},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780195169720},
Key = {fds244853}
}
@article{fds244855,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Classy Pyrrhonism},
Pages = {188-205},
Booktitle = {Pyrrhonian Skepticism},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780195169720},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195169727.003.0011},
Abstract = {This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes
within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge
claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes,
but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all
presuppositions about which contrast classes are really
relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of
everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday
perspective or any other perspective. This framework
provides a precise way to understand the central claims of
neo- Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the
problems and objections raised by its critics.},
Doi = {10.1093/0195169727.003.0011},
Key = {fds244855}
}
@article{fds244852,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology},
Pages = {339-366},
Booktitle = {Metaethics after Moore},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780199269914},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016},
Abstract = {This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology
and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral
intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a
set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs
require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short,
whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial,
emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious
sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by
confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically
justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical
work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of
his principles, and thus are in need of support from other
relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is
incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being
non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More
cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be
some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs
that do not require inferential support, still, for educated
adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting
factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are
non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not
themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed
entirely by empirical means (including the methods of
science), it does not follow that developments in the
sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not
relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs
are epistemically justified.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016},
Key = {fds244852}
}
@article{fds244806,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {McMillan Reference},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244806}
}
@article{fds244916,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral
Obligations},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {285-307},
Booktitle = {Advances in the Economics of Environmental
Resources},
Publisher = {Emerald (MCB UP )},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780762312719},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05013-3},
Doi = {10.1016/S1569-3740(05)05013-3},
Key = {fds244916}
}
@article{fds244785,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Gert Contra Consequentialism},
Pages = {145-163},
Booktitle = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with a Reply},
Publisher = {Rowan and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244785}
}
@article{fds244786,
Author = {Audi, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Scope and Structure of the Essays; A Brief
Introduction},
Pages = {1-3},
Booktitle = {Rationality, Rules, and Ideals; Critical Essays on Bernard
Gert’s Moral Theory with a Reply},
Publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Audi, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244786}
}
@article{fds244787,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Two Ways to Derive Constitutional Rights},
Pages = {231-244},
Booktitle = {Legal Interpretation in Democratic States},
Publisher = {Ashgate/Dartmouth Publishing},
Editor = {Goldsworthy, J and Campbell, T},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244787}
}
@article{fds244788,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {R. M. Hare},
Pages = {326-333},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Analytic Philosophy},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Martinich, AP and Sosa, D},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244788}
}
@article{fds244804,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Gert, Bernard},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {608-610},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244804}
}
@article{fds244805,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Ought’ Implies ‘Can'},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1265-1266},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244805}
}
@article{fds244789,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Patchwork Quilt Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {315-334},
Booktitle = {Judicial Power, Democracy, and Legal Positivism},
Publisher = {Dartmouth Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Campbell, T and Goldsworthy, J},
Year = {2000},
ISBN = {9780754620617},
Key = {fds244789}
}
@article{fds244791,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {A Perspectival Theory of Law},
Pages = {185-213},
Booktitle = {Judicial Power, Democracy, and Legal Positivism},
Publisher = {Dartmouth Publishing},
Editor = {Campbell, T and Goldsworthy, J},
Year = {2000},
ISBN = {9780754620617},
Key = {fds244791}
}
@article{fds244799,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
Pages = {535-535},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244799}
}
@article{fds244800,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism},
Pages = {589-590},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244800}
}
@article{fds244801,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Impartiality},
Pages = {419-419},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244801}
}
@article{fds244797,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Pages = {427-428},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Werhane, P and Freeman, RE},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds244797}
}
@article{fds244792,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Has Ethics Kept Up With the Development of Science,
Technology, and Medicine?},
Pages = {91-103},
Booktitle = {The Human Predicament: An International Dialogue on the
Meaning of Human Behavior},
Publisher = {Promerhus Books},
Editor = {Razis, DV},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244792}
}
@article{fds244793,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas and Rights},
Pages = {48-65},
Booktitle = {Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Mason, HE},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244793}
}
@article{fds244794,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Skepticism and Justification},
Pages = {3-48},
Booktitle = {Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Timmons, M},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244794}
}
@article{fds244832,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Problems of Philosophy of Law (Update)},
Pages = {414-416},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement},
Publisher = {Macmillian},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244832}
}
@article{fds244798,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Pages = {508-508},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244798}
}
@article{fds244795,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Brison, S},
Title = {A Philosophical Introduction to Constitutional
Interpretation},
Pages = {1-25},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Publisher = {Westview},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244795}
}
@article{fds244796,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Value of Bad Grades},
Pages = {54-56},
Booktitle = {Falling in Love with Wisdom},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244796}
}
@article{fds244802,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Moral Dilemmas},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {835-837},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Garland Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244802}
}
@article{fds244803,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Intuitionism},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {628-630},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Garland Publishing Co.},
Editor = {Becker, L and Becker, C},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244803}
}
@article{fds219478,
Author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
Title = {Are Addicts Responsible?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Neil Levy},
Key = {fds219478}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds244903,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Special Issue: Pardo and Patterson on Neuroscience and the
Law},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {4},
Number = {3},
Pages = {179-222},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244903}
}
@misc{fds244810,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Pollsters with Dirty Tricks},
Journal = {Valley News},
Pages = {A9-A9},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds244810}
}
@misc{fds244809,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schauer, F},
Title = {Introduction},
Journal = {Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {251-252},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244809}
}
@misc{fds244845,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Section B: Ethics},
Journal = {Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, Philosophical
Issues},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {143-293},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244845}
}
@misc{fds306228,
Author = {, },
Title = {Evidence and Law},
Journal = {Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Schauer, F},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds306228}
}
@misc{fds244816,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Can You Believe It?},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine},
Pages = {30-33},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds244816}
}
@misc{fds306235,
Author = {, },
Title = {Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation},
Journal = {Boston University law review. Boston University. School of
Law},
Volume = {72},
Number = {4},
Pages = {681-799},
Publisher = {The Boston University School of Law},
Editor = {Brison, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {1992},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds306235}
}
@misc{fds244824,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {The Ethics of the Bomb},
Journal = {Dartmouth Alumni Magazine},
Pages = {14-15},
Year = {1990},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds244824}
}
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