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Publications of Emerson S. Niou    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds297349,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
   Title = {Strategy and Politics},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2015},
   Key = {fds297349}
}

@book{fds211705,
   Author = {Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook},
   Title = {Games and Politics},
   Publisher = {Rutledge},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds211705}
}

@book{fds297348,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {An Introduction to Community Compacts in China (in
             Chinese)},
   Series = {revised edition},
   Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds297348}
}

@book{fds297350,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {Bean Voting: The History and Politics of Secret Ballot (in
             Chinese)},
   Publisher = {People’s University Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds297350}
}

@book{fds51152,
   Author = {E. Niou},
   Title = {Community Compacts in China: Theory and Practice},
   Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds51152}
}

@book{fds297347,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {An Introduction to Community Compacts in China (in
             Chinese)},
   Publisher = {Chinese Society Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds297347}
}

@book{fds297346,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {The Balance of Power: Stability in International
             Systems},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds297346}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds332014,
   Author = {Niou, EMS},
   Title = {On local governance in China: From feudalism, centralized
             bureaucracy, to self-governance},
   Pages = {225-246},
   Booktitle = {Confucian Culture and Democracy},
   Publisher = {World Scientific},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9789814596381},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814596398_0010},
   Abstract = {Prior to the introduction of Western political thoughts on
             local governance to China in the 19th century, for centuries
             Chinese intellectuals had also been engaging in extensive
             debates on the advantages and disadvantages of various forms
             of local governance. The debate was at first centering on
             whether feudalism is a better system than a centralized
             bureaucracy. Then, during the Song and Yuan Dynasties,
             scholars began to question whether either system was
             superior to the other. They argued that optimal
             institutional choice might depend on the particular
             circumstances. During the Ming Dynasty, Gu Yanwu proposed an
             alternative system named “embodying feudalism in
             centralized bureaucracy,” wherein county magistrates are
             selected and evaluated by the local constituents. To be
             reappointed, the incumbent magistrate must perform well.
             After each successful reappointment, the magistrate will be
             vested more power in personnel appointment and budgeting.
             After three successful terms, the incumbent magistrate will
             be granted tenure of his position. The system of
             “embodying feudalism in centralized bureaucracy”
             proposed by Gu Yanwu is in nature a form of local
             self-government, a path breaking institutional renovation in
             Chinese history…},
   Doi = {10.1142/9789814596398_0010},
   Key = {fds332014}
}

@misc{fds297338,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in
             Elections},
   Booktitle = {Advances in Political Economy: Instituions, Modeling, and
             Empirical Analysis},
   Publisher = {SPRINGER},
   Editor = {Schofield, N and Kselman, D},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds297338}
}

@misc{fds297337,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {The China Factor in Taiwan’s Electoral
             Politics},
   Booktitle = {Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in
             Transformation},
   Publisher = {Ashgate Publishing},
   Editor = {Meernik, J and Paolino, P},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds297337}
}

@misc{fds140134,
   Author = {Emerson Niou},
   Title = {On Cultivating the Spirit of Self-Governance (in
             Chinese)},
   Booktitle = {Prospects of Grassroots Democracy in China},
   Editor = {Yong Xu and Zengyang Xu},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds140134}
}

@misc{fds297336,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {論如何培養自治的真精神 [On Cultivating the Spirit
             of Self-Governance]},
   Booktitle = {Prospects of Grassroots Democracy in China},
   Editor = {Xu, Y and Xu, Z},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds297336}
}

@misc{fds297335,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in
             China},
   Booktitle = {How Asia Votes},
   Publisher = {Chatham House},
   Editor = {Hsieh, J and Newman, D},
   Year = {2001},
   Key = {fds297335}
}

@misc{fds297334,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {An Introduction to the Electoral Systems Used in Chinese
             Village Elections},
   Booktitle = {Contemporary China: Approaching the 21st
             Century},
   Publisher = {University Press of Maryland},
   Editor = {Lilley, JR and McGinnis, RW and Panko, BA},
   Year = {1999},
   Key = {fds297334}
}

@misc{fds297333,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
   Title = {Designing Government for Coherent Domestic and Foreign
             Policy: Taiwan as a Test Case},
   Booktitle = {Consolidating The Third Wave Democracies: Themes and
             Perspectives},
   Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
   Editor = {Diamond, L and Plattner, M and Chu, Y-H and Tien,
             H-M},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds297333}
}

@misc{fds297332,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Balance of Power versus Collective Security: A
             Game-Theoretic Analysis},
   Booktitle = {Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the
             Future of Nuclear Disarmament},
   Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
   Editor = {Melvin L Best and J},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds297332}
}

@misc{fds297330,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {The Prospects for a New International Order based on
             Collective Security},
   Booktitle = {Collective Security beyond the Cold War},
   Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
   Editor = {Downs, GW},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds297330}
}

@misc{fds297331,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {An Evaluation of the Republic of China’s Foreign Policy
             Alternatives},
   Booktitle = {The Permutation Across the Taiwan Straits},
   Publisher = {Lynn Reiner Press},
   Editor = {Cheng, TJ and Hwang, C and Wu, S},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds297331}
}

@misc{fds297329,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Stability in International Systems and The Costs of
             War},
   Booktitle = {Models of Strategic Choices in Politics},
   Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
   Editor = {Ordeshook, PC},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds297329}
}


%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds352790,
   Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E and Wang, AHE},
   Title = {Measuring ‘closeness’ in 3-candidate elections:
             Methodology and an application to strategic
             voting},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {68},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102220},
   Abstract = {Past research suggests that voter behavior is influenced by
             perceptions of electoral competitiveness. For example, when
             an election is perceived to be close, voters will be more
             likely to turnout and/or cast strategic votes for their
             second-most preferred candidate. Operationalizing electoral
             competitiveness in three-candidate elections presents
             previously unrecognized methodological challenges. This
             paper first shows that many past strategies for measuring
             ‘closeness’ in three-candidate contests have violated at
             least one of three basic properties that any such measure
             should satisfy. We then propose a new measurement grounded
             in probability ratios, and prove formally that ratio-indices
             satisfy these axiomatic criteria. Empirical analyses using
             this new index provide novel and nuanced findings on the
             extent and causes of strategic voting in the 2010 British
             general election. The paper's operational strategy should be
             generally applicable to research on voting in elections,
             legislatures, and organizations.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102220},
   Key = {fds352790}
}

@article{fds297341,
   Author = {Niou, EMS and Zeigler, SM},
   Title = {External threat, internal rivalry, and alliance
             formation},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {81},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {571-584},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701724},
   Abstract = {History reveals enemies often ally to confront a common
             threat. In such competitive coalitions actors must balance
             the simultaneous risk of distrust of their ally against
             external danger. We model this interactive relationship and
             generate several novel outcomes. Intra-alliance rivalry
             forces allying players to preemptively commit more resources
             to conflict and to free ride less. Consequently, their
             likelihood of conflict success increases. However,
             intra-alliance instability forces weaker players to commit a
             higher proportion of resources to fighting than do their
             stronger allies. This outcome runs contrary to Mancur
             Olson’s classic collective action result that the “small
             exploit the great.” Furthermore, allies do not demonstrate
             a uniform preference for bandwagoning or balancing. In
             general, it is preferable to bandwagon with friends but to
             balance with enemies. Finally, because rivalry can raise
             alliance payoffs, actors may rationally seek out risky
             partnerships with so-called enemies rather than molding more
             certain alliances with friends.},
   Doi = {10.1086/701724},
   Key = {fds297341}
}

@article{fds332013,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS and Paolino, P and Rein, RA},
   Title = {Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans
             Want Divided Government and Vote to Create
             It},
   Journal = {Political Behavior},
   Volume = {41},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {79-103},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9442-4},
   Abstract = {Tests of theories of the electoral origins of divided
             government hinge on the proper measurement of voter
             preferences for divided government. Deriving preferences for
             divided government from voters’ ideological positions or
             responses to the standard American National Election Studies
             question inflates estimates of the proportion of people who
             prefer divided government. We present two alternative survey
             measures of preferences for divided government and evaluate
             the measures across multiple surveys. We find that the
             percentage of voters who prefer divided government is
             smaller than previous studies suggest. Voters who prefer
             divided government according to the new measures are
             significantly more likely than other voters to vote in ways
             that create divided government in both presidential year and
             midterm congressional elections.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11109-017-9442-4},
   Key = {fds332013}
}

@article{fds327643,
   Author = {Hickey, DV and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Taiwan in 2016: A new era?},
   Journal = {Asian Survey},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {111-118},
   Publisher = {University of California Press},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/AS.2017.57.1.111},
   Abstract = {The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive
             victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential
             elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a
             difficult year for Taiwan's new ruling party. As 2016 drew
             to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan's population
             disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen's performance as
             president.},
   Doi = {10.1525/AS.2017.57.1.111},
   Key = {fds327643}
}

@article{fds321647,
   Author = {Hickey, DV and Niou, E},
   Title = {Taiwan in 2015: A turning point?},
   Journal = {Asian Survey},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {57-67},
   Publisher = {University of California Press},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/AS.2016.56.1.57},
   Abstract = {In 2015, Taipei's relations with Washington moved forward in
             parallel with the improvements in cross-Strait relations
             initiated in 2008. Perhaps most notable was President Ma
             Ying-jeou's summit meeting with China's President Xi
             Jinping. Despite gains in external relations, however, the
             island was plagued by partisan gridlock, a stagnating
             economy, and political unrest. Most anticipated a Democratic
             Progressive Party victory over the ruling Kuomintang in the
             January 2016 presidential election. But few could predict
             what kind of fallout the election might generate.},
   Doi = {10.1525/AS.2016.56.1.57},
   Key = {fds321647}
}

@article{fds297339,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {Information and Issue Voting in Taiwan},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds297339}
}

@article{fds297340,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E and Paolino, P},
   Title = {Measuring Preferences for Divided Government},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds297340}
}

@article{fds297342,
   Author = {Song, J and Niou, E},
   Title = {日本地方财政的财源结构与地方自治的特征
             [The Financial Politics of Local Self-Government in
             Japan]},
   Journal = {Fudan University Political Science Review},
   Volume = {13},
   Pages = {172-195},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {Winter},
   Key = {fds297342}
}

@article{fds297351,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {The China Factor in Taiwanese Politics},
   Journal = {Journal of Social Science, University of
             Tokyo},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds297351}
}

@article{fds297352,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {“Information and Heterogeneity in Issue Voting: Evidence
             from the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan,”},
   Journal = {Journal of East Asian Studies},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {119-141},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2012},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007645},
   Abstract = {A voter's capacity to acquire and retain information
             moderates the relationship between issues and the vote.
             Issues differ in their distance from the voter's personal
             experience. Proximate issues, such as personal economic
             conditions, affect the vote decisions of highly informed and
             less informed voters equally. Distant issues, such as
             national economic conditions and foreign affairs, affect the
             vote of highly informed voters but not less informed voters.
             The 2008 presidential election on Taiwan provides a critical
             test of the effect of information on issue voting.
             Unification with mainland China versus Taiwan independence
             is the most important issue in the 2008 election, and voters
             with higher levels of political information show a larger
             effect of the issue on their vote. The national economy is
             also a significant predictor of vote choice, but only for
             highly informed voters. Personal economic conditions and
             other proximate issues are not significant predictors of the
             vote at any information level.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1598240800007645},
   Key = {fds297352}
}

@article{fds297354,
   Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {Protest Voting in Plurality Elections: A Theory of Voter
             Signaling},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {148},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {395-418},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9661-2},
   Abstract = {This paper develops a model of protest voting in which
             unsatisfied voters may abandon their most-preferred
             candidate even though he or she has a good chance of
             winning, in the hope that this signal of disaffection will
             lead to downstream improvements in that candidate's
             performance. We use a spatial model to identify voters whose
             ideological profile makes protest voting an option, and an
             expected utility model to identify the conditions under
             which potential protest voters will in fact use their vote
             as a signaling device. Aggregate-level data provide
             suggestive evidence in the argument's favor. © 2010
             Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9661-2},
   Key = {fds297354}
}

@article{fds297353,
   Author = {Kselman, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {227-244},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2010},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpp027},
   Abstract = {This paper extends McKelvey and Ordeshook’s (1972)
             Calculus of Voting, providing a direct derivation of the
             conditions under which voters will vote strategically:
             choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to
             prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning.
             Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly
             all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly
             or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from this
             seminal model. The formal result allows us to isolate the
             subset of voters to which strategic voting hypotheses
             properly apply, and in turn motivates a critical
             reevaluation of past empirical work. In making this
             argument, we develop a unified and parsimonious framework
             for understanding competing models of tactical voter choice.
             The typology helps to elucidate the methodological
             difficulties in studying tactical behavior when faced with
             heterogeneous explanatory models, and suggests the need for
             both theoretical caution and more precise data instruments
             in future empirical work.},
   Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpp027},
   Key = {fds297353}
}

@article{fds297355,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {中國地方自治爲何總不成功 [Why Has the
             Self-Government Movement Not Been Successful in China?
             ]},
   Journal = {Fudan Univeristy Political Science Review},
   Number = {6},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds297355}
}

@article{fds297357,
   Author = {Benson, B and Niou, E},
   Title = {Economic Interdependence and Peace: A Game-Theoretic
             Analysis},
   Journal = {Journal of East Asian Studies},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {35-59},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {Spring},
   Keywords = {economic interdependence • dependence theory •
             trade and peace • economic sanction • issue
             linkage • cross-strait relations • Taiwan
             Strait},
   Abstract = {Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding economic
             interdependence and peace has focused on devising responses
             either in favor of or in opposition to the long prevailing
             notion that trade is positively and unconditionally
             correlated with peace. The China and Taiwan case –
             noteworthy for the simultaneous presence of an
             ever-increasing economic interdependence and an adversarial
             political relationship -- provides an interesting
             counter-example to the leading positions in the literature.
             What is missing in the literature is a model that studies
             states’ decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a
             function, not only of their own utility, but also of their
             perceptions about how their opponent will respond. States’
             decisions to trade depend upon the likelihood that their
             prospective trade partner will initiate a conflict, and
             decisions to initiate a conflict depend upon perceptions of
             the likelihood that the target will concede. In this paper,
             we develop a model that expands the domain of the
             trade-peace analysis by endogenizing and analyzing states’
             decisions to trade and initiate conflicts.},
   Key = {fds297357}
}

@article{fds297356,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {彭真与中國地方自治的再起 [Peng Zhen and the
             Reemergence of Self-Governance in China]},
   Journal = {Zhejiang Academic Journal},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {99-106},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds297356}
}

@article{fds51154,
   Title = {Lessons from the self-government movement in the late Qing
             Dynasty (in Chinese)},
   Journal = {21 Century Bi-Monthly},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds51154}
}

@article{fds297345,
   Author = {Niou, ES},
   Title = {清末地方自治運動的反思 [Lessons from the
             self-government movement in the late Qing
             Dynasty]},
   Journal = {21 Century Bi Monthly},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297345}
}

@article{fds297358,
   Author = {E.S. Niou and Chu, C and Niou, E},
   Title = {The Strategy of Ambiguity in Electoral Competition},
   Journal = {Academia Economic Papers},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {279-302},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds297358}
}

@article{fds297363,
   Author = {Niou, E and Tan, G},
   Title = {External Threat and Collective Action},
   Journal = {Economic Inquiry},
   Volume = {43},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {519-530},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi035},
   Abstract = {This article studies how players allocate their endowed
             resources between productive and conflictual activities in
             the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the
             suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by
             Olson (1965) do not necessarily apply when external threat
             is endogenized. We also illustrate that it does not always
             pay to take an offensive stance. When competing with an
             offensive group, it might be better for members of a
             defensive group to remain defensive. Furthermore, in the
             context of rivalry between two groups, free riding can
             actually benefit everyone in the system. (JEL D70, D74). ©
             Western Economic Association International.},
   Doi = {10.1093/ei/cbi035},
   Key = {fds297363}
}

@article{fds297366,
   Author = {Niou, E and Chen, K},
   Title = {Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {67},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {390-406},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00322.x},
   Abstract = {In this paper we develop a spatial model to provide an
             explanation for the seeming paradox that voters in some
             states reelect incumbents while unilaterally self-imposing
             legislative term limits. The model shows that voters are
             more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's
             position is farther from the median voter position or if the
             incumbent's party is more moderate. Furthermore, it suggests
             that term limits, or the threat of term limits, increases
             the responsiveness of politicians' policy platforms. © 2005
             Southern Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00322.x},
   Key = {fds297366}
}

@article{fds297361,
   Author = {Hsieh, J and Niou, E},
   Title = {Measuring Taiwanese Public Opinion on the Taiwan
             Independence Issue: A Methodological Note},
   Journal = {China Quarterly},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {158-168},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds297361}
}

@article{fds321648,
   Author = {Hsieh, JFS and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Measuring Taiwanese public opinion on Taiwanese
             independence},
   Journal = {The China Quarterly},
   Volume = {181},
   Number = {181},
   Pages = {158-168},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741005000093},
   Abstract = {Whether there will be a war between China and Taiwan depends
             very much upon whether Taiwan will declare independence. And
             given that Taiwan is a democracy now, public opinion on the
             issue will certainly affect the political leaders' decision
             to move one way or the other. Since the early 1990s, several
             competing methods have been used in surveys to study
             Taiwanese attitudes on the independence-unification issue.
             The existence of a large percentage of respondents with
             conditional preferences makes us realize that the
             traditional six-point or 11-point scale measures of
             preferences oversimplify the situation. In this article, we
             construct a new measure of preferences and show that it
             clearly outperforms the traditional methods. © The China
             Quartery, 2005.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0305741005000093},
   Key = {fds321648}
}

@article{fds297364,
   Author = {Niou, E and Benson, B},
   Title = {Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in
             the Taiwan Strait},
   Journal = {Security Studies},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {274-289},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2005},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410500232933},
   Abstract = {The delicate security balance in the Taiwan Strait is
             threatened on several fronts. In Taiwan, democratization has
             placed Taiwan independence as one of the most salient issues
             in its domestic politics, and the rise of the
             pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to power has
             created uncertainty regarding Taiwan's future policy on the
             Taiwan independence-unification issue. In this paper, we
             investigate whether external factors such as China's
             military threat and the United States' security commitment
             to Taiwan can affect the development of the Taiwan
             independence movement. An interesting finding from our
             analysis is approximately one-third of the people in Taiwan
             can agree simultaneously on two seemingly contradictory
             issues: to unite with China if China becomes democratic and
             to declare independence if China will not use force and
             peace can be maintained. Voters in Taiwan with conditional
             preferences create opportunities for China and the United
             States to formulate foreign policy that will restrain
             Taiwan's drive toward independence. Copyright © Taylor &
             Francis Inc.},
   Doi = {10.1080/09636410500232933},
   Key = {fds297364}
}

@article{fds297365,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {A New Measure of the Preferences on the Independence-Unification
             Issue in Taiwan},
   Journal = {Journal of Asian and African Studies},
   Volume = {40},
   Number = {1-2},
   Pages = {91-104},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2005},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909605052946},
   Abstract = {An accurate and reliable measure of preferences on the
             independence- unification issue is indispensable to the
             study of Taiwanese politics. In the foreseeable future the
             study of Taiwanese politics and the cross-Strait relations
             will continue to focus on Taiwanese preferences on the
             independence-unification issue. These preferences, however,
             are neither readily identifiable nor easily defined. For
             many people, it might be a simple and a straightforward
             choice between for or against Taiwan's independence, but
             others are less decisive because their preferences are
             conditional on factors such as China's military threat, the
             USA security commitment to Taiwan, and China's prospects of
             becoming democratic and prosperous. In this article I devise
             a new measure of people's preferences regarding this issue.
             I show that a large percentage of the people in Taiwan can
             agree simultaneously to unite with China if China becomes
             modernized and democratic and to declare independence if
             China will not use force and peace can be maintained.
             Because independence and unification are not necessarily
             mutually exclusive alternatives, this empirical finding
             questions the appropriateness of the traditional six-point
             scale one-dimensional representation of Taiwanese
             preferences on the independence-unification issue. Copyright
             © 2005 SAGE Publications.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0021909605052946},
   Key = {fds297365}
}

@article{fds321649,
   Author = {Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy
             implications},
   Journal = {Asian Survey},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {555-567},
   Publisher = {University of California Press},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.4.555},
   Abstract = {Taiwan's democratization has placed Taiwan independence as
             one of the most important issues for its domestic politics
             and for the security balance in the Taiwan Strait. Surveys
             have been conducted regularly to track shifts in Taiwanese
             public sentiment on this issue. This article presents a new
             measure of the Taiwan independence issue and shows how
             voters' preferences can be influenced. © 2004 by The
             Regents of the University of California. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1525/as.2004.44.4.555},
   Key = {fds321649}
}

@article{fds297325,
   Author = {Niou, ES},
   Title = {中外選舉制度的類別及特點 [An Introduction to
             Voting Methods]},
   Journal = {21st Century Bi Monthly},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds297325}
}

@article{fds321650,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles
             of Preferences, Information, and Threats},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {66},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {25-42},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x},
   Abstract = {A realistic theory of economic sanctions should be built on
             the facts that sanctions are a game of issue linkage
             involving two or more issues, players may not know each
             other's preferences for the outcome of the game, and
             threatening sanctions may be as important as imposing
             sanctions as a strat egy in international disputes. The
             threat and use of economic sanctions are modeled as a
             multistage game of two-sided incomplete information between
             a target and a coercer. The threat stage is criti cally
             important for understanding the outcome of sanctions, and
             current empirical studies suffer from a case selection bias.
             Economic sanctions are likely to be imposed when they are
             not likely to succeed in changing the target's behavior.
             Sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so at the mere
             threat of sanctions. Despite the unlikely success of
             sanctions, coercers must sometimes impose sanctions, even
             after the threat of sanctions has failed to change the
             target's behavior.},
   Doi = {10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x},
   Key = {fds321650}
}

@article{fds297324,
   Author = {Niou, ES},
   Title = {從封建、郡縣、到自治: 論中國地方制度的演變
             [On Local Governance in China: From Feudalism, Centralized
             Bureaucracy, to Self-Government]},
   Journal = {Open Times},
   Number = {6},
   Year = {2004},
   Key = {fds297324}
}

@article{fds39431,
   Author = {E. Niou and Changsheng Lin},
   Title = {Analyzing China's Nuclear Deterrence Strategy},
   Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds39431}
}

@article{fds297326,
   Author = {Niou, ES},
   Title = {對中共核威懾的重新審視 [A Reevaluation of
             China’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy]},
   Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297326}
}

@article{fds297367,
   Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
   Title = {China’s Nuclear Strategy: Minimal or Limited
             Deterrence?},
   Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297367}
}

@article{fds297399,
   Author = {Niou, E and Paolino, P},
   Title = {The Rise of the Opposition Party in Taiwan: Explaining Chen
             Shui-bian's Victory in the 2000 Presidential Election in
             Taiwan},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {721-740},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00010-0},
   Abstract = {The 2000 Taiwan presidential election drastically changed
             Taiwan's political landscape. For the first time in Taiwan,
             an opposition party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the
             presidential race, receiving 39.3% of the popular vote. To
             understand the factors that determined the election's
             outcome, we analyze survey data from the 2000 presidential
             election. First, we study whether a divided ruling party was
             the cause of the opposition party candidate's victory. That
             is, would the ruling party have lost if one of the trailing
             candidates had opted not to run? Second, there were charges
             following the election that the Kuomintang misled people
             into believing their candidate was still leading in the
             polls, when he was really running third, and this
             misinformation led people to vote differently than they
             would have otherwise, possibly giving the election to the
             opposition party candidate. We examine the validity of this
             claim by measuring the degree to which strategic voting
             could have influenced the outcome. Third, to understand the
             underlying dimensions of the electoral competition in Taiwan
             and to understand each candidate's electoral support, we run
             a multivariate statistical model to study how strategic
             voting, candidate personalities, party identification, and
             issues influenced respondents' vote choices. Finally, we
             discuss the effects of election polling data on election
             outcomes. © 2002 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00010-0},
   Key = {fds297399}
}

@article{fds297362,
   Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
   Title = {Analyzing China’s Nuclear Threat to the United
             States},
   Journal = {Mainland China Studies},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {November},
   Key = {fds297362}
}

@article{fds297344,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {經濟因素對中國村民自治發展的影響 [Economic
             Development and Local Self-Government in
             China]},
   Journal = {21 Century Bi Monthly},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds297344}
}

@article{fds297400,
   Author = {Niou, E and Lin, C},
   Title = {Counting China’s ICBMs},
   Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {80-90},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds297400}
}

@article{fds305581,
   Author = {Niou, ES and Lin, C},
   Title = {中共洲際導彈軍力的建設與實力 [Development of
             ICBMs in China]},
   Journal = {Studies on Chinese Communism},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {80-90},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds305581}
}

@article{fds297343,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {患難相恤: 論中國民間的自治與扶貧
             [Self-Governance and Poverty Alleviation in
             China]},
   Journal = {21 Century E Journal},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds297343}
}

@article{fds297359,
   Author = {Lin, C and Niou, E},
   Title = {論中共嚇阻美軍介入台海衝突的軍事準備及其影響
             [Assessing China's Military Preparation to Deter the US from
             Intervening in the Taiwan Strait Conflict]},
   Journal = {Mainland China Studies},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds297359}
}

@article{fds297398,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {Strategic Voting under Plurality and Runoff
             Rules?},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {209-227},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692801013002004},
   Abstract = {Choosing a method of electing a president is often a
             contentious constitutional issue for newly emerging
             democracies. The debate focuses largely on two alternative
             electoral procedures: plurality rule and plurality rule with
             a runoff. Duverger (1954) argues that plurality rule has a
             consolidating influence on parties that a runoff rule lacks.
             This paper focuses on the 'psychological effect' identified
             by Duverger as the principal basis of consolidation, and
             studies the conditions under which strategic voting can
             change the sincere voting outcome and identifies the types
             of voters who should vote strategically under plurality and
             runoff rules. Three interesting findings can be drawn from
             the theoretical results. First, strategic voting is needed
             more often under plurality rule than under runoff rule to
             render the Condorcet winner the voting outcome. Second,
             under the plurality rule, strategic voting cannot ensure
             that a Condorcet winner will win and cannot even preclude a
             Condorcet loser from winning. Under the runoff rule,
             however, strategic voting ensures that the Condorcet winner
             will win, if one exists. Third, it is easier for a third
             candidate to enter the election and win the race under the
             plurality rule than under the runoff rule even if the third
             candidate is not a Condorcet winner.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692801013002004},
   Key = {fds297398}
}

@article{fds297397,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, E},
   Title = {全民公決的若干問題 [A Problem with
             Referendums]},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {5-31},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692800012001001},
   Abstract = {When some voters have nonseparable preferences across
             multiple binary issues, majority rule may not select a
             Condorcet winning set of outcomes when one exists, and the
             social choice may be a Condorcet loser or Pareto-dominated
             by every other set of outcomes. We present an empirical
             example of one such paradox from voting on the Internet. We
             evaluate potential solutions to the problem of nonseparable
             preferences in referendums, including set-wise voting,
             sequential voting, and vote-trading. Sequential voting and
             vote-trading prevent the selection of Condorcet losers and
             universally Pareto-dominated outcomes. Legislatures
             facilitate sequential voting and vote-trading better than
             referendums, suggesting that referendums increase the
             quantity of participants in democratic decision-making but
             decrease the quality of participation.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692800012001001},
   Key = {fds297397}
}

@article{fds297396,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, P},
   Title = {Return of the Luddites},
   Journal = {International Security},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {84-96},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {Fall},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228899560167},
   Doi = {10.1162/016228899560167},
   Key = {fds297396}
}

@article{fds12344,
   Author = {E. Niou and Dean Lacy},
   Title = {Nonseperable Preference and the Elections in Double-Member
             Districts},
   Journal = {Journal of Soviet Nationalities},
   Year = {1999},
   Key = {fds12344}
}

@article{fds297395,
   Author = {Ordeshook, P and Niou, E},
   Title = {Alliances and Federations},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Year = {1999},
   Key = {fds297395}
}

@article{fds321651,
   Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Alliances versus federations: An extension of riker's
             analysis of federal formation},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {271-288},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009062602826},
   Abstract = {This essay explores the distinction between federations and
             alliances and asks the question: When will states choose to
             federate rather than ally? William Poker argues that a
             necessary condition for a federal state's formation is that
             those offering the federal bargain must seek to "expand
             their territorial control, usually either to meet an
             external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for
             military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement." This
             argument, though, does not tell us why states sometimes
             respond to threats by forming federations and at other times
             by forming alliances. Here we address this issue directly
             and use a formal model of alliance formation to illustrate
             our arguments. Briefly, that model assumes states have
             initial endowments of military and economic resources, where
             economic resources enter utility functions directly and
             military capability influences preference only insofar as it
             determines a state's ability to counter or make threats.
             State can divert economic resources to military spending,
             and alliances, in turn, are self-enforcing coalitions
             designed to augment a state's offensive or defensive
             capabilities. Federations, which serve the same ends as
             alliances, are coalitions that need to be enforced by the
             "higher authority" established when the federation is
             formed. Our assumption is that states form federations in
             lieu of alliances if and only if (1) a stable alliance
             partition does not exist or, if one exists, it is dominated
             by an unstable partition and (2) if the cost of the loss of
             sovereignty to each state in the federation is offset by the
             gains from joining it, relative to what that state secures
             as its security value. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers,
             Boston.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1009062602826},
   Key = {fds321651}
}

@article{fds321652,
   Author = {Lacy, D and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Elections in double-member districts with nonseparable voter
             preferences},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {89-110},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692898010001004},
   Abstract = {We derive Nash equilibrium candidate strategies in a
             double-member district election when voters have
             nonseparable preferences for candidates in a
             single-dimensional policy space. When candidates are elected
             simultaneously, nonseparable voter preferences create
             multiple equilibria, including some in which candidates
             adopt extreme positions. The results are robust to limited
             voter uncertainty about candidate interaction in the
             legislature. Nonseparable voter preferences create
             incentives for the formation of political parties and
             disincentives for candidates to moderate their
             positions.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010001004},
   Key = {fds321652}
}

@article{fds297368,
   Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Lacy, D},
   Title = {Retrospective and Prospective Voting in a One-Party
             Dominance Democracy: Taiwan's 1996 Presidential
             Election},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {383-399},
   Year = {1998},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005062527921},
   Abstract = {Several theories of voting behavior suggest that voters
             evaluate candidates in an election based on the candidates'
             past performance and future promise. There is a dispute in
             the theory and ambiguity in empirical evidence about which
             direction voters look when choosing candidates: do voters
             weigh past performance or future promise more heavily in the
             voting booth? This paper contributes empirical support to
             the prospective voting model by testing both retrospective
             and prospective voting in a pivotal case: the 1996 Taiwan
             presidential election. Taiwan's 1996 election represents the
             first popular election of the president from a field of
             candidates that included the long-ruling KMT party
             incumbent, Lee Tent-hui. In the Taiwan presidential
             election, voter evaluations of Lee's prospects for managing
             the economy in the future prove statistically significant as
             a predictor of voter choice. Voter evaluations of recent
             economic conditions do not appear closely related to voter
             choice. Voters' perceptions of the candidates' abilities to
             influence ethnic relations, domestic safety, and
             international security are better predictors of the vote
             than past ethnic relations or past security problems, even
             in the face of Communist China's pre- election aggression
             toward Taiwan.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1005062527921},
   Key = {fds297368}
}

@article{fds321653,
   Author = {Brehm, J and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {A comparative analysis of the control systems used in the
             former Soviet Union and Communist China},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {107-130},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692897009001010},
   Abstract = {The policing systems used in the former Soviet Union and
             Communist China are prototypes of control systems found in
             many political systems. The system in the former Soviet
             Union is a variant on the 'police patrol', while the system
             in Communist China is a self-policing system calling upon
             citizens to report not only their own behavior, but the
             behavior of others. Our paper applies both game-theoretic
             and learning models to explore the relative effectiveness of
             the two systems.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692897009001010},
   Key = {fds321653}
}

@article{fds297369,
   Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Paolino, P},
   Title = {Strategic Voting in the 1994 Taipei City Mayoral
             Election},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {153-163},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1997},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(97)00001-2},
   Abstract = {In most multi-candidate, plurality rule elections, voters
             often have to consider whether or not to vote strategically;
             defecting from a most preferred, but non-viable candidate in
             order to reduce the chances that an even less-preferred
             candidate would be elected. What makes the 1994 Taipei
             election interesting is that the non-viable candidates could
             not be easily identified, which created an opportunity for
             party elites to manipulate voters' decisions by sending
             signals to influence their perceptions of the candidates'
             viability. Our analysis has two important results. First,
             voters discounted strategic considerations in their vote
             calculations early in the campaign, especially when there
             was considerable doubt, among both voters and party elites,
             over which candidate was unlikely to win the election.
             Second, once the election became more proximate and
             information about candidate viability was more likely to
             accurately reflect the outcome of the election, voters used
             signals from party elites and placed greater weight on
             strategic considerations. © 1997 Elsevier Science
             Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1016/s0261-3794(97)00001-2},
   Key = {fds297369}
}

@article{fds297370,
   Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J},
   Title = {Taiwan's March 1996 Elections},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {545-550},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {November},
   Key = {fds297370}
}

@article{fds297371,
   Author = {Niou, E and Huang, T},
   Title = {Party System and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of
             Taiwan},
   Journal = {American Asian Review},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds297371}
}

@article{fds297372,
   Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J and Lacy, D},
   Title = {Economic Voting in the 1994 Taiwan Elections},
   Journal = {American Asian Review},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {Summer},
   Key = {fds297372}
}

@article{fds318630,
   Author = {Feaver, PD and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Managing nuclear proliferation: Condemn, strike, or
             assist?},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {40},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {209-234},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600957},
   Abstract = {The nonproliferation regime, which denies countries access
             to critical materials, makes it more likely that defiant
             proliferators will develop unsafe arsenals. In order to
             manage proliferation, the U.S. could continue to uphold the
             regime, hoping to persuade the proliferator to return to
             non-nuclear status. It could attack, thereby ensuring that
             the proliferator is unable to join the nuclear club. Or it
             could concede the nonproliferation goal and render
             assistance to address the attendant safety concerns. Through
             a series of deductive models we argue that three factors are
             important in determining the right option: (1) U.S.
             preferences on proliferation, whether purist or pragmatist;
             (2) the proliferator's type, which can vary by size,
             affinity, and risk tolerance; and (3) the phase in the
             proliferation process to which the proliferator has
             advanced: preweaponization, after weaponization but before
             deployment, the deployment phase, and, finally, full
             deployment. We analyze the special case of proliferation by
             a small enemy of the United States such as North Korea as a
             signaling game wherein each side attempts to push the
             outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium. The North
             Koreans prefer the equilibrium in which the United States
             never attacks regardless of its type, whereas the United
             States prefers the equilibrium in which North Korea never
             deploys regardless of its type.},
   Doi = {10.2307/2600957},
   Key = {fds318630}
}

@article{fds327644,
   Author = {Huang, T and Niou, EMS},
   Title = {Electoral politics in Taiwan},
   Journal = {Asian Affairs: an American Review},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {128-138},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1996.9933724},
   Doi = {10.1080/00927678.1996.9933724},
   Key = {fds327644}
}

@article{fds297373,
   Author = {Niou, E and Hsieh, J},
   Title = {Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {219-235},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1996},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(95)00031-3},
   Abstract = {Electoral politics in Taiwan has undergone drastic change in
             the past few years. The Democratic Progressive Party was
             established in 1986 and has proven to be a viable political
             force challenging the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) which has been
             the dominant party in Taiwan since 1945. The dominance of
             the KMT in Taiwanese politics was further threatened by the
             defection of some KMT members to form the New Party. The new
             configuration of Taiwan's party system seriously complicates
             Taiwan's electoral politics and increases uncertainty over
             the electoral fortune of each political party in future
             elections. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role
             of issues in voters' evaluations of the political parties.
             Information on issue positions and salience and their impact
             on vote choice will be helpful to understand each party's
             strategy in formulating its party platform to compete for
             votes. Survey data from the 1993 election of the county
             magistrates and city mayors in the Republic of China on
             Taiwan, collected by the Election Study Center of National
             Chengchi University in February 1994, are used to explore
             voters' preferences; their perception of the parties'
             positions on important issues; and the weights they attach
             to different issues. We employ a spatial model of party
             competition to investigate the impact of the issues and
             party identification on voters' evaluation of the parties'
             performance. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science
             Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1016/0261-3794(95)00031-3},
   Key = {fds297373}
}

@article{fds297374,
   Author = {Hsieh, J and Niou, E},
   Title = {Issue Voting in the Republic of China on Taiwan's 1992
             Legislative Yuan Election},
   Journal = {International Political Science Review},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {13-27},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1996},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019251296017001002},
   Abstract = {In the past few years, the Republic of China on Taiwan has
             undergone a quiet transformation from an authoritarian to a
             democratic system. On 19 December 1992, forty-five years
             after the first legislative yuan election, voters went to
             the poll to elect the entire body of the second legislative
             yuan. The 1992 election marks a turning point in the ROC's
             electoral history. This paper examines the role that issues
             played in that election. The Kuomintang and the Democratic
             Progressive Party competed on four main issues during the
             1992 legislative yuan election. Based on the survey results,
             the paper depicts the salience of these issues to individual
             respondents, the distribution of respondents preferences,
             and their perceptions of the two parties' policy positions
             on these issues. The authors then test whether these issues
             play an important role in explaining the variation in
             voters' evaluation of the two parties, and, indirectly,
             their vote choices. The results show that among the four
             issues included in the model, the democracy/stability issue
             has the greatest impact on voters' evaluations of parties,
             followed by the economic and national identity issues, with
             the environmental issue having the smallest impact. In
             addition, the paper examines the role of issue salience in
             affecting voters' comparative evaluation of the parties. The
             results show that on the economic, national identity, and
             democracy/stability issues, difference in salience between
             those who think of the issue as most important and those who
             think otherwise contributes to a difference in the impact of
             issues on party evaluation between the two groups, but on
             the environmental issue it does not.},
   Doi = {10.1177/019251296017001002},
   Key = {fds297374}
}

@article{fds297375,
   Author = {Brehm, J and Niou, E},
   Title = {Police Patrol vs. Self-Policing: A Comparative Analysis of
             the Control Systems Used in the Ex-Soviet Union and the
             Communist China},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds297375}
}

@article{fds297376,
   Author = {Niou, E and Feaver, P},
   Title = {Managing Nuclear Proliferation: What Makes
             Sense?},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds297376}
}

@article{fds305582,
   Author = {Niou, ES and Hsieh, JF and Lin, H},
   Title = {民國八十三年省市長選舉中之議題投票:理性抉擇理論之分析
             [Issue Voting in the 1994 Gubernatorial and Mayoral
             Elections: An Application of Rational Choice
             Approach]},
   Journal = {Journal of Electoral Studies},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds305582}
}

@article{fds297379,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sun Tzu's The Art of
             War},
   Journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {2},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds297379}
}

@article{fds297377,
   Author = {Niou, E and Tan, G},
   Title = {An Analysis of Dr. Sun Yet-sen's Self-Assessment Scheme for
             Land Policy},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {78},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {103-114},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01053368},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF01053368},
   Key = {fds297377}
}

@article{fds297380,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Less Filling, Tastes Great: The Realist-Neoliberal
             Debate},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {209-234},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2950673},
   Doi = {10.2307/2950673},
   Key = {fds297380}
}

@article{fds297381,
   Author = {Niou, E and Cox, G},
   Title = {Seat Bonuses under the Single Non-Transferable Vote for
             Large Parties: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan},
   Journal = {Comparative Politics},
   Pages = {351-374},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds297381}
}

@article{fds321654,
   Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's: The Art of
             War},
   Journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {161-174},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343394031002004},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022343394031002004},
   Key = {fds321654}
}

@article{fds297378,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Alliances in Anarchic International Systems},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds297378}
}

@article{fds297382,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Notes on Constitutional Change in the Republic of China on
             Taiwan},
   Journal = {Chinese Political Science Review},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297382}
}

@article{fds297383,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC and Tan, G},
   Title = {Taiwanese Investment in Mainland China as a Tool of Foreign
             Policy},
   Journal = {Issues and Studies},
   Year = {1992},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds297383}
}

@article{fds297384,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {An Analysis of the Republic Of China's Security
             Issues},
   Journal = {Issues and Studies},
   Year = {1992},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds297384}
}

@article{fds297385,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's
             Emerging Electoral System},
   Journal = {International Political Science Review},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-79},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1992},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019251219201300105},
   Abstract = {Despite differences in history, culture, and stages of
             political development, the same theoretical constructs used
             to study American and European political processes can be
             used to understand the Republic of China's evolving
             electoral institutions and processes. The particular
             theoretical constructs upon which we focus are game theory
             and its application to electoral politics, spatial models of
             party competition. After reviewing the core results of
             spatial analysis — that electoral systems dominated by a
             single issue occasion stable and convergent party platforms
             and that systems with multiple salient issues occasion
             instability — we examine the types of issues that
             opposition parties are most likely to use in challenging KMT
             rule. Based on this discussion we argue that the ROC ought
             to be especially sensitive to Riker's conclusion that
             evolving democracies should devote special attention to
             developing institutional structures such as bicameralism and
             staggered terms of office for legislators that avoid the
             populist ideal of direct democracy. Theoretical results
             reveal the fragility of the idea of a popular will, so that
             populist institutions designed to achieve it can foster
             electoral instability. We use a recent result about
             multi-candidate elections to argue that the form of
             electoral competition and the forces operating to produce
             factionalism within parties are functions of the extent to
             which voters perceive electoral competition in terms of
             individual candidate characteristics versus party labels. To
             the extent that voters evaluate candidates on the basis of
             their party label, the parties will tend to converge on
             issues; whereas, to the extent that voters focus on the
             specific characteristics of candidates and their policy
             pronouncements, the candidates will diverge on issues.
             Finally, we examine the circumstances under which the nature
             of the issues that concern an electorate determines the form
             of competition in democracies characterized by a single
             dominant party. © 1992, Sage Publications. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1177/019251219201300105},
   Key = {fds297385}
}

@article{fds297386,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {Constitutional Design in Taiwan: Presidential versus
             Parliamentary Systems},
   Journal = {The Annals: Chinese Association of Political
             Science},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297386}
}

@article{fds297387,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds297387}
}

@article{fds297388,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Stability in Anarchic International Systems},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {84},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1207-1234},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1990},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963260},
   Abstract = {Can stability emerge solely from the competition and
             self-interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of
             anarchy, or does stability depend on restraints from the
             complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the
             contemporary world economy and its associated institutions?
             We suppose some infinitely divisible resource, that all
             nation-states are endowed with and maximize and that enables
             them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict. We
             offer a noncooperative, extensive-form model of
             international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to
             enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions
             balance of power and collective security ensure the
             sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems. We conclude
             that there exists at least one world—albeit an abstract
             one—in which anarchy yields stability. © 1990, American
             Political Science Association. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.2307/1963260},
   Key = {fds297388}
}

@article{fds321655,
   Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {The geographical imperatives of the balance of power in
             3-country systems},
   Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modelling},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4-5},
   Pages = {519-531},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1989},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90422-6},
   Abstract = {This paper extends a cooperative game-theoretic model of the
             balance of power in anarchic international systems to
             include consideration of the asymmetry which geography
             occasions in the offensive and defensive capabilities of
             countries. The two substantive ideas which concern us are a
             formalization of the notion of a "balancer" and that of a
             "central power". What we show is that in stable systems,
             only specific countries (such as Britain in the eighteenth
             and the nineteenth centuries) can play the role of balancer,
             and that the strategic imperatives of a central country
             (e.g. Germany in the period 1871-1945) differ in important
             ways from those of "peripheral" countries. ©
             1989.},
   Doi = {10.1016/0895-7177(89)90422-6},
   Key = {fds321655}
}

@article{fds297389,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {The Imperatives of Geography and the Balance of Power in
             3-Country Systems},
   Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modeling},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds297389}
}

@article{fds297390,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {An Experimental Test of a Theory of the Balance of
             Power},
   Journal = {Simulation and Games},
   Year = {1988},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297390}
}

@article{fds297392,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Preventive War and the Balance of Power: A Game-Theoretic
             Analysis},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {387-419},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002787031003001},
   Abstract = {Preventive wars are commonly defined as wars initiated by a
             major power to preempt an anticipated disadvantageous
             position in terms of resources or military capabilities
             owing to the differential growth rates of countries. This
             essay extends a game-theoretic model of the balance of power
             to admit differential growth rates and also to permit
             countries to adjust their investments for the future. After
             establishing the conditions for equilibrium investment
             strategies, we then examine the properties of the
             nation-system that this equilibrium implies. Specifically,
             using a two-period model, we are interested in those
             first-period equilibria in which, because their sovereignty
             is subsequently threatened, countries will prefer to
             instigate a preventive war. We conclude by arguing that,
             although differential growth rates and the period 1
             equilibria that initial resources imply can threaten the
             sovereignty of countries, there are a variety of coalitional
             strategies available to countries and that only some of them
             imply preventive war. © 1987, Sage Publications. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022002787031003001},
   Key = {fds297392}
}

@article{fds297391,
   Author = {Niou, E},
   Title = {A Note on Nanson's Rule},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {191-193},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00123006},
   Abstract = {E.J. Nanson, in 1883, proposed a voting rule designed mainly
             to select the Condorcet winner. Unfortunately, much of the
             collective choice literature has misstated Nanson's rule.
             This note shows that the misstated versions of the rule and
             Nanson's actual rule can yield different outcomes, and it
             provides a counter example, which shows that Nanson's rule,
             although it satisfies the strong Condorcet condition, does
             not satisfy the weak Condorcet condition. © 1987 Martinus
             Nijhoff Publishers.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00123006},
   Key = {fds297391}
}

@article{fds297393,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {A Theory of the Balance of Power},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds297393}
}

@article{fds321656,
   Author = {Niou, EMS and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {A Theory of the Balance of Power in International
             Systems},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {685-715},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030004005},
   Abstract = {Attempts at incorporating the assumption that national
             leaders pursue clearly defined objectives, and at applying
             the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of
             international systems, have led to little success in
             formalizing the concept of balance of power, and in
             providing a theoretical justification for much of the
             scholarly intuition about this concept. But by assuming that
             such leaders temper their desire to maximize resources by
             the goal of ensuring the survival of their countries, and by
             distinguishing between two forms of stability—one in which
             no nation's existence is threatened and one in which no
             nation's resources are threatened—we offer a model that
             yields necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of
             stability. Our critical assumption is that before entering
             armed conflicts and before forming either offensive or
             defensive alliances, national leaders evaluate the future
             games that their current actions imply, and the consequences
             of participating in such games. © 1986, Sage Publications.
             All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022002786030004005},
   Key = {fds321656}
}

@article{fds297394,
   Author = {Niou, E and Ordeshook, PC},
   Title = {Universalism in Congress},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Year = {1985},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds297394}
}


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