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Publications of Georg Vanberg    :recent first  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds297452,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {The Politics of Constitutional Review in
             Germany},
   Pages = {1-193},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2005},
   ISBN = {0521836476},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510427},
   Abstract = {Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions
             in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the
             sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on
             the central role of public support for judicial
             independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate
             the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German
             Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis
             of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with
             judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the
             interests of governing majorities, prevailing public
             opinion, and the transparency of the political environment
             exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are
             influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and
             their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By
             highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the
             book challenges the contention that high court justices are
             largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that
             constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511510427},
   Key = {fds297452}
}

@book{fds297460,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative
             Institutions in Multiparty Governance},
   Pages = {1-192},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {July},
   ISBN = {9780199607884},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001},
   Abstract = {Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world's
             parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are
             comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to
             tensions that are largely absent under single-party
             government. The pressures of electoral competition and the
             necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers
             affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise
             agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance.
             The central argument of this book is that strong legislative
             institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to
             deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains.
             Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills
             across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
             and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of
             the treatment of government legislation in contemporary
             parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the
             book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that
             legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European
             democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case
             that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play
             an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book
             contributes to the field of coalition governance. While
             scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and
             death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in
             which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This
             book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty
             governments make policy.},
   Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001},
   Key = {fds297460}
}

@book{fds328613,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Constitutional courts in comparative perspective: A
             theoretical assessment},
   Volume = {18},
   Pages = {167-185},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-040113-161150},
   Abstract = {In many democratic polities, constitutional courts
             significantly shape the political landscape. Yet, how they
             are able to do so is a puzzle: With limited resources at
             their disposal, and no direct powers of enforcement, judges
             must rely on the willingness of executives and legislators
             to comply with their decisions and to respect judicial
             authority. This essay surveys recent literature that has
             explored the conditions that sustain judicial authority. I
             contrast explanations that highlight the benefits that
             independent courts can provide to other policy makers
             ("endogenous explanations") with explanations that emphasize
             the constraints that keep executives and legislators from
             undermining the judiciary ("exogenous explanations"). I
             conclude by exploring the role of strategic judicial
             behavior in maintaining and expanding judicial
             power.},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-040113-161150},
   Key = {fds328613}
}


%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds328623,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Abstract judicial review, legislative bargaining, and policy
             compromise},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {299-326},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692898010003005},
   Abstract = {The constitutions of many parliamentary democracies provide
             for abstract judicial review, a proceeding that allows a
             specified parliamentary minority to initiate judicial review
             against legislation in the absence of a concrete case. The
             paper analyzes the impact that this proceeding has on
             legislative bargaining, using a simple game-theoretic model.
             The main conclusion is that the most important effects of
             abstract review are indirect and anticipatory. Furthermore,
             abstract review results in more moderate legislative
             proposals than would be expected in its absence. In this
             sense, it promotes what Lijphart has called 'consensus
             democracy'. Finally, the model reveals that such moderation
             depends on the degree of judicial deference towards the
             legislature. Surprisingly, a court that is not deferential
             will be appealed to less than a deferential court, even
             though its influence on policy is larger.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010003005},
   Key = {fds328623}
}

@article{fds328624,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Reply to Stone Sweet},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {339-346},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1998},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692898010003007},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010003007},
   Key = {fds328624}
}

@article{fds328622,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Intergovernmental fiscal relations},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {199-201},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1017272930043},
   Doi = {10.1023/a:1017272930043},
   Key = {fds328622}
}

@article{fds328621,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Establishing judicial independence in West Germany: The
             impact of opinion leadership and the separation of
             powers},
   Journal = {Comparative Politics},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {333-353},
   Publisher = {JSTOR},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/422370},
   Doi = {10.2307/422370},
   Key = {fds328621}
}

@article{fds328620,
   Author = {Powell, GB and Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence:
             Implications for two visions of democracy},
   Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {383-411},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400000168},
   Abstract = {Comparative studies of election rules and legislative
             representation have focused intensively on vote-seat
             disproportionality as an indication of poor representation.
             Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has
             important advantages and is especially more appropriate for
             a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of
             election rules on both vote-seat correspondence and median
             left-right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen
             countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions
             necessary to reduce vote-seat disproportionality in high
             threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and
             higher levels) of distortion. Although good median
             correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide
             range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest
             that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to
             outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this
             criterion also.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0007123400000168},
   Key = {fds328620}
}

@article{fds297437,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to
             Constitutional Review},
   Volume = {45},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {346-361},
   Publisher = {JSTOR},
   Year = {2001},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2669345},
   Abstract = {This article develops an imperfect information model of the
             interactions between legislatures and constitutional courts.
             The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial
             review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, and the
             impact of anticipation of such reactions on judicial
             behavior. The most important finding is that the nature of
             legislative-judicial relations depends crucially on the
             political environment in which court and legislature must
             act, as well as on judicial preferences. Several results are
             tested in a logit analysis of decisions by the German
             Constitutional Court from 1983 to 1995.},
   Doi = {10.2307/2669345},
   Key = {fds297437}
}

@article{fds297438,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Law, Politics, and Interdisciplinary Work},
   Journal = {European Union Politics},
   Pages = {127-135},
   Year = {2002},
   ISSN = {1465-1165},
   Key = {fds297438}
}

@article{fds305586,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Rogers, J},
   Title = {Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in
             Comparative Perspective},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {379-397},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1540-5907},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3088383},
   Abstract = {High courts in eleven U.S. states (and a number of
             countries) provide advisory opinions on pending legislation
             when requested by the executive or legislative branch of the
             government. To examine the implications of the advisory
             mechanism for institutional behavior and for policy
             outcomes, we develop and compare results form two
             incomplete-information models of judicial-legislative
             interaction. One game models judicial-legislative
             interaction with "ordinary" judicial review, the other
             models the interaction with an advisory option. We show how
             the advisory mechanism alters policy outcomes relative to
             outcomes that would be realized without the advisory option.
             We then identify the conditions under which legislatures
             request advisory opinions and when they choose to legislate
             without them. Finally, we consider whether the advisory
             mechanism is a welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing
             institution, and identify conditions that explain why some
             courts are willing to offer advisory opinions while others
             refuse to do so.},
   Doi = {10.2307/3088383},
   Key = {fds305586}
}

@article{fds328619,
   Author = {Alter, KJ and Dehousse, R and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Law, Political Science and EU Legal Studies: An
             Interdisciplinary Project?},
   Journal = {European Union Politics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {113-136},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003001006},
   Doi = {10.1177/1465116502003001006},
   Key = {fds328619}
}

@article{fds305587,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Wasting Time? The Impact of Ideology and Size on Delay in
             Coalition Formation},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {323-332},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123403000140},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0007123403000140},
   Key = {fds305587}
}

@article{fds297439,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary
             Scrutiny},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {48},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {13-27},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2004},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x},
   Abstract = {Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic
             principal-agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties
             with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate
             important policymaking powers to individual cabinet
             ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will
             attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the
             expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep
             ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they
             favor rather than sticking to the "coalition deal"? We argue
             that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of
             "hostile" ministerial proposals to overcome the potential
             problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain.
             Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in
             Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our
             findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in
             allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition
             conflicts.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x},
   Key = {fds297439}
}

@article{fds297440,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
   Title = {Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {99},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {93-106},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2005},
   ISSN = {1537-5943},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051518},
   Abstract = {Political scientists know remarkably little about the extent
             to which legislatures are able to influence policymaking in
             parliamentary democracies. In this article, we focus on the
             influence of legislative institutions in periods of
             coalition government. We show that multiparty governments
             are plagued by "agency" problems created by delegation to
             cabinet ministers that increase in severity on issues that
             divide the coalition. We also argue that the process of
             legislative review presents an important-but understudied-
             institutional opportunity for coalition partners to overcome
             these tensions. We evaluate our argument using original
             legislative data on over 300 government bills collected from
             two parliamentary democracies. The central implication of
             our findings is that legislatures play a more important role
             in parliamentary democracies than is usually appreciated by
             providing a key institutional mechanism that allows
             coalition partners with divergent preferences to govern
             successfully.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055405051518},
   Key = {fds297440}
}

@article{fds297441,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Rogers, J},
   Title = {Resurrecting Lochner: A Continent Defense of Judicial
             Activism},
   Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
   Pages = {442-468},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds297441}
}

@article{fds328618,
   Author = {Rogers, JR and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Resurrecting lochner: A defense of unprincipled judicial
             activism},
   Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {442-468},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm029},
   Abstract = {Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stands as one of
             the Supreme Court's most reviled decisions. We challenge the
             critical consensus against Lochner and provide a defense,
             albeit a contingent defense, of "unprincipled" judicial
             activism. To do so, we develop a game-theoretic model of
             judicial-legislative interaction. We use the model to
             compare outcomes generated in a system of legislative
             supremacy to outcomes generated in a system in which
             judicial review is provided by a legally unprincipled,
             activist judiciary. We show that judicial review, even when
             provided by an activist, politicized judiciary, can promote
             important constitutional values and improve legislative
             quality relative to a deferential judiciary. In doing so, we
             identify an important "passive" component to the effect that
             judicial review has on legislatures and on legislation.
             Finally, we demonstrate that the addition of other
             institutions and constraints on judicial behavior amplify
             the beneficial effects that judicial review provides to the
             legislative process.},
   Doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewm029},
   Key = {fds328618}
}

@article{fds297442,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
   Title = {Reply to Benoit and Laver},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {112-114},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2008},
   ISSN = {1476-4989},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm018},
   Abstract = {<jats:p>We appreciate the positive reception of our
             transformation by Benoit and Laver (hereafter, BL), and we
             are grateful that they have incorporated it into the
             Wordscores package. Because their comment highlights a
             fundamental difference between the Martin-Vanberg (MV) and
             Laver-Benoit-Garry (LBG) approaches that is critical to the
             choice among transformations, we offer some brief comments
             that will allow users to make an informed decision regarding
             the appropriate use of the transformations. The central
             issue concerns comparisons between reference and virgin
             texts. As BL point out, researchers will often be interested
             in making such comparisons, and the LBG and MV
             transformations can yield substantially different results.
             In light of these differences, BL's primary suggestion is to
             focus analysis on the raw scores, which can be obtained for
             reference as well as virgin texts. We wholeheartedly agree
             with this prescription. In fact, it is precisely a concern
             for faithfully reporting the raw score information, while
             making it more intuitive, that motivates the MV
             transformation. As we show below, the MV transformation
             accurately reflects all and nothing but the information
             contained in raw scores. Therefore, “users [who] get eye
             strain” by looking at raw scores can safely substitute MV
             scores and be confident that the information provided is
             equivalent. The same will typically not be true of LBG
             scores.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpm018},
   Key = {fds297442}
}

@article{fds297443,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
   Title = {A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political
             Texts},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {93-100},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2008},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm010},
   Abstract = {In a recent article in the American Political Science
             Review, Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003, "Extracting policy
             positions from political texts using words as data,"
             97:311-331) propose a new method for conducting content
             analysis. Their Wordscores approach, by automating
             text-coding procedures, represents an advance in content
             analysis that will potentially have a large long-term impact
             on research across the discipline. To allow substantive
             interpretation, the scores produced by the Wordscores
             procedure require transformation. In this note, we address
             several shortcomings in the transformation procedure
             introduced in the original program. We demonstrate that the
             original transformation distorts the metric on which content
             scores are placed - hindering the ability of scholars to
             make meaningful comparisons across texts - and that it is
             very sensitive to the texts that are scored - opening up the
             possibility that researchers may generate, inadvertently or
             not, results that depend on the texts they choose to include
             in their analyses. We propose a transformation procedure
             that solves these problems. © The Author 2007. Published by
             Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for
             Political Methodology. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpm010},
   Key = {fds297443}
}

@article{fds297444,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
   Title = {Coalition Government and Political Communication},
   Journal = {Political Research Quarterly},
   Volume = {61},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {502-516},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2008},
   ISSN = {1938-274X},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912907308348},
   Abstract = {One of the central challenges facing multiparty governments
             in parliamentary democracies is the need for coalition
             parties to communicate to their constituents that they have
             not strayed significantly from their electoral commitments
             when agreeing to policy compromises. We argue that one of
             the main ways parties attempt to make their case to
             constituents is through their behavior in legislative
             debate. Debate provides a unique opportunity-tied directly
             to the policy the government is implementing-to declare
             party positions on the coalition compromise. In an analysis
             of several hundred legislative speeches in two parliamentary
             democracies, we show that coalition parties communicate with
             constituents much more extensively on internally divisive
             issues, especially as the next parliamentary elections draw
             near. We also demonstrate contextual and institutional
             effects (including the impact of junior ministers) that
             complement emerging findings in the literature on coalition
             governance. © 2008 University of Utah.},
   Doi = {10.1177/1065912907308348},
   Key = {fds297444}
}

@article{fds297445,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Staton, J},
   Title = {The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial
             Opinions},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {504-519},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2008},
   ISSN = {1540-5907},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x},
   Abstract = {An established line of research demonstrates that vague
             judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than
             clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why
             would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We
             argue that the relationships between judges and other policy
             makers in separation-of-powers systems are central to
             understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect
             efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial
             policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts
             of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability
             to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide
             likely defiance from public view. At the same time,
             vagueness removes a central source of pressure for
             compliance that judges can place on other policy makers.
             Using a game-theoretic model, we identify conditions under
             which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use
             statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under
             which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard
             delegation accounts. © 2008, Midwest Political Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x},
   Key = {fds297445}
}

@article{fds297455,
   Author = {McGuire, KT and Vanberg, G and Smith, CE and Caldeira,
             GA},
   Title = {Measuring policy content on the U.S. Supreme
             court},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {71},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1305-1321},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990107},
   Abstract = {Political scientists have developed increasingly
             sophisticated understandings of the influences on Supreme
             Court decision making. Yet, much less attention has been
             paid to empirical measures of the Court's ideological
             output. We develop a theory of the interactions between
             rational litigants, lower court judges, and Supreme Court
             justices. We argue that the most common measure of the
             Supreme Court's ideological outputwhether the Court's
             decision is liberal or conservativesuffers from systematic
             bias. We trace this bias empirically and explain the
             undesirable consequences it has for empirical analyses of
             judicial behavior. Specifically, we show that, although the
             Court's preferences are positively correlated with the
             ideological direction of the justices decision to reverse a
             lower court, the attitudes of the justices are negatively
             relatedand significantly soto the ideological direction of
             outcomes that affirm lower court decisions. We also offer a
             solution that allows scholars to work around this affirmance
             bias. © 2009 Copyright Southern Political Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381609990107},
   Key = {fds297455}
}

@article{fds297446,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {The Will of the People: A Comparative Perspective on
             Friedman},
   Journal = {Michigan State Law Review},
   Volume = {3},
   Pages = {717-728},
   Year = {2010},
   ISSN = {1087-5468},
   Key = {fds297446}
}

@article{fds297456,
   Author = {Vanberg, G and Engstrom, E},
   Title = {Assessing the Partisan Allocation of Pork: Evidence from
             Congressional Earmarks},
   Journal = {American Politics Research},
   Volume = {38},
   Pages = {958-985},
   Year = {2010},
   Key = {fds297456}
}

@article{fds328617,
   Author = {Engstrom, EJ and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Assessing the Allocation of Pork: Evidence From
             Congressional Earmarks},
   Journal = {American Politics Research},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {959-985},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X10369529},
   Abstract = {Distributive politics represents one of the most important
             and controversial aspects of legislative policymaking. In
             the U.S. Congress, controversies over distributive politics
             are most evident in the area of legislative earmarking. In
             this article, we employ a unique set of data matching
             earmarks to their legislative sponsors to assess the leading
             explanations of distributive politics. We find that members
             of the majority party do considerably better than equally
             situated members of the minority. Moreover, party leaders
             target earmarks to those holding pivotal agenda-setting
             positions and to electorally vulnerable members. These
             findings have direct implications for both the extensive
             political science literature on distributive politics and
             the practical politics of earmarking reform. © The
             Author(s) 2010.},
   Doi = {10.1177/1532673X10369529},
   Key = {fds328617}
}

@article{fds297457,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and
             constitutional choice},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
   Volume = {80},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {309-318},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.030},
   Abstract = {The constitutional political economy research program
             established by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan provides a
             rigorous analytical framework for the analysis of
             constitutional choice. I focus on two issues that have
             received only limited attention in the CPE literature: the
             problem of constitutional enforcement and the role of
             judicial review. I demonstrate that incorporating a concern
             for enforcement into constitutional analysis has significant
             implications for the the choice among rules, and suggests
             that procedural constitutional constraints have significant
             advantages over constitutional norms that attempt to secure
             broader, substantive values. © 2011 Elsevier
             B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.030},
   Key = {fds297457}
}

@article{fds297447,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS and Vanberg, V},
   Title = {Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The
             Calculus of Consent at 50},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {152},
   Pages = {245-252},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds297447}
}

@article{fds297458,
   Author = {Carrubba, C and Friedman, B and Martin, AD and Vanberg,
             G},
   Title = {Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court
             Opinions?},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {400-412},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x},
   Abstract = {Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or
             the opinion author as the most influential justices in
             shaping the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a
             model of judicial decision making that suggests that
             opinions are likely to reflect the views of the median
             justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from
             two features of judicial decision making that have received
             little attention in previous models. The first is that in
             deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute,
             and that they may have preferences over which party wins the
             specific case confronting them. The second is that justices
             who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write
             concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate that both
             features undermine the bargaining power of the Court's
             median and shift influence towards the coalition median. An
             empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides
             significant support for the model. © 2011, Midwest
             Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x},
   Key = {fds297458}
}

@article{fds297459,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Multiparty government, fiscal institutions, and public
             spending},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {953-967},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000947},
   Abstract = {A large body of research has claimed that budget making by
             multiparty governments constitutes a common pool resource
             (CPR) problem that leads them to engage in higher levels of
             spending than single-party governments and, further, that
             this upwards fiscal pressure increases with the number of
             parties in the coalition. We offer a significant
             modification of the conventional wisdom. Drawing on recent
             developments in the literature on coalition governance, as
             well as research on fiscal institutions, we argue that
             budgetary rules can mitigate the CPR logic provided that
             they (1) reduce the influence of individual parties in the
             budget process and (2) generate endogenous incentives to
             resist spending demands by coalition partners. Our empirical
             evaluation, based on spending patterns in 15 European
             democracies over nearly 40 years, provides clear support for
             this contention. Restrictive budgetary procedures can
             eliminate the expansionary fiscal pressures associated with
             growing coalition size. Our conclusions suggest that there
             is room for addressing contemporary concerns over the size
             of the public sector in multiparty democracies through
             appropriate reforms to fiscal institutions, and they also
             have implications for debates about the merits of
             proportional and majoritarian models of democracy that are,
             at least in part, characterized by the difference between
             coalition and single-party governance. © Southern Political
             Science Association 2013.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381613000947},
   Key = {fds297459}
}

@article{fds297453,
   Author = {Fox, J and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Narrow versus broad judicial decisions},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {355-383},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629813502709},
   Abstract = {A central debate among judges and legal scholars concerns
             the appropriate scope of judicial opinions: should decisions
             be narrow, and stick to the facts at hand, or should they be
             broad, and provide guidance in related contexts? A central
             argument for judicial ‘minimalism’ holds that judges
             should rule narrowly because they lack the knowledge
             required to make general rules to govern unknown future
             circumstances. In this paper, we challenge this argument.
             Our argument focuses on the fact that, by shaping the legal
             landscape, judicial decisions affect the policies that are
             adopted, and that may therefore subsequently be challenged
             before the court. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that
             in such a dynamic setting, in which current decisions shape
             future cases, judges with limited knowledge confront
             incentives to rule broadly precisely because they are
             ignorant.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951629813502709},
   Key = {fds297453}
}

@article{fds328614,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {A step in the wrong direction: An appraisal of the
             zero-intelligence model of government formation},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {873-879},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000474},
   Abstract = {In a recent article in the Journal of Politics, Golder,
             Golder, and Siegel (2012) argue that models of government
             formation should be rebuilt "from the ground up." They
             propose to do so with a "zero-intelligence" model of
             government formation. They claim that this model makes no
             theoretical assumptions beyond the requirement that a
             potential government, to be chosen, must be preferred by all
             its members and a legislative majority to the incumbent
             administration. They also claim that, empirically, their
             model does significantly better than existing models in
             predicting formation outcomes. We disagree with both claims.
             Theoretically, their model is unrestrictive in terms of its
             institutional assumptions, but it imposes a highly
             implausible behavioral assumption that drives the key
             results. Empirically, their assessment of the performance of
             the zero-intelligence model turns on data that are of
             limited relevance in testing coalition theories. We
             demonstrate that the predictions of the zero-intelligence
             model are no more accurate than random guesses, in stark
             contrast to the predictions of well-established approaches
             in traditional coalition research. We conclude that scholars
             would be ill-advised to dismiss traditional approaches in
             favor of the approach advanced by Golder, Golder, and
             Siegel.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381614000474},
   Key = {fds328614}
}

@article{fds328615,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The
             legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition
             compromise},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {979-996},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12099},
   Abstract = {In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically
             composed of multiple political parties working together in a
             coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental
             challenge in policymaking-the preferences of coalition
             parties often diverge significantly, but the government can
             adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This
             fact raises a critical question that has far-reaching
             implications for the quality of democratic representation:
             Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition
             policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing
             answers to this question derived from the theoretical
             literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary
             institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the
             legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from
             three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that
             coalition policies reflect a compromise between government
             parties rather than the preferences of the ministers
             proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the
             legislature.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12099},
   Key = {fds328615}
}

@article{fds324046,
   Author = {Benjamin, S and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme
             Court Decisions},
   Journal = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {5-26},
   Year = {2016},
   Key = {fds324046}
}

@article{fds328612,
   Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Gordon Tullock as a political scientist},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {194-213},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x},
   Abstract = {We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science,
             focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic
             entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a
             “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago
             encompassed considerable coursework related to political
             science. We consider three sources of information to draw
             conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political
             science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic
             political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of
             important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual
             agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is
             clearly significant for central questions in political
             science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy
             lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the
             careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the
             development of political science scholarship.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x},
   Key = {fds328612}
}

@article{fds354338,
   Author = {Gulati, M and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Financial Crises and Constitutional Compromise},
   Year = {2017},
   Key = {fds354338}
}

@article{fds340472,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and
             institutional design},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {177},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {199-216},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0570-0},
   Abstract = {Democracy and constitutionalism are both central to the
             Western political tradition. And yet, constitutional
             restrictions are often perceived to be in tension with
             democratic commitments. I argue that the constitutional
             political economy approach developed by Nobel Laureate James
             Buchanan resolves the tension between constitutionalism and
             the values of democratic governance by shifting the analysis
             from a system-attributes perspective that focuses on the
             particular institutional properties of a political order to
             a system-legitimacy perspective that focuses on the manner
             in which political institutions gain democratic legitimacy.
             In so doing, the approach reveals that constitutionalism can
             be understood as a natural expression of democratic
             values.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0570-0},
   Key = {fds340472}
}

@article{fds340933,
   Author = {Fortunato, D and Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Committee Chairs and Legislative Review in Parliamentary
             Democracies},
   Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {49},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {785-797},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000673},
   Abstract = {Recent research on parliamentary institutions has
             demonstrated that legislatures featuring strong committees
             play an important role in shaping government policy.
             However, the impact of the legislators who lead these
             committees - committee chairs - is poorly understood. This
             study provides the first examination of whether the partisan
             control of committee chairs in parliamentary systems has a
             systematic impact on legislative scrutiny. The article
             argues that committee chairs can, in principle, use their
             significant agenda powers to serve two purposes: providing
             opposition parties with a greater ability to scrutinize
             government policy proposals, and enabling government parties
             to better police one another. Analyzing the legislative
             histories of 1,100 government bills in three parliamentary
             democracies, the study finds that control of committee
             chairs significantly strengthens the ability of opposition
             parties to engage in legislative review. The analysis also
             suggests that government parties' ability to monitor their
             coalition allies does not depend on control of committee
             chairs.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0007123416000673},
   Key = {fds340933}
}

@article{fds352896,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining before
             an Audience under Multiparty Government},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {114},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1138-1154},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000337},
   Abstract = {Party elites in coalition governments are acutely aware that
             the deals they strike will be critically evaluated by their
             supporters, and that they risk losing support if they are
             perceived as ineffective negotiators. This has a powerful
             influence on the bargains parties strike. Because most
             supporters are unaware of the complex aspects of bargains
             and instead rely on simple heuristics to evaluate their most
             visible features, parties have incentives to meet supporter
             expectations primarily on easily observable outcomes. To do
             so, they make trade-offs on less observable outcomes. This
             implies that the more visible features of a bargain
             typically do not accurately reflect the relative success of
             parties in coalition negotiations. We evaluate our argument
             using original data on the office rewards and policy risks
             of portfolio allocation in 16 parliamentary democracies. Our
             findings support our argument, and they have important
             implications for the nature of representation under
             multiparty government.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055420000337},
   Key = {fds352896}
}

@article{fds352895,
   Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public
             Policy in Parliamentary Democracies},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {325-340},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12453},
   Abstract = {Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising
             multiple political parties with conflicting policy
             positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a
             significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments
             are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent
             theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty
             government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition
             parties depends crucially on institutional context.
             Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement
             of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all
             governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the
             preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries
             should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far
             failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional
             relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection
             policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the
             first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative
             institutions significantly shapes the relative policy
             influence of coalition parties. Our findings have
             implications for our understanding of coalition government,
             policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12453},
   Key = {fds352895}
}

@article{fds358020,
   Author = {Broman, B and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Feuding, arbitration, and the emergence of an independent
             judiciary},
   Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {162-199},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09341-x},
   Abstract = {Anthropologists, historians, and political economists
             suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and
             enforces agreements in the absence of a state. We ground
             these accounts in a series of formal models that shows the
             relationship between feuding, informal arbitration, and
             formal judicial resolution. Feuding enables cooperation by
             deterring exploitative behavior, but its ability to do so is
             conditioned by two credible commitment problems that affect
             both militarily weak and strong actors. These commitment
             problems can be partially ameliorated through arbitration,
             even in the absence of coercive authority, by providing
             information that makes the wronged party’s threat to feud
             more credible. Transitioning to a formal, coercive justice
             system, however, represents a qualitative change to the
             nature of disputing—a change that can be universally
             beneficial. We therefore provide a new explanation for the
             creation of independent courts rooted in the logic of
             dispute resolution and illustrate this explanation with
             reference to the creation of the Imperial Chamber Court of
             the Holy Roman Empire.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09341-x},
   Key = {fds358020}
}


%% Edited Volumes   
@misc{fds297448,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Gesetzgebung: Zum politischen
             Spielraum des Bun-desverfassungsgerichtes},
   Booktitle = {Neue theoretische Perspektiven auf das deutsche
             Regierungssystem},
   Publisher = {Max-Planck-Institut f ̈ ur Gesellschafts-
             forschung},
   Editor = {Manow, P and Ganghof, S},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds297448}
}

@misc{fds297450,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence},
   Pages = {828 pages},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Whittington, KE and Kelemen, RD and Caldeira, GA},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {0191615064},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0007},
   Abstract = {This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of the field
             of law and politics in all its diversity, ranging from such
             traditional subjects as theories of jurisprudence,
             constitutionalism, judicial politics and law-and-society to
             such re ...},
   Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0007},
   Key = {fds297450}
}

@misc{fds328616,
   Author = {Vanberg, G},
   Title = {"John Marshall has made his decision": Implementation,transparency,
             and public support},
   Pages = {69-96},
   Booktitle = {Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme
             Court},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {September},
   ISBN = {9780813925271},
   Key = {fds328616}
}

@misc{fds297449,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {John Marshall Has Made His Decision: Implementation,
             Transparency, and Public Support},
   Pages = {320 pages},
   Booktitle = {Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme
             Court},
   Publisher = {University of Virginia Press},
   Editor = {Rogers, JR and Flemming, RB and Bond, JR},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {October},
   ISBN = {0813934192},
   Abstract = {Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and
             consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a
             growing body of work that considers these influential
             interactions among various branches of the U.S.
             government.},
   Key = {fds297449}
}

@misc{fds297454,
   Author = {Vanberg, G and Martin, L},
   Title = {“Legislative Institutions and Coalition
             Government.”},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
   Publisher = {Oxford Univeristy Press},
   Editor = {Saalfeld, T and Strøm, K and Martin, S},
   Year = {2013},
   ISBN = {0199653011},
   Abstract = {The 33 chapters in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative
             Studies, written by 47 of the most distinguished legislative
             scholars, provide a comprehensive and up-to-date description
             and assessment of the state of the art in legislative
             studies.},
   Key = {fds297454}
}

@misc{fds354339,
   Author = {Vanberg, G and Martin, L},
   Title = {“Legislative Institutions and Coalition
             Government.”},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
   Publisher = {Oxford Univeristy Press},
   Editor = {Saalfeld, T and Strøm, K and Martin, S},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds354339}
}

@misc{fds305588,
   Author = {Vanberg, GS},
   Title = {Legislative Institutions and Coalition Government},
   Pages = {800 pages},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Martin, S and Saalfeld, T and Strøm, KW},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {0199653011},
   Abstract = {The 33 chapters in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative
             Studies, written by 47 of the most distinguished legislative
             scholars, provide a comprehensive and up-to-date description
             and assessment of the state of the art in legislative
             studies.},
   Key = {fds305588}
}

@misc{fds355649,
   Author = {Todd, JD and Cho, M and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Politics, Polarization, and the U.S. Supreme
             Court},
   Pages = {41-66},
   Booktitle = {The U.S. Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law:
             The Obama Era and Its Legacy},
   Publisher = {Nomos / Routledge},
   Editor = {Kaiser, A-B and Petersen, N and Saurer, J},
   Year = {2018},
   ISBN = {9780367182311},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845289496-41},
   Abstract = {In recent decades, the American political system has become
             increasingly polarized. Has this trend affected the U.S.
             Supreme Court? In this chapter, we approach the question
             empirically through seven decades’ worth of data on the
             nomination, confirmation, law clerk hires, and voting
             behaviors of the justices. We find strong evidence of
             increased polarization in the perceived ideology of nominees
             and in the Senate’s confirmation process. However,
             polarization’s impact is less clear-cut where the behavior
             of the justices themselves is concerned. While new patterns
             such as ideological homophily in the clerk hiring process
             and partisan sorting in voting behaviors point toward
             greater polarization, network analysis of the voting
             coalitions reveals that moderate levels of polarization are
             not new to the Court.},
   Doi = {10.5771/9783845289496-41},
   Key = {fds355649}
}


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