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| Publications of Georg Vanberg :chronological alphabetical by type listing:
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@article{fds358020,
Author = {Broman, B and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Feuding, arbitration, and the emergence of an independent
judiciary},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {162-199},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09341-x},
Abstract = {Anthropologists, historians, and political economists
suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and
enforces agreements in the absence of a state. We ground
these accounts in a series of formal models that shows the
relationship between feuding, informal arbitration, and
formal judicial resolution. Feuding enables cooperation by
deterring exploitative behavior, but its ability to do so is
conditioned by two credible commitment problems that affect
both militarily weak and strong actors. These commitment
problems can be partially ameliorated through arbitration,
even in the absence of coercive authority, by providing
information that makes the wronged party’s threat to feud
more credible. Transitioning to a formal, coercive justice
system, however, represents a qualitative change to the
nature of disputing—a change that can be universally
beneficial. We therefore provide a new explanation for the
creation of independent courts rooted in the logic of
dispute resolution and illustrate this explanation with
reference to the creation of the Imperial Chamber Court of
the Holy Roman Empire.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09341-x},
Key = {fds358020}
}
@article{fds352895,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public
Policy in Parliamentary Democracies},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {64},
Number = {2},
Pages = {325-340},
Year = {2020},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12453},
Abstract = {Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising
multiple political parties with conflicting policy
positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a
significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments
are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent
theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty
government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition
parties depends crucially on institutional context.
Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement
of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all
governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the
preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries
should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far
failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional
relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection
policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the
first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative
institutions significantly shapes the relative policy
influence of coalition parties. Our findings have
implications for our understanding of coalition government,
policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12453},
Key = {fds352895}
}
@article{fds352896,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining before
an Audience under Multiparty Government},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {114},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1138-1154},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000337},
Abstract = {Party elites in coalition governments are acutely aware that
the deals they strike will be critically evaluated by their
supporters, and that they risk losing support if they are
perceived as ineffective negotiators. This has a powerful
influence on the bargains parties strike. Because most
supporters are unaware of the complex aspects of bargains
and instead rely on simple heuristics to evaluate their most
visible features, parties have incentives to meet supporter
expectations primarily on easily observable outcomes. To do
so, they make trade-offs on less observable outcomes. This
implies that the more visible features of a bargain
typically do not accurately reflect the relative success of
parties in coalition negotiations. We evaluate our argument
using original data on the office rewards and policy risks
of portfolio allocation in 16 parliamentary democracies. Our
findings support our argument, and they have important
implications for the nature of representation under
multiparty government.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055420000337},
Key = {fds352896}
}
@article{fds340933,
Author = {Fortunato, D and Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Committee Chairs and Legislative Review in Parliamentary
Democracies},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {49},
Number = {2},
Pages = {785-797},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000673},
Abstract = {Recent research on parliamentary institutions has
demonstrated that legislatures featuring strong committees
play an important role in shaping government policy.
However, the impact of the legislators who lead these
committees - committee chairs - is poorly understood. This
study provides the first examination of whether the partisan
control of committee chairs in parliamentary systems has a
systematic impact on legislative scrutiny. The article
argues that committee chairs can, in principle, use their
significant agenda powers to serve two purposes: providing
opposition parties with a greater ability to scrutinize
government policy proposals, and enabling government parties
to better police one another. Analyzing the legislative
histories of 1,100 government bills in three parliamentary
democracies, the study finds that control of committee
chairs significantly strengthens the ability of opposition
parties to engage in legislative review. The analysis also
suggests that government parties' ability to monitor their
coalition allies does not depend on control of committee
chairs.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123416000673},
Key = {fds340933}
}
@article{fds340472,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and
institutional design},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {177},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {199-216},
Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0570-0},
Abstract = {Democracy and constitutionalism are both central to the
Western political tradition. And yet, constitutional
restrictions are often perceived to be in tension with
democratic commitments. I argue that the constitutional
political economy approach developed by Nobel Laureate James
Buchanan resolves the tension between constitutionalism and
the values of democratic governance by shifting the analysis
from a system-attributes perspective that focuses on the
particular institutional properties of a political order to
a system-legitimacy perspective that focuses on the manner
in which political institutions gain democratic legitimacy.
In so doing, the approach reveals that constitutionalism can
be understood as a natural expression of democratic
values.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0570-0},
Key = {fds340472}
}
@misc{fds355649,
Author = {Todd, JD and Cho, M and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Politics, Polarization, and the U.S. Supreme
Court},
Pages = {41-66},
Booktitle = {The U.S. Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law:
The Obama Era and Its Legacy},
Publisher = {Nomos / Routledge},
Editor = {Kaiser, A-B and Petersen, N and Saurer, J},
Year = {2018},
ISBN = {9780367182311},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845289496-41},
Abstract = {In recent decades, the American political system has become
increasingly polarized. Has this trend affected the U.S.
Supreme Court? In this chapter, we approach the question
empirically through seven decades’ worth of data on the
nomination, confirmation, law clerk hires, and voting
behaviors of the justices. We find strong evidence of
increased polarization in the perceived ideology of nominees
and in the Senate’s confirmation process. However,
polarization’s impact is less clear-cut where the behavior
of the justices themselves is concerned. While new patterns
such as ideological homophily in the clerk hiring process
and partisan sorting in voting behaviors point toward
greater polarization, network analysis of the voting
coalitions reveals that moderate levels of polarization are
not new to the Court.},
Doi = {10.5771/9783845289496-41},
Key = {fds355649}
}
@article{fds354338,
Author = {Gulati, M and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Financial Crises and Constitutional Compromise},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds354338}
}
@article{fds328612,
Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Gordon Tullock as a political scientist},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {194-213},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x},
Abstract = {We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science,
focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic
entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a
“natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago
encompassed considerable coursework related to political
science. We consider three sources of information to draw
conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political
science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic
political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of
important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual
agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is
clearly significant for central questions in political
science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy
lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the
careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the
development of political science scholarship.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x},
Key = {fds328612}
}
@article{fds324046,
Author = {Benjamin, S and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions},
Journal = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-26},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds324046}
}
@book{fds328613,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Constitutional courts in comparative perspective: A
theoretical assessment},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {167-185},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-040113-161150},
Abstract = {In many democratic polities, constitutional courts
significantly shape the political landscape. Yet, how they
are able to do so is a puzzle: With limited resources at
their disposal, and no direct powers of enforcement, judges
must rely on the willingness of executives and legislators
to comply with their decisions and to respect judicial
authority. This essay surveys recent literature that has
explored the conditions that sustain judicial authority. I
contrast explanations that highlight the benefits that
independent courts can provide to other policy makers
("endogenous explanations") with explanations that emphasize
the constraints that keep executives and legislators from
undermining the judiciary ("exogenous explanations"). I
conclude by exploring the role of strategic judicial
behavior in maintaining and expanding judicial
power.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-040113-161150},
Key = {fds328613}
}
@article{fds328615,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The
legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition
compromise},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {58},
Number = {4},
Pages = {979-996},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12099},
Abstract = {In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically
composed of multiple political parties working together in a
coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental
challenge in policymaking-the preferences of coalition
parties often diverge significantly, but the government can
adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This
fact raises a critical question that has far-reaching
implications for the quality of democratic representation:
Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition
policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing
answers to this question derived from the theoretical
literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary
institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the
legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from
three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that
coalition policies reflect a compromise between government
parties rather than the preferences of the ministers
proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the
legislature.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12099},
Key = {fds328615}
}
@article{fds328614,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {A step in the wrong direction: An appraisal of the
zero-intelligence model of government formation},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {76},
Number = {4},
Pages = {873-879},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000474},
Abstract = {In a recent article in the Journal of Politics, Golder,
Golder, and Siegel (2012) argue that models of government
formation should be rebuilt "from the ground up." They
propose to do so with a "zero-intelligence" model of
government formation. They claim that this model makes no
theoretical assumptions beyond the requirement that a
potential government, to be chosen, must be preferred by all
its members and a legislative majority to the incumbent
administration. They also claim that, empirically, their
model does significantly better than existing models in
predicting formation outcomes. We disagree with both claims.
Theoretically, their model is unrestrictive in terms of its
institutional assumptions, but it imposes a highly
implausible behavioral assumption that drives the key
results. Empirically, their assessment of the performance of
the zero-intelligence model turns on data that are of
limited relevance in testing coalition theories. We
demonstrate that the predictions of the zero-intelligence
model are no more accurate than random guesses, in stark
contrast to the predictions of well-established approaches
in traditional coalition research. We conclude that scholars
would be ill-advised to dismiss traditional approaches in
favor of the approach advanced by Golder, Golder, and
Siegel.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0022381614000474},
Key = {fds328614}
}
@article{fds297453,
Author = {Fox, J and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Narrow versus broad judicial decisions},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {355-383},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629813502709},
Abstract = {A central debate among judges and legal scholars concerns
the appropriate scope of judicial opinions: should decisions
be narrow, and stick to the facts at hand, or should they be
broad, and provide guidance in related contexts? A central
argument for judicial ‘minimalism’ holds that judges
should rule narrowly because they lack the knowledge
required to make general rules to govern unknown future
circumstances. In this paper, we challenge this argument.
Our argument focuses on the fact that, by shaping the legal
landscape, judicial decisions affect the policies that are
adopted, and that may therefore subsequently be challenged
before the court. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that
in such a dynamic setting, in which current decisions shape
future cases, judges with limited knowledge confront
incentives to rule broadly precisely because they are
ignorant.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951629813502709},
Key = {fds297453}
}
@misc{fds305588,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Legislative Institutions and Coalition Government},
Pages = {800 pages},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Martin, S and Saalfeld, T and Strøm, KW},
Year = {2014},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {0199653011},
Abstract = {The 33 chapters in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative
Studies, written by 47 of the most distinguished legislative
scholars, provide a comprehensive and up-to-date description
and assessment of the state of the art in legislative
studies.},
Key = {fds305588}
}
@article{fds297459,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Multiparty government, fiscal institutions, and public
spending},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {75},
Number = {4},
Pages = {953-967},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000947},
Abstract = {A large body of research has claimed that budget making by
multiparty governments constitutes a common pool resource
(CPR) problem that leads them to engage in higher levels of
spending than single-party governments and, further, that
this upwards fiscal pressure increases with the number of
parties in the coalition. We offer a significant
modification of the conventional wisdom. Drawing on recent
developments in the literature on coalition governance, as
well as research on fiscal institutions, we argue that
budgetary rules can mitigate the CPR logic provided that
they (1) reduce the influence of individual parties in the
budget process and (2) generate endogenous incentives to
resist spending demands by coalition partners. Our empirical
evaluation, based on spending patterns in 15 European
democracies over nearly 40 years, provides clear support for
this contention. Restrictive budgetary procedures can
eliminate the expansionary fiscal pressures associated with
growing coalition size. Our conclusions suggest that there
is room for addressing contemporary concerns over the size
of the public sector in multiparty democracies through
appropriate reforms to fiscal institutions, and they also
have implications for debates about the merits of
proportional and majoritarian models of democracy that are,
at least in part, characterized by the difference between
coalition and single-party governance. © Southern Political
Science Association 2013.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0022381613000947},
Key = {fds297459}
}
@misc{fds297454,
Author = {Vanberg, G and Martin, L},
Title = {“Legislative Institutions and Coalition
Government.”},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
Publisher = {Oxford Univeristy Press},
Editor = {Saalfeld, T and Strøm, K and Martin, S},
Year = {2013},
ISBN = {0199653011},
Abstract = {The 33 chapters in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative
Studies, written by 47 of the most distinguished legislative
scholars, provide a comprehensive and up-to-date description
and assessment of the state of the art in legislative
studies.},
Key = {fds297454}
}
@misc{fds354339,
Author = {Vanberg, G and Martin, L},
Title = {“Legislative Institutions and Coalition
Government.”},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
Publisher = {Oxford Univeristy Press},
Editor = {Saalfeld, T and Strøm, K and Martin, S},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds354339}
}
@misc{fds297449,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {John Marshall Has Made His Decision: Implementation,
Transparency, and Public Support},
Pages = {320 pages},
Booktitle = {Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme
Court},
Publisher = {University of Virginia Press},
Editor = {Rogers, JR and Flemming, RB and Bond, JR},
Year = {2012},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {0813934192},
Abstract = {Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and
consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a
growing body of work that considers these influential
interactions among various branches of the U.S.
government.},
Key = {fds297449}
}
@misc{fds328616,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {"John Marshall has made his decision": Implementation,transparency,
and public support},
Pages = {69-96},
Booktitle = {Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme
Court},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780813925271},
Key = {fds328616}
}
@article{fds297458,
Author = {Carrubba, C and Friedman, B and Martin, AD and Vanberg,
G},
Title = {Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court
Opinions?},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {56},
Number = {2},
Pages = {400-412},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x},
Abstract = {Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or
the opinion author as the most influential justices in
shaping the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a
model of judicial decision making that suggests that
opinions are likely to reflect the views of the median
justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from
two features of judicial decision making that have received
little attention in previous models. The first is that in
deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute,
and that they may have preferences over which party wins the
specific case confronting them. The second is that justices
who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write
concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate that both
features undermine the bargaining power of the Court's
median and shift influence towards the coalition median. An
empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides
significant support for the model. © 2011, Midwest
Political Science Association.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x},
Key = {fds297458}
}
@article{fds297447,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Vanberg, V},
Title = {Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The
Calculus of Consent at 50},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {152},
Pages = {245-252},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds297447}
}
@article{fds297457,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and
constitutional choice},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
Volume = {80},
Number = {2},
Pages = {309-318},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.030},
Abstract = {The constitutional political economy research program
established by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan provides a
rigorous analytical framework for the analysis of
constitutional choice. I focus on two issues that have
received only limited attention in the CPE literature: the
problem of constitutional enforcement and the role of
judicial review. I demonstrate that incorporating a concern
for enforcement into constitutional analysis has significant
implications for the the choice among rules, and suggests
that procedural constitutional constraints have significant
advantages over constitutional norms that attempt to secure
broader, substantive values. © 2011 Elsevier
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.030},
Key = {fds297457}
}
@book{fds297460,
Author = {Martin, LW and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative
Institutions in Multiparty Governance},
Pages = {1-192},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9780199607884},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001},
Abstract = {Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world's
parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are
comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to
tensions that are largely absent under single-party
government. The pressures of electoral competition and the
necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers
affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise
agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance.
The central argument of this book is that strong legislative
institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to
deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains.
Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills
across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of
the treatment of government legislation in contemporary
parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the
book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that
legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European
democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case
that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play
an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book
contributes to the field of coalition governance. While
scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and
death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in
which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This
book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty
governments make policy.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001},
Key = {fds297460}
}
@article{fds328617,
Author = {Engstrom, EJ and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Assessing the Allocation of Pork: Evidence From
Congressional Earmarks},
Journal = {American Politics Research},
Volume = {38},
Number = {6},
Pages = {959-985},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X10369529},
Abstract = {Distributive politics represents one of the most important
and controversial aspects of legislative policymaking. In
the U.S. Congress, controversies over distributive politics
are most evident in the area of legislative earmarking. In
this article, we employ a unique set of data matching
earmarks to their legislative sponsors to assess the leading
explanations of distributive politics. We find that members
of the majority party do considerably better than equally
situated members of the minority. Moreover, party leaders
target earmarks to those holding pivotal agenda-setting
positions and to electorally vulnerable members. These
findings have direct implications for both the extensive
political science literature on distributive politics and
the practical politics of earmarking reform. © The
Author(s) 2010.},
Doi = {10.1177/1532673X10369529},
Key = {fds328617}
}
@misc{fds297450,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence},
Pages = {828 pages},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Whittington, KE and Kelemen, RD and Caldeira, GA},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {0191615064},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0007},
Abstract = {This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of the field
of law and politics in all its diversity, ranging from such
traditional subjects as theories of jurisprudence,
constitutionalism, judicial politics and law-and-society to
such re ...},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0007},
Key = {fds297450}
}
@article{fds297446,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {The Will of the People: A Comparative Perspective on
Friedman},
Journal = {Michigan State Law Review},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {717-728},
Year = {2010},
ISSN = {1087-5468},
Key = {fds297446}
}
@article{fds297456,
Author = {Vanberg, G and Engstrom, E},
Title = {Assessing the Partisan Allocation of Pork: Evidence from
Congressional Earmarks},
Journal = {American Politics Research},
Volume = {38},
Pages = {958-985},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds297456}
}
@article{fds297455,
Author = {McGuire, KT and Vanberg, G and Smith, CE and Caldeira,
GA},
Title = {Measuring policy content on the U.S. Supreme
court},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {71},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1305-1321},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990107},
Abstract = {Political scientists have developed increasingly
sophisticated understandings of the influences on Supreme
Court decision making. Yet, much less attention has been
paid to empirical measures of the Court's ideological
output. We develop a theory of the interactions between
rational litigants, lower court judges, and Supreme Court
justices. We argue that the most common measure of the
Supreme Court's ideological outputwhether the Court's
decision is liberal or conservativesuffers from systematic
bias. We trace this bias empirically and explain the
undesirable consequences it has for empirical analyses of
judicial behavior. Specifically, we show that, although the
Court's preferences are positively correlated with the
ideological direction of the justices decision to reverse a
lower court, the attitudes of the justices are negatively
relatedand significantly soto the ideological direction of
outcomes that affirm lower court decisions. We also offer a
solution that allows scholars to work around this affirmance
bias. © 2009 Copyright Southern Political Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0022381609990107},
Key = {fds297455}
}
@article{fds297442,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
Title = {Reply to Benoit and Laver},
Journal = {Political Analysis},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {112-114},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1476-4989},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm018},
Abstract = {<jats:p>We appreciate the positive reception of our
transformation by Benoit and Laver (hereafter, BL), and we
are grateful that they have incorporated it into the
Wordscores package. Because their comment highlights a
fundamental difference between the Martin-Vanberg (MV) and
Laver-Benoit-Garry (LBG) approaches that is critical to the
choice among transformations, we offer some brief comments
that will allow users to make an informed decision regarding
the appropriate use of the transformations. The central
issue concerns comparisons between reference and virgin
texts. As BL point out, researchers will often be interested
in making such comparisons, and the LBG and MV
transformations can yield substantially different results.
In light of these differences, BL's primary suggestion is to
focus analysis on the raw scores, which can be obtained for
reference as well as virgin texts. We wholeheartedly agree
with this prescription. In fact, it is precisely a concern
for faithfully reporting the raw score information, while
making it more intuitive, that motivates the MV
transformation. As we show below, the MV transformation
accurately reflects all and nothing but the information
contained in raw scores. Therefore, “users [who] get eye
strain” by looking at raw scores can safely substitute MV
scores and be confident that the information provided is
equivalent. The same will typically not be true of LBG
scores.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpm018},
Key = {fds297442}
}
@article{fds297443,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
Title = {A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political
Texts},
Journal = {Political Analysis},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {93-100},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm010},
Abstract = {In a recent article in the American Political Science
Review, Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003, "Extracting policy
positions from political texts using words as data,"
97:311-331) propose a new method for conducting content
analysis. Their Wordscores approach, by automating
text-coding procedures, represents an advance in content
analysis that will potentially have a large long-term impact
on research across the discipline. To allow substantive
interpretation, the scores produced by the Wordscores
procedure require transformation. In this note, we address
several shortcomings in the transformation procedure
introduced in the original program. We demonstrate that the
original transformation distorts the metric on which content
scores are placed - hindering the ability of scholars to
make meaningful comparisons across texts - and that it is
very sensitive to the texts that are scored - opening up the
possibility that researchers may generate, inadvertently or
not, results that depend on the texts they choose to include
in their analyses. We propose a transformation procedure
that solves these problems. © The Author 2007. Published by
Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for
Political Methodology. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpm010},
Key = {fds297443}
}
@article{fds297444,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
Title = {Coalition Government and Political Communication},
Journal = {Political Research Quarterly},
Volume = {61},
Number = {3},
Pages = {502-516},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1938-274X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912907308348},
Abstract = {One of the central challenges facing multiparty governments
in parliamentary democracies is the need for coalition
parties to communicate to their constituents that they have
not strayed significantly from their electoral commitments
when agreeing to policy compromises. We argue that one of
the main ways parties attempt to make their case to
constituents is through their behavior in legislative
debate. Debate provides a unique opportunity-tied directly
to the policy the government is implementing-to declare
party positions on the coalition compromise. In an analysis
of several hundred legislative speeches in two parliamentary
democracies, we show that coalition parties communicate with
constituents much more extensively on internally divisive
issues, especially as the next parliamentary elections draw
near. We also demonstrate contextual and institutional
effects (including the impact of junior ministers) that
complement emerging findings in the literature on coalition
governance. © 2008 University of Utah.},
Doi = {10.1177/1065912907308348},
Key = {fds297444}
}
@article{fds297445,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Staton, J},
Title = {The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial
Opinions},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {52},
Number = {3},
Pages = {504-519},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {1540-5907},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x},
Abstract = {An established line of research demonstrates that vague
judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than
clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why
would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We
argue that the relationships between judges and other policy
makers in separation-of-powers systems are central to
understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect
efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial
policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts
of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability
to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide
likely defiance from public view. At the same time,
vagueness removes a central source of pressure for
compliance that judges can place on other policy makers.
Using a game-theoretic model, we identify conditions under
which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use
statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under
which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard
delegation accounts. © 2008, Midwest Political Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x},
Key = {fds297445}
}
@article{fds328618,
Author = {Rogers, JR and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Resurrecting lochner: A defense of unprincipled judicial
activism},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {442-468},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm029},
Abstract = {Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stands as one of
the Supreme Court's most reviled decisions. We challenge the
critical consensus against Lochner and provide a defense,
albeit a contingent defense, of "unprincipled" judicial
activism. To do so, we develop a game-theoretic model of
judicial-legislative interaction. We use the model to
compare outcomes generated in a system of legislative
supremacy to outcomes generated in a system in which
judicial review is provided by a legally unprincipled,
activist judiciary. We show that judicial review, even when
provided by an activist, politicized judiciary, can promote
important constitutional values and improve legislative
quality relative to a deferential judiciary. In doing so, we
identify an important "passive" component to the effect that
judicial review has on legislatures and on legislation.
Finally, we demonstrate that the addition of other
institutions and constraints on judicial behavior amplify
the beneficial effects that judicial review provides to the
legislative process.},
Doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewm029},
Key = {fds328618}
}
@article{fds297441,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Rogers, J},
Title = {Resurrecting Lochner: A Continent Defense of Judicial
Activism},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
Pages = {442-468},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds297441}
}
@article{fds297440,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Martin, L},
Title = {Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {99},
Number = {1},
Pages = {93-106},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2005},
ISSN = {1537-5943},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051518},
Abstract = {Political scientists know remarkably little about the extent
to which legislatures are able to influence policymaking in
parliamentary democracies. In this article, we focus on the
influence of legislative institutions in periods of
coalition government. We show that multiparty governments
are plagued by "agency" problems created by delegation to
cabinet ministers that increase in severity on issues that
divide the coalition. We also argue that the process of
legislative review presents an important-but understudied-
institutional opportunity for coalition partners to overcome
these tensions. We evaluate our argument using original
legislative data on over 300 government bills collected from
two parliamentary democracies. The central implication of
our findings is that legislatures play a more important role
in parliamentary democracies than is usually appreciated by
providing a key institutional mechanism that allows
coalition partners with divergent preferences to govern
successfully.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055405051518},
Key = {fds297440}
}
@misc{fds297448,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Gesetzgebung: Zum politischen
Spielraum des Bun-desverfassungsgerichtes},
Booktitle = {Neue theoretische Perspektiven auf das deutsche
Regierungssystem},
Publisher = {Max-Planck-Institut f ̈ ur Gesellschafts-
forschung},
Editor = {Manow, P and Ganghof, S},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds297448}
}
@book{fds297452,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {The Politics of Constitutional Review in
Germany},
Pages = {1-193},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {0521836476},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510427},
Abstract = {Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions
in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the
sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on
the central role of public support for judicial
independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate
the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German
Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis
of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with
judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the
interests of governing majorities, prevailing public
opinion, and the transparency of the political environment
exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are
influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and
their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By
highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the
book challenges the contention that high court justices are
largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that
constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511510427},
Key = {fds297452}
}
@article{fds297439,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary
Scrutiny},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {1},
Pages = {13-27},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x},
Abstract = {Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic
principal-agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties
with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate
important policymaking powers to individual cabinet
ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will
attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the
expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep
ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they
favor rather than sticking to the "coalition deal"? We argue
that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of
"hostile" ministerial proposals to overcome the potential
problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain.
Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in
Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our
findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in
allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition
conflicts.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x},
Key = {fds297439}
}
@article{fds305587,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Wasting Time? The Impact of Ideology and Size on Delay in
Coalition Formation},
Volume = {33},
Number = {2},
Pages = {323-332},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123403000140},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123403000140},
Key = {fds305587}
}
@article{fds305586,
Author = {Vanberg, GS and Rogers, J},
Title = {Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in
Comparative Perspective},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {46},
Number = {2},
Pages = {379-397},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1540-5907},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3088383},
Abstract = {High courts in eleven U.S. states (and a number of
countries) provide advisory opinions on pending legislation
when requested by the executive or legislative branch of the
government. To examine the implications of the advisory
mechanism for institutional behavior and for policy
outcomes, we develop and compare results form two
incomplete-information models of judicial-legislative
interaction. One game models judicial-legislative
interaction with "ordinary" judicial review, the other
models the interaction with an advisory option. We show how
the advisory mechanism alters policy outcomes relative to
outcomes that would be realized without the advisory option.
We then identify the conditions under which legislatures
request advisory opinions and when they choose to legislate
without them. Finally, we consider whether the advisory
mechanism is a welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing
institution, and identify conditions that explain why some
courts are willing to offer advisory opinions while others
refuse to do so.},
Doi = {10.2307/3088383},
Key = {fds305586}
}
@article{fds328619,
Author = {Alter, KJ and Dehousse, R and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Law, Political Science and EU Legal Studies: An
Interdisciplinary Project?},
Journal = {European Union Politics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {113-136},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003001006},
Doi = {10.1177/1465116502003001006},
Key = {fds328619}
}
@article{fds297438,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Law, Politics, and Interdisciplinary Work},
Journal = {European Union Politics},
Pages = {127-135},
Year = {2002},
ISSN = {1465-1165},
Key = {fds297438}
}
@article{fds297437,
Author = {Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to
Constitutional Review},
Volume = {45},
Number = {2},
Pages = {346-361},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2669345},
Abstract = {This article develops an imperfect information model of the
interactions between legislatures and constitutional courts.
The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial
review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, and the
impact of anticipation of such reactions on judicial
behavior. The most important finding is that the nature of
legislative-judicial relations depends crucially on the
political environment in which court and legislature must
act, as well as on judicial preferences. Several results are
tested in a logit analysis of decisions by the German
Constitutional Court from 1983 to 1995.},
Doi = {10.2307/2669345},
Key = {fds297437}
}
@article{fds328621,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Establishing judicial independence in West Germany: The
impact of opinion leadership and the separation of
powers},
Journal = {Comparative Politics},
Volume = {32},
Number = {3},
Pages = {333-353},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/422370},
Doi = {10.2307/422370},
Key = {fds328621}
}
@article{fds328620,
Author = {Powell, GB and Vanberg, GS},
Title = {Election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence:
Implications for two visions of democracy},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {30},
Number = {3},
Pages = {383-411},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400000168},
Abstract = {Comparative studies of election rules and legislative
representation have focused intensively on vote-seat
disproportionality as an indication of poor representation.
Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has
important advantages and is especially more appropriate for
a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of
election rules on both vote-seat correspondence and median
left-right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen
countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions
necessary to reduce vote-seat disproportionality in high
threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and
higher levels) of distortion. Although good median
correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide
range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest
that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to
outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this
criterion also.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0007123400000168},
Key = {fds328620}
}
@article{fds328622,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Intergovernmental fiscal relations},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {199-201},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1017272930043},
Doi = {10.1023/a:1017272930043},
Key = {fds328622}
}
@article{fds328623,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Abstract judicial review, legislative bargaining, and policy
compromise},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {299-326},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692898010003005},
Abstract = {The constitutions of many parliamentary democracies provide
for abstract judicial review, a proceeding that allows a
specified parliamentary minority to initiate judicial review
against legislation in the absence of a concrete case. The
paper analyzes the impact that this proceeding has on
legislative bargaining, using a simple game-theoretic model.
The main conclusion is that the most important effects of
abstract review are indirect and anticipatory. Furthermore,
abstract review results in more moderate legislative
proposals than would be expected in its absence. In this
sense, it promotes what Lijphart has called 'consensus
democracy'. Finally, the model reveals that such moderation
depends on the degree of judicial deference towards the
legislature. Surprisingly, a court that is not deferential
will be appealed to less than a deferential court, even
though its influence on policy is larger.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010003005},
Key = {fds328623}
}
@article{fds328624,
Author = {Vanberg, G},
Title = {Reply to Stone Sweet},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {339-346},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692898010003007},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692898010003007},
Key = {fds328624}
}
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