Publications of David Siegel    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{moore2013mathematics,
   Author = {Moore, WH and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {A Mathematics Course for Political and Social
             Research},
   Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {moore2013mathematics}
}

@book{bendor2011behavioral,
   Author = {Bendor, J and Diermeier, D and Siegel, DA and Ting,
             MM},
   Title = {A behavioral theory of elections},
   Pages = {1-254},
   Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780691135076},
   Abstract = {Most theories of elections assume that voters and political
             actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce
             many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously,
             about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed
             new challenges to the premise of rationality. This
             groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of
             elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians
             as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory
             posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an
             actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the
             future, while those that fall short are less likely to be
             tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors
             construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and
             voters' choices of candidates. These models predict
             substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and
             winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty
             elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on
             majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner
             significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and
             its models produce macroimplications consistent with the
             data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions
             about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A
             computational model accompanies the book and can be used as
             a tool for further research.},
   Key = {bendor2011behavioral}
}

@book{fds321657,
   Author = {Bendor, J and Diermeier, D and Siegel, DA and Ting,
             MM},
   Title = {A behavioral theory of elections},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780691135069},
   Abstract = {Most theories of elections assume that voters and political
             actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce
             many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously,
             about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed
             new challenges to the premise of rationality. This
             groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of
             elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians
             as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory
             posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an
             actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the
             future, while those that fall short are less likely to be
             tried later.Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors
             construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and
             voters' choices of candidates. These models predict
             substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and
             winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty
             elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on
             majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner
             significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and
             its models produce macroimplications consistent with the
             data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions
             about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A
             computational model accompanies the book and can be used as
             a tool for further research. © 2011 by Princeton University
             Press. All Rights Reserved.},
   Key = {fds321657}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds329540,
   Author = {Siegel, D},
   Title = {Democratic Institutions and Political Networks},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2017},
   ISBN = {9780190228217},
   Abstract = {How can countries build ties that promote peace? What are
             the most fruitful strategies for disrupting arms or
             terrorist networks? This volume is designed as a
             foundational statement and resource.},
   Key = {fds329540}
}

@misc{fds321658,
   Author = {Shapiro, JN and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Underfunding in terrorist organizations},
   Pages = {349-382},
   Booktitle = {Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism},
   Publisher = {Springer Vienna},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {9783211094419},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_21},
   Abstract = {A review of international terrorist activity reveals a
             pattern of financially strapped operatives working for
             organizations that seem to have plenty of money. To explain
             this observation, and to examine when restricting
             terrorists' funds will reduce their lethality, we model a
             hierarchical terror organization in which leaders delegate
             financial and logistical tasks to middlemen, but cannot
             perfectly monitor them for security reasons. These middlemen
             do not always share their leaders' interests: the temptation
             exists to skim funds from financial transactions. When
             middlemen are sufficiently greedy and organizations suffer
             from sufficiently strong budget constraints, leaders will
             not fund attacks because the costs of skimming are too
             great. Using general functional forms, we find important
             nonlinearities in terrorists' responses to government
             counter-terrorism. Restricting terrorists' funds may be
             ineffective until a critical threshold is reached, at which
             point cooperation within terrorist organizations begins to
             break down and further government actions have a
             disproportionately large impact. © 2009 Springer
             Vienna.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_21},
   Key = {fds321658}
}

@incollection{siegel2007rational,
   Author = {Bendor, J and Kumar, S and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Rational parties and retrospective voters},
   Volume = {17},
   Pages = {1-28},
   Booktitle = {International Symposia in Economic Theory and
             Econometrics},
   Publisher = {Elsevier},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780444531377},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1571-0386(06)17001-5},
   Abstract = {Many elections specialists take seriously V.O. Key's
             hypothesis (1966) that much voting is retrospective:
             citizens reward good performance by becoming more likely to
             vote for the incumbent and punish bad performance by
             becoming less likely. Earlier (Bendor et al., 2005) we
             formalized Key's verbal theory. Our model shows that people
             endogenously develop partisan voting tendencies, even if
             they lack explicit ideologies. However, that paper depicts
             parties as passive payoff-generating mechanisms. Here we
             make parties active, rational players with conventional
             goals: they either are pure office-seekers or have the usual
             mix of goals (office and policy preferences). The parties'
             optimal strategies reflect the incentives produced by
             retrospective voting. These incentives are powerful: for a
             wide range of parameter values they induce parties to select
             policies that differ not only from the median of the
             distribution of voter ideal points, but also from the mean.
             Further, by analyzing the complex dynamics of voter
             adaptation and party response, we can derive and
             characterize the endogenous incumbency advantage enjoyed by
             the party in power. We establish these properties both
             analytically and computationally. © Emerald Group
             Publishing Limited.},
   Doi = {10.1016/S1571-0386(06)17001-5},
   Key = {siegel2007rational}
}


%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds376087,
   Author = {Levy, G and Dudley, R and Chen, C and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Diplomatic Statements and the Strategic Use of Terrorism in
             Civil Wars},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220027241227907},
   Abstract = {How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect
             rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via
             a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts
             prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to
             military targets, in anticipation of material support, while
             material support alters the cost structure of attacks,
             leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the
             model’s implications using an original dataset of UN
             resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case
             study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find
             that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions
             in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical
             shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against
             civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling
             civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than
             examining civilian targeting in isolation.},
   Doi = {10.1177/00220027241227907},
   Key = {fds376087}
}

@article{fds371893,
   Author = {Mastro, OS and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Talking to the enemy: Explaining the emergence of peace
             talks in interstate war},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {182-203},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298231185112},
   Abstract = {Why are some states open to talking while fighting while
             others are not? We argue that a state considering opening
             negotiations is concerned not only with the adverse
             inference that the opposing state will draw, but also the
             actions that the opposing state might take in response to
             that inference. We use a formal model, with assumptions
             grounded in extensive historical evidence, to highlight one
             particular response to opening negotiations—the escalation
             of war efforts—and one particular characteristic of the
             state opening negotiations—its resilience to escalation.
             We find that states are willing to open negotiations under
             two conditions: when their opponents find escalation too
             costly, and when there is a signal of high resilience that
             only the highly resilient care to use. To illustrate the
             dynamics of the second condition, we offer an extended case
             study detailing North Vietnam’s changing approach to
             negotiations during the Vietnam War.},
   Doi = {10.1177/09516298231185112},
   Key = {fds371893}
}

@article{fds361810,
   Author = {Wirtz, JJ and Siegel, DA and Shapiro, JN and Zegart, A and Johnson,
             LK},
   Title = {INS special forum on David Sherman’s ‘An Intelligence
             Classic That Almost Never Was–Roberta Wohlstetter’s
             Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision},
   Journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {346-358},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.2015852},
   Abstract = {Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
             is probably the most influential book in the field of
             intelligence studies. As David Sherman explains, however,
             government officials attempted to block its publication due
             to security concerns that seemed to focus on Wohlstetter’s
             passing reference to World War II SIGINT. Because
             Sherman’s history raises issues of such ongoing importance
             to the field of intelligence studies, the editors have
             invited four scholars to offer their reflections on the
             classification issues that bedeviled Pearl Harbor: Warning
             and Decision.},
   Doi = {10.1080/02684527.2021.2015852},
   Key = {fds361810}
}

@article{fds356178,
   Author = {Datta, AC and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {INCLUSIVE AND NON-INCLUSIVE NETWORKS},
   Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {507-509},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S104909652100007X},
   Doi = {10.1017/S104909652100007X},
   Key = {fds356178}
}

@article{fds350867,
   Author = {Crabtree, C and Kern, HL and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the
             dictator’s dilemma},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {409-434},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629820927790},
   Abstract = {We offer a novel rational explanation for cults of
             personality. Participation in a cult of personality is
             psychologically costly whenever it involves preference
             falsification, with the costs varying across individuals. We
             highlight two characteristics associated with lower
             individual costs of preference falsification: (i) loyalty to
             the regime and (ii) unscrupulousness. Different
             characteristics might serve the regime better in different
             roles. Using a simple formal screening model, we demonstrate
             that one’s participation in a cult of personality improves
             the dictator’s personnel decisions under a wide variety of
             circumstances. Decisions are most improved when
             subordinates’ characteristics that better enable cult
             participation are correspondingly valued by dictators.
             Dictators who can manipulate the costs that cult
             participants pay find it easiest to ensure that
             correspondence. Our model also highlights the importance to
             dictators of not believing their own propaganda, and their
             need to offer increasingly extreme acts of cult
             participation as old acts become normalized.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951629820927790},
   Key = {fds350867}
}

@article{fds349727,
   Author = {Beardsley, K and Liu, H and Mucha, PJ and Siegel, DA and Tellez,
             JF},
   Title = {Hierarchy and the provision of order in international
             politics},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {82},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {731-746},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/707096},
   Abstract = {The anarchic international system is actually heavily
             structured: Communities of states join together for common
             benefit; strong states form hierarchical relationships with
             weak states to enforce order and achieve preferred outcomes.
             Breaking from prior research, we conceptualize structures
             such as community and hierarchy as properties of networks of
             states’ interactions that can capture unobserved
             constraints in state behavior, constraints that may reduce
             conflict. We offer two claims. One, common membership in
             trade communities pacifies to the extent that breaking trade
             ties would entail high switching costs: Thus, we expect
             heavy arms trade, more than most types of commercial trade,
             to reduce intracommunity conflict. Two, this is driven by
             hierarchical communities in which strong states can use high
             switching costs as leverage to constrain conflict between
             weaker states in the community. We find empirical support
             for these claims using a timedependent multilayer network
             model and a new measure of hierarchy based on network
             centrality.},
   Doi = {10.1086/707096},
   Key = {fds349727}
}

@article{fds342774,
   Author = {Mele, CS and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Identifiability, state repression, and the onset of ethnic
             conflict},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {181},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {399-422},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00664-w},
   Abstract = {When do persecuted ethnic minority groups choose to
             assimilate into the dominant majority group, rather than
             differentiate from it, and how do states respond? We argue
             that any answer to these questions must consider the joint
             effects of identity on state repression and the possibility
             of ethnic conflict. We posit two mechanisms through which
             identity acts: (1) mobilization and (2) operational
             capacity, defined as the ability of the group to contest
             state repression successfully. We show that minority groups
             may choose assimilation, even when differentiation would aid
             them in mobilization against the state, for a tactical
             reason: the benefits from improved mobilization may be
             outweighed by costly reductions in operational capacity.
             Efforts to assimilate emerge when the state cannot be
             indiscriminate in countering dissent, or when members of the
             minority group can more easily pass as members of the
             majority. Repressive states, in anticipation, will hinder
             assimilation by accentuating fundamental differences between
             groups.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11127-019-00664-w},
   Key = {fds342774}
}

@article{fds344827,
   Author = {Foster, MJ and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Pink Slips from the Underground: Changes in Terror
             Leadership},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {231-243},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz017},
   Abstract = {Personnel management at the top of terrorist groups presents
             a puzzle. Commanders act off-message reasonably often,
             sometimes angering powerful backers. When this happens group
             leaders typically have the means and incentives to kill the
             commander. Yet, we often observe group leaders dismissing
             them instead. This gives those commanders an opportunity to
             work against the movement by providing aid to the government
             or starting a competing group. Why would rational leaders
             act this way? We argue formally that this is a consequence
             of having to satisfy two "masters," a common problem in
             organizational behavior but as of yet underexplored in the
             study of terrorist organizations. Our model elucidates the
             substantive factors that underlie a leader's fraught
             personnel decision when caught in such a bind, here
             conceptualized as between backers and an important
             constituency. We develop implications for organizational
             functioning and structure, government action against groups,
             and the effect of technological innovations on leaders'
             incentives.},
   Doi = {10.1093/isq/sqz017},
   Key = {fds344827}
}

@article{fds335635,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Analyzing Computational Models},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {62},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {745-759},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12364},
   Abstract = {Computational models have been underutilized as tools for
             formal theory development, closing off theoretical analysis
             of complex substantive scenarios that they would well serve.
             I argue that this occurs for two reasons, and provide
             resolutions for each. First, computational models generally
             do not employ the language or modes of analysis common to
             game-theoretic models, the status quo in the literature. I
             detail the types of insights typically derived from
             game-theoretic models and discuss analogues in computational
             modeling. Second, there are not widely established
             procedures for analysis of deductive computational models. I
             present a regularized method for deriving comparative
             statics from computational models that provides insights
             comparable to those arising from game-theoretic analyses. It
             also serves as a framework for building theoretically
             tractable computational models. Together, these
             contributions should enhance communication between models of
             social science and open up the tool kit of deductive
             computational modeling for theory building to a broader
             audience.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12364},
   Key = {fds335635}
}

@article{fds329315,
   Author = {Mele, CS and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Identity, repression, and the threat of ethnic conflict in a
             strong state},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {578-598},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629817710562},
   Abstract = {Faced with repression from a strong state, one might expect
             minority ethnic groups to attempt to assimilate into the
             dominant group to make themselves seem less threatening.
             However, this conceptualization of threat elides its
             tactical components. Oppressed minority groups, even under
             strong states, may engage in anti-state operations in order
             to reduce the repression they face, and these operations may
             succeed with greater likelihood the more they assimilate.
             Anticipating this, strategic states may be more likely to
             preemptively raise repression in the face of assimilation in
             order to reduce this threat. Our model formalizes this
             logic, illustrating that it can be optimal for the minority
             group to differentiate even when doing so is strictly
             detrimental to mobilization. Differentiation is more likely
             to obtain when increased repression is more costly to the
             group and when the group’s anti-state operations are more
             capable of compelling the state to substantially reduce
             repression.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951629817710562},
   Key = {fds329315}
}

@article{fds291546,
   Author = {Siegel, DA and Shapiro, J},
   Title = {Coordination and Security: How Mobile Communications Affect
             Insurgency},
   Journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {312-322},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2015},
   ISSN = {0022-3433},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343314559624},
   Abstract = {Recent work has shown that the introduction of mobile
             communications can substantially alter the course of
             conflict. In Afghanistan and India targeting mobile
             communications is a central part of the insurgent campaigns.
             The opposite was true in Iraq. There insurgents instead
             threatened providers who did not do enough to maintain
             mobile phone networks. These differences likely arise from
             two competing effects of mobile communications: they make it
             easier for antigovernment actors to coordinate collective
             action, thereby increasing violence, and for pro-government
             civilians to collaborate with security forces allowing them
             to more effectively suppress rebels, thereby decreasing
             violence. To study these competing effects we analyze a
             formal model of insurgent action in which changes in the
             communications environment alter both (i) the ability of
             rebels to impose costs on civilians who cooperate with the
             government and (ii) the information flow to government
             forces seeking to suppress rebellion with military action.
             Our analysis highlights the importance of the threat of
             information sharing by non-combatants in reducing violence
             and offers some guidelines for policymakers in thinking
             about how much to support ICT development in conflict zones.
             In particular, we show that officials can generate
             reasonable expectations about whether expanding ICT access
             will exacerbate conflict or reduce it by assessing the
             relative gains to both sides from changes in ICT access
             along several simple dimensions.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022343314559624},
   Key = {fds291546}
}

@article{fds291547,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Evaluating a Stochastic Model of Government
             Formation},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {880-886},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2014},
   ISSN = {0022-3816},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002238161400053X},
   Abstract = {In a 2012 Journal of Politics article, we presented a
             zero-intelligence model of government formation. Our intent
             was to provide a "null" model of government formation, a
             baseline upon which other models could build. We made two
             claims regarding aggregate government formation outcomes:
             first, that our model produces aggregate results on the
             distributions of government types, cabinet portfolios, and
             bargaining delays in government formation that compare
             favorably to those in the real world; and second, that these
             aggregate distributions vary in theoretically intuitive ways
             as the model parameters change. In this issue, Martin and
             Vanberg (MV) criticize our model on theoretical and
             empirical grounds. Here we not only show how MV's evaluation
             of our model is flawed, but we also illustrate, using an
             analogy to common statistical practice, how one might
             properly attempt to falsify stochastic models such as ours
             at both the individual and the aggregate
             level.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S002238161400053X},
   Key = {fds291547}
}

@article{Gaskins2013,
   Author = {Gaskins, B and Golder, M and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Religious Participation, Social Conservatism, and Human
             Development},
   Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {04},
   Pages = {1125-1141},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0022-3816},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000765},
   Abstract = {What is the relationship between human development,
             religion, and social conservatism? We present a model in
             which individuals derive utility from both the secular and
             religious worlds. Our model is unusual in that it explains
             both an individual’s religious participation and her
             preferences over social policy at different levels of
             development. Using data from the pooled World Values Survey,
             we find that religious participation declines with human
             development and an individual’s ability to earn secular
             income. We also find that although social conservatism
             declines with development in absolute terms, religious
             individuals become more socially conservative relative to
             the population average. Paradoxically, our results suggest
             that human development may make it easier for religious
             individuals to overcome collective action problems and
             obtain disproportionate political influence, even as their
             numbers dwindle and society as a whole becomes less socially
             conservative. Our analysis has important implications for
             the debate about secularization theory.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381613000765},
   Key = {Gaskins2013}
}

@article{gaskins2013religious,
   Author = {Gaskins, B and Golder, M and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Religious Participation and Economic Conservatism},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {823-840},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12024},
   Abstract = {Why do some individuals engage in more religious activity
             than others? And how does this religious activity influence
             their economic attitudes? We present a formal model in which
             individuals derive utility from both secular and religious
             sources. Our model, which incorporates both demand-side and
             supply-side explanations of religion, is unusual in that it
             endogenizes both an individual's religious participation and
             her preferences over economic policy. Using data on over 70
             countries from the pooled World Values Survey, we find that
             religious participation declines with societal development,
             an individual's ability to produce secular goods, and state
             regulations on religion, but that it increases with
             inequality. We also find that religious participation
             increases economic conservatism among the poor but decreases
             it among the rich. Our analysis has important insights for
             the debate about secularization theory and challenges
             conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between
             religious participation and economic conservatism. ©2013,
             Midwest Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12024},
   Key = {gaskins2013religious}
}

@article{siegel2013social,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Social networks and the mass media},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {107},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {786-805},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0003-0554},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000452},
   Abstract = {How do global sources of information such as mass media
             outlets, state propaganda, NGOs, and national party
             leadership affect aggregate behavior? Prior work on this
             question has insufficiently considered the complex
             interaction between social network and mass media influences
             on individual behavior. By explicitly modeling this
             interaction, I show that social network structure conditions
             media's impact. Empirical studies of media effects that fail
             to consider this risk bias. Further, social network
             interactions can amplify media bias, leading to large swings
             in aggregate behavior made more severe when individuals can
             select into media matching their preferences. Countervailing
             media outlets and social elites with unified preferences can
             mitigate the effect of bias; however, media outlets
             promulgating antistatus quo bias have an advantage.
             Theoretical results such as these generate numerous testable
             hypotheses; I provide guidelines for deriving and testing
             hypotheses from the model and discuss several such
             hypotheses. © 2013 American Political Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055413000452},
   Key = {siegel2013social}
}

@article{siegel2013will,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Will you accept the government's friend request? Social
             networks and privacy concerns.},
   Journal = {PloS one},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {e80682},
   Publisher = {Public Library of Science},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24312236},
   Abstract = {Participating in social network websites entails voluntarily
             sharing private information, and the explosive growth of
             social network websites over the last decade suggests
             shifting views on privacy. Concurrently, new anti-terrorism
             laws, such as the USA Patriot Act, ask citizens to surrender
             substantial claim to privacy in the name of greater
             security. I address two important questions regarding
             individuals' views on privacy raised by these trends. First,
             how does prompting individuals to consider security concerns
             affect their views on government actions that jeopardize
             privacy? Second, does the use of social network websites
             alter the effect of prompted security concerns? I posit that
             prompting individuals to consider security concerns does
             lead to an increased willingness to accept government
             actions that jeopardize privacy, but that frequent users of
             websites like Facebook are less likely to be swayed by
             prompted security concerns. An embedded survey experiment
             provides support for both parts of my claim.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0080682},
   Key = {siegel2013will}
}

@article{siegel2013voter,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation.
             By Meredith Rolfe.},
   Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {01},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {siegel2013voter}
}

@article{golder2012modeling,
   Author = {Golder, M and Golder, SN and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Modeling the institutional foundation of parliamentary
             government formation},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {74},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {427-445},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001654},
   Abstract = {That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard
             government formation models entirely correspond to empirical
             findings has led some to conclude that theoretical accounts
             of government formation should be reconsidered from the
             bottom up. We take up this challenge by presenting a
             zero-intelligence model of government formation. In our
             model, three or more parties that care about office and
             policy make random government proposals. The only
             constraints that we impose on government formation
             correspond to the two binding constitutional constraints
             that exist in all parliamentary systems: An incumbent
             government always exists and all governments must enjoy
             majority legislative support. Despite its deliberately
             limited structure, our model predicts distributions over
             portfolio allocation, government types, and bargaining
             delays that approach those observed in the real world. Our
             analysis suggests that many formation outcomes may result
             from the institutional foundation of parliamentary
             democracies, independent of the strategic behavior of party
             leaders. © 2012 Southern Political Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381611001654},
   Key = {golder2012modeling}
}

@article{shapiro2012moral,
   Author = {Shapiro, JN and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Moral hazard, discipline, and the management of terrorist
             organizations},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {39-78},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000293},
   Abstract = {<jats:p>Terrorist groups repeatedly include operatives of
             varying commitment and often rely on a common set of
             security-reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these
             individuals. This is puzzling in that covert organizations
             are commonly thought to screen their operatives very
             carefully and pay a particularly heavy price for record
             keeping. The authors use terrorist memoirs and the internal
             correspondence of one particularly prominent group to
             highlight the organizational challenges terrorist groups
             face and use a game-theoretic model of moral hazard in a
             finitely sized organization to explain why record keeping
             and bureaucracy emerge in these groups. The model provides
             two novel results. First, in small heterogeneous
             organizations longer institutional memory can enhance
             organizational efficiency. Second, such organizations will
             use worse agents in equilibrium under certain conditions.
             The core logic is that in small organizations the punishment
             strategies that allow leaders to extract greater effort are
             credible only when operatives can identify and react to
             deviations from the leaders' equilibrium strategy. This
             dynamic creates incentives for record keeping and means that
             small organizations will periodically use problematic agents
             in equilibrium as part of a strategy that optimally
             motivates their best operatives.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0043887111000293},
   Key = {shapiro2012moral}
}

@article{siegel2011non,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Non-disruptive tactics of suppression are superior in
             countering terrorism, insurgency, and financial
             panics.},
   Journal = {PloS one},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e18545},
   Publisher = {Public Library of Science},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018545},
   Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>Suppressing damaging aggregate behaviors
             such as insurgency, terrorism, and financial panics are
             important tasks of the state. Each outcome of these
             aggregate behaviors is an emergent property of a system in
             which each individual's action depends on a subset of
             others' actions, given by each individual's network of
             interactions. Yet there are few explicit comparisons of
             strategies for suppression, and none that fully incorporate
             the interdependence of individual behavior.<h4>Methods and
             findings</h4>Here I show that suppression tactics that do
             not require the removal of individuals from networks of
             interactions are nearly always more effective than those
             that do. I find using simulation analysis of a general model
             of interdependent behavior that the degree to which such
             less disruptive suppression tactics are superior to more
             disruptive ones increases in the propensity of individuals
             to engage in the behavior in question.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Thus,
             hearts-and-minds approaches are generally more effective
             than force in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and
             partial insurance is usually a better tactic than gag rules
             in quelling financial panics. Differences between
             suppression tactics are greater when individual incentives
             to support terrorist or insurgent groups, or
             susceptibilities to financial panic, are higher. These
             conclusions have utility for policy-makers seeking to end
             bloody conflicts and prevent financial panics. As the model
             also applies to mass protest, its conclusions provide
             insight as well into the likely effects of different
             suppression strategies undertaken by authoritarian regimes
             seeking to hold on to power in the face of mass movements
             seeking to end them.},
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0018545},
   Key = {siegel2011non}
}

@article{siegel2011social,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Social networks in comparative perspective},
   Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {51-54},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S104909651000185X},
   Abstract = {In a sense, the study of comparative politics is the study
             of the role that context plays in structuring behavior.
             Institutional contexts, such as the nature of the electoral
             system or the existence of an independent judiciary, drive
             differences in electoral outcomes or human rights across
             nations. Individual-level contextual factors such as norms,
             culture, or ethnic or religious identity can be
             determinative in understanding when social movements will
             likely flourish and which cleavages will lead to political
             parties or ethnic strife. Variation in context leads to
             variation in political outcomes and behavior across both
             peoples and nations, and provides comparative politics with
             its richness. © Copyright American Political Science
             Association 2011.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S104909651000185X},
   Key = {siegel2011social}
}

@article{block2011identity,
   Author = {Block, R and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Identity, bargaining, and third-party mediation},
   Journal = {International Theory},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {416-449},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971911000169},
   Abstract = {This paper elucidates a theory of identity formation and
             applies it to the study of international negotiation. The
             theory acknowledges that actors/agents can adopt a
             multiplicity of identities, and it treats changes in the
             salience of identities as endogenous to the contextually
             dependent processes of interpersonal and intergroup
             interactions. Typically, strong identities are viewed as
             encouraging conflict and exacerbating interstate disputes.
             Our theory, however, suggests a palliative role for
             identity: third-party mediation can more effectively resolve
             conflicts when it enhances shared, if initially less
             salient, aspects of the disputants’ identities. We discuss
             several causal pathways through which the process of
             enhancing identity salience can increase the likelihood of
             successful conflict resolution, providing a complementary
             mechanism for the effectiveness of mediation to those extant
             in the literature. The paper concludes with a practical
             method for applying the theory's insights to the choice of
             mediator and the mediator's technique. © 2011, Cambridge
             University Press. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1752971911000169},
   Key = {block2011identity}
}

@article{baybeck2011strategic,
   Author = {Baybeck, B and Berry, WD and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {A strategic theory of policy diffusion via intergovernmental
             competition},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {232-247},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000988},
   Abstract = {Scholars have hypothesized that policy choices by national,
             state, and local governments often have implications for
             "location choices" made by residents (e.g., tax policies
             affect where firms set up business, welfare benefits
             influence where the poor live, government restaurant smoking
             restrictions influence where people eat). We develop a
             spatially explicit strategic theory of policy diffusion
             driven by intergovernmental competition over residents'
             location choices. The theory assumes that governments'
             decisions constitute a strategic game in which governments
             are influenced by their neighbors. We suggest a variety of
             policy contexts in which the theory is applicable. For one
             such context'the adoption of lotteries by American states'we
             use the theory to generate several hypotheses and then test
             them using event history analysis. The results provide
             substantial support for the theory and indicate that states
             compete for lottery business in a much more sophisticated
             fashion than has been previously recognized. © 2011
             Southern Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381610000988},
   Key = {baybeck2011strategic}
}

@article{siegel2011does,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {When does repression work? Collective action in social
             networks},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {232-47},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2011},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611000727},
   Abstract = {Empirical studies reach conflicting conclusions about the
             effect of repression on collective action. Extant theories
             cannot explain this variation in the efficacy of repression,
             in part because they do not account for the way in which
             social networks condition how individual behavior is
             aggregated into population levels of participation. Using a
             model in which the population is heterogeneous in interests
             and social influence, I demonstrate that the extent to which
             repression reduces participation, and the extent to which an
             angry backlash against repression increases participation,
             depends critically on the structure of the social network in
             place; this implies the need for greater empirical attention
             to network structure. To facilitate the model's empirical
             application, I focus on broad qualitative network types that
             require comparatively little data to identify and provide
             heuristics for how one might use qualitative network data to
             derive quantitative hypotheses on expected aggregate
             participation levels. © Copyright Southern Political
             Science Association 2011.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381611000727},
   Key = {siegel2011does}
}

@article{bendor2009satisficing,
   Author = {Bendor, J and Kumar, S and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Satisficing: A pretty good heuristic},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {48-60},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {June},
   Key = {bendor2009satisficing}
}

@article{bendor2010adaptively,
   Author = {Bendor, J and Kumar, S and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Adaptively rational retrospective voting},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {26-63},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629809347581},
   Abstract = {Since the seminal work of Key (1966), Kramer (1971), and
             Nordhaus (1975), retrospective voting has been a major
             component of voting theory. However, although these views
             are alive empirically (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000;
             Franzese, 2002; Hibbs, 2006), most theorizing assumes
             rational citizens. We suspect that Key had a less heroic
             view of voter cognition, and we formalize his verbal theory
             accordingly. Our model is based on two axioms: if an
             incumbent performed well (above voter A's aspiration) then A
             becomes more likely to vote for the incumbent; A is less
             likely to do so if the incumbent performed poorly (below A's
             aspiration). We then prove that such citizens, though
             lacking ideologies, endogenously develop partisan voting
             tendencies. This result is robust against perceptual errors
             (citizens evaluating an incumbent's performance
             incorrectly). We also show that the best-informed voters,
             who perceive performance most accurately, are the most
             partisan. © The Author(s), 2010.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951629809347581},
   Key = {bendor2010adaptively}
}

@article{shapiro2010paper,
   Author = {Shapiro, JN and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Is this paper dangerous? Balancing secrecy and openness in
             counterterrorism},
   Journal = {Security Studies},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {66-98},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410903546483},
   Abstract = {We analyze a seemingly simple question: When should
             government share private information that may be useful to
             terrorists? Policy makers' answer to this question has
             typically been "it is dangerous to share information that
             can potentially help terrorists." Unfortunately, this
             incomplete response has motivated a detrimental increase in
             the amount of information government keeps private or labels
             "sensitive but unclassified." We identify two distinct types
             of private information that are potentially useful to
             terrorists and identify the range of conditions under which
             sharing each can enhance counterterrorism efforts. Our
             results highlight the complex trade-offs policy makers face
             in deciding how much openness is right in a world where
             protecting the people from terrorists has become a central
             duty of government. © Taylor & Francis Group,
             LLC.},
   Doi = {10.1080/09636410903546483},
   Key = {shapiro2010paper}
}

@article{siegel2009simulating,
   Author = {Siegel, DA and Young, JK},
   Title = {Simulating terrorism: Credible commitment, costly signaling,
             and strategic behavior},
   Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
   Volume = {42},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {765-771},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096509990151},
   Abstract = {We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic
             nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a
             simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate
             the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling.
             The second explores high-level decision making of both a
             terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight
             scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The
             simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom
             setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer
             on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run
             the simulations. © 2009 The American Political Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1049096509990151},
   Key = {siegel2009simulating}
}

@article{siegel2009social,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Social networks and collective action},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {53},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {122-138},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x},
   Abstract = {Despite growing attention to the role of social context in
             determining political participation, the effect of the
             structure of social networks remains little examined. This
             article introduces a model of interdependent decision making
             within social networks, in which individuals have
             heterogeneous motivations to participate, and networks are
             defined via a qualitative typology mirroring common
             empirical contexts. The analysis finds that some metrics for
             networks' influence - size, the prevalence of weak ties, the
             presence of elites - have a more complex interaction with
             network structure and individual motivations than has been
             previously acknowledged. For example, in some contexts
             additional network ties decrease participation. This
             presents the potential for selection bias in empirical
             studies. The model offers a fuller characterization of the
             role of network structure and predicts expected levels of
             participation across network types and distributions of
             motivations as a function of network size, weak and strong
             ties, and elite influence. © 2009, Midwest Political
             Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x},
   Key = {siegel2009social}
}

@article{fds321659,
   Author = {Bendor, JB and Kumar, S and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic},
   Journal = {B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1478},
   Abstract = {One of the best known ideas in the study of bounded
             rationality is Simon's satisficing; yet we still lack a
             standard formalization of the heuristic and its
             implications. We propose a mathematical model of satisficing
             which explicitly represents agents' aspirations and which
             explores both single-person and multi-player contexts. The
             model shows that satisficing has a signature
             performance-profile in both contexts: (1) it can induce
             optimal long-run behavior in one class of problems but not
             in the complementary class; and (2) in the latter, it
             generates behavior that is sensible but not optimal. The
             model also yields empirically testable predictions: in
             certain bandit-problems it pins down the limiting
             probabilities of each arm's use, and it provides an ordering
             of the arms' dynamical use-probabilities as well. © 2009
             The Berkeley Electronic Press.},
   Doi = {10.2202/1935-1704.1478},
   Key = {fds321659}
}

@article{siegel2008risk,
   Author = {Siegel, DA},
   Title = {The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in
             the Twenty-First Century. By Mikkel Vedby
             Rasmussen},
   Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {02},
   Pages = {427-428},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {siegel2008risk}
}

@article{shapiro2007underfunding,
   Author = {Shapiro, JN and Siegel, DA},
   Title = {Underfunding in terrorist organizations},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {51},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {405-429},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00457.x},
   Abstract = {A review of international terrorist activity reveals a
             pattern of financially strapped operatives working for
             organizations that seem to have plenty of money. To explain
             this observation, and to examine when restricting
             terrorists' funds will reduce their lethality, we model a
             hierarchical terror organization in which leaders delegate
             financial and logistical tasks to middlemen, but cannot
             perfectly monitor them for security reasons. These middlemen
             do not always share their leaders' interests: the temptation
             exists to skim funds from financial transactions. When
             middlemen are sufficiently greedy and organizations suffer
             from sufficiently strong budget constraints, leaders will
             not fund attacks because the costs of skimming are too
             great. Using general functional forms, we find important
             nonlinearities in terrorists' responses to government
             counter-terrorism. Restricting terrorists' funds may be
             ineffective until a critical threshold is reached, at which
             point cooperation within terrorist organizations begins to
             break down and further government actions have a
             disproportionately large impact. © 2007 International
             Studies Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00457.x},
   Key = {shapiro2007underfunding}
}

@article{souder1998laser,
   Author = {Souder, PA and Bogorad, PL and Brash, EJ and Cates, GD and Cummings, WJ and Gorelov, A and Hasinoff, MD and Hausser, O and Hicks, K and Holmes, R and Siegel, D},
   Title = {Laser polarized muonic He3 and spin dependent μ
             capture},
   Journal = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section
             A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated
             Equipment},
   Volume = {402},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {311-318},
   Publisher = {Elsevier},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {souder1998laser}
}

@article{bogorad1997combined,
   Author = {Bogorad, P and Brash, EJ and Cates, GD and Cummings, WJ and Gorelov, A and Hasinoff, MD and Hausser, O and Hicks, K and Holmes, R and Huang,
             JC},
   Title = {A combined polarized target/ionization chamber for measuring
             the spin dependence of nuclear muon capture in laser
             polarized muonic He-3},
   Journal = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section
             A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated
             Equipment},
   Volume = {398},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {211-223},
   Publisher = {Elsevier},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {bogorad1997combined}
}

@article{bogorad1996laser,
   Author = {Bogorad, P and Behr, J and Brash, EJ and Cates, GD and Cummings, WJ and Gorelov, A and Hasinoff, MD and Hausser, O and Hicks, K and Holmes, R and others},
   Title = {Laser-polarized muonic3He and a measurement of the induced
             pseudoscalar coupling},
   Journal = {Hyperfine interactions},
   Volume = {101},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {433-437},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {bogorad1996laser}
}