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| Publications of Daniel Stegmueller :recent first alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds354302,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Who wants what?: Redistribution preferences in comparative
perspective},
Pages = {1-280},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781108484626},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108681339},
Abstract = {Why do some people support redistributive policies such as a
generous welfare state, social policy or protections for the
poor, and others do not? The (often implicit) model behind
much of comparative politics and political economy starts
with redistribution preferences. These affect how
individuals behave politically and their behavior in turn
affects the strategies of political parties and the policies
of governments. This book challenges some influential
interpretations of the political consequences of inequality.
Rueda and Stegmueller provide a novel explanation of how the
demand for redistribution is the result of expected future
income, the negative externalities of inequality, and the
relationship between altruism and population heterogeneity.
This innovative and timely volume will be of great interest
to readers interested in the political causes and
consequences of inequality.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108681339},
Key = {fds354302}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds366942,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {1-+},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366942}
}
@misc{fds366943,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Conclusion},
Pages = {219-231},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366943}
}
@misc{fds366944,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Income Expectations as Determinants of Redistribution},
Pages = {58-82},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366944}
}
@misc{fds366945,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Heterogeneity and Redistribution},
Pages = {133-153},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366945}
}
@misc{fds366946,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Analysis of Externalities},
Pages = {104-130},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366946}
}
@misc{fds366947,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Income, Income Expectations, Redistribution, and
Insurance},
Pages = {35-57},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366947}
}
@misc{fds366948,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Analysis of Heterogeneity},
Pages = {154-181},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366948}
}
@misc{fds366949,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Externalities and Redistribution},
Pages = {85-103},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366949}
}
@misc{fds366950,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {The Political Consequences of Redistribution
Demands},
Pages = {185-218},
Booktitle = {WHO WANTS WHAT?: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE},
Year = {2019},
ISBN = {978-1-108-72343-5},
Key = {fds366950}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds318646,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Apples and Oranges? The Problem of Equivalence in
Comparative Research},
Journal = {Political Analysis},
Volume = {19},
Number = {04},
Pages = {471-487},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr028},
Abstract = {Researchers in comparative research are increasingly relying
on individual level data to test theories involving
unobservable constructs like attitudes and preferences.
Estimation is carried out using large-scale cross-national
survey data providing responses from individuals living in
widely varying contexts. This strategy rests on the
assumption of equivalence, that is, no systematic distortion
in response behavior of individuals from different countries
exists. However, this assumption is frequently violated with
rather grave consequences for comparability and
interpretation. I present a multilevel mixture ordinal item
response model with item bias effects that is able to
establish equivalence. It corrects for systematic
measurement error induced by unobserved country
heterogeneity, and it allows for the simultaneous estimation
of structural parameters of interest. © The Author 2011.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the
Society for Political Methodology. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpr028},
Key = {fds318646}
}
@article{fds318647,
Author = {Neundorf, A and Stegmueller, D and Scotto, TJ},
Title = {The individual-level dynamics of bounded
partisanship},
Journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
Volume = {75},
Number = {3},
Pages = {458-482},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr018},
Abstract = {Over the past half century, scholars have utilized a variety
of theoretical and methodological approaches to study the
attachment or identification voters have with political
parties. However, models of partisan (in)stability ignore
its bounded character. Making use of Mixed Latent Markov
Models, we measure the change and stability of
individual-level West German partisan identification
captured over a 24-year period via the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSEOP). Results suggest that distinctive
subpopulations exist that follow different patterns of
partisan stability. One party's loss is not necessarily
another party's gain. © The Author 2011. Published by
Oxford University Press on behalf of the American
Association for Public Opinion Research. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/poq/nfr018},
Key = {fds318647}
}
@article{fds318645,
Author = {Stegmueller, D and Scheepers, P and Roßteutscher, S and De Jong,
E},
Title = {Support for redistribution in western Europe: Assessing the
role of religion},
Journal = {European Sociological Review},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {482-497},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcr011},
Abstract = {Previous sociological studies have paid little attention to
religion as a central determinant of individual preferences
for redistribution. In this article we argue that religious
individuals, living in increasingly secular societies,
differ in political preferences from their secular
counterparts. Based on the theory of religious cleavages, we
expect that religious individuals will oppose income
redistribution by the state. Furthermore, in contexts where
the polarization between religious and secular individuals
is large, preferences for redistribution will be lower. In
the empirical analysis we test our predictions in a
multilevel framework, using data from the European Social
Survey 2002-2006 for 16 Western European countries. After
controlling for a wide range of individual socio-economic
factors and for welfare-state policies, religion plays and
important explanatory role. We find that both Catholics and
Protestants strongly oppose income redistribution by the
state. The cleavage between religious and secular
individuals is far more important than the difference
between denominations. Using a refined measure of religious
polarization, we also find that in more polarized context
the overall level of support for redistribution is lower. ©
The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/esr/jcr011},
Key = {fds318645}
}
@article{fds318643,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Modeling dynamic preferences: A Bayesian robust dynamic
latent ordered probit model},
Journal = {Political Analysis},
Volume = {21},
Number = {3},
Pages = {314-333},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt001},
Abstract = {Much politico-economic research on individuals' preferences
is cross-sectional and does not model dynamic aspects of
preference or attitude formation. I present a Bayesian
dynamic panel model, which facilitates the analysis of
repeated preferences using individual-level panel data. My
model deals with three problems. First, I explicitly include
feedback from previous preferences taking into account that
available survey measures of preferences are categorical.
Second, I model individuals' initial conditions when
entering the panel as resulting from observed and unobserved
individual attributes. Third, I capture unobserved
individual preference heterogeneity both via standard
parametric random effects and a robust alternative based on
Bayesian nonparametric density estimation. I use this model
to analyze the impact of income and wealth on preferences
for government intervention using the British Household
Panel Study from 1991 to 2007. © The Author 2013. Published
by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for
Political Methodology. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpt001},
Key = {fds318643}
}
@article{fds318644,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {How many countries for multilevel modeling? A comparison of
frequentist and bayesian approaches},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {57},
Number = {3},
Pages = {748-761},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12001},
Abstract = {Researchers in comparative research increasingly use
multilevel models to test effects of country-level factors
on individual behavior and preferences. However, the
asymptotic justification of widely employed estimation
strategies presumes large samples and applications in
comparative politics routinely involve only a small number
of countries. Thus, researchers and reviewers often wonder
if these models are applicable at all. In other words, how
many countries do we need for multilevel modeling? I present
results from a large-scale Monte Carlo experiment comparing
the performance of multilevel models when few countries are
available. I find that maximum likelihood estimates and
confidence intervals can be severely biased, especially in
models including cross-level interactions. In contrast, the
Bayesian approach proves to be far more robust and yields
considerably more conservative tests. ©2013, Midwest
Political Science Association.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12001},
Key = {fds318644}
}
@article{fds318642,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Religion and redistributive voting in Western
Europe},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {75},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1064-1076},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001023},
Abstract = {Why some individuals, who would clearly benefit from
redistribution, do not vote for parties offering
redistributive policies is an old puzzle of redistributive
politics. Recent work in political economy offers an
explanation based on the interplay between religious
identity and party policies. Strategic parties bundle
conservative moral policies with anti-redistribution
positions inducing individuals with a strong religious
identity to vote based on moral rather than economic
preferences. I test this theory using microlevel data on
individuals' vote choices in 24 recent multiparty elections
in 15 Western European countries. I use an integrated model
of religion, economic and moral preferences, and vote choice
to show that religious individuals possess less liberal
economic preferences, which shapes their vote choice against
redistributive parties. This holds even for individuals who
would clearly benefit from redistribution. Moreover, the
redistributive vote of religious individuals is primarily
based on economic not moral preferences. © Southern
Political Science Association 2013.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0022381613001023},
Key = {fds318642}
}
@article{fds318641,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Bayesian hierarchical age-period-cohort models with
time-structured effects: An application to religious voting
inthe US, 1972-2008},
Journal = {Electoral Studies},
Volume = {33},
Pages = {52-62},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.005},
Abstract = {To examine dynamics of political processes using repeated
cross-section data, effects of age, cohort, and time period
have to be disentangled. I propose a Bayesian dynamic
hierarchical model with cohort and period effects modeled as
random walk through time. It includes smoothly time-varying
effects of covariates, allowing researchers to study
changing effects of individual characteristics on political
behavior. It provides a flexible functional form estimate of
age by integrating a semi-parametric approach in the
hierarchical model. I employ this approach to examine
religious voting in the United States using repeated
cross-sectional surveys from 1972 to 2008. I find starkly
differing nonlinear trends of de- and re-alignment among
different religious denominations. © 2013 Elsevier
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.005},
Key = {fds318641}
}
@article{fds339896,
Author = {Dimick, M and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {The Political Economy of Risk and Ideology},
Year = {2015},
Abstract = {This paper argues for the central role of risk aversion in
shaping political ideology. We develop a political economy
model, which makes explicit the link between risk aversion,
the labor market, government policy, and ideology. Our model
distinguishes the effects of risk aversion from unemployment
risk and our evidence sheds light on debates over
explanations for the welfare state. We test our model using
a large-scale household panel with an experimentally
validated measure of risk aversion. We find that risk
aversion is a systematic and important determinant of
political-economic attitudes and is at least as important
as, if not more so, an individual’s position in the income
distribution.},
Key = {fds339896}
}
@article{fds318640,
Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and
Preferences for Redistribution in Western
Europe},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {60},
Number = {2},
Pages = {472-489},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2016},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12212},
Abstract = {Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between
the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in
others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do
with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We
contend that while there is a general relative income effect
on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich
are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The
reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and
transfer considerations but to a negative externality of
inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more
unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of
redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because
of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions
between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article
challenge some influential approaches to the politics of
inequality.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12212},
Key = {fds318640}
}
@article{fds336488,
Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Online Appendix},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {385-439},
Publisher = {Now Publishers},
Year = {2017},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015099_app},
Doi = {10.1561/100.00015099_app},
Key = {fds336488}
}
@article{fds325032,
Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {The altruistic rich? Inequality and other-regarding
preferences for redistribution},
Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {385-439},
Publisher = {Now Publishers},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015099},
Abstract = {What determines support among individuals for redistributive
policies? Do individuals care about others when they assess
the consequences of redistribution? This article proposes a
model of other-regarding preferences for redistribution,
which we term income-dependent altruism. Our model predicts
that an individual's preferred level of redistribution is
decreasing in income, increasing in inequality, and, more
importantly, that the inequality effect is increasing in
income. Thus, even though the rich prefer less
redistribution than the poor, the rich are more responsive,
in a positive way, to changes in inequality than are the
poor. We contrast these results with several other prominent
alternatives of other-regarding behavior. Using data for the
United States from 1978 to 2010, we find significant support
for our claims.},
Doi = {10.1561/100.00015099},
Key = {fds325032}
}
@article{fds326203,
Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Käppner, K},
Title = {Local union organization and law making in the US
congress},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {80},
Number = {2},
Pages = {539-554},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694546},
Abstract = {The political power of labor unions is a contentious issue
in the social sciences. Departing from the dominant focus on
membership size, we argue that unions’ influence on
national law making is based to an important degree on their
local organization. We delineate the novel hypothesis that
the horizontal concentration of union members within
electoral districts matters. To test it, we draw on
administrative records and map the membership size and
concentration of local unions to districts of the US House
of Representatives, 2003-12. We find that, controlling for
membership size, representatives from districts with less
concentrated unions have more liberal voting records than
their peers. This concentration effect survives numerous
district controls and relaxing OLS assumptions. While
surprising for several theoretical perspectives, it is
consistent with theories based on social incentives. These
results have implications for our broader understanding of
political representation and the role of groups in
democratic politics.},
Doi = {10.1086/694546},
Key = {fds326203}
}
@article{fds336487,
Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Models of Other-Regarding Preferences, Inequality, and
Redistribution},
Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {441-460},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-091515-030034},
Abstract = {Despite the increasing popularity of comparative work on
other-regarding preferences, the implications of different
models of altruism are not always fully understood. This
article analyzes different theoretical approaches to
altruism and explores what empirical conclusions we should
draw from them, paying particular attention to models of
redistribution preferences where inequality explicitly
triggers other-regarding motives for redistribution. While
the main contribution of this article is to clarify the
conclusions of these models, we also illustrate the
importance of their distinct implications by analyzing
Western European data to compare among them. We draw on
individual-level data from the European Social Survey
fielded between September 2002 and December
2013.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-091515-030034},
Key = {fds336487}
}
@article{fds358108,
Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Brouard, S and Kerrouche,
E},
Title = {Comparative Experimental Evidence on Compliance with Social
Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds358108}
}
@article{fds326202,
Author = {Beramendi, P and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {The Political Geography of the Eurocrisis},
Journal = {World Politics},
Volume = {72},
Number = {4},
Pages = {639-678},
Year = {2020},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000118},
Abstract = {The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008
financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue
fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it
introduced significant transfers between countries that were
designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors
analyze this response as the outcome of democratic
constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU's current
institutional structure, citizens' preferences pose a
binding constraint on what leaders can do as these
preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members
and the degree of political tolerance for different courses
of action. The authors show that citizens' preferences
reflect differences in the geography of income, production
regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity
of constituencies' redistribution preferences combined with
a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political
constraints on national governments prevent them from
engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast,
externalities among member states shift the preferences of
citizens who may experience negative effects and make
international redistribution politically feasible. The
authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel
empirical results on the determinants of preferences for
fiscal integration and international redistribution in the
aftermath of the eurocrisis.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0043887120000118},
Key = {fds326202}
}
@article{fds356049,
Author = {Daoust, J-F and Bélanger, É and Dassonneville, R and Lachapelle, E and Nadeau, R and Becher, M and Brouard, S and Foucault, M and Hönnige, C and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {A guilt-free strategy increases self-reported non-compliance
with COVID-19 preventive measures: Experimental evidence
from 12 countries.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {16},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e0249914},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249914},
Abstract = {Studies of citizens' compliance with COVID-19 preventive
measures routinely rely on survey data. While such data are
essential, public health restrictions provide clear signals
of what is socially desirable in this context, creating a
potential source of response bias in self-reported measures
of compliance. In this research, we examine whether the
results of a guilt-free strategy recently proposed to lessen
this constraint are generalizable across twelve countries,
and whether the treatment effect varies across subgroups.
Our findings show that the guilt-free strategy is a useful
tool in every country included, increasing respondents'
proclivity to report non-compliance by 9 to 16 percentage
points. This effect holds for different subgroups based on
gender, age and education. We conclude that the inclusion of
this strategy should be the new standard for survey research
that aims to provide crucial data on the current
pandemic.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0249914},
Key = {fds356049}
}
@article{fds350003,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Comment on Elff et al.},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {51},
Number = {1},
Pages = {454-459},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000796},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123419000796},
Key = {fds350003}
}
@article{fds353058,
Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Reducing unequal representation: The impact of labor unions
on legislative responsiveness in the U.S.
Congress},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {92-109},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S153759272000208X},
Abstract = {It has long been recognized that economic inequality may
undermine the principle of equal responsiveness that lies at
the core of democratic governance. A recent wave of
scholarship has highlighted an acute degree of political
inequality in contemporary democracies in North America and
Europe. In contrast to the view that unequal responsiveness
in favor of the affluent is nearly inevitable when income
inequality is high, we argue that organized labor can be an
effective source of political equality. Focusing on the
paradigmatic case of the U.S. House of Representatives, our
novel dataset combines income-specific estimates of
constituency preferences based on 223,000 survey respondents
matched to roll-call votes with a measure of district-level
union strength drawn from administrative records. We find
that local unions significantly dampen unequal
responsiveness to high incomes: a standard deviation
increase in union membership increases legislative
responsiveness towards the poor by about six to eight
percentage points. As a result, in districts with relatively
strong unions legislators are about equally responsive to
rich and poor Americans. We rule out alternative
explanations using flexible controls for policies,
institutions, and economic structure, as well as a novel
instrumental variable for unionization based on history and
geography. We also show that the impact of unions operates
via campaign contributions and partisan selection.},
Doi = {10.1017/S153759272000208X},
Key = {fds353058}
}
@article{fds356050,
Author = {Daoust, J-F and Belanger, E and Dassonneville, R and Lachapelle, E and Nadeau, R and Becher, M and Brouard, S and Foucault, M and Hönnige, C and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {A Guilt-Free Strategy to Increase Self-Reported
Non-Compliance with COVID-19 Preventive Measures:
Experimental Evidence from 12 Countries},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds356050}
}
@article{fds359041,
Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Brouard, S and Kerrouche,
E},
Title = {Ideology and compliance with health guidelines during the
COVID-19 pandemic: A comparative perspective.},
Journal = {Social science quarterly},
Volume = {102},
Number = {5},
Pages = {2106-2123},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13035},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>We measure the prevalence of noncompliance
with public health guidelines in the COVID-19 pandemic and
examine how it is shaped by political ideology across
countries.<h4>Methods</h4>A list experiment of noncompliance
and a multi-item scale of health-related behaviors were
embedded in a comparative survey of 11,000 respondents in
nine OCED countries. We conduct a statistical analysis of
the list experiment capturing degrees of noncompliance with
social distancing rules and estimate ideological effect
heterogeneity. A semiparametric analysis examines the
functional form of the relationship between ideology and the
propensity to violate public health guidelines.<h4>Results</h4>Our
analyses reveal substantial heterogeneity between countries.
Ideology plays an outsized role in the United States. No
association of comparable magnitude is found in the majority
of the other countries in our study. In many settings, the
impact of ideology on health-related behaviors is
nonlinear.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Our results highlight the
importance of taking a comparative perspective.
Extrapolating the role of ideology from the United States to
other advanced industrialized societies might paint an
erroneous picture of the scope of possible nonpharmaceutical
interventions. Heterogeneity limits the extent to which
policymakers can learn from experiences across borders.},
Doi = {10.1111/ssqu.13035},
Key = {fds359041}
}
@article{fds361146,
Author = {Becher, M and Longuet Marx and N and Pons, V and Brouard, S and Foucault,
M and Galasso, V and Kerrouche, E and León Alfonso and S and Stegmueller,
D},
Title = {Government Performance and Democracy: Survey Experimental
Evidence from 12 Countries During Covid-19},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds361146}
}
@article{fds363068,
Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Organized Interests and the Mechanisms Behind Unequal
Representation in Legislatures},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds363068}
}
@article{fds366941,
Author = {Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Hijacking the Agenda: Economic Power and Political
Influence. By Christopher Witko, Jana Morgan, Nathan J.
Kelly, and Peter K. Enns. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2021. 416p. $35.00 paper.},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1116-1117},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722001980},
Doi = {10.1017/s1537592722001980},
Key = {fds366941}
}
@article{fds361147,
Author = {Becher, M and Menéndez González and I and Stegmueller,
D},
Title = {Proportional Representation and Right-Wing Populism:
Evidence from Electoral System Change in
Europe},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {53},
Number = {1},
Pages = {261-268},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123421000703},
Abstract = {How much do electoral institutions matter for the rise of
populist parties? Evidence on this question is mixed, with
some scholars arguing that the role of electoral rules is
small. We provide new evidence for the impact of electoral
system change. The UK's adoption of a proportional electoral
system for European elections in 1999 provides a unique
opportunity to study the link between electoral rules and
the ascendancy of right-wing populist parties. Employing
both synthetic control and difference-in-difference methods,
we estimate that the electoral reform increased the vote
share of right-wing populists by about 12 to 13.5 percentage
points on average. During a time when populism was rising
across Europe, the reform abruptly shifted populist votes in
the UK above the European trend and above more plausible
comparison cases. Our results also imply that caution is
needed when empirical results based on partial reforms are
extrapolated to electoral system change.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123421000703},
Key = {fds361147}
}
@article{fds363067,
Author = {Becher, M and Brouard, S and Stegmueller, D},
Title = {Endogenous Benchmarking and Government Accountability:
Experimental Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {54},
Number = {2},
Pages = {355-372},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123423000170},
Abstract = {When do cross-national comparisons enable citizens to hold
governments accountable? According to recent work in
comparative politics, benchmarking across borders is a
powerful mechanism for making elections work. However,
little attention has been paid to the choice of benchmarks
and how they shape democratic accountability. We extend
existing theories to account for endogenous benchmarking.
Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a test case, we embedded
experiments capturing self-selection and exogenous exposure
to benchmark information from representative surveys in
France, Germany, and the UK. The experiments reveal that
when individuals have the choice, they are likely to seek
out congruent information in line with their prior view of
the government. Moreover, going beyond existing experiments
on motivated reasoning and biased information choice,
endogenous benchmarking occurs in all three countries
despite the absence of partisan labels. Altogether, our
results suggest that endogenous benchmarking weakens the
democratic benefits of comparisons across
borders.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123423000170},
Key = {fds363067}
}
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