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Publications of Daniel Stegmueller    :chronological  combined listing:

%% Books   
   Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Who wants what?: Redistribution preferences in comparative
   Pages = {1-280},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {August},
   ISBN = {9781108484626},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108681339},
   Abstract = {Why do some people support redistributive policies such as a
             generous welfare state, social policy or protections for the
             poor, and others do not? The (often implicit) model behind
             much of comparative politics and political economy starts
             with redistribution preferences. These affect how
             individuals behave politically and their behavior in turn
             affects the strategies of political parties and the policies
             of governments. This book challenges some influential
             interpretations of the political consequences of inequality.
             Rueda and Stegmueller provide a novel explanation of how the
             demand for redistribution is the result of expected future
             income, the negative externalities of inequality, and the
             relationship between altruism and population heterogeneity.
             This innovative and timely volume will be of great interest
             to readers interested in the political causes and
             consequences of inequality.},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108681339},
   Key = {fds354302}

%% Journal Articles   
   Author = {Daoust, J-F and Bélanger, É and Dassonneville, R and Lachapelle, E and Nadeau, R and Becher, M and Brouard, S and Foucault, M and Hönnige, C and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {A guilt-free strategy increases self-reported non-compliance
             with COVID-19 preventive measures: Experimental evidence
             from 12 countries.},
   Journal = {Plos One},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {e0249914},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249914},
   Abstract = {Studies of citizens' compliance with COVID-19 preventive
             measures routinely rely on survey data. While such data are
             essential, public health restrictions provide clear signals
             of what is socially desirable in this context, creating a
             potential source of response bias in self-reported measures
             of compliance. In this research, we examine whether the
             results of a guilt-free strategy recently proposed to lessen
             this constraint are generalizable across twelve countries,
             and whether the treatment effect varies across subgroups.
             Our findings show that the guilt-free strategy is a useful
             tool in every country included, increasing respondents'
             proclivity to report non-compliance by 9 to 16 percentage
             points. This effect holds for different subgroups based on
             gender, age and education. We conclude that the inclusion of
             this strategy should be the new standard for survey research
             that aims to provide crucial data on the current
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0249914},
   Key = {fds356049}

   Author = {Daoust, J-F and Belanger, E and Dassonneville, R and Lachapelle, E and Nadeau, R and Becher, M and Brouard, S and Foucault, M and Hönnige, C and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {A Guilt-Free Strategy to Increase Self-Reported
             Non-Compliance with COVID-19 Preventive Measures:
             Experimental Evidence from 12 Countries},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds356050}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Apples and Oranges? The Problem of Equivalence in
             Comparative Research},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {04},
   Pages = {471-487},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr028},
   Abstract = {Researchers in comparative research are increasingly relying
             on individual level data to test theories involving
             unobservable constructs like attitudes and preferences.
             Estimation is carried out using large-scale cross-national
             survey data providing responses from individuals living in
             widely varying contexts. This strategy rests on the
             assumption of equivalence, that is, no systematic distortion
             in response behavior of individuals from different countries
             exists. However, this assumption is frequently violated with
             rather grave consequences for comparability and
             interpretation. I present a multilevel mixture ordinal item
             response model with item bias effects that is able to
             establish equivalence. It corrects for systematic
             measurement error induced by unobserved country
             heterogeneity, and it allows for the simultaneous estimation
             of structural parameters of interest. © The Author 2011.
             Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the
             Society for Political Methodology. All rights
   Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpr028},
   Key = {fds318646}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Bayesian hierarchical age-period-cohort models with
             time-structured effects: An application to religious voting
             inthe US, 1972-2008},
   Journal = {Electoral Studies},
   Volume = {33},
   Pages = {52-62},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.005},
   Abstract = {To examine dynamics of political processes using repeated
             cross-section data, effects of age, cohort, and time period
             have to be disentangled. I propose a Bayesian dynamic
             hierarchical model with cohort and period effects modeled as
             random walk through time. It includes smoothly time-varying
             effects of covariates, allowing researchers to study
             changing effects of individual characteristics on political
             behavior. It provides a flexible functional form estimate of
             age by integrating a semi-parametric approach in the
             hierarchical model. I employ this approach to examine
             religious voting in the United States using repeated
             cross-sectional surveys from 1972 to 2008. I find starkly
             differing nonlinear trends of de- and re-alignment among
             different religious denominations. © 2013 Elsevier
   Doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.005},
   Key = {fds318641}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Comment on Elff et al.},
   Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {51},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {454-459},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000796},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0007123419000796},
   Key = {fds350003}

   Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Brouard, S and Kerrouche,
   Title = {Comparative Experimental Evidence on Compliance with Social
             Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds358108}

   Author = {Becher, M and Longuet Marx and N and Pons, V and Brouard, S and Foucault,
             M and Galasso, V and Kerrouche, E and León Alfonso and S and Stegmueller,
   Title = {Covid-19, Government Performance, and Democracy: Survey
             Experimental Evidence from 12 Countries},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {November},
   Key = {fds361146}

   Author = {Becher, M and Brouard, S and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Endogenous Benchmarking and Government Accountability:
             Experimental Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds363067}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {How many countries for multilevel modeling? A comparison of
             frequentist and bayesian approaches},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {748-761},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12001},
   Abstract = {Researchers in comparative research increasingly use
             multilevel models to test effects of country-level factors
             on individual behavior and preferences. However, the
             asymptotic justification of widely employed estimation
             strategies presumes large samples and applications in
             comparative politics routinely involve only a small number
             of countries. Thus, researchers and reviewers often wonder
             if these models are applicable at all. In other words, how
             many countries do we need for multilevel modeling? I present
             results from a large-scale Monte Carlo experiment comparing
             the performance of multilevel models when few countries are
             available. I find that maximum likelihood estimates and
             confidence intervals can be severely biased, especially in
             models including cross-level interactions. In contrast, the
             Bayesian approach proves to be far more robust and yields
             considerably more conservative tests. ©2013, Midwest
             Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12001},
   Key = {fds318644}

   Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Brouard, S and Kerrouche,
   Title = {Ideology and compliance with health guidelines during the
             COVID-19 pandemic: A comparative perspective.},
   Journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
   Volume = {102},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {2106-2123},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13035},
   Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>We measure the prevalence of noncompliance
             with public health guidelines in the COVID-19 pandemic and
             examine how it is shaped by political ideology across
             countries.<h4>Methods</h4>A list experiment of noncompliance
             and a multi-item scale of health-related behaviors were
             embedded in a comparative survey of 11,000 respondents in
             nine OCED countries. We conduct a statistical analysis of
             the list experiment capturing degrees of noncompliance with
             social distancing rules and estimate ideological effect
             heterogeneity. A semiparametric analysis examines the
             functional form of the relationship between ideology and the
             propensity to violate public health guidelines.<h4>Results</h4>Our
             analyses reveal substantial heterogeneity between countries.
             Ideology plays an outsized role in the United States. No
             association of comparable magnitude is found in the majority
             of the other countries in our study. In many settings, the
             impact of ideology on health-related behaviors is
             nonlinear.<h4>Conclusion</h4>Our results highlight the
             importance of taking a comparative perspective.
             Extrapolating the role of ideology from the United States to
             other advanced industrialized societies might paint an
             erroneous picture of the scope of possible nonpharmaceutical
             interventions. Heterogeneity limits the extent to which
             policymakers can learn from experiences across borders.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ssqu.13035},
   Key = {fds359041}

   Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D and Käppner, K},
   Title = {Local union organization and law making in the US
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {80},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {539-554},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694546},
   Abstract = {The political power of labor unions is a contentious issue
             in the social sciences. Departing from the dominant focus on
             membership size, we argue that unions’ influence on
             national law making is based to an important degree on their
             local organization. We delineate the novel hypothesis that
             the horizontal concentration of union members within
             electoral districts matters. To test it, we draw on
             administrative records and map the membership size and
             concentration of local unions to districts of the US House
             of Representatives, 2003-12. We find that, controlling for
             membership size, representatives from districts with less
             concentrated unions have more liberal voting records than
             their peers. This concentration effect survives numerous
             district controls and relaxing OLS assumptions. While
             surprising for several theoretical perspectives, it is
             consistent with theories based on social incentives. These
             results have implications for our broader understanding of
             political representation and the role of groups in
             democratic politics.},
   Doi = {10.1086/694546},
   Key = {fds326203}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Modeling dynamic preferences: A Bayesian robust dynamic
             latent ordered probit model},
   Journal = {Political Analysis},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {314-333},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt001},
   Abstract = {Much politico-economic research on individuals' preferences
             is cross-sectional and does not model dynamic aspects of
             preference or attitude formation. I present a Bayesian
             dynamic panel model, which facilitates the analysis of
             repeated preferences using individual-level panel data. My
             model deals with three problems. First, I explicitly include
             feedback from previous preferences taking into account that
             available survey measures of preferences are categorical.
             Second, I model individuals' initial conditions when
             entering the panel as resulting from observed and unobserved
             individual attributes. Third, I capture unobserved
             individual preference heterogeneity both via standard
             parametric random effects and a robust alternative based on
             Bayesian nonparametric density estimation. I use this model
             to analyze the impact of income and wealth on preferences
             for government intervention using the British Household
             Panel Study from 1991 to 2007. © The Author 2013. Published
             by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for
             Political Methodology. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1093/pan/mpt001},
   Key = {fds318643}

   Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Models of Other-Regarding Preferences, Inequality, and
   Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {441-460},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-091515-030034},
   Abstract = {Despite the increasing popularity of comparative work on
             other-regarding preferences, the implications of different
             models of altruism are not always fully understood. This
             article analyzes different theoretical approaches to
             altruism and explores what empirical conclusions we should
             draw from them, paying particular attention to models of
             redistribution preferences where inequality explicitly
             triggers other-regarding motives for redistribution. While
             the main contribution of this article is to clarify the
             conclusions of these models, we also illustrate the
             importance of their distinct implications by analyzing
             Western European data to compare among them. We draw on
             individual-level data from the European Social Survey
             fielded between September 2002 and December
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-091515-030034},
   Key = {fds336487}

   Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Online Appendix},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {385-439},
   Publisher = {Now Publishers},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015099_app},
   Doi = {10.1561/100.00015099_app},
   Key = {fds336488}

   Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Organized Interests and the Mechanisms Behind Unequal
             Representation in Legislatures},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds363068}

   Author = {Becher, M and Menéndez González and I and Stegmueller,
   Title = {Proportional Representation and Right-Wing Populism:
             Evidence from Electoral System Change in
   Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123421000703},
   Abstract = {How much do electoral institutions matter for the rise of
             populist parties? Evidence on this question is mixed, with
             some scholars arguing that the role of electoral rules is
             small. We provide new evidence for the impact of electoral
             system change. The UK's adoption of a proportional electoral
             system for European elections in 1999 provides a unique
             opportunity to study the link between electoral rules and
             the ascendancy of right-wing populist parties. Employing
             both synthetic control and difference-in-difference methods,
             we estimate that the electoral reform increased the vote
             share of right-wing populists by about 12 to 13.5 percentage
             points on average. During a time when populism was rising
             across Europe, the reform abruptly shifted populist votes in
             the UK above the European trend and above more plausible
             comparison cases. Our results also imply that caution is
             needed when empirical results based on partial reforms are
             extrapolated to electoral system change.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0007123421000703},
   Key = {fds361147}

   Author = {Becher, M and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Reducing unequal representation: The impact of labor unions
             on legislative responsiveness in the U.S.
   Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {92-109},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S153759272000208X},
   Abstract = {It has long been recognized that economic inequality may
             undermine the principle of equal responsiveness that lies at
             the core of democratic governance. A recent wave of
             scholarship has highlighted an acute degree of political
             inequality in contemporary democracies in North America and
             Europe. In contrast to the view that unequal responsiveness
             in favor of the affluent is nearly inevitable when income
             inequality is high, we argue that organized labor can be an
             effective source of political equality. Focusing on the
             paradigmatic case of the U.S. House of Representatives, our
             novel dataset combines income-specific estimates of
             constituency preferences based on 223,000 survey respondents
             matched to roll-call votes with a measure of district-level
             union strength drawn from administrative records. We find
             that local unions significantly dampen unequal
             responsiveness to high incomes: a standard deviation
             increase in union membership increases legislative
             responsiveness towards the poor by about six to eight
             percentage points. As a result, in districts with relatively
             strong unions legislators are about equally responsive to
             rich and poor Americans. We rule out alternative
             explanations using flexible controls for policies,
             institutions, and economic structure, as well as a novel
             instrumental variable for unionization based on history and
             geography. We also show that the impact of unions operates
             via campaign contributions and partisan selection.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S153759272000208X},
   Key = {fds353058}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {Religion and redistributive voting in Western
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1064-1076},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001023},
   Abstract = {Why some individuals, who would clearly benefit from
             redistribution, do not vote for parties offering
             redistributive policies is an old puzzle of redistributive
             politics. Recent work in political economy offers an
             explanation based on the interplay between religious
             identity and party policies. Strategic parties bundle
             conservative moral policies with anti-redistribution
             positions inducing individuals with a strong religious
             identity to vote based on moral rather than economic
             preferences. I test this theory using microlevel data on
             individuals' vote choices in 24 recent multiparty elections
             in 15 Western European countries. I use an integrated model
             of religion, economic and moral preferences, and vote choice
             to show that religious individuals possess less liberal
             economic preferences, which shapes their vote choice against
             redistributive parties. This holds even for individuals who
             would clearly benefit from redistribution. Moreover, the
             redistributive vote of religious individuals is primarily
             based on economic not moral preferences. © Southern
             Political Science Association 2013.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0022381613001023},
   Key = {fds318642}

   Author = {Stegmueller, D and Scheepers, P and Roßteutscher, S and De Jong,
   Title = {Support for redistribution in western Europe: Assessing the
             role of religion},
   Journal = {European Sociological Review},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {482-497},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcr011},
   Abstract = {Previous sociological studies have paid little attention to
             religion as a central determinant of individual preferences
             for redistribution. In this article we argue that religious
             individuals, living in increasingly secular societies,
             differ in political preferences from their secular
             counterparts. Based on the theory of religious cleavages, we
             expect that religious individuals will oppose income
             redistribution by the state. Furthermore, in contexts where
             the polarization between religious and secular individuals
             is large, preferences for redistribution will be lower. In
             the empirical analysis we test our predictions in a
             multilevel framework, using data from the European Social
             Survey 2002-2006 for 16 Western European countries. After
             controlling for a wide range of individual socio-economic
             factors and for welfare-state policies, religion plays and
             important explanatory role. We find that both Catholics and
             Protestants strongly oppose income redistribution by the
             state. The cleavage between religious and secular
             individuals is far more important than the difference
             between denominations. Using a refined measure of religious
             polarization, we also find that in more polarized context
             the overall level of support for redistribution is lower. ©
             The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1093/esr/jcr011},
   Key = {fds318645}

   Author = {Dimick, M and Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {The altruistic rich? Inequality and other-regarding
             preferences for redistribution},
   Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {385-439},
   Publisher = {Now Publishers},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015099},
   Abstract = {What determines support among individuals for redistributive
             policies? Do individuals care about others when they assess
             the consequences of redistribution? This article proposes a
             model of other-regarding preferences for redistribution,
             which we term income-dependent altruism. Our model predicts
             that an individual's preferred level of redistribution is
             decreasing in income, increasing in inequality, and, more
             importantly, that the inequality effect is increasing in
             income. Thus, even though the rich prefer less
             redistribution than the poor, the rich are more responsive,
             in a positive way, to changes in inequality than are the
             poor. We contrast these results with several other prominent
             alternatives of other-regarding behavior. Using data for the
             United States from 1978 to 2010, we find significant support
             for our claims.},
   Doi = {10.1561/100.00015099},
   Key = {fds325032}

   Author = {Rueda, D and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and
             Preferences for Redistribution in Western
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {60},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {472-489},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12212},
   Abstract = {Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between
             the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in
             others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do
             with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We
             contend that while there is a general relative income effect
             on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich
             are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The
             reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and
             transfer considerations but to a negative externality of
             inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more
             unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of
             redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because
             of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions
             between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article
             challenge some influential approaches to the politics of
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12212},
   Key = {fds318640}

   Author = {Neundorf, A and Stegmueller, D and Scotto, TJ},
   Title = {The individual-level dynamics of bounded
   Journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {458-482},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr018},
   Abstract = {Over the past half century, scholars have utilized a variety
             of theoretical and methodological approaches to study the
             attachment or identification voters have with political
             parties. However, models of partisan (in)stability ignore
             its bounded character. Making use of Mixed Latent Markov
             Models, we measure the change and stability of
             individual-level West German partisan identification
             captured over a 24-year period via the German Socio-Economic
             Panel (GSEOP). Results suggest that distinctive
             subpopulations exist that follow different patterns of
             partisan stability. One party's loss is not necessarily
             another party's gain. © The Author 2011. Published by
             Oxford University Press on behalf of the American
             Association for Public Opinion Research. All rights
   Doi = {10.1093/poq/nfr018},
   Key = {fds318647}

   Author = {Dimick, M and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {The Political Economy of Risk and Ideology},
   Year = {2015},
   Abstract = {This paper argues for the central role of risk aversion in
             shaping political ideology. We develop a political economy
             model, which makes explicit the link between risk aversion,
             the labor market, government policy, and ideology. Our model
             distinguishes the effects of risk aversion from unemployment
             risk and our evidence sheds light on debates over
             explanations for the welfare state. We test our model using
             a large-scale household panel with an experimentally
             validated measure of risk aversion. We find that risk
             aversion is a systematic and important determinant of
             political-economic attitudes and is at least as important
             as, if not more so, an individual’s position in the income
   Key = {fds339896}

   Author = {Beramendi, P and Stegmueller, D},
   Title = {The Political Geography of the Eurocrisis},
   Journal = {World Politics},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {639-678},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000118},
   Abstract = {The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008
             financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue
             fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it
             introduced significant transfers between countries that were
             designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors
             analyze this response as the outcome of democratic
             constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU's current
             institutional structure, citizens' preferences pose a
             binding constraint on what leaders can do as these
             preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members
             and the degree of political tolerance for different courses
             of action. The authors show that citizens' preferences
             reflect differences in the geography of income, production
             regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity
             of constituencies' redistribution preferences combined with
             a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political
             constraints on national governments prevent them from
             engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast,
             externalities among member states shift the preferences of
             citizens who may experience negative effects and make
             international redistribution politically feasible. The
             authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel
             empirical results on the determinants of preferences for
             fiscal integration and international redistribution in the
             aftermath of the eurocrisis.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0043887120000118},
   Key = {fds326202}

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