Publications of Rachel Myrick    :chronological  alphabetical  by type listing:

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@article{fds372292,
   Author = {Myrick, R and Wang, C},
   Title = {Domestic Polarization and International Rivalry: How
             Adversaries Respond to America's Partisan
             Politics},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/726926},
   Doi = {10.1086/726926},
   Key = {fds372292}
}

@article{fds370623,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {Searching For Progressive Foreign Policy in Theory and in
             Practice},
   Journal = {Security Studies},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {389-395},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2200972},
   Doi = {10.1080/09636412.2023.2200972},
   Key = {fds370623}
}

@article{fds370876,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International
             Politics},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Pages = {002200272311775-002200272311775},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220027231177592},
   Abstract = {Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to
             high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret.
             However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a
             negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public
             opinion matters because it informs government decisions
             about when to conceal or reveal information during a
             negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first
             examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and
             economic agreements. I then randomize government
             justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success,
             protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of
             criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find
             that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in
             international negotiations, but there are justifications for
             its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is
             more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive
             information or when it improves the likelihood that
             agreements are reached. It is less permissible when
             governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic
             criticism.},
   Doi = {10.1177/00220027231177592},
   Key = {fds370876}
}

@article{fds362395,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {The reputational consequences of polarization for American
             foreign policy: evidence from the US-UK bilateral
             relationship},
   Journal = {International Politics},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1004-1027},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00382-z},
   Abstract = {How does partisan polarization in the United States affect
             foreign perceptions of its security commitments and global
             leadership? In a survey experiment fielded to 2000 adults in
             the United Kingdom, I demonstrate that priming respondents
             to think about US polarization negatively impacts their
             evaluations of the US-UK bilateral relationship. These
             impacts are stronger for the long-term, reputational
             consequences of polarization than for immediate security
             concerns. While foreign allies do not expect the United
             States to renege on existing security commitments,
             perceptions of extreme polarization make them less willing
             to engage in future partnerships with the United States and
             more skeptical of its global leadership. I find that these
             negative reputational consequences of polarization are
             driven by perceptions of preference-based, ideological
             polarization rather than identity-based, affective
             polarization. The results suggest that American allies
             anticipate that increasing divergence between the Republican
             and Democratic Party will create future uncertainty around
             US foreign policy.},
   Doi = {10.1057/s41311-022-00382-z},
   Key = {fds362395}
}

@article{fds359936,
   Author = {Myrick, R and Weinstein, JM},
   Title = {Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US
             Campaign to Free Political Prisoners},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {379-413},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000424},
   Abstract = {Scholarship on human rights diplomacy (HRD)-efforts by
             government officials to engage publicly and privately with
             their foreign counterparts-often focuses on actions taken to
             name and shame target countries because private diplomatic
             activities are unobservable. To understand how HRD works in
             practice, we explore a campaign coordinated by the US
             government to free twenty female political prisoners. We
             compare release rates of the featured women to two
             comparable groups: A longer list of women considered by the
             State Department for the campaign; and other women
             imprisoned simultaneously in countries targeted by the
             campaign. Both approaches suggest that the campaign was
             highly effective. We consider two possible mechanisms
             through which expressive public HRD works: by imposing
             reputational costs and by mobilizing foreign actors.
             However, in-depth interviews with US officials and an
             analysis of media coverage find little evidence of these
             mechanisms. Instead, we argue that public pressure resolved
             deadlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy, enabling
             private diplomacy and specific inducements to secure the
             release of political prisoners. Entrepreneurial bureaucrats
             leveraged the spotlight on human rights abuses to overcome
             competing equities that prevent government-led coercive
             diplomacy on these issues. Our research highlights the
             importance of understanding the intersection of public and
             private diplomacy before drawing inferences about the
             effectiveness of HRD.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818321000424},
   Key = {fds359936}
}

@article{fds361229,
   Author = {Jee, H and Lueders, H and Myrick, R},
   Title = {Towards a unified approach to research on democratic
             backsliding},
   Journal = {Democratization},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {754-767},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.2010709},
   Abstract = {A growing literature examines democratic backsliding, but
             there is little consensus on when, where, and why it occurs.
             Reviewing more than 100 recent articles and working papers,
             this research note argues that inattention to the
             measurement of backsliding and the underlying concept of
             democracy drives this disagreement. We propose three
             remedies. First, we outline several questions that help
             researchers navigate common measurement challenges. Second,
             we argue that conceptual confusion around backsliding is
             driven in large part by inconsistent definitions of
             democracy. We show how outlining a comprehensive concept of
             democracy enables researchers to better account for the
             diversity of instances of democratic backsliding. Our third
             contribution is drawing attention to a previously overlooked
             form of backsliding: when governments lose the effective
             power to govern or voters and elites increasingly disagree
             about truths and facts. The research note urges scholars to
             pay closer attention to the conceptualization and
             measurement of backsliding prior to empirical
             analysis.},
   Doi = {10.1080/13510347.2021.2010709},
   Key = {fds361229}
}

@article{fds356009,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {Do External Threats Unite or Divide? Security Crises,
             Rivalries, and Polarization in American Foreign
             Policy},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {921-958},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000175},
   Abstract = {A common explanation for the increasing polarization in
             contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of
             external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which
             threats could reduce polarization: by revealing information
             about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from
             policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the
             salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity
             mechanism). To evaluate the information mechanism, study 1
             uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches
             to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in
             attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the
             identity mechanism, study 2 uses public opinion polls to
             assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among
             the public. Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey
             experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I
             find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability
             to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or
             affective polarization among the American public. Instead,
             responses to external threats reflect the domestic political
             environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast
             doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will
             inherently create partisan unity.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818321000175},
   Key = {fds356009}
}

@article{fds357319,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {Reflections on Using Annotation for Transparent Inquiry in
             Mixed-Methods Research},
   Journal = {Ps: Political Science & Politics},
   Volume = {54},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {492-495},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096521000214},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1049096521000214},
   Key = {fds357319}
}

@article{fds355514,
   Author = {Reid, L and Myrick, R and Kadera, KM and Crescenzi,
             MJC},
   Title = {Conflict Environments and Civil War Onset},
   Journal = {Journal of Global Security Studies},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {2},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz064},
   Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>The spread of
             civil war poses serious risks and costs. We argue that
             conflict environments, which vary across time and space,
             systematically exacerbate the spread of civil war. As
             conflict in a state’s neighborhood becomes more spatially
             proximate and as lingering effects of conflict accumulate
             over time, that state’s risk of civil war onset increases.
             To theorize and test this argument, we construct the
             conflict environment (CE) score, a concept that taps into
             spatial and temporal dimensions of violence in a state’s
             neighborhood. Using the CE score in established empirical
             models of civil war onset, we demonstrate that a dangerous
             conflict environment consistently elevates the risk of civil
             war, outperforming traditional measures of nearby violence,
             even when domestic factors are taken into
             account.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1093/jogss/ogz064},
   Key = {fds355514}
}

@article{fds352224,
   Author = {ALRABABA'H, A and MYRICK, R and WEBB, I},
   Title = {Do donor motives matter? investigating perceptions of
             foreign aid in the conflict in donbas},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {748-757},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa026},
   Abstract = {How do the perceived motives of donor states shape recipient
             attitudes toward foreign aid in a conflict zone? This
             research note evaluates the impact of two frames that
             characterize the motives of foreign powers involved in a
             civil conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
             These frames portray foreign actors as providing aid either
             to alleviate suffering during conflict (humanitarian frame)
             or to increase their power and influence in the recipient
             country (political influence frame). We demonstrate how
             framing impacts attitudes toward foreign assistance from the
             European Union and the Russian government among potential
             aid recipients in the Donbas. The results show that frames
             impact support for foreign aid from the European Union but
             have no effect on views of Russian aid. Counter to
             conventional expectations, aid provided for geopolitical,
             strategic reasons may be viewed as a positive, stabilizing
             force-even more than foreign aid provided for humanitarian
             reasons.},
   Doi = {10.1093/isq/sqaa026},
   Key = {fds352224}
}

@article{fds350414,
   Author = {Myrick, R},
   Title = {Why So Secretive? Unpacking Public Attitudes toward Secrecy
             and Success in US Foreign Policy},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {82},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {828-843},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/707308},
   Doi = {10.1086/707308},
   Key = {fds350414}
}