Political Science
Arts & Sciences
Duke University
| |
Faculty Database Political Science Arts & Sciences Duke University |
|
| HOME > Arts & Sciences > Political Science > Faculty | Search Help Login |
|
| Publications of Tim Büthe :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds198860,
Author = {Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli},
Title = {New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the
World Economy},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
Address = {Princeton},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {Over the past two decades, governments have delegated
extensive regulatory authority to international
private-sector organizations. This internationalization and
privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by
the economic benefits of common rules for global markets,
but also by the realization that government regulators often
lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly
complex and urgent regulatory tasks. The New Global Rulers
examines who writes the rules in international private
organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why. The
book examines three powerful global private regulators: the
International Accounting Standards Board, which develops
financial reporting rules used by corporations in more than
a hundred countries; and the International Organization for
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical
Commission, which account for 85 percent of all
international product standards. Büthe and Mattli offer
both a new framework for understanding global private
regulation and detailed empirical analyses of such
regulation based on multi-country, multi-industry business
surveys. They find that global rule making by technical
experts is highly political, and that even though rule
making has shifted to the international level, domestic
institutions remain crucial. Influence in this form of
global private governance is not a function of the economic
power of states, but of the ability of domestic
standard-setters to provide timely information and speak
with a single voice. Büthe and Mattli show how domestic
institutions' abilities differ, particularly between the two
main standardization players, the United States and
Europe.},
Key = {fds198860}
}
%% Monographs
@misc{fds249589,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {The new global rulers: The privatization of regulation in
the world economy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780691144795},
Abstract = {Over the past two decades, governments have delegated
extensive regulatory authority to international
private-sector organizations. This internationalization and
privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by
the economic benefits of common rules for global markets,
but also by the realization that government regulators often
lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly
complex and urgent regulatory tasks.The New Global
Rulersexamines who writes the rules in international private
organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why.Tim B
the and Walter Mattli examine three powerful global private
regulators: the International Accounting Standards Board,
which develops financial reporting rules used by
corporations in more than a hundred countries; and the
International Organization for Standardization and the
International Electrotechnical Commission, which account for
85 percent of all international product standards. B the and
Mattli offer both a new framework for understanding global
private regulation and detailed empirical analyses of such
regulation based on multi-country, multi-industry business
surveys. They find that global rule making by technical
experts is highly political, and that even though rule
making has shifted to the international level, domestic
institutions remain crucial. Influence in this form of
global private governance is not a function of the economic
power of states, but of the ability of domestic
standard-setters to provide timely information and speak
with a single voice. B the and Mattli show how domestic
institutions' abilities differ, particularly between the two
main standardization players, the United States and Europe.
© 2011 by Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli. All Rights
Reserved.},
Key = {fds249589}
}
@misc{fds249588,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {Assessing the IASB: Results of a Business Survey about
International Financial Reporting Standards and IASB’s
Operations, Accountability, and Responsiveness to
Stakeholders},
Publisher = {Duke University Center for International Studies and Oxford
University Global Economic Governance Programme},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/web/standards},
Abstract = {http://www.duke.edu/web/standards/downloads/ButheMattli_ExecSummary.pdf},
Key = {fds249588}
}
@misc{fds249587,
Author = {Büthe, T and Swank, G},
Title = {The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in the European
Union: Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to
2004},
Publisher = {CES Working Paper No.142. Cambridge, MA: Minda de Gunzburg
Center for European Studies, Harvard University},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {http://www.duke.edu/ buthe/research/european_integration.html#change},
Key = {fds249587}
}
@misc{fds249586,
Author = {Büthe, T and Witte, JM},
Title = {Product Standards in Transatlantic Trade and Investment:
Domestic and International Practices and
Institutions},
Series = {American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Policy
Report No.13. },
Publisher = {Washington: AICGS},
Year = {2004},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds249586}
}
@misc{fds249585,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {European Union and National Electorates: Explaining the
Austrian Referendum on Joining the European
Union},
Publisher = {Center for European Studies, Harvard University},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds249585}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds249573,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Institutionalization and Its Consequences: The Transnational
Legal Order for Food Safety},
Booktitle = {Transnational Legal Orders},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Halliday, T and Shaffer, G},
Year = {2013},
Keywords = {institutional development • food safety},
Abstract = {This chapter analyzes the institutionalization of the
transnational legal order(s) for the safety of
internationally traded agricultural goods for human
consumption ("food safety"). Today, in the public realm, the
TLO for trade-related food safety is jointly underpinned by
two international organizations (and their rules and
procedures): the World Trade Organization, WTO, on the basis
of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Measures, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a hybrid
public-private body jointly created by the UN’s Food and
Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization.
Following Halliday and Shaffer, I ask first: Does Codex
Alimentarius standard-setting under the SPS-Agreement meet
the definition of a TLO? I find that it does. But what
exactly is being ordered by this TLO for food safety? Each
TLO corresponds to an issue area, i.e., an issue or behavior
that allegedly "need[s] to be addressed transnationally" to
avoid problems or undesirable consequences for some
stakeholders (Halliday and Shaffer 2013:37). Before we can
assess how well the legal and geographic scope of the TLO
fit the issue as conceived by the actors at the time, it is
necessary to establish how the issue came to be understood
as it was understood by those actors at that time. I will
therefore examine in this chapter the development of food
aid as a distinct issue in need of transnational ordering,
including how food aid came to be seen as a trade issue,
keeping in mind that the conceptual, legal, and geographic
boundaries of both the issue and the TLO are socially and
politically constructed, and it is highly likely that there
is some recursivity between the two processes.},
Key = {fds249573}
}
@misc{fds249574,
Author = {Büthe, T and Cheng, C},
Title = {Private Transnational Governance of Economic Development:
International Development Aid},
Pages = {322-341},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Global Economic Governance},
Publisher = {London: Routledge},
Editor = {Moschella, M and Weaver, C},
Year = {2013},
Keywords = {foreign aid • development • non-state actors in
world politics},
Abstract = {This chapter examines the role of private actors in raising,
allocating, and implementing international development aid
(understood as resources supposedly intended to lastingly
improve the well-being of individuals and groups in another
country). Private individuals and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have long been important actors in the
transnational governance of economic development through
aid. Yet some, such as foundations providing funds for
development projects in other countries, have become much
more prominent in international development during the last
two decades while others, such as NGOs, have become far more
numerous or have taken on new roles. we organize our
discussion around a distinction between four different kinds
of new actors (or actors who have taken on new roles): (1)
transnational NGOs as a channel of delivery for public
(governmental) development aid; (2) transnational aid NGOs
as agenda-setters; (3) foundations and other private sources
of development aid; (4) transnational aid NGOs as private
providers of privately funded aid. For each of them, we
discuss the sources of their power and influence and examine
how ideas about development and aid have shaped the rise of
these new players, identifying throughout promising and
important areas for future research. In the final section,
we consider peer-to-peer development aid and related
innovative attempts to solve pervasive accountability
problems in development aid. Our review of the research
frontier on this issue suggests: Increasingly, an analysis
of global economic governance through development aid
without attention to private players is not just incomplete
but is likely to result in biased analyses and misguided
policy advice.},
Key = {fds249574}
}
@misc{fds249572,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Beyond Supply and Demand: A Political-Economic Conceptual
Model},
Pages = {29-51},
Booktitle = {Governance by Indicators: Global Power through
Quantification and Rankings},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {New York},
Editor = {Davis, K and Fisher, A and Kingsbury, B and Merry,
SE},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds249572}
}
@misc{fds249571,
Author = {Büthe, T and Harris, N},
Title = {The Codex Alimentarius Commission: A Hybrid Public-Private
Regulator},
Pages = {219-228},
Booktitle = {Handbook on Transnational Governance: New Institutions and
Innovations},
Publisher = {Polity Press},
Address = {Cambridge},
Editor = {Hale, T and Held, D},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds249571}
}
@misc{fds249568,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {International Standards-Setting Bodies},
Pages = {440-471},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Business and Government},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {Oxford and New York},
Editor = {Coen, D and Wilson, G and Grant, W},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds249568}
}
@misc{fds249569,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {Standards for Global Markets: Domestic and International
Institutions for Setting International Product
Standards},
Pages = {455-476},
Booktitle = {Handbook on Multi-Level Governance},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar},
Editor = {Enderlein, H and Wälti, S and Zürn, M},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds249569}
}
@misc{fds249570,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {The Power of Norms; the Norms of Power: Who Governs
International Electrical and Electronic Technology?},
Pages = {292-232},
Booktitle = {Who Govern the Globe?},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Avant, DD and Finnemore, M and Sell, SK},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {This article/chapter analyzes the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) as a "global governor."
Founded in 1906 by the nascent professional associations of
electrical engineers from nine countries, the IEC was set up
to help its members coordinate on common terms, symbols, and
basic measurements for science and the emerging field of
electrical engineering. Today, the IEC is the clear focal
point for international electrotechnical standard-setting.
Its more than 5,000 standards govern research methods,
product designs, and purchase specifications across a broad
range of industries and are frequently incorporated into
laws and regulations in many of the hundred-fifty countries
in which the IEC has member bodies or affiliates. In the
first half of this chapter, I describe and explain the
remarkable institutional evolution of this international
nongovernmental organization over the past century. I
identify functional incentives for the increased scope and
geographic reach of IEC governance, but institutional change
from 1906 to 2008 was ultimately a political process, driven
by specific actors pursuing their particular interests.
Internationally competitive firms have often pushed for
broadening the scope of international standardization since
it reduces non-tariff barriers and integrates markets. And
the IEC, as a non-governmental international organization,
has at times been an actor itself, augmenting its
expertise-based authority by developing formal and informal
institutions, increasing effectiveness and efficiency, and
getting governments to delegate international
standard-setting functions to the IEC. In the second half of
the chapter, I put IEC standard-setting (that is,
transnational rule-making) into the context of the broader
governance sequence: agenda-setting, rule-making,
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. For each of
these activities, I identify the key groups with a stake in
IEC governance, their motivations and resources, and why
they do or do not play a role as "governors." I argue and
show that the key characters at each stage in this process
differ greatly. The answer to Dahl’s deceptively simple
question, "Who Governs?," therefore depends upon the stage
of the governance sequence, but I find that formal and
informal institutions at the domestic (as well as at the
international) level generally determine who the main actors
are at each stage of the governance sequence and what kinds
of power resources they can use to exert influence in this
realm of global private politics.},
Key = {fds249570}
}
@misc{fds249565,
Author = {Büthe, T and Milner, HV},
Title = {Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:
A Political Analysis},
Booktitle = {The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and
Investment Flows},
Year = {2009},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780199855322},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0006},
Abstract = {© 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights
reserved. This chapter examines the effect of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) on inward foreign direct
investment flows (FDI) into least developed countries
(LDCs). It suggests that BITs should not only boost FDI
between the signatory states but more broadly increase
inward FDI into the developing country signatory. The
chapter begins with a discussion of the often narrow,
legalistic conceptualization of BITs in previous studies, as
well as previous dyadic and monadic empirical findings. It
presents a statistical analysis of inward FDI flows into 122
developing countries with a population of more than 1
million from 1970 to 2000, and a qualitative analysis of the
hypothesized causal mechanisms. It shows that the positive
correlation between BITs and subsequent FDI is driven by the
hypothesized causal mechanisms.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0006},
Key = {fds249565}
}
@misc{fds154968,
Author = {Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner},
Title = {Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Invest: A
Political Analysis},
Pages = {171-224},
Booktitle = {The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and
Investment Flows},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Address = {Oxford and New York},
Editor = {Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs. },
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {9780195388534},
Key = {fds154968}
}
@misc{fds249566,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {The Politics of Food Safety in the Age of Global Trade: The
Codex Alimentarius Commission in the SPS-Agreement of the
WTO},
Pages = {88-109},
Booktitle = {Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global
Economy},
Publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press},
Editor = {Coglianese, C and Finkel, A and Zaring, D},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds249566}
}
@misc{fds249567,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Technical Standards as Public and Club Goods? Financing the
International Accounting Standards Board},
Pages = {157-179},
Booktitle = {Voluntary Programs: A Club Theory Approach},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {Potoski, M and Prakash, A},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds249567}
}
@misc{fds249564,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {The Politics of Competition and Institutional Change in the
European Union: The First 50 Years},
Pages = {175-194},
Booktitle = {Making History: European Integration and Institutional
Change at Fifty (The State of the European Union,
vol.8)},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Meunier, S and McNamara, KR},
Year = {2007},
Abstract = {http://www.duke.edu/ buthe/research/european_integration.html#change},
Key = {fds249564}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds249584,
Author = {Büthe, T and Milner, HV},
Title = {Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements and Their Effect
on Foreign Direct Investment: Credibility, Commitments, and
Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971-2007},
Journal = {World Politics},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {88-122},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {International trade agreements lead to more foreign direct
investment (FDI) in developing countries. We examine the
causal mechanisms underpinning this trade-investment linkage
by asking whether institutional features of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs), which allow governments to make
more credible commitments to protect foreign investments,
indeed result in greater FDI. We explore three such
institutional differences. We first examine whether PTAs
that have entered into force lead to greater FDI than PTAs
that have merely been negotiated and signed since only the
former constitute a binding commitment under international
law. Second, do trade agreements that have investment
clauses lead to greater FDI? Third, do PTAs with dispute
settlement mechanisms lead to greater FDI? Analyses of FDI
flows into 122 developing countries from 1971 to 2007 show
that more FDI is induced by trade agreements that include
stronger mechanisms for credible commitment. Institutional
diversity in international agreements matters.},
Key = {fds249584}
}
@article{fds249583,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Agent-Centric Historical Institutionalism as a Theory of
Institutional Change: The Politics of Regulating Competition
and Mergers in the European Union, 1955-2010},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {68},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {This paper examines the striking transformation of the
European Commission from a weak antitrust regulator with no
authority to regulate mergers into an extremely powerful,
unambiguously supranational regulator of market competition,
with broad authority to review and impose conditions upon or
even prohibit mergers. To explain this institutional
development, which was not intended by the member states and
opposed by the largest, most powerful ones, I put forward an
actor-centric historical institutionalist theory. It
emphasizes institutional feedbacks from economic integration
to the preferences of sub- and transnational private
actors—actors that treat the broader institutional context
as a political opportunity structure. This allows me to
specify the conditions under which these actors’ pursuit
of their private, often commercial interests incrementally
leads to supranational market regulation. The theoretical
framework also recognizes that institutional change—such
as establishing supranational authority—has opponents as
well as supporters and identifies the conditions under which
the latter are more likely to succeed. Actor-centric
historical institutionalism thus can explain institutional
changes in the international political economy that take
place without directly involvement by, and even contrary to
the preferences for autonomy of, powerful
states.},
Key = {fds249583}
}
@article{fds249590,
Author = {Büthe, T and Major, S and Souza, ADME},
Title = {The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian
Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and
Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid
Allocation},
Journal = {International organization},
Volume = {66},
Number = {04},
Pages = {571-607},
Year = {2012},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {0020-8183},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000252},
Abstract = {A large and increasing share of international humanitarian
and development aid is raised from non-governmental sources,
allocated by transnational NGOs. We know little about this
private foreign aid, not even how it is distributed across
recipient countries, much less what explains the allocation.
This paper presents an original dataset, based on detailed
financial records from most of the major U.S.-based
humanitarian and development NGOs, which allows us for the
first time to map and analyze the allocation of U.S. private
aid. We find no support for the common claim that aid NGOs
systematically prioritize their organizational self-interest
when they allocate private aid, and we find only limited
support for the hypothesis that expected aid effectiveness
drives aid allocation. By contrast, we find strong support
for the argument that the deeply rooted humanitarian
discourse within and among aid NGOs drives their aid
allocation, consistent with a view of aid NGOs as principled
actors and constructivist theories of international
relations. Recipients' humanitarian need is substantively
and statistically the most significant determinant of U.S.
private aid allocation (beyond a regional effect in favor of
Latin American countries). Materialist concerns do not crowd
out ethical norms among these NGOs.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818312000252},
Key = {fds249590}
}
@article{fds249591,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda},
Journal = {Business and Politics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-26},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1469-3569},
url = {http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art12/},
Abstract = {In this concluding essay to the special issue on Private
Regulation in the Global Economy, I review the main
findings, focused on the answers that the papers in this
issue jointly suggest to the three sets of core questions
noted in the introductory essay: (1) How do private bodies
attain regulatory authority? Why do private regulators
provide governance and why do the targets of these rules
comply? (2) Who governs? Who are the key actors in private
regulation and what are their motivations? (3) What is the
effect of the rise of private regulation on public
regulatory authority and capacity? I then identify and
discuss several key issues to develop a research agenda for
what I call global private politics.},
Key = {fds249591}
}
@article{fds249592,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional
Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC)},
Journal = {Business and Politics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-64},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1469-3569},
url = {http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art4/},
Abstract = {Private regulation often entails competition among multiple
rule-makers, but private rules and regulators do not always
compete. For substantial parts of the global economy, a
single private body (per issue) is recognized as the focal
point for global rule-making. The selection of the
institutional setting here effectively takes place prior to
drawing up the specific rules, with important consequences
for the politics of regulating global markets. In this
paper, I develop a theoretical explanation for how a private
transnational organization may attain such preeminencehow
it can become the focal point for rule-makingin its area
of expertise. I emphasize the transnational body's capacity
to pursue its organizational self-interest, as well as
timing and sequence. I then examine empirically a
particularly important body of this kind, which today is
essentially uncontested as the focal point for private
regulation in its area, even though its standards often have
substantial distributive implications: the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). I analyze the persistence
and changes in the IEC's formal rules or procedures and
informal norms, as well as the broadening scope of its
regulatory authority and membership over more than a
century.},
Key = {fds249592}
}
@article{fds249593,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A
(P)Review},
Journal = {Business and Politics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-40},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1469-3569},
url = {http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art2/},
Abstract = {This introduction to the special issue combines a review of
the existing literature about the causes and consequences of
private regulation in the global economy with a preview of
the articles in this issue. To organize this (p)review, I
introduce a conceptual model beyond supply and demand,
which distinguishes three major subsets of stakeholders of
global private regulation, which may (but need not) overlap:
the political actors who call for private regulation, the
rule-makers who provide such governance for the global
economy, and what I call the targets of the private
regulations, who are supposed to behave according to these
private rules. I then highlight the three core questions
addressed by the contributions to the special issue: (1) How
do private bodies attain regulatory authority; why do
private regulators provide governance; and why do the
targets of the rules comply? (2) Who governs the global
economy through private regulations? And (3) what are the
effects of private regulation, and how does the rise of
private regulation affect public regulatory authority and
capacity?},
Key = {fds249593}
}
@article{fds249594,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {The Evolution of Supranational Antitrust Enforcement and
Control of Government Subsidies in the EU},
Journal = {New Global Law and Policy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {181-206},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds249594}
}
@article{fds249595,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation
of Regulatory Authority in the SPS-Agreement of the GATT
1994 (WTO) Treaty},
Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {71},
Number = {1},
Pages = {219-255},
Year = {2008},
Month = {Winter},
Keywords = {delegation • principal-agent • international
organizations • regulation • trade • food
safety • IR theory},
Abstract = {This article examines the delegation of regulatory authority
in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, which is an integral part of
the founding treaty of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The SPS-Agreement institutionalizes cooperation on SPS
standards by committing member states to the use of
"international" SPS standards, defined as the standards
developed by three international organizations: the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the World Animal Health
Organization (OIE), and the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC). Member states of the WTO have delegated
regulatory authority to these collective agents in that
national or regional regulations based on divergent
standards are open to challenge through the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, where the burden of proof falls on the
country with the divergent standards to show that such
measures have scientific justification and do not constitute
unnecessary non-tariff barriers to trade, whereas
regulations based on CAC, OIE, or IPPC standards are safe
from such challenges since the SPS-Agreement declares them
to be categorically in compliance with WTO obligations. I
ask why states decided to institutionalize international
cooperation in the realm of SPS standards, which are the
technical basis for many politically sensitive health and
safety regulations, and why they chose delegation of
regulatory authority to international organizations outside
of the WTO itself as the particular form of that
cooperation. Based on an analysis of the negotiations that
led to the SPS-Agreement, I show that international
delegation was agreed upon because all governments
participating in those negotiations preferred it over both
the pre-WTO status quo and possible alternative ways of
minimizing the trade-impeding effect of national health and
safety regulations. Importantly, however, cooperation and
delegation came to be defined as the national interest due
to the costs-benefit analyses of the politically dominant
groups within these countries, given domestic political
institutions—as emphasized by the liberal tradition in IR
theory. Given these domestic interests, international
delegation offered governments a way of attaining the
benefits of delegation emphasized by principal-agent theory
while (seemingly) minimizing the political costs that arise
from the loss of policymaking autonomy. In retrospect,
however, it appears that the widespread positive normative
association of international standards with multilateralism
and international consensus—as well as, for developing
countries, their primary focus on exceptions and short-term
technical and financial assistance arising out of the
dominant "development" discourse—led many countries to
underestimate those autonomy costs. Material and ideational
factors thus interacted (sometimes to a country's detriment)
to a shape the definition of national interests and the
outcome of international delegation of regulatory authority
to international bodies (an increasingly common
phenomenon).},
Key = {fds249595}
}
@article{fds249597,
Author = {Buthe, T and Milner, HV},
Title = {The politics of foreign direct investment into developing
countries: Increasing FDI through international trade
agreements?},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {741-762},
Year = {2008},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0092-5853},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000259610300002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Keywords = {international institutions, foreign direct investment, trade
agreements, treaties, credibility, development},
Abstract = {Foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational
corporations has grown rapidly in recent decades, and
developing countries have attracted an increasing share of
it: $334 billion in 2005, or more than 36% of all inward FDI
flows (UNCTAD 2006, xvii). Its importance for developing
countries' economies also has increased, from an average of
barely 1% of GDP in the 1970s to about 2.5% of GDP on
average by 2000. Yet, the magnitude and especially the
timing of increases in FDI into developing countries have
varied greatly. What explains this variation? To answer this
question, we develop a theoretical argument emphasizing
political factors and specifically trade agreements:
GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We argue
that these international institutions provide mechanisms for
governments to make commitments to foreign investors about
the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and
increasing investment. These international commitments are
more credible than domestic policy choices, because reneging
on them is more costly due to the informational and
political effects of these international agreements.
Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970
to 2000 support this argument. Developing countries that
belong to the WTO and participate in more PTAs experience
greater FDI inflows than otherwise, controlling for many
factors including domestic policy preferences and taking
into account possible endogeneity. The paper seeks to
advance our understanding of how political factors affect
foreign direct investment, especially into developing
countries. We also contribute to the broader literature on
international institutions by showing that governments can
use international institutions to make more credible
commitments vis-a-vis private actors; international
institutions thus facilitate not just international but also
transnational cooperation. We also contribute to the
literature on the relationship between trade and investment
by showing that FDI into developing countries is strongly
positively correlated with trade flow measures, measures for
a foreign economic policy choice, and measures of trade
agreements.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x},
Key = {fds249597}
}
@article{fds249596,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Politics and Institutions in the Regulation of Global
Capital},
Journal = {Review of International Organizations},
Volume = {3},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-220},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
Keywords = {international regulation • international finance •
globalization • international organizations •
delegation},
Abstract = {This review article examines the literature on the
regulation of global finance, focusing on three recent
contributions: Rawi Abdelal's Capital Rules: The
Construction of Global Finance (Harvard UP, 2007); David A.
Singer's Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the
International Financial System (Cornell UP, 2007); and Kees
Camfferman and Stephen A. Zeff's Financial Reporting and
Global Capital Markets: A History of the International
Accounting Standards Committee, 1973-2000 (Oxford UP, 2007).
I explore different notions of who the key actors are and
what the sources of their preferences are, focusing on the
role of domestic political institutions in aggregating those
preferences as "inputs" into inter- or transnational
negotiations over regulatory cooperation (negotiations that
can be explicit or implicit). I discuss different
theoretical approaches to how domestic preferences get
translated into international outcomes (whether or not
cooperation takes place and, if so, on what terms). Finally,
I examine what determines the role of international
organizations in this process, which can range from
providing "merely" the context for the negotiation to
exhibiting independent agency.},
Key = {fds249596}
}
@article{fds324427,
Author = {Buethe, T},
Title = {Politics and institutions in the regulation of global
capital: A review article},
Journal = {The Review of International Organizations},
Volume = {3},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-220},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9038-1},
Doi = {10.1007/s11558-008-9038-1},
Key = {fds324427}
}
@article{fds249598,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of
Setting Standards in Accounting},
Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {68},
Number = {3/4},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds249598}
}
@article{fds249599,
Author = {Mattli, W and Buthe, T},
Title = {Accountability in accounting? The politics of private
rule-making in the public interest},
Journal = {Governance},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {399-429},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0952-1895},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000229635500004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00282.x},
Key = {fds249599}
}
@article{fds249602,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Governance through Private Authority? Non-State Actors in
World Politics},
Journal = {Journal of International Affairs (New York)},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {281-290},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds249602}
}
@article{fds249600,
Author = {Mattli, W and Büthe, T},
Title = {Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality
or Primacy of Power?},
Journal = {World Politics},
Volume = {57},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-42},
Year = {2003},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds249600}
}
@article{fds249601,
Author = {Buthe, T},
Title = {Taking temporality seriously: Modeling history and the use
of narratives as evidence},
Journal = {The American political science review},
Volume = {96},
Number = {3},
Pages = {481-493},
Year = {2002},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0003-0554},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000177823400001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds249601}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds249582,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Review of Randall W. Stone, Controlling Institutions:
International Organizations and the Global
Economy},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {282-284},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds249582}
}
@article{fds249581,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Andrew Walter, ’Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption
of International Standards’ (book review)},
Journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
Volume = {124},
Number = {2},
Pages = {376-379},
Year = {2009},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds249581}
}
@article{fds249580,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {[Review of] Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L.
Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency
in International Organizations},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {5},
Number = {4},
Pages = {861-862},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds249580}
}
@article{fds249579,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {"European Integration, 1950-2003"},
Journal = {Journal of Cold War Studies},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {166-168},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds249579}
}
@article{fds249578,
Author = {Büthe, T},
Title = {Microcredit as a Development Strategy: A Review of Banker
for the Poor, by Muhammad Yunus},
Journal = {Journal of International Affairs},
Volume = {53},
Number = {2},
Pages = {741-745},
Year = {2000},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds249578}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds249577,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {The Privatization of Regulation in Global Markets: Winners
and Losers in the Private Governance of Financial and
Product Markets},
Journal = {World Financial Review},
Pages = {66-69},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds249577}
}
@misc{fds249575,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {The Privatization of Regulation in the World
Economy},
Journal = {RegBlog: Regulatory News, Analysis, and Opinion},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
url = {http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog},
Key = {fds249575}
}
@misc{fds249576,
Author = {Büthe, T and Mattli, W},
Title = {Mehr deutscher Einfluss auf die Bilanzierungsregeln?},
Journal = {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung},
Pages = {14-14},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds249576}
}
| |
Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Political Science * Faculty * Staff * Grad * Master * Foreign Exchange * Reload * Login | ||
