Political Science
Arts & Sciences
Duke University
| |
Faculty Database Political Science Arts & Sciences Duke University |
|
| HOME > Arts & Sciences > Political Science > Faculty | Search Help Login |
|
| Publications of H. Geoffrey Brennan :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds320696,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {The economics of ethics and the ethics of economics: Values,
markets and the state},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781848446540},
Abstract = {'Do market prices reflect values? What is the relation
between social norms and economic incentives? Do economic
agents respond to ethical arguments? By probing the
boundaries between positive and normative theorizing and by
bridging ethics, economics, and political science, this book
is able to address a fascinating set of questions. I
strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in
normative issues in public policy - to academics and
practitioners alike.' - Fabienne Peter, University of
Warwick, UK. © Geoffrey Brennan and Giuseppe Eusepi 2009.
All rights reserved.},
Key = {fds320696}
}
@book{fds320697,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Introduction: Ethics vs Economics-in praise of the
'disciplined' life?},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781848446540},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781849801904.00006},
Doi = {10.4337/9781849801904.00006},
Key = {fds320697}
}
@book{fds320705,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pettit, P},
Title = {The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political
Society},
Pages = {1},
Year = {2004},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {0199246483},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246489.001.0001},
Abstract = {However much people want esteem, it is an untradeable
commodity: there is no way that I can buy the good opinion
of another or sell to others my good opinion of them. But
though it is a non-tradable good, esteem is allocated in
society according to systematic determinants; people's
performance, publicity and presentation relative to others
will help fix how much esteem they enjoy and how much
disesteem they avoid. The fact that it is subject to such
determinants means in turn that rational individuals are
bound to compete with one another, however tacitly, in the
attempt to control those influences, increasing their
chances of winning esteem and avoiding disesteem. And the
fact that they all compete for esteem in this way shapes the
environment in which they each pursue the good, setting
relevant comparators and benchmarks, and determining the
cost that a person must bear-the price that they must
pay-for obtaining a given level of esteem in any domain of
activity.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246489.001.0001},
Key = {fds320705}
}
@book{fds296660,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {The Economy of Esteem},
Pages = {xii + 339 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press, Oxford},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296660}
}
@book{fds296658,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Australia Reshaped: 200 Years of Institutional
Reform},
Pages = {304 + x pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Castles, F},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296658}
}
@book{fds296659,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Methods and Morals in Constitutional Economics: Essays in
Honor of James M. Buchanan},
Pages = {567 + xv pages},
Publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Kliemt, H and Tollison, R},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds296659}
}
@book{fds296657,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Democratic Devices and Desires},
Pages = {263+x pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296657}
}
@book{fds296656,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Collected Works of James M. Buchanan},
Publisher = {Indianapolis: Liberty Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Kliemt, H and Tollison, R},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296656}
}
@book{fds296655,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Economics and Religion: a Methodological
Enquiry},
Pages = {289 + ix pages},
Publisher = {Kluwer Dordrecht},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Waterman, AMC},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296655}
}
@book{fds296654,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {Democracy and Decision: the Pure Theory of Electoral
Preference},
Pages = {236 pages},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296654}
}
@book{fds296653,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Rationality, Individualism, and Public Policy},
Publisher = {Canberra: CRFFR, ANU},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296653}
}
@book{fds296652,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Politics and Process: New Essays in Democratic
Theory},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296652}
}
@book{fds296651,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Taxation and Fiscal Federalism: Essays in Honour of Russell
Mathews},
Pages = {250 pages},
Publisher = {Sydney: Australian National University Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Grewal, B and Groenewegen, P},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296651}
}
@book{fds296650,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Local Government Finance},
Publisher = {Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial
Relations, Occasional Paper},
Editor = {Brennan, G},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds296650}
}
@book{fds296648,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {The Morality of the Market: Religious and Economic
Perspectives},
Pages = {488 pages},
Publisher = {Toronto: Macmillan of Canada},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Block, W and Elzinga, K},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296648}
}
@book{fds296649,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political
Economy},
Pages = {176 pages},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296649}
}
@book{fds296647,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {Chaining Australia: Church Bureaucracies and Political
Economy},
Pages = {143 pages},
Publisher = {Sydney: Center for Independent Studies},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Williams, J},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296647}
}
@book{fds296646,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Monopoly in Money and Inflation},
Series = {Hobart Paper 88},
Pages = {68 pages},
Publisher = {London: Institute of Economic Affairs},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296646}
}
@book{fds296644,
Author = {Brennan, HG},
Title = {The Economics of Federalism},
Pages = {432 pages},
Publisher = {Canberra: Australian National University
Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Matthews, RL and Grewal, B},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296644}
}
@book{fds296645,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal
Constitution},
Pages = {231 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296645}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds320680,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Liberty, Preference Satisfaction, and the Case against
Categories},
Pages = {10-30},
Booktitle = {Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John
Broome},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780199684908},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0002},
Abstract = {This chapter applies a distinction due to Broome between
categorical and comparative formulations in ethics to social
choice theory, using the Sen result on the 'impossibility of
a Paretian Liberal' as a case study. The point of departure
is the observation that the normative element within social
choice theory is contained in the various criteria that any
'aggregation mechanism' must meet, rather than in terms of
measures of the degree to which various desirable attributes
(Paretianism, transitivity, non-dictatorship, and the like)
are secured. The Sen result is a useful case because
preference satisfaction and liberty are concepts that lend
themselves to formulation in terms of 'degrees of
achievement'. Indeed, Sen himself talks of his 'liberal'
criterion as embodying 'minimal liberty'. Reformulating
Sen's claims as exposing a possible tension between liberty
and preference satisfaction invites comparison with other
writers concerned with similar issues-and specifically with
the work of Ronald Coase on social cost.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0002},
Key = {fds320680}
}
@misc{fds320682,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {The role of numbers in prisoner’s dilemmas and public good
situations},
Pages = {177-198},
Booktitle = {The Prisoner's Dilemma},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107044357},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107360174.011},
Abstract = {Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma was originally developed
and analyzed as a two-person interaction, many of the most
important applications of what we might loosely call
“Prisoner’s Dilemma thinking” involve issues in the
social sciences that are concerned with much larger numbers.
This fact immediately poses a question: How does the
two-person version differ from the largenumber Prisoner’s
Dilemma? Do the lessons of (and intuitions arising from) the
two-person case carry over to larger scale social
applications? The general consensus in the economics
literature is that the differences are very
considerable-amounting to something like a qualitative
difference between small-number and large-number situations.
Consider, for example, the case of market provision of
so-called “public goods.”},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781107360174.011},
Key = {fds320682}
}
@misc{fds296560,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {Expressive voting},
Pages = {111-126},
Booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second
Edition},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press},
Editor = {Shugart, W},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781849802857},
Abstract = {There is now a considerable literature operating (one way or
another) under the rubrics of 'expressive voting' and
expressive political activity more generally. Some of the
relevant ideas are to be found in early contributions by
mainstream public choice scholars - such as Buchanan
(1954b), Downs (1957) and Tullock (1971a) - but the
contributions that make the expressive idea a centerpiece of
the 'rational actor' approach to political behavior are of
more recent origin. Notable examples include Goodin and
Roberts (1975), Brennan and Buchanan (1984), Kliemt (1986),
Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Schuessler (2000a, 2000b) and
Brennan and Hamlin (1998); for more recent attempts, see
Brennan (2008b), Hamlin and Jennings (2009) and Hillman
(2010).},
Key = {fds296560}
}
@misc{fds332878,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Buchanan, Hobbes and contractarianism: The supply of
rules?},
Pages = {17-34},
Booktitle = {Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781781003961},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781781003978.00009},
Doi = {10.4337/9781781003978.00009},
Key = {fds332878}
}
@misc{fds296561,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Political Leadership: A public choice view},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership},
Publisher = {OUP},
Editor = {Hart, PT and Rhodes, R},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296561}
}
@misc{fds296562,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Striving for the Middle Ground},
Booktitle = {Political Philosophy and Taxation},
Publisher = {OUP},
Editor = {Neill, MO and Orr, S},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296562}
}
@misc{fds296564,
Author = {Brennan, G and Anomaly, J},
Title = {Markets and Economic Theory},
Booktitle = {Sage Reference Encyclopedia for Philosophy in the Social
Sciences},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296564}
}
@misc{fds296643,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Hume’s (Sugden’s) Psychopathy},
Booktitle = {Norms and Values},
Editor = {Baurmann, M and Brennan, G and Southwood, RGN},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296643}
}
@misc{fds296642,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {Institutional and governance aspects of the Henry Tax
Review},
Booktitle = {Australia’s Future Tax System},
Editor = {Krever, R},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds296642}
}
@misc{fds296639,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Positive constraints on normative political
theory},
Pages = {106-130},
Booktitle = {The Economics of Ethics and the Ethics of Economics: Values,
Markets and the State},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781848446540},
Key = {fds296639}
}
@misc{fds320695,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Value and values, preferences and price: An economic
perspective on ethical questions},
Pages = {14-31},
Booktitle = {The Economics of Ethics and the Ethics of Economics: Values,
Markets and the State},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781848446540},
Key = {fds320695}
}
@misc{fds296637,
Author = {Brennan, G and Baurmann, M and Goodin, R and Southwood,
N},
Title = {What the Voter Needs to Know},
Booktitle = {Relaibale Knowledge and Social Epistemology},
Publisher = {Graxer Philosophisce Studien},
Editor = {Schurz, G and Werning, M},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296637}
}
@misc{fds296638,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Bygones are Bygones},
Pages = {157-175},
Booktitle = {Perspectives in Moral Science},
Publisher = {Nomos Verlag},
Editor = {Baurmann, M and Lahno, B},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296638}
}
@misc{fds296640,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Value and Values, Preferences and Prices},
Pages = {14-31},
Booktitle = {The Ethics of Economics and the Economics of
Ethics},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296640}
}
@misc{fds296641,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Commitment to Exchange: the Theologian as
Conversationalist},
Pages = {153-166},
Booktitle = {Embracing Grace},
Publisher = {Barton Books},
Editor = {Thompson, H},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296641}
}
@misc{fds296630,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Constitutions As Expressive Documents},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Wingast, B and Wittman, D},
Year = {2008},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9780199548477},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0018},
Abstract = {This article looks at constitutions as expressive documents.
Two concepts are the main focus of this article: the
constitution and the notion of expressiveness. The article
tries to clarify these concepts by appeal of a contrast,
which will be between a constitution as a legal document and
the more general idea of a constitution, which is envisaged
by the Constitutional Political Economy (CPE). It also tries
to clarify the notion of expressive activity, followed by a
discussion on the issue of how expressiveness operates in
electoral politics. Finally, a simple two-bytwo matrix is
used to explore the role of expressive elements in
constitutions.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0018},
Key = {fds296630}
}
@misc{fds320701,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pettit, P},
Title = {Esteem, identifiability, and the internet},
Pages = {175-194},
Booktitle = {Information Technology and Moral Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521855495},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498725.011},
Abstract = {ESTEEM, REPUTATION, AND THE “COMPOUNDING EFFECT’:
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an
original desire to please, and an original aversion to
offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in
their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard.
(Adam Smith 1759/1982, p. 116). We assume in this chapter,
in line with what we have argued elsewhere (Brennan and
Pettit 2004), that people desire the esteem of others and
shrink from their disesteem. In making this assumption, we
are deliberately associating ourselves with an intellectual
tradition that dominated social theorizing until the
nineteenth century, and specifically until the emergence of
modern economics. That tradition includes Adam Smith, Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, the Baron de Montesquieu, David Hume –
indeed, just about everyone who is recognized as a forebear
of modern social and political theory, whether specifically
in the economistic style or not. There is scarcely a social
theorist up to the nineteenth century who does not regard
the desire for esteem as among the most ubiquitous and
powerful motives of human action (Lovejoy 1961). Smith's
elegantly forthright formulation, offered as the epigraph to
this section, simply exemplifies the wider tradition. We can
think of a minimalist version of the basic esteem
relationship as involving just two individuals – actorAand
an observer, B. The actor undertakes some action, or
exhibits some disposition, that is observed byB. The
observation of this action/disposition induces inBan
immediate and spontaneous evaluative attitude.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511498725.011},
Key = {fds320701}
}
@misc{fds332879,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Economics},
Pages = {118-152},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781405136532},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405177245.ch5},
Abstract = {Some understanding of what ‘political philosophy’ and
‘economics’ are is presupposed by the title to this
article. It is useful to begin by briefly setting out what
those understandings will be. Political philosophy for my
purposes here will be taken as equivalent to normative
social theory. Political philosophy’s concerns may be
centred on the institutions and actions of the state - on
politics more narrowly construed - but I shall include all
forms of social organization, including specifically
decentralized ones like anarchy and the market, within the
scope of political philosophy as here understood. This
understanding of political philosophy may be rather broader
than that adopted in other contributions to this volume,
but, given the nature of economists’ preoccupations within
political theory, the greater breadth is
necessary.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781405177245.ch5},
Key = {fds332879}
}
@misc{fds296633,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Reflections for Public Policy},
Pages = {195-206},
Booktitle = {Promoting Better Environmental Outcomes},
Editor = {Commission, P and Government, A},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296633}
}
@misc{fds296634,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Bicameralism: A Public Choice View},
Pages = {44-66},
Booktitle = {Restraining Elective Dictatorship},
Publisher = {UWA Press},
Editor = {Aroney, N and Nethercote, J and Prasses, S},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296634}
}
@misc{fds296635,
Author = {Brennan, G and Waterman, AMC},
Title = {Christian Theology and Economics: Covergence and
Clashes},
Pages = {100-126},
Booktitle = {Christian Morality and Market Economics},
Editor = {Harper, I and Gregg, S},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296635}
}
@misc{fds296636,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Behavioural Economics and Public Policy},
Pages = {131-151},
Booktitle = {Behavioural Economics and Public Policy Roundtable},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296636}
}
@misc{fds320702,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {Esteem, norms of participation and public goods
supply},
Pages = {63-80},
Booktitle = {Public Economics and Public Choice: Contributions in Honor
of Charles B. Blankart},
Publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9783540727811},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8_4},
Abstract = {Festschrifts are an occasion for registering the esteem in
which the honouree is held. Given Beat Blankart's
significant contributions to public economics over an
extended career, we thought it appropriate for this occasion
to write a paper on a public economics topic in which esteem
figures as a major analytic category. In that sense, esteem
here plays a double role - as content and as intent. © 2007
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8_4},
Key = {fds320702}
}
@misc{fds296631,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pettit, P},
Title = {The Feasibility Issue},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Jackson, F and Smith, M},
Year = {2007},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9780199234769},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0010},
Abstract = {Much political philosophy seeks to identify those
institutions that would be more desirable than alternatives
under the ideal-theory assumption that whatever alternative
is in place will command general compliance. This assumption
means that the question of how likely it is that such
institutions will engage prevailing incentives and command
high levels of compliance is effectively assumed away. The
failure to engage this question represents a potentially
serious limitation on the relevance of political philosophy
for real-world policy. It suggests that philosophy ought to
seek something beyond the purely ideal sort of theory that
is fashionable in many circles. This article provides an
overview of the case for such 'non-ideal' theory and of its
prospects. It looks at ideal theory in philosophy and at the
problems it faces. It also considers the emphasis on
incentive-compatibility found among economists and sketches
the possibility of developing that perspective within
philosophy.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0010},
Key = {fds296631}
}
@misc{fds296629,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Terror: The 'ISM' versus the 'ISTS'},
Pages = {285-302},
Booktitle = {The Economic Analysis of Terrorism},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Brück, T},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {0203016637},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203016633},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203016633},
Key = {fds296629}
}
@misc{fds296632,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Globalisation and Varieties of Democracy},
Booktitle = {2003 Proceedings of the Tampere Club},
Editor = {Aarnio, A},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds296632}
}
@misc{fds296628,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The political economy of regulation: A prolegomenon},
Pages = {72-92},
Booktitle = {Changing Institutions in the European Union: A Public Choice
Perspective},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Cheltenham},
Editor = {Eusepi, G and Schneider, F},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781843765158},
Key = {fds296628}
}
@misc{fds320704,
Author = {Bernholz, P and Brennan, G},
Title = {Indebtedness and deficits of the nations of the european
union},
Pages = {28-43},
Booktitle = {Changing Institutions in the European Union: A Public Choice
Perspective},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781843765158},
Key = {fds320704}
}
@misc{fds296625,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {The European Constitution and Peace: Taking the Heat out of
Politics},
Pages = {1-24},
Booktitle = {A Constitution for the European Union},
Publisher = {MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.},
Editor = {Blankart, C and Mueller, D},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296625}
}
@misc{fds296626,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Fiscal Constitutionalism},
Pages = {53-76},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Public Finance},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, Mass.},
Editor = {Backhaus, J and Wagner, R},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296626}
}
@misc{fds296627,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Comments on Berholz},
Pages = {44-48},
Booktitle = {Changing Institutions in the European Union A Public Choice
Perspective},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar, Cheltenham},
Editor = {Eusepi, G and Schneider, F},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296627}
}
@misc{fds296619,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Democratic trust: A rational-choice theory
view},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {197-217},
Booktitle = {Trust and Governance},
Publisher = {Russell Sage Foundation},
Editor = {Braithwaite, V and Levi, M},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0871541343},
Key = {fds296619}
}
@misc{fds296624,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Conservatism as a Political Philosophy: An Economist’s
Approach},
Pages = {7-24},
Booktitle = {Faith, Reason and Economics: Essays in Honour of Anthony
Waterman},
Publisher = {St. John’s College Press, Manitoba},
Editor = {Hum, D},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds296624}
}
@misc{fds296623,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Constitutional Economics and Public Choice},
Pages = {117-149},
Booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to Public Choice},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar, Cheltenham},
Editor = {Razzolini, L and III, WS},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296623}
}
@misc{fds296622,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Nationalism and Federalism: The Political Constitution of
Pace},
Pages = {259-283},
Booktitle = {Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of
Collective Decisions; Essays in Honour of Albert
Breton},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New
York},
Editor = {Galeotti, G and Salmon, P and Wintrobe, R},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296622}
}
@misc{fds296620,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Constitutional Economics},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {401-410},
Booktitle = {New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics},
Publisher = {McMillan, London},
Editor = {Newman, P},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds296620}
}
@misc{fds296621,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Fiscal Federalism},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {144-150},
Booktitle = {New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics},
Publisher = {McMillan, London},
Editor = {Newman, P},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds296621}
}
@misc{fds296616,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Rational Choice Political Theory},
Booktitle = {Political Theory},
Publisher = {Cambridge University},
Editor = {Vincent, A},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds296616}
}
@misc{fds296617,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Public Choice and Taxation: Leviathan After Twenty
Years},
Pages = {61-79},
Booktitle = {Tax Policy Conversations},
Publisher = {Kluwer Law International},
Editor = {Head, J and Krever, R},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds296617}
}
@misc{fds296618,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Economic Concept of Contract},
Pages = {27-38},
Booktitle = {A New Contractualism?},
Publisher = {Macmillan, Melbourne},
Editor = {Davis, G and Sullivan, B and Yeatman, A},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds296618}
}
@misc{fds296611,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Economists’ Approach to Ethics: A Late Twentieth
Century View},
Pages = {121-137},
Booktitle = {Economics and Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge, London},
Editor = {Groenewegen, P},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296611}
}
@misc{fds296612,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Economical Constitutions},
Pages = {194-207},
Booktitle = {Constitutionalism in Transformation},
Publisher = {Blackwells, Oxford},
Editor = {Bellamy, R and Castiglione, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296612}
}
@misc{fds296613,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {On Family Taxation and Leviathan Government},
Pages = {123-42},
Booktitle = {Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale},
Publisher = {Australian Tax Research Foundation},
Editor = {Head, JG and Krever, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296613}
}
@misc{fds296614,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Socialization of Commodities: A revisionist
view},
Pages = {223-36},
Booktitle = {Current Issues in Public Choice},
Publisher = {Cheltenham: Edward Elgar},
Editor = {Pardo, JC and Schneider, F},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296614}
}
@misc{fds296615,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Selection and the Currenty of Reward},
Pages = {256-76},
Booktitle = {The Theory of Institutional Design},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Goodin, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296615}
}
@misc{fds296610,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Commentary on R. Goodin’s Short Terms and Long
Fuses},
Pages = {245-148},
Booktitle = {Short-termism in Australian Investment},
Publisher = {EPAC Commission Paper No. 6},
Year = {1995},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296610}
}
@misc{fds296608,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Un modilo minimizado de transferencias federales},
Pages = {143-161},
Booktitle = {La Financiacion de las Comunidades Autonomas},
Publisher = {Junta de Castilla y Leon},
Editor = {Velasco, JR},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296608}
}
@misc{fds296609,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Economizing on Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Theory of
Institutional Design},
Pages = {20-34},
Booktitle = {Case Studies in International Development and
Competitiveness},
Publisher = {Queensland University Press},
Editor = {Layton, A and Ryan, N},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296609}
}
@misc{fds296605,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Economic Rationalism: What Does Economics Really
Say?},
Pages = {2-11},
Booktitle = {Economic Rationalism: Dead End or Way Forward?},
Publisher = {Sydney: Allen and Unwin},
Editor = {King, S and Lloyd, P},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296605}
}
@misc{fds296606,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Baby Trade: the Political Economy of Inter-Country
Adoption},
Booktitle = {Multi-Cultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of
Identity},
Publisher = {Sydney: CIS},
Editor = {Kukathas, C},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296606}
}
@misc{fds296607,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Contribution of Economics},
Pages = {123-156},
Booktitle = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Basil Blackwell},
Editor = {Goodin, R and Petit, P},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds296607}
}
@misc{fds296604,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Konsumbesteuerung und Demokratischer Prozess},
Pages = {51-84},
Booktitle = {Konsumorientierte Neuordnung des Steuersystems},
Publisher = {Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag},
Editor = {Rose, M},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296604}
}
@misc{fds296599,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Irrational Action, Individual Sovereignty and Political
Process},
Booktitle = {Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy},
Publisher = {Canberra: CRFFR, ANU},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296599}
}
@misc{fds296600,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Flattening the Tax Rate Scale: A Public Choice
View},
Pages = {387-406},
Booktitle = {Flattening The Tax Rate Scale},
Publisher = {Melbourne: Longman Professional},
Editor = {Head, JG and Krever, R},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296600}
}
@misc{fds296601,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {State Taxation Issues: A Commentary},
Pages = {93-100},
Booktitle = {Issues in State Taxation},
Publisher = {Canberra: CRFFR, ANU},
Editor = {Walsh, C},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296601}
}
@misc{fds296602,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, J},
Title = {Consumption Taxation and Democratic Process},
Pages = {191-217},
Booktitle = {Heidelberg Conferences on Taxing Consumption},
Publisher = {Berlin: Springer Verlag},
Editor = {Rose, M},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296602}
}
@misc{fds296603,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {What Might Rationality Fail to Do?},
Booktitle = {The Limits of Rationality},
Publisher = {Chicago: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Cook, K and Levy, M},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296603}
}
@misc{fds296596,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Politics With Romance: Is A Theory of Democratic Socialism
Possible?},
Pages = {49-66},
Booktitle = {The Good Polity},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
Editor = {Hamlin, and Petit},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296596}
}
@misc{fds296597,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tax Mix and Horizontal Equity},
Pages = {421-430},
Booktitle = {Austrlaian Tax Reform In Retrospect and Prospect},
Publisher = {Australian Tax Research Foundation},
Editor = {Head, JG},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296597}
}
@misc{fds296598,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Large Numbers, Small Costs: The Uneasy Foundations of
Democratic Rule},
Booktitle = {Politics and Process: New Essays in Democratic
Theory},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Brennan, and Lomasky},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds296598}
}
@misc{fds296594,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tertiary Education Fees - Yet Again},
Pages = {186-209},
Booktitle = {Withering Heights: The State of Higher Education In
Australia},
Publisher = {Allen & Unwin Austrlaia},
Editor = {Hogbin, GR},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296594}
}
@misc{fds296595,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {On Feasiable Tax Reform},
Pages = {103-119},
Booktitle = {Taxation and Fiscal Federalism},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {Brennan, G and Groenewegen},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296595}
}
@misc{fds296593,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Constitutional Routes to Smaller Government},
Pages = {309-330},
Booktitle = {Restraining Leviathan: Small Government in
Practice},
Publisher = {Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, Policy Forum No.
6},
Editor = {James, M},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds296593}
}
@misc{fds296591,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Markets and Majorities - Moral and Madness},
Pages = {233-247},
Booktitle = {The Morality of the Market},
Publisher = {Toronto: Macmillan of Canada},
Editor = {Block, B and Elzinga},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296591}
}
@misc{fds296592,
Author = {Brennan, G and Head, J},
Title = {Free Provision, Tax Limits and Fiscal Reform},
Pages = {193-208},
Booktitle = {Public Sector and Political Economy},
Publisher = {New York: Gustav Fischer Verlag},
Editor = {Hanusch, H and Roskamp, K and Wiseman, J},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296592}
}
@misc{fds296588,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Rendering Unto Ceasar: ’Chaning Australia’ on Paying
Taxes},
Booktitle = {Chaining Australia},
Publisher = {Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies},
Editor = {Brennan, and Williams},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296588}
}
@misc{fds296589,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Road to Hell and Back: One Economist’s View of
’Changing Australia’},
Booktitle = {Chaining Australia},
Publisher = {Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies},
Editor = {Brennan, and Williams},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296589}
}
@misc{fds296590,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Constitutional Constraints on the Fiscal Powers of
Government},
Pages = {115-132},
Booktitle = {Constitutional Economics: Containing the Economic Powers of
Government},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: D.C. Heath Co.},
Editor = {McKenzie, R},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296590}
}
@misc{fds296581,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {Towars a Theory of Family Taxation: The Equity
Dimension},
Pages = {119-132},
Booktitle = {The Theory and Policy of Tax Reform, Chapter
7},
Publisher = {Sydney: Australian Tax Institute},
Editor = {Head, JG},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296581}
}
@misc{fds296582,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Who Should Tax, Where and What?},
Pages = {20-23},
Booktitle = {Tax Assignment in Federal Countries},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {McLure, C},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296582}
}
@misc{fds296583,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tax Effectiveness and Tax Equity in Federal Countries: A
Comment},
Pages = {87-93},
Booktitle = {Tax Assignment in Federal Countries},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {McLure, C},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296583}
}
@misc{fds296584,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Normative Tax Theory for a Federal Polity: Some Public
Choice Preliminaries},
Pages = {52-65},
Booktitle = {Tax Assignment in Federal Countries},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {McLure, C},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296584}
}
@misc{fds296585,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital},
Pages = {41-54},
Booktitle = {Public Finance and Economic Growth, Papers and Proceedings
of the 37th I.I.P.F. Congress},
Publisher = {Detroit: Wayne State University Press},
Editor = {Biehl, D and Roskamp, K and Stolper, W},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296585}
}
@misc{fds296586,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Estate Duties and the Family: Prolegomena to a Theory of the
Tex Unit},
Pages = {109-127},
Booktitle = {Taxation of the Family},
Publisher = {Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute},
Editor = {Penner, R},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296586}
}
@misc{fds296587,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, JJ},
Title = {The Growth of Government},
Series = {Section II, Chapter 1},
Booktitle = {Why Governments Grow: Measuring Public Sector
Size},
Publisher = {Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.},
Editor = {Taylor, C},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296587}
}
@misc{fds296580,
Author = {Brennan, G and Friedman, D},
Title = {A Libertarian View of Welfare},
Booktitle = {Income Support: Conceptual and Policy Issues},
Publisher = {Ottowa: J.J. Rowman and Littlefield},
Editor = {Brown, PG and Johnson, C and Vernier, P},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296580}
}
@misc{fds296578,
Author = {Brennan, G and Tollison, R},
Title = {Rent-Seeking in Academia},
Booktitle = {Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society},
Publisher = {College Station: Texas A&M University Press},
Editor = {Buchanan, JM and Tollison, R and Tullock, G},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296578}
}
@misc{fds296579,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Tax Reform Without Tears: Why Must the Rich be Made to
Suffer?},
Pages = {35-54},
Booktitle = {The Economics of Taxation},
Publisher = {Washington: Brookings Institute},
Editor = {Aaron, HJ and Boskin, M},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296579}
}
@misc{fds296577,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Limits and the Logic of Constitutional
Restrictions},
Booktitle = {COUPE Conference Proceedings},
Publisher = {Philadelphia},
Year = {1979},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds296577}
}
@misc{fds296576,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy: A Public Choice
Perspective},
Booktitle = {Proceedings of the First National Conference on
Environmental Economics},
Publisher = {Australian government Printing Office},
Year = {1978},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds296576}
}
@misc{fds296575,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Indexing the Personal Income Tax Rate Scale},
Pages = {123-140},
Booktitle = {Policy Analysis and Deductive Reasoning},
Publisher = {Lexington Books},
Editor = {Tullock, G and Wagner, R},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds296575}
}
@misc{fds296573,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {On the Incidence of Estate and Gift Duties: A Theoretical
Analysis},
Pages = {39-64},
Booktitle = {Chapter 3 in State and Local Taxation},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {Matthews, RL},
Year = {1977},
Key = {fds296573}
}
@misc{fds296574,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Criteria for State and Local Taxes},
Pages = {1-9},
Booktitle = {Chapter 2 in State and Local Taxation},
Publisher = {Canberra: ANU Press},
Editor = {Matthews, RL},
Year = {1977},
Key = {fds296574}
}
@misc{fds296572,
Author = {Brennan, G and Nottle, R},
Title = {The Meaning and Measurement of Welfare in
Economics},
Booktitle = {Victorian Secondary Schools Text},
Editor = {Nottle, R and al, E},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds296572}
}
@misc{fds296571,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Fee Abolition: Summary and Conclusions},
Booktitle = {Readings in the Economics and Politics of Australian
Education},
Publisher = {Angus and Robertson},
Editor = {Harman, GS and Selby-Smith, C},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds296571}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds339583,
Author = {Brennan, G and Sayre-Mccord, G},
Title = {On 'cooperation'},
Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
Volume = {40},
Number = {1},
Pages = {107-130},
Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2018-0005},
Abstract = {The term 'cooperation' is widely used in social and
political and biological and economic theory. Perhaps for
this reason, the term takes on a variety of meanings and it
is not always clear in many settings what aspect of an
interaction is being described. This paper has the modest
aim of sorting through some of this variety of meanings; and
exploring, against that background, when and why cooperation
(in which sense) might be of value, or be required, or
constitute a virtue.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2018-0005},
Key = {fds339583}
}
@article{fds325485,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Practical conservatism},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {99},
Number = {4},
Pages = {336-351},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw009},
Abstract = {We explore the extent to which general considerations about
the nature of social and political organization and the role
of conventions in political life might provide a defence for
the systematic status-quo orientation that we take to
characterize conservatism. We term this strand of
conservative thought "practical conservatism" because the
conservatism in question is a practical response to certain
facts about human society rather than deriving from any
specifically conservative value or conservative attitude
towards values.},
Doi = {10.1093/monist/onw009},
Key = {fds325485}
}
@article{fds325484,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlinf, A},
Title = {Conservative value},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {99},
Number = {4},
Pages = {352-371},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw010},
Abstract = {We distinguish three forms of conservatism and focus
attention on the form in which conservatives identify and
recognize a value not recognized by nonconservatives.
Starting from an attempt to rescue conservative values by
G.A. Cohen, we provide an analysis of the requirements of
such a conservative position and a formulation in terms of
state-relative evaluation.},
Doi = {10.1093/monist/onw010},
Key = {fds325484}
}
@article{fds323252,
Author = {Brennan, G and Sayre-McCord, G},
Title = {DO NORMATIVE FACTS MATTER⋯ to WHAT IS FEASIBLE?},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {434-456},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000194},
Abstract = {G. A. Cohen famously argued that fundamental normative
principles (for example, concerning justice) are "fact-free"
in such a way that their truth is independent of
nonnormative facts. For our purposes here, we take Cohen's
claim as given. Our focus is on what might be thought of as
the "other side" of this issue - on whether the
non-normative facts that determine what might be feasible
for us to accomplish are value-independent. We argue that
they are not, that people have reason to think that the
normative properties of different possible options can and
sometimes do have a crucial impact on their feasibility. In
other words: facts about feasibility are partially dependent
on Cohen's "fact-free moral principles".},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052516000194},
Key = {fds323252}
}
@article{fds320679,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Olson and imperceptible differences: the Tuck
critique},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {164},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {235-250},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0294-3},
Abstract = {This paper examines Olson’s “logic of collective
action” through the lens of a sustained critique by
political theorist/philosopher Richard Tuck. Tuck’s
discussion exposes the emphasis Olson places on
“imperceptibility” in his analysis of free riding. Tuck
makes a plausible case for thinking that Olson confuses
incentives to free ride (which are a matter of the relative
benefit to the individual of contributing to a public
purpose compared with the cost) with negligibility of
contribution. Moreover, Olson seems to confuse
imperceptibility of individual contribution on aggregate
output with imperceptibility of action. In lots of cases
where there are norms of contributing, compliance with the
norm is totally detectable even if the effects of a single
individual’s compliance on aggregate realization of the
common purpose are not. But many forces for compliance (of
which social esteem is one) rely only on the latter kind of
perceptibility. I conclude with Tuck’s analysis of
voting—partly because the topic is of special interest to
a public choice readership, and partly because turnout seems
to be a notable case where there is significant contribution
despite the large numbers setting—and hence a challenge to
the spirit of Olson’s emphasis on numbers as
such.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0294-3},
Key = {fds320679}
}
@article{fds320681,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Buchanan’s anti-conservatism},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {163},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {7-13},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0223-x},
Abstract = {Buchanan’s last book declares an antipathy to one aspect
of “conservatism” as he identified it—namely,
conservatism’s defense of hierarchy in social relations.
Buchanan’s anti-hierarchy stance owes something to the
rural populist background of his early years. That stance
also explains something about his professional and
individual personality: his contentment to remain at
non-elitist institutions; his preparedness to challenge
establishment thinking on the nature and role of government;
his antagonism to inherited wealth and the privileges of
dynasty; and his life-long affection for elements of the
simple rural life. The aim of this short piece is to
highlight these various connections between Buchanan’s
political commitments and the content and conduct of his
work.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-014-0223-x},
Key = {fds320681}
}
@article{fds320685,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {"For economists, everything must fit on a single
screen"},
Journal = {Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik},
Volume = {15},
Number = {4},
Pages = {334-345},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2014-0027},
Doi = {10.1515/pwp-2014-0027},
Key = {fds320685}
}
@article{fds318517,
Author = {Brennan, G and Munger, M},
Title = {The soul of James Buchanan?},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {331-342},
Year = {2014},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {The article reflects on the views and life of James M.
Buchanan. The Buchanan family had a political past:
Buchanan's grandfather had briefly been governor of
Tennessee in the early 1890s as a member of the populist
People's Party. This party was a coalition of agrarian
interests mainly poor cotton and wheat farmers from the
South and the West. Throughout his professional career,
Buchanan called himself a classical liberal. As indicated,
this was something he learned from Frank Knight and that he
held accordingly as a matter of intellectual conviction
rather than personal inclination, which he always
acknowledged was closer to 'libertarian socialist.'. He
viewed politics as arising from agreements. But the
agreements were founded in a notion of exchange rather than
in some fixed notion of consensus on a single policy or
choice. As a consequence, his conception of politics was
encompassing and multidimensional, allowing agreement to be
achieved through accommodations or compromises such as
logrolls.},
Key = {fds318517}
}
@article{fds320683,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Comprehending conservatism: frameworks and
analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Political Ideologies},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {227-239},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2014.909262},
Abstract = {Jan-Werner Müller provides a four-dimensional framework for
comprehending conservatism as a political ideology. We focus
on conservatism as a political philosophy, rather than an
ideology, and provide more detailed analysis in order to
re-assess Müller's framework; arguing that the suggested
sociological and aesthetic dimensions do not play
significant roles in defining political conservatism, while
the suggested methodological and philosophical dimensions
are better understood in terms of an alternative analytic
structure. © 2014 Taylor & Francis.},
Doi = {10.1080/13569317.2014.909262},
Key = {fds320683}
}
@article{fds320684,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The reason for 'The Reason of Rules'},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {103-109},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9160-4},
Abstract = {This paper is an attempt to locate the writing of the book,
The Reason of Rules, in its intellectual and temporal
setting. The object is to capture something of the ambitions
of the book and to assess its limitations as perceived three
decades after its writing. It includes some personal
reflections on the experience of Buchanan as a co-author. ©
2014 Springer Science+Business Media New
York.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-014-9160-4},
Key = {fds320684}
}
@article{fds320687,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Feasibility in optimizing ethics},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {314-329},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052513000150},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052513000150},
Key = {fds320687}
}
@article{fds320686,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Conservatism and radicalism},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {173-176},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9135-x},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-013-9135-x},
Key = {fds320686}
}
@article{fds320688,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Politics-as-exchange and The Calculus of
Consent},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {152},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {351-358},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9980-6},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-012-9980-6},
Key = {fds320688}
}
@article{fds320689,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The political economy of public debt},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {182-198},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-012-9124-5},
Abstract = {Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the
inter-temporal pattern of tax rates-it reduces current rates
and increases future rates. Accordingly, whether the share
of the cost of a given public expenditure is reduced or
increased by debt for a given individual depends on the time
profile of that individual's income (tax base) vis-à-vis
others' incomes. Therefore, given the age-profile of income
in virtually all Western countries, individuals will tend to
be better off under current taxes the younger they are. If
(as most standard models of political economy assume)
individuals vote according to their economic interests, and
if they are tolerably well-informed, then the pattern of
support for public debt will track age. And increases in the
median age of the population will lead to larger public
debt. In other words, public debt policy collapses to a kind
of demographic politics. This explanation may, however, be
sensitive to assumptions about motives for bequest.
Specifically, if bequestors seek to leave positive bequests
and are motivated exclusively by the lifetime consumption of
their heirs (as well as themselves) then the aged may, under
plausible assumptions about the age of their heirs, prefer
current taxes over debt. © 2012 Springer Science + Business
Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-012-9124-5},
Key = {fds320689}
}
@article{fds296668,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Keeping Company with Seabright},
Journal = {Biological Theory},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296668}
}
@article{fds320690,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {On the 'cashing out' hypothesis and 'soft' and 'hard'
policies},
Journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {601-610},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.001},
Abstract = {In the literature on paternalism that has grown out of the
behavioural economics 'revolution', a distinction is drawn
between 'hard' and 'soft' policies. Although this hard/soft
distinction seems to be motivated by the thought that the
two policy types might have different implications for
individual liberty, there is a claim that 'hard' policies
are normatively superior to 'soft' for '. efficiency'
reasons. We show, by appeal to an esteem-based model of
'soft' policy that this claim is not valid in general. We
also expose a number of conceptual mistakes in what many
seem to have identified as the normative implications of
behavioural economics. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.001},
Key = {fds320690}
}
@article{fds296669,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {On the Cashing-out Hypothesis and Hard and Soft
Policies},
Journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {4},
Pages = {601-610},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds296669}
}
@article{fds320692,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, JJ},
Title = {Fiscal equity in federal systems},
Journal = {Review of Law & Economics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1543},
Abstract = {This paper examines the normative foundations of fiscal
equalization - an issue handled, apparently decisively, in a
classic paper by James Buchanan (1950). Contrary to
Buchanan's claims, we argue that fiscal equalization
requires extremely strong value judgements - at least in the
case where fiscal differences arise from the interaction of
public goods provision under different population size -
effectively committing one to a Rawlsian maximin rule. Much
weaker forms of the 'social welfare function' in this public
goods case will generate the requirement that private
consumption levels be equalized, but specifically not public
consumption levels - in which sense private goods
equalization seems normatively weaker than public goods
equalization, If this is so, the hope of justifying federal
fiscal equalization on the basis of relatively
uncontroversial individualistic norms seems illusory. ©
2010 by bepress.},
Doi = {10.2202/1555-5879.1543},
Key = {fds320692}
}
@article{fds320693,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare without
illusion},
Journal = {Review of Law & Economics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1535},
Doi = {10.2202/1555-5879.1535},
Key = {fds320693}
}
@article{fds320691,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A and Kliemt, H},
Title = {PPE: An appraisal},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {363-365},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2010},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X10369443},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X10369443},
Key = {fds320691}
}
@article{fds320694,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Climate hopes: Pious and otherwise},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics},
Volume = {54},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-7},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.2009.00475.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8489.2009.00475.x},
Key = {fds320694}
}
@article{fds296661,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Division of Epistemic Labour},
Journal = {Analys Und Kritik},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {231-246},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds296661}
}
@article{fds296662,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {PPE: An Institutional View},
Journal = {Politics/Philosophy/Economics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {379-397},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X10368270},
Abstract = {One way of responding to the question of what PPE is
involves mobilizing the tools that PPE involves. That is the
exercise attempted in this article. The object is to use PPE
as a method to analyze PPE as a subject matter. PPE is,
whatever else, an interdisciplinary enterprise; so the point
of departure involves analyzing the role and properties of
disciplines within the institutional organization of
enquiry. The basic idea is that enquiry is governed by a
'division of epistemic labour' in Adam Smith's sense, and
that that division of labour depends for its working on
institutions for the reliable certification of claims.
Disciplines are such 'institutions'. As such, they are
indispensable. But they impose centripetal forces within the
organization of enquiry that stand against interdisciplinary
work. Understanding these forces offers some hope of
securing an 'optimal' compromise between the benefits and
costs that disciplines entail. Examples are offered from
each of the disciplines involved in PPE separately, and some
observations are offered about the architecture of the three
disciplines' interrelationships. © The Author(s)
2010.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X10368270},
Key = {fds296662}
}
@article{fds320698,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley's
benevolent despot},
Journal = {The Review of Austrian Economics},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {131-143},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0072-x},
Abstract = {This paper is an assessment of Besley's attempt to
orchestrate a rapprochement between public choice theory and
conventional public economics-with its characteristic
normative orientation towards public policy. In this paper,
I first try to set the Besley enterprise in the context of
earlier work-focussing on my own work with Buchanan (The
Power to Tax and The Reason of Rules). I then direct
attention to three aspects of the Besley enterprise: whether
selecting for competence depends on having solved the
motivation problem (either by incentive or selection means),
how selection mechanisms might be supported institutionally
and the possibility that selection processes might create
incentives at the 'dispositional' level. © 2009 Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11138-009-0072-x},
Key = {fds320698}
}
@article{fds296663,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Climate Change: A Rational Choice Politics
View},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics},
Volume = {53},
Number = {3},
Pages = {305-322},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.2009.00457.x},
Abstract = {Reduction in carbon dioxide emissions constitutes a global
public good; and hence there will be strong incentives for
countries to free ride in the provision of CO2 emission
reductions. In the absence of more or less binding
international agreements, we would expect carbon emissions
to be seriously excessive, and climate change problems to be
unsolvable. Against this obvious general point, we observe
many countries acting unilaterally to introduce carbon
emission policies. That is itself an explanatory puzzle, and
a source of possible hope. Both aspects are matters of 'how
politics works' - i.e. 'public choice' problems are central.
The object of this paper is to explain the phenomenon of
unilateral policy action and to evaluate the grounds for
'hope'. One aspect of the explanation lies in the
construction of policy instruments that redistribute
strategically in favour of relevant interests. Another is
the 'expressive' nature of voting and the expressive value
of environmental concerns. Both elements - elite interests
and popular (expressive) opinion - are quasi-constraints on
politically viable policy. However, the nature of expressive
concerns is such that significant reductions in real GDP are
probably not sustainable in the long term - which suggests
that much of the CO2 reduction action will be limited to
modest reductions of a largely token character. In that
sense, the grounds for hope are, although not non-existent,
decidedly thin. © 2009 The Author Journal compilation ©
2009 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society
Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8489.2009.00457.x},
Key = {fds296663}
}
@article{fds296664,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Hobbes’ Samuel},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {141},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {5-12},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9445-8},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9445-8},
Key = {fds296664}
}
@article{fds296665,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {Revenue Risk and Revenue Timing},
Journal = {Tax Research Forum},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1},
Pages = {89-109},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds296665}
}
@article{fds320699,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {European Journal of Law and Economics: Introduction},
Journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {233-235},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9071-9},
Doi = {10.1007/s10657-008-9071-9},
Key = {fds320699}
}
@article{fds320700,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Homo economicus and homo politicus: An introduction},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {137},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {429-438},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9352-4},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9352-4},
Key = {fds320700}
}
@article{fds296666,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Lessons for Ethics from Economics},
Journal = {Philosophical Issues},
Volume = {18},
Number = {B},
Pages = {249-271},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296666}
}
@article{fds296667,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Psychological Dimesnion of Homo Economicus},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {137},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {475-489},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9356-0},
Abstract = {In this paper, I have advanced what I regard as the "truly
rational" account of voting behaviour. This account depends
essentially on the application of relative price logic in
the comparative institutional context. For that logic to get
purchase, certain (I think, minimal) psychological
assumptions are required. These assumptions are: that people
have views about matters over which they exercise negligible
control; and that they have a desire to express those views.
Of course, they also have a desire for their own material
flourishing. This latter desire predictably plays a larger
role in market settings where the individual's choices are
consequential; the former play a larger role in the
electoral setting where the individual's choices are not
consequential. When I say "larger" here, I mean relative to
markets: and I mean LARGER by a factor of many thousands!
This means that homo economicus and homo politicus are
likely to be rather different animals- behaviourally
speaking. This difference is, I think, something that the
rational choice method properly applied would predict. To
deny it requires what seem to me to be very strong
psychological claims about expressive and instrumental
preferences - namely that they are very highly correlated.
No one, to my knowledge, has provided any direct evidence on
this matter. Certainly, the fact that we can find occasional
instances (areas of policy say) where they do appear to be
highly correlated does not, of course, establish the case
one way or the other! Equally, to assert a difference in
market and political behaviour does not commit one to a
"wholly different model of man". On the contrary, it is this
same model of man - the rational responder to incentive
changes - that drives the whole analysis. I am totally
committed to the logic of rationality. But I believe that
much of public choice has got the "behavioural implications"
of that logic just plain wrong! Voters and consumers are the
same, rational persons: but the considerations that drive
them in the marketplace where their choices are decisive are
not the same considerations that drive them in the
ballot-box. In that sense, rational choice logic predicts
that homo economicus and homo politicus will exhibit
different behaviours, in the sense that the kinds of
considerations that weigh with them are likely to be rather
different. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
2008.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9356-0},
Key = {fds296667}
}
@article{fds296670,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Crime and Punishment: An Expressive Voting
View},
Journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {235-252},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9068-4},
Abstract = {Incarceration rates in many countries (the US and Australia
among them) have risen spectacularly over the last twenty
years and are only partially explicable by increases in
crime rates. Moreover, in some countries where crime rates
have shown a comparable time-path, incarceration rates have
not shown the same spectacular increase. The aim of this
paper is to explore the politics of punishment. The claim is
that the US and Australian experiences are best understood
in terms of political considerations; and that this fact
lends some support to the "expressive" as distinct from the
"interest" approach to electoral behaviour. © 2008 Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10657-008-9068-4},
Key = {fds296670}
}
@article{fds296671,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Regulation and revenue},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {249-260},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9054-4},
Abstract = {The power to tax and the power to regulate are often
analyzed separately. We argue that, when in the hands of a
single authority, the power to tax may act as a check on the
power to regulate, thereby discouraging regulations that
adversely affect GDP, and promoting regulations that enhance
GDP. This effect will be stronger the higher are (marginal)
taxes. This argument is used both to suggest an explanation
for the observed positive correlation between high taxes and
economic freedom, and to warn against the granting of
regulatory but not fiscal powers at the European level. ©
2008 Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-008-9054-4},
Key = {fds296671}
}
@article{fds296672,
Author = {Brennan, G and Gonzalez, L and Levati, WGV},
Title = {Attitudes Toward Private and Collective Risk in Individual
and Strategic Choice Situations},
Journal = {Jebo},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {253-262},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.02.001},
Abstract = {Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be
commonly known and related to own payoffs only. However, the
alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risk
about others' payoffs as well. Motivated by the importance
of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this
paper explores idiosyncratic attitudes toward own and
others' risk. We elicit risk attitudes in an experiment
involving choices with and without strategic interaction.
Regardless of the choice situation, the results do not
support any relation between risk attitudes and
other-regarding concerns. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2007.02.001},
Key = {fds296672}
}
@article{fds296675,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Revisionist Public Choice Theory},
Journal = {New Political Economy},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-33},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563460701859744},
Doi = {10.1080/13563460701859744},
Key = {fds296675}
}
@article{fds296676,
Author = {Brennan, G and Guth, W and Kliemt, H},
Title = {Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling},
Journal = {Homo Economicus},
Volume = {25},
Number = {3/4},
Pages = {1-20},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296676}
}
@article{fds296677,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Market failure – compared to what?},
Journal = {Ethics and Economics},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds296677}
}
@article{fds296678,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Economy of Privacy},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {91},
Number = {1},
Pages = {23-51},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist200891111},
Doi = {10.5840/monist200891111},
Key = {fds296678}
}
@article{fds296673,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Discounting the Future Yet Again},
Journal = {Politics Philosophy and Economics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {259-284},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X07081298},
Abstract = {The question of ‘discounting the future’ is one on which
philosophers and economists have divergent professional
views. There is a lot of talking at cross-purposes across
the disciplinary divide here; but there is a fair bit of
confusion (I think) within disciplines as well. My aim here
is essentially clarificatory. I draw several distinctions
that I see as significant: • between inter-temporal and
intergenerational questions • between price (discount
rate) and quantity (inter-temporal and intergenerational
allocations) as the ethically relevant magnitude, and •
between price change and preference change as the primary
instrument of change. I show that discounting does not
violate the principle of inter-temporal and
intergenerational neutrality, but I also cast some doubt on
whether making adequate allowance for future generations has
really been the problem that economists and philosophers
seem to have taken it to be. © 2007, Sage Publications. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X07081298},
Key = {fds296673}
}
@article{fds296674,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Esteem-based Contributions and Optimality in Public Goods
Supply},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {130},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {457-470},
Publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9098-9},
Abstract = {In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues
that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the
forces of esteem, there is "too little" norm compliance. In
this paper, we show that Cowen's logic is flawed - that when
the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no
such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the
conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem
incentives for public goods contributions generate
optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that
basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and
supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9098-9},
Key = {fds296674}
}
@article{fds320703,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Conservatism, idealism and cardinality},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {66},
Number = {292},
Pages = {286-295},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00631.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00631.x},
Key = {fds320703}
}
@article{fds296680,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {’The Myth of Ownership’: Liam Murphy and Thomas
Nagel},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {239-251},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-2236-4},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-005-2236-4},
Key = {fds296680}
}
@article{fds296686,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Analytic Conservatism},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {675-691},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2004},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123404000249},
Abstract = {We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism
that attempts to uncover a foundation of what is often taken
to be an anti-foundationalist position. We identify a bias
in favour of the status quo as a key component of the
conservative disposition and address the question of the
justification of such a conservative disposition, and the
circumstances in which the widespread adoption of such a
disposition might be normatively desirable. Our analysis
builds on a structural link between the economist's
traditional emphasis on questions of feasibility and the
conservative's attachment to the status quo.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123404000249},
Key = {fds296686}
}
@article{fds296570,
Title = {Coercive Power and its Allocation in the Emergent
Europe},
Journal = {Rivista Di Politica Economica},
Series = {Special Issue},
Editor = {Brennan, G},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296570}
}
@article{fds296681,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, J},
Title = {Fiscal Equalisation: Some Questions of Design},
Journal = {Rivista Di Politica Economica},
Volume = {XCIV},
Pages = {79-104},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296681}
}
@article{fds296682,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The European Constitution and the Distribution of
Power},
Journal = {Rivista Di Politica Economica},
Volume = {XCIV},
Pages = {3-18},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296682}
}
@article{fds296683,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {What’s New in Globalisation?},
Journal = {Associations},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {47-59},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296683}
}
@article{fds296684,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {E-reputation and E-esteem},
Journal = {Analyse and Kritik},
Volume = {26},
Pages = {139-157},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds296684}
}
@article{fds296685,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {An Introduction to the Status Quo},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {2},
Pages = {127-132},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000029638.07102.78},
Abstract = {The following collection of articles focus on the role and
status of the idea of the status quo in constitutional
economics, and derive from a symposium held in May 2004 in
Blacksburg, Virginia. This brief note provides an
introduction both to the papers presented and to some of the
issues raised in considering the status quo.},
Doi = {10.1023/B:COPE.0000029638.07102.78},
Key = {fds296685}
}
@article{fds296688,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Life in the Putty-Knife Factory},
Journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-104},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00276.x},
Abstract = {The public choice approach can be used to analyze a wide
variety of social phenomena, of which academic activity is
one possible example. The object of this paper is to see if
the public choice approach can throw useful light on its own
rise as a potent body of ideas in contemporary social
sciences. The particular focus is a set of reminiscences
about the life of the Public Choice Center over the period
1969 to 1983 (and especially 1976 to 1983, when I was myself
part of the Center). Reflecting on that period, I attempt to
isolate those features of the Center's life that seem to me
to have been most important to its success; and then ask
broader questions about how much of that success public
choice methods might illuminate. The aspect of public choice
theory that I focus on in this connection is its account of
agent motivation. I assert that the desire for esteem played
a greater role in motivating the agents than the desire for
"interests," more narrowly construed. The paper concludes
with some general thoughts about esteem as a motivating
factor in academic circles and more generally.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00276.x},
Key = {fds296688}
}
@article{fds296689,
Author = {Brennan, G and Kliemt, H and Guth, W},
Title = {Trust in the Shadow of the Courts},
Journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics},
Volume = {159},
Number = {1},
Pages = {16-36},
Publisher = {Mohr Siebeck},
Year = {2003},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456032975140},
Abstract = {Even if contract enforcers are as opportunistic as ordinary
traders, a system of adjudication can increase the degree to
which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are
fulfilled. Only if arbitrators receive a fixed income,
occasional mistakes will not favour the untrustworthy. It
can be shown that the presence of the courts may further the
prospects of the trustworthy in a large class of situations.
But under non-optimal court policies and unfavorable
parameter constellations introducing courts may crowd out
trustworthiness.},
Doi = {10.1628/0932456032975140},
Key = {fds296689}
}
@article{fds296687,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Diversas Formas de Democracia},
Journal = {Quorum},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {39-49},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds296687}
}
@article{fds296690,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {Power Corrupts, But Can Office Ennoble?},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {55},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-178},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.t01-1-00181},
Abstract = {This paper investigates the effects of increased power
associated with higher office on the quality of agent
performance, within the context of a model in which agents
care about what others think of them. They care that is
about the esteem they enjoy. The object is to conduct a
simple comparative static exercise in the 'economy of
esteem', isolating the various dimensions of the relation
between office held and esteem-related incentives to perform
in a more estimable way.},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-6435.t01-1-00181},
Key = {fds296690}
}
@article{fds296691,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Expressive Constitutionalism},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {299-311},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1020857219135},
Abstract = {We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy
defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument
relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested
motivations in the in-period context to relatively
general-interest decision making in the constitutional
context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to
relate to essentially political settings where decision
making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest
an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that
points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions
that are insulated from popular voting. © 2002 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1020857219135},
Key = {fds296691}
}
@article{fds296692,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {The Dubious Ethics of Debt Default},
Journal = {Public Finance Review},
Volume = {30},
Number = {6},
Pages = {546-561},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114202238002},
Abstract = {This article is an engagement with a piece of Buchanan's on
the ethics of debt default, in which Buchanan proved to be
surprisingly sympathetic to debt default as an option. Debt
default is a current period transfer from bondholders to
taxpayers at large. Default cannot then serve to improve, in
aggregate, the lot of the generation whose bequest receipts
may have been diminished by the use of debt financing.
Current generations of taxpayers may have a legitimate
complaint against past generations of voters/taxpayers who
used debt financing (and reduced their net bequests
thereby), but that past generation is beyond the grave and
cannot provide recompense.},
Doi = {10.1177/109114202238002},
Key = {fds296692}
}
@article{fds296697,
Author = {Brennan, G and Goodin, R},
Title = {Bargaining over Beliefs},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {111},
Number = {2},
Pages = {256-277},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/233473},
Doi = {10.1086/233473},
Key = {fds296697}
}
@article{fds296693,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Five Rational Actor Accounts of the Welfare
State},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {54},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {213-233},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2001.00150.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.0023-5962.2001.00150.x},
Key = {fds296693}
}
@article{fds296694,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Collective Coherence?},
Journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {197-211},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00056-4},
Doi = {10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00056-4},
Key = {fds296694}
}
@article{fds296696,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Republican Liberty and Resilience},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {84},
Number = {1},
Pages = {47-62},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds296696}
}
@article{fds296569,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Paying for Politics},
Journal = {Nomos Xlii},
Pages = {55-74},
Editor = {Shapiro, I and Macedo, S},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296569}
}
@article{fds296695,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Peace in the Public Household},
Journal = {Quaderni Della Scuola Europea},
Number = {1},
Pages = {75-100},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296695}
}
@article{fds296698,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Onwards and Upwards: James Buchanan at Eighty},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {104},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-18},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296698}
}
@article{fds296699,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Constitutional Reticence and Expressive Voting},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296699}
}
@article{fds296700,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {Is There A Duty to Vote?},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {62-86},
Year = {2000},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002533},
Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500002533},
Key = {fds296700}
}
@article{fds296701,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {The Hidden Economy of Esteem},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-98},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100000146},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100000146},
Key = {fds296701}
}
@article{fds296702,
Author = {Brennan, G and Mitchell, N},
Title = {The Logic of Spatial Politics: The 1998 Queensland
Election},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {34},
Number = {3},
Pages = {379-390},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361149950290},
Abstract = {This paper combines one of the few facts we know about the
1998 Queensland state election, ie the break-up of seats
before and after the poll, with some straightforward
assumptions about political behaviour to develop a spatial
model of the election. In doing so, we reach interesting
conclusions about the nature of the political contest in
Queensland and highlight the existence of somewhat
surprising similarities and differences between the policies
of the main parties.},
Doi = {10.1080/10361149950290},
Key = {fds296702}
}
@article{fds320706,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Institutionalising accountability: A commentary},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Public Administration},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {94-97},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.00078},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8500.00078},
Key = {fds320706}
}
@article{fds296568,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Public Choice and Public Finance},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv, Bd 56},
Pages = {1-19},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296568}
}
@article{fds296704,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {On Political Representation},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {29},
Number = {1},
Pages = {109-127},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1999},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000058},
Abstract = {An essential feature of political representation is that a
mediating assembly is set between the citizenry and
political decision making. Representation involves indirect
decision making or agency. Rational actor political theory
often assumes representation in order to focus on problems
of a principal-agent kind, but offers only relatively weak
arguments for representation. We offer an alternative
argument for representation that builds on our broader
interpretation of rational actor political theory - an
interpretation that emphasizes expressive considerations
relative to instrumental considerations, and operates in a
richer motivational setting. As well as providing an account
of representation, we believe that our approach is capable
of re-connecting rational actor political theory to many of
the concerns of more traditional political
theory.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123499000058},
Key = {fds296704}
}
@article{fds296703,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The "Unrepresentative Swill" "Feel their
Oats},
Journal = {Policy},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {3-9},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds296703}
}
@article{fds296705,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibirum},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {95},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {149-175},
Year = {1998},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1004936203144},
Abstract = {There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the
public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental
account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference
over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a
market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the
vote as expressing support for one or other electoral
options, rather like cheering at a football match. This
paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the
expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as
well as for the nature of political equilibrium, and to
compare these implications with those derived from the
instrumental account. We also identify and discuss the
alternative views of the domain of electoral politics
associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of
voting, and sketch a route towards the integration of
expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of
rational electoral politics.},
Doi = {10.1023/a:1004936203144},
Key = {fds296705}
}
@article{fds296768,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {On Progression and Public Sector Size},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Pages = {123-130},
Year = {1997},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds296768}
}
@article{fds320707,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincush, JJ},
Title = {A minimalist model of federal grants and flypaper
effects},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {61},
Number = {2},
Pages = {229-246},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01543-4},
Abstract = {This paper shows that 'flypaper effects' can be observed for
unconditional federal grants, even in the absence of
agenda-setters, voting intransitivities, informational
asymmetries, etc. In a simple representation of a regime of
federal, general revenue grants, median citizen-voters are
decisive over the levels of grants, taxation and spending.
By assumption, federal grants received equal federal taxes
paid in each recipient locality. The size of the federal
grant varies endogenously with demand conditions and the
efficiency of tax technologies. The apparent flypaper
effects, positive or negative, vary with the source of the
change in grants.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(95)01543-4},
Key = {fds320707}
}
@article{fds340372,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Economical constitutions},
Journal = {Political Studies},
Volume = {44},
Number = {3},
Pages = {605-619},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00603.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00603.x},
Key = {fds340372}
}
@article{fds296559,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Market Capitalism and Moral Values by S. Bittman & A.
Hamlin},
Journal = {Economic Record},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296559}
}
@article{fds296706,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, J},
Title = {A Minimalist Theory of Inter-Governmental
Grants},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {229-46},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds296706}
}
@article{fds296707,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Ecnomical Constitutions},
Journal = {Political Studies},
Volume = {XLIV},
Number = {3},
Pages = {605-619},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1996},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00603.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00603.x},
Key = {fds296707}
}
@article{fds296711,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Economy of
Homo Economicus},
Journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {280-303},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1995},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.1995.tb00038.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.1995.tb00038.x},
Key = {fds296711}
}
@article{fds296558,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice by Hugh
Stretton & Lionel Orchard},
Journal = {Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration},
Pages = {125-6},
Year = {1995},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds296558}
}
@article{fds296557,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Government by the Market? by Peter Self},
Journal = {Anu Reporter},
Year = {1995},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds296557}
}
@article{fds296556,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory
trans. & ed. by Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt},
Journal = {History of Economics},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds296556}
}
@article{fds296708,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {One Cheer for Australia’s Parliaments!},
Journal = {Policy},
Pages = {17-22},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds296708}
}
@article{fds296712,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Economizing on Virtue},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-56},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1995},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01298375},
Abstract = {Our central aim is to explore the ideas involved in the
claim that certain institutional structures economize on
virtue and, in particular, to explore the widely held idea
that reliance on institutions that economize on virtue may
undermine virtue itself. We explore these ideas both by
discussing alternative conceptions of 'virtue' and
'economizing', and by constructing a simple model of the
relationship between a specific institutional structure that
may be said to economize on virtue and the emergence of
virtue. © 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01298375},
Key = {fds296712}
}
@article{fds320708,
Author = {Horwitz, S and Brennan, G and Yeager, LB},
Title = {Reviews},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {117-127},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1994},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393259},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02393259},
Key = {fds320708}
}
@article{fds296555,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Coase Theorem by Gary North},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {119-122},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296555}
}
@article{fds296709,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {Consecuencialismo restrictivo},
Journal = {Telos},
Volume = {III},
Number = {2},
Pages = {73-98},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds296709}
}
@article{fds296710,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Public Economics: Where Are We Now?},
Journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {183-188},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1994},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00872497},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00872497},
Key = {fds296710}
}
@article{fds296713,
Author = {Brennan, G and Kliemt, H},
Title = {Finite Lives and Social Institutions},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {47},
Number = {4},
Pages = {551-572},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1994},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02066.x},
Abstract = {‘The days of our years are threescore yeas and ten; and if
by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their
strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we
fly away.’ Copyright © 1994, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02066.x},
Key = {fds296713}
}
@article{fds296714,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {The Separation of Powers: a Revisionist View},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {345-368},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1994},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692894006003005},
Abstract = {The doctrine of the separation of powers attracts almost
universal support as a central element of the liberal
constitution designed to protect citizens against
governmental power. However, there is little agreement on,
or analysis of, the precise institutional requirements of
the doctrine or the method by which the claimed benefit is
achieved. We set out a simple model of the interaction
between citizen-voters, the legislature and the executive to
illustrate that the functional division of powers can
operate systematically against the interests of
citizen-voters. This case provides the basis both for a
taxonomy of distinct senses of the separation of powers, and
for the revisionist claim that there is a general liberal
presumption against the functional separation of powers. ©
1994, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692894006003005},
Key = {fds296714}
}
@article{fds296715,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {The Separation and Division of Powers},
Journal = {Public Choice Studies},
Volume = {22},
Pages = {16-22},
Year = {1993},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296715}
}
@article{fds296717,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pettit, P},
Title = {Hands invisible and intangible},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {94},
Number = {2},
Pages = {191-225},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1993},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064338},
Abstract = {The notion of a spontaneous social order, an order in human
affairs which operates without the intervention of any
directly ordering mind, has a natural fascination for social
and political theorists. This paper provides a taxonomy
under which there are two broadly contrasting sorts of
spontaneous social order. One is the familiar invisible
hand; the other is an arrangement that we describe as the
intangible hand. The paper is designed to serve two main
purposes. First, to provide a pure account of the invisible
hand, with some indication of the varieties of invisible
hand (and, indeed, backhand) available. Second, to develop
and motivate the unfamiliar conception of the intangible
backhand. We believe that a recognition of the availability
of this latter sort of spontaneous organising mechanism -
and the mechanism is implicitly recognised in many
traditions - is of great importance in political theory; it
is of particular importance nowadays when the usual focus is
entirely on the invisible hand. © 1993 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064338},
Key = {fds296717}
}
@article{fds296716,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Rationalising Parliamentary Systems},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {28},
Number = {3},
Pages = {443-457},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1993},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00323269308402253},
Abstract = {Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions
focuses on the issues that are most salient under US
constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer
different institutional arrangements and different
challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a
Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which
concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition
and disciplined political parties, while also offering a
discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice
approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of
representative, responsible government in which disciplined
political parties are often seen as a threat to
parliamentary democracy. © AusJPS 1993},
Doi = {10.1080/00323269308402253},
Key = {fds296716}
}
@article{fds296718,
Author = {Brennan, G and Hamlin, A},
Title = {Bi-Cameralism and Majoritarian Equilibrium},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-180},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1992},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00140765},
Abstract = {Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support
a non-empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional
policy spaces. We generalise this result to the
n-dimensional case, and provide a discussion of
multi-cameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of
potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising
opposition between mutually oriented median voters, this
provides a clear link with the standard median voter model
and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism. © 1992
Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00140765},
Key = {fds296718}
}
@article{fds296719,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Implications of Variations in Research Output for
Management Decisions},
Journal = {Assa Annual Report},
Pages = {23-30},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds296719}
}
@article{fds296721,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Civil Disaster Management: an Economist’s
View},
Journal = {Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration},
Volume = {64},
Pages = {30-33},
Year = {1991},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds296721}
}
@article{fds296722,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Freedom, Government and Economics},
Journal = {Transformation},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {15-19},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1991},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026537889200900101},
Abstract = {This paper sets out the way in which economists think about
the role of government in the affairs of persons, and to
indicate how Christian affections might bear on such
questions. As economics sees it, the central issue at stake
here revolves around the working properties of two
alternative mechanisms for reaching social decisions-the
decentralized mechanism characteristic of markets on the one
hand; and the centralized or “collective” mechanisms
characteristic of politics, on the other. This issue is
itself an analytic one, on which the Christian qua Christian
would seem to have little to contribute. However, it may be
that the terms in which economists think about the role of
government are defective, or too narrow-or that the criteria
of evaluation that economists have in mind are at odds with
important themes in Christian Thinking. I have tried to
suggest in what ways this might be so, and thereby the areas
where dialogue between Christian and economist might most
effectively be joined. © 1992, SAGE Publications. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/026537889200900101},
Key = {fds296722}
}
@article{fds296725,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Political Economy of Communist Reform},
Journal = {Public Choice Studies},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {18-29},
Year = {1991},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296725}
}
@article{fds296720,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Taking Political Economy Seriously},
Journal = {Methodus},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-15},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296720}
}
@article{fds296723,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {Modeling and Motivating Academic Performance},
Journal = {The Australian Universities’ Review},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {4-10},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296723}
}
@article{fds296724,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Catholic Bishops on Common Wealth and Common
Good},
Journal = {St. Mark’S Review},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {8-11},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds296724}
}
@article{fds296726,
Author = {Pardo, GBIJC},
Title = {A Reading of the Spanish Constitution},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {53-79},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1991},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393226},
Abstract = {The object of this paper is to examine the Spanish
Constitution (1978) using the perspective of modern
consitutional political economy. This exercise is an
interesting one for two reasons: first it provides a kind of
test for the usefulness of the c.p.e. approach and the
insights the application of that approach yields; second, it
provides an opportunity for a wider readership of a document
that is of considerable interest in its own right. © 1991
George Mason University.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02393226},
Key = {fds296726}
}
@article{fds296729,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {Unveiling the Vote},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {311-333},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712340000586X},
Abstract = {The case for secrecy in voting depends on the assumption
that voters reliably vote for the political outcomes they
want to prevail. No such assumption is valid. Accordingly,
voting procedures should be designed to provide maximal
incentive for voters to vote responsibly. Secret voting
fails this test because citizens are protected from public
scrutiny. Under open voting, citizens are publicly
answerable for their electoral choices and will be
encouraged thereby to vote in a discursively defensible
manner. The possibility of bribery, intimidation or
blackmail moderates this argument but such dangers will be
avoidable in many contemporary societies without recourse to
secrecy. © 1990, Cambridge University Press. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1017/S000712340000586X},
Key = {fds296729}
}
@article{fds296554,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Moral Dimension by Amitai Etzioni},
Journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {275-278},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296554}
}
@article{fds296727,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {James Buchanan’s Public Economics},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {113-133},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1990},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393045},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02393045},
Key = {fds296727}
}
@article{fds296728,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, JJ},
Title = {An Implicit Contracts Theory of Inter-governmental
Grants},
Journal = {Publius: the Journal of Federalism},
Volume = {20},
Number = {4},
Pages = {129-144},
Year = {1990},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330296},
Abstract = {A central puzzle in the economic analysis of
intergovernmental grants in a federal polity is the conflict
between the predictions of the standard theory and empirical
observation. Standard theory has no explanation for the
widely observed fact that "money sticks where it hits," that
is, for the "flypaper effect" from specific, non-matching
grants. This effect is observed when grants that apparently
are the economic equivalents of general revenue grants have
the consequences to be expected from matching specific
grants. We propose a resolution. Most grants are accompanied
by an implicit as well as an explicit contract between
grantor and recipient. The purpose of these contracts is to
influence the behavior of the recipient, by making the size
of the stream of grants conditional upon the recipient's
responses to the wishes of the donor. Copyright © 1990, CSF
Associates.},
Doi = {10.2307/3330296},
Key = {fds296728}
}
@article{fds296730,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Structure of Tertiary Education Fees},
Journal = {Economic Analysis & Policy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {149-170},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1988},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(88)50021-8},
Doi = {10.1016/S0313-5926(88)50021-8},
Key = {fds296730}
}
@article{fds296731,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Is Public Choice Immoral?},
Journal = {Virginia Law Review},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {179-189},
Year = {1988},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296731}
}
@article{fds296732,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Public Choice Approach to Tax Reform},
Journal = {Government and Policy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-52},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds296732}
}
@article{fds296553,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tyranny of the Status Quo by Milton and Rose
Friedman},
Journal = {Economic Analysis and Policy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {239-241},
Year = {1987},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds296553}
}
@article{fds296735,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, J},
Title = {Rational Actor Theory in Politics: A Critical Review of John
Quiggin},
Journal = {Economic Record},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-32},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1987},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1987.tb00634.x},
Abstract = {John Quiggin's paper attacks public‐choice theory. among
other things, for its us? of the assumption of ‘rational
egoism’. The object of our response is twofold. First. to
distinguish egoism from rationality, and to indicate that
rationality postulates, when faithfully applied, provide
reasons for believing that political behaviour and market
behaviour will be systematically different, and specifically
that the former will be less egoistic than the latter.
Second, to indicate that comparative static propasitions in
public‐choice theory (and in economics more generally) can
be sustained on rather weaker behavioural assumptions than
homo economicus embodies, and that consequently some of the
public‐choice orthodoxy would survive any attack on the
egoism assumption. Copyright © 1987, Wiley Blackwell. All
rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4932.1987.tb00634.x},
Key = {fds296735}
}
@article{fds320709,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Methodological individualism under fire. A reply to
Jackson},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
Volume = {8},
Number = {4},
Pages = {627-635},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(87)90039-4},
Doi = {10.1016/0167-2681(87)90039-4},
Key = {fds320709}
}
@article{fds296567,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Buchanan Contribution},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv, Band 45 Heft 1},
Pages = {1-24},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds296567}
}
@article{fds296733,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {The Logic of Electoral Preference},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-138},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002789},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100002789},
Key = {fds296733}
}
@article{fds296734,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Methodological Individualism Under Fire},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation},
Volume = {8},
Pages = {627-635},
Year = {1987},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds296734}
}
@article{fds296736,
Author = {Brennan, G and Petit, P},
Title = {Restrictive Consequentialism},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4},
Pages = {438-455},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1986},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342631},
Doi = {10.1080/00048408612342631},
Key = {fds296736}
}
@article{fds296552,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Vol. 1 of Kenneth Arrow’s Collected Papers},
Journal = {Economic Record},
Volume = {61},
Number = {175},
Pages = {753-754},
Year = {1985},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296552}
}
@article{fds296739,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Towards a
Smithian Theory of Electoral Politics},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {I},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-229},
Year = {1985},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds296739}
}
@article{fds296737,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Private Markets in Excludable Public Goods: A
Re-examination},
Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
Volume = {C},
Number = {3},
Pages = {811-819},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884381},
Doi = {10.2307/1884381},
Key = {fds296737}
}
@article{fds320710,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Taxation and Policy Change: A Median Voter Model for
Australia 1968–69 to 1981–82},
Journal = {The Australian Economic Review},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {20-33},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.1985.tb00285.x},
Abstract = {This article constructs a median voter model of public
expenditure levels, which includes as a central piece of the
analysis the costs of expenditure increments to voters in
various income groups. These marginal cost‐shares or
‘tax‐prices’ are derived from tax data for three
separate periods over the larger period under discussion.
The levels of spending predicted by the model are compared
with the levels of spending that actually prevailed, as a
means of checking the median voter model ‐ and in that
sense, to investigate the plausibility of one line of
reasoning that might be used to explain ‘continuity and
change’ from 1968–69 to 1981–82. 1985 The University
of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and
Social Research},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8462.1985.tb00285.x},
Key = {fds320710}
}
@article{fds320711,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {189-211},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002467},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100002467},
Key = {fds320711}
}
@article{fds296738,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Taxation and Policy Change: A Median Voter Model for
Australia},
Journal = {Australian Economic Review},
Volume = {71},
Pages = {20-33},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296738}
}
@article{fds296740,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Economics at the Margin: Natural and Institutional
Constraints on the Pursuit of Knowledge},
Journal = {Search},
Volume = {16},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {17-22},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds296740}
}
@article{fds296745,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tax Reform and Tax Limits: Political Process in Public
Finance},
Journal = {Australian Tax Forum},
Volume = {I},
Number = {1},
Pages = {83-95},
Year = {1984},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296745}
}
@article{fds296746,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {Inefficient Unanimity},
Journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {151-163},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1984},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00195.x},
Abstract = {ABSTRACT The notion of consensus plays an important
epistemological role in modern welfare economics, in that
unanimous consent is a (unique) conceptual test for those
changes that are ‘Pareto‐desirable’ (that is, make
someone better off and no‐one else worse). In this paper,
we seek to show that unanimous consent does not logically
imply Pareto‐desirability—that a rational individual may
fail to veto policy changes that make him/her worse off. The
central element in the proof of this proposition is the
observation that in social agreements involving a
significant number of participants, any one individual's
veto is decisive if it is the only veto. If the individual
does not expect to be decisive, he will rationally exercise
his vote ‘expressively’, and without sole regard to its
consequences. When all individuals so act, a sort of
prisoners' dilemma interaction may emerge, even under
explicit consensus. Copyright © 1984, Wiley Blackwell. All
rights reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00195.x},
Key = {fds296746}
}
@article{fds320712,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, J},
Title = {Evaluating political alternatives.},
Journal = {American Behavioral Scientist},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {185-202},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000276484028002003},
Abstract = {Public choice theory, in assuming that voters behave
rationally and in a manner analogous to that in which market
agents can be presumed to operate, is at risk entirely on
logical grounds. And, although pure logic may not be
sufficient to enable us to reject public choice
propositions, a great deal more in the way of empirical
evidence would have to be amassed before rational voting (in
the public choice sense) could be presumed. What logic and a
priori theorizing can do is alert us to those considerations
that seem likely to weigh most heavily in voting
behaviour.-from Authors},
Doi = {10.1177/000276484028002003},
Key = {fds320712}
}
@article{fds296741,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {La Hacienda Publica a fin de siglo},
Journal = {Hacienda Espagnola},
Volume = {91},
Pages = {356-360},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296741}
}
@article{fds296742,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Elements of a Fiscal Politics: Public Choice and Public
Finance},
Journal = {Australian Economic Review},
Volume = {67},
Number = {3},
Pages = {62-72},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1984},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.1984.tb00455.x},
Abstract = {The object of this paper is to indicate how public choice
theory and orthodox normative tax theory may be integrated
within a single coherent intellectual framework. Because
public choice theory has quite different conceptual
foundations from normative tax theory, this is no simple
task. A purely positive fiscal theory, that derives tax
arrangements as one aspect of the emergent political
equilibrium, would leave no logical room for normative tax
theory at all: the question as to what the tax system
‘ought to be’ becomes irrelevant, or at least
inseparable from the broader question as to the
appropriateness of general political institutions. However,
if tax arrangements are viewed as part of the political
institutional framework, normative tax theory can be
admitted ‐ but in a somewhat reformulated way. The paper
aims to set out briefly the reformulations required.
Copyright © 1984, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8462.1984.tb00455.x},
Key = {fds296742}
}
@article{fds296743,
Author = {Brennan, G and Bohanon, C and Carter, R},
Title = {Public Finance and Public Prices: Towards a Reconstruction
of Tax Theory},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {XXXIX},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-181},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296743}
}
@article{fds296744,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Voter Choice and the Evaluation of Political Alternatives: A
Critique of Public Choice},
Journal = {American Behavioral Scientist},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {185-201},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds296744}
}
@article{fds296749,
Author = {Brennan, G and Pincus, J},
Title = {Government Growth and Resource Allocation: The Nebulous
Connection},
Journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {351-365},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1983},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041601},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041601},
Key = {fds296749}
}
@article{fds296750,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lee, D and Walsh, C},
Title = {Uniform All-or-None Pricing of Public Goods},
Journal = {Public Finance Quarterly},
Pages = {465-490},
Year = {1983},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds296750}
}
@article{fds296751,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Predictive Power and the Choice Among Regimes},
Journal = {Economic Journal},
Volume = {93},
Pages = {89-105},
Year = {1983},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296751}
}
@article{fds320713,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lee, D and Walsh, C},
Title = {Monopoly markets in public goods: The case of the uniform
all-or-none price},
Journal = {Public Finance Review},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {465-490},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114218301100404},
Abstract = {This article explores the provision of a price-excludable
public good under conditions of monopoly, in which the
monopolist sets a uniform all-or-none price-output package
to all consumers. The reasons for interest in this
particular monopoly model are twofold First, many public
goods are amenable to exclusion on an all-or-none basis.
Second, the model does not presume the monopolist to have
any information beyond that normally assumed for sellers in
private goods markets. The profit-maximizing outcome under
these conditions is developed and several striking
comparative static results derived. The monopoly outcome is
compared with the outcome under the most closely analogous
perfectly competitive model (Oakland, 1974). It is shown
that, under certain conditions, the monopoly result is
superior to the competitive outcome in a welfare sense and
indeed that optimality can emerge under monopoly in
conditions where it would not under competition. The
possibility that the monopolist might oversupply the public
good is also explored. © 1983, Sage Publications. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/109114218301100404},
Key = {fds320713}
}
@article{fds296747,
Author = {Brennan, G and Lomasky, L},
Title = {Institutional Aspects of Merit Goods Analysis},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv},
Volume = {4},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296747}
}
@article{fds296748,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {On Monopoly Price},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {36},
Number = {4},
Pages = {538-551},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296748}
}
@article{fds296753,
Author = {Brennan, G and Nellor, D},
Title = {Wealth, Consumption and Taxation},
Journal = {National Tax Journal},
Volume = {XXV4},
Number = {427-436},
Year = {1982},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296753}
}
@article{fds296752,
Author = {Brennan, G and Tullock, G},
Title = {An Economic Theory of Military Tactics: Methodological
Individualism at War},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
Volume = {3},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {225-242},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1982},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(82)90019-1},
Abstract = {'Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army ... without
exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his
state of mind, his morals, at the instant of combat'. ©
1982.},
Doi = {10.1016/0167-2681(82)90019-1},
Key = {fds296752}
}
@article{fds296551,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Ulysses and the Sirens by J. Elster},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {XIX1},
Number = {99-100},
Year = {1981},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296551}
}
@article{fds296756,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Revenue Implications of Money Creation Under
Leviathan},
Journal = {American Economic Review, Proceedings},
Volume = {71},
Pages = {347-351},
Year = {1981},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296756}
}
@article{fds296757,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {A Monopoly Model of Public Goods Provision: The Uniform
Pricing Case},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {71},
Pages = {196-206},
Year = {1981},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296757}
}
@article{fds296550,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Wither the State? by I. Sharkansky},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {47},
Number = {3},
Pages = {820-821},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds296550}
}
@article{fds296755,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, J},
Title = {The normative purpose of economic 'science': Rediscovery of
an eighteenth century method},
Journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155-166},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(81)90013-2},
Doi = {10.1016/0144-8188(81)90013-2},
Key = {fds296755}
}
@article{fds296549,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Readings and Course Lists in Economics by Ed
Tower},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {36},
Number = {2},
Pages = {365-367},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296549}
}
@article{fds296566,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Die verteilende Staat: Ansatze zu einer Theorie der
Umberteilung},
Journal = {Zeitschrift Fur Wirtachaftspolitik, 30 Heft
2},
Pages = {103-128},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296566}
}
@article{fds296754,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Attribution of Public Goods Benefits},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {XXXVI},
Number = {3},
Pages = {347-373},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296754}
}
@article{fds296548,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Ideal Worlds of Economics by B. Ward},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {XVIII},
Pages = {1049-1150},
Year = {1980},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds296548}
}
@article{fds296758,
Author = {Brennan, G and Brooks, M},
Title = {On Information and Satisfaction},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1157-1162},
Year = {1980},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296758}
}
@article{fds296760,
Author = {Brennan, G and Flowers, M},
Title = {All ’Ng’ Up on Clubs: Some Notes on the Current Status
of Clug Theory},
Journal = {Public Finance Quarterly},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {153-169},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1980},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114218000800202},
Abstract = {This article aims to analyze two aspects of the theory of
clubs which are currently matters of some controversy: The
question of optimal club size and the distinction between
clubs and firms. Both aspects become of interest when the
optimal number of clubs is small relative to population. In
the case where population is relatively large, the original
Buchanan determination of “optimal” club size is
essentially correct, but there is no substantive difference
between clubs and firms. In the case where optimal club size
is relatively large, the Ng criticism of Buchanan's analysis
is somewhat more appropriate— though, as we show, only
strictly valid in one rather special case. In this
quasi-monopoly setting, the distinction between clubs and
firms becomes substantive, and is explored in this article
under plausible assumptions. © 1980, Sage Publications. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/109114218000800202},
Key = {fds296760}
}
@article{fds296759,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv, Heft},
Volume = {38},
Number = {1},
Pages = {4-16},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds296759}
}
@article{fds296547,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Economic Constitution of Federal States by A. Breton and
A. Scott},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {XVII},
Pages = {1051-1052},
Year = {1979},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds296547}
}
@article{fds296763,
Author = {Brennan, G and Miller, R},
Title = {Optimal Voting Turnouts},
Journal = {Atlantic Economic Journal},
Volume = {VII},
Number = {3},
Pages = {62-68},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1979},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02300343},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02300343},
Key = {fds296763}
}
@article{fds296762,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {The logic of Tax Limits},
Journal = {National Tax Journal},
Volume = {XXXII},
Number = {2},
Pages = {11-22},
Year = {1979},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds296762}
}
@article{fds296761,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Market Provision of Public Goods: A Monopoly Version of the
Oakland Model},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv, Heft},
Volume = {37},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-395},
Year = {1979},
Key = {fds296761}
}
@article{fds296764,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Death and Taxes: An Attack on the Orthodoxy},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {201-224},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds296764}
}
@article{fds296765,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public
Revenues},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Pages = {301-318},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1978},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(78)90013-0},
Abstract = {This paper examines the possible selection of tax
instruments as means of inducing a Leviathan-like government
to provide the public goods and services that
taxpayer-beneficiaries desire. The analysis is conducted in
a constitutional setting, in which potential
taxpayers-beneficiaries confront choices among tax
instruments, when these are taken to be the primary
constraints on the behavior of government in
postconstitutional periods. The analysis suggests a
particular form of earmarking; each expenditure is allotted
a particular tax base that is highly complementary with the
public good itself. The complementarity between tax base and
the corresponding public good is the central relationship
that exerts discipline on government. Arguments for this
type of earmarking have not, to our knowledge, been
previously developed in tax theory. © 1978.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(78)90013-0},
Key = {fds296765}
}
@article{fds296767,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Twoards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {255-275},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1977},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(77)90001-9},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(77)90001-9},
Key = {fds296767}
}
@article{fds296769,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Pareto-Desirable Redistribution-in-Kind: An Impossiblity
Theorem},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Pages = {987-990},
Year = {1977},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296769}
}
@article{fds320714,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {A note on progression and public sector size},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {32},
Number = {1},
Pages = {123-129},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1977},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01718674},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01718674},
Key = {fds320714}
}
@article{fds341287,
Author = {Brennan, G and Buchanan, JM},
Title = {Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {8},
Number = {3},
Pages = {255-273},
Year = {1977},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(77)90001-9},
Abstract = {This paper attempts to derive normative tax rules based on
the constitutional calculus of the typical voter-taxpayer
when he predicts that post-constitutional political
processes will be dominated by a budget-maximizing
Leviathan-like bureaucracy. In this setting, selection of
tax institutions becomes part of the apparatus by which
Leviathan is constrained. Such an approach generates tax
rules strikingly at variance with more conventional norms.
In particular, the goal of a 'comprehensive' tax base, which
informs standard analysis, gives way to a preference for
specific limitations on the width of the tax base: moves
towards a greater comprehensiveness will lead inexorably to
larger public spending, and beyond some point are clearly
undesirable. The analysis also implies a rather
unconventional defense of progression in the tax structure.
An attempt is made to relate the discussion to contemporary
tax reform issues. © 1977.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(77)90001-9},
Key = {fds341287}
}
@article{fds296766,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Tax Concessions for Charitable Contributions},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {402-411},
Year = {1977},
Key = {fds296766}
}
@article{fds296770,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Inflation, Taxation, and Indexation},
Journal = {Policy Studies Journal},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {326-332},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1977},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1977.tb01105.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1541-0072.1977.tb01105.x},
Key = {fds296770}
}
@article{fds296771,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Distributional Implications of Public
Goods},
Journal = {Econometrica},
Pages = {391-400},
Year = {1976},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296771}
}
@article{fds296679,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {A Policy-Maker’s Guide to Incidence},
Journal = {Taxation Review Committee Commissioned Studies (Appendix to
Final Report)},
Pages = {19-46},
Year = {1975},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds296679}
}
@article{fds296772,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Pareto Desirable Redistribution: A Perspective},
Journal = {Finanzarchiv},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {234-271},
Year = {1975},
Key = {fds296772}
}
@article{fds296773,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Public Goods and Factor Prices’},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {1-19},
Year = {1975},
Key = {fds296773}
}
@article{fds296774,
Author = {Brennan, G and McGuire, T},
Title = {Optimal Policy Choice Under Uncertainty},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {205-209},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1975},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90018-3},
Abstract = {Neutrality is shown to be the appropriate goal of policy in
the class of realistic policy situation in which allocative
decisions are taken with virtually no knowledge of the
direction or magnitude of pre-existing resource
misallocation. This follows as the principal corollary of
the central theorem of the paper which states that with
linear demand and constant marginal cost schedules, the
appropriate excise tax under uncertainty is equal to the
expected value of the market distortion. This theorem is
proved and its major implications for corrective fiscal
policy are discussed. © 1975.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(75)90018-3},
Key = {fds296774}
}
@article{fds320715,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C and Chisholm, T},
Title = {Pollution and Resource Allocation},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-21},
Year = {1974},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.1974.tb00124.x},
Abstract = {Western society's economic perspective of the pollution
problem characterizes that problem as involving a conflict
between the consumption of two broad classes of goods;
physical (or produced) commodities, and the direct
consumption of 'clean environment'. This article presents a
broad conceptual framework within which the pollution
problem may be analyzed and appropriate means of reducing
the impact of pollution on society's well being discussed.
After considering the relative merits of market and
political decision making processes used to achieve
appropriate social choices between the consumption of
physical goods and 'clean environment', the authors focus on
the alternative policy options for pollution control. It is
concluded that, in general, fiscal instruments (taxes and
subsidies) are a more efficient means of controlling
pollution than the widespread use of regulations or other
legal instruments. A general policy of reducing pollution
levels might be successfully achieved by general and
reasonably uniform taxes on all pollution
sources.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8489.1974.tb00124.x},
Key = {fds320715}
}
@article{fds320716,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Hochman and rodgers on brennan and walsh:
Reply},
Journal = {Public Finance Review},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {383-392},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1974},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114217400200307},
Abstract = {Harold Hochman and James Rodgers' response to our
reconsideration of their discussion of Paretian
redistribution indicates that their model and ours are quite
distinct. However, the differences emerge from a number of
assumptions that had not been explicitly raised in their
earlier discussions of the model; and while these
assumptions are not implausible, it is not clear that
systematic analysis of them would yield the sort of
redistributive patterns that their formal models have
produced. Moreover, their response totally misinterprets our
comments on the transfer-elasticity concept (which we argue
obscures aspects of the transfer process which have an
important bearing on the final redistributive pattern), and
on the normative significance of the notion of Pareto
desirable redistribution (which we believe to be less than
H&R. have suggested). © 1974, SAGE Publications. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/109114217400200307},
Key = {fds320716}
}
@article{fds296778,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Pareto Optimal Redistribution: The Case of Malice and
Envy},
Journal = {Journal of Public Culture},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {173-183},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1973},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(73)90004-2},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(73)90004-2},
Key = {fds296778}
}
@article{fds296777,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Pareto Optimal Redistribution Reconsidered},
Journal = {Public Finance Quarterly},
Pages = {147-168},
Year = {1973},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds296777}
}
@article{fds296779,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Second Best Aspects of Horizontal Equity
Questions},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {282-291},
Year = {1972},
Key = {fds296779}
}
@article{fds296780,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Horizontal Equity: An Extension of an Extension},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Pages = {437-456},
Year = {1971},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds296780}
}
@article{fds296565,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Fee Abolition: An Appraisal},
Journal = {Australian University},
Series = {Special Edition},
Pages = {81-149},
Year = {1971},
Key = {fds296565}
}
@article{fds296781,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Game-Theoretic Aspects of Lindahl’s Budget
Theory},
Journal = {Rivista Di Diritto Finanziario E Scienze Delle
Finanze},
Pages = {153-181},
Year = {1970},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds296781}
}
@article{fds296782,
Author = {Brennan, G and Auld, DAL},
Title = {The Tax Cut as an Anti-Inflationary Weapon},
Journal = {Economic Record},
Volume = {44},
Number = {4},
Pages = {520-525},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1968},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1968.tb00140.x},
Abstract = {‘…the Government is convinced that the right course at
this juncture, and the best contribution it can make to the
solution of the current problems of our economy, is a bold
policy of reducing taxes—particularly those taxes which
are levied directly upon individuals and upon business. We
believe that this is the best form of assistance we can give
in the attack on costs. Essentially, the cost problem is one
to be solved by greater efforts and greater efficiency on
the part of both labour and management. By reducing taxes
and so making wages and profits more worth earning, the
Government can provide an inducement to greater effort and
greater efficiency…’ ‘…the Government proposes to
reduce taxes up to the limit of budget capacity after making
provision for essential expenditures… and it has devised
the tax reductions in a way that will ensure the maximum
incentive to effort while making whenever possible a direct
reduction in costs. At the same time it has taken care to
ensure that the Budget for the year will balance; for there
could be no thought at a time like this of adding to the
volume of spending power by the process of
deficit‐financing… As in last year's Budget, the
greatest weight should be given to reductions of Income Tax
on individuals. By so doing the benefits will spread most
widely and the greatest number of people will receive a
further incentive to work and to save. The Government has,
however, explored the possibilities of reducing indirect
taxation, and it is proposing some very useful reductions in
that field. Some of these reductions will make an important
direct contribution to the problem of reducing costs’
Copyright © 1968, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4932.1968.tb00140.x},
Key = {fds296782}
}
@article{fds296776,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Pareto Optimal Redistribution: The Non-Altruistic
Dimension},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {14},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-61},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1922},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01718441},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01718441},
Key = {fds296776}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds296563,
Author = {Brennan, G and Moseley, D},
Title = {economics and ethics},
Series = {Hugh La Follette},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds296563}
}
@misc{fds309852,
Author = {Brennan, G and Baurmann, M and Goodin, R and Southwood,
N},
Title = {Norms and Values: The Role of Social Norms as Instruments of
Value realization},
Publisher = {Nomos Verlag},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds309852}
}
@misc{fds309853,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {The Ethics of Economics and the Economics of
Ethics},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds309853}
}
@misc{fds309854,
Author = {Brennan, G and Eusepi, G},
Title = {Coralling the Economy of Crime and Money
Laundering},
Journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds309854}
}
@misc{fds309855,
Author = {Brennan, G and Waterman, AMC},
Title = {are economists Immoral},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Inc.},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds309855}
}
@misc{fds309856,
Author = {Gillespie, GBM},
Title = {Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds309856}
}
@misc{fds309857,
Author = {Brennan, G and R Goodin and FJ and Smith, M},
Title = {common minds},
Publisher = {OUP},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds309857}
}
@misc{fds296546,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Esteem Engine: A Resource for Institutional
Design},
Volume = {1},
Series = {Cunningham Lecture 2004 Academy of Social Sciences in
Australia Occasional Paper},
Pages = {14-14},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds296546}
}
@misc{fds296545,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Comments on Jeremy Webber’s Paper},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds296545}
}
@misc{fds296544,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Proportional Representation in the Senate after 50 Years’
Conference with this title},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds296544}
}
@misc{fds296542,
Author = {Brennan, G and Kliemt, H},
Title = {Logo logic},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {125-127},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1990},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393036},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02393036},
Key = {fds296542}
}
@misc{fds296543,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Tale of the Slace-Owner},
Series = {Virginia Political Economy Lecture, No. 6},
Publisher = {Public Choice Center, GMU},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds296543}
}
@misc{fds296541,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Case Against Tax Reform},
Series = {Critical Issues Paper No. 7, 31},
Pages = {31-31},
Publisher = {Perth: A.I.P.P.},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds296541}
}
@misc{fds296540,
Author = {BRENNAN, G and BUCHANAN, J and LEE, DR},
Title = {On Monopoly Price: Reply},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {274-275},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1985.tb02228.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.1985.tb02228.x},
Key = {fds296540}
}
@misc{fds296539,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {The Christian and the State: Towards a Libertarian
View},
Series = {Occasional Paper No. 7},
Pages = {35-35},
Publisher = {Sydney: Center for Independent Studies},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds296539}
}
@misc{fds296538,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Appendix to Gordon Tullock’s ’Why So Much
Stability?’},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {203-205},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds296538}
}
@misc{fds296537,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {Pareto-Desirable Redistribution-In-Kind: A
Reply},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {70},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1032-1036},
Year = {1980},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds296537}
}
@misc{fds296536,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {A Reply to Aaron and McGuire},
Journal = {Econometrica},
Pages = {405-408},
Year = {1976},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds296536}
}
@misc{fds296535,
Author = {Chisholm, AH and Walsh, C and Brennan, G},
Title = {POLLUTION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: REPLY},
Journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {122-124},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.1975.tb00152.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8489.1975.tb00152.x},
Key = {fds296535}
}
@misc{fds296534,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Second-Best Aspects of Horizontal Equity Questions: A
Reply},
Journal = {Public Finance/Finances Publiques},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {473-475},
Year = {1975},
Key = {fds296534}
}
@misc{fds296533,
Author = {Brennan, G and Walsh, C},
Title = {A Reply to Hochman and Rodgers on Mutt and
Jeff},
Journal = {Public Finance Quarterly},
Pages = {383-392},
Year = {1974},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds296533}
}
@misc{fds296532,
Author = {Brennan, G},
Title = {Over-Supply of Public Goods: A Comment},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Pages = {237-240},
Year = {1969},
Key = {fds296532}
}
| |
Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Political Science * Faculty * Staff * Grad * Master * Foreign Exchange * Reload * Login | ||
