Publications of Bahar Leventoglu    :chronological  combined listing:

%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds371080,
   Author = {Leventoğlu, B},
   Title = {Bargaining power in crisis bargaining},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {825-847},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00325-3},
   Abstract = {A large body of game-theoretic work examines the process by
             which uncertainty can lead to inefficient war. In a typical
             crisis bargaining model, players negotiate according to a
             pre-specified game form and no player has the ability to
             change the rules of the game. However, when one of the
             parties has full bargaining power and is able to set the
             rules of the game on her own, the game itself becomes an
             endogenous decision variable. I formulate this problem in a
             principal-agent framework. I show that both the likelihood
             of costly war and the exact mechanism that yields it depend
             on the nature of the informational problem and the identity
             of the informed player.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10058-022-00325-3},
   Key = {fds371080}
}

@article{fds333808,
   Author = {Leventoğlu, B},
   Title = {Bargaining with habit formation},
   Journal = {Economic Theory},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {477-508},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z},
   Abstract = {Habit formation is a well-documented behavioral regularity
             in psychology and economics; however, its implications on
             bargaining outcomes have so far been overlooked. I study an
             otherwise standard Rubinstein bargaining model with
             habit-forming players. In equilibrium, a player can
             strategically exploit his opponent’s habit- forming
             behavior via unilateral transfers off the equilibrium path
             to generate endogenous costs and gain bargaining leverage at
             no cost to himself on the equilibrium path. Uncertainty
             about habit formation may lead to delay in
             agreement.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z},
   Key = {fds333808}
}

@article{fds336486,
   Author = {Leventoğlu, B and Metternich, NW},
   Title = {Born Weak, Growing Strong: Anti-Government Protests as a
             Signal of Rebel Strength in the Context of Civil
             Wars},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {62},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {581-596},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12356},
   Abstract = {All rebel organizations start weak, but how do they grow and
             achieve favorable conflict outcomes? We present a
             theoretical model that allows for rebel organizations to
             gain support beyond their “core” and build their
             bargaining power during fighting. We highlight that rebel
             organizations need to win over crucial parts of society to
             generate the necessary support that allows them to attain
             favorable civil conflict outcomes. We find empirical support
             for the argument that low-income individuals who initially
             fight the government (rebel organizations) have to convince
             middle-class individuals to turn out against the government
             to gain government concessions. Empirically, we demonstrate
             that government concessions in the form of peace agreements
             and the onset of negotiations become more likely when
             protest occurs in the context of civil conflicts.},
   Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12356},
   Key = {fds336486}
}

@article{fds287743,
   Author = {Leventoğlu, B and Tarar, A},
   Title = {Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis
             Bargaining?*},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {533-553},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0020-8833},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000258289600005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00514.x},
   Key = {fds287743}
}

@article{fds287741,
   Author = {B. Leventoglu and Tarar, A and Leventoglu, B},
   Title = {Limited Audience Costs in International Crises},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Volume = {57},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1065-1089},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2012},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002712459713},
   Abstract = {Do audience costs have to be extremely large in order to
             credibly signal resolve and affect international crises?
             Existing theoretical work on audience costs suggests an
             affirmative answer, and recent empirical work on audience
             costs focuses on whether a leader can generate such large
             audience costs as to create a commitment to fight where no
             such commitment previously existed. We analyze a richer
             crisis bargaining model with audience costs and find that
             (1) audience costs can have war-reducing effects on
             incomplete-information crisis bargaining through a
             noninformative, bargaining-leverage mechanism and (2)
             audience costs can have war-reducing effects even when such
             large audience costs are not being generated as to create a
             commitment to fight where no such commitment previously
             existed. Even more limited audience costs can have
             war-reducing effects in international crises. We discuss how
             the bargaining-leverage mechanism is consistent with a
             number of prominent historical cases. © The Author(s)
             2012.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022002712459713},
   Key = {fds287741}
}

@article{fds287739,
   Author = {B. Leventoglu and Epstein, D and O'Halloran, S},
   Title = {Minorities and Democratization},
   Journal = {Economics and Politics},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {259-278},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2012},
   ISSN = {0954-1985},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000309911700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {We analyze the process of democratization in a polity with
             groups that are divided along ethnic as well as economic
             lines. We show that: (i) the presence of ethnic minorities,
             in general, makes peaceful democratic transitions less
             likely; (ii) minorities suffer from discriminatory policies
             less in democracies with intermediate levels of income
             inequality; and (iii) in new democracies with low levels of
             income inequality, politics is divided along ethnic lines,
             and at greater levels of inequality economic cleavages
             predominate. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing
             Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2012.00403.x},
   Key = {fds287739}
}

@article{fds287746,
   Author = {Leventoǧlu, B and Tarar, A},
   Title = {Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and
             international bargaining},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {99},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {419-433},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0003-0554},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000231547800008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many
             domestic and international bargaining situations, one or
             both negotiators make public statements in front of their
             constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain
             benefits in the negotiations. We find that making public
             commitments provides bargaining leverage, when backing down
             from such commitments carries domestic political costs.
             However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs
             for violating a public commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is
             created in which both sides make high public demands which
             cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better
             off if they could commit to not making public demands.
             However, making a public demand is a dominant strategy for
             each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome.
             Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for
             secret negotiations. Testable hypotheses are derived from
             the nature of the commitments and agreements made in
             equilibrium.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055405051750},
   Key = {fds287746}
}

@article{fds287742,
   Author = {Tarar, A and Leventoǧlu, B},
   Title = {Public commitment in crisis bargaining},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {53},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {817-839},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0020-8833},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000269679000012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved
             leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their
             resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby
             overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If
             democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then
             audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a
             game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be
             used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in
             a complete-information setting in which they have no
             signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for
             bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The
             results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well
             as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the
             disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist
             explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be
             bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big
             concessions, and compromise is still possible in
             equilibrium. © 2009 International Studies
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00557.x},
   Key = {fds287742}
}

@article{fds287745,
   Author = {Leventoǧlu, B},
   Title = {Social mobility and political transitions},
   Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {465-496},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0951-6298},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000232470400004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {I address the role of social mobility in political
             transitions. I develop a political economy model of regime
             transitions that incorporates social mobility as a key
             feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes
             toward redistribution. I show that social mobility
             facilitates democratization by reducing the conflict over
             redistribution between the rich and the poor. Furthermore,
             it facilitates democratic consolidation by reducing the
             likelihood of a coup under democracy. On the other hand,
             social mobility helps to keep an authoritarian regime stable
             by reducing the likelihood of mass movements against
             political elites. Copyright © 2005 Sage
             Publications.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0951629805056897},
   Key = {fds287745}
}

@article{fds287740,
   Author = {Leventoglu, B},
   Title = {Social Mobility, Middle Class and Political
             Transitions},
   Journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {825-864},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2012},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478563},
   Abstract = {This article addresses the highly variable middle-class
             attitudes regarding political transitions and suggests that
             social mobility is a key factor conditioning its behavior.
             Social mobility creates a trade-off for the middle class
             between autocracy, which yields lower redistribution today,
             and democracy, which guarantees higher redistribution
             tomorrow. The way this trade-off is resolved impacts
             middle-class attitudes toward democratic transitions. Even
             when the middle class prefers lower redistribution levels
             under autocracy today, the middle class may prefer democracy
             today to guarantee higher levels of redistribution in the
             future, if it feels vulnerable about its future
             prospects.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0022002713478563},
   Key = {fds287740}
}

@article{fds287744,
   Author = {Leventoǧlu, B and Slantchev, BL},
   Title = {The armed peace: A punctuated equilibrium theory of
             war},
   Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   Volume = {51},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {755-771},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0092-5853},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000249923300004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can
             break out when a large, rapid shift of power causes a
             credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify
             how inefficient fighting can resolve this cause, so it is an
             incomplete explanation of war. We present a complete
             information model of war as a sequence of battles and show
             that although opportunities for a negotiated settlement
             arise throughout, the very desirability of peace creates a
             commitment problem that undermines its likelihood. Because
             players have incentives to settle as soon as possible, they
             cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent
             launches a surprise attack. This decreases the expected
             duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to
             fail. Fighting's destructiveness improves the credibility of
             these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the
             war and can eventually lead to peace. In equilibrium players
             can only terminate war at specific windows of opportunity
             and fighting results in escalating costs that can leave both
             players worse off at the time peace is negotiated than a
             full concession would have before the war began. © 2007,
             Midwest Political Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00279.x},
   Key = {fds287744}
}