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| Publications of Paul Seli :recent first alphabetical combined listing:
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds335751,
Author = {Seli, P and Cheyne, JA and Barton, KR and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Consistency of sustained attention across modalities:
comparing visual and auditory versions of the
SART.},
Journal = {Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue
canadienne de psychologie experimentale},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {44-50},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025111},
Abstract = {We develop and assess an auditory version of an increasingly
widely used measure of sustained attention, the Sustained
Attention to Response Task (SART). In two separate studies,
the auditory SART generated slower response times and fewer
errors than the visual SART. Proportion of errors, response
times, and response time variability were, however,
significantly and strongly correlated across the two
modalities. The cross-modality correlations were generally
equivalent to split-half correlations within modalities,
indicating a strong agreement of the assessment of
individual differences in sustained attention in the visual
and auditory modalities. The foregoing results plus the
finding that errors on the auditory SART were reduced
suggests that the auditory SART may be a preferred
alternative for use with populations with deficits in
sustained attention.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0025111},
Key = {fds335751}
}
@article{fds335752,
Author = {Seli, P and Cheyne, JA and Smilek, D},
Title = {Attention failures versus misplaced diligence: separating
attention lapses from speed-accuracy trade-offs.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {277-291},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.017},
Abstract = {In two studies of a GO-NOGO task assessing sustained
attention, we examined the effects of (1) altering
speed-accuracy trade-offs through instructions (emphasizing
both speed and accuracy or accuracy only) and (2) auditory
alerts distributed throughout the task. Instructions
emphasizing accuracy reduced errors and changed the
distribution of GO trial RTs. Additionally, correlations
between errors and increasing RTs produced a U-function;
excessively fast and slow RTs accounted for much of the
variance of errors. Contrary to previous reports, alerts
increased errors and RT variability. The results suggest
that (1) standard instructions for sustained attention
tasks, emphasizing speed and accuracy equally, produce
errors arising from attempts to conform to the misleading
requirement for speed, which become conflated with
attention-lapse produced errors and (2) auditory alerts have
complex, and sometimes deleterious, effects on attention. We
argue that instructions emphasizing accuracy provide a more
precise assessment of attention lapses in sustained
attention tasks.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.017},
Key = {fds335752}
}
@article{fds335750,
Author = {Pennycook, G and Cheyne, JA and Seli, P and Koehler, DJ and Fugelsang,
JA},
Title = {Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal
belief.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {123},
Number = {3},
Pages = {335-346},
Year = {2012},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003},
Abstract = {An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set
aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem
solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive
style is associated with a history of questioning, altering,
and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both
religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined
associations of God beliefs, religious engagement
(attendance at religious services, praying, etc.),
conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and
paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation,
etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and
analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style
negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs
when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious
engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education.
Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning
were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further,
an association between analytic cognitive style and
religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs,
suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively
affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of
conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God
belief indicate that the association between an analytic
cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere
acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less
conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our
data are consistent with the idea that two people who share
the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology,
sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very
different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in
their propensity to think analytically.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003},
Key = {fds335750}
}
@article{fds335749,
Author = {Jonker, TR and Seli, P and Macleod, CM},
Title = {Less we forget: retrieval cues and release from
retrieval-induced forgetting.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {40},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1236-1245},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-012-0224-2},
Abstract = {Retrieving some items from memory can impair the subsequent
recall of other related but not retrieved items, a
phenomenon called retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). The
dominant explanation of RIF-the inhibition account-asserts
that forgetting occurs because related items are suppressed
during retrieval practice to reduce retrieval competition.
This item inhibition persists, making it more difficult to
recall the related items on a later test. In our set of
experiments, each category was designed such that each
exemplar belonged to one of two subcategories (e.g., each
BIRD exemplar was either a bird of prey or a pet bird), but
this subcategory information was not made explicit during
study or retrieval practice. Practicing retrieval of items
from only one subcategory led to RIF for items from the
other subcategory when cued only with the overall category
label (BIRD) at test. However, adapting the technique of
Gardiner, Craik, and Birtwistle (Journal of Learning and
Verbal Behavior 11:778-783, 1972), providing subcategory
cues during the final test eliminated RIF. The results
challenge the inhibition account's fundamental assumption of
cue independence but are consistent with a cue-based
interference account.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-012-0224-2},
Key = {fds335749}
}
@article{fds335747,
Author = {Seli, P and Carriere, JSA and Levene, M and Smilek,
D},
Title = {How few and far between? Examining the effects of probe rate
on self-reported mind wandering.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {430},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00430},
Abstract = {We examined whether the temporal rate at which thought
probes are presented affects the likelihood that people will
report periods of mind wandering. To evaluate this
possibility, we had participants complete a
sustained-attention task (the Metronome Response Task; MRT)
during which we intermittently presented thought probes.
Critically, we varied the average time between probes (i.e.,
probe rate) across participants, allowing us to examine the
relation between probe rate and mind-wandering rate. We
observed a positive relation between these variables,
indicating that people are more likely to report mind
wandering as the time between probes increases. We discuss
the methodological implications of this finding in the
context of the mind-wandering literature, and suggest that
researchers include a range of probe rates in future work to
provide more insight into this methodological
issue.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00430},
Key = {fds335747}
}
@article{fds335748,
Author = {Seli, P and Jonker, TR and Cheyne, JA and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Enhancing SART Validity by Statistically Controlling
Speed-Accuracy Trade-Offs.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {265},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00265},
Abstract = {Numerous studies focused on elucidating the correlates,
causes, and consequences of inattention/attention-lapses
employ the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a
GO-NOGO task with infrequent withholds. Although the SART
has become popular among inattention researchers, recent
work has demonstrated its susceptibility to speed-accuracy
trade-offs (SATOs), rendering its assessment of inattention
problematic. Here, we propose and illustrate methods to
statistically control for the occurrence of SATOs during
SART performance. The statistical solutions presented here
can be used to correct standard SART-error scores, including
those of already-published data, thereby allowing
researchers to re-examine existing data, and to more
sensitively evaluate the validity of earlier
conclusions.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00265},
Key = {fds335748}
}
@article{fds335746,
Author = {Seli, P and Cheyne, JA and Smilek, D},
Title = {Wandering minds and wavering rhythms: linking mind wandering
and behavioral variability.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and
performance},
Volume = {39},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-5},
Year = {2013},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0030954},
Abstract = {Mind wandering is a pervasive feature of human cognition
often associated with the withdrawal of task-related
executive control processes. Here, we explore the
possibility that, in tasks requiring executive control to
sustain consistent responding, moments of mind wandering
could be associated with moments of increased behavioral
variability. To test this possibility, we developed and
administered a novel task (the metronome response task) in
which participants were instructed to respond synchronously
(via button presses) with the continuous rhythmic
presentation of tones. We provide evidence (replicated
across 2 independent samples) that response variability
during the 5 trials preceding probe-caught reports of mind
wandering (tuned-out and zoned-out mind wandering) is
significantly greater than during the 5 trials preceding
reports of on-task performance. These results suggest that,
at least in some tasks, behavioral variability is an online
marker of mind wandering.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0030954},
Key = {fds335746}
}
@article{fds335745,
Author = {Carriere, JSA and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {Wandering in both mind and body: individual differences in
mind wandering and inattention predict fidgeting.},
Journal = {Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue
canadienne de psychologie experimentale},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {19-31},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031438},
Abstract = {Anecdotal reports suggest that during periods of inattention
or mind wandering, people tend to experience increased
fidgeting. In four studies, we examined whether individual
differences in the tendency to be inattentive and to mind
wander in everyday life are related to the tendency to make
spontaneous and involuntary movements (i.e., to fidget). To
do so, we developed self-report measures of spontaneous and
deliberate mind wandering, as well as a self-report scale to
index fidgeting. In addition, we used several existing
self-report measures of inattentiveness, attentional
control, and memory failures. Across our studies, a series
of multiple regression analyses indicated that fidgeting was
uniquely predicted by inattentiveness and spontaneous mind
wandering but not by other related factors, including
deliberate mind wandering, attentional control, and memory
failures. As a result, we suggest that only spontaneously
wandering thoughts are related to a wandering
body.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0031438},
Key = {fds335745}
}
@article{fds335744,
Author = {Seli, P and Jonker, TR and Solman, GJF and Cheyne, JA and Smilek,
D},
Title = {A methodological note on evaluating performance in a
sustained-attention-to-response task.},
Journal = {Behavior research methods},
Volume = {45},
Number = {2},
Pages = {355-363},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-012-0266-1},
Abstract = {We evaluated the influence of speed-accuracy trade-offs on
performance in the sustained attention to response task
(SART), a task often used to evaluate the effectiveness of
techniques designed to improve sustained attention. In the
present study, we experimentally manipulated response delay
in a variation of the SART and found that commission errors,
which are commonly used as an index of lapses in sustained
attention, were a systematic function of manipulated
differences in response delay. Delaying responses to roughly
800 ms after stimulus onset reduced commission errors
substantially. We suggest the possibility that any technique
that affects response speed will indirectly alter error
rates independently of improvements in sustained attention.
Investigators therefore need to carefully explore, report,
and correct for changes in response speed that accompany
improvements in performance or, alternatively, to employ
tasks that control for response speed.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13428-012-0266-1},
Key = {fds335744}
}
@article{fds335743,
Author = {Jonker, TR and Seli, P and MacLeod, CM},
Title = {Putting retrieval-induced forgetting in context: an
inhibition-free, context-based account.},
Journal = {Psychological review},
Volume = {120},
Number = {4},
Pages = {852-872},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034246},
Abstract = {We present a new theoretical account of retrieval-induced
forgetting (RIF) together with new experimental evidence
that fits this account and challenges the dominant
inhibition account. RIF occurs when the retrieval of some
material from memory produces later forgetting of related
material. The inhibition account asserts that RIF is the
result of an inhibition mechanism that acts during retrieval
to suppress the representations of interfering competitors.
This inhibition is enduring, such that the suppressed
material is difficult to access on a later test and is,
therefore, recalled more poorly than baseline material.
Although the inhibition account is widely accepted, a
growing body of research challenges its fundamental
assumptions. Our alternative account of RIF instead
emphasizes the role of context in remembering. According to
this context account, both of 2 tenets must be met for RIF
to occur: (a) A context change must occur between study and
subsequent retrieval practice, and (b) the retrieval
practice context must be the active context during the final
test when testing practiced categories. The results of 3
experiments, which directly test the divergent predictions
of the 2 accounts, support the context account but cannot be
explained by the inhibition account. In an extensive
discussion, we survey the literature on RIF and apply our
context account to the key findings, demonstrating the
explanatory power of context.},
Doi = {10.1037/a0034246},
Key = {fds335743}
}
@article{fds335742,
Author = {Jonker, TR and Seli, P and Cheyne, JA and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Performance reactivity in a continuous-performance task:
implications for understanding post-error
behavior.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1468-1476},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.10.005},
Abstract = {Although there has been considerable interest in the effects
of errors on subsequent performance, relatively few studies
have considered the effects of non-error events that contain
some performance-relevant information, such as correct
performance on critical trials. In the present article, we
propose and assess a hypothesis of performance reactivity.
In support of this hypothesis, we provide evidence of
performance decrements following both incorrect and correct
responses but not following performance-irrelevant events.
More specifically, in a continuous response task (Sustained
Attention to Response Task), we (1) replicate previous
findings that errors of commission on rare NOGO trials
produce decrements in subsequent performance, and (2)
observe that correct withholds to NOGO trials produce
decrements in subsequent accuracy relative to
task-irrelevant tones. These results corroborate a
hypothesis that some error-related effects on subsequent
performance are not unique, but are instead a particularly
salient version of a more general performance-reactivity
effect.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2013.10.005},
Key = {fds335742}
}
@article{fds335741,
Author = {Ralph, BCW and Seli, P and Cheng, VOY and Solman, GJF and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Running the figure to the ground: figure-ground segmentation
during visual search.},
Journal = {Vision research},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {65-73},
Year = {2014},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2014.02.005},
Abstract = {We examined how figure-ground segmentation occurs across
multiple regions of a visual array during a visual search
task. Stimuli consisted of arrays of black-and-white
figure-ground images in which roughly half of each image
depicted a meaningful object, whereas the other half
constituted a less meaningful shape. The colours of the
meaningful regions of the targets and distractors were
either the same (congruent) or different (incongruent). We
found that incongruent targets took longer to locate than
congruent targets (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and that this
segmentation-congruency effect decreased when the number of
search items was reduced (Experiment 2). Furthermore, an
analysis of eye movements revealed that participants spent
more time scrutinising the target before confirming its
identity on incongruent trials than on congruent trials
(Experiment 3). These findings suggest that the distractor
context influences target segmentation and detection during
visual search.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.visres.2014.02.005},
Key = {fds335741}
}
@article{fds335740,
Author = {Seli, P and Carriere, JSA and Thomson, DR and Cheyne, JA and Martens,
KAE and Smilek, D},
Title = {Restless mind, restless body.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and
cognition},
Volume = {40},
Number = {3},
Pages = {660-668},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035260},
Abstract = {In the present work, we investigate the hypothesis that
failures of task-related executive control that occur during
episodes of mind wandering are associated with an increase
in extraneous movements (fidgeting). In 2 studies, we
assessed mind wandering using thought probes while
participants performed the metronome response task (MRT),
which required them to synchronize button presses with
tones. Participants performed this task while sitting on a
Wii Balance Board providing us with an index of fidgeting.
Results of Study 1 demonstrate that relative to on-task
periods, mind wandering is indeed accompanied by increases
in fidgeting, as well as increased response variability in
the MRT. In Study 2, we observed that only deep mind
wandering was associated with increases in fidgeting,
whereas task-related response variability increased even
during mild mind wandering. We interpret these findings in
the context of current theories of mind wandering and
suggest that (a) mind wandering is associated with costs not
only to primary-task performance but also to secondary-task
goals (e.g., controlling extraneous movements) and (b) these
costs may depend on the degree to which task-related
executive control processes are disengaged during mind
wandering (i.e., depth of mind wandering).},
Doi = {10.1037/a0035260},
Key = {fds335740}
}
@article{fds335739,
Author = {Thomson, DR and Seli, P and Besner, D and Smilek,
D},
Title = {On the link between mind wandering and task performance over
time.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {27},
Pages = {14-26},
Year = {2014},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.001},
Abstract = {Here we test the hypothesis that fluctuations in subjective
reports of mind wandering over time-on-task are associated
with fluctuations in performance over time-on-task. In Study
1, we employed a singleton search task and found that
performance did not differ prior to on- and off-task
reports, nor did individual differences in mind wandering
predict differences in performance (so-called standard
analytic methods). Importantly however, we find that
fluctuations in mind wandering over time are strongly
associated with fluctuations in behavior. In Study 2, we
provide a replication of the relation between mind wandering
and performance over time found in Study 1, using a Flanker
interference task. These data indicate (1) a tight coupling
between mind wandering and performance over time and (2)
that a temporal-analytic approach can reveal effects of mind
wandering on performance in tasks where standard analyses
fail to do so. The theoretical and methodological
implications of these findings are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.001},
Key = {fds335739}
}
@article{fds335738,
Author = {Ralph, BCW and Thomson, DR and Seli, P and Carriere, JSA and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Media multitasking and behavioral measures of sustained
attention.},
Journal = {Attention, perception & psychophysics},
Volume = {77},
Number = {2},
Pages = {390-401},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13414-014-0771-7},
Abstract = {In a series of four studies, self-reported media
multitasking (using the media multitasking index; MMI) and
general sustained-attention ability, through performance on
three sustained-attention tasks: the metronome response task
(MRT), the sustained-attention-to-response task (SART), and
a vigilance task (here, a modified version of the SART). In
Study 1, we found that higher reports of media multitasking
were associated with increased response variability (i.e.,
poor performance) on the MRT. However, in Study 2, no
association between reported media multitasking and
performance on the SART was observed. These findings were
replicated in Studies 3a and 3b, in which we again assessed
the relation between media multitasking and performance on
both the MRT and SART in two large online samples. Finally,
in Study 4, using a large online sample, we tested whether
media multitasking was associated with performance on a
vigilance task. Although standard vigilance decrements were
observed in both sensitivity (A') and response times, media
multitasking was not associated with the size of these
decrements, nor was media multitasking associated with
overall performance, in terms of either sensitivity or
response times. Taken together, the results of the studies
reported here failed to demonstrate a relation between
habitual engagement in media multitasking in everyday life
and a general deficit in sustained-attention
processes.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13414-014-0771-7},
Key = {fds335738}
}
@article{fds335736,
Author = {Seli, P and Jonker, TR and Cheyne, JA and Cortes, K and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Can research participants comment authoritatively on the
validity of their self-reports of mind wandering and task
engagement?},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and
performance},
Volume = {41},
Number = {3},
Pages = {703-709},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000029},
Abstract = {The study of mind wandering rests upon the assumption that
people are able to consistently and accurately introspect
and report on these sorts of mental experiences. Although
there is some initial evidence that people can indeed
accurately report on the subjective experience of mind
wandering, to date, no work has directly examined people's
degree of confidence in their self-reports of mind wandering
and the effects that confidence has on the accuracy of such
reports. In the present study, participants completed a
sustained-attention task during which they intermittently
provided assessments of task engagement (i.e., whether they
were focused on the task or mind wandering), as well as
reports of confidence in the accuracy of their assessments.
This study yielded 3 key findings: We found substantial
between- and within-subject variability in both (a) reported
mind wandering and (b) confidence in mind-wandering reports,
and, most critically, (c) we found that the relation of
reported mind wandering and task performance varied as a
function of confidence. We discuss the implications of these
findings in the context of the literature on mind
wandering.},
Doi = {10.1037/xhp0000029},
Key = {fds335736}
}
@article{fds335737,
Author = {Seli, P and Smallwood, J and Cheyne, JA and Smilek,
D},
Title = {On the relation of mind wandering and ADHD
symptomatology.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {629-636},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-014-0793-0},
Abstract = {Mind wandering seems to be a prototypical feature of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However, an
important emerging distinction of mind-wandering types
hinges on whether a given episode of mind wandering reflects
a failure of executive control (spontaneous mind wandering)
or the engagement of controlled processes for internal
processing (deliberate mind wandering). Here we distinguish
between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering and test
the hypothesis that symptoms of ADHD are associated with the
former but not the latter. We assessed ADHD symptomatology
and everyday levels of deliberate and spontaneous mind
wandering in two large non-clinical samples (Ns = 1,354). In
addition, to provide converging evidence, we examined rates
of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in a clinically
diagnosed ADHD sample. Results provide clear evidence that
spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is a central
feature of ADHD symptomatology at both the clinical and
non-clinical level. We discuss the implications of these
results for understanding both ADHD and mind
wandering.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-014-0793-0},
Key = {fds335737}
}
@article{fds335735,
Author = {Jonker, TR and Seli, P and MacLeod, CM},
Title = {Retrieval-Induced Forgetting and Context},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {24},
Number = {4},
Pages = {273-278},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2015},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721415573203},
Abstract = {Retrieving information can result in the forgetting of
related information, a phenomenon referred to as
retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). To date, the dominant
explanation of RIF has been an inhibition account, which
emphasizes long-term suppression of interfering memories. As
one alternative, some have advocated for a strength-based
interference account, which emphasizes the role of
strengthening associations. More recently, we have proposed
a context account, which emphasizes the role of context
change and context reinstatement. In this article, we
outline these three accounts of RIF and demonstrate that
there is substantial evidence that uniquely supports our
context account.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721415573203},
Key = {fds335735}
}
@article{fds335733,
Author = {Seli, P and Cheyne, JA and Xu, M and Purdon, C and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Motivation, intentionality, and mind wandering: Implications
for assessments of task-unrelated thought.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and
cognition},
Volume = {41},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1417-1425},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000116},
Abstract = {Researchers of mind wandering frequently assume that (a)
participants are motivated to do well on the tasks they are
given, and (b) task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) that occur
during task performance reflect unintentional, unwanted
thoughts that occur despite participants' best intentions to
maintain task-focus. Given the relatively boring and tedious
nature of most mind-wandering tasks, however, there is the
possibility that some participants have little motivation to
do well on such tasks, and that this lack of motivation
might in turn result in increases specifically in
intentional TUTs. In the present study, we explored these
possibilities, finding that individuals reporting lower
motivation to perform well on a sustained-attention task
reported more intentional relative to unintentional TUTs
compared with individuals reporting higher motivation.
Interestingly, our results indicate that the extent to which
participants engage in intentional versus unintentional TUTs
does not differentially relate to performance: both types of
off-task thought were found to be equally associated with
performance decrements. Participants with low levels of
task-motivation also engaged in more overall TUTs, however,
and this increase in TUTs was associated with greater
performance decrements. We discuss these findings in the
context of the literature on mind wandering, highlighting
the importance of assessing the intentionality of TUTs and
motivation to perform well on tasks assessing mind
wandering.},
Doi = {10.1037/xlm0000116},
Key = {fds335733}
}
@article{fds335734,
Author = {Seli, P and Carriere, JSA and Smilek, D},
Title = {Not all mind wandering is created equal: dissociating
deliberate from spontaneous mind wandering.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {79},
Number = {5},
Pages = {750-758},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-014-0617-x},
Abstract = {In two large samples we show a dissociation between
trait-level tendencies to mind-wander spontaneously
(unintentionally) and deliberately (intentionally).
Participants completed online versions of the Mind Wandering
Spontaneous (MW-S) and the Mind Wandering Deliberate (MW-D)
self-report scales and the Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire (FFMQ). The results revealed that deliberate
and spontaneous mind wandering were uniquely associated with
some factors of the FFMQ. Notably, while the MW-D and the
MW-S were positively associated with each other, the MW-D
was uniquely positively associated with the 'Non-Reactivity
to Inner Experience' factor of the FFMQ, whereas the MW-S
was uniquely negatively associated with this factor. We also
showed that conflating deliberate and spontaneous mind
wandering can result in a misunderstanding of how mind
wandering is related to other traits. We recommend that
studies assessing individual differences in mind wandering
should distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous
subtypes of mind wandering to avoid possibly erroneous
conclusions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-014-0617-x},
Key = {fds335734}
}
@article{fds335731,
Author = {Seli, P},
Title = {The Attention-Lapse and Motor Decoupling accounts of SART
performance are not mutually exclusive.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {189-198},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.017},
Abstract = {There is an ongoing debate about the mechanisms purported to
underlie performance in the Sustained-Attention-to-Response
Task (SART). Whereas the Attention-Lapse account posits that
SART errors result from attentional disengagement, the Motor
Decoupling account proposes that SART errors result from
failures to inhibit a fast, prepotent motor response,
despite adequate attention to the task. That SART
performance might be fully accounted for by motor decoupling
is problematic for a Attention-Lapse account, and for the
use of the SART as an index of attention lapses. To test
whether SART performance is in fact fully accounted for by
motor decoupling, I examined the relation between SART
performance and attention lapses while controlling for motor
decoupling. The results were clear: The SART was associated
with attention lapses independently of motor decoupling.
Thus, the present study suggests that both accounts are
correct and that the SART is a valid measure of attention
lapses.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.017},
Key = {fds335731}
}
@article{fds335732,
Author = {Seli, P and Risko, EF and Smilek, D},
Title = {Assessing the associations among trait and state levels of
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {50-56},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.002},
Abstract = {Recent research has demonstrated that mind wandering can be
subdivided into spontaneous and deliberate types, and this
distinction has been found to hold at both the trait and
state levels. However, to date, no attempts have been made
to link trait-level spontaneous and deliberate mind
wandering with state-level assessments of these two subtypes
of mind wandering. Here we evaluated whether trait-level
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering map onto state
levels of these subtypes of mind wandering. Results showed
correspondence between trait-level reports of spontaneous
and deliberate mind wandering and their state-level
counterparts, indicating that people's reports on the
intentionality of their mind wandering in the laboratory
correspond to their reports of the intentionality of mind
wandering in everyday life. Thus, the trait- and state-level
scales of mind wandering were found to validate each other:
Whereas the state-level measures provided some construct
validity for the trait-level measures, the trait-level
measures indicated that the state-level measures may be
generalizable to everyday situations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.002},
Key = {fds335732}
}
@article{fds335730,
Author = {Seli, P and Risko, EF and Smilek, D},
Title = {On the Necessity of Distinguishing Between Unintentional and
Intentional Mind Wandering.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {685-691},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616634068},
Abstract = {In recent years, there has been an enormous increase in the
number of studies examining mind wandering. Although
participants' reports of mind wandering are often assumed to
largely reflect spontaneous, unintentional thoughts, many
researchers' conceptualizations of mind wandering have left
open the possibility that at least some of these reports
reflect deliberate, intentional thought. Critically,
however, in most investigations on the topic, researchers
have not separately assessed each type of mind wandering;
instead, they have measured mind wandering as a unitary
construct, thereby conflating intentional and unintentional
types. We report the first compelling evidence that an
experimental manipulation can have qualitatively different
effects on intentional and unintentional types of mind
wandering. This result provides clear evidence that
researchers interested in understanding mind wandering need
to consider the distinction between unintentional and
intentional occurrences of this phenomenon.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797616634068},
Key = {fds335730}
}
@article{fds335728,
Author = {Seli, P and Risko, EF and Smilek, D and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Mind-Wandering With and Without Intention.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {20},
Number = {8},
Pages = {605-617},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.010},
Abstract = {The past decade has seen a surge of research examining
mind-wandering, but most of this research has not considered
the potential importance of distinguishing between
intentional and unintentional mind-wandering. However, a
recent series of papers have demonstrated that
mind-wandering reported in empirical investigations
frequently occurs with and without intention, and, more
crucially, that intentional and unintentional mind-wandering
are dissociable. This emerging literature suggests that, to
increase clarity in the literature, there is a need to
reconsider the bulk of the mind-wandering literature with an
eye toward deconvolving these two different cognitive
experiences. In this review we highlight recent trends in
investigations of the intentionality of mind-wandering, and
we outline a novel theoretical framework regarding the
mechanisms underlying intentional and unintentional
mind-wandering.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.010},
Key = {fds335728}
}
@article{fds335729,
Author = {Seli, P and Wammes, JD and Risko, EF and Smilek, D},
Title = {On the relation between motivation and retention in
educational contexts: The role of intentional and
unintentional mind wandering.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {23},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1280-1287},
Year = {2016},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0979-0},
Abstract = {Highly motivated students often exhibit better academic
performance than less motivated students. However, to date,
the specific cognitive mechanisms through which motivation
increases academic achievement are not well understood. Here
we explored the possibility that mind wandering mediates the
relation between motivation and academic performance, and
additionally, we examined possible mediation by both
intentional and unintentional forms of mind wandering. We
found that participants reporting higher motivation to learn
in a lecture-based setting tended to engage in less mind
wandering, and that this decrease in mind wandering was in
turn associated with greater retention of the lecture
material. Critically, we also found that the influence of
motivation on retention was mediated by both intentional and
unintentional types of mind wandering. Not only do the
present results advance our theoretical understanding of the
mechanisms underlying the relation between motivation and
academic achievement, they also provide insights into
possible methods of intervention that may be useful in
improving student retention in educational
settings.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-015-0979-0},
Key = {fds335729}
}
@article{fds335727,
Author = {Ozubko, JD and Seli, P},
Title = {Forget all that nonsense: The role of meaning during the
forgetting of recollective and familiarity-based
memories.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {90},
Pages = {136-147},
Year = {2016},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.06.026},
Abstract = {Memory can be divided into recollection and familiarity.
Recollection is characterized as the ability to vividly
re-experience past events, and is believed to be supported
by the hippocampus, whereas familiarity is defined as an
undifferentiated feeling of knowing or acquaintance, and is
believed to be supported by extra-hippocampal regions, such
as the perirhinal cortex. Recent evidence suggests that the
neural architectures of the hippocampus and neocortex lead
information in these regions being susceptible to different
forgetting processes. We expand on these accounts and
propose that the neocortex may be sensitive to the semantic
content of a trace, with more meaningful traces being more
easily retained. The hippocampus, in contrast, is not
hypothesized to be influenced by semantics in the same way.
To test this new account, we use a continuous-recognition
paradigm to examine the forgetting rates words and nonwords
that are either recollected or familiar. We find that words
and nonwords that are recollected are equally likely to be
forgotten over time. However, nonwords that are familiar are
more likely to be forgotten over time than are words that
are familiar. Our results support recent
neuropsychologically-based forgetting theories of
recollection and familiarity and provide new insight into
how and why representations are forgotten over
time.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.06.026},
Key = {fds335727}
}
@article{fds335726,
Author = {Golchert, J and Smallwood, J and Jefferies, E and Seli, P and Huntenburg, JM and Liem, F and Lauckner, ME and Oligschläger, S and Bernhardt, BC and Villringer, A and Margulies,
DS},
Title = {Individual variation in intentionality in the mind-wandering
state is reflected in the integration of the default-mode,
fronto-parietal, and limbic networks.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {146},
Pages = {226-235},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.11.025},
Abstract = {Mind-wandering has a controversial relationship with
cognitive control. Existing psychological evidence supports
the hypothesis that episodes of mind-wandering reflect a
failure to constrain thinking to task-relevant material, as
well the apparently alternative view that control can
facilitate the expression of self-generated mental content.
We assessed whether this apparent contradiction arises
because of a failure to consider differences in the types of
thoughts that occur during mind-wandering, and in
particular, the associated level of intentionality. Using
multi-modal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) analysis, we
examined the cortical organisation that underlies
inter-individual differences in descriptions of the
spontaneous or deliberate nature of mind-wandering. Cortical
thickness, as well as functional connectivity analyses,
implicated regions relevant to cognitive control and regions
of the default-mode network for individuals who reported
high rates of deliberate mind-wandering. In contrast, higher
reports of spontaneous mind-wandering were associated with
cortical thinning in parietal and posterior temporal regions
in the left hemisphere (which are important in the control
of cognition and attention) as well as heightened
connectivity between the intraparietal sulcus and a region
that spanned limbic and default-mode regions in the ventral
inferior frontal gyrus. Finally, we observed a dissociation
in the thickness of the retrosplenial cortex/lingual gyrus,
with higher reports of spontaneous mind-wandering being
associated with thickening in the left hemisphere, and
higher repots of deliberate mind-wandering with thinning in
the right hemisphere. These results suggest that the
intentionality of the mind-wandering state depends on
integration between the control and default-mode networks,
with more deliberation being associated with greater
integration between these systems. We conclude that one
reason why mind-wandering has a controversial relationship
with control is because it depends on whether the thoughts
emerge in a deliberate or spontaneous fashion.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.11.025},
Key = {fds335726}
}
@article{fds335725,
Author = {Seli, P and Risko, EF and Purdon, C and Smilek, D},
Title = {Intrusive thoughts: linking spontaneous mind wandering and
OCD symptomatology.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {81},
Number = {2},
Pages = {392-398},
Year = {2017},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-016-0756-3},
Abstract = {One recent line of research in the literature on mind
wandering has been concerned with examining rates of mind
wandering in special populations, such as those
characterized by attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
dysphoria, and schizophrenia. To best conceptualize mind
wandering in studies examining special populations, it has
recently been suggested that researchers distinguish between
deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of this experience.
Extending this line of research on mind wandering in special
populations, in a large non-clinical sample (N = 2636), we
examined how rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind
wandering vary with symptoms of obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD). Results indicate that, whereas deliberate
mind wandering is not associated with OCD symptomatology,
spontaneous mind wandering is, with higher reports of
spontaneous mind wandering being associated with higher
reports of OCD symptoms. We discuss the implications of
these results for understanding both mind wandering and
OCD.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-016-0756-3},
Key = {fds335725}
}
@article{fds335723,
Author = {Seli, P and Ralph, BCW and Konishi, M and Smilek, D and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {What did you have in mind? Examining the content of
intentional and unintentional types of mind
wandering.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {149-156},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.007},
Abstract = {It has recently been argued that researchers should
distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with
and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies
have found that intentional and unintentional MW have
behavioral/neural differences, and that they are
differentially associated with certain variables of
theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable
inroads made into the distinction between
intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their
content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two
types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete
a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional
or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions
about the content of their MW. Results indicated that
intentional MW was more frequently rated as being
future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These
findings shed light on the nature of intentional and
unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that
researchers should distinguish between intentional and
unintentional types.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.007},
Key = {fds335723}
}
@article{fds335724,
Author = {Xu, M and Purdon, C and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {Mindfulness and mind wandering: The protective effects of
brief meditation in anxious individuals.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {157-165},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.009},
Abstract = {Mind wandering can be costly, especially when we are engaged
in attentionally demanding tasks. Preliminary studies
suggest that mindfulness can be a promising antidote for
mind wandering, albeit the evidence is mixed. To better
understand the exact impact of mindfulness on mind
wandering, we had a sample of highly anxious undergraduate
students complete a sustained-attention task during which
off-task thoughts including mind wandering were assessed.
Participants were randomly assigned to a meditation or
control condition, after which the sustained-attention task
was repeated. In general, our results indicate that
mindfulness training may only have protective effects on
mind wandering for anxious individuals. Meditation prevented
the increase of mind wandering over time and ameliorated
performance disruption during off-task episodes. In
addition, we found that the meditation intervention appeared
to promote a switch of attentional focus from the internal
to present-moment external world, suggesting important
implications for treating worrying in anxious
populations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.009},
Key = {fds335724}
}
@article{fds335722,
Author = {Seli, P and Maillet, D and Smilek, D and Oakman, JM and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Cognitive aging and the distinction between intentional and
unintentional mind wandering.},
Journal = {Psychology and aging},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {315-324},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pag0000172},
Abstract = {A growing number of studies have reported age-related
reductions in the frequency of mind wandering. Here, at both
the trait (Study 1) and state (Study 2) levels, we
reexamined this association while distinguishing between
intentional (deliberate) and unintentional (spontaneous)
mind wandering. Based on research demonstrating
age-accompanied deficits in executive functioning, we
expected to observe increases in unintentional mind
wandering with increasing age. Moreover, because aging is
associated with increased task motivation, we reasoned that
older adults might be more engaged in their tasks, and
hence, show a more pronounced decline in intentional mind
wandering relative to young adults. In both studies, we
found that older adults did indeed report lower rates of
intentional mind wandering compared with young adults.
However, contrary to our expectations, we also found that
older adults reported lower rates of unintentional mind
wandering (Studies 1 and 2). We discuss the implications of
these findings for theories of age-related declines in mind
wandering. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/pag0000172},
Key = {fds335722}
}
@article{fds335721,
Author = {Maillet, D and Seli, P and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Mind-wandering and task stimuli: Stimulus-dependent thoughts
influence performance on memory tasks and are more often
past- versus future-oriented.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {52},
Pages = {55-67},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.014},
Abstract = {Although many studies have indicated that participants
frequently mind-wander during experimental tasks, relatively
little research has examined the extent to which such
thoughts are triggered by task stimuli (stimulus-dependent
thoughts; SDTs) versus internally triggered
(stimulus-independent thoughts; SITs). In the current
experiment, we assessed differences in the frequency and
characteristics of SDTs and SITs, as well as their
associations with subsequent memory in young adults. Whereas
frequency of SDTs (but not SITs) increased in a task with
more meaningful stimuli, frequency of SITs (but not SDTs)
increased in an easier task. Furthermore, only SDTs were
more likely to be past- versus future-oriented. Finally,
frequency and vividness of SDTs during a shallow, but not a
deep, incidental encoding task both correlated with later
memory performance for word stimuli. These results suggest
that SDTs differ from SITs in several important
ways.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.014},
Key = {fds335721}
}
@article{fds335719,
Author = {Seli, P and Ralph, BCW and Risko, EF and W Schooler and J and Schacter, DL and Smilek, D},
Title = {Intentionality and meta-awareness of mind wandering: Are
they one and the same, or distinct dimensions?},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {24},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1808-1818},
Year = {2017},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1249-0},
Abstract = {Researchers have recently demonstrated that mind-wandering
episodes can vary on numerous dimensions, and it has been
suggested that assessing these dimensions will play an
important role in our understanding of mind wandering. One
dimension that has received considerable attention in recent
work is the intentionality of mind wandering. Although it
has been claimed that indexing the intentionality of mind
wandering will be necessary if researchers are to obtain a
coherent understanding of the wandering mind, one concern is
that this dimension might be redundant with another,
longstanding, dimension: namely, meta-awareness. Thus, the
utility of the argument for assessing intentionality rests
upon a demonstration that this dimension is distinct from
the meta-awareness dimension. To shed light on this issue,
across two studies we compared and contrasted these
dimensions to determine whether they are redundant or
distinct. In both studies, we found support for the view
that these dimensions are distinct.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-017-1249-0},
Key = {fds335719}
}
@article{fds335717,
Author = {Seli, P and Smilek, D and Ralph, BCW and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {The awakening of the attention: Evidence for a link between
the monitoring of mind wandering and prospective
goals.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {147},
Number = {3},
Pages = {431-443},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000385},
Abstract = {Across 2 independent samples, we examined the relation
between individual differences in rates of self-caught mind
wandering and individual differences in temporal monitoring
of an unrelated response goal. Rates of self-caught mind
wandering were assessed during a commonly used
sustained-attention task, and temporal goal monitoring was
indexed during a well-established prospective-memory task.
The results from both samples showed a positive relation
between rates of self-caught mind wandering during the
sustained-attention task and rates of checking a clock to
monitor the amount of time remaining before a response was
required in the prospective-memory task. This relation held
even when controlling for overall propensity to mind-wander
(indexed by intermittent thought probes) and levels of
motivation (indexed by subjective reports). These results
suggest the possibility that there is a common monitoring
system that monitors the contents of consciousness and the
progress of ongoing goals and tasks. (PsycINFO Database
Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000385},
Key = {fds335717}
}
@article{fds335715,
Author = {Seli, P and Kane, MJ and Smallwood, J and Schacter, DL and Maillet, D and Schooler, JW and Smilek, D},
Title = {Mind-Wandering as a Natural Kind: A Family-Resemblances
View.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {22},
Number = {6},
Pages = {479-490},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.03.010},
Abstract = {As empirical research on mind-wandering accelerates, we draw
attention to an emerging trend in how mind-wandering is
conceptualized. Previously articulated definitions of
mind-wandering differ from each other in important ways, yet
they also maintain overlapping characteristics. This
conceptual structure suggests that mind-wandering is best
considered from a family-resemblances perspective, which
entails treating it as a graded, heterogeneous construct and
clearly measuring and describing the specific aspect(s) of
mind-wandering that researchers are investigating. We
believe that adopting this family-resemblances approach will
increase conceptual and methodological connections among
related phenomena in the mind-wandering family and encourage
a more nuanced and precise understanding of the many
varieties of mind-wandering.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.03.010},
Key = {fds335715}
}
@article{fds335716,
Author = {Seli, P and Carriere, JSA and Wammes, JD and Risko, EF and Schacter, DL and Smilek, D},
Title = {On the Clock: Evidence for the Rapid and Strategic
Modulation of Mind Wandering.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {29},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1247-1256},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797618761039},
Abstract = {We examined the hypothesis that people can modulate their
mind wandering on the basis of their expectations of
upcoming challenges in a task. To this end, we developed a
novel paradigm in which participants were presented with an
analog clock, via a computer monitor, and asked to push a
button every time the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00.
Importantly, the time at which the clock's hand was pointed
at 12:00 was completely predictable and occurred at 20-s
intervals. During some of the 20-s intervals, we presented
thought probes to index participants' rates of mind
wandering. Results indicated that participants decreased
their levels of mind wandering as they approached the
predictable upcoming target. Critically, these results
suggest that people can and do modulate their mind wandering
in anticipation of changes in task demands.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797618761039},
Key = {fds335716}
}
@article{fds335718,
Author = {Laflamme, P and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {Validating a visual version of the metronome response
task.},
Journal = {Behavior research methods},
Volume = {50},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1503-1514},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-018-1020-0},
Abstract = {The metronome response task (MRT)-a sustained-attention task
that requires participants to produce a response in
synchrony with an audible metronome-was recently developed
to index response variability in the context of studies on
mind wandering. In the present studies, we report on the
development and validation of a visual version of the MRT
(the visual metronome response task; vMRT), which uses the
rhythmic presentation of visual, rather than auditory,
stimuli. Participants completed the vMRT (Studies 1 and 2)
and the original (auditory-based) MRT (Study 2) while also
responding to intermittent thought probes asking them to
report the depth of their mind wandering. The results showed
that (1) individual differences in response variability
during the vMRT are highly reliable; (2) prior to thought
probes, response variability increases with increasing depth
of mind wandering; (3) response variability is highly
consistent between the vMRT and the original MRT; and (4)
both response variability and depth of mind wandering
increase with increasing time on task. Our results indicate
that the original MRT findings are consistent across the
visual and auditory modalities, and that the response
variability measured in both tasks indexes a
non-modality-specific tendency toward behavioral
variability. The vMRT will be useful in the place of the MRT
in experimental contexts in which researchers' designs
require a visual-based primary task.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13428-018-1020-0},
Key = {fds335718}
}
@article{fds338053,
Author = {Seli, P and Konishi, M and Risko, EF and Smilek, D},
Title = {The role of task difficulty in theoretical accounts of mind
wandering.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {65},
Pages = {255-262},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.08.005},
Abstract = {Recent research has indicated that reducing the difficulty
of a task by increasing the predictability of critical
stimuli produces increases in intentional mind wandering,
but, contrary to theoretical expectations, decreases in
unintentional mind wandering. Here, we sought to determine
whether reducing task difficulty by reducing working-memory
load would yield similar results. Participants completed an
easy (Choice Response Time; CRT) task and a relatively
difficult (Working Memory; WM) task, and intermittently
responded to thought probes asking about intentional and
unintentional mind wandering. As in prior studies, we found
higher rates of intentional mind wandering during the easy
compared to the more difficult task. However, we also found
more unintentional mind wandering during the difficult
compared to the easy task. We discuss these results in the
context of theoretical accounts of mind wandering.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2018.08.005},
Key = {fds338053}
}
@article{fds339652,
Author = {Seli, P and Beaty, RE and Cheyne, JA and Smilek, D and Oakman, J and Schacter, DL},
Title = {How pervasive is mind wandering, really?},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {74-78},
Year = {2018},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.10.002},
Abstract = {Recent claims that people spend 30-50% of their waking lives
mind wandering (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Kane et al.,
2007) have become widely accepted and frequently cited.
While acknowledging attention to be inconstant and wavering,
and mind wandering to be ubiquitous, we argue and present
evidence that such simple quantitative estimates are
misleading and potentially meaningless without serious
qualification. Mind-wandering estimates requiring
dichotomous judgments of inner experience rely on
questionable assumptions about how such judgments are made,
and the resulting data do not permit straightforward
interpretation. We present evidence that estimates of
daily-life mind wandering vary dramatically depending on the
response options provided. Offering participants a range of
options in estimating task engagement yielded variable
mind-wandering estimates, from approximately 60% to 10%,
depending on assumptions made about how observers make
introspective judgments about their mind-wandering
experiences and how they understand what it means to be on-
or off-task.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2018.10.002},
Key = {fds339652}
}
@article{fds338054,
Author = {Seli, P and Kane, MJ and Metzinger, T and Smallwood, J and Schacter, DL and Maillet, D and Schooler, JW and Smilek, D},
Title = {The Family-Resemblances Framework for Mind-Wandering Remains
Well Clad.},
Journal = {Trends in cognitive sciences},
Volume = {22},
Number = {11},
Pages = {959-961},
Year = {2018},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.07.007},
Doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.07.007},
Key = {fds338054}
}
@article{fds342492,
Author = {Seli, P and Beaty, RE and Marty-Dugas, J and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Depression, anxiety, and stress and the distinction between
intentional and unintentional mind wandering},
Journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory Research, and
Practice},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {163-170},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000182},
Abstract = {We examined whether the previously documented association
between mind wandering and affective dysfunction depends, at
least to some extent, on whether mind wandering episodes are
intentional or unintentional. In two large samples, we
assessed trait-level rates of intentional and unintentional
mind wandering, as well as three different types of
affective dysfunction: depression, anxiety, and stress.
Results indicated that, whereas unintentional mind wandering
was uniquely positively associated with all three types of
affective dysfunction, intentional mind wandering was
uniquely (albeit very weakly) negatively associated with
stress and anxiety and had no relation to depression. These
findings indicate that people who more frequently engage in
unintentional types of mind wandering are more likely to
report symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress, and that
intentional mind wandering may buffer against these types of
affective dysfunction.},
Doi = {10.1037/cns0000182},
Key = {fds342492}
}
@article{fds338080,
Author = {Beaty, RE and Seli, P and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Network Neuroscience of Creative Cognition: Mapping
Cognitive Mechanisms and Individual Differences in the
Creative Brain.},
Journal = {Current opinion in behavioral sciences},
Volume = {27},
Pages = {22-30},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.08.013},
Abstract = {Network neuroscience research is providing increasing
specificity on the contribution of large-scale brain
networks to creative cognition. Here, we summarize recent
experimental work examining cognitive mechanisms of network
interactions and correlational studies assessing network
dynamics associated with individual creative abilities. Our
review identifies three cognitive processes related to
network interactions during creative performance:
<i>goal-directed memory retrieval</i>, <i>prepotent-response
inhibitio</i>n, and <i>internally-focused attention</i>.
Correlational work using prediction modeling indicates that
functional connectivity between networks-particularly the
executive control and default networks-can reliably predict
an individual's creative thinking ability. We discuss
potential directions for future network neuroscience,
including assessing creative performance in specific domains
and using brain stimulation to test causal hypotheses
regarding network interactions and cognitive mechanisms of
creative thought.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.08.013},
Key = {fds338080}
}
@article{fds337407,
Author = {Beaty, RE and Seli, P and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Thinking about the past and future in daily life: an
experience sampling study of individual differences in
mental time travel.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {83},
Number = {4},
Pages = {805-816},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1075-7},
Abstract = {Remembering the past and imagining the future are hallmarks
of mental time travel. We provide evidence that such
experiences are influenced by individual differences in
temporal and affective biases in cognitive style,
particularly brooding rumination (a negative past-oriented
bias) and optimism (a positive future-oriented bias).
Participants completed a 7-day, cellphone-based
experience-sampling study of temporal orientation and mental
imagery. Multilevel models showed that individual
differences in brooding rumination predicted less vivid and
positive past- and future-oriented thoughts, even after
controlling for depressed mood. People high in brooding
rumination were also more likely to report thinking about a
past experience when probed at random during the day.
Conversely, optimists were more likely to report more vivid
and positive future-oriented, but not past-oriented
thoughts, although they did not report thinking more or less
often about the past and future. The results suggest that
temporal and affective biases in cognitive style influence
how people think about the past and future in daily
life.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-018-1075-7},
Key = {fds337407}
}
@article{fds335720,
Author = {Seli, P and Schacter, DL and Risko, EF and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Increasing participant motivation reduces rates of
intentional and unintentional mind wandering.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {83},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1057-1069},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-017-0914-2},
Abstract = {We explored the possibility that increasing participants'
motivation to perform well on a focal task can reduce mind
wandering. Participants completed a sustained-attention task
either with standard instructions (normal motivation), or
with instructions informing them that they could be excused
from the experiment early if they achieved a certain level
of performance (higher motivation). Throughout the task, we
assessed rates of mind wandering (both intentional and
unintentional types) via thought probes. Results showed that
the motivation manipulation led to significant reductions in
both intentional and unintentional mind wandering as well as
improvements in task performance. Most critically, we found
that our simple motivation manipulation led to a dramatic
reduction in probe-caught mind-wandering rates (49%)
compared to a control condition (67%), which suggests the
utility of motivation-based methods to reduce people's
propensity to mind-wander.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-017-0914-2},
Key = {fds335720}
}
@article{fds353536,
Author = {Ho, NSP and Baker, D and Karapanagiotidis, T and Seli, P and Wang, HT and Leech, R and Bernhardt, B and Margulies, D and Jefferies, E and Smallwood, J},
Title = {Missing the forest because of the trees: slower alternations
during binocular rivalry are associated with lower levels of
visual detail during ongoing thought.},
Journal = {Neuroscience of consciousness},
Volume = {2020},
Number = {1},
Pages = {niaa020},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa020},
Abstract = {Conscious awareness of the world fluctuates, either through
variation in how vividly we perceive the environment, or
when our attentional focus shifts away from information in
the external environment towards information that we
generate via imagination. Our study combined individual
differences in experience sampling, psychophysical reports
of perception and neuroimaging descriptions of structural
connectivity to better understand these changes in conscious
awareness. In particular, we examined (i) whether aspects of
ongoing thought-indexed via multi-dimensional experience
sampling during a sustained attention task-are associated
with the white matter fibre organization of the cortex as
reflected by their relative degree of anisotropic diffusion
and (ii) whether these neurocognitive descriptions of
ongoing experience are related to a more constrained measure
of visual consciousness through analysis of bistable
perception during binocular rivalry. Individuals with
greater fractional anisotropy in right hemisphere white
matter regions involving the inferior fronto-occipital
fasciculus, the superior longitudinal fasciculus and the
cortico-spinal tract, described their ongoing thoughts as
lacking external details. Subsequent analysis indicated that
the combination of low fractional anisotropy in these right
hemisphere regions, with reports of thoughts with high
levels of external details, was associated with the shortest
periods of dominance during binocular rivalry. Since
variation in binocular rivalry reflects differences between
bottom-up and top-down influences on vision, our study
suggests that reports of ongoing thoughts with vivid
external details may occur when conscious precedence is
given to bottom-up representation of perceptual
information.},
Doi = {10.1093/nc/niaa020},
Key = {fds353536}
}
@article{fds335714,
Author = {Ralph, BCW and Seli, P and Wilson, KE and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Volitional media multitasking: awareness of performance
costs and modulation of media multitasking as a function of
task demand.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {84},
Number = {2},
Pages = {404-423},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1056-x},
Abstract = {In two experiments, we sought to determine whether (a)
people are aware of the frequently observed performance
costs associated with engaging in media multitasking
(Experiment 1), and (b) if so, whether they modulate the
extent to which they engage in multitasking as a function of
task demand (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants
completed a high-demand task (2-back) both independently and
while a video was simultaneously presented. To determine
whether people were sensitive to the impact that the
concurrent video had on primary-task performance, subjective
estimates of performance were collected following both trial
types (No-Video vs. Video trials), as were explicit beliefs
about the influence of the video on performance. In
Experiment 2, we modified our paradigm by allowing
participants to turn the video on and off at their
discretion, and had them complete either a high-demand task
(2-back) or a low-demand task (0-back). Findings from
Experiment 1 indicated that people are sensitive to the
magnitude of the decrement that media multitasking has on
primary-task performance. In addition, findings from
Experiment 2 indicated that people modulate the extent to
which they engage in media multitasking in accordance with
the demands of their primary task. In particular,
participants completing the high-demand task were more
likely to turn off the optional video stream compared to
those completing the low-demand task. The results suggest
that people media multitask in a strategic manner by
balancing considerations of task performance with other
potential concerns.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-018-1056-x},
Key = {fds335714}
}
@article{fds345891,
Author = {Ralph, BCW and Smith, AC and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {Yearning for distraction: Evidence for a trade-off between
media multitasking and mind wandering.},
Journal = {Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue
canadienne de psychologie experimentale},
Volume = {74},
Number = {1},
Pages = {56-72},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cep0000186},
Abstract = {We examined whether providing participants with the
opportunity to media multitask influenced their tendency to
be 'off-task.' More specifically, we were interested in
whether providing participants with the opportunity to
engage with an external media stream during a required
(researcher-imposed) cognitive task might lead to a
trade-off between mind wandering and engagement with
external distractions (such as the media). We also examined
the extent to which intentionality plays a role in these
associations. Participants completed 2 phases of a cognitive
task (1-back). During 1 phase, participants were provided
the opportunity to concurrently watch a video while they
performed the cognitive task; during the other, no such
opportunity was provided. Throughout both phases, thought
probes asked participants if they were (a) focused on the
task, (b) attending to external distractions, or (c) mind
wandering. If options 2 or 3 were selected, participants
were further asked to report whether these forms of
distraction were engaged intentionally or unintentionally.
Our findings indicated that, although the opportunity to
media multitask increased overall reports of being off-task,
the tendency to mind-wander was significantly reduced in
favour of attending to external distractions (such as the
video). Of interest to the authors, overall reports of being
unintentionally off-task were equivalent, irrespective of
whether participants had the opportunity to media multitask
or not, which suggests that the increased tendency to have
an off-task locus of attention was because of intentionally
shifting attention away from the primary task. (PsycINFO
Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights
reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/cep0000186},
Key = {fds345891}
}
@article{fds366422,
Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Schooler, JW and Seli,
P},
Title = {What's in a Task? Complications in the Study of the
Task-Unrelated-Thought Variety of Mind Wandering.},
Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the
Association for Psychological Science},
Volume = {15},
Number = {3},
Pages = {572-588},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691619897966},
Abstract = {In recent years, the number of studies examining mind
wandering has increased considerably, and research on the
topic has spread widely across various domains of
psychological research. Athough the term <i>mind
wandering</i> has been used to refer to various cognitive
states, researchers typically operationalize mind wandering
in terms of <i>task-unrelated thought</i> (TUT). Research on
TUT has shed light on the various task features that require
people's attention and on the consequences of task
inattention. Important methodological and conceptual
complications do persist, however, in current investigations
of TUT. We argue that these complications may be dampening
the development of a more nuanced scientific account of TUT.
In this article, we outline three of the more prominent
methodological and conceptual complications in the
literature on TUT and discuss potential directions for
researchers to take as they move forward in their
investigations of TUT.},
Doi = {10.1177/1745691619897966},
Key = {fds366422}
}
@article{fds349785,
Author = {Struk, AA and Scholer, AA and Danckert, J and Seli,
P},
Title = {Rich environments, dull experiences: how environment can
exacerbate the effect of constraint on the experience of
boredom.},
Journal = {Cognition & emotion},
Volume = {34},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1517-1523},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2020.1763919},
Abstract = {We examined the hypothesis that boredom is likely to occur
when opportunity costs are high; that is, when there is a
high potential value of engaging in activities other than
the researcher-assigned activity. To this end, participants
were either placed in a room with many possible affordances
(e.g. a laptop, puzzle, etc.; <i>affordances condition;
n = 121</i>), or they were ushered into an empty room
(<i>control condition; n = 107</i>). In both conditions
participants were instructed to entertain themselves with
only their thoughts (hence, participants in the affordances
condition were to refrain from engaging with the available
options). As predicted, participants in the affordances
condition reported higher levels of boredom compared with
those in the control condition. Results suggest that under
some conditions, environments that afford alternative
activities may be <i>more</i> boring than those that are
void of such activities.},
Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2020.1763919},
Key = {fds349785}
}
@article{fds351440,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Whitehead, PS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Seli,
P},
Title = {Exposure to opposing reasons reduces negative impressions of
ideological opponents},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
Volume = {91},
Year = {2020},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Abstract = {Americans have become increasingly likely to dislike,
distrust, and derogate their ideological opponents on
contemporary social and political issues. We hypothesized
that a lack of exposure to compelling reasons, arguments,
and evidence from ideological opponents might at least
partly explain negative views of those opponents. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we found that participants assume
their ideological opponents, in comparison to their
ideological allies, are less likely to have good reasons for
their positions. Moreover, we found that the more strongly
participants believe their opponents lack good reasons for
their positions, the more likely they are to report that
those opponents lack both intellectual capabilities and
moral character. Critically, exposure to arguments favoring
their opponents' position produced more favorable
impressions of those opponents. We discuss possible
implications of these results for the role of reasons and
reasoning in political discourse, and for productive
disagreement in a functioning democracy.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104030},
Key = {fds351440}
}
@article{fds350350,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Sinclair, AH and Seli, P},
Title = {Intellectual humility and perceptions of political
opponents.},
Journal = {Journal of personality},
Volume = {88},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1196-1216},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12566},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the
recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We
investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for
how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and moral
character of their sociopolitical opponents and for their
willingness to associate with those opponents.<h4>Method</h4>In
four initial studies (N = 1,926, M<sub>age</sub> = 38,
880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellectual and
moral derogation of opponents, and willingness to befriend
opponents. In two additional studies (N = 568,
M<sub>age</sub> = 40, 252 females, 314 males), we
presented participants with a specific opponent on certain
sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from
that opponent in which he expressed his views on the issue.
We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral derogation of
the opponent, participants' willingness to befriend the
opponent, participants' willingness to "friend" the opponent
on social media, and participants' willingness to "follow"
the opponent on social media.<h4>Results</h4>Low-IH relative
to high-IH participants were more likely to derogate the
intellectual capabilities and moral character of their
opponents, less willing to befriend their opponents, and
less willing to "friend" and "follow" an opponent on social
media.<h4>Conclusions</h4>IH may have important
interpersonal implications for person perception, and for
understanding social extremism and polarization.},
Doi = {10.1111/jopy.12566},
Key = {fds350350}
}
@article{fds351200,
Author = {Sinclair, AH and Stanley, ML and Seli, P},
Title = {Closed-minded cognition: Right-wing authoritarianism is
negatively related to belief updating following prediction
error.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {27},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1348-1361},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-020-01767-y},
Abstract = {When confronted with information that challenges our
beliefs, we must often learn from error in order to
successfully navigate the world. Past studies in
reinforcement learning and educational psychology have
linked prediction error, a measure of surprise, to
successful learning from feedback. However, there are
substantial individual differences in belief-updating
success, and the psychological factors that influence belief
updating remain unclear. Here, we identify a novel factor
that may predict belief updating: right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA), which is characterized by a desire
for order, structure, and preservation of social norms. We
hypothesized that because people who score high on RWA are
motivated to preserve entrenched beliefs, they may often
fail to successfully update their beliefs when confronted
with new information. Using a novel paradigm, we challenged
participants' false beliefs and misconceptions to elicit
prediction error. In two studies, we found consistent
evidence that high-RWA individuals were less successful at
correcting their false beliefs. Relative to low-RWA
individuals, high-RWA individuals were less likely to revise
beliefs in response to prediction error. We argue that RWA
is associated with a relatively closed-minded cognitive
style that negatively influences belief updating.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-020-01767-y},
Key = {fds351200}
}
@article{fds350534,
Author = {Forrin, ND and Mills, C and D’Mello, SK and Risko, EF and Smilek, D and Seli, P},
Title = {TL;DR: Longer Sections of Text Increase Rates of
Unintentional Mind-Wandering},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Education},
Volume = {89},
Number = {2},
Pages = {278-290},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220973.2020.1751578},
Abstract = {The prevalence of the acronym tl;dr (“too long; didn’t
read”) suggests that people intentionally disengage their
attention from long sections of text. We studied this
real-world phenomenon in an educational context by measuring
rates of intentional and unintentional mind-wandering while
undergraduate student participants (n = 80) read academic
passages that were presented in either short sections of
text (one sentence per screen) or relatively long sections
(2–6 sentences per screen). We found that participants
were significantly more likely to unintentionally disengage
their attention while reading the longer sections of text,
whereas intentional mind-wandering rates were equivalent
across short and long sections of text. The difference in
unintentional mind-wandering rates suggests that section
length may serve as a cue that people use to assess the
cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in attending to (or
disengaging from) text. We conclude that instructors should
avoid presenting electronic reading material in long
sections of text.},
Doi = {10.1080/00220973.2020.1751578},
Key = {fds350534}
}
@article{fds352228,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Barr, N and Peters, K and Seli, P},
Title = {Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping
behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic},
Journal = {Thinking and Reasoning},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {464-477},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806},
Abstract = {The COVID-19 outbreak was labeled a global pandemic by the
WHO in March of 2020. During that same month, the number of
confirmed cases and the death rate grew exponentially in the
United States, creating a serious public-health emergency.
Unfortunately, many Americans dismissed the pandemic as a
hoax and failed to properly engage in helpful behaviors like
social-distancing and increased hand-washing. Here, we
examine a disposition—engagement in analytic-thinking—that
might predict beliefs that the pandemic is a hoax and
failures to change behavior in positive ways during that
critical early period in March. Our results indicate that
individuals less likely to engage effortful, deliberative,
and reflective cognitive processes were more likely to
believe the pandemic was a hoax and less likely to have
recently engaged in social-distancing and hand-washing in
March. We discuss possible implications of these results for
understanding and addressing the COVID-19
pandemic.},
Doi = {10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806},
Key = {fds352228}
}
@article{fds356998,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and Van Tilburg and W and Scholer, AA and Boylan, J and Seli,
P and Danckert, J},
Title = {Boredom proneness, political orientation and adherence to
social-distancing in the pandemic.},
Journal = {Motivation and emotion},
Volume = {45},
Number = {5},
Pages = {631-640},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11031-021-09888-0},
Abstract = {Research recently showed that boredom proneness was
associated with increased social distancing rule-breaking in
a sample collected early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we
explore data collected early in the pandemic to examine what
factors might drive this relation. We focus on political
affiliation. Given the functional account of boredom as a
call to action, we hypothesized that this urge to act may
drive individuals towards outlets replete with symbolic
value (e.g., ideology, identity). In addition, given the
politicization of some social distancing rules (e.g., mask
wearing), we explored whether those who adhere to strong
political ideologies-particularly conservative
ideologies-would be more likely to rule-break. Moderation
analyses indicated that boredom proneness and social (but
not fiscal) conservatism were indeed predictive of
rule-breaking. These results highlight the need for both
clear messaging emphasizing the strength of communal
identity and action (i.e., that "We are all in this
together") and for interventions that emphasize shared
collective values in contexts that appeal directly to social
conservatives.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11031-021-09888-0},
Key = {fds356998}
}
@article{fds346495,
Author = {Ralph, BCW and Smith, AC and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {The relation between task-unrelated media multitasking and
task-related motivation.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {85},
Number = {1},
Pages = {408-422},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01246-7},
Abstract = {In two experiments, we explored the relation between
participants' (a) levels of motivation to complete a task
and (b) task-unrelated media multitasking. In Experiment 1,
we examined the extent to which participants' levels of
motivation to complete a task influenced their tendency to
engage in task-unrelated media multitasking. Participants
completed a 1-back task, while having the opportunity to
turn on and off an unrelated, optional video. Results showed
that participants who were told they would finish the
experiment early if they achieved a sufficient level of
performance (the motivated group) were significantly less
likely to play the optional video during the 1-back task
than those who were not given the opportunity to finish
early (control condition). In Experiment 2, we examined the
extent to which engaging in task-unrelated media
multitasking affected task-related motivation. Three groups
of participants completed a 1-back task, while (a) no video
was presented, (b) a video was continuously played, or (c)
participants could turn on and off a video at their leisure
(as in Experiment 1). At both the beginning and the end of
Experiment 2, participants were asked to indicate their
level of motivation to complete the task. Interestingly,
results revealed that continuously having the video playing
helped sustain task-related motivation. Thus, although
greater motivation to perform a task reduces the likelihood
of engaging in task-unrelated media multitasking, such media
multitasking also appears to increase levels of
motivation.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-019-01246-7},
Key = {fds346495}
}
@article{fds354515,
Author = {Gross, ME and Smith, AP and Graveline, YM and Beaty, RE and Schooler,
JW and Seli, P},
Title = {Comparing the phenomenological qualities of
stimulus-independent thought, stimulus-dependent thought and
dreams using experience sampling.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {376},
Number = {1817},
Pages = {20190694},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0694},
Abstract = {Humans spend a considerable portion of their lives engaged
in 'stimulus-independent thoughts' (SIT), or mental activity
that occurs independently of input from the immediate
external environment. Although such SITs are, by definition,
different from thoughts that are driven by stimuli in one's
external environment (i.e. stimulus-dependent thoughts;
SDTs), at times, the phenomenology of these two types of
thought appears to be deceptively similar. But how similar
are they? We address this question by comparing the content
of two types of SIT (dreaming and waking SITs) with the
content of SDTs. In this 7 day, smartphone-based
experience-sampling procedure, participants were
intermittently probed during the day and night to indicate
whether their current thoughts were stimulus dependent or
stimulus independent. They then responded to content-based
items indexing the qualitative aspects of their experience
(e.g. My thoughts were jumping from topic to topic). Results
indicate substantial distinctiveness between these three
types of thought: significant differences between at least
two of the three mental states were found across every
measured variable. Implications are discussed. This article
is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary
and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching
external stimulation'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2019.0694},
Key = {fds354515}
}
@article{fds353330,
Author = {Boylan, J and Seli, P and Scholer, AA and Danckert,
J},
Title = {Boredom in the COVID-19 pandemic: Trait boredom proneness,
the desire to act, and rule-breaking.},
Journal = {Personality and individual differences},
Volume = {171},
Pages = {110387},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110387},
Abstract = {The state of boredom presents a conundrum: When bored, we
want to engage with an activity, but we don't want to engage
with whatever is currently available. This conflict is
exacerbated when external factors impose restrictions on the
range of behaviors we can engage in, which is precisely the
scenario we are currently facing, at a global level, during
this period of social isolation in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. We collected data from 924 North American
participants (530 Male, Mean age = 37.7 years) using the
internet-based Mturk platform to examine the relation
between self-reports of boredom proneness (using the Short
Boredom-Proneness Scale) and individual responses to
questions about compliance with social-distancing
requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our sample
replicated recent findings in boredom research, including a
negative correlation between boredom proneness and
self-control. We also provide novel evidence that highly
boredom prone people have been more likely to break the
rules of social isolation in a variety of ways (e.g., fewer
hours spent in social isolation, poor adherence to social
distancing as evidenced by increased likelihood of holding a
social gathering and coming into proximity with more people
than recommended). We further demonstrated that boredom
proneness substantially mediates the association between
self-control and rule-breaking. These results indicate that
boredom proneness is a critical factor to consider when
encouraging adherence to social isolation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.paid.2020.110387},
Key = {fds353330}
}
@article{fds355487,
Author = {Smallwood, J and Turnbull, A and Wang, H-T and Ho, NSP and Poerio, GL and Karapanagiotidis, T and Konu, D and Mckeown, B and Zhang, M and Murphy,
C and Vatansever, D and Bzdok, D and Konishi, M and Leech, R and Seli, P and Schooler, JW and Bernhardt, B and Margulies, DS and Jefferies,
E},
Title = {The neural correlates of ongoing conscious
thought.},
Journal = {iScience},
Volume = {24},
Number = {3},
Pages = {102132},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.102132},
Abstract = {A core goal in cognitive neuroscience is identifying the
physical substrates of the patterns of thought that occupy
our daily lives. Contemporary views suggest that the
landscape of ongoing experience is heterogeneous and can be
influenced by features of both the person and the context.
This perspective piece considers recent work that explicitly
accounts for both the heterogeneity of the experience and
context dependence of patterns of ongoing thought. These
studies reveal that systems linked to attention and control
are important for organizing experience in response to
changing environmental demands. These studies also establish
a role of the default mode network beyond task-negative or
purely episodic content, for example, implicating it in the
level of vivid detail in experience in both task contexts
and in spontaneous self-generated experiential states.
Together, this work demonstrates that the landscape of
ongoing thought is reflected in the activity of multiple
neural systems, and it is important to distinguish between
processes contributing to how the experience unfolds from
those linked to how these experiences are
regulated.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.isci.2021.102132},
Key = {fds355487}
}
@article{fds353535,
Author = {Frith, E and Elbich, DB and Christensen, AP and Rosenberg, MD and Chen,
Q and Kane, MJ and Silvia, PJ and Seli, P and Beaty,
RE},
Title = {Intelligence and creativity share a common cognitive and
neural basis.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {150},
Number = {4},
Pages = {609-632},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000958},
Abstract = {Are intelligence and creativity distinct abilities, or do
they rely on the same cognitive and neural systems? We
sought to quantify the extent to which intelligence and
creative cognition overlap in brain and behavior by
combining machine learning of fMRI data and latent variable
modeling of cognitive ability data in a sample of young
adults (<i>N</i> = 186) who completed a battery of
intelligence and creative thinking tasks. The study had 3
analytic goals: (a) to assess contributions of specific
facets of intelligence (e.g., fluid and crystallized
intelligence) and general intelligence to creative ability
(i.e., divergent thinking originality), (b) to model
whole-brain functional connectivity networks that predict
intelligence facets and creative ability, and (c) to
quantify the degree to which these predictive networks
overlap in the brain. Using structural equation modeling, we
found moderate to large correlations between intelligence
facets and creative ability, as well as a large correlation
between general intelligence and creative ability (<i>r</i>
= .63). Using connectome-based predictive modeling, we found
that functional brain networks that predict intelligence
facets overlap to varying degrees with a network that
predicts creative ability, particularly within the
prefrontal cortex of the executive control network. Notably,
a network that predicted general intelligence shared 46% of
its functional connections with a network that predicted
creative ability-including connections linking executive
control and salience/ventral attention networks-suggesting
that intelligence and creative thinking rely on similar
neural and cognitive systems. (PsycInfo Database Record (c)
2021 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000958},
Key = {fds353535}
}
@article{fds354593,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and Murray, S and Schooler, JW and Seli,
P},
Title = {Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes
explicit but not implicit sequence learning.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {209},
Pages = {104530},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104530},
Abstract = {According to the attentional resources account, mind
wandering (or "task-unrelated thought") is thought to
compete with a focal task for attentional resources. Here,
we tested two key predictions of this account: First, that
mind wandering should not interfere with performance on a
task that does not require attentional resources; second,
that as task requirements become automatized, performance
should improve and depth of mind wandering should increase.
Here, we used a serial reaction time task with implicit- and
explicit-learning groups to test these predictions.
Providing novel evidence for the attentional resource
account's first prediction, results indicated that depth of
mind wandering was negatively associated with learning in
the explicit, but not the implicit, group, indicating that
mind wandering is associated with impaired explicit, but not
implicit, learning. Corroborating the attention resource
account's second prediction, we also found that, overall,
performance improved while at the same time depth of mind
wandering increased. From an implicit-learning perspective,
these results are consistent with the claim that explicit
learning is impaired under attentional load, but implicit
learning is not. Data, analysis code, manuscript preparation
code, and pre-print available at osf.io/qzry7/.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104530},
Key = {fds354593}
}
@article{fds349003,
Author = {Seli, P and O'Neill, K and Carriere, JSA and Smilek, D and Beaty, RE and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Mind-Wandering Across the Age Gap: Age-Related Differences
in Mind-Wandering Are Partially Attributable to Age-Related
Differences in Motivation.},
Journal = {The journals of gerontology. Series B, Psychological
sciences and social sciences},
Volume = {76},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1264-1271},
Year = {2021},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa031},
Abstract = {<h4>Objectives</h4>A common finding in the mind-wandering
literature is that older adults (OAs) tend to mind-wander
less frequently than young adults (YAs). Here, we sought to
determine whether this age-related difference in
mind-wandering is attributable to age-related differences in
motivation.<h4>Method</h4>YAs and OAs completed an attention
task during which they responded to thought probes that
assessed rates of mind-wandering, and they provided
self-reports of task-based motivation before and after
completion of the attention task.<h4>Results</h4>Age-related
differences in mind-wandering are partially explained by
differences in motivation, and motivating YAs via incentive
diminishes mind-wandering differences across these
groups.<h4>Discussion</h4>We consider these results in the
context of theories on age-related differences in mind
wandering, with a specific focus on their relevance to the
recently proposed motivational account of such age-related
differences.},
Doi = {10.1093/geronb/gbaa031},
Key = {fds349003}
}
@article{fds359684,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and Murray, S and Schooler, JW and Seli,
P},
Title = {Thought dynamics under task demands: Evaluating the
influence of task difficulty on unconstrained
thought.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and
performance},
Volume = {47},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1298-1312},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000944},
Abstract = {As research on mind wandering has accelerated, the
construct's defining features have expanded and researchers
have begun to examine different dimensions of mind
wandering. Recently, Christoff and colleagues have argued
for the importance of investigating a hitherto neglected
variety of mind wandering: "unconstrained thought," or,
thought that is relatively unguided by executive-control
processes. To date, with only a few studies investigating
unconstrained thought, little is known about this intriguing
type of mind wandering. Across 2 experiments, we examined,
for the first time, whether changes in task demand influence
rates of constrained versus unconstrained thoughts. In both
experiments, participants completed either an easy (0-back)
or hard (2-back) task and responded to intermittently
presented thought probes that gauged thought constraint
throughout the task. In Experiment 1, we found that
participants completing the easy task engaged in
unconstrained thoughts more frequently than those completing
the difficult task. In Experiment 2, we replicated this
result and further demonstrated manipulations of
unconstrained thought while also measuring task-relatedness
(a common dimension of mind wandering). Finally, exploratory
analyses showed associations between constrained thought and
age, verbal intelligence, and an assessment of flow ('deep
effortless concentration'), thereby adding further evidence
to indicate a dissociation between task-relatedness and
constraint. We discuss the methodological and theoretical
applications of our findings to the burgeoning field of
research on unconstrained thought. All data, analysis,
article, and experiment code can be found at
https://osf.io/wr2vk/ (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021
APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xhp0000944},
Key = {fds359684}
}
@article{fds365320,
Author = {Murray, S and Liang, N and Brosowsky, N and Seli,
P},
Title = {What are the benefits of mind wandering to
creativity?},
Journal = {Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the
Arts},
Publisher = {American Psychological Association (APA)},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aca0000420},
Doi = {10.1037/aca0000420},
Key = {fds365320}
}
@article{fds358357,
Author = {Whitehead, PS and Mahmoud, Y and Seli, P and Egner,
T},
Title = {Mind wandering at encoding, but not at retrieval, disrupts
one-shot stimulus-control learning.},
Journal = {Attention, perception & psychophysics},
Volume = {83},
Number = {7},
Pages = {2968-2982},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13414-021-02343-9},
Abstract = {The one-shot pairing of a stimulus with a specific cognitive
control process, such as task switching, can bind the two
together in memory. The episodic control-binding hypothesis
posits that the formation of temporary stimulus-control
bindings, which are held in event-files supported by
episodic memory, can guide the contextually appropriate
application of cognitive control. Across two experiments, we
sought to examine the role of task-focused attention in the
encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings in
episodic event-files. In Experiment 1, we obtained
self-reports of mind wandering during encoding and
implementation of stimulus-control bindings. Results
indicated that, whereas mind wandering during the
implementation of stimulus-control bindings does not
decrease their efficacy, mind wandering during the encoding
of these control-state associations interferes with their
successful deployment at a later point. In Experiment 2, we
complemented these results by using trial-by-trial
pupillometry to measure attention, again demonstrating that
attention levels at encoding predict the subsequent
implementation of stimulus-control bindings better than
attention levels at implementation. These results suggest
that, although encoding stimulus-control bindings in
episodic memory requires active attention and engagement,
once encoded, these bindings are automatically deployed to
guide behavior when the stimulus recurs. These findings
expand our understanding of how cognitive control processes
are integrated into episodic event files.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13414-021-02343-9},
Key = {fds358357}
}
@article{fds352390,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Smith, AP and Smilek, D and Seli, P},
Title = {Dissociating the freely-moving thought dimension of
mind-wandering from the intentionality and task-unrelated
thought dimensions.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {85},
Number = {7},
Pages = {2599-2609},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01419-9},
Abstract = {The recently forwarded family-resemblances framework of
mind-wandering argues that mind-wandering is a
multidimensional construct consisting of a variety of
exemplars. On this view, membership in the mind-wandering
family is graded along various dimensions that define more
or less prototypical instances of mind-wandering. In recent
work, three dimensions that have played a prominent role in
defining prototypicality within the mind-wandering family
include: (a) task-relatedness (i.e., how related the content
of a thought is to an ongoing task), (b) intentionality
(i.e., whether thought is deliberately or spontaneously
engaged), and (c) thought constraint (i.e., how much
attention constrains thought dynamics). One concern,
however, is that these dimensions may be redundant with each
other. The utility of distinguishing among these different
dimensions of mind-wandering rests upon a demonstration that
they are dissociable. To shed light on this issue, we
indexed the task-relatedness, intentionality, and constraint
dimensions of thought during the completion of a laboratory
task to evaluate how these dimensions relate to each other.
We found that 56% of unconstrained thoughts were "on-task"
and that 23% of constrained thoughts were "off-task."
Moreover, we found that rates of off-task thought, but not
"freely-moving" (i.e., unconstrained) thought, varied as a
function of expected changes in task demands, confirming
that task-relatedness and thought constraint are separable
dimensions. Participants also reported 21% of intentional
off-task thoughts that were freely moving and 9% of
unintentional off-task thoughts that were constrained.
Finally, off-task thoughts were more likely to be
freely-moving than unintentional. Taken together, the
results suggest that these three dimensions of
mind-wandering are not redundant with one
another.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-020-01419-9},
Key = {fds352390}
}
@article{fds363784,
Author = {Lopata, JA and Barr, N and Slayton, M and Seli, P},
Title = {Dual-Modes of Creative Thought in the Classroom:
Implications of Network Neuroscience for Creativity
Education},
Journal = {Translational Issues in Psychological Science},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-89},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/tps0000317},
Abstract = {Students experience varying engagement levels and modes of
thought in educational contexts, and educators have
substantial influence on those attributes of student
engagement. When designing lessons, educators typically
utilize Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives;
however, there are calls for education planning to be more
empirically grounded and supportive of creativity. Previous
to the past decade, creativity neuroscientists have focused
on small-scale regional attributions of cognitive processes
to specific brain areas. The most recent decade, however,
has seen a trend toward a large-scale view attributing
cognitive processes to whole-brain networks. Several
networks have been identified, and two—the default mode
network and executive control network—have been implicated
in creative cognition. These networks appear to interact,
and neuroscientists have associated them with dual-process
models delineating generative and evaluative phases of the
creative process, type I and type II cognitive processes,
and associative and analytic modes of thought. In the
current article, we draw on cognitive science and creativity
neuroscience research to advance the notion that modes of
creative thought are legitimate and important
creativitysupportive learning objectives. Given that
creativity is a 21st century educational priority, it is
imperative for educators to begin considering how to design
creativitysupportive learning experiences with these modes
at the front of their minds. Recommendations for educational
practice and future research directions are
provided.},
Doi = {10.1037/tps0000317},
Key = {fds363784}
}
@article{fds355374,
Author = {Smith, AC and Brosowsky, NP and Ralph, BCW and Smilek, D and Seli,
P},
Title = {Re-examining the effect of motivation on intentional and
unintentional task-unrelated thought: accounting for thought
constraint produces novel results.},
Journal = {Psychological research},
Volume = {86},
Number = {1},
Pages = {87-97},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-021-01487-5},
Abstract = {It has been proposed that motivating participants to perform
well on a cognitive task ought to lead to decreases in rates
of intentional, but not unintentional, task-unrelated
thought (TUT; a commonly studied variety of mind wandering).
However, at odds with this prediction, research has found
that increasing motivation results in decreases in both
intentional and unintentional TUTs. One possible explanation
for this surprising finding is that standard assessments of
TUT may inadvertently conflate TUTs with another variety of
mind wandering: unconstrained thought. If so, then
deconfounding task-unrelated and unconstrained varieties of
mind wandering might produce the predicted effect of a
decrease in intentional, but not unintentional, TUT when
motivation is increased. To explore this possibility, in the
present study, participants completed a sustained-attention
task after receiving standard instructions
(normal-motivation condition) or instructions informing them
that they could leave the study early if they achieved a
certain level of performance (motivated condition).
Throughout the task, we assessed rates of TUT (both
intentional and unintentional) and unconstrained thoughts.
Consistent with prior work, the results indicated that
motivated participants reported being on-task significantly
more frequently than non-motivated participants. However,
unlike previous work, we found that when deconfounding TUTs
and unconstrained thoughts, participants in the motivation
condition reported significantly fewer bouts of intentional
TUT than those in the non-motivation condition, but no
differences in rates of unintentional TUT were observed
between groups. These results suggest that (a) motivation
specifically targets intentional TUT and (b) standard
assessments of TUT conflate task-relatedness and thought
constraint.},
Doi = {10.1007/s00426-021-01487-5},
Key = {fds355374}
}
@article{fds362204,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and Smith, AC and Smilek, D and Seli,
P},
Title = {On the relation between mind wandering, PTSD symptomology,
and self-control.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {99},
Pages = {103288},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2022.103288},
Abstract = {Here we examined the association between mind wandering,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomology, and
self-control. In a large undergraduate sample (N = 5,387),
we assessed trait-levels of spontaneous and deliberate mind
wandering, self-control, and PTSD symptomology. Results
indicated that, while PTSD symptomology was uniquely
positively associated with spontaneous mind wandering, it
was negatively associated with deliberate mind wandering and
self-control. These findings suggest that the mechanism(s)
underlying everyday mind wandering may also underlie PTSD
symptomology and traumatic intrusions. Moreover, the unique
negative association between PTSD symptomatology and
self-control suggests that PTSD is characterized not only by
impairments in inhibiting unwanted thoughts (as indexed by
mind wandering), but also by impairments in inhibiting other
unwanted behaviors.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2022.103288},
Key = {fds362204}
}
@article{fds362484,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and Barr, N and Mugon, J and Scholer, AA and Seli, P and Danckert, J},
Title = {Creativity, Boredom Proneness and Well-Being in the
Pandemic.},
Journal = {Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland)},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {68},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs12030068},
Abstract = {Throughout the course of the pandemic, it has become clear
that the strictures of social isolation and various levels
of lockdown constraints have impacted people's well-being.
Here, our aim was to explore relations between trait
dispositions associated with boredom proneness,
self-regulation and well-being using data collected early in
the pandemic. Specifically, we explored whether the tendency
to engage in everyday creative pursuits (e.g., making your
own greeting cards) would act as a prophylactic against poor
well-being. Results showed that well-being was higher for
those individuals who increased engagement with creative
pursuits during the early stages of the pandemic. That is,
people who engaged more in everyday creative activities also
reported higher levels of self-esteem, optimism, and
positive affect. In contrast, those who pursued fewer
creative outlets had higher levels of depression and
anxiety, were higher in boredom proneness, and reported
experiencing more negative affect. As we emerge from the
pandemic, these data provide a clue as to how people might
plan to cope adaptively with the restrictive circumstances
this extreme world event engendered. More generally, these
data provide support for the notion that everyday creativity
(and not necessarily creative expertise) has positive
associations for well-being.},
Doi = {10.3390/bs12030068},
Key = {fds362484}
}
@article{fds362784,
Author = {Ragnhildstveit, A and Slayton, M and Jackson, LK and Brendle, M and Ahuja, S and Holle, W and Moore, C and Sollars, K and Seli, P and Robison,
R},
Title = {Ketamine as a Novel Psychopharmacotherapy for Eating
Disorders: Evidence and Future Directions.},
Journal = {Brain sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {382},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci12030382},
Abstract = {Eating disorders (EDs) are serious, life-threatening
psychiatric conditions associated with physical and
psychosocial impairment, as well as high morbidity and
mortality. Given the chronic refractory nature of EDs and
the paucity of evidence-based treatments, there is a
pressing need to identify novel approaches for this
population. The noncompetitive N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor
(NMDAr) antagonist, ketamine, has recently been approved for
treatment-resistant depression, exerting rapid and robust
antidepressant effects. It is now being investigated for
several new indications, including obsessive-compulsive,
post-traumatic, and substance use disorder, and shows
transdiagnostic potential for EDs, particularly among
clinical nonresponders. Hence, the aim of this review is to
examine contemporary findings on the treatment of EDs with
ketamine, whether used as a primary, adjunctive, or
combination psychopharmacotherapy. Avenues for future
research are also discussed. Overall, results are
encouraging and point to therapeutic value; however, are
limited to case series and reports on anorexia nervosa.
Further empirical research is thus needed to explore
ketamine efficacy across ED subgroups, establish safety
profiles and optimize dosing, and develop theory-driven,
targeted treatment strategies at the individual patient
level.},
Doi = {10.3390/brainsci12030382},
Key = {fds362784}
}
@article{fds363702,
Author = {Smith, AP and Brosowsky, N and Murray, S and Daniel, R and Meier, ME and Seli, P},
Title = {Fixation, flexibility, and creativity: The dynamics of mind
wandering.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and
performance},
Volume = {48},
Number = {7},
Pages = {689-710},
Year = {2022},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0001012},
Abstract = {The mind-wandering literature is long on results and short
on theory. One notable exception is the <i>Dynamic
Framework,</i> a theoretical framework that characterizes
mind wandering as thoughts that are relatively unconstrained
from deliberate and automatic sources, or "freely moving."
Critically, this framework makes numerous testable
predictions, including (a) a positive association between
freely moving thought and ADHD, (b) negative associations
between freely moving thought and depression, anxiety, and
OCD, and (c) a positive association between freely moving
thought and divergent thinking ability. In Study 1, to test
these predictions, we measured participants' reports of
freely moving thoughts during a cognitive task and assessed
divergent thinking and various psychopathological symptoms.
Results failed to support any of the Dynamic Framework's
predictions. In Study 2, we assessed the predicted relations
between freely moving thought and divergent-thinking
performance by manipulating thought constraint during a
creative-incubation interval that preceded a
divergent-thinking task. Here, we found some evidence
(albeit very weak) to support the Dynamic Framework's
prediction. Finally, in Study 3, we examined the possibility
that indexing freely moving thought <i>during</i> a
divergent-thinking task would yield the predicted
associations but failed to find support for these
associations. These results, most of which are at odds with
the predictions of the Dynamic Framework, suggest either the
need to revise the framework and/or that current methods are
inadequate to properly test these predictions. (PsycInfo
Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights
reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xhp0001012},
Key = {fds363702}
}
@article{fds363196,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Whitehead, PS and Marsh, EJ and Seli,
P},
Title = {Prior exposure increases judged truth even during periods of
mind wandering.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {29},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1997-2007},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-022-02101-4},
Abstract = {Much of our day is spent mind-wandering-periods of
inattention characterized by a lack of awareness of external
stimuli and information. Whether we are paying attention or
not, information surrounds us constantly-some true and some
false. The proliferation of false information in news and
social media highlights the critical need to understand the
psychological mechanisms underlying our beliefs about what
is true. People often rely on heuristics to judge the truth
of information. For example, repeated information is more
likely to be judged as true than new information (i.e., the
illusory truth effect). However, despite the prevalence of
mind wandering in our daily lives, current research on the
contributing factors to the illusory truth effect have
largely ignored periods of inattention as experimentally
informative. Here, we aim to address this gap in our
knowledge, investigating whether mind wandering during
initial exposure to information has an effect on later
belief in the truth of that information. That is, does the
illusory truth effect occur even when people report not
paying attention to the information at hand. Across three
studies we demonstrate that even during periods of mind
wandering, the repetition of information increases truth
judgments. Further, our results suggest that the severity of
mind wandering moderated truth ratings, such that greater
levels of mind wandering decreased truth judgements for
previously presented information.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-022-02101-4},
Key = {fds363196}
}
@article{fds352862,
Author = {Brosowsky, NP and DeGutis, J and Esterman, M and Smilek, D and Seli,
P},
Title = {Mind Wandering, Motivation, and Task Performance Over Time:
Evidence That Motivation Insulates People From the Negative
Effects of Mind Wandering},
Journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory Research, and
Practice},
Volume = {10},
Number = {4},
Pages = {475-486},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000263},
Abstract = {In the current study, we examined whether participant
motivation was associated with fluctuations of attentional
engagement and performance over time. We gauged
participants’ motivation and depth of mind wandering as
they completed the metronome response task to determine
whether fluctuations in inattention (indexed by task
performance and depth of mind wandering) would be related to
fluctuations in motivation. As in prior work, we found that,
with increasing time on task, (a) self-reported depth of
mind wandering increased, (b) task performance decreased,
and (c) motivation waned. Extending this work, we found an
interaction between motivation and mind wandering such that
mind wandering was negatively associated with task
performance when motivation was low, but unrelated to
performance when motivation was high. These results suggest
that motivation may help improve task performance by
reducing the depth of mind wandering, while also providing
insulation from the negative effects of mind wandering, when
it does occur.},
Doi = {10.1037/cns0000263},
Key = {fds352862}
}
@article{fds362396,
Author = {Jansen, EJ and Danckert, J and Seli, P and Scholer,
AA},
Title = {Under pressure: Locomotion and assessment in the COVID-19
pandemic},
Journal = {Self and Identity},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-18},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2022.2036635},
Abstract = {The COVID-19 pandemic poses unique opportunities to explore
how fundamental self-regulatory variables affect responses
to the pandemic. We examine how two critical self-regulatory
orientations, locomotion and assessment, relate to
psychological distress and obeying public health guidelines
using secondary data analysis. In the initial pandemic
stages (April and May, 2020), North American participants (N
= 924) completed measures of chronic locomotion and
assessment, pandemic behaviors and feelings, and various
individual-differences. Analyses revealed that assessment,
but not locomotion, was indirectly associated with greater
pandemic rule-breaking and psychological distress through
the fear of missing out, difficulty engaging in activities,
and engagement in negative activities. We discuss why the
vulnerabilities of assessment, and not locomotion, may be
particularly sensitive to pandemic-related
constraints.},
Doi = {10.1080/15298868.2022.2036635},
Key = {fds362396}
}
@article{fds367264,
Author = {Smith, AC and Brosowsky, NP and Caron, EE and Seli, P and Smilek,
D},
Title = {Examining the relation between mind wandering and unhealthy
eating behaviours},
Journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
Volume = {200},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111908},
Abstract = {In the present study, we explored how individual differences
in the tendency to mind-wander are related to unhealthy
eating behaviours (i.e., eating habits and eating-disorder
symptoms). Given that eating-disorders are associated with
inhibition (extreme control) and impulsivity (a lack of
control), we were interested in how unhealthy eating
behaviours might relate to both spontaneous mind-wandering,
which is often construed as a failure of executive control,
and deliberate mind-wandering, which is thought to occur via
controlled processes. To ensure that any observed relations
were not driven by self-control, we also measured and
statistically controlled for this variable. In a large,
non-clinical sample (N = 2328), regression analyses
predicting each of the eating measures with self-control,
spontaneous mind-wandering, and deliberate mind-wandering
revealed that self-control and spontaneous mind-wandering
were significantly positively predictive of unhealthy eating
behaviours, whereas deliberate mind-wandering did not
significantly predict these measures. These findings suggest
that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind-wandering has a
robust unique relation with unhealthy eating behaviours,
even when controlling for self-control.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.paid.2022.111908},
Key = {fds367264}
}
@article{fds369859,
Author = {Ragnhildstveit, A and Kaiyo, M and Snyder, MB and Jackson, LK and Lopez,
A and Mayo, C and Miranda, AC and August, RJ and Seli, P and Robison, R and Averill, LA},
Title = {Cannabis-assisted psychotherapy for complex dissociative
posttraumatic stress disorder: A case report.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychiatry},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {1051542},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1051542},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>A dissociative subtype of posttraumatic
stress disorder, known as "D-PTSD", has been included in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition. In addition to meeting criteria for PTSD, patients
endorse prominent dissociative symptoms, namely
depersonalization and derealization, or detachment from
one's self and surroundings. At present, this population is
supported by a highly heterogeneous and undeveloped
literature. Targeted interventions are therefore lacking,
and those indicated for PTSD are limited by poor efficacy,
delayed onset of action, and low patient engagement. Here,
we introduce cannabis-assisted psychotherapy (CAP) as a
novel treatment for D-PTSD, drawing parallels to psychedelic
therapy.<h4>Case presentation</h4>A 28-year-old female
presented with complex D-PTSD. In a naturalistic setting,
she underwent 10 sessions of CAP, scheduled twice monthly
over 5 months, coupled with integrative cognitive behavioral
therapy. An autonomic and relational approach to CAP was
leveraged, specifically psychedelic somatic interactional
psychotherapy. Acute effects included oceanic boundlessness,
ego dissolution, and emotional breakthrough. From baseline
to post-treatment, the patient showed a 98.5% reduction in
pathological dissociation, as measured by the
Multidimensional Inventory of Dissociation, no longer
meeting criteria for D-PTSD. This was accompanied by
decreased cognitive distractibility and emotional suffering,
as well as increased psychosocial functioning. Anecdotally,
the patient has sustained improvements for over 2 years to
date.<h4>Conclusions</h4>There is urgency to identify
treatments for D-PTSD. The present case, while inherently
limited, underscores the potential of CAP as a therapeutic
option, leading to robust and sustained improvement.
Subjective effects were comparable to those produced by
classic and non-classic psychedelics, such as psilocybin and
ketamine. Further research is warranted to explore,
establish, and optimize CAP in D-PTSD, and to characterize
its role in the pharmacological landscape.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1051542},
Key = {fds369859}
}
@article{fds372414,
Author = {Bellaiche, L and Smith, AP and Barr, N and Christensen, A and Williams,
C and Ragnhildstveit, A and Schooler, J and Beaty, R and Chatterjee, A and Seli, P},
Title = {Back to the basics: Abstract painting as an index of
creativity},
Journal = {Creativity Research Journal},
Volume = {35},
Number = {4},
Pages = {698-713},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10400419.2023.2243100},
Abstract = {Researchers have invested a great deal in creating reliable,
“gold-standard” creativity assessments that can be
administered in controlled laboratory settings, though these
efforts have come at the cost of not using ecologically and
face-valid tasks. To help fill this critical gap, we
developed and implemented a novel, face-valid paradigm that
required participants to paint abstract pieces of art, which
were later rated for creative quality. We first sought to
evaluate whether there was good convergence among creativity
ratings provided by independent raters. Next, we examined
whether its measure of creativity correlated with (a)
existing creativity measures and (b) individual traits (e.g.
openness, fluid intelligence) that are typically correlated
with indices of creativity. Our findings indicate that our
abstract-painting paradigm is feasible to implement
(independent ratings of the creativity of the paintings
converged well), and that its measure of creativity
significantly correlated with some of the gold-standard
indices of creativity (thereby providing convergent
validity). These findings suggest that having participants
engage in abstract painting provides a valid index of
creativity, thereby opening new opportunities for future
research to index a more-face-valid measure of
creativity.},
Doi = {10.1080/10400419.2023.2243100},
Key = {fds372414}
}
@article{fds374573,
Author = {Ragnhildstveit, A and Khan, R and Seli, P and Bass, LC and August, RJ and Kaiyo, M and Barr, N and Jackson, LK and Gaffrey, MS and Barsuglia, JP and Averill, LA},
Title = {5-MeO-DMT for post-traumatic stress disorder: a real-world
longitudinal case study.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychiatry},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {1271152},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1271152},
Abstract = {Psychedelic therapy is, arguably, the next frontier in
psychiatry. It offers a radical alternative to longstanding,
mainstays of treatment, while exciting a paradigm shift in
translational science and drug discovery. There is
particular interest in 5-methoxy-<i>N,N</i>-dimethyltryptamine
(5-MeO-DMT)-a serotonergic psychedelic-as a novel,
fast-acting therapeutic. Yet, few studies have directly
examined 5-MeO-DMT for trauma- or stress-related
psychopathology, including post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Herein, we present the first longitudinal case study
on 5-MeO-DMT for chronic refractory PTSD, in a 23-year-old
female. A single dose of vaporized bufotoxin of the Sonoran
Desert Toad (<i>Incilius alvarius</i>), containing an
estimated 10-15 mg of 5-MeO-DMT, led to clinically
significant improvements in PTSD, with next-day effects.
This was accompanied by marked reductions in hopelessness
and related suicide risk. Improvements, across all
constructs, were sustained at 1-, 3-, 6-, and 12-months
follow-up, as monitored by a supporting clinician. The
subject further endorsed a complete mystical experience,
hypothesized to underly 5-MeO-DMT's therapeutic activity. No
drug-related, serious adverse events occurred. Together,
results showed that 5-MeO-DMT was generally tolerable, safe
to administer, and effective for PTSD; however, this was not
without risk. The subject reported acute nausea,
overwhelming subjective effects, and late onset of night
terrors. Further research is warranted to replicate and
extend these findings, which are inherently limited,
non-generalizable, and rely on methods not clinically
accepted.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1271152},
Key = {fds374573}
}
@article{fds369746,
Author = {Brendle, M and Ragnhildstveit, A and Slayton, M and Smart, L and Cunningham, S and Zimmerman, MH and Seli, P and Gaffrey, MS and Averill,
LA and Robison, R},
Title = {Registered clinical trials investigating ketamine and
esketamine for treatment-resistant depression: A systematic
review},
Journal = {Journal of Psychedelic Studies},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {176-187},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/2054.2022.00234},
Abstract = {Background and Aims: Ketamine and esketamine have garnered
interest in both psychiatric research and clinical practice
for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). In this review, we
examined registered trials investigating the therapeutic use
of ketamine or esketamine for TRD, with the aim of
characterizing emerging trends and knowledge gaps. Methods:
The ClinicalTrials.gov electronic registry and results
database was queried from inception to February 5, 2022,
adhering to elements of the PRISMA guideline, we evaluated
trial eligibility in the qualitative synthesis. Data
regarding study design, drug regimens, and measures were
subsequently abstracted and descriptively analyzed. Results:
The search returned 86 records, of which 56 trials were
included in the final review. The number of trials
investigating ketamine and esketamine for TRD increased
since 2008, with higher peaks observed in 2015 (n = 9) and
2021 (n = 9). Most trials were Phase 2 (13, 23.2%) or Phase
3 (11, 19.6%), gathering preliminary data on efficacy and/or
further data on safety and efficacy with variant dosing and
pharmacological approaches. By and large, trials examined
ketamine and esketamine as individual versus combination
treatments (45% and 25%, respectively). The
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS) was most
commonly used to assess clinical outcomes (75%).
Conclusions: There are increasingly large-scale and
late-phase trials of esketamine over ketamine for TRD,
coupled with efforts to centralize evidence on these
medications. Yet several trials do not assess patient
characteristics that may affect treatment response, such as
age, sex, and race. By understanding these design
limitations, scientists and clinicians can avoid research
waste and funding bodies can judiciously direct support
towards high priority research.},
Doi = {10.1556/2054.2022.00234},
Key = {fds369746}
}
@article{fds364337,
Author = {Landry, AP and Schooler, JW and Willer, R and Seli,
P},
Title = {Reducing Explicit Blatant Dehumanization by Correcting
Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions},
Journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {407-418},
Year = {2023},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/19485506221099146},
Abstract = {If explicitly, blatantly dehumanizing a group of
people—overtly characterizing them as less than
human—facilitates harming them, then reversing this
process is paramount. Addressing dehumanization among
American political partisans appears especially crucial,
given that it has been linked to their anti-democratic
hostility. Perhaps because of its overt nature, partisans
recognize—and greatly exaggerate—the extent to which
out-partisans explicitly, blatantly dehumanize them. Past
research has found that when people perceive they are
dehumanized by an outgroup (i.e., meta-dehumanization), they
respond with reciprocal dehumanization. Therefore, we
reasoned that partisans’ dehumanization could be reduced
by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. Indeed,
across three preregistered studies (N = 4,154), an
intervention correcting American partisans’ exaggerated
meta-dehumanization reduced their own dehumanization of
out-partisans. This decreased dehumanization persisted at a
1-week follow-up and predicted downstream reductions in
partisans’ anti-democratic hostility, suggesting that
correcting exaggerated meta-dehumanization can durably
mitigate the dark specter of dehumanization.},
Doi = {10.1177/19485506221099146},
Key = {fds364337}
}
@article{fds371795,
Author = {Bellaiche, L and Shahi, R and Turpin, MH and Ragnhildstveit, A and Sprockett, S and Barr, N and Christensen, A and Seli,
P},
Title = {Humans versus AI: whether and why we prefer human-created
compared to AI-created artwork.},
Journal = {Cognitive research: principles and implications},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {42},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s41235-023-00499-6},
Abstract = {With the recent proliferation of advanced artificial
intelligence (AI) models capable of mimicking human
artworks, AI creations might soon replace products of human
creativity, although skeptics argue that this outcome is
unlikely. One possible reason this may be unlikely is that,
independent of the physical properties of art, we place
great value on the imbuement of the human experience in art.
An interesting question, then, is whether and why people
might prefer human-compared to AI-created artworks. To
explore these questions, we manipulated the purported
creator of pieces of art by randomly assigning a
"Human-created" or "AI-created" label to paintings actually
created by AI, and then assessed participants' judgements of
the artworks across four rating criteria (Liking, Beauty,
Profundity, and Worth). Study 1 found increased positive
judgements for human- compared to AI-labelled art across
all criteria. Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1
with additional ratings (Emotion, Story, Meaningful, Effort,
and Time to create) intended to elucidate why people
more-positively appraise Human-labelled artworks. The main
findings from Study 1 were replicated, with narrativity
(Story) and perceived effort behind artworks (Effort)
moderating the label effects ("Human-created" vs.
"AI-created"), but only for the sensory-level judgements
(Liking, Beauty). Positive personal attitudes toward
AI moderated label effects for more-communicative
judgements (Profundity, Worth). These studies demonstrate
that people tend to be negatively biased against AI-created
artworks relative to purportedly human-created artwork, and
suggest that knowledge of human engagement in the artistic
process contributes positively to appraisals of
art.},
Doi = {10.1186/s41235-023-00499-6},
Key = {fds371795}
}
@article{fds376292,
Author = {Petranker, R and Anderson, T and Fewster, EC and Aberman, Y and Hazan,
M and Gaffrey, M and Seli, P},
Title = {Keeping the promise: a critique of the current state of
microdosing research.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychiatry},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {1217102},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2024.1217102},
Abstract = {<h4>Introduction</h4>The practice of taking small,
sub-hallucinogenic doses of psychedelics, known as
microdosing, has exploded in popularity over the last
decade. Users claim benefits ranging from improved mood and
enhanced creativity to an increased sense of meaning and
connectedness in life. While research on microdosing is
still lagging behind the shift in public opinion, several
papers have been published in the last five years which
attempted to assess the effects of microdosing.<h4>Methods</h4>This
review paper aimed to critically analyze the research
practices used in the recent wave of microdosing research:
We reviewed 15 papers published before the closing date of
this review in March 2022.<h4>Results</h4>Our review
concludes that it is premature to draw any conclusions about
the efficacy or safety of microdosing since the research
quality cannot be considered confirmatory.<h4>Discussion</h4>We
propose some potential causes for the current state of the
literature and some suggestions for how these causes may be
ameliorated.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2024.1217102},
Key = {fds376292}
}
@article{fds376092,
Author = {Landry, AP and Seli, P},
Title = {A family-resemblances framework for dehumanization
research},
Journal = {Current Research in Ecological and Social
Psychology},
Volume = {6},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cresp.2024.100185},
Abstract = {Dehumanization has figured prominently in intergroup
discrimination and violence, which has inspired sustained
social-psychological inquiry. Over two decades, researchers
have brought an abundance of theories and methods to bear on
the empirical study of dehumanization. Collectively, this
work has painted an expansive portrait of the many ways we
can overlook or deny the humanity of others. At the same
time, these diverse conceptual and measurement approaches
have progressed in relative isolation, which has created
confusion about what, precisely, is meant by
“dehumanization” and cast uncertainty on fundamental
conclusions drawn from this research. To stimulate
theoretical development and more-productive exchanges across
the field, we offer a Family-Resemblances perspective on
dehumanization research. Specifically, we conceptualize
dehumanization as a multifaceted construct that encompasses
a family of related processes with both overlapping and
unique features. Thus, the diverse theoretical and
methodological approaches to studying dehumanization are
complementary means of capturing a fundamentally
heterogeneous phenomenon. Further, we argue that this
perspective can catalyze a more nuanced and precise
understanding of dehumanization's many facets: by specifying
the different varieties of dehumanization under
investigation, the field can more precisely map them onto
specific targets, causes, consequences, and intervention
strategies.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cresp.2024.100185},
Key = {fds376092}
}
@article{fds376908,
Author = {Cárdenas-Egúsquiza, AL and Seli, P and Berntsen,
D},
Title = {Associations Between Autobiographical Memory and Dreaming:
An Individual-Differences Approach},
Journal = {Dreaming},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/drm0000264},
Abstract = {Autobiographical memory and dreaming are ubiquitous in
everyday life. The study of their relation has largely been
assessed using experimental approaches, abstracting from
individual differences, despite evidence of stable
individual differences in both mental processes. Here, we
examined, for the first time, whether individual differences
in the recollective experience of autobiographical memory
(measured by the Autobiographical Recollection Test [ART];
Berntsen et al., 2019) are associated with individual
differences in dreaming (measured by the Inventory of Dream
Experiences and Attitudes, BeaulieuPrévost et al., 2009) in
a sample of 246 participants. The ART showed consistent and
robust associations with five out of seven aspects of
dreaming, demonstrating that the way people generally
remember their personal past is reliably related to the way
they experience their dreams. The findings provide new
perspectives on the role of autobiographical memory in
dreaming as well as on the continuity hypothesis of
dreaming.},
Doi = {10.1037/drm0000264},
Key = {fds376908}
}
@article{fds374608,
Author = {Landry, AP and Fincher, K and Barr, N and Brosowsky, NP and Protzko, J and Ariely, D and Seli, P},
Title = {Harnessing dehumanization theory, modern media, and an
intervention tournament to reduce support for retributive
war crimes},
Journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
Volume = {111},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104567},
Abstract = {We demonstrate how psychological scientists can curate
rich-yet-accessible media to intervene on
conflict-escalating attitudes during the earliest stages of
violent conflicts. Although wartime atrocities all-too-often
ignite destructive cycles of tit-for-tat war crimes,
powerful third parties can de-escalate the bloodshed.
Therefore, following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine,
we aimed to reduce Americans' support for committing
retributive war crimes against Russian soldiers. To
intervene during the earliest stages of the invasion, we
drew on theories of dehumanization and “parasocial”
intergroup contact to curate publicly available media
expected to humanize Russian soldiers. We then identified
the most effective materials by simultaneously evaluating
all of them with an intervention tournament. This allowed us
to quickly implement a psychological intervention that
reliably reduced support for war crimes during the first
days of a momentous land war. Our work provides a practical,
result-driven model for developing psychological
interventions with the potential to de-escalate incipient
conflicts.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104567},
Key = {fds374608}
}
@article{fds376752,
Author = {Ragnhildstveit, A and Tuteja, N and Seli, P and Smart, L and Uzun, N and Bass, LC and Miranda, AC and Ford, TJ and Neufeld,
SAS},
Title = {Transitions from child and adolescent to adult mental health
services for eating disorders: an in-depth systematic review
and development of a transition framework.},
Journal = {Journal of eating disorders},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {36},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40337-024-00984-3},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>Eating disorders (EDs) peak in
mid-to-late adolescence and often persist into adulthood.
Given their early onset and chronicity, many patients
transition from child and adolescent mental health services
(CAMHS) to adult mental health services (AMHS) for ongoing,
speciality ED care. This transition typically occurs at
18 years of age, when important biological, psychosocial,
and vocational changes take place. Thus, smooth and
effective transitions are paramount for ensuring service
continuity, as well as reducing the risk of ED relapse and
premature death. Here, we synthesized evidence on
transitions from CAMHS to AMHS for young people with EDs,
aiming to inform future research, clinical practice, and
healthcare policy.<h4>Methods</h4>A systematic review of the
literature was conducted. This adhered to PRISMA guidelines.
PubMed, Embase, and Scopus electronic databases were queried
from inception to December 3, 2023. Leveraging the PICOS
framework, study eligibility was evaluated in the
qualitative synthesis. Data regarding methodology, analytic
approach, and associated outcomes were then extracted. The
quality of evidence was examined using critical appraisal
tools. Finally, concept mapping was applied to organize
findings into a transition framework.<h4>Results</h4>The
search returned 76 articles. Of these, 14 were included in
the final review. Articles were grouped into 'qualitative'
(n = 10), 'cross-sectional' (n = 2), and
'longitudinal cohort' (n = 2) studies based on
research design. Overall, ED transitions were complex,
multifaceted, and challenging for patients, caregivers, and
providers alike. This resulted from an interplay of
temporal- (e.g., timing of ED onset and transition),
stakeholder- (e.g., patient ambivalence towards recovery)
and systemic- (e.g., differences between services) related
factors. Most studies were of moderate-to-high quality.
Findings informed the development of five
transition strategies designed to facilitate effective
transfers across ED care: Timely talks, Readiness,
Inclusion, Preparation, and Synergy (TRIPS).<h4>Conclusions</h4>Transitions
from CAMHS to AMHS appear problematic for young people with
EDs and other involved stakeholders. The field stands to
benefit from TRIPS, an actionable, evidence-based framework
that aims to alleviate challenges of transitioning and
subsequently improve ED trajectories. As a logical next
step, future work should empirically test the TRIPS
framework, exploring its predictive utility and clinical
value.},
Doi = {10.1186/s40337-024-00984-3},
Key = {fds376752}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds337196,
Author = {Wammes, JD and Seli, P and Smilek, D},
Title = {Mind-wandering in educational settings},
Pages = {259-272},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought: Mind-Wandering,
Creativity, and Dreaming},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780190464745},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190464745.013.15},
Abstract = {Recently, there has been a growing interest in exploring the
influence of mind- wandering on learning in educational
settings. In considering the available research on the
topic, one might draw the following conclusions: the
prevalence of unintentional mind- wandering in classroom
settings is high; mindwandering rates increase over time in
lectures; and mind- wandering interferes with learning.
Although research in the extant literature provides ample
support for these conclusions, much of this research was
conducted in the laboratory, while participants viewed
video- recorded lectures. More recently, however,
researchers have examined the effects of intentional and
unintentional mind- wandering in live- classroom settings,
and, as this chapter reveals, such research has produced
some results that are at odds with those produced in
laboratory- based studies. The chapter discusses these
recent findings in the context of the aforementioned
potential conclusions, and concludes that findings from the
laboratory do not readily generalize to real- world
educational settings.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190464745.013.15},
Key = {fds337196}
}
@misc{fds362205,
Author = {Barr, N and Beaty, R and Seli, P},
Title = {Autonomy and control across cognition: Insights from
creativity, memory, mind wandering, and reasoning
research},
Pages = {25-54},
Booktitle = {Creativity and the Wandering Mind: Spontaneous and
Controlled Cognition},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128164006},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-816400-6.00002-X},
Abstract = {Increasing amounts of behavioral and neuroscientific
evidence support a view in which creativity arises as a
result of an interaction between associative and executive
processes (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Beaty,
Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014). Although much
progress has been made in this area, the precise nature of
the interplay among different modes of thought in creative
thinking requires further specification (see Sowden,
Pringle, & Gabora, 2014). In this chapter, it is argued that
advances in this area can be facilitated by connecting
creativity research to other cognitive literatures that make
similar delineations among types of thought, but whose
evolution has progressed relatively independently.
Theoreticians in the areas of mind wandering, memory, and
reasoning have all independently argued for the utility of
distinguishing processing and thinking that is
unintentional, spontaneous, and autonomous from that which
is intentional, deliberate, and controlled (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013; Hintzman, 2011; Seli, Risko, Smilek, &
Schacter, 2016). By connecting creativity research to these
literatures, this chapter aids theoretical refinement and
integration, makes suggestions for future empirical
research, and helps to further ground the study of creation
in cognition.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-816400-6.00002-X},
Key = {fds362205}
}
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