Publications [#237852] of Attila Ambrus

Journal Articles

1. Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y; Takagi, Y, Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 94 (2013), pp. 103-115, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0167-2681 [doi]
   (last updated on 2023/03/28)

   Abstract:
   This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and determines whether the proposal is processed under open or closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee and, depending on the lobbyist's bias, both open and closed rule are used in equilibrium. For small lobbyist bias, it is optimal to choose closed rule and a committee whose interests are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist's. For intermediate lobbyist bias, closed rule remains optimal with a committee whose preferences lie between those of the legislature and those of the lobbyist. For large lobbyist bias, open rule and a committee biased against the lobbyist become optimal. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.