Publications [#237855] of Attila Ambrus

Journal Articles

1. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study, American Economic Review, vol. 102 no. 7 (December, 2012), pp. 3317-3332, American Economic Association, ISSN 0002-8282 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]
   (last updated on 2023/04/01)

   Abstract:
   This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. Copyright © 2012 by the American Economic Association.