Publications [#320210] of Attila Ambrus

Journal Articles

1. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 183 (August, 2015), pp. 27 pages
   (last updated on 2023/03/31)

   Abstract:
   In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member’s contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors’ punishment intentions more pro-social.