Publications [#287742] of Bahar Leventoglu

Journal Articles

1. Tarar, A; Leventoǧlu, B, Public commitment in crisis bargaining, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53 no. 3 (September, 2009), pp. 817-839, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0020-8833 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]
   (last updated on 2025/04/03)

   Abstract:
   The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in a complete-information setting in which they have no signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big concessions, and compromise is still possible in equilibrium. © 2009 International Studies Association.