Publications [#239009] of Curtis R. Taylor

Journal Articles

1. Jeitschko, TD; Taylor, CR, Local discouragement and global collapse: A theory of coordination avalanches, American Economic Review, vol. 91 no. 1 (January, 2001), pp. 208-224, American Economic Association [repository], [doi]
   (last updated on 2026/01/17)

   Abstract:
   We study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity. Eventually, players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive. This prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population stops. Coordination avalanches are part of Pareto-efficient equilibria; they can occur at any point in the game; their occurrence does not depend on the true state of nature; and allowing players to exchange information may merely hasten their onset. We present applications to search markets, organizational meltdown, and inefficient computer upgrades.