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| Publications [#324697] of Curtis R. Taylor
Chapters in Books
- Taylor, CR; Yildirim, H, Re-examining Voter Turnout in Large Elections
(May, 2005) [pdf]
(last updated on 2024/04/24)
Abstract:
A well-known shortcoming of rational voter
models is that the equilibrium probability
that an individual votes converges to zero
as the population of citizens tends to
infinity. We show that this does not -- as
is often suggested -- imply that equilibrium
voter turnout is insignificant in the
limit. We characterize limiting equilibrium
turnout and show that it may actually be
arbitrarily large. Indeed, expected
equilibrium turnout is shown to be closely
approximated by 1/(2*pi*b2), where b is the
lowest possible realization of an
individual's voting cost.
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