Publications [#289587] of David McAdams

Journal Articles

1. McAdams, D, On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 157 (May, 2015), pp. 959-972, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0531 [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/11/04)

   Abstract:
   Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with i.i.d. private values have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable, the resulting dynamic-bidding game generates greater expected total welfare than if bids were sealed, for any given reserve price. Making early bids observable allows high-value bidders to signal their strength and deter others from entering the auction. Nonetheless, as long as the seller can commit to a reserve price, expected revenue is higher when bids are observable than when they are sealed.