Publications [#289601] of David McAdams

Journal Articles

1. Hortaçsu, A; McAdams, D, Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions: An empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 118 no. 5 (October, 2010), pp. 833-865, University of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-3808 [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/22)

   Abstract:
   We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent. © 2010 by The University of Chicago.