Publications [#289602] of David McAdams

Journal Articles

1. McAdams, D, Performance and turnover in a stochastic partnership, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 3 no. 4 (November, 2011), pp. 107-142, American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7669 [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/19)

   Abstract:
   Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of "survivorship bias" and "honeymoon".