| Publications [#311134] of James J. Anton
Journal Articles
- Anton, JJ; Yao, DA, Coordination in split award auctions,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107 no. 2
(January, 1992),
pp. 681-707, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]
(last updated on 2024/04/24)
Abstract: We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated. Because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices, each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split. The need to coordinate is reflected in a split pri;e that does not vary with private information. We also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner-take-all auctions. © President and Fellows of Harvard College.
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